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21. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept. Analysis and implications for Austria

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Adopted at the Madrid Summit in June 2022, the long-overdue NATO’s new Strategic Concept provides a clear set of guidelines for the Atlantic Alliance in a mid-term perspective. The war in Ukraine has provided the Allies with a powerful catalyst to reconsider NATO’s identity, core missions, as well as their vision of Russia and China. NATO’s new deterrence and defence-centric approach has already entailed a major shift in our security architecture, especially on Europe’s eastern flank. Without undermining its historical neutrality, Austria might reinterpret it in light of NATO’s “reset” and use this opportunity to reinvigorate its partnership with the Alliance.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Partnerships, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and Balkans

22. The World After Taiwan’s Fall

Author:
David Santoro, Ralph Cossa, Ian Easton, Malcolm Davis, and Matake Kamiya
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Let us start with our bottom line: a failure of the United States to come to Taiwan’s aid—politically, economically, and militarily—would devastate the Unites States’ credibility and defense commitments to its allies and partners, not just in Asia, but globally. If the United States tries but fails to prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, the impact could be equally devastating unless there is a concentrated, coordinated U.S. attempt with likeminded allies and partners to halt further Chinese aggression and eventually roll back Beijing’s ill-gotten gains. This is not a hypothetical assessment. Taiwan has been increasingly under the threat of a military takeover by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and, even today, is under attack politically, economically, psychologically, and through so-called “gray zone” military actions short of actual combat. The U.S. government, U.S. allies, and others have begun to pay attention to this problem, yet to this day, they have not sufficiently appreciated the strategic implications that such a takeover would generate. To address this problem, the Pacific Forum has conducted a multi-authored study to raise awareness in Washington, key allied capitals, and beyond about the consequences of a Chinese victory in a war over Taiwan and, more importantly, to drive them to take appropriate action to prevent it. The study, which provides six national perspectives on this question (a U.S., Australian, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and European perspective) and fed its findings and recommendations into the second round of the DTRA SI-STT-sponsored (and Pacific Forum-run) Track 2 “U.S.-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue,”[1] outlines these strategic implications in two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, China attacks Taiwan and it falls with no outside assistance from the United States or others. In the other scenario, Taiwan falls to China despite outside assistance (i.e., “a too little, too late” scenario).
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Crisis Management, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, India, Taiwan, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

23. The United States & Japan: Allied Against Disinformation

Author:
Akira Igata, Morihiro Ogasahara, and Christopher Paul
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In our 21st century information age security does not start with weapons or with the armed forces who wield them. A range of non-traditional security issues has arisen to test even the oldest and closest of alliances—including that of the United States and Japan. Disinformation is among these issues, and this paper series, carried out with the generous support of the US Embassy Tokyo, highlights the specific challenges that disinformation presents. The good news is that Japan, at least so far, is not demonstrating exceptionally high difficulties with disinformation so far. However, as the paper by Prof. Morihiro Ogasahara demonstrates, there are specific demographics and specific types of news consumers in the country who are vulnerable, and Dr. Christopher Paul’s findings indicate that Japan could very well find itself under a more sustained attack by adversaries wishing to weaken its relationship with the US in the future. We at Pacific Forum hope that these papers serve as a wakeup call for policymakers, and lead to proactive solutions not only for this alliance, but which may be modeled for US relationships throughout the region.
Topic:
Security, Alliance, Disinformation, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

24. US-Korea Relations: Nuclear New Year

Author:
Mason Richey
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol has tried to make a priority of transforming the traditional US-South Korea military alliance into a “global, comprehensive strategic alliance” with increasing ambitions beyond hard security issues on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia in general. Yoon and his foreign policy team get an “A” for vision and effort—joining the NATO Asia-Pacific Four (AP4) and releasing an Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2022 are evidence. But, like Michael Corleone trying to go legit in The Godfather III, every time they make progress getting out, they get pulled back into the Peninsula. To wit, during the first trimester of 2023 Korean Peninsula security issues again commanded disproportionate attention from Seoul and Washington. The proximate cause for this dynamic is North Korea’s mafioso-in-chief, Kim Jong Un, who started 2023 with a January 1 missile launch and kept at it throughout the winter. This, of course, followed record-breaking 2022 North Korean missile tests and demonstrations, which totaled approximately 70 launches of around 100 projectiles. Given the near-zero prospects for North Korean denuclearization and the growing arsenal at Pyongyang’s disposal, it is understandable that any South Korean president would be distracted from interests further afield. The audacious nature of Yoon’s re-focusing on South Korean security was surprising and controversial, however. On January 11, apparently fed up with perceived South Korean vulnerability to its nuclear-armed consanguine, and perhaps irritated with the Biden administration’s slow realization of this South Korean sentiment, he made a pronouncement that no democratic leader in Seoul has ever made publicly before: he stated that South Korea—which benefits from US extended nuclear deterrence—could still consider acquiring its own nuclear weapons, if “North Korean provocations continued intensifying.” This set off a diplomatic kerfuffle that resonated—on both sides of the 38th parallel, as well as in Washington and Beijing—for much of the rest of the January-April reporting period. Given the provocative nature of Yoon’s statement, the South Korean presidential office later backtracked, “clarifying” that Yoon was simply expressing his “firm commitment to defending the nation” against North Korea’s nuclear threats, and while the “worst case scenario must be taken into consideration,” “the principle of abiding by the [Nuclear] Nonproliferation Treaty holds.” In any event, Washington took notice of its anxious ally, responding with demonstrations of commitment to extended deterrence for South Korea—including a visit by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and strategic asset deployments to South Korea. All this was in addition to regular combined military exercises and naval exercises featuring US aircraft carrier strike groups. Washington also consented to more bilateral consultation with Seoul regarding the US nuclear umbrella. The saga has concluded—at least for now—with the Washington Declaration promulgated at the Biden-Yoon summit in late April. The Washington Declaration promises tightened US-South Korea extended deterrence coordination and consultation, while the leaders’ summit—in the context of Yoon’s state visit to celebrate 70 years of US-South Korea alliance relations—functioned as a renewal of Washington-Seoul ties. These ties are now perhaps as strong as they have ever been. If Pyongyang has reckoned that increased belligerence would decouple the US-South Korea alliance, it has seemingly miscalculated.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

25. US-China Effort to Set “Guardrails” Fizzles with Balloon Incident

Author:
Sourabh Gupta
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The proposed “guardrail” that Joe Biden and Xi Jinping sought to erect last fall in Bali failed to emerge in the bitter aftermath of a wayward Chinese surveillance balloon that overflew the United States and violated its sovereignty. Though Antony Blinken and Wang Yi met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference afterward, aspersions cast by each side against the other, including a series of disparaging Chinese government reports, fed the chill in ties. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy during the return leg of her US transit added to bilateral and cross-strait tensions and were met with Chinese sanctions. Issues pertaining to Taiwan, be it arms sales or a speculated Chinese invasion date of the island, remained contentious. The administration’s attempt to restart constructive economic reengagement with China, including via an important speech by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, appears to have fallen on deaf ears in Beijing. Following the Biden-Xi meeting on Nov. 14 on the sidelines of the G20 Leaders Summit in Bali, Indonesia, US-People’s Republic of China relations were transitioning to an improving track—or so it seemed. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin met with his Chinese counterpart, Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defense Ministers” Meeting-Plus meeting in Cambodia on Nov. 22. On Dec. 11-12, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink held “candid, in-depth and constructive” talks in Beijing. On Jan. 18, Secretary Yellen had a “candid, substantive, and constructive conversation” with departing Vice-Premier Liu He in Zurich ahead of the World Economic Forum in Davos. Hours before Secretary Blinken was due to board a flight to Beijing on Feb. 3, which would have been the highest-ranking contact between the two sides since the Bali meeting, the budding rapprochement came to a screeching halt.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

26. The US and Japan Build Multilateral Momentum

Author:
Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
2023 brings a renewed focus on the US-Japan partnership as a fulcrum of global and regional diplomacy. With an eye to the G7 Summit in Hiroshima in mid-May, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio began the year with visits to G7 counterparts in Europe and North America. Later in the spring, he toured Africa in an effort to gain understanding from countries of the Global South. The Joe Biden administration looks ahead to a lively economic agenda, as it hosts the APEC Summit in November on the heels of the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan laid out in detail the economic ambitions of the Biden national strategy on April 27, giving further clarity to how the administration’s foreign policy will meet the needs of the American middle class. Regional collaboration continues to expand. Both leaders will gather in Australia on May 24 as Prime Minister Anthony Albanese hosts the third in-person meeting of the leaders of the Quad. Also noteworthy in this first quarter of 2023 is the progress in ties between Japan and South Korea. Trilateral consultations began early in the Biden administration, and after the election of President Yoon Suk Yeol last spring, the groundwork for resolving the many difficulties in the bilateral relationship began. This spring, President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida revealed their progress in a set of visits to each other’s capitals. A trilateral summit is planned for the G7 Summit, which Yoon will attend as an observer. Overshadowing this active multilateral calendar is the continuing war in Ukraine. Both Kishida and Biden have visited President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in his capitol. The United States and Japan remain stalwart supporters of the Ukrainian defense effort as Ukrainians prepare for the spring counteroffensive against Russian forces. Yet questions have arisen within the US Congress over the scale and duration of military aide provided to Zelenskyy. Interestingly, there remains little doubt about the Kishida Cabinet’s support of Ukraine. While Japan does not provide lethal aid, it has joined in solidarity with European nations to contribute to the complex humanitarian relief needed by the Ukrainian people. Political choices will also shape the remainder of the year. President Biden on April 25 announced his run for a second term in the 2024 election. The Republican field of candidates begins to emerge with former UN Ambassador Nikki Haley officially declaring her candidacy on Feb. 14, and Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, while not yet official, has been the center of media attention. Former President Donald Trump has already begun his rallies, having announced his candidacy on Nov. 15. In Tokyo, talk of a national snap election continues, with the latest rumors suggesting that Kishida, coming off his party’s good showing in local elections in April, might opt for a ballot after the G7 Summit in Hiroshima.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Multilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

27. Japan and South Korea as Like-Minded Partners in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Ji-Young Lee and Andy Lim
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The last four months of 2022 saw a flurry of bilateral diplomatic activities between Japan and South Korea in both nations’ capitals and around the world. They focused on 1) North Korea, 2) the issue of wartime forced labor, and 3) the future of Seoul-Tokyo cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite mutual mistrust and the low approval ratings of Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and President Yoon Suk Yeol, both leaders had the political will to see a breakthrough in bilateral relations. Another signal came in the form of new strategy documents in which Seoul and Tokyo explained their foreign and security policy directions and goals. On Dec. 16, the Kishida government published three national security-related documents—the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Defense Buildup program. On Dec. 28, the Yoon government unveiled South Korea’s Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, its first-ever Indo-Pacific strategy. Although each document serves a somewhat different purpose, it is now possible to gauge how similarly or differently Japan and South Korea assess challenges in the international security environment, and how they plan to respond to them. Importantly, they signal the other, the United States, and the world that they acknowledge the strategic and economic importance of their partner in their vision of the future. When one considers the future of Japan-South Korea relations, what are some of the most important takeaways?
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

28. Japan-China Relations: A Period of Cold Peace?

Author:
June Teufel Dreyer
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In the sole high-level meeting in the reporting period, on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Bangkok in November, General Secretary/President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio essentially talked past each other. At an earlier ASEAN+3 meeting in Phnom Penh, Premier Li Keqiang and Kishida not only talked past each other but pointedly walked past each other. There was no resolution of major issues: the Chinese position is and remains that Taiwan is a core interest of the PRC in which Japan must not interfere. Japan counters that a Chinese invasion would be an emergency for Japan. On the islands known to the Chinese as the Diaoyu and to the Japanese as the Senkaku, Tokyo considers them an integral part of Japan on the basis of history and international law while China says the islands are part of China. On jurisdiction in the East China Sea, Japan says that demarcation should be based on the median line and that China’s efforts at unilateral development of oil and gas resources on its side of the median are illegal. Beijing does not recognize the validity of the median line. Economically, a number of Japanese industries have been decoupling from China out of concern for the integrity of their supply chains and for security reasons while others are planning to expand operations there. Both sides continued their respective defense buildups while accusing the other of military expansionism.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

29. US-Korea Relations: Everything Everywhere All At Once, Extremely Close and Incredibly Loud

Author:
Mason Richey and Rob York
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Continuing a trend from the May-August reporting period, the final reporting period of 2022 in US-Korea relations was marked by an accelerated ratcheting up of tension. In short, numerous problems reared up on the Korean Peninsula from September-December, and good solutions have been few. And not only does this describe relations between the US and North Korea, but in their own, friendly way also the situation between Washington and Seoul, whose frequent invocations of rock-solid alliance cooperation belie unease about crucial areas of partnership. Two critical issues have been increasingly affecting the US-South Korea alliance in 2022, with the September-December period no exception. First, South Korea desires ever more alliance-partner defense and security reassurance from the US in the face of a growing North Korean nuclear threat and Chinese revisionism. Yet the US has downward-trending limits on credible reassurance as North Korea masters nuclear weapons technology that threatens US extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea. The US also faces less geopolitical pressure to effusively reassure its Indo-Pacific allies—including South Korea—as China grows to menace the regional order and the US consequently faces lower risk of ally hedging or realignment.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Military
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

30. Military capabilities affected by climate change: An analysis of China, Russia and the United States

Author:
Adaja Stoetman, Dick Zandee, Ties Dams, Niels Drost, and Louise Van Schaik
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Climate change is one of the most pressing challenges of the present and the future. Rising temperatures and sea levels, as well as extreme weather events are manifestations of climate change that also influence military capabilities. Increased attention for the climate change-security nexus is visible both at the national and the international level: nationally through the incorporation of climate change in security strategies and internationally through incorporation in important strategic documents such as the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s Strategic Concept. Given its transnational nature, governments around the world have a shared responsibility to face climate change. A particular role is laid down for the global powers, China, Russia and the United States, given their position in the world. It is, however, questionable whether the global powers’ interests align. They differ in their approaches to address climate change, and even more so in their views on how it affects the armed forces. China and particularly Russia are more reluctant towards depicting climate change as a matter of international security. This is for example visible in international forums, such as the UN Security Council. In contrast, in the US, support for climate action is subject to political preferences, but climate related security risks are widely recognised within the defence establishment. This report reviews various aspects of the relationship between climate and security, with a particular focus on the military. It discusses the role of climate change in a country’s security and defence strategy and, vice versa, the changing tasks and deployment of the armed forces in response to climate change, the effects of climate change on military infrastructure, and measures to realise a greener defence sector.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, European Union, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

31. China “De-risking”: A Long Way from Political Statements to Corporate Action

Author:
Ole Spillner and Guntram Wolff
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Major Western leaders have been calling for “de-risking” from China, rather than “decoupling.” But what exactly de-risking means and how it differs from decoupling, remains unclear. It is ultimately firms, not governments, driving trade and investment relations. But firms cannot account for unidentified risks by themselves. National security risks are for governments to define. Complex supply chain externalities might entail risks to production that are also difficult for firms to account for. Furthermore, firms may bet that governments will rescue them if a worst-case scenario happens, effectively socializing risks. In the EU, Germany is particularly exposed to China risk in terms of security, macroeconomic, and political exposure.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Macroeconomics, Supply Chains, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

32. What North Korea Has Been Learning From Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Tereza Novotná
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
A year ago, in February 2022, Russia invaded its neighbor, Ukraine. Russian aggression has upended the post-war security mechanisms in Europe and made the international multilateral system, including the UN Security Council, more fragile and ineffective than ever. Even though the war in Ukraine has implications for security in Northeast Asia, many Asian nations consider it a distant issue for Europeans to solve. However, this perspective mirrors what Europe’s Asian counterparts, especially the Koreans, have faced for decades. It serves as an apt analogy for explaining the dangers of North Korea to Europe. North Korea is also watching the war closely to discern what lessons or leverage can be extracted from the unfolding conflict. This short article reflects on two lessons and three opportunities that the War in Ukraine presents to Kim Jong Un and concludes with recommendations on what the Europeans could do in the near future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Asia, and North Korea

33. Enhancing small state preparedness: Risks of foreign ownership, supply disruptions and technological dependencies

Author:
Mikael Mattlin, Shaun Breslin, Elina Sinkkonen, Liisa Kauppila, and Annika Björkdahl
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The post-Cold War liberalist view, according to which interdependences supported a virtuous cycle of mutual gains, has given way to a realist-tinged view that regards economic interdependence as a cause of insecurity and an element in conflicts. In this new environment of increasing great power competition and technological decoupling, all states are not created equal. Major states such as the United States and China can be system shapers, whereas small states tend to be system takers. Unlike smaller states, they have a greater ability to use their investment leverage, supply chain dominance and control of core technologies. For smaller states with open economies, such as Finland and Sweden, these capabilities of major powers create vulnerabilities in the form of security risks of foreign ownership, supply disruptions and critical technological dependencies. The report explores how small states can mitigate such risks. A series of innovative Delphi backcasting exercises in Finland and Sweden brought together 113 sectoral experts and generalists to ponder ways to prevent dystopian scenarios from unfolding. The target years of the scenarios extended from 2027 to 2035, encouraging ideas on both short- and longer-term solutions. Instead of aiming for a consensus of expert views, the process sought to produce a variety of effective means and measures that a small state could choose to adopt. The exercise consisted of nine scenarios, presented as comic art. The narratives on the risks of foreign ownership focused on 1) acquisitions of gaming companies gathering personal data, 2) transfers of real estate ownership in Lapland and 3) venture capital investments in emerging technology start-ups. The scenarios on supply disruptions dealt with 4) discriminatory practices limiting access to antibiotics, 5) political retaliation limiting access to water treatment components and 6) sanctions on wind power materials, components and minerals. As for high technology dependencies, the cases included 7) the maintenance of military technology, 8) the cybersecurity of health technology and 9) the supply of chemicals for research and development activities. According to the report, small states have the least leeway in navigating the risk environments created by technological dependencies, whereas the toolkits to tackle the potential dangers of foreign ownership and supply disruptions are more extensive. Although different issues and insecurities require different bespoke solutions, all the risk categories call for active mitigation efforts. Most of the suggested Finnish and Swedish expert solutions can be clustered into three alternative approaches: protectionist/interventionist, liberal and technologically oriented. Protectionist/interventionist solutions would expand the state’s powers in controlling, guiding and limiting economic activities. Key suggestions included: covering acquisitions and greenfield investments in national foreign direct investment screening screening real estate acquisitions with a wide range of countries of origin imposing country-specific limitations to real estate acquisitions screening venture capital investments in emerging technologies initiating a national security act to limit foreign control rapidly imposing country- and company-specific limitations to bids in critical industries increasing tariffs supporting domestic or EU-level production through subsidies and industrial policy friendshoring the production of critical goods expanding the scope of supply stockpiling in pharmaceuticals and water treatment components The more liberal approach towards national preparedness would focus on solving the challenges primarily through carrots instead of sticks – to avoid limiting entrepreneurial freedoms and interfering with the dynamics of the capitalist market economy. The proposed solutions included: initiating value debates to guide individuals’ choices when accepting investments formulating a national innovation strategy to boost domestic companies’ operating conditions in emerging technology fields teaching “technology literacy” to guide the use of foreign-owned products engaging all stakeholders in making decisions on foreign ownership diversifying the sources of critical goods such as antibiotics enhancing awareness of risks and making “plan Bs” in supply chain management deepening the EU’s single market to offer genuine scalability opportunities for start-ups The third, more technologically oriented approach would rely on new innovations or technical solutions to enhance small state preparedness. Key ideas included: innovating new medicines to replace antibiotics prioritising non-conventional technologies such as small modular reactors (SMRs) enhancing domestic capacity to produce key components with 3D printing researching alternative materials to replace critical chemicals developing the recycling, recovery and transportation of critical chemicals adopting geofencing and coding solutions to enhance cybersecurity designating emerging technologies as focus areas in higher education increasing the adaptability of technical solutions through standardisation These three approaches prioritise different key solutions for enhancing small state preparedness. However, they represent generic policy preferences rather than ready-made policy recommendations. Ideally, states can formulate their own pick-and-mix toolkit by combining elements from the different approaches. The complementary nature of some of the expert views was also suggested by the fact that many – even most – respondents argued for diversification as a solution to various challenges. For example, and regardless of the chosen strategy, tendering rules could be improved by placing quality over price, taking geopolitical risks into account and allowing multiple winners in contrast to the currently dominant winner-takes-it-all logic, which leads to overly concentrated supply chains. Moreover, at least minor legislative tightenings were widely proposed to be made on foreign ownership – especially with regard to that of nationals of authoritarian states. These changes were, however, typically proposed to be complemented with such balancing acts as long-term leases and incentives to develop and acquire domestic products and companies. Ultimately, by highlighting alternative approaches to small state preparedness, this report seeks to encourage democratic discussion on a broader political choice: what type of state and economy do we want in the future? It is not only their identity that guides what states do; adopted policies and means also shape state identities over time.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Supply, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Finland, Asia, Sweden, and United States of America

34. Allies Help Those Who Help Themselves: How Estonia and Japan Approach Deterrence

Author:
Yoko Iwama, Tetsuo Kotani, Sugio Takahashi, Tony Lawrence, and Henrik Praks
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Up until the blatant act of Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2022, the West had been gradually shifting its attention towards East Asia, with China seen as the primary challenge of the first half of the 21st century. The new context requires a thorough reassessment of international security architecture by all national stakeholders. This, in turn, offers Estonia and Japan the opportunity to enrich their security perspectives on common strategic threats, as well as on broader geopolitical shifts caused by Russia and China. This report introduces several aspects of these revolutionary developments, their background, and their potential implications, some of which have already been reflected in the updated strategic documents unveiled by US and Japanese defence communities. Taken together, these documents make a case for an enhanced partnership between Japan, the US, and Europe that would prepare like-minded allies to respond to any security crisis. In the eventuality of a crisis resulting in an actual military confrontation, the report compares China’s missile supremacy and Japan’s long-range standoff maritime firepower strategies by grounding this analysis in the theory of victory. Charting a more favourable course forward, the report assesses the current state of deterrence in the Baltics by detailing the key developments in regional defence posture and planning, with a clear shift towards forward defence. Centring on emerging cross-border risks posed by hybrid warfare and using Estonia as a case study for vulnerabilities, the report proposes ways to mitigate these risks by advancing the role of deterrence. The report’s recommendations are as follows: To establish a cooperative format between NATO and Indo-Pacific nations along the lines of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and Cooperation Council and open NATO’s liaison office in Japan. To create the Baltic-Japan security and defence 1.5 Track dialogue forum. To develop ties between the defence intelligence services of Estonia and Japan in order to better understand the threats posed by Russia and China. To facilitate networking in the fields of concept development, capability planning, doctrine, and military education to address the challenges of multi-domain operations. To explore possibilities for closer defence industrial cooperation and technology sharing between Estonia and Japan in cyber security, artificial intelligence, sensorics, robotics, and electronic warfare. To engage Estonia’s knowledge and experience when adopting NATO’s standards and practices in Japan’s future capability development in pursuit of interoperability. To hold joint exercises in integrated air and missile defence, coastal defence, critical undersea infrastructure protection, etc. As Japan seeks to forge closer defence relations with Europe and European nations and enhance their defence ties with the democracies in the Indo-Pacific area, the need to understand better how cooperation between Estonia and Japan contributes to the emerging Euro-Pacific deterrence agenda will persist.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and Estonia

35. How Russia Went to War: The Kremlin’s Preparations for Its Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu, Mykola Nazarov, Keir Giles, and Matthew Johnson
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This report examines Russia’s preparations for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: domestically, in Ukraine itself, in the global information domain, and in building its relationship with China. For Russia, crushing Ukraine’s quest for democracy was central to meeting its objectives of reshaping the post-Cold War order in Europe and globally, restoring its own status, and reconstituting the Russian empire and Russian world. Its preparations in the political and informational, military, and economic domains for a full-scale war in Ukraine were too extensive and overt to go unnoticed, but they were not acted upon. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the evidence went against the dominant narrative in the West and was simply brushed aside. In the political and informational domains, Russia’s domestic preparations including cementing the regime’s authority, and taking advantage of the population’s Soviet nostalgia and aspirations for the restoration of the Russian world and the empire. Limited economic preparations were intended to safeguard Russia’s economy against current and future Western sanctions, while Russia’s extensive military preparations involved large-scale defence spending and extensive military modernisation efforts. Russia’s preparations beyond its own territory included: a campaign within Ukraine to divide society and discredit the democratically elected leadership; a campaign directed at the rest of the world about Ukraine, discrediting the country and its people as an object of sympathy and support in their resistance against Russia; and a campaign of intimidation designed to instil in western leaders and populations a fear of obstructing, impeding, or offending Russia. Russia also worked to build a relationship with China. China’s support is essential to Putin’s ambitions. But equally, China’s strategy for confronting the United States – which China cannot do alone – depends on Russia remaining at least a quasi-great power.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Development, Sanctions, Military Affairs, European Union, Resilience, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

36. Australia and India’s New Military Bases: Responses to China’s Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean

Author:
Felix K. Chang
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Australia and India have built and expanded military bases in and around the Indian Ocean in anticipation of a larger Chinese naval presence in its waters. Most of the construction has focused on creating the capacity to monitor the three main passages into the ocean through the Indonesian archipelago, namely the Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda Straits. India has established two new naval air stations in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and boosted its maritime patrol forces at others nearby. Australia is working to establish a military base in the Cocos (Keeling) Islands and is beefing up its Stirling naval base near Perth to support and sustain nuclear-powered attack submarines.
Topic:
Security, Navy, Military, and Military Bases
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

37. Naval Incident Management in Europe, East Asia and South East Asia

Author:
Ian Anthony, Fei Su, and Lora Saalman
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Unprecedented global turbulence in 2022 has demonstrated the need to pay increased attention to naval operations. Enhanced military capability allows naval power projection far beyond home waters. New threats and challenges are emerging from technological advances and new applications, not least the vulnerability of warships and naval facilities to cyber intrusions and cyberattacks. As states implement the programmes they need to protect and promote their interests at sea, there is also likely to be an increase in the number of close tracking incidents. How effective current risk reduction mechanisms will be at dealing with incidents at sea is unclear. This Insights Paper provides a preliminary assessment of the existing mechanisms and suggests areas for further improvement.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Navy, Crisis Management, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe, East Asia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

38. Moving to an Offshore Balancing Strategy for East Asia

Author:
Peter Harris
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Those calling for Washington to expand U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific have misread the regional security environment. The United States can reduce its military footprint in East Asia without jeopardizing its national security or the stability of the region. China is not poised to dominate East Asia or any other part of the Indo-Pacific region. While the distribution of power in East Asia has shifted in favor of Beijing, it does not follow that China constitutes a major threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of all neighboring states. Regional powers can deter China from launching wars of aggression by investing in the right kinds of defensive weaponry to capitalize on geographic advantages. The United States should play the role of an “offshore balancer” by helping China’s neighbors to become more resilient to coercion from Beijing. The leaders of several prominent states in East Asia are anxious to avoid a “cold war” between the United States and China. Washington should heed their calls for restraint. Pushing these governments to choose a side in the U.S.-China rivalry would needlessly antagonize them. The issue of Taiwanese security presents a special challenge for the United States and its allies. Taiwan has the most to lose from China’s rise and perceives U.S. military support as essential to its survival as a de facto independent entity. However, the United States can retrench from East Asia without “abandoning” Taiwan to China. Peace in East Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific does not depend upon the United States enjoying primacy in the region. On the contrary, the pursuit of U.S. military primacy in the Western Pacific will make it more difficult to maintain regional security and promote economic prosperity over the long term.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Deterrence, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, and United States of America

39. Atomic Strait: How China’s Nuclear Buildup Shapes Security Dynamics with Taiwan and the United States

Author:
Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report examines the intersection of China’s nuclear modernization and cross-Strait tensions, especially how they might play out during a crisis, contingency, or conflict involving China, Taiwan, and the United States. Beijing is rapidly modernizing its nuclear arsenal to make it larger and more sophisticated. Changes include an increase in warhead numbers from more than 400 today to potentially 700 by 2027 and more beyond, consolidating a nuclear triad, developing new delivery systems, and digging at least 300 new missile silos. Some factors still could constrain the growth of China’s arsenal or the policies that shape the way Chinese leaders employ it. They range from fissile material stocks to competing military spending priorities, considerations about China’s international reputation, and upholding Beijing’s claimed No First Use policy. But nearly all those constraining factors either already have weakened or could do so in the near future. China’s expanding nuclear arsenal suggests that the force will be designed to fulfill new missions. Some part of Beijing’s buildup surely is meant to bolster its second-strike retaliatory capability in the face of what China perceives as shifts in U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities and policies. China’s long-term goal for the expansion, however, could be more ambitious and potentially even include seeking to build an arsenal on par with Washington’s and Moscow’s. Meanwhile, China continues to ramp up pressure on Taiwan using political, economic, and military tools. Beijing’s campaign could provoke more crises in the coming years. The three major roles that nuclear weapons could play for China when dealing with cross-Strait crises or conflicts are: to shield China from U.S. nuclear coercion, to threaten Chinese nuclear use to try to forestall U.S. intervention, and to conduct a limited Chinese nuclear detonation in an attempt to force U.S. and Taiwanese capitulation. The report concludes with recommendations for U.S. policymakers. It calls for carrying out U.S. nuclear modernization plans to deter China but avoiding nuclear arms racing as a strategy in itself. It recommends incorporating nuclear elements into contingency planning and scenario exercises related to Taiwan, both unilaterally and with allies and partners. The report then calls for improving Taiwan’s conventional military capabilities while maintaining a consistent U.S. policy on cross-Strait issues and ensuring Taiwan forgoes pursuing indigenous nuclear weapons. Finally, the report argues in favor of pushing forward tough-minded bilateral engagement with Beijing on strategic stability and security issues while crafting a multilateral arms control strategy that builds coalitions to incentivize China to join and impose costs on Beijing if it opts to stay outside of key agreements.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

40. Avoiding the Brink: Escalation Management in a War to Defend Taiwan

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States is entering an unprecedented multipolar nuclear era that is far more complex and challenging than that of the Cold War. This report examines potential triggers, thresholds, and targets for Chinese nuclear use as well as options for the United States and its allies and partners to avoid and manage escalation. It uses the results of two exploratory tabletop exercises (TTXs) focused on how China’s expanding nuclear arsenal could impact the risk of nuclear escalation in a conventional conflict over Taiwan. From these two TTXs, the authors derived tentative insights into how nuclear escalation in a war over Taiwan might unfold and identified areas where further research is needed. First, the expansions and improvements projected for China’s nuclear forces will provide it with a wider range of coercive options. With a secure second-strike capability and more diverse theater nuclear options, China may be willing to brandish its nuclear weapons to attempt to deter the United States from entering a war. There are few incentives to conduct nuclear strikes early in such a conflict, but a war over Taiwan might well lead to a protracted war between the great powers—another area where more study will be critical. The authors also found that American policymakers today might not find the PRC’s nuclear threats credible because of its smaller arsenal size and historic policy of no first use (NFU). Furthermore, the authors found that attempts to degrade key conventional capabilities might lead either side to cross the other’s red lines, setting off an escalatory spiral and transforming a regional conflict into a great-power war. Both the United States and China will have to weigh the value of eliminating certain targets with the risk of crossing an adversary red line. Last, the authors found an asymmetry between the targets available to the United States and China in a Taiwan contingency. With fewer categories of targets to strike and types of capabilities with which to strike them, the United States may have fewer options to manage escalation. All these findings merit further study. The two TTXs, conducted in summer 2022, pitted a U.S. Blue team against a Chinese Red team in a war over Taiwan. The two wargames were designed as a controlled comparison to focus on the impact of one specific variable—the size and composition of the PLA’s nuclear arsenal—on the Red team’s decision-making and its propensity to deliberately escalate and on the Blue team’s ability to defend its allies and partners while managing escalation. By holding most other factors constant but changing Red’s nuclear force structure, the authors aimed to concentrate on the role that nuclear weapons played. In TTX 1, the players had a notional 2027 order of battle with a nuclear arsenal of about 700 warheads, diverse in yield and delivery system type and range. The second TTX, set in 2030, included a similarly diverse Red arsenal of over 1,000 nuclear warheads. After analyzing the results of both exercises, the authors contextualized and expanded the findings through research on existing literature on nuclear deterrence and escalation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America