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141. More than meets the eye in ROK ceding developing economy status

Author:
Dong Yan and Ma Tao
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
A large number of farmers in the Republic of Korea took to the streets of Seoul on Wednesday, protesting the government's recent decision to give up its developing country status at the World Trade Organization in future trade negotiations and thus lose the benefits accruing out of it. The protesters were worried that the decision would eventually lead to a drastic cut in state agriculture subsidies and tariffs. …… Given that countries could experience uneven development, gaining undue advantages in some areas while being weak in others, the WTO has prevented some developing countries from enjoying some of the special and differential treatments in certain fields. For instance, it has restricted the ROK and India from using measures to promote balance of payment. Besides, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, revised in 2003, allows countries that lack production capability to import nonproprietary medicines, which is opposed by the developed countries－and 11 countries including China, the ROK, Mexico and Turkey have agreed to implement the agreement only in emergencies.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, World Trade Organization, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, and Korea

142. CSIS Brief: Beyond the Brink: Escalation and Conflict in U.S.-China Economic Relations

Author:
Matthew P. Goodman, Dylan Gerstel, and Pearl Risberg
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
As the United States and China mark their 40th anniversary of formal diplomatic relations in 2019, the world’s most important bilateral relationship is increasingly defined by mistrust, competition, and uncertainty. After four decades of deepening economic integration, the talk in Washington today is about the extent to which the two economies will “decouple” over the years ahead. In a recent study, the CSIS Simon Chair drew on several different academic disciplines to model how an economic conflict between the United States and China could escalate and eventually de-escalate. Our findings suggest that economic conflict is likely to be an enduring feature of the U.S.-China relationship for many years to come. Until perceptions of relative costs in the two countries shift, Washington and Beijing seem set on a path of continued escalation, no substantial trade deal, and at least partial decoupling of their economies.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Conflict, Trade Policy, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

143. The Sino-U.S. Phase One Trade Deal Is an Imperfect Painkiller. What's Next?

Author:
Jude Blanchette and Qiu Mingda
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassadors Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
After two days of intense talks with United States Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer, Chinese Vice Premier Liu He and his delegation crossed the street to the White House on the afternoon of October 11th to meet with President Donald Trump for the first time since the negotiations collapsed in May. The visit marked the 13th round of the bilateral trade talks and concluded with an announcement from the Oval Office of a “phase one” agreement. According to President Trump, this included China’s commitment to purchase $40-50 billion of U.S. agricultural products and a pledge to strengthen its intellectual property protection regime domestically. Moreover, Beijing would make still-unknown adjustments to how it manages its currency, the renminbi. For its part, the United States delayed a scheduled tariff hike on $250 billion of Chinese goods from 25% to 30% on October 15th. In addition, the Treasury Department would potentially review its previous decision to designate China a currency manipulator. All in all, it seemed to mark a turning point in the bilateral tensions. According to a tweet from President Trump two days later, this was the beginning of a larger deal that would be spread over three phases and that would benefit American farmers and potentially put an end to the trade hostilities between the two nations. In short, he tweeted, “the relationship with China is very good.” Though he acknowledged that the actual terms of any deal are still being worked out, the President repeatedly expressed optimism that he and Chinese leader Xi Jinping could ink a deal by mid-November during their meeting at the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Santiago, Chile. Unfortunately, such confidence is misplaced. The decided lack of details on the scope, timing and mechanics of the phase one announcement is an indication of just how preliminary the agreement is. Second, Beijing remains unwilling to make more substantive concessions on core structural issues, ranging from its preferential treatment of its state-owned enterprises to a credible commitment that it will protect the intellectual property of foreign companies. Finally, even if phase one comes to fruition, this won’t do much to reduce the uncertainty that likely will define the U.S.-China relationship for years to come, as both countries begin to openly acknowledge that they are entering a period of prolonged strategic rivalry.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

144. Public and Opinion Leaders' Views on US-China Trade War

Author:
Craig Kafura
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
The Trump Administration has taken an aggressive line on US-China trade issues. Starting with steel and aluminum tariffs in March 2018, the United States has gradually imposed a number of tariffs on various Chinese goods. China responded in turn to each round. Recent negotiations, though initially fruitful, foundered on issues of Chinese subsidies and what US trade representative Robert Lighthizer described as “an erosion in commitments by China.” Now the escalation cycle has resumed. According to surveys conducted in 2018 among foreign policy opinion leaders by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the University of Texas, and the results of the 2018 Chicago Council Survey of the general US public, concerns about a potential trade war between the United States and China were already widespread before this most recent escalation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Public Opinion, and Trade Wars
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

145. Americans Favor US-China Trade, Split Over Tariffs

Author:
Craig Kafura
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Over the past 18 months, the United States and China have engaged in a steady escalation of tariffs. Beginning with steel and aluminum tariffs imposed by the Trump administration in March 2018, the trade conflict has expanded to cover hundreds of billions of dollars in bilateral trade. Recent rounds of negotiations have made no new progress and have led to both sides escalating further. The most recent US tariffs on Chinese imports went into effect on September 1, covering $112 billion of goods. Beijing has countered with retaliatory tariffs and has halted all agricultural purchases from the United States, a move targeted at already-struggling US farmers. While Americans broadly support engaging in trade with China, they are split along partisan lines on how to engage in that trade. Republicans support raising tariffs on Chinese imports and believe it will help the US economy in the long run, while Democrats oppose doing so and believe it will be harmful.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Tariffs, and Trade Wars
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

146. Delivering Prosperity in the Indo-Pacific: An Agenda for Australia and the United States

Author:
Matthew P. Goodman, Gordon de Brouwer, Shiro Armstrong, and Adam Triggs
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The ongoing shift in global economic weight to the Indo-Pacific1 presents tremendous opportunities for the United States and Australia, along with risks and significant challenges. Both countries share a deep strategic interest in working together to keep Asian markets open, contestable, and rules-based. In doing so, Washington and Canberra can help maximize the prosperity and security of the American and Australian people, as well as those in the region. It is an opportunity too great to miss.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia, Australia, North America, and United States of America

147. China in a World of Orders: Rethinking Compliance and Challenge in Beijing's International Relations

Author:
Alastair Iain Johnston
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Many scholars and policymakers in the United States accept the narrative that China is a revisionist state challenging the U.S.-dominated international liberal order. The narrative assumes that there is a singular liberal order and that it is obvious what constitutes a challenge to it. The concepts of order and challenge are, however, poorly operationalized. There are at least four plausible operationalizations of order, three of which are explicitly or implicitly embodied in the dominant narrative. These tend to assume, ahistorically, that U.S. interests and the content of the liberal order are almost identical. The fourth operationalization views order as an emergent property of the interaction of multiple state, substate, nonstate, and international actors. As a result, there are at least eight “issue-specific orders” (e.g., military, trade, information, and political development). Some of these China accepts; some it rejects; and some it is willing to live with. Given these multiple orders and varying levels of challenge, the narrative of a U.S.-dominated liberal international order being challenged by a revisionist China makes little conceptual or empirical sense. The findings point to the need to develop more generalizable ways of observing orders and compliance.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, Military Affairs, Information Age, and Liberal Order
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

148. Determinants of Developing Countries' Export Upgrading: The Role of China and Productive Investment

Author:
Dic Lo and Yue Teng
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
School of Oriental and African Studies - University of London
Abstract:
This paper explores the determinants of developing countries' export upgrading measured by export sophistication. In particular, as a response to the recent debate on China's impact on developing countries' industrialisation, we examine a new hypothesis that the considerable growth in developing countries' trade with China may serve as a source of productive investment for their export upgrading. Dynamic panel estimations based on HS 6-digit export data on 62 developing countries during 1995-2014 show the positive effects of human capital, productive investment, and absolute gains from trade with China measured by income terms of trade vis-à-vis China. Mediation analysis finds that the positive effect of trade with China on export upgrading takes effect largely through its enhancing effect on productive investment, which supports our hypothesis. By contrast, China's direct export-downgrading impact is minor. Our findings suggest that, for developing countries, China serves more as a stimulator of capital accumulation for industrial development than a competitor in manufacturing market or a predator of natural resources. This provides an alternative to the widespread argument of China's crowding-out and re- primarisation impact on developing countries. The priority for developing countries is therefore the appropriate use of the gains from trade for productive purposes.
Topic:
Development, International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, Investment, Exports, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
China and Asia

149. U.S. Trade Policy in North America, China, and Beyond

Author:
Andy Green and Daniella Zessoules
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
In recent decades, economic, political, and technological barriers to international trade and investment have collapsed around the world. This rapid globalization of commerce has lifted many out of poverty in developing countries, but due in part to a lack of meaningful labor and environmental standards and enforcement, it has also resulted in an outsourcing of production and jobs as well as downward pressure on workers’ real wages in developed countries such as the United States.1 The key trade agreements and international institutions put in place to manage globalization, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), have failed to rebalance the rules to enable globalization to work on behalf of all workers—not just in the United States, but in Mexico, China, and more broadly. And in many cases, the trade rules have exacerbated economic pressures on many U.S. workers.2 For years, progressive voices in the United States have called for efforts to make globalization work better for working families, communities, and the environment.3 Now, the Trump administration has sought claim to the trade reform mantle. Those claims, however, should be met with skepticism. The 2017 congressional Republican tax law slashed taxes for corporations and the wealthy on the false promise of raising wages for workers.4 Corporate profits, share buybacks, and mergers and acquisitions have all boomed, but working-class wages have barely budged.5 The international provisions of the 2017 tax law further incentivize offshoring operations at the expense of domestic investments and sourcing.6 The Trump administration’s domestic economic agenda of financial deregulation, budget cuts, and attacks on workplace safety and labor rights protections will simply make matters worse for working families. The administration’s record on trade policy has been mixed and largely incoherent. The president railed against NAFTA and other trade agreements for harming workers and U.S. jobs yet renegotiated a new NAFTA deal that fails to make labor and environmental standards meaningfully enforceable.7 His administration has slapped tariffs on adversaries and allies alike with little strategy—often in the name of national security and without addressing the root causes of the problem. Threatening further tariffs, the administration now is engaged in negotiations with China over intellectual property theft, market access for foreign multinationals, and a state-led industrial strategy.8 The president announced a delay in the additional tariffs, suggesting a deal with China is coming together, but concerns have long existed that the administration may settle for high-profile spot sales of U.S. commodities while effectively letting structural impediments and China’s industrial policies continue.9 The cost of what may be President Donald Trump’s high-profile deal with China could be real concessions for the United States, including in the technology and national security space, without providing lasting, solidly enforceable benefits more broadly.10 As U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer makes his first appearance this week before the new U.S. House of Representatives, the Trump administration will finally have to answer for its approach. Here are several questions that Congress should ask in order to hold the administration accountable to the American people.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

150. Chinese Leadership and the Future of BRI: What Key Decisions Lie Ahead?

Author:
Brad Parks
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
It’s 2028. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been underway for 15 years, but the initial enthusiasm and momentum behind BRI has vanished. Many of the governments that initially joined the initiative have publicly withdrawn or quietly wound down their participation. China’s staunchest allies remain engaged but even they have reservations about the wisdom of the initiative. They are saddled with unproductive public investment projects and struggling to service their debts. Domestic public sentiment towards China has soured, and they have come to view their participation in BRI as more of a political liability than an asset. But they worry about the consequences of alienating their most important patron and creditor. China has also assumed a defensive posture. Lacking the goodwill that it possessed at the beginning of BRI, it is now using inducements and threats to prevent its remaining clients from abandoning the initiative. Western donors and lenders watch from the sidelines with a sense of bemusement. They encouraged China to “multilateralize” BRI by establishing a common set of project appraisal standards, procurement guidelines, fiduciary controls, and social and environmental safeguards that other aid agencies and development banks could support. But Beijing chose to go it alone. It opted not to embrace the use of economic rate-of-return analysis to vet project proposals; resisted efforts to harmonize its environmental, social, and fiduciary safeguards with those used by aid agencies and development banks outside of China; and pushed back on the “Western” suggestion that it modernize its monitoring and evaluation practices. China bet that its fast and flexible approach to infrastructure finance would prove to be so compelling that traditional donors and lenders would eventually jump on the bandwagon and co-finance BRI projects. But it miscalculated. Its model was insufficiently attractive on its merits to enlist the participation and support of the other major players in the bilateral and multilateral development finance market. Nor was it sufficiently appealing to sustain elite and public support in partner countries.
Topic:
Development, International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Leadership, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China and Asia