Political Geography: Asia / Publication Year: within 10 Years

851. Security Dialogues with Chinese Characteristics

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: This summer, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) organized two multilateral security dialogues with African nations, which highlight Beijing’s efforts to promote an alternative model of international security. In June, representatives of the PRC and six East African states convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for the first China-Horn of Africa Peace, Governance and Development Conference, which is an initiative that was originally proposed by Foreign Minister Wang Yi during his January visit to Kenya (Guangming Daily, June 27; PRC Foreign Ministry, January 7). At the meeting, PRC Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Xue Bing said that Beijing sought a greater role in the region, “not only in trade and investments but also in the area of peace and development” (South China Morning Post, June 23). The conference resulted in a joint statement committing to utilize confidence building, dispute resolution, dialogue and negotiation to achieve a “lasting peace” in the region (China News Service, June 23). In doing so, the parties pledged to uphold the “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept,” which was first laid out by President Xi Jinping in 2014 as a core element of his vision for a new international security architecture (Xinhua, May 24). Xi cited the need to remain committed to this concept as motivation for the PRC’s new Global Security Initiative, which he introduced in April (China Brief, May 13). Earlier this week, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) hosted the second “China-Africa Peace and Security Forum,” which was virtually attended by senior defense leaders from nearly fifty African countries (Gov.cn, July 26). In his keynote remarks, State Councilor and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe read a congratulatory letter from Xi, which hailed the resilience of Sino-African friendship in a challenging international landscape and called for the implementation of the Global Security Initiative (People’s Daily, July 26). Although somewhat short on specifics, Beijing has promoted the Global Security Initiative as a positive-sum, “common security” model in contrast to the militaristic, zero-sum approach it ascribes to the United States (China Brief, July 15).
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:: China and Asia

852. The Real U.S.-China 5G Contest is Just Getting Started

Author:: Philip Hsu
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On June 6, China declared the three-year anniversary of its business deployment of 5G, with the country having invested nearly 185 billion yuan in related infrastructure in 2021 alone (Xinhua Baoye, June 5). However, China’s 5G ambitions, which continue to form a substantial component of its national and international development policies, began years ago with Huawei. After Apple revolutionized the smartphone, demand for sophisticated computer “chips” and other components skyrocketed. Companies like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) and Foxconn capitalized on this shift to become the main pillars of Taiwan’s economy. In addition to supplying Samsung, Apple and HTC, a lesser-known, nominally private Chinese company, Huawei was also starting to make smartphones around this time using Taiwanese hardware (Nikkei Asia, 2016). Although in recent years up to 60 percent of 5G-capable Huawei phone components have been manufactured in China, which is due in large part to U.S. sanctions against it and other Chinese technology companies, a new technological Cold War is unlikely to materialize over 5G. The economic stakes over advanced computing and a new generation of telecommunications infrastructure are too high for the international community to afford any one nation or corporation primacy across the deep and diverse set of software, hardware and human capital requirements this technology will demand.
Topic:: Development, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Strategic Competition, and 5G
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

853. China’s Shifting Approach to Alliance Politics

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: For decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has abstained from seeking formal alliances. Chinese leaders often invoke the principle of advancing state-to-state relations through “dialogue rather than confrontation [and] partnerships rather than alliances” (对话不对抗、结伴不结盟, duihua bu duikang, jieban bu jiemeng) (Xinhuanet, June 23; Gov.cn, November 22, 2021). The PRC highlights its multitude of strategic partnerships and lack of official alliances as emblematic of its self-proclaimed anti-hegemonic approach to international relations, which is predicated on inclusivity, mutual respect and “win-win cooperation.” Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda regularly juxtaposes this purportedly positive-sum approach to world politics with its stock depiction of the United States as a decaying but violent empire, which practices a ruthless brand of power politics based on zero-sum thinking. For the CCP, America’s “cold war mentality” manifests in its global military presence and formal security alliances in Europe and Asia, which Beijing characterizes as “closed and exclusive cliques” (PRC Foreign Ministry [FMPRC], April 12; China Brief, October 22, 2021).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Security, and Alliance
Political Geography:: China and Asia

854. Will the China-Pakistan Corridor Get a Boost with a New Government in Islamabad?

Author:: Syed Fazl-e Haider
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On June 10, the Foreign Office in Islamabad received a diplomatic communication from the Pakistani ambassador in Beijing (The News, June 13). China assured Prime Minister (PM) Shehbaz Sharif, who replaced former PM Imran Khan in April, that it is eager to work with the present government (PRC Foreign Ministry [FMPRC], June 17). China also confirmed the rollover of a $2.3 billion loan to Pakistan at a reduced rate, which is a great help to the cash-strapped nation (The Express Tribune, June 22). Furthermore, China agreed to extend additional financial assistance between $2.5 to $2.8 billion, and pledged to support Pakistan’s fragile economy through the multi-billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Business Standard, June 29). Chinese leadership also urged the present government to reinvigorate CPEC projects, which were neglected under Imran Khan’s government (The News, June 13; Business Recorder, June 15). However, PM Sharif’s government has inherited a plethora of problems and issues plaguing progress and causing delays in the execution of projects that fall under the umbrella of CPEC.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Economy
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

855. No Choice but to Lie Flat: Youth Unemployment Surges in China

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Pity the class of 2022. The job market in China has long been a gauntlet for college graduates as the country’s largely industrial economy does not generate sufficient opportunities in the knowledge industries to satisfy the career aspirations of its growing number of college graduates. However, prospects for the current crop of jobseekers are particularly grim with a record 10.76 million college students graduating this year (Wuhan Evening News, May 24). Recent graduates must navigate an intensely competitive labor market where demand for jobs greatly outstrips supply due to the negative ramifications of the dynamic clearance zero-COVID policy, which has led to mass hiring freezes and layoffs. Regulatory crackdowns on private businesses, which reached a crescendo last year, have fostered uncertainty in the technology and private education industries, sectors where many graduates had previously found work (South China Morning Post, March 20). According to the annual “College Student Employability Survey Report” released by the recruitment firm Zhaopin (招聘), only 46.7 percent of graduating college students had received job offers as of mid-April, which is down from 62.8 percent last year (Hangzhou Daily, April 28). Not only have fewer graduates found work, but those that have, are earning less this year with an expected monthly salary of 6,295 yuan ($939), a six percent decrease from 2021.
Topic:: Economy, Youth, and Unemployment
Political Geography:: China and Asia

856. 16 + 1: China’s Push Into Central and Eastern Europe Loses Momentum

Author:: Filip Jirouš
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Since its inception in 2012, the Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (China-CEEC; 中国—中东欧国家合作, Zhongguo—Zhong Dong Ou Guojia Hezuo), better known as the 16+1 or 17+1 initiative, has often been described as a security risk with the potential to divide European structures and make them serve the interests of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC). The 16+1 is a Sinocentric economic cooperation initiative comprising China and 16 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, which share only a mutual Communist past as a common denominator (in 2019, Greece, which is heavily indebted to China, joined, and the platform was briefly renamed to 17+1). Apart from several different formats such as inter-party dialogues and think tank conferences, the 16+1 holds annual summits attended by state heads, with Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) and then Li Keqiang (李克强) the official highest-ranking PRC representatives in attendance. In comparison, two other, similar, Sinocentric regional platforms — China-CELAC Forum (中国-拉共体论坛, Zhongguo- Lagongti Luntan); and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC: 中非合作论坛, Zhongfei Hezuo Luntan) — are regularly attended by President and General Secretary Xi Jinping (习近平) (China-CELAC Forum, March 1, 2018). Thus far, FOCAC has generated the greatest level of interest from participating regional countries (China Brief, December 3, 2021). By contrast, several CEE countries have distanced themselves from the 16+1 platform: in 2021, Lithuania quit the group and this May, a Czech parliamentary committee urged the government to consider making the same move.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Asia

857. Unemployment Monitoring and Early Warning: New Trends in Xinjiang’s Coercive Labor Placement Systems

Author:: Adrian Zenz
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In mid-2019, the first efforts to systematically research and conceptualize state-sponsored forced labor systems in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) took place (Journal of Political Risk, December 2019). First, this research examined the placement of detainees in Vocational Skills Education and Training Centers (VSETCs, 职业技能教育培训中心, zhiye jineng jiaoyu peixun zhongxin), which function as re-education camps; and second, the findings detailed the transfer of rural surplus laborers (农村劳动者转移就业, nongcun laodongzhe zhuanyi jiuye) into secondary or tertiary sector work – referred to as Poverty Alleviation through Labor Transfer (脱贫转移就业, tuopin zhuanyi jiuye). In addition to general evidence for coercive labor placements into labor-intensive manufacturing, scholars uncovered evidence of coercive labor transfers for specific economic sectors such as cotton and tomato picking, as well as the production of polysilicon for solar panels (Newlines Institute, December 2020; CBC News, October 29, 2021; Bloomberg, April 2021).[1] Much of the evidence implicating these industries came from publicly available government data, media or company reports, typically dating from between 2017 and 2020. Unfortunately, since then, such evidence has become much sparser. This examination argues that this falloff in information is not just due to government censorship. Rather, it also reflects systemic and concerning changes to the ways that coercive labor placements in Xinjiang are being consolidated.
Topic:: Labor Issues, Unemployment, Domestic Policy, and Forced Labor
Political Geography:: China and Asia

858. The Enemy of My Friend Remains My Friend: China’s Ukraine Dilemma

Author:: Horia Ciurtin
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: State media in China remains equivocal about the level of destruction and mayhem caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the Chinese government has stated it will meet the challenge of overcoming strained global supplies resulting from the conflict, and has emphasized that the nation’s food security will be ensured (People’s Daily, June 2; China News Service, May 27). Nevertheless, given Ukraine’s position as a global agricultural supplier, China has not fully appreciated the scope of the problem. At a broader level, the war is a litmus test for China’s ability to navigate geopolitical troubles along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Thus far, the conflict has underscored the difficulties facing China in moving beyond convenient cordialities to play the role of a benign ‘balancer’ in global politics. In its relationships with Moscow and Kyiv, Beijing is entangled financially with both sides. Furthermore, China is now exposed to secondary sanctions due to its economic entanglement with Russia. At the same time, its investments, construction projects and supply chains that traverse Ukraine risk destruction as the war drags on.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Investment, Supply Chains, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Asia

859. China and Sri Lanka’s Debt Crisis: Belt and Road Initiative Blowback

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Sri Lanka is in the grip of an unprecedented crisis. For several months, the country has been reeling under a severe foreign exchange crisis. In early May, Foreign Minister Ali Sabry said that its usable forex reserves were just $50 million (Daily News, May 5). As a result, Sri Lanka has been forced to suspend repayment of $51 billion worth of debt owed to China, Japan and other foreign creditors (The Hindu, April 12; The Island, April 13). The country has also been unable to pay for imports of essential commodities, and has experienced serious shortages of food, fuel and medicine (The Island, January 15). The economic crisis has in turn triggered a political crisis. Public anger has boiled over onto the streets. Angry protesters have been calling for the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his brother, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa (Colombo Telegraph, April 7). The Rajapaksa family has dominated Sri Lankan politics for decades and several members of the family are in positions of power as ministers, legislators or heads of corporations and departments. Sri Lankans want the entire clan out. Some of them, including Mahinda, resigned under public pressure in recent months (Island, April 17). Although Gotabaya remains president and under the country’s executive presidential system, continues to wield enormous power, it is evident that the influence of the Rajapaksas has declined. The unfolding crises in Sri Lanka have implications beyond the island. China is among Sri Lanka’s largest bilateral lenders and has played a big role in the island’s infrastructure development. Sri Lanka is a part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Despite China’s pledges that BRI would boost Sri Lanka’s economic and social development by transforming it into “the hub of the Indian Ocean”, Chinese loans are widely believed to have pushed the country into a ‘debt trap’ (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Sri Lanka, June 16, 2017). How have the crises impacted China’s image in Sri Lanka and will the decline of the Rajapaksas, widely regarded as ‘pro-China,’ impact Sino-Sri Lankan relations? Finally, will the Sri Lankan crises affect the fate of BRI?
Topic:: Debt, Development, Politics, Infrastructure, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, Asia, and Sri Lanka

860. Mongolia’s Currency Crisis: Made in China?

Author:: Antonio Graceffo
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: When COVID-19 lockdowns closed the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) borders in 2020, imports entering Mongolia came to a grinding halt, leading to domestic inflation and product shortages. Exports also declined significantly, further constricting the flow of U.S. dollars into the country. More than two years later, China continues to pursue its “Zero-COVID” policy and the Russia-Ukraine war is driving up global gas and energy costs. An unwitting victim of decisions made in Beijing and Moscow, Mongolia is facing currency devaluation, high inflation, and a shortage of dollars.
Topic:: Currency, COVID-19, Economic Crisis, and Zero-COVID
Political Geography:: China, Mongolia, and Asia

861. Another Potemkin Visit? Rethinking the UN Human Rights Chief’s Upcoming Trip to Xinjiang

Author:: Christelle Genoud
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In March, United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet announced an agreement with China for a May visit, which includes access to Xinjiang. The exact date for the visit has yet to be determined, but recent reports indicate it is due to take place before the end of this month, which will make Bachelet the first UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit China in 17 years (China Daily, May 11). Negotiations were stalled for years with Bachelet first indicating intent to report on Xinjiang in a 2018 request for unhindered access to “all regions of China” (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), September 10, 2018). At the end of April, a UN advance team arrived in Guangzhou to quarantine before traveling to Xinjiang to lay the groundwork for Bachelet’s visit (South China Morning Post (SCMP), April 25.
Topic:: Human Rights, United Nations, and Uyghurs
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Xinjiang

862. Future Global Policeman? The Growing Extraterritorial Reach of PRC Law Enforcement

Author:: Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The recently signed security agreement between the Solomon Islands and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), along with the support of Chinese police to the Solomon Islands government to suppress social unrest in November 2021, highlight the increasing international deployment of PRC law enforcement (China Daily, April 2). This deployment follows several decades of expanding PRC international law enforcement activity, which is intended for extraterritorial enforcement action, seeking the return of fugitives, and as part of China’s engagement with other countries. The 2021 violence in the capital, Honiara, led to destruction in the local Chinatown and the subsequent deployment of Chinese police officers, who have previously provided equipment and training to the Solomon Islands. The China Police Liaison Team is led by Zhang Guangbo, an officer of the rank of Commissioner third class, who stated that the deployment is intended to protect the safety of Chinese communities in the Solomon Islands as well as to contribute to the overall stability in the islands (Embassy of the PRC in the Solomon Islands, March 4). There has been considerable unease in wider region over the expanded deployment of Chinese police officers to the Solomon Islands. The governments of Australia, Japan, and the United States have all criticized the security pact, and have raised concerns that the deployment of Chinese police officers could lead to a future military presence. Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Marise Payne stated on March 25 that “Australia is aware of the proposed draft Security Cooperation agreement between China and Solomon Islands…We would be particularly concerned by any actions that undermine the stability and security of our region, including the establishment of a permanent presence such as a military base” (Australian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, March 2022). In response to these concerns, the Solomon Islands High Commissioner to Australia has said that if Chinese police officers were called on for assistance they would be under the command of the Royal Solomon Islands Police and stated that “We will try and do our best in terms of dealing with them to make sure that what is happening in other countries where, like Hong Kong, doesn’t happen in our country” (Solomon Times, 6 May 2022).
Topic:: Security, Politics, Law Enforcement, and Economy
Political Geography:: China and Asia

863. The Storms to Come: China and Natural Disasters

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The Chinese government is currently focused on sustaining its “dynamic clearance” zero-COVID strategy, while also mitigating the negative externalities of this approach, including shortfalls in food supply and access to medical services in Shanghai and other major urban centers (China Brief, April 8). Last Friday, netizens temporarily overwhelmed censors on WeChat to widely share the video- “Voices of April” (四月之声, si yue zhi sheng), which highlights the nightmarish lockdown experiences of many Shanghai residents (China Digital Times, April 23, 2022). Mounting popular frustration with the government’s pandemic response underscores how environmental factors, which include not only diseases but also natural disasters, threaten the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) political standing. Water-related disasters such as the severe flooding that devastated Henan province last summer, and the extended drought that hit southeast China beginning in late 2020 are a rising risk due to climate change and extensive environmental degradation in China (Xinhuanet, July 31, 2021; Sina, December 9, 2021).
Topic:: Natural Disasters, Governance, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: China and Asia

864. China’s 2022 Defense Budget: Behind the Numbers

Author:: Amrita Jash
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: At the fifth session of the 13th National People’s Congress in early March, the Chinese government announced a defense budget of 1.45 trillion yuan (about $229 billion) for fiscal year 2022, which is a 7.1 percent year-on-year increase from 2021 (Xinhua, March 5). After years of double digit increases in the 2000s and early 2010s, this is the seventh consecutive year that China’s defense spending has grown by single digits. Nevertheless, China has moved up in the global defense spending rankings, and is now second only to the United States in expenditures. In the Indo-Pacific region, China’s military spending increasingly dwarfs that of its neighbors. For example, China now spends more on its military than Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and India combined (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], April 2021). For instance, at $229 billion, China’s military spending is three times that of India’s $70 billion figure for 2022 (The Economic Times, March 5). An increase in Beijing’s defense budget raises red flags for China’s neighbors and the U.S. given the growing tensions over Taiwan, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Sino-Indian border dispute in the Himalayas. However, in Chinese eyes, as Beijing-based military expert Wei Dongxu argues, the budget is “proper and reasonable” (Global Times, March 5).
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Budget, and Transparency
Political Geography:: China and Asia

865. China and the Ongoing Political Crisis in Pakistan

Author:: Syed Fazl-e Haider
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is closely monitoring the rapidly developing political crisis in Pakistan. The current upheaval stems from the introduction in Parliament of a no-confidence vote against Prime Minister Imran Khan, and his subsequent allegation that the motion is due to a foreign conspiracy to topple his government. On Sunday, the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly (the lower house of parliament), who is a member of Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party (PTI) party, dismissed the no-confidence vote as a violation of Article 5 of the Constitution, which establishes loyalty to the state as the basic duty of every citizen (Dawn, April 3). Following the dismissal, President Arif Alvi dissolved the National Assembly on the Prime Minister’s advice (The News , April 3). These developments are unfolding in the context of “letter gate,” which refers to Khan’s recent allegations that the no-confidence motion introduced by the opposition is driven by the efforts of a foreign power, which he later claimed was the US, to induce regime change in Pakistan. Yesterday, Pakistan’s Supreme Court declared both the Deputy Speaker’s dismissal of the motion again Khan, and the president’s decision to dissolve parliament unconstitutional. The Supreme Court restored the National Assembly and ordered it to reconvene on Saturday to hold a vote on the no-confidence motion (Dawn, April 7). China’s state-run media has reported extensively on the whole drama from the deputy speaker’s ruling to the Supreme Court’s verdict (Xinhua, April 8; NDTV, April 3).
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Strategic Stability, and Political Crisis
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, and Asia

866. The Beijing Olympics in Retrospect: An Anti-Human Rights Politics Machine

Author:: Christelle Genoud
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: As the U.S. and other Western nations announced diplomatic boycotts of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) frequently exhorted the international community to keep politics out of the games (People’s Daily, December 8, 2021). Spokespersons of the Beijing Organizing Committee also objected to the “politicization” of the Olympic Games, and claimed that the closed loop Olympic bubble was solely a COVID-19 containment measure necessitated by growing concerns over the spread of the Omicron variant in China (Global Times, January 5). Although, the creation of a closed loop bubble was ostensibly undertaken for epidemic prevention purposes, it also had the impact of isolating athletes and journalists, and forestalling unwanted international focus on poor human rights conditions in China.
Topic:: Human Rights, Politics, Sports, and Olympics
Political Geography:: China and Asia

867. Organized Crime on the Belt and Road

Author:: Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The continued rapid economic growth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the past decade has brought greater commerce and investment to Asia through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, as China’s overseas economic footprint has grown, Chinese organized crime groups have also expanded their activities to become a regional problem. President Xi Jinping first introduced the BRI in 2013 when he proposed to Asian leaders jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, both of which PRC officials later commonly came to call the BRI. The expansion of Chinese organized crime across Asia encompasses multiple areas of activity: online fraud (including pyramid schemes), online gambling, human trafficking (for slavery and prostitution), animal or animal parts trafficking (for use in traditional Chinese medicine), and money laundering (of the proceeds of crime from the PRC).
Topic:: Infrastructure, Economic Growth, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Organized Crime
Political Geography:: China, Malaysia, Asia, Philippines, Cambodia, and Myanmar

868. Why Beijing Wants the Dalai Lama to Reincarnate

Author:: Tenzin Dorjee
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: A strange battle is waiting to unfold at the center of the Sino-Tibetan conflict: the fight over the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation. As the 86-year-old Tibetan leader, who has spent most of his life in exile, advances further in age, there is growing uncertainty about where, or whether, his reincarnation might appear. In a 2011 statement, he laid out several different succession scenarios, one of which was the possibility that he might bring the lineage to an end (Office of his Holiness the Dalai Lama, September 24, 2011). The Chinese government was incensed; it vowed to install its own 15th Dalai Lama after the demise of the incumbent—with or without his consent (Tibetan Review, December 3, 2015).
Topic:: Religion, Domestic Politics, Dalai Lama, and Reincarnation
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Tibet

869. China and Russia: Shackled to a Corpse?

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Almost as soon as Russian tanks began their bloody crawl toward Kyiv, debate ensued over whether Chinese leaders had advance knowledge of the Kremlin’s war plans. The broader Chinese foreign policy community was certainly dumbstruck as U.S. warnings of an imminent Russian attack on Ukraine were discounted as geopolitical ploys (Global Times, February 18; Stimson, February 28). However, given the highly personalized nature of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership— President Xi Jinping has met with his counterpart Vladimir Putin 38 times since 2013 — the top leadership was assuredly not entirely in the dark (FMPRC, December 15, 2021). As competition with the U.S. has intensified under Xi, Russia has consolidated its position as China’s most consequential strategic partner. However, China is increasingly concerned that Putin’s war and the resultant international backlash are severely damaging Russia. Some elites have also condemned Russia’s brutality and unilateral aggression, which underscores mounting anxiety that China is tied to a partner that is both weaker and more belligerent than it had previously realized (China Times, March 1). In the current situation, Xi comes off poorly regardless of how much foreknowledge he possessed. If he was naïve about Putin’s designs, he looks weak for allowing a lesser partner to drag China into a confrontation with the West. If Xi cut Putin a blank check for aggression, this may intensify muted but pointed domestic criticism of his foreign policy acumen including his decision to privilege ties with Russia over relations with the West, which are more integral to China’s economic and technological development.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and Asia

870. City of Vice: Macau, Gambling, and Organized Crime in China

Author:: Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In November 2021 and January 2022, the Macau Special Administrative Region (SAR) Judiciary Police arrested 13 individuals involved in operating two separate casino VIP customer “junkets” for engaging in illegal gambling activities, running a criminal syndicate, and money laundering (Macau Judiciary Police, November 29, 2021; January 31). The criminal groups used their VIP junket business in Macau casinos to recruit mainland Chinese residents to engage in illegal online gambling on overseas platforms, and illicit side-betting. The proceeds of the syndicate were then laundered and transferred through the junket accounts of the casinos using underground banks. These developments underscore how gambling in Macau has grown from small beginnings, as tolerant Portuguese administrators did not want to unduly antagonize local Chinese, to a multi-billion dollar business that has been infiltrated by organized crime groups for much of its modern history. During Portuguese rule (1557–1999) Macau was described as the “city of the name God,” hosting the religious orders of St. Augustine, St. Dominic, and St. Francis, as well as convents and Catholic churches (Cultural Affairs Bureau, Macau Government). In the 20th century, Macau became a city of vice as casino gambling emerged as the dominant business, supported by related prostitution, money lending, and money laundering from mainland China. After the return of sovereignty and administration from Portugal to China in 1999, Macau has had extraordinary economic success and relative political stability compared to the neighboring Hong Kong SAR. Macau’s gross domestic product (GDP) rose from $6.458 billion in 1999 to $45,103 billion in 2016 at average annual growth rate of 12 percent. This economic growth, however, has been increasingly dominated by the gambling sector, which in 2013 accounted for over 60 percent of GDP. Casino “gross gambling revenue” in Macau has surpassed Las Vegas and the city is effectively the world’s largest gambling center. [1] However, as the gambling sector has grown, so has the organized crime long associated with that business that has become a domestic problem for China and has impacted other countries in Asia. A particular concern for Beijing is the Macau gambling industry’s role in facilitating capital flight.
Topic:: Law Enforcement, Borders, Gambling, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Macau

871. Gay in the PLA: Chinese Military Views on Homosexuals Serving in the Armed Forces

Author:: Brian Waidelich
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Chinese President Xi Jinping has identified the recruitment and retention of top-notch human capital as key to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) transformation into a “world-class military” by mid-century. In late January 2022, under Xi’s guidance as chairman, China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) issued its “Decision on Strengthening Military Talent Work in the New Era” (关于加强新时代军队人才工作的决定, Guanyu jiaqiang xin shidai jundui rencai gongzuo jueding), which calls human talent “a key element driving the Chinese military’s high-quality development and for winning the initiative in military competition and future warfare.” The decision calls on the PLA to develop high quality, professional talent in key areas—joint operations command, new-type combat forces, science and technology innovation, and strategic management—and for these individuals to provide “firm support” for achieving the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) military-strengthening goal and building the PLA into a world-class military (Xinhua, January 26). The CMC’s decision echoes similar past statements by Chinese leaders who have emphasized the need for the “right” kind of people to lead and support China’s armed forces (US Army War College, July 23, 2021). A common thread is the requirement for PLA personnel to fill increasingly specialized billets as the force receives and operates new, high-tech information systems, weapons, and equipment (China Brief, January 14). Apart from pronouncements of desired education and experience levels for incoming servicemembers, the PLA also publicizes certain exclusion criteria. The PLA’s official conscription and recruitment website, for example, specifies several physical requirements including minimum height and passable body mass index (Zhongguo Zhengbing Wang, January 14, 2021). However, evidence indicates other potential exclusion criteria for Chinese service members that are less clearly stated. This article offers a preliminary analysis of PLA views on homosexuals—in most cases, gay men specifically—serving in China’s armed forces. [1] The analysis draws upon 12 academic papers published by PLA-affiliated authors between 2009 and 2019 whose research focused on issues related to homosexuality and/or homosexuals serving in China’s armed forces. Ten of the 12 studies involved test subjects. This topic was difficult to explore due to the paucity of primary source material (PLA authorities may deem content on sexual minorities sensitive and unfit for public consumption). Yet it remains an important issue, as it has implications for the talent pool the PLA can draw from and for homosexual servicemembers’ ability to survive, thrive, and contribute to China’s objective of developing a world-class military force.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Military Affairs, LGBT+, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

872. China and Pakistan: Strains in the All-Weather Partnership?

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: China and Pakistan have formally launched Phase II of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship venture in China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). During Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to Beijing on February 3-6 for the Winter Olympics, the two sides signed a Framework Agreement on Industrial Cooperation to kick off the second phase of CPEC, which will focus on the development and industrialization of special economic zones (SEZs) (Pakistan Today, February 4). The joint statement issued at the end of Khan’s visit noted that “the two sides signed or concluded a number of agreements / MoUs, covering bilateral cooperation in areas of economic and technical, industry, investment, infrastructure, space, vaccine, digitalization, standardization, disaster management, culture, sports, and vocational education” (for the full text of the China-Pakistan joint statement see People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 6). According to Pakistan’s Special Assistant to the Prime Minister (SAPM) on CPEC Affairs Khalid Mansoor, CPEC’s second phase will attract multi-billion dollar investments to Pakistan. Representatives of around 500 Chinese companies met with Khan in Beijing, and per the Prime Minister’s remarks to Pakistani media following the visit, expressed interest in investing in industry, agriculture, information technology, infrastructure, housing and construction, mining and oil refining (Business Recorder, February 8). The big question, however, is whether this ostensible interest from Chinese businesses will translate into hard cash commitments. China is concerned over the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan. In the run-up to Khan’s visit, Pakistani militants carried out several major attacks in the country. On January 17, the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP), also known as Pakistani Taliban, opened fire on a security checkpoint in Islamabad (Dawn, January 19). A few days later, the newly formed Baluch Nationalist Army (BNA) carried out a bomb attack in a busy market in Lahore (Express Tribune, January 20). Hours before Khan left for China, Baluch militants struck again, this time attacking security forces’ camps in Panjgur and Naushki in Baluchistan province in southwestern Pakistan (Dawn, February 2). Then on February 5, the TTP killed five Frontier Corps personnel at a security checkpoint in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Dawn, February 7). Last year, Pakistan suffered 207 terrorist attacks, a 42% increase over 2020, according to a study by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, an independent think-tank based in Islamabad. Fatalities from terror attacks increased by 51% over the previous year. [1] Worryingly for Beijing, Pakistani militant groups have increasingly threatened Chinese nationals. Four of the attacks in 2021 targeted Chinese nationals and at least 17 Chinese workers were killed in these attacks. As China and Pakistan move into Phase II of CPEC, the safety of Chinese projects and personnel in Pakistan will be a key concern.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

873. What is at Stake in China-Bhutan Boundary Negotiations?

Author:: Jagannath P. Panda
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Satellite imagery reveals that China has recently accelerated construction along its border with Bhutan. Underway since 2020, the project includes over 200 structures, with several two-story buildings in six locations (Times of India, January 13). Bhutan has not commented on the situation in keeping with its policy to refrain from public discussion of border issues, whereas Beijing has framed the development as “normal construction activities on its own territory” (The Hindu, January 13). India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has acknowledged that it is monitoring China’s bridge-building activities over the Pangong Tso lake (India MEA, January 6). In late December, China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs announced the “standardization” of the names of 15 places (eight residential areas, four mountains, two rivers, and one mountain pass) in the Northeast Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh that China also claims and calls “Southern Tibet” (藏南, Zangnan). This is the second instance of China renaming localities in Arunachal Pradesh; the first occurred in 2017 (Global Times, December 30, 2021). India called it a “ridiculous exercise to support untenable territorial claims” (Indian MEA, January 6). Though 2022 has only begun, China’s various intimidation tactics against India are already in full swing: from renaming places and circulating videos of People’s Liberation Army soldiers raising the five-starred red flags of China, supposedly, in the Galwan Valley as part of their New Year celebrations, to expanding its dual use infrastructure along the Himalayan border (Global Times, January 1; The Print, January 13). According to state media, China has been strengthening infrastructure-related projects in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Beijing claims its infrastructure push in Tibet is intended to support economic development, but the Indian side interprets the projects as serving dual use, or, military purposes (China Brief, November 19, 2021). While Chinese sources claim that India was making a “fuss,” they did not, however, entirely deny these reports (Global Times, January 19).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, and Bhutan

874. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Hits Bottom in Balochistan

Author:: Kiyya Baloch and Akbar Notezai
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In early January, several hours of heavy rain exposed poor infrastructure and exaggerated claims of massive development in Gwadar. The largely deserted port city sits on the Iranian border in Pakistan’s southwestern Balochistan province, which is wracked by poverty, militancy, and violence. Despite its challenging location, Gwadar has long been touted as the crown jewel of the much heralded China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the $62 billion megaproject connecting western China with the Arabian sea (China Brief, January 17, 2020). On January 4, heavy rains disrupted routine activities, forcing schools, restaurants, and shops to shut down. The town’s main streets and roads, as well as its tiny airport, were flooded (Twitter/KiyyaBaloch, January 4). Cars floated down roads and people used small wooden dhows to navigate flooded streets. Local reports claimed that in the remote southern parts of Gwadar, thousands of people fled their homes (Dawn, January 5). In the city center, which is about three miles from the seaport where the China Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC) is building a $250 million coastal port, officials from the Pakistan Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) said floodwaters had reached heights of four to six feet (ARY News, January 4; Balochistan Times, January 4). As Gwadar has fallen on hard times, residents have blamed Beijing and Islamabad for ignoring them in their CPEC megaproject plans. The governments of both China and Pakistan claim that they are modernizing Gwadar by building a well-equipped hospital, parks, technical colleges, modern roads, an industrial park, and a seaport. For years, Chinese and Pakistani officials have claimed that this coastal backwater would soon compete with Dubai, Singapore, and Shenzhen to attract huge foreign investment. However, the currently poor state of Gwadar’s infrastructure underscores that this narrative remains illusory. The rain and flooding have wreaked havoc in Gwadar as it grapples with huge protests demanding better civic facilities and an end to economic injustices. Some have called the recent protests a struggle for civil rights, while others have labeled the movement — the “Baloch Spring” (Dawn, January 2). In December, the protests, which lasted for more than a month, became a heated topic of discussion on Pakistani social media. However, the protests attracted only modest international media attention, and were officially called off on December 16. While it is too early to determine the full impact of the protests, Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan and the Chief Minister of Balochistan province have formed a committee to address protesters’ concerns.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Economy, and Investment
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

875. China-Lithuania Tensions Boil Over Taiwan

Author:: William Yuen Yee
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: After Lithuania decided to open a Taiwanese Representative Office in July 2021, China responded with an all-out diplomatic and economic pressure campaign against the Baltic nation of 2.8 million people. The Chinese government expelled the Lithuanian ambassador, recalled its own ambassador from Vilnius in August, and downgraded Lithuania’s overall diplomatic status in China (Xinhua, August 10, 2021). In response, Lithuania announced a diplomatic boycott of the upcoming Beijing Winter Olympics in protest of China’s human rights abuses, even before the United States, Australia, Canada, and Britain announced their own Olympic boycotts (LRT, December 2, 2021). “Anyone who would choose Lithuania as an enemy has also made an enemy of the United States of America,” former U.S. President George W. Bush told a crowd of thousands gathered in the capital city of Vilnius in 2002 (Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, November 25, 2002). Back then, Bush lauded Lithuania’s entry into NATO and pledged that its people would no longer stand alone against external aggression. Two decades later, rapidly intensifying tensions between Lithuania and China are putting Bush’s famous words to the test. As Lithuania looks to its democratic partners in the EU and U.S. for support amid a firestorm of Chinese sanctions, the response has been mixed and somewhat uncertain.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Eastern Europe, Taiwan, Asia, and Lithuania

876. The U.S.-China Perception Gap: A Recipe for Disaster?

Author:: Harry He
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In December, a war of words raged across the Pacific over the very meaning of the word “democracy” (China Brief, December 14, 2021). The United States held its Summit for Democracy, inviting other democracies of various stripes, while China convened its own competing “Dialogue on Democracy,” calling out the U.S. for fomenting a cold war-style global geopolitical split (CGTN, December 2, 2021; U.S. Department of State). This discourse battle exemplifies a trend in Chinese views of the U.S. that has been gradually forming over the past 15 years. The 2008 global financial crisis, ill-fated American military campaigns, and mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic have led Chinese leaders to doubt U.S. power and capabilities. Yet, Washington has held on to the belief that it is capable of shaping China’s behaviors, either through inducement or deterrence. Even as the U.S. recognizes the limits of its influence and the recent relative decline in prestige, it still sees tremendous strengths in its military and economic prowess, alliance networks, democratic values, and soft power. The perception gap between China and the U.S. concerning American power is a potential recipe for disaster. While this does not imply that conflict is imminent or unavoidable, it does make miscalculations and miscommunications in the U.S.-China relationship both more likely and more dangerous.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Discourse, and Perception
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

877. A Bitter Winter: Omicron Tests the Limits of China’s Zero-COVID Approach

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has sought to achieve a “zero-infection” (零感染,ling ganran) rate among its population. The Chinese government has pursued this objective through the “dynamic clearance” (动态清零, dongtai qing ling) policy, which is predicated on keeping China’s international borders largely closed, and rapidly detecting, isolating, and eliminating domestic outbreaks (People’s Daily, January 7). Dynamic clearance relies on digital monitoring, mass testing, and controlling population movement to achieve early detection and reduce of COVID-19 transmission. Responses to even single-digit case clusters include mandatory lockdowns, and centralized quarantines in government health centers for potentially infected or exposed groups (Xinhua, August 19, 2021).
Topic:: Crisis Management, COVID-19, Health Crisis, and Zero-COVID
Political Geography:: China and Asia

878. China’s Antarctic Ambitions – and Their Implications for Australia

Author:: Yun Jiang
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In a new special report AIIA China Matters Fellow Yun Jiang argues that popular Australian concerns around the Antarctic ambitions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including possible territorial claims, militarisation, and mining, are overstated.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Hegemony, Conflict, Mining, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Australia

879. Winning hearts and minds: the PRC’s efforts to attract scientific talent

Author:: Yun Jiang
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In her second policy research report, Ms Yun Jiang, AIIA China Matters Fellow, assesses efforts by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to encourage the return of PRC-born scientists from abroad. Xi Jinping has made attracting returnee talent a priority to enable the PRC to achieve greater technological strength and self-reliance. Yun Jiang argues that these sometimes controversial programs have not met their objectives. Many top scientists are reluctant to return because of domestic policies in the PRC. At the same time, scientists of Chinese heritage in the United States face greater scrutiny and suspicion. Australia has an opportunity to attract some of this top scientific talent caught between the two countries.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Hegemony, Business, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China and Asia

880. Impact of CPEC on Pakistan’s Economic Outlook

Author:: Sajid Mehmood Shahzad
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Pakistan‟s vital geopolitical position is an advantage for this South Asian nation. It is located at the apex of the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, the People‟s Republic of China has setup the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with a futuristic strategy to gain long-term benefits. This planning is not random at all. It is a cohesive plan to revitalize the financial system of its long-standing collaborator and ally through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which is currently the talk of the town. The present study analyzes how Pakistan‟s conventional economic outlook can be transformed through the CPEC. While harnessing the power of Pakistan as a „trade route‟, the CPEC has the potential to reshape transport & security options, increase the cost-effectiveness of goods, and widen the scope for new and existing businesses. it will develop a networking coherence among agricultural & industrial hubs and connect special economic zones (SEZs) with the rest of the country and beyond. This paper evaluates the CPEC‟s fiscal footprint on Pakistan‟s economy and examines the correlation between overcoming economic shortcomings and increasing future gains through a cause-and-effect relationship.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

881. Pak-China Geostrategic Interdependence: Impact on Rising Economies of Asia

Author:: Ameena Nasim
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: China and Pakistan have enjoyed a close and mutually beneficial relationship during the last seven decades. Both the nations‘ leadership pronounced the bilateral relationship between China and Pakistan as the ―All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership‖ and ―Iron Brother.‖ The strategic partnership between China and Pakistan has a significant impact on the Asian strategic environment in particular and global politics. The Indian strategic enclave regards China-Pakistan‘s multifaceted relationship as a substantial obstacle for India‘s rise as a Great Power within the regional context. The study‘s primary objective is to critically examine impact on Asia‘s main actors such as India and Russia. So that one can profess about the dynamics of this relationship and implications of China and Pakistan‘s geo-strategic relations on the rising economies. A qualitative study with qualitative interviews and thematic analysis was applied to conduct this study. The analysis reveals that South Asian RSC has no change in the patterns of amity and enmity. The region continues to be conflictive, where their enduring rivalry and continued distrust shape enmity patterns between Pakistan and India. On the contrary, Pakistan and China‘s amity patterns can be seen growing in the longstanding strategic relationship and deep-rooted cooperation. The investigation discovers that on a bilateral level, several new factors in the post-9/11 era have molded Pakistan-China Strategic relations, which have intricate linkages with the regional and global security complexion.
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Interests, Interdependence, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, and Asia

882. Japanese Non-State Actors’ Under-Recognised Contributions to the International Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movement

Author:: Lili Chin, Geetha Govindasamy, and Md Nasrudin Md Akhir
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: Since the 1950s, Japanese non-state actors in the international anti-nuclear weapons movement have disseminated the dangers of nuclear weapons, tied to Japanese experiences of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Coming from the only country that has experienced nuclear attacks, they provide much needed evidence of the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons. These actors include survivors of the atomic bombings, commonly known as hibakusha, who have initiated and persistently maintained the humanitarian focus on nuclear discourse for decades. This paper examines their contributions to eyewitness testimonies on the impacts of nuclear weapons and their efforts leading to major milestones in international efforts for nuclear abolition. It also focuses on the roles played by the Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organization (Nihon Hidankyo) and the Japan Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (JALANA), which made tremendous contributions facilitating the success of the World Court Project in the 1990s and the Humanitarian Initiative in the 2010s that led to the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Non-state Japanese contributions were, unfortunately, under-recognised, and the successes of international nuclear abolition were often attributed to other international actors. Hence, this paper recognises the contributions of non-state Japanese actors in sustaining the international anti-nuclear weapons movement and achieving the nuclear ban treaty.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Non State Actors, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

883. A pillar of stability in an unstable world

Author:: Stefania Benaglia and Dylan Macchiarini Crosson
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: The rising centrality of the Indo-Pacific is self-evident. What remains to be defined is the potential role the EU could play, notably as a security actor. Given capacity constraints, the EU’s objectives in the region should focus on credibility and on safeguarding shared interests – for example securing sea lines of communication, an objective also shared by Japan. Hard power remains the preferred language in the Indo-Pacific region. Australia unceremoniously dumping the French contract over US nuclear technology in the AUKUS affair, as well as India’s reluctance to take a position against Russia, a major provider of defence equipment, over its full-blown invasion of Ukraine demonstrate that being able to speak the language of power in a credible and reliable way takes precedence. While the EU will unlikely become a defence security provider à la the United States, it is now clear that it must evolve its global stance. The adoption of the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy and cross-references to it in the EU’s Strategic Compass represent an important milestone for bolstering its security and defence posture. The EU would do well to support its efforts to be a more credible security and defence actor in the Indo-Pacific by upgrading relations with its strategic partners, Japan in primis. Further operational, capabilities development, and industrial cooperation with Japan must be considered and reinforced by triangulation with other strategic partners in the region.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Political stability, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Japan, Europe, and Asia

884. The Belt and Road Initiative as Ten Policy Commandments: Review of Xi’s Kazakhstan and Indonesia Launch Speeches

Author:: Lauren A. Johnson
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: In 2019 Foreign Policy described China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as “the most talked about and least defined buzzword of this decade”. Given that confusion and the importance of leader political speeches in China, especially those of current President Xi Jinping, it is surprising that the BRI literature has little in-depth analysed the two launch speeches of 2013. This article seeks to fill that gap with study of those speeches and focus on the five cooperationoriented areas announced in each. In comparative context those ten pillars appear not to be descended from New Era Chinese heaven but rather demonstrate substantive thematic overlap with the ten pillars of what was once relatively mainstream macroeconomic development policy, the Washington Consensus. Yet, in the case of the BRI there is a relative implicit implementation emphasis also. In forward context of contemporary global political economy tensions, the need to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic, the G7’s Build Back Better and the European Union’s Global Gateway ambitions also, this article may offer a timely fresh and comparative lens on the BRI.
Topic:: Development, International Cooperation, Infrastructure, Hegemony, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Global Focus

885. Ukraine and China: Russian Invasion and After

Author:: Vivienne Bath, Rowan Callick, Raffaello Pantucci, Bing Ling, and Jingdong Yuan
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: This Understanding China Brief results from a roundtable discussion organized by the China Studies Centre and the Centre for Asia and Pacific Law of Sydney University on 10 March 2022 to examine the legal, political, economic, and international relations issues surrounding China arising from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

886. Why China’s Zero Covid Strategy Might Underwrite China’s High-Quality Development and Common Prosperity Agendas – At Home and Away

Author:: Lauren Johnston
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: The more than month-long strict ‘Zero-Covid19’ lockdown of Shanghai from April 1, 2022, drew international attention for the fact that one of the world’s richest and most trade-connected cities in the world even could be so shutdown. Economists have expressed fear that the scale of the disruption to China’s middle-class elite and to global supply chains may have lasting negative impacts for China’s economy and globalisation. In a case of making hay while the lockdown sun shines, however, while residents of Shanghai and to some extent also Beijing, have been locked inside, Beijing has been busy announcing some new hukou-related educational and civil administrative reforms. In total contrast to locking Chinese down, these may ultimately and in contrast come to underpin a far more mobile Chinese labour force, a more competitive business environment within China, and even more mobility of Chinese citizens globally. In this way, far from being incongruent with China’s economic development or globalisation, via the parallel hukou-related reforms that took place alongside the distraction of COVID19 lockdowns of early 2022, these may prove to have served to underpin not only China’s ‘high-quality development’ and ‘common prosperity’ agendas, but even the fluidity of the Belt and Road Initiative.
Topic:: Governance, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China and Asia

887. What now for Australia-China relations?

Author:: The University of Sydney China Studies Centre
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: After the May Federal Election, Labor Party leader Anthony Albanese was sworn in as the new Prime Minister of Australia. What could this change in government mean for future Australia-China relations? At the China Studies Centre event on 3 June, four experts and practitioners in Australia-China relations discussed the bilateral relations over the past few years and the prospects for future political, social and economic interactions.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Australia

888. China’s international higher education environment: change and stasis

Author:: The University of Sydney China Studies Centre
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: It seems that China’s international higher education environment may be changing. This roundtable discussion focuses on the following 4 topics: 1. Several of China’s leading universities have announced their withdrawal from international ranking schemes. How do more China-focussed measures of performance feed into the push for world-class universities. 2. There seems to be a push to discourage Chinese students from going overseas for international education opportunities, as for example in the postponement of US placement exams and continuing concerns about Covid-19 pandemic control. Is this likely to continue, and if so for how long and under what conditions 3. What are the prospects for recruitment of Chinese students to Australian universities. 4. What are the prospects for China’s international cooperation in higher education, both in research and in delivery of joint venture programs and institutions in China. The discussion was chaired and moderated by Anthony Welch of Sydney School of Education and Social Work, the University of Sydney, and the speakers include academic managers and leaders, academics with an interest in international higher education (China’s and more generally), and those with experience of joint venture higher education institutions.
Topic:: Education, Higher Education, COVID-19, and Study Abroad
Political Geography:: China and Asia

889. Post 20th CCP Congress Roundtable

Author:: The University of Sydney China Studies Centre
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China met in Beijing starting 16 October. The last five years since the 19th Congress have seen fairly important changes in the political environment, including the deterioration of relations with the USA, the challenges of dealing with the pandemic, and an economic slowdown. The Congress has adopted the various reports presented and announced the new CCP leadership line-up. On Monday 31st October the China Studies Centre hosted an online Roundtable discussion of the main outcomes of the Congress.
Topic:: Governance, Ideology, Transition, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

890. Europe’s Area of Maritime Interest in Northeast Asia

Author:: Philip Shetler-Jones
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Participation in the monitoring of UN sanctions on North Korea is Europe’s most prominent operational contribution to Indo-Pacific security, but is also characterised by a fragmented, bilateral approach that contradicts the trajectory of recent European policies that strive for a more meaningful and coordinated investment in this area. A coordinated European presence in the region built around the sanctions monitoring task is within reach, and steps taken to achieve it would dramatically enhance the policy coherence and impact of European action on Northeast Asian security.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, European Union, and Maritime
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, and North Korea

891. India–China Boundary Dispute: Progress on Disengagement, but De-escalation Remains Far-fetched

Author:: Amrita Jash
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: On 13 September 2022, India and China confirmed the completion of their respective disengagements from another friction point along their mutually contested border. The disengagement took place in eastern Ladakh, resulting in the withdrawal of troops from Patrolling Point (PP) 15 in the Gogra-Hot Springs area.[1] This was the fourth disengagement from the area, marking a step towards ending the 28-month stand-off in the eastern Ladakh ongoing since the military clashes of May 2020. This stand-off has not only been the longest but also one of the most violent confrontations between India and China. On 15 June 2020, the Galwan Valley clash led to multiple casualties, twenty on the Indian side, while less clarity exists on the numbers of Chinese deaths.[2] All in all the incident was the bloodiest military clash since the Sumdorong Chu crisis in 1986–87.
Topic:: Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Borders, and Disengagement
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

892. NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Novelties and Priorities

Author:: Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: NATO’s new Strategic Concept provides a clear set of guidelines for the Alliance in a mid-term perspective. Adopted on 29 June in Madrid, the Concept outlines a number of priorities stemming from Russia’s war on Ukraine, but also puts forward relevant novelties concerning China and the Indo-Pacific. During the NATO Summit in Madrid, alliance members affirmed that Russia can no longer be considered a partner, effectively internalising the geopolitical earthquake represented by the return of a major conventional and multi-domain war on European soil.[1] The Strategic Concept also identifies deterrence and defence as the Alliance’s number one priority, in comparison to the other core tasks: crisis prevention and management and cooperative security.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

893. North Korea’s Covid-19 Outbreak: An Opening for Engagement?

Author:: Lorenzo Mariani and Leonardo Bruni
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In January 2020, in response to the novel coronavirus, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK; North Korea) closed its borders and for the next two years claimed it had not experienced a single case of Covid-19. However, on 12 May 2022, North Korea disclosed a severe domestic outbreak and in the following weeks began reporting millions of cases of “fevers” and several deaths.[1] Pyongyang’s admission was initially interpreted as a veiled request for international assistance as the country is particularly vulnerable due to its zero per cent vaccination rate, inadequate healthcare system and chronic food insecurity. However, as with previous attempts during the height of the pandemic, offers of aid and vaccines from the Republic of Korea (ROK; South Korea), the US, international organisations (IOs) and multilateral initiatives like COVAX received no response; most likely due to suspicion of the aid being politicised.[2]
Topic:: Health, Foreign Aid, European Union, Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

894. A Perfect Recipe for the Next Escalation on the Korean Peninsula

Author:: Lorenzo Mariani and Manuel Herrera
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: North Korea has been conducting regular missile tests as part of its weapons development programme over the past year. Put bluntly, this reflects the complete stalemate in denuclearisation talks following Biden’s election in the US and a stark reminder of the meagre results of the conciliatory strategy carried out by the former South Korean President Moon Jae-in. Hypersonic as well as short-range, intermediate-range and long-range ballistic missiles have all been part of this latest series of tests. On 24 March, North Korea claimed to have successfully launched a new modern intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), denominated Hwasong-17. While the entity of the vector has yet to be confirmed, if this allegation is proven true it would mark the first time an ICBM has been fired since 2017, breaking Pyongyang's self-imposed moratorium on such tests. The volley of tests has fuelled speculations that North Korea is gearing up for the launch of a larger weapon theoretically capable of reaching the US mainland.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Conflict Management
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

895. Constraints for Engagement with China: Dutch Ports and the BRI

Author:: Vera Kranenburg and Frans-Paul van der Putten
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Rising US–China rivalry is shaping and constraining the relations between European states and China. The Netherlands is no exception and recent tensions with China have carried over to impact its trade and cooperative engagements with Beijing. The Netherlands never formally signed onto the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)[1] – the Chinese policy framework for international transport, communication and energy development. Nevertheless, the BRI is very relevant to the Netherlands, in particular for the Dutch port of Rotterdam and its ambition to preserve its role as a major logistical hub for trade with Europe.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Trade, Engagement, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Netherlands, and United States of America

896. Japan and the War in Ukraine

Author:: Eyal Ben-Ari
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Two weeks after the war began, Japan announced that its new National Security Strategy scheduled to be published this year would recategorize Russia from “partner” to “security challenge,” thus placing it alongside China and North Korea.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Europe, and Asia

897. Biden, Israel, and China: Making a Difficult Threesome Work

Author:: Steven R. David
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: It is wrong to expect Israel, a middle-level economy, to decouple from China when far wealthier countries (including the United States) show no signs of following suit. Israeli companies should not be subject to restrictions not placed on companies elsewhere, including the United States itself.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, North America, and United States of America

898. Through the Lenses of Morality and Responsibility: BRICS, Climate Change and Sustainable Development

Author:: Goktug Kiprizli
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: The aim of this article is to shed a broader light on the social identity of the BRICS group of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) whose growing economic power is the defining motive of their social construct in international relations. In line with this purpose, the article examines the BRICS nations’ positions concerning the moral aspect and the notion of responsibility for the nexus between climate change and sustainable development. This article argues that their statements and discourse on climate change and sustainable development forge the process of constructing a separate group identity for the BRICS partners. The articulation of moral appraisals and the notion of responsibility in the areas of climate change and sustainable development help the BRICS countries build their self-conception and self-categorization corresponding to their identity as emerging powers, so their actions are accomplished accordingly.
Topic:: Development, Sustainability, BRICS, Morality, Identity, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Europe, India, Asia, South Africa, Brazil, and South America

899. COVID-19 Implications for China's National Security

Author:: Marta Gębska
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The COVID-19 pandemic began in March 2020 and China has since been under public scrutiny for neglecting the first signs of this global health challenge and for its lockdown strategy. Although lockdowns have not lasted for long, China needs to confront the political, social, and economic implications for its national security. The paper aims to fill a gap in the knowledge and investigate aspects of China’s national security in light of the pandemic. The study is based on desk research using secondary data and statistical and comparative analysis. It also employs an inductive method to build general theorems. The Chinese government can be seen as successful in dealing with the pandemic because of a low death toll and minimal economic losses. By early February 2022, only 106,863 Chinese had been diagnosed, and 4,636 had died from the virus. China also achieved enviable economic success and, its output grew by 18.3% year on year in the first quarter of 2021, the fastest rate since the 1990s, and it was the first major economy to withdraw its pandemic stimulus. China consolidated its position in low-income countries and improved its image as a global leader in trade by supplying vaccines, masks and ventilators, and strengthened its geopolitical standing. It will face threats from other countries working on a joint approach to the challenges posed by Beijing and while the aftereffects of the crisis can be seen, it also fears that they might further affect China's national security.
Topic:: National Security, International Security, Economy, COVID-19, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: China and Asia

900. Ukraine War Distracts US from China, Legitimizes Nuclear Bombs

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is distracting the US from the Chinese threat and erodes the nuclear taboo.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, Rivalry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, North America, and United States of America

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