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61. Adapting the U.S.-South Korea Alliance to an Indo-Pacific Regional Architecture: Challenges and Prospects

Author:
Andrew Yeo
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper addresses the U.S.-South Korea alliance in the context of Asia’s evolving security architecture. At the crux of the issue is the Biden administration’s desire to uphold the rules-based international order by reinforcing the network of inter-Asia alliances and multilateral institutions, on one hand, and the Moon government’s relative reluctance to deepen and expand security ties linked to an Indo-Pacific strategy that counter-balances China, on the other hand. Leveraging the existing alliance relationship, the Biden administration should encourage Seoul to coordinate with other like-minded countries committed to sustaining a rules-based regional order while assisting Seoul in mitigating potential strategic vulnerabilities. Conversely, as a middle power, South Korea must not shy away from the region’s security architecture, but instead actively coordinate with other actors in shaping the region’s strategic environment. By working in concert with other countries in the Indo-Pacific, Seoul can reduce its geopolitical vulnerability while advancing its national and regional interests.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

62. Advancing South Korea-Southeast Asia Security Ties: Between Opportunities and Challenges

Author:
Prashanth Parameswaran
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s New Southern Policy (NSP)—the most recent effort by Seoul to boost relations with Southeast Asian countries and India and diversify its relationships beyond four major powers: China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Yet, at the same time, less of a focus has been placed on how to advance the security aspect of the NSP despite some of the inroads that have been made, as well as the underlying convergences of concerns and interests between South Korea and the countries of Southeast Asia. This paper addresses this gap by providing insights into South Korea’s security ties with Southeast Asia, based on a close analysis of South Korean and Southeast Asian accounts as well as conversations with officials and scholars on both sides. It makes three arguments. First, while South Korea’s efforts to advance security ties with Southeast Asian states as well as with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a bloc may have been met with mixed results so far, the inroads made still deserve attention and are rooted in several domestic, regional, and global drivers. Second, though these security ties create opportunities for Seoul’s relations with ASEAN countries, they also pose challenges that should not be ignored. Third and finally, advancing security relations between South Korea and Southeast Asian countries will require actions not just on the part of Seoul or ASEAN nations, but also other actors.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Southeast Asia

63. 2021 Report on American Attitudes towards the U.S.-ROK Alliance and North Korea Policy

Author:
Troy Stangarone and Juni Kim
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
KEI’s 2021 Report on American Attitudes on the U.S.-ROK Alliance and North Korea Policy summarizes results from a survey commissioned by KEI and conducted by YouGov on May 6th to May 10th, 2021 in advance of the U.S.-ROK summit on May 21st, 2021. The survey asked Americans their views on the U.S.-South Korea relationship, North Korea policy, and the U.S.’ role in the East Asian region.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

64. Abe Shinzo: Diplomat-in-Chief

Author:
Yuki Tatsumi
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Abe Shinzo is the longest-serving prime minister in post-World War II Japan. Having occupied the office since December 2012, Abe has attempted to leverage his stable tenure to increase Japan’s international presence. In particular, Abe has tried to reshape the way Japan conducts its foreign policy, from being responsive to proactive. “A proactive contribution to peace with international principle” or chikyushugi o fukansuru gaiko (diplomacy that takes a panoramic view of the world map) symbolizes his government’s approach, part of an earnest attempt to remain relevant on the international scene even as the country grapples with irreversible trends including population decline and aging.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

65. The Silence of non-Western International Relations Theory as a Camouflage Strategy: The Trauma of Qing China and the Late Ottoman Empire

Author:
Hayriye Asena Demirer
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
My main argument in this article is that there have been at least three important barriers to the development of non-Western international relations theory (NWIRT): intellectual barriers (traumatizing effects of the imposition of the “standard of civilization”); ideational barriers (dominance of Western concepts and contexts); and scientific barriers (imposition of the standard of science). I argue that the silence of NWIRT is substantially a side effect of the strategy of mimicking the West, which was developed as an intellectual defense mechanism or as a camouflage strategy for the (re)establishment and the survival of non-Western states after their traumatic encounter with the Western states. Therefore, the surfacing of NWIRT discussions in the last decades can be attributed primarily to the maturation of an internal condition that is the revival of self-confidence in the residuals of former empires due to their regaining of rising power status and, thus, can be seen as a new phase of the ‘revolt against the West.’ On the other hand, I argue that the rise of NWIRT discussions are also related to the ripening of an external condition: some European schools of IR have been attempting to intellectually balance against the hegemony of American mainstream IRT, therefore, publication of edited books and special issues on NWIRT can also be read as searching for intellectual alliance with NWIRT.
Topic:
International Relations, Trauma, Civilization, and Ottoman Empire
Political Geography:
China, Turkey, Middle East, and Asia

66. Answering Beijing’s Growing Assertiveness beyond the Senkakus: Balancing Japan-China Relations

Author:
Valerie Niquet
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
To Japanese authorities, there is no such thing as the “Senkaku question”. China is pursuing with increased assertiveness a strategy of coercion, using ambiguity and “grey zone” operations to put the onus of potential escalation on Tokyo.1 The vague and ambiguous nature of this strategic power play makes it all the more dangerous and complex. When Tokyo proclaims, with reason, that “the government continues to control and administer the territory by such means as patrolling and law enforcement,” it seeks to answer the permanent pressure that China exerts in the zone.2 However, the maintenance of the status quo, when China exerts an almost continuous pressure in the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands and Japanese fishermen do not have access to part of Japan’s own national territory, poses other types of problems that the People’s Republic of China tries to exploit at the service of broader ambitions. It also poses a challenge in crisis management: how can the Japanese government be active and in control of situational developments, and not just reactive, without going as far as sparking a major incident in the East China Sea?
Topic:
International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

67. Can China Practice Major Power Diplomacy in the Middle East?

Author:
Masaaki Yatsuzuka
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
There is no question that China's presence in the Middle East is growing significantly. Will China continue to deepen its involvement in the region and play a role in shaping the regional order, taking the place of the United States? In other words, will China practice major power diplomacy in the Middle East? The view among researchers in China and elsewhere1 over this question is divided. To categorize their arguments into two camps, there is a cautious engagement theory that warns against the risk of getting caught up in the turmoil in the Middle East and recommends (or predicts) that China protect its economic interests while maintaining political neutrality vis-à-vis the Middle East as it has done so far. On the other hand, there is an active engagement theory advocating (or foreseeing) that China deepen its engagement, proactively participate based on the responsibility of a major world power in solving problems in the Middle East, and actively propose its own ideas in order to protect Chinese interests in the Middle East.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and Asia

68. U.S. Trade Policy toward China: Learning the Right Lessons

Author:
Scott Lincicome
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Cato Journal
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Labor market and cultural disruptions in the United States are real and important, as is China’s current and unfortunate turn toward illiberalism and empire. But pretending today that there was a better trade policy choice in 2000—when Congress granted China “permanent normal trade relations” (PNTR) status and paved the way for broader engagement—is misguided. It assumes too much, ignores too much, and demands too much. Worse, it could lead to truly bad governance: increasing U.S. protectionism; forgiving the real and important failures of our policymakers, CEOs, and unions over the last two decades; and preventing a political consensus for real policy solutions. Indeed, that is happening now.
Topic:
International Relations, Economics, Markets, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Protectionism
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

69. Hun Sen's Mistake? The Domestic Political Ramifications of His Chinese Shelter

Author:
Charles Dunst
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s close relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has led scholars and policymakers alike to suggest that Beijing’s backing will keep him in power. While Hun Sen himself seems to believe this to be true, his reliance on China is actually enflaming Cambodian discontent to such an extent that his planned patrimonial succession is at risk. Given the fragility of regimes mid-succession, Hun Sen’s Chinese shelter is augmenting the potential of his clan’s fall. Yet as Hun Sen faces increased domestic opposition, he will only further deepen ties with China in hopes of remaining in power, thereby creating a vicious cycle from which escaping will prove difficult.
Topic:
International Relations, Power Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Cambodia, and Southeast Asia

70. A Principled Middle Power Diplomacy Approach For South Korea to Navigate the U.S.-China Rivalry

Author:
Saeme Kim
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In the context of growing US-China tensions, South Korean administrations have opted for degrees of strategic ambiguity, refraining from overt actions that suggest South Korea is taking sides. While strategic ambiguity has been moderately successful, there are limits to this approach which make it unsustainable. This paper will argue that rather, South Korea needs to apply a principled middle power diplomacy, which refers to a middle power carrying out roles expected of it in accordance with a set of rules or values that uphold the liberal international order. The goal of principled middle power diplomacy would be to shape the environment in which the current great power rivalry is unfolding, in order to moderate the fallout of great power competition. After an analysis of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy, this paper will recommend that South Korea double down on its commitment to multilateralism so that it can augment its roles as a facilitator and agenda-setter on the international stage.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Multilateralism, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

71. South Korea as a Fourth Industrial Revolution Middle Power?

Author:
Dongwoo Kim
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper proposes a framework for conceptualizing middle powerism in the context of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, using South Korea as an example. The paper argues that the systemic transformation of the Fourth Industrial Revolution has created new openings for middle powerism, and proposes 1) technology, 2) networks, and 3) governance as factors that could enable it. Then, South Korea’s capacities in each of these three areas, potential barriers, and ultimately Seoul’s capacity to act as a “Fourth Industrial Revolution” middle power are evaluated.
Topic:
International Relations, Economics, Science and Technology, Governance, Industrialization, and Middle Power
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

72. Between a Rock and a Hard Place: How Should South Korea Manage its Relations with the United States and China?

Author:
Zhiqun Zhu
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper deals with one of the most critical issues in contemporary international relations: how China’s rise challenges foreign policies of U.S. allies, with a focus on the Republic of Korea (ROK) or South Korea. South Korea has been carefully hedging between the United States and China, its traditional security patron and largest trade partner, respectively. Strategic rivalry between the two great powers has put South Korea in an awkward position as pressure grows from the two powers to pick a side. Using a modified dual-track economics-security nexus framework, this paper suggests that the United States and China each has a significant impact on South Korea’s security and economic policies, making it important but challenging for South Korea to simultaneously manage relations with the two great powers. So far, South Korea has maintained these two sets of relationships remarkably well, but it may be difficult to continue with business as usual in the years ahead. For its own national interests, South Korea must seek to preserve the status quo under which it can continue to benefit from good relations with both great powers. The paper also proposes that South Korea should form a “middle power coalition” with like-minded nations to deflect pressures and avoid the dilemma of having to choose sides.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Alliance, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

73. The Sino–U.S. National Identity Gap and Bilateral Relations

Author:
Danielle Cohen
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The national identity gap between China and the United States has become increasingly apparent. Under Xi Jinping, China has sought to reclaim its historical greatness and proclaimed itself to be a responsible great power that offers a credible alternative to Western values, while also promoting increasingly authoritarian policies at home, complete with extensive repression in Xinjiang and renewed state control of the economy. Assertions of U.S. national identity were somewhat muted under Donald Trump, confused by the battle between those who supported the administration’s “America First” policy, its transactional approach to foreign affairs, and its deemphasis on human rights and democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy, and those who worried about the global repercussions of an isolationist, nativist policy. For a time, the United States seemed more preoccupied with its trade war with China than with claims that the United States should act as the global protector of human rights and democracy. The COVID-19 pandemic further complicated already tense Sino–U.S. relations and called both countries’ national identities into question. While China had, as of spring 2021, succeeded in keeping its COVID-19 outbreak remarkably small, the damage caused by its initial suppression of medical reports, along with successful virus mitigation in a number of non-authoritarian states, called into question its claim to be a responsible world power on the basis of its pandemic performance. Meanwhile, the Trump administration failed to protect U.S. citizens from catastrophic death tolls and prevented the United States from taking a leading role in resolving this global crisis. In January 2021, the Biden administration took office with a focus on swiftly ending the pandemic, while also reasserting the traditional U.S. global leadership role. When combined with its assessment of U.S. power after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and of U.S. domestic social and political instability evident throughout 2020-2021, the pandemic has strengthened China’s perceptions of the United States as a country in decline, and of China as a “risen” great power that should now play a major role in shaping the global order. At the same time, although U.S. policy towards China remains firm despite the presidential transition, the underlying rationale has shifted from the “America First” approach of the Trump administration to the democratic values-infused approach of the Biden administration. As the world struggles to move beyond the pandemic, the national identities of China and the United States are increasingly defined in opposition to each other and seem likely to drive an ever more challenging bilateral relationship in the coming years.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Culture, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

74. The Pandemic as a Geopolitical Game Changer in the Indo-Pacific: The View from Japan

Author:
Glen S. Fukushima
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The coronavirus pandemic that struck in late 2019 has affected the world profoundly, and Japan is no exception. But the direct impact on Japan has been relatively small considering the number of cases of infections and deaths relative to the size of Japan’s population, particularly considering its elderly population and high density. For instance, among the G7 countries, Japan has had the fewest cases of infections (4,690 per million population as of May 2, 2021) compared to 32,276 in Canada, 40,620 in Germany, 64,804 in the United Kingdom, 66,828 in Italy, 86,283 in France, and 99,652 in the United States. Similarly, among the G7 countries, Japan has had by far the fewest number of deaths (81 per million population as of May 2, 2021) compared to 638 in Canada, 996 in Germany, 1,601 in France, 1,776 in the United States, 1,870 in the United Kingdom, and 2,004 in Italy. This chapter argues that although the direct disruptions to Japan resulting from the pandemic have been less than to the other G7 countries, the effect of the pandemic on other nations with strong geopolitical importance to Japan—in particular, the United States and China—coupled with changes in Japan’s domestic political and economic environment have accelerated changes in geopolitical posture and direction that were already in progress in Japan. The fundamental geopolitical challenge facing Japan is how to ensure its military security, political independence, and economic prosperity in the face of a less reliable and less predictable United States and a more powerful and more assertive China. For Japan, the ideal resolution of this challenge is to maintain positive and constructive relations with both countries, while recognizing the reality that even as economic ties with China—whether in trade, investment, finance, tourism, or the exchange of people—are growing relative to ties with the United States, political and security ties (and the sharing of common values) with the United States remain the centerpiece of Japan’s foreign policy. Given this context, it is only natural that Japan would seek to diversify and strengthen its relationships with other countries, regions, economic arrangements, and international organizations and institutions. This diversification, which could be seen since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, has gained momentum in recent years, and the pandemic has served only to accelerate it. The analysis proceeds through the examination of the following: 1) pandemic chronology; 2) Japan’s domestic politics; 3) relations with the United States; 4) relations with China; 5) Japan’s diversification strategy; and 6) conclusions.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

75. How COVID-19 Has Affected the Geopolitics of Korea

Author:
Jung-Yeop Woo
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
COVID-19 has not gone away, and observers are now discussing possible long-term effects of the pandemic, including on geopolitics. A report by the European Parliament discussed five COVID-generated factors that could impact the geopolitical environment, i.e., supply chains, health multilateralism, digital diplomacy, climate change, and democratic activism. It predicted a reshuffling of value chains, where cooperation within the same “bloc” would be strengthened, while states continue their reshoring efforts, consequently shifting the current geopolitical environment. The report pointed out that the pandemic necessitated thorough scientific cooperation and information sharing beyond the level that the WHO had initially offered, suggesting changes in patterns of behavior, as in adapting to digital platforms while opening opportunities for nations to counter climate change and strengthen their geopolitical positions. Moreover, it also looked at the number of protests resulting from the pandemic and its economic effects and suggested that such pressure would encourage governments to mollify inequality. Missing is optimism that countries will be stirred to pursue common interests. Missing too is the geopolitical fallout from acutely worsening Sino-U.S. relations, as in South Korea, which stands at the forefront of states facing pressure from both sides. With the unforeseen disruption in both global and domestic economies, much attention has been paid to the effect of COVID-19 on the economic side rather than the political side, perhaps because many did not expect that the pandemic would last this long. However, recent disruptions are clearly rife with serious political implications, both domestically and globally. Above all, as seen from Seoul, their impact on the relationship between Beijing and Washington demonstrated how much the economic forces could spill into geopolitics. Koreans follow this impact attentively, realizing that worsening Sino-U.S. ties may reverberate on one or both powers, increasing pressure on Seoul’s efforts to sustain a precarious balance for the sake of its North Korean policy and its hope for regional stability. Many nations in the Indo-Pacific have recently struggled between the United States and China, trying to find the most advantageous equilibrium between security and economy. South Korea has uniquely stood on the frontlines, as in 2016-17 when it bowed to the U.S. and deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense targeting North Korea, which was met with strong Chinese pressure—strict economic sanctions through unofficial channels and demands to promise the “three noes” that restricted further missile defense deployment to deescalate the tension. President Biden’s new measures to bridge security and economy through multilateralism call for Seoul to choose between acceding to U.S. requests or risking China’s threats to respond aggressively—even as some anti-THAAD sanctions remain in place. President Xi Jinping’s warnings point to China’s harsh response. South Korean concerns have grown because of the relationship between the current global supply chains and geopolitics, which is a preoccupation of the Biden administration. Situated at the juncture of supply networks centering around China, South Korea’s economy is almost certain to be heavily hit. Furthermore, the pandemic brought ongoing pressures for de-globalization and de-dollarization to the forefront with major ramifications for Seoul. Much of the anxiety has focused on the geopolitics of deteriorating relations between Beijing and Washington. The former is warning Seoul against joining the Quad, agreeing to trilateralism with Japan and the U.S., and tilting the balance away from China in the Sino-U.S.-ROK triangle. Meanwhile, the Biden administration, even before it clarifies its regional strategy, is nudging Seoul in precisely the opposite direction. The year 2020 raised challenging issues for Seoul, which loom in 2021 as more severe geopolitical tests for the Moon administration. To properly gauge the effect of COVID-19 on South Korea’s geopolitics, it is crucial to understand the world before the pandemic. Has COVID-19 functioned as an independent variable in South Korean geopolitics? If there is a discernable difference, we have to see whether that difference was caused by COVID-19. This paper proceeds in four parts: 1) outlining the pre-pandemic status quo up until 2020; 2) assessing how COVID-19 affected international geopolitics; 3) examining how it influenced South Korea’s supply chain and geopolitics; and 4) analyzing ongoing discourse on South Korea’s strategic choice amid the U.S.-China rivalry. These sections are followed by brief conclusions on implications for policy choices.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

76. China, ASEAN, and the Covid-19 Pandemic

Author:
Joseph Chinyong Liow
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
For Southeast Asia, the COVID-19 pandemic was not only a public health crisis. It also provided an occasion for China to deepen its engagement in the region by dint of its own successful containment of the virus within its borders, and the resources it possessed to extend help to regional countries battling COVID-19 and its consequences, including economic, on their own shores. While Chinese help was welcomed, Southeast Asia also sought to avoid being beholden to any single external power. To that end, Southeast Asian states have actively pursued such diversification not only through efforts at reinforcing cooperation within ASEAN but also by using ASEAN as a vehicle to engage external powers. At the end of 2019, Chinese health authorities reported a cluster of pneumonia cases that had emerged in Wuhan, in the province of Hubei, which eventually led to the confirmation of a novel coronavirus. Several weeks later in January, the pandemic struck Southeast Asian shores when the first case outside of China was detected in Thailand. Within a few months, the world found itself in the grip of a global pandemic. By the end of January 2021, there were more than 100 million recorded cases of the COVID-19 infection, with over two million deaths. While the fatality rates are lower than those of previous pandemics of the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) strain, it has by far been the most infectious, prompting Singapore foreign minister Vivian Balakrishnan to opine that with the pandemic “we are facing a global life and death crisis which requires extraordinary measures.” Threats posed by pandemics are not new to Southeast Asia. In the last two decades alone, the region had been beset by several transnational health crises, of which SARS and the H5N1 Avian Flu were arguably the most lethal. What is striking about the current climate, however, is the backdrop against which the pandemic is playing out: the COVID-19 pandemic has hastened the further bifurcation of an international order that was already threatening to come undone because of the intensification of Sino-U.S. rivalry and American withdrawal from multilateralism under Donald J. Trump. Southeast Asian states found themselves increasingly compelled to reassess their relationships with external powers. Taking the present pandemic as a point of entry, this paper considers its impact on Southeast Asia’s relations with China and the U.S. The paper makes three main arguments. First, it contends that Sino-U.S. rivalry has sharpened over the COVID-19 pandemic by dint of the politicization of this public health crisis by both parties. Second, it argues that China has identified and seized upon opportunities presented by the pandemic to enhance its regional and global standing through continued support for multilateralism and economic engagement through initiatives such as the BRI, in turn creating favorable conditions for the advancement of its foreign policy interests. Conversely, because of the severe deficiencies in how the Trump administration handled the pandemic domestically, the Biden administration will have to prioritize its domestic challenges at the expense of greater bandwidth and resources for foreign policy, especially in Southeast Asia, a region that since the end of the Vietnam War has never featured prominently in Washington’s pursuit of its overseas interests. Third, it posits that while Southeast Asia has doubtless benefited from Chinese support during this crisis, the region remains skeptical of Chinese strategic intent and concerned about overreliance. States have tried to diversify relations with regional powers while strengthening cooperation within ASEAN. The paper first looks, by way of background, at how the pandemic emerged as the latest arena of Sino-U.S. rivalry. It then explores how China has handled the pandemic domestically, where its success has allowed it to expand its influence as a putative provider of “global public goods.” In the interest of brevity, the paper then focuses on ASEAN by documenting collective regional efforts and strategies to navigate great power rivalry in the realm of global public health.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, ASEAN, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

77. The Pandemic as a Geopolitical Gamechanger in the Indo-Pacific: The View from China

Author:
Yun Sun
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
How has the COVID-19 pandemic reshaped or influenced China’s geopolitical outlook and its grand strategy for the years to come? This is a question that will determine China’s relationship with the United States, the Indo-Pacific region, and the rest of the world. In the Chinese strategic community, the pandemic has been regarded as a “watershed” event that has reshaped the structure of the international system and the power equilibrium. Its importance is elevated to the same status as the end of World War II, which determined the bipolar international system between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War which began thirty years of U.S. hegemony in a unipolar world. Although China began as a sheer loser in the pandemic given its culpability in the origin of COVID and its early poor management of the domestic spread of the disease, Beijing believes that it has eventually emerged as a pure winner in the pandemic: the relative gain China has made vis-à-vis the U.S.’s bigger losses in disease control, national power, economic growth, global leadership, and credibility has strengthened Chinese confidence that the tide is turning in China’s favor. The “effectiveness” of the Chinese political system, as manifested in its domestic disease control, has reinforced China’s ideological conviction of its superiority. As China uses COVID diplomacy to demonstrate the superiority and desirability of its political system, the pandemic is perceived as an opportunity for it to shape the new international order and promote China’s desired “Community of Common Destiny.” Challenges remain, as the U.S. revamps its alliance system under the Biden administration and as regional powers and Western countries grow increasingly concerned and anxious about China’s growing confidence and capabilities. However, for China, the pandemic has been a great opportunity, and China has emerged from it as a pure winner. It is an interesting question as to how the pandemic has changed the nature and the dynamics of the great power competition between the U.S. and China. Most would agree that the pandemic exacerbated, accelerated, and aggravated the deterioration of relations that the U.S. and China had already been experiencing before 2020. However, the differences lie in the degree, intensity, velocity, and extensiveness of the damage. Without the pandemic, the downward slope U.S. and China had already been on would not have come to a state of “freefall” in 2020. And that “freefall” period has long-lasting and significant implications for their bilateral relations in the post-COVID world. The damaged trust, confidence, and credibility, and the deeply entrenched sense of hostility, or even antagonism, have made any effort to repair the relations extremely difficult, if not completely impossible. And this reality will affect the regional dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region for the many years and decades to come.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

78. Xi Jinping’s Evergrande Dilemma

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Evergrande is one of the top-two real estate developers in a still highly fragmented Chinese sector. Its main strategy is to achieve ever-increasing scale (rather than profitability) in order to move ahead of and crowd out commercial competitors. It has also amassed the largest land reserves of all Chinese developers, which were financed through massive borrowings. By 2018, Evergrande held 822 pieces of undeveloped land in 228 cities, with a planned gross floor area of 3.28 billion square feet of new homes—the equivalent of 10 percent of Germany’s entire housing stock. It paid $75 billion just for this undeveloped land. Although Evergrande’s market share is only around 4 percent, its borrowings stand out. Its current balance sheet liabilities amount to an estimated 2 percent of China’s gross domestic product (GDP), while its off-balance-sheet liabilities could be another 1 percent of China’s GDP. This makes Evergrande the most indebted property developer in the world. Burdened by this debt, struggling to meet its debt interest and repayment obligations, and viable only if property asset values and sales continue to increase, Evergrande faces possible financial collapse—an event bound to have flow-on effects for the Chinese economy. However, the unusually high global interest in Evergrande has arisen because its woes are increasingly seen as symptomatic of those faced by the broader Chinese economy, which is struggling with enormous levels of indebtedness and overreliance on the real estate sector. Debt held by nonfinancial institutions in China increased from about 115 percent of GDP in 2010 to around 160 percent of GDP currently. This is the most rapid and largest increase in a 10-year period for any major economy and makes the level of debt held by Chinese nonfinancial institutions one of the highest in the world. The real estate sector accounts for around 15 percent of GDP, while property services account for another 14 percent—the highest in any developing economy. The share of the real estate sector as a proportion of GDP was only about 4 percent in 1997 and 9 percent in 2008. Since 2008, up to a third of all domestic fixed investment has gone into real estate, and up to half of total national debt is linked to the real estate sector.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Debt, Economics, Markets, and Business
Political Geography:
China and Asia

79. A Strategic US Approach to India’s COVID-19 Crisis

Author:
Husain Haqqani and Aparna Pande
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The recent surge of COVID-19 in South Asia challenges India’s traditional ability to aid its smaller neighbors, a change that could, in turn, affect India’s influence in its competition with China. Unless India can recover from this surge with the help of allies like the United States, the pandemic could impact the Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical balance. In the past, India has often acted as a first responder across South Asia, helping other countries recover from natural disasters, and it initially occupied this role during the first months of the coronavirus pandemic, when it helped several South Asian and Indian Ocean region countries cope with the effects of the disease. India’s role as ‘first responder’ has been a key factor in its geopolitical power and in maintaining its role as a leader in the region. However, the resurgence of COVID-19 has jolted India at a time when democratic countries, including the United States, view India as critical to balancing China’s deepening influence cross Asia. South Asia, a region holding 23 percent of the world’s population, now accounts for over 11 percent of global COVID-19 cases and 6 percent of COVID-related deaths. The world’s largest democracy and second-most populous country, India alone currently accounts for over 84 percent of South Asia’s cases and deaths. For most of 2020, it appeared that India, thanks partly to a lockdown, had managed to avert a huge health crisis. During this time, India supported its immediate South Asian neighbors by supplying personal protective equipment and medications. However, the latest COVID-19 surge has created a crisis that has strained the Indian health infrastructure’s ability to meet. With more resources being diverted towards domestic ends, India’s ability to maintain friends and influence other countries has diminished, also potentially shrinking its sphere of influence. The US must therefore go beyond dealing with its own health crisis and also support India in dealing with its crisis. Instead of allowing China to consolidate its positions in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, and the Maldives, helping India restore its ability to provide assistance would be in the best interests of the United States and its allies.
Topic:
International Relations, Health Care Policy, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, Asia, and United States of America

80. Regaining the Digital Advantage: A Demand-Focused Strategy for US Microelectronics Competitiveness

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Microprocessors are a critical element of US national infrastructure and manage the country’s energy grids, transportation systems, and telecommunications networks. Without a reliable supply of computer chips and microelectronic components, most US economic and societal activity would grind to a halt. The semiconductor manufacturing process is largely concentrated in East Asia, where manufacturers could be subjected to pressure or coercion by the People’s Republic of China. The semiconductor supply chain, and its inherent resilience and security, could be strengthened by US government investment to bring more steps of the microelectronics production and assembly process onto US shores. To guide government policies, this study proposes a four-factor framework measured from the perspective of the US microelectronics customers and industry. These factors include: resilience of continued microelectronics supplies to the US market; assurance that US microelectronics reflect their intended design and are free of security vulnerabilities; the ability of the US microelectronics industry to meet current microelectronics demand, which shapes the ecosystem; and the value added from US firms, which supports future demand.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Communications, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America