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71. US strategy and force posture for an era of nuclear tripolarity

Author:
Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The term “nuclear tripolarity” describes a world in which China has joined the United States and Russia as a leading nuclear power. As China modernizes its existing nuclear forces and deploys new weapons, it is on track to roughly double its deployed nuclear arsenal in the next few years—from approximately 350 to 700 deliverable warheads. The US Department of Defense projects that China will go further, expanding its arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035.1 At those force levels, China’s arsenal would be comparable to US and Russian deployed nuclear forces, currently capped at 1,550 by the New START Treaty.2 What are the consequences of emerging tripolarity for US nuclear strategy and force posture? If the United States retains its current approach to nuclear force planning, the growth of China’s arsenal (and the ongoing modernization of Russia’s nuclear weapons) will likely compel the United States to significantly increase its own arsenal. The easiest way to do so would be to upload one to two thousand additional warheads from US reserves onto existing delivery systems when the New START treaty expires in 2026. Unfortunately, a major increase in US forces would likely mark just another step in an intensifying arms competition among the three leading nuclear powers, since China and Russia would then feel pressure to respond.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

72. China’s subsea-cable power in the Middle East and North Africa

Author:
Dale Aluf
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In a new Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative issue brief, “China’s subsea-cable power in the Middle East and North Africa,” Aluf analyzes China’s campaign to make countries in the region more dependent on Chinese networks, while reducing its own dependence on foreign cables. For a country that seeks to alter the internet’s physical form and influence digital behavior while exerting supreme control over information flows, China’s growing presence in the Middle East and North Africa’s cable industry is significant because Beijing has the power to shape the route of global internet traffic by determining when, where, and how to build cables.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Politics, Science and Technology, Partnerships, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, and North Africa

73. The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization

Author:
Robert Murray
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Commercial opportunities in space-based technologies are expanding rapidly. From satellite communications and Earth observation to space tourism and asteroid mining, the potential for businesses to capitalize on these emerging technologies is vast and known as “NewSpace.”1 The NewSpace model is important for governments to understand because the dual-use nature of space, specifically its growing commercialization, will influence the types of space-based technologies that nations may leverage, and consequently, impact their national security paradigms. By capitalizing on the private sector’s agility and combining it with the essential research efforts and customer role played by the public sector, the NewSpace industry can play a critical function in addressing current and future national security challenges through public-private codevelopment. As the NewSpace industry expands, the role of government is evolving from being the primary developer and operator of space assets to facilitating their commercialization, while still prioritizing key advancements. US and allied governments can capitalize on this competitive landscape by strategically investing in areas that align with their national security objectives. However, it is crucial for them to first understand and adapt to their changing roles within this dynamic environment. Indeed, the benefits of the burgeoning NewSpace industry extend beyond the United States. International collaboration and competition in this area can lead to faster technological advancements and economic gains. The global NewSpace landscape is driving down costs, increasing access to space, and fostering innovation that can improve not only economic well-being, but also impact national security models. To that end, this memo will examine the broad state of the space market, discuss the industry drivers, and propose recommendations for US and allied policymakers as they consider future government investments in those enabling space-based activities that support wider national security ambitions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Space, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, and United States of America

74. Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes

Author:
Tiffany Vora
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The “United States Space Priorities Framework,” released in December 2021, confirmed the White House’s commitment to American leadership in space.1 Space activities deliver immense benefits to humankind. For example, satellite imaging alone is crucial for improvements in daily life such as weather monitoring as well as for grand challenges like the fight against climate change. Such breakthrough discoveries in space pave the way for innovation and new economies on Earth. Exploration is at the cutting edge of this process: it expands humankind’s knowledge of the universe, transforming the unknown into the supremely challenging, expensive, risky, and promising. US allies and partners accelerate this transformation via scientific and technical achievements as well as processes, relationships, and a shared vision for space exploration. By integrating these allied capabilities, the United States and its allies and partners set the stage for safe and prosperous space geopolitics and economy in the decades to come. However, harnessing the capabilities of US allies and partners for space exploration is complex, requiring the balance of relatively short-term progress with far-horizon strategy. Space exploration has changed since the US-Soviet space race of the 1960s. In today’s rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment, it is unclear whether the processes, relationships, and vision that previously enabled allied cooperation in space, epitomized by the International Space Station (ISS), will keep pace. Here, China is viewed as the preeminent competitor for exploration goals and capabilities—as well as the major competitor for long-term leadership in space.2 This development drives fears of space militarization and weaponization, prompting protectionist legislation, investment screening, and industrial policies that can disrupt collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners.3 Further complication stems from the rise of commercial space, with opportunities and challenges due to the decentralization, democratization, and demonetization of technologies for robotic and crewed space exploration. This paper serves as a primer for current US space exploration goals and capabilities that will be critical to achieving them. It highlights arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned to jointly accelerate space exploration while also benefitting life on Earth. This paper concludes with recommended actions—gleaned from interviews with international experts in space exploration—for the US government as well as allied and partner governments to increase the number and impact of global stakeholders in space exploration, to remove friction in collaboration, and to guide the future of space toward democratic values.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Partnerships, and Space
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

75. China in Sub-Saharan Africa: Reaching far beyond natural resources

Author:
Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou and Naomi Aladekoba
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This work empirically examines China’s growing footprint in Sub-Saharan Africa’s investment, trade, cultural, and security landscape over the past two decades. It highlights China’s increasing appetite for Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resources and growing young labor force—identifying the region’s consumer market as an important destination for Chinese goods and services over the next few decades. The analysis identifies more than 600 Chinese investments and construction contracts in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), valued at over $303 billion, signed between 2006 and 2020. Four sectors attract 87 percent of China’s investment and construction in the region: energy at 34 percent; transport, 29 precent; metals, 13 percent; and real estate, 11 percent. This is very similar to the Middle East and North Africa Region, where the energy sector attracts close to 50 percent of China’s investment, followed by transport, 19 percent; real estate, 15 percent; and metals, 6 percent. In terms of trade, this work shows that between 2001 and 2020, China’s merchandise trade with the region increased by a whopping 1,864 percent—surpassing SSA’s trade with both the United States and the European Union. In other words, from 2001 to 2020, China’s share in total merchandise trade in SSA rose from 4 percent to 25.6 percent, while during the same period, the shares of the United States and the EU in SSA’s total trade declined by 10 percentage points and 8 percentage points, respectively. The report also takes a look at China’s arms trade with the region. Twenty-two percent of SSA’s arms imports are sourced from China, making China the region’s second-largest supplier of arms and military equipment, with Russia in the lead (24 percent). Finally, the report highlights the fact that the size of Chinese migrants in Africa is estimated at one to two million, with around one million permanently residing in the region. The largest numbers are in Ghana, South Africa, Madagascar, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.This work is the first in a series of empirical analyses that will be conducted on China’s presence in developing economies and low-income countries.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Economy, Business, Economic Growth, Macroeconomics, Trade, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa

76. United States–China semiconductor standoff: A supply chain under stress

Author:
Jeremy Mark and Dexter Tiff Roberts
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In August 2022, the US Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act, a law that approves subsidies and tax breaks to help jump-start the renewed production on American soil of advanced semiconductors.1 Just two months later, the Joe Biden administration issued wide-ranging restrictions on the export to China of chips and chip-making technology to undercut that country’s ability to manufacture the same class of integrated circuits.2 Taken together with a steady stream of Biden administration prohibitions on technology sales to key Chinese companies, the US initiatives represent a profound turn toward competition with China in the high-tech realm.3 They also highlight an effort to restructure the complex, multinational supply chains centered on East Asia that manufacture hundreds of billions of dollars of semiconductors a year. As such, the Biden administration has set in motion a process that could alter the business strategies—and fortunes—of homegrown and foreign-invested semiconductor companies based in China, world-leading chipmakers in Taiwan and South Korea, and suppliers around the world that provide the industry with the machinery and myriad inputs that fuel chip production. The Biden administration insists that its restrictions on sales to China are intended only to limit China’s ability to produce the cutting-edge chips that can feed into the development of weapons and other strategically important technologies—and not to cripple its semiconductor industry. But the current state of play of sanctions and support for US-based semiconductor production, including by Taiwanese and Korean chipmakers, is not the endpoint in this process. Rather, the momentum to constrain Beijing’s semiconductor program is likely to continue in the coming months, at the very least with additional restrictions on Chinese companies and government-linked entities, and unprecedented bureaucratic scrutiny of American venture-capital and equity-financing flows to China. That amounts to more bad news for corporate leaders in Asia, North America, and Europe who have spent the past generation building a globe-spanning semiconductor industry that has faced few barriers to expansion. As US restrictions mount, and sales of certain technologies to China flag, the once-unimaginable process of reorienting semiconductor supply chains will become an ever-present reality. The CHIPS and Science Act already is becoming an important factor in corporate strategy, providing incentives for Taiwanese, Korean, and American companies to make big bets on new factories in places like New York, Ohio, Texas, and Arizona—witness Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s (TSMC’s) recent decision to build a second factory in Phoenix.4 This paper explores the potential implications of US semiconductor policy for the global semiconductor supply chains and the competition for primacy in an industry that is constantly changing the face of the global economy and one that has implications for global security in all its dimensions. It begins by examining the policies put in place by the Biden administration, and then discusses the changes taking place across the industry, with a focus on Asia.
Topic:
Economy, Business, Supply Chains, Semiconductors, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

77. Implementing NATO’s Strategic Concept on China

Author:
Hans Binnendijk and Daniel S. Hamilton
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Set against the backdrop of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the June 2022 Madrid NATO Summit set the tone for the next decade of the Alliance’s shared future. Allies made it clear that they consider Russia their most immediate and direct threat. Yet they also made headlines by addressing challenges emanating from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Allies laid out actions to be taken across the diplomatic, economic, and military spheres. Now the Alliance must implement those responses. Beijing will be watching closely.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, and United States of America

78. China and the new globalization

Author:
Franklin D. Kramer
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The unitary globalized economy no longer exists. Driven in significant part by security considerations, a new and more diverse globalization is both required and being built. The transition is ongoing, and its final form is yet to be determined. Many of the causal factors for this very significant change revolve around China and the consequent responses to its actions by the United States, other democracies of the transatlantic alliance, and the advanced democratic economies of the Indo-Pacific. There are other important factors generating this new globalization including the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war both on energy markets and on trade and investment with Russia generally, as well as the global requirements for mitigating and adapting to climate change. However, China has been a critical element in what might be described as the “maximum trade-centered globalization,” which has dominated trade and investment policy in the three decades since the end of the Cold War. This issue brief describes the still-developing new globalization focusing on the issues surrounding China. A fundamental challenge that China presents arises because its actions have generated significant security and economic challenges, yet it nonetheless is a massive trade and investment partner for the “advanced democratic economies” (ADEs),1 which for purposes of this analysis include the Group of Seven (G7) countries,2 plus Australia, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and the European Union. Adapting to a new globalization requires establishing a strategic approach that resolves the inherent contradictions between those conflicting considerations.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Environment, Politics, Science and Technology, Economy, Business, and Energy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

79. Impact of economic sanctions on net commodity-producing and net commodity-consuming countries

Author:
Sergio R. Vale and Eduardo Viola
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has had a marked economic impact. However, since Russia is a net producer of important commodities, the impact of sanctions on its economy was less than expected. But what would happen if there was a war involving a country that was a net importer of commodities? In the case of a possible China-US conflict over Taiwan, the impact on the world economy would be different, with a deeper recession around the world, but the impact on the Brazilian economy would still be positive on account of the possibility that would remain of agricultural exports to China.
Topic:
Agriculture, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Commodities, and Exports
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

80. The Belt and Road Initiative: Dynamics for Latin America and the Caribbean Region

Author:
Anurag Tripathi, Abhishek R.L., and Arun Teja
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
To examine the challenges and risks arising from the Belt and Road Initiative, this article, in its initial section undertakes a case study of Venezuela in explaining the probable debt-trap situation arising in the Latin American region. Following it, the next section examines the risks arising from BRI from the perspective of dependency theory. It is observed that the US has taken the Latin American region for granted. However, China appears to encroach into what the US considers as its backyard. With this hindsight, China’s increasing involvement in the region is dichotomously analyzed to ponder whether it is a strategy to gain influence or an extension of peaceful rise in the third section. China’s post-pandemic investments in LAC have been analyzed to enhance the argument of a tussle between the US and China. This provides a clear picture of how the two global economic giants are scrambling their money to sustain their influence over LAC. Finally, digital geopolitics has also been considered in explaining the risks and challenges of BRI. It is observed that without any data regulation regime currently across the world, would end up LAC states into what we call data-trap. As all the above is considered, it cannot be ignored that the future of geopolitics is no more validly explained through hegemonic stability theory or hierarchical structures. It is either going to be a horizontally varied power poles anchored to the regional institutions or going back to the idea of sovereignty as the main concept
Topic:
International Cooperation, Infrastructure, Hegemony, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South America, and Venezuela