Political Geography: Asia / Topic: International Relations

51. China’s increased presence in Latin America: Win-win relations or a new dependency? A state of the art

Author:: Daniel Agramont Lechín
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Postgraduate Program on Sustainable Development and Social Inequalities in the Andean Region (trAndeS)
Abstract:: The rise of the Popular Republic of China (PRC) is one of the most significant events in contemporary international relations. However, at the global level, the “reemergence of China as a major global power has led to a considerable debate over the likely consequences for the rest of the world” (Jenkins, 2010: 810). China’s growing power raises questions as to the meaning of its superpower status as a nation, and the impact of its newfound influence in not only the Asia-Pacific region, but also the Global South (Dessein, 2015). In the specific case of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the debate centers on the potential disadvantages that China’s vast supply of financial resources might bring for the region. Accordingly, the current paper is intended to examine the debate that has arisen in recent literature around the impact of China’s increased economic presence on Latin America –with win-win relations on the one hand and new dependency on the other.
Topic:: International Relations, Economics, Investment, and Dependency
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Latin America

52. EU- Pacific talks: U.S.-Japan relations - new leaders, new chance to restore the old relationship

Author:: Inka Koutná
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:: This year’s fifth debate in a series of expert discussions on the EU’s relations with the Pacific took place online on Tuesday 15th of February. The expert guests offered their views on the potential new developments and challenges in U.S.- Japan relations with new political leadership. And future challenges with consideration for a potential multilateral relation with other European countries and countries from the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:: International Relations, European Union, Multilateralism, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: Japan, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

53. China Makes a Move in the Middle East: How Far Will Sino-Arab Strategic Rapprochement Go?

Author:: Sine Ozkarasahin
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: With a well-planned strategy and a careful exploitation of the gaps opened by U.S. foreign policy shifts, China has successfully increased its role as a strategic actor in the Middle East, including by gaining a foothold in the regional arms market. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s early December visit to Saudi Arabia, upon King Salman’s invitation, exemplifies the recent improvement in Sino-Arab ties (Xinhua, December 8). While in Saudi Arabia, Xi initiated two new multilateral forums intended to strengthen engagement between China and the Arab world: the China-Arab States Summit and the China-Gulf Cooperation Council summit (Xinhua, December 11). In addition to deepening political rapprochement between Beijing and several regional countries, China is simultaneously establishing crucial military-strategic ties with key Middle Eastern states. Chinese-made drones are already present in the arsenals of multiple Arab countries and technological cooperation between Beijing and its regional counterparts is rapidly increasing. The most striking example in this regard was the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) revocation of the F-35 deal that constrained its cooperation with the Chinese tech and telecommunications giant Huawei over 5G technology (Al Arabiya News, December 14, 2021). As many Arab countries’ doubts about Washington’s commitment to regional security grow, more and more countries are increasingly open to entreaties from China.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Rapprochement
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Asia, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

54. What now for Australia-China relations?

Author:: The University of Sydney China Studies Centre
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: After the May Federal Election, Labor Party leader Anthony Albanese was sworn in as the new Prime Minister of Australia. What could this change in government mean for future Australia-China relations? At the China Studies Centre event on 3 June, four experts and practitioners in Australia-China relations discussed the bilateral relations over the past few years and the prospects for future political, social and economic interactions.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Australia

55. Turkey’s Response to Syrian Mass Migration: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis

Author:: Zeynep Sahin Mencutek, N. Ela Gokalp Aras, and Bezen Balamir Coşkun
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: Migration studies have seldom dealt with the foreign policy dimensions of refugee migration. Additionally, international relations (IR) theories have barely addressed migration policy. The present study seeks to address this gap by analysing Turkey’s response to Syrian mass migration through the lens of neoclassical realist theory. Its purpose is to ascertain to what extent IR theories, particularly neoclassical realism, help us to understand Turkey’s policies and politics addressing Syrian mass migration and changes over time. It questions the pertinence of Turkey’s relative power and its foreign policy objectives in shaping responses to Syrian mass migration. The research also sheds much-needed light not only on dynamism in power-policy relations but also interaction between the international system and internal dynamics in designing migration policies. It aims to stimulate dialogue between IR theories and migration studies, with a particular focus on the foreign policy dimension of state responses to mass refugee migration.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Migration, and Refugees
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, and Syria

56. Tianxia (All-Under-Heaven): An Alternative System or a Rose by another Name?

Author:: Mehmet Şahin
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: Tianxia is considered as an alternative institutionalization to govern the international system. It refers to world governance that is regulated by a world institution. Accordingly, a world institution plays the harmonizer role under this system. States, on the other hand, choose their economic models and the leader organizes the relations among different units. This paper thus argues that Tianxia is an alternative framework to Western-oriented IR theories. In that sense, this article aims to explore the similarities between the philosophical idea of Tianxia and Western-oriented IR Theory. More specifically, the article explores the issue from the international system perspective. The epistemological gaps and ontological similarities between the two frameworks will be demonstrated.
Topic:: International Relations, Governance, International Relations Theory, and International System
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Global Focus

57. The Belt and Road Initiative and the Internationalisation of China's Scientific Power: The Case of Italy

Author:: Lorenzo Mariani
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: What are the elements and the impact of the inclusion of scientific cooperation within the 2019 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in support of the Belt and Road Initiative between Italy and China? Like many other developed countries, Italy has played a role in contributing to China’s growth as a science and technology (S&T) power. Most S&T bilateral collaborations are decade-long and predate the MoU, suggesting that the importance of the latter is largely symbolic. Nonetheless, the MoU of March 2019 has reinforced the process of centralisation of S&T collaborations as well as a public debate that has grown to include matters regarding 5G technology and public procurement involving Chinese technology. Paper prepared in the framework of the IAI project “When Italy Embraces the BRI”.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, and Research
Political Geography:: Asia and Italy

58. The Impact of the Repression in Xinjiang on China’s Relations with Other Countries

Author:: Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The policy of repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang has become a significant element of criticism of China in the world. In March this year, the EU, U.S., Canada, and the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on China over the matter. Moreover, the Netherlands, the U.S. and Canada described China’s actions as genocide. For China, however, its actions involving Uyghurs are a key element of domestic politics, which is why it presents accusations as disinformation. It has imposed counter sanctions, including on the EU, and their wide scope indicates that for China, Xinjiang is more important than, for example, the ratification of the Comprehensive Investment Agreement (CAI) with the EU.
Topic:: International Relations, Genocide, Human Rights, European Union, and Uyghurs
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, Europe, Canada, Asia, Netherlands, United States of America, and Xinjiang

59. The Vision Group on U.S.-ROK Relations: Insights and Recommendations

Author:: KEI
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI), with the generous support of the Korea Foundation, organized six “Vision Group” roundtable conversations with leading American scholars and commentators to discuss the United States’ relationship with the Republic of Korea. The first was held in December 2019, the last in November 2020. The intent was to consider the future of relations during a time of change. The Vision Group comprised a wide range of expertise and opinion. This record conveys some of the insights and recommendations that arose during the conversations.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Human Rights
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

60. Limits of Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Lessons from the THAAD Dispute for South Korea's Foreign Policy

Author:: Maximilian Ernst
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This paper examines South Korea’s foreign policy towards China before, during, and after the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense dispute to investigate the limits of South Korea’s public diplomacy and soft power. South Korea’s official public diplomacy has the objective to “gain global support for Korea’s policies,” following Joseph Nye’s narrow definition of soft power. South Korea furthermore ranks high in the most relevant soft power indices. Based on the case of Chinese economic retaliation against South Korea in response to THAAD deployment, this paper argues that public diplomacy and soft power only work in the absence of traditional security contentions, but fail in the presence of such security contentions. The THAAD case also demonstrates the utility of traditional diplomacy, based on high-level summits and negotiations, to solve the very disputes that South Korea’s latent public diplomacy and soft power were unable to alleviate.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Weapons
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and Korea

61. Adapting the U.S.-South Korea Alliance to an Indo-Pacific Regional Architecture: Challenges and Prospects

Author:: Andrew Yeo
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This paper addresses the U.S.-South Korea alliance in the context of Asia’s evolving security architecture. At the crux of the issue is the Biden administration’s desire to uphold the rules-based international order by reinforcing the network of inter-Asia alliances and multilateral institutions, on one hand, and the Moon government’s relative reluctance to deepen and expand security ties linked to an Indo-Pacific strategy that counter-balances China, on the other hand. Leveraging the existing alliance relationship, the Biden administration should encourage Seoul to coordinate with other like-minded countries committed to sustaining a rules-based regional order while assisting Seoul in mitigating potential strategic vulnerabilities. Conversely, as a middle power, South Korea must not shy away from the region’s security architecture, but instead actively coordinate with other actors in shaping the region’s strategic environment. By working in concert with other countries in the Indo-Pacific, Seoul can reduce its geopolitical vulnerability while advancing its national and regional interests.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

62. Advancing South Korea-Southeast Asia Security Ties: Between Opportunities and Challenges

Author:: Prashanth Parameswaran
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s New Southern Policy (NSP)—the most recent effort by Seoul to boost relations with Southeast Asian countries and India and diversify its relationships beyond four major powers: China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Yet, at the same time, less of a focus has been placed on how to advance the security aspect of the NSP despite some of the inroads that have been made, as well as the underlying convergences of concerns and interests between South Korea and the countries of Southeast Asia. This paper addresses this gap by providing insights into South Korea’s security ties with Southeast Asia, based on a close analysis of South Korean and Southeast Asian accounts as well as conversations with officials and scholars on both sides. It makes three arguments. First, while South Korea’s efforts to advance security ties with Southeast Asian states as well as with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a bloc may have been met with mixed results so far, the inroads made still deserve attention and are rooted in several domestic, regional, and global drivers. Second, though these security ties create opportunities for Seoul’s relations with ASEAN countries, they also pose challenges that should not be ignored. Third and finally, advancing security relations between South Korea and Southeast Asian countries will require actions not just on the part of Seoul or ASEAN nations, but also other actors.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and Southeast Asia

63. 2021 Report on American Attitudes towards the U.S.-ROK Alliance and North Korea Policy

Author:: Troy Stangarone and Juni Kim
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: KEI’s 2021 Report on American Attitudes on the U.S.-ROK Alliance and North Korea Policy summarizes results from a survey commissioned by KEI and conducted by YouGov on May 6th to May 10th, 2021 in advance of the U.S.-ROK summit on May 21st, 2021. The survey asked Americans their views on the U.S.-South Korea relationship, North Korea policy, and the U.S.’ role in the East Asian region.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

64. Abe Shinzo: Diplomat-in-Chief

Author:: Yuki Tatsumi
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Abe Shinzo is the longest-serving prime minister in post-World War II Japan. Having occupied the office since December 2012, Abe has attempted to leverage his stable tenure to increase Japan’s international presence. In particular, Abe has tried to reshape the way Japan conducts its foreign policy, from being responsive to proactive. “A proactive contribution to peace with international principle” or chikyushugi o fukansuru gaiko (diplomacy that takes a panoramic view of the world map) symbolizes his government’s approach, part of an earnest attempt to remain relevant on the international scene even as the country grapples with irreversible trends including population decline and aging.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

65. The Silence of non-Western International Relations Theory as a Camouflage Strategy: The Trauma of Qing China and the Late Ottoman Empire

Author:: Hayriye Asena Demirer
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: My main argument in this article is that there have been at least three important barriers to the development of non-Western international relations theory (NWIRT): intellectual barriers (traumatizing effects of the imposition of the “standard of civilization”); ideational barriers (dominance of Western concepts and contexts); and scientific barriers (imposition of the standard of science). I argue that the silence of NWIRT is substantially a side effect of the strategy of mimicking the West, which was developed as an intellectual defense mechanism or as a camouflage strategy for the (re)establishment and the survival of non-Western states after their traumatic encounter with the Western states. Therefore, the surfacing of NWIRT discussions in the last decades can be attributed primarily to the maturation of an internal condition that is the revival of self-confidence in the residuals of former empires due to their regaining of rising power status and, thus, can be seen as a new phase of the ‘revolt against the West.’ On the other hand, I argue that the rise of NWIRT discussions are also related to the ripening of an external condition: some European schools of IR have been attempting to intellectually balance against the hegemony of American mainstream IRT, therefore, publication of edited books and special issues on NWIRT can also be read as searching for intellectual alliance with NWIRT.
Topic:: International Relations, Trauma, Civilization, and Ottoman Empire
Political Geography:: China, Turkey, Middle East, and Asia

66. Answering Beijing’s Growing Assertiveness beyond the Senkakus: Balancing Japan-China Relations

Author:: Valerie Niquet
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:: To Japanese authorities, there is no such thing as the “Senkaku question”. China is pursuing with increased assertiveness a strategy of coercion, using ambiguity and “grey zone” operations to put the onus of potential escalation on Tokyo.1 The vague and ambiguous nature of this strategic power play makes it all the more dangerous and complex. When Tokyo proclaims, with reason, that “the government continues to control and administer the territory by such means as patrolling and law enforcement,” it seeks to answer the permanent pressure that China exerts in the zone.2 However, the maintenance of the status quo, when China exerts an almost continuous pressure in the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands and Japanese fishermen do not have access to part of Japan’s own national territory, poses other types of problems that the People’s Republic of China tries to exploit at the service of broader ambitions. It also poses a challenge in crisis management: how can the Japanese government be active and in control of situational developments, and not just reactive, without going as far as sparking a major incident in the East China Sea?
Topic:: International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

67. Can China Practice Major Power Diplomacy in the Middle East?

Author:: Masaaki Yatsuzuka
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:: There is no question that China's presence in the Middle East is growing significantly. Will China continue to deepen its involvement in the region and play a role in shaping the regional order, taking the place of the United States? In other words, will China practice major power diplomacy in the Middle East? The view among researchers in China and elsewhere1 over this question is divided. To categorize their arguments into two camps, there is a cautious engagement theory that warns against the risk of getting caught up in the turmoil in the Middle East and recommends (or predicts) that China protect its economic interests while maintaining political neutrality vis-à-vis the Middle East as it has done so far. On the other hand, there is an active engagement theory advocating (or foreseeing) that China deepen its engagement, proactively participate based on the responsibility of a major world power in solving problems in the Middle East, and actively propose its own ideas in order to protect Chinese interests in the Middle East.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, and Asia

68. U.S. Trade Policy toward China: Learning the Right Lessons

Author:: Scott Lincicome
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Cato Journal
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Labor market and cultural disruptions in the United States are real and important, as is China’s current and unfortunate turn toward illiberalism and empire. But pretending today that there was a better trade policy choice in 2000—when Congress granted China “permanent normal trade relations” (PNTR) status and paved the way for broader engagement—is misguided. It assumes too much, ignores too much, and demands too much. Worse, it could lead to truly bad governance: increasing U.S. protectionism; forgiving the real and important failures of our policymakers, CEOs, and unions over the last two decades; and preventing a political consensus for real policy solutions. Indeed, that is happening now.
Topic:: International Relations, Economics, Markets, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Protectionism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

69. Hun Sen's Mistake? The Domestic Political Ramifications of His Chinese Shelter

Author:: Charles Dunst
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s close relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has led scholars and policymakers alike to suggest that Beijing’s backing will keep him in power. While Hun Sen himself seems to believe this to be true, his reliance on China is actually enflaming Cambodian discontent to such an extent that his planned patrimonial succession is at risk. Given the fragility of regimes mid-succession, Hun Sen’s Chinese shelter is augmenting the potential of his clan’s fall. Yet as Hun Sen faces increased domestic opposition, he will only further deepen ties with China in hopes of remaining in power, thereby creating a vicious cycle from which escaping will prove difficult.
Topic:: International Relations, Power Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Cambodia, and Southeast Asia

70. EU-China Engagement in Humanitarian Aid: Different Approaches, Shared Interests?

Author:: Ina Friesen and Leon Janauschek
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: Protracted crises and frequent natural disasters have generated an unprecedented number of people in need of humanitarian assistance. The international community faces a great challenge in supporting these populations, as the gap between needs and available funding is growing. To close this resource gap, the European Union (EU) aims to step up its engagement with emerging donors, particularly China, to increase their level of funding. Although China has previously been reluctant to engage in the international humanitarian system, its response to the COVID-19 pandemic indicates a change in attitude. Over the past year, China has delivered hundreds of tonnes of personal protective equipment (PPE) to over 150 countries and dispatched medical teams abroad. It has also donated $100 million to the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations (UN) and pledged to establish a global humanitarian response depot and hub in China in cooperation with the UN. Amidst increasing geopolitical tensions between China and the EU, China’s growing humanitarian engagement opens an opportunity for the EU to engage with China in the humanitarian sector. However, rather than framing China’s increased engagement in solely financial terms, the EU should develop a long-term strategy as to how to engage with China on humanitarian matters. A dialogue that takes both parties’ different approaches towards humanitarian aid into account and searches for common ground could open the door towards possible cooperation. This would not only help in narrowing the funding gap but carry the potential for greater coordination and consequently more effective assistance provision. China conceptualises humanitarian aid as a subcategory of development aid and provides the majority of its assistance bilaterally. Beijing’s state-centric approach to humanitarian assistance means in practice that it engages mostly in the aftermath of natural disasters rather than conflict settings. The EU, on the other hand, has a separate humanitarian aid policy that guides the allocation of funds and provides its humanitarian assistance through non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This Briefing Paper maps out the characteristics of Chinese humanitarian aid and outlines two areas on which the EU’s tentative steps towards a dialogue with China could focus. • Food security sector: Food insecurity is a key component in existing humanitarian needs, only exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Food assistance and nutrition are already a key area of engagement for the EU and China. The EU should advocate for China to scale up its contributions to global food security through the World Food Programme (WFP), with whom China has a good working relationship. This could be combined with a political dialogue on how to foster cooperation on food security assistance. • Anticipatory humanitarian aid: Disaster risk reduction, preparedness and response play an increasingly important role in global humanitarian aid. China has built up its most significant expertise in response to natural disasters. Enhancement of disaster risk reduction is one of the strategic priorities of the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) for 2020–2024. In light of both parties’ interest in anticipatory humanitarian aid, knowledge exchange in this area has the potential to open the door for future cooperation.
Topic:: International Relations, Humanitarian Aid, European Union, Food Security, and Engagement
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

71. A Principled Middle Power Diplomacy Approach For South Korea to Navigate the U.S.-China Rivalry

Author:: Saeme Kim
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: In the context of growing US-China tensions, South Korean administrations have opted for degrees of strategic ambiguity, refraining from overt actions that suggest South Korea is taking sides. While strategic ambiguity has been moderately successful, there are limits to this approach which make it unsustainable. This paper will argue that rather, South Korea needs to apply a principled middle power diplomacy, which refers to a middle power carrying out roles expected of it in accordance with a set of rules or values that uphold the liberal international order. The goal of principled middle power diplomacy would be to shape the environment in which the current great power rivalry is unfolding, in order to moderate the fallout of great power competition. After an analysis of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy, this paper will recommend that South Korea double down on its commitment to multilateralism so that it can augment its roles as a facilitator and agenda-setter on the international stage.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Multilateralism, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

72. South Korea as a Fourth Industrial Revolution Middle Power?

Author:: Dongwoo Kim
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This paper proposes a framework for conceptualizing middle powerism in the context of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, using South Korea as an example. The paper argues that the systemic transformation of the Fourth Industrial Revolution has created new openings for middle powerism, and proposes 1) technology, 2) networks, and 3) governance as factors that could enable it. Then, South Korea’s capacities in each of these three areas, potential barriers, and ultimately Seoul’s capacity to act as a “Fourth Industrial Revolution” middle power are evaluated.
Topic:: International Relations, Economics, Science and Technology, Governance, Industrialization, and Middle Power
Political Geography:: Asia and South Korea

73. Between a Rock and a Hard Place: How Should South Korea Manage its Relations with the United States and China?

Author:: Zhiqun Zhu
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This paper deals with one of the most critical issues in contemporary international relations: how China’s rise challenges foreign policies of U.S. allies, with a focus on the Republic of Korea (ROK) or South Korea. South Korea has been carefully hedging between the United States and China, its traditional security patron and largest trade partner, respectively. Strategic rivalry between the two great powers has put South Korea in an awkward position as pressure grows from the two powers to pick a side. Using a modified dual-track economics-security nexus framework, this paper suggests that the United States and China each has a significant impact on South Korea’s security and economic policies, making it important but challenging for South Korea to simultaneously manage relations with the two great powers. So far, South Korea has maintained these two sets of relationships remarkably well, but it may be difficult to continue with business as usual in the years ahead. For its own national interests, South Korea must seek to preserve the status quo under which it can continue to benefit from good relations with both great powers. The paper also proposes that South Korea should form a “middle power coalition” with like-minded nations to deflect pressures and avoid the dilemma of having to choose sides.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Alliance, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

74. The Sino–U.S. National Identity Gap and Bilateral Relations

Author:: Danielle Cohen
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The national identity gap between China and the United States has become increasingly apparent. Under Xi Jinping, China has sought to reclaim its historical greatness and proclaimed itself to be a responsible great power that offers a credible alternative to Western values, while also promoting increasingly authoritarian policies at home, complete with extensive repression in Xinjiang and renewed state control of the economy. Assertions of U.S. national identity were somewhat muted under Donald Trump, confused by the battle between those who supported the administration’s “America First” policy, its transactional approach to foreign affairs, and its deemphasis on human rights and democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy, and those who worried about the global repercussions of an isolationist, nativist policy. For a time, the United States seemed more preoccupied with its trade war with China than with claims that the United States should act as the global protector of human rights and democracy. The COVID-19 pandemic further complicated already tense Sino–U.S. relations and called both countries’ national identities into question. While China had, as of spring 2021, succeeded in keeping its COVID-19 outbreak remarkably small, the damage caused by its initial suppression of medical reports, along with successful virus mitigation in a number of non-authoritarian states, called into question its claim to be a responsible world power on the basis of its pandemic performance. Meanwhile, the Trump administration failed to protect U.S. citizens from catastrophic death tolls and prevented the United States from taking a leading role in resolving this global crisis. In January 2021, the Biden administration took office with a focus on swiftly ending the pandemic, while also reasserting the traditional U.S. global leadership role. When combined with its assessment of U.S. power after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and of U.S. domestic social and political instability evident throughout 2020-2021, the pandemic has strengthened China’s perceptions of the United States as a country in decline, and of China as a “risen” great power that should now play a major role in shaping the global order. At the same time, although U.S. policy towards China remains firm despite the presidential transition, the underlying rationale has shifted from the “America First” approach of the Trump administration to the democratic values-infused approach of the Biden administration. As the world struggles to move beyond the pandemic, the national identities of China and the United States are increasingly defined in opposition to each other and seem likely to drive an ever more challenging bilateral relationship in the coming years.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Culture, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

75. The Pandemic as a Geopolitical Game Changer in the Indo-Pacific: The View from Japan

Author:: Glen S. Fukushima
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The coronavirus pandemic that struck in late 2019 has affected the world profoundly, and Japan is no exception. But the direct impact on Japan has been relatively small considering the number of cases of infections and deaths relative to the size of Japan’s population, particularly considering its elderly population and high density. For instance, among the G7 countries, Japan has had the fewest cases of infections (4,690 per million population as of May 2, 2021) compared to 32,276 in Canada, 40,620 in Germany, 64,804 in the United Kingdom, 66,828 in Italy, 86,283 in France, and 99,652 in the United States. Similarly, among the G7 countries, Japan has had by far the fewest number of deaths (81 per million population as of May 2, 2021) compared to 638 in Canada, 996 in Germany, 1,601 in France, 1,776 in the United States, 1,870 in the United Kingdom, and 2,004 in Italy. This chapter argues that although the direct disruptions to Japan resulting from the pandemic have been less than to the other G7 countries, the effect of the pandemic on other nations with strong geopolitical importance to Japan—in particular, the United States and China—coupled with changes in Japan’s domestic political and economic environment have accelerated changes in geopolitical posture and direction that were already in progress in Japan. The fundamental geopolitical challenge facing Japan is how to ensure its military security, political independence, and economic prosperity in the face of a less reliable and less predictable United States and a more powerful and more assertive China. For Japan, the ideal resolution of this challenge is to maintain positive and constructive relations with both countries, while recognizing the reality that even as economic ties with China—whether in trade, investment, finance, tourism, or the exchange of people—are growing relative to ties with the United States, political and security ties (and the sharing of common values) with the United States remain the centerpiece of Japan’s foreign policy. Given this context, it is only natural that Japan would seek to diversify and strengthen its relationships with other countries, regions, economic arrangements, and international organizations and institutions. This diversification, which could be seen since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, has gained momentum in recent years, and the pandemic has served only to accelerate it. The analysis proceeds through the examination of the following: 1) pandemic chronology; 2) Japan’s domestic politics; 3) relations with the United States; 4) relations with China; 5) Japan’s diversification strategy; and 6) conclusions.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

76. How COVID-19 Has Affected the Geopolitics of Korea

Author:: Jung-Yeop Woo
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: COVID-19 has not gone away, and observers are now discussing possible long-term effects of the pandemic, including on geopolitics. A report by the European Parliament discussed five COVID-generated factors that could impact the geopolitical environment, i.e., supply chains, health multilateralism, digital diplomacy, climate change, and democratic activism. It predicted a reshuffling of value chains, where cooperation within the same “bloc” would be strengthened, while states continue their reshoring efforts, consequently shifting the current geopolitical environment. The report pointed out that the pandemic necessitated thorough scientific cooperation and information sharing beyond the level that the WHO had initially offered, suggesting changes in patterns of behavior, as in adapting to digital platforms while opening opportunities for nations to counter climate change and strengthen their geopolitical positions. Moreover, it also looked at the number of protests resulting from the pandemic and its economic effects and suggested that such pressure would encourage governments to mollify inequality. Missing is optimism that countries will be stirred to pursue common interests. Missing too is the geopolitical fallout from acutely worsening Sino-U.S. relations, as in South Korea, which stands at the forefront of states facing pressure from both sides. With the unforeseen disruption in both global and domestic economies, much attention has been paid to the effect of COVID-19 on the economic side rather than the political side, perhaps because many did not expect that the pandemic would last this long. However, recent disruptions are clearly rife with serious political implications, both domestically and globally. Above all, as seen from Seoul, their impact on the relationship between Beijing and Washington demonstrated how much the economic forces could spill into geopolitics. Koreans follow this impact attentively, realizing that worsening Sino-U.S. ties may reverberate on one or both powers, increasing pressure on Seoul’s efforts to sustain a precarious balance for the sake of its North Korean policy and its hope for regional stability. Many nations in the Indo-Pacific have recently struggled between the United States and China, trying to find the most advantageous equilibrium between security and economy. South Korea has uniquely stood on the frontlines, as in 2016-17 when it bowed to the U.S. and deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense targeting North Korea, which was met with strong Chinese pressure—strict economic sanctions through unofficial channels and demands to promise the “three noes” that restricted further missile defense deployment to deescalate the tension. President Biden’s new measures to bridge security and economy through multilateralism call for Seoul to choose between acceding to U.S. requests or risking China’s threats to respond aggressively—even as some anti-THAAD sanctions remain in place. President Xi Jinping’s warnings point to China’s harsh response. South Korean concerns have grown because of the relationship between the current global supply chains and geopolitics, which is a preoccupation of the Biden administration. Situated at the juncture of supply networks centering around China, South Korea’s economy is almost certain to be heavily hit. Furthermore, the pandemic brought ongoing pressures for de-globalization and de-dollarization to the forefront with major ramifications for Seoul. Much of the anxiety has focused on the geopolitics of deteriorating relations between Beijing and Washington. The former is warning Seoul against joining the Quad, agreeing to trilateralism with Japan and the U.S., and tilting the balance away from China in the Sino-U.S.-ROK triangle. Meanwhile, the Biden administration, even before it clarifies its regional strategy, is nudging Seoul in precisely the opposite direction. The year 2020 raised challenging issues for Seoul, which loom in 2021 as more severe geopolitical tests for the Moon administration. To properly gauge the effect of COVID-19 on South Korea’s geopolitics, it is crucial to understand the world before the pandemic. Has COVID-19 functioned as an independent variable in South Korean geopolitics? If there is a discernable difference, we have to see whether that difference was caused by COVID-19. This paper proceeds in four parts: 1) outlining the pre-pandemic status quo up until 2020; 2) assessing how COVID-19 affected international geopolitics; 3) examining how it influenced South Korea’s supply chain and geopolitics; and 4) analyzing ongoing discourse on South Korea’s strategic choice amid the U.S.-China rivalry. These sections are followed by brief conclusions on implications for policy choices.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Asia and South Korea

77. China, ASEAN, and the Covid-19 Pandemic

Author:: Joseph Chinyong Liow
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: For Southeast Asia, the COVID-19 pandemic was not only a public health crisis. It also provided an occasion for China to deepen its engagement in the region by dint of its own successful containment of the virus within its borders, and the resources it possessed to extend help to regional countries battling COVID-19 and its consequences, including economic, on their own shores. While Chinese help was welcomed, Southeast Asia also sought to avoid being beholden to any single external power. To that end, Southeast Asian states have actively pursued such diversification not only through efforts at reinforcing cooperation within ASEAN but also by using ASEAN as a vehicle to engage external powers. At the end of 2019, Chinese health authorities reported a cluster of pneumonia cases that had emerged in Wuhan, in the province of Hubei, which eventually led to the confirmation of a novel coronavirus. Several weeks later in January, the pandemic struck Southeast Asian shores when the first case outside of China was detected in Thailand. Within a few months, the world found itself in the grip of a global pandemic. By the end of January 2021, there were more than 100 million recorded cases of the COVID-19 infection, with over two million deaths. While the fatality rates are lower than those of previous pandemics of the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) strain, it has by far been the most infectious, prompting Singapore foreign minister Vivian Balakrishnan to opine that with the pandemic “we are facing a global life and death crisis which requires extraordinary measures.” Threats posed by pandemics are not new to Southeast Asia. In the last two decades alone, the region had been beset by several transnational health crises, of which SARS and the H5N1 Avian Flu were arguably the most lethal. What is striking about the current climate, however, is the backdrop against which the pandemic is playing out: the COVID-19 pandemic has hastened the further bifurcation of an international order that was already threatening to come undone because of the intensification of Sino-U.S. rivalry and American withdrawal from multilateralism under Donald J. Trump. Southeast Asian states found themselves increasingly compelled to reassess their relationships with external powers. Taking the present pandemic as a point of entry, this paper considers its impact on Southeast Asia’s relations with China and the U.S. The paper makes three main arguments. First, it contends that Sino-U.S. rivalry has sharpened over the COVID-19 pandemic by dint of the politicization of this public health crisis by both parties. Second, it argues that China has identified and seized upon opportunities presented by the pandemic to enhance its regional and global standing through continued support for multilateralism and economic engagement through initiatives such as the BRI, in turn creating favorable conditions for the advancement of its foreign policy interests. Conversely, because of the severe deficiencies in how the Trump administration handled the pandemic domestically, the Biden administration will have to prioritize its domestic challenges at the expense of greater bandwidth and resources for foreign policy, especially in Southeast Asia, a region that since the end of the Vietnam War has never featured prominently in Washington’s pursuit of its overseas interests. Third, it posits that while Southeast Asia has doubtless benefited from Chinese support during this crisis, the region remains skeptical of Chinese strategic intent and concerned about overreliance. States have tried to diversify relations with regional powers while strengthening cooperation within ASEAN. The paper first looks, by way of background, at how the pandemic emerged as the latest arena of Sino-U.S. rivalry. It then explores how China has handled the pandemic domestically, where its success has allowed it to expand its influence as a putative provider of “global public goods.” In the interest of brevity, the paper then focuses on ASEAN by documenting collective regional efforts and strategies to navigate great power rivalry in the realm of global public health.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, ASEAN, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China and Asia

78. The Pandemic as a Geopolitical Gamechanger in the Indo-Pacific: The View from China

Author:: Yun Sun
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: How has the COVID-19 pandemic reshaped or influenced China’s geopolitical outlook and its grand strategy for the years to come? This is a question that will determine China’s relationship with the United States, the Indo-Pacific region, and the rest of the world. In the Chinese strategic community, the pandemic has been regarded as a “watershed” event that has reshaped the structure of the international system and the power equilibrium. Its importance is elevated to the same status as the end of World War II, which determined the bipolar international system between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War which began thirty years of U.S. hegemony in a unipolar world. Although China began as a sheer loser in the pandemic given its culpability in the origin of COVID and its early poor management of the domestic spread of the disease, Beijing believes that it has eventually emerged as a pure winner in the pandemic: the relative gain China has made vis-à-vis the U.S.’s bigger losses in disease control, national power, economic growth, global leadership, and credibility has strengthened Chinese confidence that the tide is turning in China’s favor. The “effectiveness” of the Chinese political system, as manifested in its domestic disease control, has reinforced China’s ideological conviction of its superiority. As China uses COVID diplomacy to demonstrate the superiority and desirability of its political system, the pandemic is perceived as an opportunity for it to shape the new international order and promote China’s desired “Community of Common Destiny.” Challenges remain, as the U.S. revamps its alliance system under the Biden administration and as regional powers and Western countries grow increasingly concerned and anxious about China’s growing confidence and capabilities. However, for China, the pandemic has been a great opportunity, and China has emerged from it as a pure winner. It is an interesting question as to how the pandemic has changed the nature and the dynamics of the great power competition between the U.S. and China. Most would agree that the pandemic exacerbated, accelerated, and aggravated the deterioration of relations that the U.S. and China had already been experiencing before 2020. However, the differences lie in the degree, intensity, velocity, and extensiveness of the damage. Without the pandemic, the downward slope U.S. and China had already been on would not have come to a state of “freefall” in 2020. And that “freefall” period has long-lasting and significant implications for their bilateral relations in the post-COVID world. The damaged trust, confidence, and credibility, and the deeply entrenched sense of hostility, or even antagonism, have made any effort to repair the relations extremely difficult, if not completely impossible. And this reality will affect the regional dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region for the many years and decades to come.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

79. Xi Jinping’s Evergrande Dilemma

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Evergrande is one of the top-two real estate developers in a still highly fragmented Chinese sector. Its main strategy is to achieve ever-increasing scale (rather than profitability) in order to move ahead of and crowd out commercial competitors. It has also amassed the largest land reserves of all Chinese developers, which were financed through massive borrowings. By 2018, Evergrande held 822 pieces of undeveloped land in 228 cities, with a planned gross floor area of 3.28 billion square feet of new homes—the equivalent of 10 percent of Germany’s entire housing stock. It paid $75 billion just for this undeveloped land. Although Evergrande’s market share is only around 4 percent, its borrowings stand out. Its current balance sheet liabilities amount to an estimated 2 percent of China’s gross domestic product (GDP), while its off-balance-sheet liabilities could be another 1 percent of China’s GDP. This makes Evergrande the most indebted property developer in the world. Burdened by this debt, struggling to meet its debt interest and repayment obligations, and viable only if property asset values and sales continue to increase, Evergrande faces possible financial collapse—an event bound to have flow-on effects for the Chinese economy. However, the unusually high global interest in Evergrande has arisen because its woes are increasingly seen as symptomatic of those faced by the broader Chinese economy, which is struggling with enormous levels of indebtedness and overreliance on the real estate sector. Debt held by nonfinancial institutions in China increased from about 115 percent of GDP in 2010 to around 160 percent of GDP currently. This is the most rapid and largest increase in a 10-year period for any major economy and makes the level of debt held by Chinese nonfinancial institutions one of the highest in the world. The real estate sector accounts for around 15 percent of GDP, while property services account for another 14 percent—the highest in any developing economy. The share of the real estate sector as a proportion of GDP was only about 4 percent in 1997 and 9 percent in 2008. Since 2008, up to a third of all domestic fixed investment has gone into real estate, and up to half of total national debt is linked to the real estate sector.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Debt, Economics, Markets, and Business
Political Geography:: China and Asia

80. A Strategic US Approach to India’s COVID-19 Crisis

Author:: Husain Haqqani and Aparna Pande
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The recent surge of COVID-19 in South Asia challenges India’s traditional ability to aid its smaller neighbors, a change that could, in turn, affect India’s influence in its competition with China. Unless India can recover from this surge with the help of allies like the United States, the pandemic could impact the Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical balance. In the past, India has often acted as a first responder across South Asia, helping other countries recover from natural disasters, and it initially occupied this role during the first months of the coronavirus pandemic, when it helped several South Asian and Indian Ocean region countries cope with the effects of the disease. India’s role as ‘first responder’ has been a key factor in its geopolitical power and in maintaining its role as a leader in the region. However, the resurgence of COVID-19 has jolted India at a time when democratic countries, including the United States, view India as critical to balancing China’s deepening influence cross Asia. South Asia, a region holding 23 percent of the world’s population, now accounts for over 11 percent of global COVID-19 cases and 6 percent of COVID-related deaths. The world’s largest democracy and second-most populous country, India alone currently accounts for over 84 percent of South Asia’s cases and deaths. For most of 2020, it appeared that India, thanks partly to a lockdown, had managed to avert a huge health crisis. During this time, India supported its immediate South Asian neighbors by supplying personal protective equipment and medications. However, the latest COVID-19 surge has created a crisis that has strained the Indian health infrastructure’s ability to meet. With more resources being diverted towards domestic ends, India’s ability to maintain friends and influence other countries has diminished, also potentially shrinking its sphere of influence. The US must therefore go beyond dealing with its own health crisis and also support India in dealing with its crisis. Instead of allowing China to consolidate its positions in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, and the Maldives, helping India restore its ability to provide assistance would be in the best interests of the United States and its allies.
Topic:: International Relations, Health Care Policy, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, Asia, and United States of America

81. Regaining the Digital Advantage: A Demand-Focused Strategy for US Microelectronics Competitiveness

Author:: Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Microprocessors are a critical element of US national infrastructure and manage the country’s energy grids, transportation systems, and telecommunications networks. Without a reliable supply of computer chips and microelectronic components, most US economic and societal activity would grind to a halt. The semiconductor manufacturing process is largely concentrated in East Asia, where manufacturers could be subjected to pressure or coercion by the People’s Republic of China. The semiconductor supply chain, and its inherent resilience and security, could be strengthened by US government investment to bring more steps of the microelectronics production and assembly process onto US shores. To guide government policies, this study proposes a four-factor framework measured from the perspective of the US microelectronics customers and industry. These factors include: resilience of continued microelectronics supplies to the US market; assurance that US microelectronics reflect their intended design and are free of security vulnerabilities; the ability of the US microelectronics industry to meet current microelectronics demand, which shapes the ecosystem; and the value added from US firms, which supports future demand.
Topic:: International Relations, Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Communications, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Military Spending
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

82. China’s Gambit for Total Information Dominance: A US-Australia Response

Author:: Patrick M. Cronin
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: This report assesses China’s comprehensive approach to information power and its implications for the U.S.-Australia alliance. The purpose of the report is threefold: to enlarge alliance awareness of China’s whole-of-society information challenge; highlight critical responses to this challenge from Canberra and Washington; and deepen alliance thinking regarding strategy and policy. The scale and scope of China’s information enterprise distinguishes it from other countries. Overt persuasion campaigns and covert influence operations are thoroughly researched, carefully choreographed, and uninhibited by concerns over individual or sovereign rights. Beijing goes beyond the use of information and instead seeks to achieve primacy in discourse power by weaponizing narrative in ways analogous to asymmetric military strategies. China uses a distinctive whole-of-society approach to building a dazzling wealth of data and information. Aided by intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, decades of education training abroad, and other forms of acquiring information, China’s industrial policy goes beyond protectionist measures like subsidies. When Military-Civil Fusion is considered, this development has far more than economic and technological ramifications.
Topic:: International Relations, Science and Technology, Alliance, Data, and Information Technology
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Australia, and United States of America

83. Europe's China Chimera

Author:: Peter Rough
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: When Xi Jinping, the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), dreams of global domination, he worries about one thing above all else: a hostile United States backed by its allies—and on the Eurasian landmass, the US has no more important ally than Europe. As a result, Xi has worked to weaken the transatlantic alliance through a two-pronged economic stratagem. First, under the guise of globalization, China has insinuated itself into the European economy, creating dependencies. Second, Beijing is manipulating those dependencies to hollow out and supplant Europe’s advanced economies. To give this deception cover, China has built a vast political network across Europe, from basic sympathizers to outright spies. Until recently, barely anyone took notice, but the financial crisis and forever wars of the past two decades, culminating in the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, lured the self-confident Xi out into the open. During the coronavirus pandemic, China revealed an aggressive attitude toward Great Britain’s former colonies that shocked the United Kingdom. In the span of mere months, London shifted from cooperation to confrontation. In July, it became the first country in Europe to block the Chinese telecommunications giant, Huawei, from its next-generation networks. Germany, the continent’s most important country, still sees China as key to post-pandemic recovery and economic growth, however. Xi has exploited this attitude to strike an investment agreement with the European Union (EU), the chief purpose of which is to forestall a transatlantic approach under the new US president, Joe Biden. Together, the United States and Europe have unparalleled advantages against any competitor. Now is the time for cooperation, before Xi’s dreams become our collective nightmare.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

84. Fear and Insecurity: Addressing North Korean Threat Perceptions

Author:: Patrick M. Cronin
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Diplomacy with North Korea must factor in an understanding of the Kim regime’s fears and insecurity. Pyongyang’s military actions and negotiating gambits jeopardize the United States, South Korea, and other nations’ vital interests and policy goals. Accordingly, the study of North Korean threat perceptions—how Kim Jong-un thinks about the utility of force and about threats to his regime—is essential for averting strategic surprise and buttressing diplomacy. National security strategy should be systematic, a deliberate calculation about national capabilities to achieve crucial objectives. It should be infused with an understanding of other actors, both friend and foe. A coherent national security strategy begins with clear and realistic written objectives. If aims are vague, it will be difficult to concentrate resources and mobilize others around a common cause. Similarly, if a nation’s goals are too ambitious and surpass the prospects or means for success, then the national security strategy represents wishful thinking and will likewise be difficult to carry out. What is needed is a serious attempt to grapple with the world as it exists and to harmonize a nation’s crucial ends with existing means.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and National Security
Political Geography:: East Asia, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

85. How China Regards its Future in the World

Author:: Marcos Caramuru and Philip Yang
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:: China’s post-Covid plans regarding national investment and foreign policy are ambitious and its success depends on the ability to build trustworthy relations with its Asian neighbors and the great powers. The XXII China Analysis Group meeting gathered experts to discuss China’s positioning and the ways in which it could overcome challenges and aim for a positive bilateral agenda with the USA during the Biden administration.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Investment, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

86. China’s grand industrial strategy and what it means for Europe

Author:: Frederico Mollet
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: In its 14th Five-Year Plan, China has mapped out a grand economic and industrial strategy that upends many of the assumptions that underpin the EU's approach - how can the Union respond? With this new plan, the EU can expect tougher competition and greater protectionism in its economic relations with China. A further blurring of the public-private sector distinction in the country's economic model will make it harder to combat unfair Chinese competition. And while China is actively courting foreign investment, it is also signalling greater protectionism to products not made in China, which will lead to European investors' and exporters' interests diverging. To balance the scales, the EU should adapt its own strategy by: continuing to develop trade instruments to combat unfair competition at home and abroad; ensuring that these instruments and institutions can respond to unfair competition from private companies benefiting from state capital investment; ensuring that the extensive and often opaque government holdings in private firms are reflected in foreign direct investment and export controls; incorporating China's attempts to reconfigure supply chains into its own assessment of strategic dependencies, identifying areas that could become vulnerable; prioritising the improvement of access to the Chinese market for goods and services produced in Europe; developing alternative sources of growth, and boost demand and reduce barriers within the Single Market to offset greater Chinese protectionism; and ensuring that its industrial policy efforts will enable European industry to match China's developments. The present moment may mark a turning point in EU–China relations: in a little over three months, an agreement on an investment treaty was followed by sanctions and countersanctions. Geopolitical conflict ratchets up between China and the US. Beijing's new economic course will reshape its global relationships. China's protectionist turn and growing one-sided dependencies will threaten Europe's long-term strategic autonomy and undercut any attempts to construct a balanced approach to EU–China relations. If the EU's multi-track strategy is to work, a concerted effort is required to preserve economic parity and balance between the two powers.
Topic:: International Relations, Political Economy, European Union, Grand Strategy, Industry, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

87. Tangled Threats: Integrating U.S. Strategies toward China and North Korea

Author:: Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: China and North Korea pose intertwined challenges for U.S. and allied policy. The Korean Peninsula constitutes just one area among many in U.S.-China relations. Meanwhile, issues on the peninsula remain central to the future stability and security of Northeast Asia and implicate many broader questions about regional and global order. Dealing with China and North Korea as an interlocking pair requires integrated policies that balance the risks and rewards of various possible approaches. This policy brief explains how to develop such policies and why they are the best option for the current regional landscape. North Korea plays several roles in China’s foreign policy. These include diverting geopolitical attention away from China, providing Beijing with an opportunity to cooperate with other states, creating a point of leverage for China to extract concessions on separate issues, and acting as a flashpoint with the potential for a regional war that directly affects China’s security. At any given time, some roles will be more pronounced than others, but each of them is always present to some degree. Any integrated U.S. strategy toward the pair will have to account for a volatile geopolitical landscape in Northeast Asia. Major trends include closer ties between Beijing and Pyongyang, deteriorating U.S.-China relations, and South Korea’s desire, especially under the government of President Moon Jae-in, to engage North Korea while balancing ties with China and the United States. The United States should employ a strategy toward China and North Korea that blends calibrated pressure and results-oriented engagement. The goal of this strategy should be problem-management rather than problem-solving. Washington should implement this approach across four areas: shaping U.S.-China relations regarding the Korean Peninsula; engaging North Korea on political and security issues; promoting stable deterrence in the region; and coordinating a shared inter-Korean and foreign policy with South Korea. Key recommendations for the United States include acknowledging that major breakthroughs are unlikely with either China or North Korea; proposing four-party nuclear and peace talks with South Korea, North Korea, China, and the United States; and standing up a Nuclear Planning Group that includes Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo to bolster deterrence and stem nuclear proliferation pressures.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

88. Partners, Competitors, or a Little of Both? Russia and China in the Arctic

Author:: Jim Townsend and Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The Arctic’s melting icecaps are changing more than the geography of the region. The diminishing sea ice and declining snow cover have allowed for new shipping lanes and growing access to natural resources, increasing geopolitical competition in the region. A defining feature of this competition is the growing interest and activity of Russia and China in the Arctic. Not only have the two countries increased their presence in the region, but coordination between them is growing. Political observers in Washington and beyond understand well the challenges that Russia and China each pose to the United States. But little thought has been given to how their interests and actions will combine and the challenges that such alignment will pose for the United States and its allies and partners. Previous CNAS research has highlighted the risks that greater Russia-China cooperation creates. This research argues that the growing partnership between Moscow and Beijing is amplifying the challenges that both actors pose. In the Arctic, Russia and China’s interests are converging around resource extraction projects, the expansion of the Northern Sea Route, and the enhancement of operational awareness and security cooperation. The increasing synergy in the Arctic will be most consequential for the United States on two fronts: First, Beijing is working with Moscow to improve its military capabilities. Second, Russia is increasing its economic reliance on China in the Arctic in ways that may raise Moscow’s willingness to back Beijing’s priorities in other regions and on other issues to avoid jeopardizing its economic ties with Beijing. Increasing military cooperation: Through joint research and, to a lesser extent, its joint military exercises with Russia, China is enhancing its military knowledge of and insight into the Arctic. Though China’s actual military presence in the Arctic is minimal, the two countries’ cooperation is enhancing Chinese insight into Russian dual-use technology, which Beijing can use to build its military capabilities. China can learn from Russia’s dual-use and hybrid capability development in the Arctic, accelerating its efforts to erode U.S. military advantages and posing a greater threat in the event of military conflict. Russia and China may also strengthen their military relationship in the Arctic in the future, including expanding the scope of their joint exercises in the region. Ultimately, sustained or deepening Russia-China military cooperation may threaten America’s ability to deter Chinese and Russian aggression in the region.
Topic:: International Relations, Natural Resources, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and Arctic

89. Is America Really Back?

Author:: Thomas Fingar
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:: Following the 2021 Taihe Civilizations Forum, the Taihe International Communications Center hosted an online discussion on October 8 that captures the candid and profound reflections of senior officials whose actions have shaped the course of ties between China and the United States. Dr. Thomas Fingar, Shorenstein APARC Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, and former Assistant Secretary of State, and Senior Colonel Zhou Bo (ret.), Senior Fellow at Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, China Forum Expert, and former Director of Center for Security Cooperation of the Office for International Military Cooperation of Ministry of National Defense, were invited to join this dialogue. During their conversation, Dr. Fingar and Senior Colonel Zhou exchanged ideas on important topics such as the current state of China-U.S. relations, the future development of the two countries' bilateral ties, the rationale behind the US foreign policy and the American alliance system, as well as the "extreme competition" that China and the U.S. are trapped in.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Hegemony, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

90. Hedging by Default: The Limits of EU “Strategic Autonomy” in a Binary World Order

Author:: Richard Higgott and Simon Reich
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: For some time, international relations has trended in the direction of an American and Chinese dominated binary world order. While the Trump administration has been an accelerator not a cause of this trend between 2016 and 2020, not coincidentally the post 2016 era has also seen key EU figures move to develop a strategy of greater "strategic autonomy". This interest in strategic autonomy was, in no small part, a reflection of growing European distrust in the reliability of both China and, increasingly, the USA. The paper shows, in contrast to the Cold War era during which the EU was unambiguously aligned, how the EU now appears to have embarked on a hedging strategy, albeit implemented more by default than design. In its desire to defend its core interests the EU appears to lean to one side or the other on an issue by issue basis in at least seven key policy domains identified in the paper. This approach is seen to be the outcome of its dual desire to articulate the values of its much touted “Geopolitical Commission" at the same time as it tries to continue its traditional institutional commitment to multilateralism. The paper concludes that the ambiguity present in this endeavour to straddle the realist-liberal fence only serves to expose the limitations of the strategy.
Topic:: International Relations, European Union, Geopolitics, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

91. Strategic Foresight in Chin: The other missing dimension

Author:: Paul Charon
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Over the last few decades, analysis of international relations and strategic issues has developed rapidly in China, both within the Chinese Communist Party– state apparatus and in think tanks and universities. However, the richness of this field of study is in stark contrast to the absence of any real open reflection on the question of foresight. If, like other nations, China is committed to understanding the world in which it is evolving and to identifying possible changes, the function of foresight has not been conceptualised or institutionalised to the same degree as in the West. Foresight analysis in China is marked by several salient features: firstly, it remains almost non-existent in Chinese institutional frameworks dedicated to the analysis of international relations; secondly, the concepts of the ‘black swan’ and the ‘grey rhino’ have made a significant breakthrough, particularly in economics, before being cannibalised and politicised by the Party; and thirdly, the reading of the horizon remains essentially informed by the Party’s vision, fears and obsessions.
Topic:: International Relations, Political Parties, Domestic Policy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China and Asia

92. Russian Relations with Central Asia and Afghanistan after U.S. Withdrawal

Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Join us for a meeting of the New York-Russia Public Policy Series, co-hosted by the Harriman Institute at Columbia University and the New York University Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia. In this second event of the academic year, our panelists will discuss the status of Russian relations with Central Asia and Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal. Moderated by Joshua Tucker (NYU Jordan Center) and Alexander Cooley (Harriman Institute). The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan and the dramatic collapse of the U.S.-backed government in Kabul has ushered in another period of Taliban rule. Regional powers and neighbors have been anticipating the U.S. exit for some time: Russia remains a critical player in the region and, even before the U.S. withdrawal, had demonstrated a pragmatic approach to engaging with the Taliban. What is Moscow’s plan for dealing with the new Afghan government and what are its overall priorities in the region? How will this affect Russia’s relations with the Central Asian states and China? And are there any prospects for renewed cooperation between Moscow and Washington on counterterrorism issues in this period of uncertainty and potential instability? Please join this distinguished group of academic experts who will explore the new complex dynamics of a post-American Afghanistan and Central Asia. This event is supported by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. Speakers Ivan Safranchuk, Director of the Center of Euro-Asian Research and Senior Fellow with the Institute for International Studies, MGIMO Nargis Kassenova, Senior Fellow and Director of the Program on Central Asia, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University Artemy Kalinovsky, Professor of Russian, Soviet, and post-Soviet Studies, Temple University Ekaterina Stepanova, Director, Peace and Conflict Studies Unit, National Research Institute of the World Economy & International Relations (IMEMO), Moderated by: Alexander Cooley, Director of the Harriman Institute, Columbia University Joshua Tucker, Director of the Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia, New York University
Topic:: International Relations, Military Strategy, Governance, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

93. Consistent Inconsistency: What One Thirty-year-old Cable Reveals About U.S.-DPRK Relations

Author:: Ben Forney
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: 30 years have passed since North Korea’s then “nascent” nuclear program was identified as a “gravely serious threat.” Since 1991, its once budding nuclear program has amassed into a large-scale program, posing a grave challenge for the nuclear proliferation regime and regional security in Northeast Asia. In the following Global NK Commentary, Ben Forney, PhD candidate at the Seoul National University Graduate School of International Studies, explains that international coordination efforts to deter North Korea from developing its nuclear weapons have been inconsistent and ineffective. Manifest in cable exchanges between Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo and President George H.W. Bush’ solo enactment of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, unaccompanied by any consultation of his international counterparts, the US stance towards North Korea since 1991 has been contradictory and erratic. With the Biden administration facing a long list of domestic and international concerns not pertaining to the North Korean nuclear regime and the Moon administration’s difficulties into its final year, Forney asserts that prospects for meaningful progress on the North Korean nuclear issue seem bleak.
Topic:: International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

94. The EU’s North Korea Policy: From Engagement, to Critical Engagement, and to Criticism with Limited Engagement

Author:: Ramon Pacheco Pardo
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: While the EU had initially focused on engagement with North Korea in the 1990s, the North Korea nuclear crisis served as a turning point, pushing the EU to change its strategy to ‘critical engagement.’ In this commentary, Ramon Pacheco Pardo, Professor of International Relations at King`s College London and the KF-VUB Korea Chair at the Brussels School of Governance, explains the trajectory of EU’s policy towards North Korea. The EU’s first Asia strategy had called for the EU to become involved in addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, establishing diplomatic relations with the country. However, at the onset of the second nuclear crisis and further acceleration of North Korea’s missile and nuclear weapons program, the EU responded by ramping up pressure. To this date, the EU has been increasingly critical of the hermit kingdom, using a strategy that admonishes and pressures Pyongyang.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, European Union, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

95. North Korea’s Energy Crisis: What Are the Problems?

Author:: Kyung-sool Kim
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: North Korean businesses run by state-supplied energy have not been properly operated due to a sharp decrease in energy supply. Long-standing energy shortages have paralyzed the state energy supply and demand system, causing further disruptions in statewide functions. In this commentary, Kyung-sool Kim, Honorary Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Energy Economics Institute, states that this resulted from a complex accumulation of various problems: the characteristics of the regime, national capacity, state monopoly of production factors, the lack of a market, limitations of policy functions, the absence of capital and technology, and international isolation. The author argues that radical changes such as systemic reform and market opening are necessary to resolve these issues. The author adds that North Korea should be free from international isolation and propagate change in order to utilize external support.
Topic:: International Relations, Energy Crisis, and Energy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and North Korea

96. Kim Jong Un’s Two-Faced Strategy: South Korea First and U.S. Later Tactics Restoration of the Inter-Korean Hotline, the Road to an Inter-Korean Summit

Author:: Sung-wook Nam
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: North Korea reportedly test-fired its new long-range cruise missiles and rail-mobile ballistic missiles four times in September, which successfully hit their respective targets. As the North continues to enhance its nuclear missile capabilities, military threats and arms races among neighboring powers are intensifying. The North claims that prospects for bilateral relations depend on the attitude of South Korean authorities as it demands the South to drop its hostile policy towards the North and that the South promptly cease crisis awareness and delusion of getting harmed that it should deter the north's provocation. The author notes that the inter-Korean hotlines restored after 55 days of suspension can create a momentum to improve inter-Korean relations. However, he notes that the road ahead will be bumpy due to the differing attitudes of the two Koreas.
Topic:: International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

97. The China Challenge Prompts Recovery of a Strained ROK-Japan Relations: Analyzing ROK-Japan Relations Through the 9th Joint Korea-Japan Public Opinion Survey

Author:: Yul Sohn
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Korea-Japan relations have been strained for the past 3 years as the feelings of fatigue between the two citizens has been steadily increasing due to the Korean Supreme Court’s ruling on the forced wartime labor in October 2018. Bilateral cooperation to reorganize the world order after COVID-19 also remains bleak. The East Asia Institue (EAI, President Yul Sohn) and Genron NPO (President Yasushi Kudo) conducted the “9th Joint Korea-Japan Public Opinion Poll.” Based on the results of the survey, this issue briefing examines the differences in public opinion between the two countries on security and economic cooperation. This briefing also analyzes the Korean public’s call to improve ROK-Japan relations and increase cooperation. President Sohn argues that ROK-Japan relations should be re-examined under the intensified U.S.-China strategic competition and the possible post-pandemic global risks. He also states that Japan should abandon its one-track approach and understand the Korean’s preference for “future-oriented” cooperation. Additionally, the next Korean administration should respond to public opinion and strive towards the reconstruction of ROK-Japan relations.
Topic:: International Relations, Regional Cooperation, Public Opinion, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

98. More Harm than Good: Why Chinese Sanctions over THAAD have Backfired

Author:: Daniel Mitchum
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In 2017 South Korean Moon Jae-in, in response to North Korean ballistics testing, adopted a resolution to implement the THAAD missile interceptor system. Beijing had long been opposed to the system and as a result initiated a series of unofficial, punitive economic sanctions against South Korea which covered a range of industries. However, Beijing’s actions did little to alter Seoul’s decisions and have instead damaged China-South Korea relations. A similar paradigm has since appeared within China-Australia relations. How nations respond and adapt to such tactics in the future is a question of critical importance.
Topic:: International Relations, Sanctions, Weapons, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

99. The Opportunity is There: South Koreans’ Views of China and the Future of the US-ROK Alliance

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Officially, relations between the Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China remain cordial. Because of China’s economic heft and South Korea’s reliance on unmolested trade with the former for its continued economic development, South Korea takes great pains to be as neutral as possible between the United States and China despite its formal alliance with the US. As such, many pejoratively refer to South Korea as “the weak link” in America’s Northeast Asia alliance system. However, on a civil society level, an overwhelming majority of the South Korean public has a negative view of China—a view that has steadily gotten worse over time. Being a democracy that reflects voters’ popular will, growing anti-Chinese sentiment among voters means South Korea’s current policy of placating China will not be sustainable indefinitely. Meanwhile, the Trump administration largely neglected the alliance between South Korea and the United States. That neglect notwithstanding, an overwhelming majority of South Koreans either strongly or somewhat support the alliance with the United States. Conditions are perfect for the Biden administration to seek to repair and strengthen relations with South Korea to empower the alliance to serve as a credible bulwark against Chinese expansionism—this paper offers solutions on how to do so.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economy, Alliance, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

100. Opciones estratégicas de Rusia desde la óptica del neorrealismo ofensivo

Author:: José Gonzálvez Vallés
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: El neorrealismo nos da claves de cómo los Estados -actor principal de las relaciones internacionales-, interactúan entre sí, y, siendo su principal misión la propia supervivencia, desarrolla unas estrategias específicas para asegurarla, las razones de escoger entre ellas, y las acciones que aseguran el objetivo final.Será en este marco teórico en el que se intentará revisitar la relación especial entre Rusia y China. Una vez socios ideológicos, otra adversarios como cabezas de las dos más grandes estructuras de poder bajo el paraguas del socialismo, y en la actualidad, parece que potencias cada vez más cercanas en su común aversión al poderío norteamericano. Y sin embargo....Este trabajo trata de identificar las opciones estratégicas de Rusia, enmarcadas en el paradigma de la escuela realista.
Topic:: International Relations, Ideology, and Neorealism
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

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