101. Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theorist's Perspective
- Author:
- Roger B. Myerson
- Publication Date:
- 11-2007
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
- Abstract:
- In a dangerous world, we need to think very carefully about how military force is used. Game theory can serve us in such analyses by providing a framework for probing the inextricable connections between our adversaries' decision problems and our own. To illustrate the power of game theory, the author focuses on a vital question that confronts American policymakers today: What determines why an application of military force, which was intended to deter potential adversaries, sometimes instead stimulates them to more militant reactions against us? When we feel that force is necessary, what can we do to minimize the risk of such adverse reactions?
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, War, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Political Geography:
- America