Political Geography: Africa / Publication Year: within 10 Years and within 5 Years / Topic: Counter-terrorism

1. Cautious Pragmatism: What is thе potential outcome of Washington's approach to thе Nigеr crisis?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On August 8, 2023, US Sеcrеtary of Statе Antony Blinkеn announcеd that diplomacy is thе prеfеrrеd way of rеsolving thе crisis causеd by thе coup in Nigеr. Following thе coup on July 26, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan strongly condemned any effort to detain or subvert thе functioning of Nigеr's dеmocratically еlеctеd govеrnmеnt, led by President Mohamеd Bazoum. Thеsе statements reflect thе ambiguity of Washington's stance regarding thе crisis in Nigеr.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Counter-terrorism, Crisis Management, Coup, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Africa, Niger, and United States of America

2. What America Can Learn from France’s Mistakes in Africa

Author:: Komlan Avoulete
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: In recent years, France has suffered geopolitical setbacks in Africa. Tensions with Burkina Faso and Mali over French counter-terrorism operations led Paris to withdraw its troops from both of those countries. Russia is exploiting France’s failure to defeat terrorist groups in Africa as well as the feeling among many Africans that Paris exerts undue influence over its former colonies. The United States should learn from France’s mistakes and strive to build partnerships in Africa based on mutual respect, rather than focus too directly on competing with Russia or China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, Partnerships, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Africa, France, Mali, and United States of America

3. Faltering Lion: Analyzing Progress and Setbacks in Somalia’s War against al-Shabaab

Author:: James Barnett
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Analysts have long understood the war against al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s East African affiliate, as “unwinnable” and “[with] no end in sight.” Most have considered the group one of the largest and most sophisticated jihadist insurgencies on the planet while viewing Somalia, the state in which it was born and primarily operates, as a quintessential “failed state.” Yet in mid-2022, many analysts began to change their tune. Al-Shabaab began to suffer its most significant setbacks in a decade at the hands of a clan uprising in Somalia’s central states of Hirshabelle and Galmudug. The uprising quickly received military support from the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), and some United States officials believe it constitutes Somalia’s Anbar Awakening. Meanwhile, Somali officials speak of this offensive, which they’ve now dubbed Operation Black Lion, as the long-awaited death blow against the group. Unfortunately, the pendulum started to swing back after al-Shabaab began regrouping and counterattacking in early 2023. As of September 2023, the Somali government is struggling to complete the offensive that began last year in central Somalia. All the while, the government promises to achieve ever more ambitious goals for defeating the group in its southern Somalian strongholds by the end of 2024. The question, then, is whether Somalia is really turning a page in the war against al-Shabaab, with the group’s defeat or meaningful degradation in sight for the first time in years, or if the FGS’s battlefield progress in 2022 was merely a short-lived setback for the terrorist group. In this report, I argue that the ongoing, if faltering, offensive against al-Shabaab reveals the dilemma of counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa: On the one hand, al-Shabaab is not invincible, and the group’s center of gravity—its ability to gain a modicum of acceptance or legitimacy from vulnerable Somali communities—has been exposed as fragile. On the other hand, Somalia’s perennial and myriad political disputes, as well as other issues like a lack of state capacity and rampant corruption, are preventing its federal and state governments from capitalizing on the opportunities available to them. Instead, Mogadishu, aware of its limited military capacity, is looking to the militaries of neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia to bear the brunt of its anticipated offensive into southern Somalia, even though these countries’ controversial interventions in Somalia over the years have catalyzed al-Shabaab’s formation and expansion. In any case, there appears to be little appetite from either country to engage in another offensive. Al-Shabaab, for its part, is counterattacking against government forces in central Somalia and looking to expand its operations in neighboring countries—in part to hinder those regional militaries’ potential participation in any forthcoming offensive. Consequently, the situation looks less promising than it did at the end of 2022, and al-Shabaab is unlikely to face a meaningful defeat in the coming months. Instead, the best-case scenario would see this military offensive degrade al-Shabaab over the coming months to the point that the terrorist organization partially fractures and loses some of its popular support, possibly opening up room for the FGS to negotiate with factions of the group. A more likely scenario, however, would see the conflict remain a stalemate, with the government’s current offensive bringing only temporary or superficial gains that do not meaningfully degrade al-Shabaab’s capacity. I have drawn this report from insights I gained during a four-week trip to Kenya and Somalia in June 2023. Within Somalia, I traveled around the federal capital, Mogadishu, as well as the capitals of the states of Jubbaland, Galmudug, and Puntland, in the south, center, and north of the country respectively. I also traveled to the frontline town of Bar Sanguuni, near al-Shabaab–controlled territory in Jubbaland, and separately to Las Anod, a disputed city that both Somaliland and local clans have claimed and that is at the heart of a new regional conflict. Given the sensitivity of discussing security matters in Somalia, I have anonymized the details of interview subjects in almost all references.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Alliance, and Al-Shabaab
Political Geography:: Africa and Somalia

4. Overreach in Africa: Rethinking U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy

Author:: William Walldorf
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Due to an overly broad definition of threat, the United States currently commits far too many military resources to counterterrorism, especially in Africa. The United States is pursuing military action against at least thirteen terrorist groups in Africa, but only one of those groups has the “global reach” to be a threat to Americans. Consequently, the U.S. military is fighting a slew of counterinsurgency—not counterterrorism—wars in Africa today, a strategy that borders on nation-building. Counterintuitively, U.S. security assistance, training, and military activity in Africa since the 2000s has inadvertently aided the growth of terrorist groups in the region. Most concerning, U.S. policy today could be helping to inspire the next generation of global jihadists tomorrow, intent on attacking the United States and its closest democratic allies. U.S. military activity in Africa has expanded significantly over the past decade and a half and this trend will likely continue even further without an intentional course correction. The potential for further mission creep and overexpansion is high. Washington should wind down direct military activity and close most military bases in Africa, while also curbing security assistance to local regimes.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Counter-terrorism, and Military Aid
Political Geography:: Africa and United States of America

5. CTC Sentinel: October/November 2023 Issue

Author:: Devorah Margolin, Matthew Levitt, Paul Cruickshank, Brian Dodwell, and Caroline Morgan
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: On October 7, Hamas killed 1,200 Israelis in the largest terror attack since 9/11, carrying out acts of brutality that matched, and even surpassed, the worst atrocities of the Islamic State. The resulting war in Gaza, the escalation in tensions across the Middle East, and the anger in Arab and Muslim communities over the large number of Palestinian civilians killed in the conflict so far have upended the international terror threat landscape, creating acute concern about reprisals, and given the attacks already seen in France and Belgium, raised the specter of a new global wave of Islamist terror. In our feature article, Devorah Margolin and Matthew Levitt write that “The brutal Hamas-led October 7 attack on Israeli communities near Gaza represented a tactical paradigm shift for the group.” They observe that “the group’s explicit targeted killing and kidnapping of civilians [on October 7] baldly contradicts Hamas’ articulated revised political strategy since it took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007. Ironically, Hamas’ sharp tactical shift only underscores that the group never abandoned its fundamental commitment to the creation of an Islamist state in all of what it considers historical Palestine and the destruction of Israel.” Global jihadi groups have been exploiting the conflict in Gaza to call for attacks. In our feature interview, EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Ilkka Salmi says that “these calls to attack or to engage in some terrorist activity spread extremely quickly on social media and that’s why they could have a rapid and serious impact on the security situation. It reminds me of the days back in 2014-2016 when Daesh propaganda was at its high peak. The situation in Israel, combined with that sort of propaganda, could change the security situation in the E.U. quite drastically.” Tore Hamming writes that “three factors are likely to determine the impact of the ongoing events on the trajectory of the terrorism threat in the West: the length of the war, the scale of Israel’s offensive in Gaza, and the degree of support from Western nations to Israel.” Erik Skare stresses that analysts need to holistically examine both what Hamas says and does to better understand the group. He writes: “October 7 likely signifies the victory of those in the movement who have grown frustrated with an excessive focus on politics, advocating instead for a renewed emphasis on violence to reach their long-term goals.” In our second interview, General (Retired) Stephen Townsend, who commanded AFRICOM until August 2022, warns about intensifying jihadi terrorist threats across Africa. He says that al-Qa`ida’s affiliates there are “probably the largest threat to U.S. interests in the region today. And as they gain capacity, they’ll broaden their picture to the region and globally, to include our homeland eventually, I think.” Finally, Asfandyar Mir examines the counterterrorism dilemmas facing the United States in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He writes: “Al-Qa`ida and the Islamic State are pivoting to exploit Hamas’ October 7 terrorist attack on Israel and the civilian harm in Israel’s military campaign in Gaza since … Policymakers should take seriously the risk of a surprise terrorist provocation from Afghanistan.”
Topic:: Terrorism, Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, and Hamas
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Africa, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

6. CTC Sentinel: September 2023 Issue

Author:: Lorena Atiyas-Lvovsky, Eitan Azani, Michael Barak, Assaf Moghadam, and Christopher Faulkner
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: In this month’s feature article, Lorena Atiyas-Lvovsky, Eitan Azani, Michael Barak, and Assaf Moghadam find that “jihadi rhetoric is rarely translated into violent attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets … The relative dearth of successful operations, however, has not deterred global jihadi organizations from regularly leveraging the Palestinian issue for political gain, and in order to reinforce their stature as powerful actors in the Middle Eastern and global arenas. Despite jihadi lip service to the Palestinian cause, support for global jihad among Arab Israelis and Palestinians has remained relatively low. Physical and ideological barriers erected by Israel and the Jewish community have so far limited the capacity of global jihadi actors to operate against Israel and the Jewish community.” Christopher Faulkner, Raphael Parens, and Marcel Plichta explore the future of the Wagner Group in Africa after the death of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin. They write: “Wagner personnel in Africa appear poised to carry on their original missions given the importance of the continent to Russia’s broader strategic ambitions. Though the mercenary mutiny and Prigozhin’s death may lead clients to raise questions about what a continued partnership with Wagner means for relations with the Kremlin, Moscow has signaled a tolerance, if not need, for Wagner or a Wagner-like entity in Africa. Abandoning Wagner clients would severely undermine Russia’s influence on the continent.” Aaron Zelin and Devorah Margolin explore the Islamic State’s shadow governance in eastern Syria since the group lost its last piece of territory in the country in 2019. They write: “While it is true that the organization’s insurgency has been degraded in recent years, only focusing on the Islamic State’s attack claims and propaganda misses an important trend happening at the local level: … the Islamic State has continued attempts to govern as shadow actors in eastern Syria.” They warn that thanks to these efforts, “even if it sounds far-fetched now, a reasonable worst-case scenario is that the Islamic State could rapidly take advantage of a changed local context to attempt to carve out a small statelet in eastern Syria again.”
Topic:: Non State Actors, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Jihad, Wagner Group, Jewish community, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:: Africa, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Syria

7. CTC Sentinel: April 2023 Issue

Author:: Christopher Faulkner, Raphael Parens, Marcel Plichta, Paul Cruickshank, and Lucas Webber
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: The late General Wayne A. Downing, a former distinguished chair of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, used to tell his colleagues at the Center, “Who thinks wins.” In this month’s feature article, Christopher Faulkner, Raphael Parens, and Marcel Plichta argue that smarter counterterrorism in the Sahel, and across sub-Saharan Africa, can pay big dividends for the United States on the field of great power competition. They write that “the United States is at a critical juncture as it looks to adapt its counterterrorism mission. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Sahel region of Africa, where for the past decade, the United States has relied on France to serve as the counterterrorism lead. Those days are over, at least for now, and the United States is left attempting to balance its counterterrorism efforts in the frame of great power competition. However, too often these two strategic objectives are cast as zero-sum. In reality, U.S. counterterrorism in the Sahel, if appropriately reassessed, designed, and implemented, can generate real wins for the United States as it seeks to counter Russian and Chinese influence in the region. Additionally, and most importantly, it can improve the prospects for stability and security for African states in desperate need of both.” Our interview is with two counterterrorism officials at the Catalan Police – Mossos d’Esquadra: Inspector Lluis Paradell Fernandez, head of the Central Analysis Unit, Intelligence and Counterterrorism Service, and Deputy Inspector Xavier Cortés Camacho, head of the Counterterrorism Central Area. They discuss lessons learned as a result of the 2017 Islamic State-inspired attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils, the evolving threats Catalonia faces, and the importance of “a joined-up effort in working to prevent violent extremism.” Lucas Webber and Daniele Garofalo write that “the Islamic State’s leadership and central propaganda apparatus have been pushing to boost the Somalia branch’s profile, while pro-Islamic State-Somalia groups have been producing media content to help the movement’s message reach Somali, Amharic, Oromo, and Swahili speakers to boost fundraising, recruitment, and violent incitement efforts as well as to grow grassroot support in regions populated by these ethnolinguistic communities.” They argue that “these developments could have regional security implications if the Islamic State is able to strengthen the Somalia branch using these means. Bolstered transnational connections could enable violent incitement and attacks directed into neighboring countries.” Nodirbek Soliev examines digital terror financing by central Asian jihadis. He writes that “their online financing efforts tend to involve three stages. The first is the dissemination of fundraising propaganda and contacting prospective donors via online public accounts. The second is communication via encrypted messaging apps to identify a suitable mode of transaction and to provide security protocols. The third is the transaction itself. Understanding these mechanisms can help enhance relevant countries’ response strategies against terrorism financing risks.”
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Spain, North America, Somalia, Sahel, and United States of America

8. CTC Sentinel: March 2023 Issue

Author:: Emilia Columbo, Kristina Hummel, Madeleine Biscaichipy, Alexander Ritzmann, and Francesco Marone
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: This month’s feature article focuses on the challenge posed by the evolving Islamic State insurgency in Mozambique. Emilia Columbo writes: “The deployment of regional military and police forces to Cabo Delgado Province in northern Mozambique to assist the Mozambican government against what was then a growing jihadi insurgency nearly two years ago has introduced new dynamics into the conflict, expanding the insurgency’s presence in the region and increasing the importance of the information space as each side works to persuade its constituencies that the conflict is proceeding in its favor.” She assesses that the sustainability of security gains along the coast “will depend largely on the government’s willingness to develop and implement a more balanced counterterrorism approach that addresses the underlying grievances driving this conflict.” Our interview is with Jessica White and Galen Lamphere-Englund, co-conveners of the Extremism and Gaming Research Network, which started a little over two years ago as a practitioner- and researcher-led initiative to try and unpack concerning developments in the online space. Alexander Ritzmann writes that “the alleged plot against the German government by the Reichsbürger group Patriotic Union, whose key members were arrested on December 7, 2022, is best understood as a thwarted, possible early-stage terrorist plot, rather than a preempted imminent violent coup attempt. The Reichsbürger, who are comprised of different groups and networks, claim that the German state of today does not legally exist. Many Reichsbürger ascribe to a version of the anti-Semitic ‘New World Order,’ others believe in ‘QAnon.’” He notes that “although the vast majority of Reichsbürger are neither considered violent nor right-wing extremists by German security agencies, the threat posed by a minority of violent and extremist Reichsbürger persists, with German security agencies continuing to thwart alleged violent activity linked to different Reichsbürger groups.” Francesco Marone examines how an ongoing hunger strike by the imprisoned insurrectionary anarchist terrorist Alfredo Cospito has amplified the threat in and beyond Italy posed by “a transnational extremist tendency that promotes ‘self-organized’ illegal and violent actions, even against people.”
Topic:: Insurgency, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Political Extremism
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Italy, and Mozambique

9. CTC Sentinel: January 2023 Issue

Author:: Heni Nsaibia, Caleb Weiss, Brian Dodwell, and Stig Jarle Hansen
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: This issue focuses on Africa, the current epicenter of global jihadi terror. On January 18, 2023, the military junta in Burkina Faso demanded that France withdraw its troops from the country within a month, raising concerns the regime in Ouagadougou may be set to follow Mali in hiring the Wagner Group to help contain the worsening jihadi threat to their country. In the feature article, Héni Nsaibia and Caleb Weiss write that “there seems to be a very significant probability that the military government in Burkina Faso will indeed hire Wagner in the near future.” They assess that a future potential Wagner deployment to Burkina Faso would entrench Russian influence in the region, complicate Western policy in West Africa, and “likely result in a further upsurge in jihadi violence in Burkina Faso given the fact that jihadi attacks, perpetrated by both JNIM and the Islamic State, have increased dramatically across Mali since Wagner’s deployment there just over a year ago.” In our interview, Brigadier General Rose Keravuori, the Deputy Director of Intelligence at the United States Africa Command, observes that “for al-Qa`ida and ISIS, the most operationally active and financially lucrative affiliates are on the African continent.” She warns that Islamic State groups are looking to grow in southern and central Africa and that in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, the al-Qa`ida affiliate JNIM “has grown exponentially, so much so that the littoral countries of Ghana, Togo, and Benin view it as an existential threat.” Stig Jarle Hansen writes that “there are reasons to be optimistic that the current Somali offensive against al-Shabaab could enduringly weaken the group. The operations have gained momentum and demonstrated that the Somali army has made large improvements over the last decade. The use of local clan militias as well as U.S. and Turkish drone support have acted as force multipliers, and the Somali government is finally making a concerted effort to go after al-Shabaab’s income generation.” He argues that “what will be key is to erode al-Shabaab’s ability to infiltrate government-controlled areas and to govern, tax, and implement ‘justice’ in these areas. In the past, this has been crucial to al-Shabaab resilience and income. Accordingly, there needs to be more focus on a ‘clear and hold’ strategy rather than just ‘search and destroy.’”
Topic:: Counter-terrorism, Jihad, Al Shabaab, and Wagner Group
Political Geography:: Africa, Somalia, and Burkina Faso

10. Niger Coup Threatens U.S. Strategy on Counterterrorism and Russia

Author:: Ben Fishman, Anna Borshchevskaya, and Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: On July 26, Nigerien president Mohamed Bazoum was detained by members of his special guard and put under house arrest, where he remains under harsh conditions. Gen. Abdourahmane Tchiani has since declared himself head of the so-called “National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland” and appointed a twenty-one-person cabinet on August 8. The coup comes in the wake of military takeovers in Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad, and Sudan over the past three years, demonstrating regional anti-democratic trends amid trans-regional instability. Diplomatic efforts to quell the crisis have failed to date. U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken has made repeated calls to Bazoum, reflecting a commitment to securing his release and returning to “constitutional order.” Bazoum was a close American security partner prior to his arrest and was accorded a prominent role during the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington last December. Blinken has also reached out to former president Mahamadou Issoufou, who has better personal ties to the junta; he was once an ally of Bazoum but had recently broken with his successor’s anti-corruption initiatives. This call followed Acting Deputy Secretary Victoria Nuland’s unsuccessful August 8 visit to Niamey, where she was prohibited from meeting with Bazoum or Tchiani. Instead, she spoke with Gen. Moussa Salaou Barmou, a longtime U.S. security partner who serves as the military’s new chief of staff but would not offer so much as an assurance of Barzoum’s safety, let alone his release or restoration. With the junta rejecting all U.S. and regional diplomatic initiatives, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has threatened military intervention. The alliance’s leaders met on August 10 and agreed to deploy a standby force, though how quickly it can be assembled remains unclear. In neighboring Algeria, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune strongly condemned the junta but said any military intervention in Niger would represent “a direct threat” to his country, declaring, “There will be no solution without us. We are the first people affected.” In Libya—another neighbor keenly attuned to Niger’s stability given persistent smuggling—the Government of National Unity condemned the junta, while the eastern-based warlord Khalifa Haftar condemned the threats by ECOWAS. Elsewhere, Egypt has remained largely silent about the crisis, while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates quickly denounced the coup and called for Bazoum’s restoration (in part because he is Niger’s first Arab president). The UAE also sent some military vehicles to neighboring Chad, providing additional border security and signaling their growing bilateral relationship.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, Strategic Competition, and Wagner Group
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, West Africa, Niger, and United States of America

11. June 2022 Issue

Author:: Tara Candland, Ryan O'Farrell, Lauren Poole, Caleb Weiss, and Boaz Ganor
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: In this month’s feature article, Boaz Ganor looks at the lessons that should be learned from the spring 2022 terror wave in Israel. His analysis kicks off the “CTC-ICT Focus on Israel” series, a joint effort between the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC) and the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at Reichman University in Israel. In the coming months, the series will examine the terrorist threat landscape in Israel and the lessons other countries can learn from Israel’s counterterrorism efforts. The two feature analysis articles focus on the foreign fighter problem set in Ukraine and the evolving linkages to far-right extremism of actors on both sides of the conflict. Kacper Rekawek finds that unlike in 2014, “the 2022 conflict has, for the most part, not energized Western right-wing extremists, nor persuaded them to travel. In what is for Ukrainians a war for national survival and a fight to secure a Western democratic future for the country, the allure of the far-right in Ukraine has dimmed. Ukrainian units with far-right histories are now deeply integrated into Ukraine’s armed forces and eschew foreign recruitment, and one of those units, the Azov Regiment, was decimated during the siege of Mariupol. Very few foreign right-wing extremists have been recruited into Ukraine’s International Legion. In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests most of the foreign fighters who have traveled this year to fight on the Ukrainian side are fighting to safeguard Ukraine’s future as a Western democracy.” Don Rassler examines key concerns and questions about the war in Ukraine that are relevant to counterterrorism practitioners. Continuing this month’s focus on the impact of nefarious Russian actions, Christopher Faulkner examines the activities in Africa of the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company closely tied to the Kremlin. He writes: “Wagner’s role in Africa poses a severe threat to the security and stability of African states as well as the strategic interests of the United States and allied nations.” Finally, Tara Candland, Ryan O’Farrell, Laren Poole, and Caleb Weiss assess the rising threat to Central Africa posed by the 2021 transformation of the Islamic State’s Congolese branch.
Topic:: Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Democracy, Islamic State, Far Right, Wagner Group, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, Israel, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, and Central Africa

12. January 2022 Issue

Author:: Michael Knights, Alex Almeida, Don Rassler, Brian Fishman, and Amira Jadoon
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: Notwithstanding a night attack that killed 11 Iraqi soldiers on an army base in the Iraqi province of Diyala earlier this month, the Islamic State is at its lowest ebb in Iraq in many years, according to new data published by Michael Knights and Alex Almeida in this month’s feature article. They write that “a comprehensive analysis of attack metrics shows an insurgency that has deteriorated in both the quality of its operations and overall volume of attack activity, which has fallen to its lowest point since 2003. The Islamic State is increasingly isolated from the population, confined to remote rural backwaters controlled by Iraq’s less effective armed forces and militias, and lacks reach into urban centers.” They note that “the key analytical quandary that emerges from this picture is whether the downtrend marks the onset of an enduring decline for the group, or if the Islamic State is merely lying low while laying the groundwork for its survival as a generational insurgency.” In this month’s interview, Amy Zegart speaks to Brian Fishman and Don Rassler about her soon-to-be published book Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence. In the interview, she calls for the creation in the United States of a dedicated open-source intelligence agency because “OSINT will never get the priority or resources the nation needs without its own agency.” Amira Jadoon, Abdul Sayed, and Andrew Mines assess the threat trajectory of Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) in the wake of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. They assess that “given the absence of multilateral counterterrorism pressure, the Taliban’s limited capacity to govern, and a worsening humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, ISK now finds itself perhaps in the most permissive environment yet to rebuild, rally, and expand.” Drawing on extensive fieldwork, including interviews with bandits and jihadi defectors, James Barnett, Murtala Ahmed Rufa’i, and Abdulaziz Abdulaziz examine the nexus between Nigeria’s bandits and jihadi organizations in northwestern Nigeria. They find that despite widespread fears bandits and jihadis would find common cause, there has been infrequent cooperation between them because they have conflicting approaches in their treatment of local inhabitants and because the more powerful bandits feel they have little to gain from working with the jihadis.
Topic:: Crime, Insurgency, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq, South Asia, Middle East, and Nigeria

13. AQIM’s Imperial Playbook: Understanding al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb’s Expansion into West Africa

Author:: Caleb Weiss
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: In 2021, the United Nations noted the newfound threats of the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), a branch of al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), that extended into Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast, stretching farther yet into Ghana, Togo, and Benin. Had an observer in 2006 had this information presented to them, they might have scarcely believed it. That year, in which AQIM was formed, the group was a thoroughly North African organization and based primarily in Algeria. Fast forward 15 years, how did AQIM end up nearly 1,300 miles away, now posing immediate threats in the states of littoral West Africa? Relying on a combination of primary source jihadi propaganda and historical research, this report argues that over the past 30 years, al-Qa`ida and its branches and allies in North and West Africa have followed what this report calls “al- Qa`ida’s Imperial Playbook,” as they have sought to expand their areas of influence southward. Al-Qa`ida’s “playbook,” this report shows, is composed of five fundamental tactics: befriending or creating militant groups operating in the midst of conflict; integrating themselves into communities where those militants exist; exploiting grievances of those communities to gain sympathy; addressing internal or external dissent either passively or aggressively; and looking toward new theaters once their base is solidified. Al-Qa`ida has subsequently utilized this playbook to expand southward from its Algeria base in five distinct historical periods: from 1992- 1998; 1998-2006; 2006-2012; 2013-2017; and 2017-present. The report concludes that al-Qa`ida and its affiliates in northern and western Africa are likely to continue to use this playbook as they continue their contemporary expansion into West Africa.
Topic:: Non State Actors, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, and History
Political Geography:: Africa and West Africa

14. Assessing U.S. Counterterrorism in Africa, 2001-2021: Summary Document of CTC’s Africa Regional Workshop

Author:: Jason Warner, Julia Broomer, and Stephanie Lizzo
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: On October 21, 2021, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, as part of the Recrudescence Project (a research collaboration with the Middle East Institute and the Center on National Security at Fordham Law), hosted a closed-door workshop with 18 top observers of U.S.-Africa policy from across government, academia, think-tanks, and the private sector. The goal of CTC’s Africa Regional Workshop was to assess the successes and challenges of U.S. policy to address terrorism by violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and to assist in counterterrorism (CT) efforts on the African continent over the past 20 years (2001-2021), and to consider how these approaches might be improved in the future. This anonymized summary document offers an overview of the findings from that workshop. Three topics of concern are the focus of this summary: assessments of U.S. kinetic counterterrorism engagement in Africa; assessments of U.S. non-kinetic counterterrorism engagement in Africa; and the future of U.S.-Africa policy beyond a counterterrorism lens.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Violent Extremism, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Africa, North America, and United States of America

15. Berlin’s Hesitation: Implications of German Foreign Minister’s tour to Mali and Niger

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, on April 12 and 13, made an important visit to Mali and Niger that is set to determine the future of Germany’s military presence in Mali. The German government is divided into those who support a continued presence in Mali and those who push for complete withdrawal of the German troops from the African country.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Armed Forces, European Union, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Germany, Mali, and Niger

16. An Alternative Approach to U.S. Sahel Policy

Author:: Alex Thurston
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The Sahel region of Africa is in freefall. Upwards of 19 million people need humanitarian assistance, five coups have occurred since 2020, jihadists and militias are killing thousands, and security forces and Russian mercenaries abuse civilians with impunity. The Sahel’s primary external actor, France, pursues intensive counterterrorism with the aim of helping Sahelian national authorities to reassert legitimacy; France also seeks to retain influence over its former colonies. But French policy has floundered. Anti-French sentiments drove France mostly out of Mali, one epicenter of the Sahel crisis, and many other Sahelians resent perceived French encroachments on their sovereignty. The United States lacks a real policy for the Sahel. Rather, U.S. policy drifts and reacts. Important humanitarian and development programs are overshadowed by securitized rhetoric and undermined by the considerable U.S. military activity in the Sahel, including vestiges of the “War on Terror.” The White House’s 2022 National Security Strategy, its Africa Strategy, and a forthcoming Sahel Strategy envision diverse efforts going beyond counterterrorism, but they read as laundry lists of priorities rather than as concrete plans of action. The vagueness of existing policy risks allowing obsolete assumptions and programs to continue.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, and Military
Political Geography:: Africa, France, Mali, and Sahel

17. Rethinking Military Responses to Terrorism and Insurgency in Nigeria

Author:: Maurice Ogbonnaya
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Social Science Research Council
Abstract:: Since 2003, terrorist insurgency in Nigeria has occasioned complex security and humanitarian crises, especially in the northeast region of the country. Boko Haram, a radical Islamist group from the region, has killed over 30,000 people and caused the displacement of more than 3 million others within the Lake Chad Basin region. Military responses by the Nigerian state and in collaboration with multilateral security agencies have achieved limited success. This paper not only questions the adequacy of military responses to terrorism, as a standalone approach, but it also advances the argument in the extant literature on the obsolescence of excessive militarization of counterterrorism operations as a security management strategy. It suggests the adoption of a more comprehensive and broad-based strategic approach. This is predicated on the limitations of purely military operations in counterterrorism, noting that military responses alone are structurally not designed to deal with the fundamental root causes of terrorism. In this regard, the paper advocates for a combination of military and other non-military counterterrorism approaches that seek to address the fundamental factors that give rise to terrorism.
Topic:: Terrorism, Insurgency, Counter-terrorism, Economic Inequality, and Exclusion
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

18. CTC Sentinel: November/December 2022 Issue

Author:: Bruce Hoffman, Jacob Ware, Paul Cruickshank, Wassim Nasr, and Samira Gaid
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: In December 2007, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point launched a new monthly publication with the aim of drawing on the “Center’s network of scholars and practitioners dedicated to the study of terrorism and counter-terrorism to provide the most well-informed forum” for the analysis of the most pressing security challenges facing the United States and its allies. This issue marks the 15th anniversary of CTC Sentinel. It has been my great privilege to serve as editor in chief for exactly half that period. We hope the publication has helped contribute to greater understanding of the complex and continuously evolving counterterrorism problem set. My predecessor, Erich Marquardt, deserves special credit for the years he spent building CTC Sentinel into a powerhouse of scholarly research. I’d like to also acknowledge the extraordinary contribution of our managing editor, Kristina Hummel, and the wise counsel of our editorial board members: Colonel Suzanne Nielsen, Brian Dodwell, Don Rassler, and Colonel Sean Morrow. The huge time and energy invested in CTC Sentinel by our leadership and faculty over the past 15 years has helped drive us forward in our mission of relentless improvement. Our choice of cover for this anniversary issue reflects our immense gratitude to our many contributors over the years whose insights and scholarship have been essential to the counterterrorism mission. In this month’s feature article, Bruce Hoffman (whose insights were featured in the inaugural issue of CTC Sentinel) and Jacob Ware examine the terrorist trends and threats to watch out for in 2023 and beyond. Our interview is with Harun Maruf, the longest-serving editor of VOA Somali, the Somali-language service of the U.S. government-funded broadcast service Voice of America. Samira Gaid argues that “recent military breakthroughs against al-Shabaab have provided Somalis with an historic opportunity to now do what is necessary to bring lasting security to the country” but that making enduring gains will require learning lessons from previous failures. Wassim Nasr outlines how the Wagner Group is aggravating the jihadi threat in Mali, creating the risk of further destabilization in the Sahel region.
Topic:: Counter-terrorism, Jihad, Al Shabaab, and Wagner Group
Political Geography:: Africa, Somalia, and Sahel

19. September 2021 Issue

Author:: Paul Cruickshank, Don Rassler, Kristina Hummel, Raffaello Pantucci, Asfandyar Mir, Charles Lister, Elisabeth Kendall, Tricia Bacon, Jason Warner, and Colin Clarke
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: It has been 20 years since 9/11. In the wake of the attacks, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC) was established to provide cadets and policymakers with best-in-class research so that they could better understand and confront the threat. With the Taliban returning to power in Afghanistan, with Africa emerging as the new epicenter of global jihadi terror, and with it likely becoming more difficult for the intelligence community to track threats in jihadi conflict zones from which the United States has withdrawn militarily, objective and rigorous open-source research is more critical than ever. To mark the 20th anniversary of 9/11, this special issue of CTC Sentinel, supported by the Recrudescence Project, features interviews with five former officials who have made immense contributions to the counterterrorism enterprise: former Acting Director of the CIA Michael Morell, former CENTCOM Commander Joseph Votel, former State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism Dell Dailey, former FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan, and former Chief of the U.K. Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) Sir Alex Younger. Their reflections on 9/11 and their lessons learned across key parts of the counterterrorism spectrum—intelligence; military; diplomacy; law enforcement—and across the Atlantic are essential reading. Video highlights of several of the interviews are available on the CTC website: Michael Morell, Joseph Votel, Dell Dailey, and Ali Soufan. (Please right-click and open new tab to view.) The special issue also features five articles by leading scholars on the evolving global terror threat landscape. Asfandyar Mir focuses on Afghanistan. Charles Lister examines Syria. Tricia Bacon and Jason Warner look at Africa. Elisabeth Kendall surveys Yemen and Saudi Arabia. And Colin Clarke evaluates the future of the global jihadi movement. On this anniversary, our deepest sympathies are with those who have lost loved ones to terrorism. Responding to this threat, as General Votel puts it, has been a noble undertaking. We deeply appreciate those who have served. Their sacrifices have saved countless lives.
Topic:: Intelligence, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, 9/11, and Jihad
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Africa, Syria, Arabian Peninsula, and United States of America

20. June 2021 Issue

Author:: Florian Flade, Jason Warner, Alex Newhouse, and Peter Kirechu
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: “A series of extreme far-right cases among members of Germany’s military and police highlight the threat of the enemy within: radicalized extremists within security services, with access to weapons, training, and confidential information,” Florian Flade writes in this month’s feature article. According to Flade, “The specter of armed underground cells being trained by former or current members of the security services has been a wake-up call for authorities. New measures have already been implemented within Germany’s domestic and military intelligence agencies to more effectively root out enemies of the state wearing uniforms. Nevertheless, the threat will most likely persist in the coming years.” He adds that “with the United States and other countries also grappling with this problem set, it is vital to share lessons learned and best practices at the international level.” This month’s interview is with Idriss Mounir Lallali, the Deputy Director and Acting (Interim) Director of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), a structure of the African Union Commission (the secretariat of the African Union). Alex Newhouse examines “the multi-node structure” of a global network of violent neo-fascist accelerationists seeking system collapse. He writes that “evidence from Atomwaffen’s development and collapse reveals that it was not the apex of a hierarchy of groups, but rather one node in a larger network of violent accelerationists. This network is built on membership fluidity, frequent communications, and a shared goal of social destruction. This framework is vital to understanding how and why action against individual groups is not sufficient, and why the threat from Atomwaffen has not faded in spite of its reported ‘collapse.’ The lesson to be drawn from the history of the Atomwaffen Division is that the current threat of neo-fascist accelerationism exists more in the evolution of the network as a whole, rather than in any one individual group.” Peter Kirechu examines “Iran’s Currency Laundromats in the Emirates.” He writes that “Since 2014, the United States has sanctioned dozens of Iranian nationals and commercial entities for the illicit acquisition of U.S. and other foreign currencies. A close review of these designations reveals the organized character of Iran’s illicit currency laundering operations and the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in their orchestration. It also shows that Iran relies on a diverse network of illicit commercial entrepreneurs to covertly access foreign currencies abroad. These actors operate under the cover of legitimate commerce and exploit the vulnerabilities of regional economic centers—such as the United Arab Emirates—to provide covert financial resources to the Revolutionary Guards.”
Topic:: Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, Fascism, Far Right, and Police
Political Geography:: Africa, Iran, Germany, and United Arab Emirates

21. Case Studies on the Role of Gender and Identity in Shaping Positive Alternatives to Extremisms

Author:: Rosalie Fransen, Melinda Holmes, Helena Gronberg, Stacey Schamber, and Shannon Foley Martinez
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Case Study
Institution:: International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN)
Abstract:: The International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN), with the support of Global Affairs Canada, has developed a set of “Case Studies on the Role of Gender and Identity in Shaping Positive Alternatives to Extremisms,” in Cameroon, Indonesia, Jordan, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Sweden, and the United States. The case studies demonstrate how conducting a Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) improves understanding of the drivers, narratives and roles that engender extremisms and violent extremist activity. By profiling examples of peacebuilding, deradicalization, reintegration and counternarrative work in these contexts, the case studies emphasize how attention to gender and intersectional identities can improve the effectiveness of interventions to transform extremisms – not only by preventing or countering it, but by providing positive alternatives that enable people to realize a peaceful, pluralistic future. The case studies cover a number of themes relevant to contemporary preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) and counterterrorism (CT) work, including countering white supremacist extremism, the role of masculinities in recruitment and disengagement, addressing trauma and deploying mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) approaches in reintegration and rehabilitation, and work with religious leaders to promote peaceful, pluralistic and gender-just interpretations of religious texts and traditions. The case studies are intended for use by practitioners and policymakers to guide them in conducting a gender analysis and in integrating responsiveness to gender and identity factors in policies and interventions.
Topic:: Education, Religion, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Women, Inequality, Trauma, Violence, Mental Health, White Supremacy, Identity, Political Participation, and Gender
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Africa, South Asia, Indonesia, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, Sweden, Jordan, Somalia, Southeast Asia, Cameroon, and United States of America

22. The Costs of United States’ Post-9/11 “Security Assistance”: How Counterterrorism Intensified Conflict in Burkina Faso and Around the World

Author:: Stephanie Savell
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University
Abstract:: United States “security assistance” exports a militarized counterterrorism model to dozens of countries through money, training, and weapons. This model comes with dangerous costs. The narrative, tactics, funding, and institutional supports of the U.S. post-9/11 wars fuel repression and corruption, and escalate cycles of violence. This paper delves into the current conflict in Burkina Faso as an illustrative case study of how the U.S. counterterrorism model has caused more, not less, instability and violence. Despite the relatively low levels of terrorism assessed in Burkina Faso at the time, the United States laid the groundwork for increased militarism in the region when it began providing security assistance to the country in 2009. Today, Burkina Faso is enveloped in a spiraling conflict involving government forces, state-sponsored militias, and militant groups, and civilians are paying the price. Militant groups have strengthened and seized territory, ethnic tensions have skyrocketed, thousands of Burkinabe have been killed and over one million displaced. A Burkina-based human rights group has warned that the government’s ethnic killings may lead to the “next Rwanda.”
Topic:: Security, Ethnic Conflict, Counter-terrorism, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Africa, United States of America, and Burkina Faso

23. Working Case Study: Congress’s Oversight of the Tongo Tongo, Niger, Ambush

Author:: Loren DeJonge Schulman
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The tragic 2017 killing of four U.S. Army personnel caught in a surprise ambush in Niger offers very few positive lessons for congressional oversight. Indeed, when speaking with experts, there is little agreement on whether Congress was kept appropriately informed or was even in a position to understand the mission of U.S. forces in Niger. Superficially, there are blunt facts—years of War Powers notifications detailing increasing numbers of combat-equipped personnel and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) posture statements highlighting the counterterrorism mission in the Sahel—stood against blunt statements from senior members—“I didn’t know there was 1,000 troops in Niger,” Senator Lindsey Graham said shortly after the incident.1 Explored in more detail, inconsistent mission and authority reporting from the Department of Defense (DoD) confronts, and combines with, variable expectations from Congress. At the heart of this friction is the by-with-and-through counterterrorism strategy, how it is implemented in practice, and whether key stakeholders have a common understanding of its rule sets and risks. Some of the gaps the Tongo Tongo ambush highlighted—between the Pentagon and operational units; between AFRICOM and Special Operations Command Africa (SOC-AF); and between Congress and the DoD—have been addressed, but others remain. This incident offers multiple lessons to both sides of the Potomac River in improving oversight relationships, both in informal interactions and in formal understanding of authorities and oversight responsibilities.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Africa, North America, Niger, and United States of America

24. The Terrorist Lists: An Examination of the U.S. Government’s Counterterrorism Designations Efforts

Author:: Seth Loertscher, Daniel Milton, Bryan C. Price, and Cynthia Loertscher
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: After the attacks of September 2001, the U.S. government grappled with ways to apply all aspects of its national power against the terrorist groups it found itself combating militarily. On the diplomatic and financial fronts, much of this increased effort revolved around the sanctioning and designating of terrorist groups and individual terrorist actors, resulting in a drastic increase of the number of individuals and groups which were branded with the term “terrorist.” Yet despite the application of these tools for almost 20 years, or longer in some cases, little work has been done to understand the impact of these programs. This report examines two sanctioning efforts the U.S. government has employed against terrorist actors: the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list and the designation of individuals as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) under the authority granted by Executive Order 13224. Although the specific purposes of each of these programs differ from one another, ultimately both represent a non-kinetic approach to counterterrorism that relies on the application of diplomatic and/or financial statecraft. The examination of each of these programs in this report has two general goals. The first is to provide an overview of the program and descriptive statistics regarding its implementation. The second is to provide some form of assessment regarding the impact that these programs have on terrorist groups and individuals. In accomplishing these two goals, the authors relied exclusively on open-source information collected by researchers at the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC). This report attempts to provide a deeper understanding of the impacts of these tools, in addition to highlighting some of the structural limitations and gaps in the application of counterterrorism sanctions.
Topic:: Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Boko Haram, Hamas, and Abu Sayyaf
Political Geography:: Africa, Middle East, Global Focus, and United States of America

25. May 2020 Issue

Author:: Eran Benedek, Neil Simon, Michael Knights, Alex Almeida, Mette Mayli Albaek, Puk Damasgard, Mahmoud Shiekh Ibrahim, Troels Kingo, Jens Vithner, and Nakissa Jahanbani
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: One painful lesson from the history of terrorism is just how dangerous one single capable international attack planner can be. Little has been written in English about Basil Hassan, a radicalized Danish engineering graduate of Lebanese descent who became one of the most dangerous international attack operatives within the Islamic State. In this issue’s first feature article, Mette Mayli Albæk, Puk Damsgård, Mahmoud Shiekh Ibrahim, Troels Kingo and Jens Vithner build on a two-year investigative report for the Danish public broadcaster DR to provide a detail-rich profile. The authors write: “As the key figure in a drone procurement network that stretched from Europe through Turkey to Syria, [Hassan] was instrumental in furthering the Islamic State’s drone-warfare capabilities. As ‘the Controller’ behind the 2017 Sydney airline plot, he pulled the strings from Syria in directing one of the most ambitious and innovative terrorist plots ever seen.” There are claims Hassan was killed in the second half of 2017, but the authors note that Danish counterterrorism officials are still not certain that he is dead. In our second feature article, Michael Knights and Alex Almeida find that “the Islamic State has recovered from its territorial defeats since 2017 to mount a strong and sustained resurgence as an insurgent force inside Iraq.” Their analysis of attack metrics from the past 18 months paints “a picture of an Islamic State insurgency that has regained its balance, spread out across many more areas, and reclaimed significant tactical proficiency.” The authors write that “now operating at the same levels it achieved in 2012, a number of factors suggest that the Islamic State could further ramp up its rural insurgency in 2020 and 2021. An input of experienced cadres from Syria, a downturn in Iraqi and coalition effectiveness, and now the disruption of a combined COVID and economic crisis will likely all feed into an escalating campaign of attrition against the Iraqi state, military, and tribes.” May 2020 marks the third anniversary of the suicide bombing attack at the Manchester Arena in the United Kingdom. Two brothers from Manchester of Libyan descent, Salman and Hashem Abedi, were responsible for the attack. Following the conviction of Hashem Abedi in a trial that concluded two months ago in the United Kingdom, Eran Benedek and Neil Simon outline what is now known about the genesis of the attack, the brothers’ web of connections in a British-Libyan jihadi nexus, and their links to Islamic State extremists. Finally, Nakissa Jahanbani provides a high-level analysis of attack trends from 2008 to 2019 of Iranian proxies in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa using several open-source datasets.
Topic:: Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Jihad, Proxy War, and Aviation
Political Geography:: Africa, Iraq, United Kingdom, South Asia, Middle East, and Libya

26. June 2020 Issue

Author:: Paul Cruickshank, Don Rassler, Audrey Alexander, Chelsea Daymon, Meili Criezis, Christopher Hockey, Michael Jones, Mark Dubowitz, Saeed Ghasseminejad, and Nikita Malik
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: COVID-19 is arguably the biggest crisis the planet has faced since the Second World War and will likely have significant impacts on international security in ways which can and cannot be anticipated. For this special issue on COVID-19 and counterterrorism, we convened five of the best and brightest thinkers in our field for a virtual roundtable on the challenges ahead. In the words of Magnus Ranstorp, “COVID-19 and extremism are the perfect storm.” According to another of the panelists, Lieutenant General (Ret) Michael Nagata, “the time has come to acknowledge the stark fact that despite enormous expenditures of blood/treasure to ‘kill, capture, arrest’ our way to strategic counterterrorism success, there are more terrorists globally today than on 9/11, and COVID-19 will probably lead to the creation of more.” Audrey Kurth Cronin put it this way: “COVID-19 is a boost to non-status quo actors of every type. Reactions to the pandemic—or more specifically, reactions to governments’ inability to respond to it effectively—are setting off many types of political violence, including riots, hate crimes, intercommunal tensions, and the rise of criminal governance. Terrorism is just one element of the growing political instability as people find themselves suffering economically, unable to recreate their pre-COVID lives.” The roundtable identified bioterrorism as a particular concern moving forward, with Juan Zarate noting that “the severity and extreme disruption of a novel coronavirus will likely spur the imagination of the most creative and dangerous groups and individuals to reconsider bioterrorist attacks.” Ali Soufan warned that “although the barriers to entry for terrorists to get their hands on bio weapons remain high, they are gradually being lowered due to technological advances and the democratization of science.” The special issue also features five articles. Audrey Alexander examines the security threat COVID-19 poses to the northern Syria detention camps holding Islamic State members, drawing on a wide range of source materials, including recent interviews she conducted with General Mazloum Abdi, the top commander of the SDF, and former U.S. CENTCOM Commander Joseph Votel. Chelsea Daymon and Meili Criezis untangle the pandemic narratives spun by Islamic State supporters online. Christopher Hockey and Michael Jones assess al-Shabaab’s response to the spread of COVID-19 in Somalia. Mark Dubowitz and Saeed Ghasseminejad document how the Iranian regime has spread disinformation relating to the pandemic. Finally, Nikita Malik discusses the overlaps between pandemic preparedness and countering terrorism from a U.K. perspective.
Topic:: Communications, Governance, Counter-terrorism, Media, Islamic State, Crisis Management, Al Shabaab, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Disinformation
Political Geography:: Africa, United Kingdom, Iran, Middle East, Syria, and Global Focus

27. July 2020 Issue

Author:: Heni Nsaibia, Caleb Weiss, Seth Loertscher, Nick Kramer, Robin Simcox, Hannah Stuart, Amarnath Amarasingam, and Marc-Andre Argentino
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: Earlier this month, the United Nations monitoring team that tracks the global jihadi threat warned the Security Council that “ISIL franchises in West Africa and the Sahel continued to enjoy operational success in early 2020, as have those of Al-Qaida, heightening international concern about stability in the region.” Concern over the threat has grown despite the fact that a year ago clashes erupted between the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida franchises in the region, turning what had been an often amicable and sometimes cooperative relationship into fighting between them in Mali and Burkina Faso. In our feature article, Héni Nsaibia and Caleb Weiss assess that a number of factors ended the “Sahelian anomaly” of amicable relations between the regional Islamic State and al-Qa`ida groupings, “including the hardening of ideological divisions, pressure from Islamic State Central for its regional satellite to take on a more confrontational approach toward its rival, and tensions created by the growing ambition of the Islamic State affiliate in the Sahel.” They note that “while some argue that fighting between jihadi groups is positive for the counterterrorism landscape, it is also possible that the two groups are in effect engaging in a process called ‘outbidding,’ wherein a group aims to show ‘greater resolve to fight the enemy than rival groups.’” Our interview is with Chris Costa, who during the first year of the Trump administration served as the Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Counterterrorism. Building on a study of terrorist recidivism in Belgium by Thomas Renard published in the April issue of CTC Sentinel, Robin Simcox and Hannah Stuart examine the problem set created by jihadi prisoners in Europe from two different angles. Firstly, they examine the nature of the threat by analyzing a dozen alleged jihadi terror plots and attacks that occurred inside and outside prisons in Western Europe since 2014 in which at least one of the attackers/plotters had been convicted in Europe of a previous terrorism offense. Secondly, they look at the scale of the threat by calculating the rates of various forms of recidivism from a comprehensive database relating to U.K. jihadi terror activity. Amarnath Amarasingam and Marc-André Argentino assess the emerging security threat posed by the QAnon conspiracy. They write: “A survey of cases of individuals who have allegedly or apparently been radicalized to criminal acts with a nexus to violence by QAnon, including one case that saw a guilty plea on a terrorism charge, makes clear that QAnon represents a public security threat with the potential in the future to become a more impactful domestic terror threat. This is true especially given that conspiracy theories have a track record of propelling terrorist violence elsewhere in the West as well as QAnon’s more recent influence on mainstream political discourse.”
Topic:: Terrorism, Prisons/Penal Systems, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Conflict, and QAnon
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Sahel, and United States of America

28. August 2020 Issue

Author:: J. Kenneth Wickiser, Kevin J. O'Donovan, Michael Washington, Stephen Hummel, F. John Burpo, Raffaello Pantucci, Nuno Tiago Pinto, Tomasz Rolbiecki, Pieter Van Ostaeyen, and Charlie Winter
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: The COVID-19 pandemic has renewed concerns over bioterror threats, with Microsoft founder Bill Gates recently warning that a bioterror attack involving a pathogen with a high death rate “is kind of the nightmare scenario” facing the planet. In this month’s feature article, J. Kenneth Wickiser, Kevin J. O’Donovan, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Washington, Major Stephen Hummel, and Colonel F. John Burpo assess the potential future threat posed by the malevolent use of synthetic biology. They write that synthetic biology “is a rapidly developing and diffusing technology. The wide availability of the protocols, procedures, and techniques necessary to produce and modify living organisms combined with an exponential increase in the availability of genetic data is leading to a revolution in science affecting the threat landscape that can be rivaled only by the development of the atomic bomb.” The authors, who all serve at, or are affiliated with, the Department of Chemistry and Life Science at the United States Military Academy, note that synthetic biology has “placed the ability to recreate some of the deadliest infectious diseases known well within the grasp of the state-sponsored terrorist and the talented non-state actor” and that “the techniques used to propagate bacteria and viruses and to cut and paste genetic sequences from one organism to another are approaching the level of skill required to use a cookbook or a home computer.” They argue that “an effective response to the threats posed by those using synthetic biology for nefarious purpose will require vigilance on the part of military planners, the development of effective medical countermeasures by the research community, and the development of diagnostic and characterization technologies capable of discriminating between natural and engineered pathogens.” In our interview, Gilles de Kerchove, the European Union’s longtime Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, speaks to Raffaello Pantucci. Nuno Pinto presents a detailed case study of an alleged Portuguese Islamic State network with strong connections to the United Kingdom that sheds significant light on the foreign fighter recruitment pipeline between Europe and Syria in the last decade. Tomasz Rolbiecki, Pieter Van Ostaeyen, and Charlie Winter examine the threat posed by the Islamic State across Africa based on a study of its attack claims. They write: “As the second half of 2020 unfolds, it is critical that military and counterterrorism policymakers recognize what is at stake in Africa. The Islamic State is not just fighting a low-grade insurgency on the continent; in at least two countries, it has been able to seize and hold territory and subsequently engage in pseudo-state activities.”
Topic:: Terrorism, European Union, Counter-terrorism, Weapons, Islamic State, Biological Weapons, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Middle East, Syria, and Portugal

29. October 2020 Issue

Author:: Michael Knights, Stephen Hummel, Paul Cruickshank, Don Rassler, Tim Lister, Pete Erickson, Seth Loertscher, David C. Lane, and Paul Erickson
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: In this month’s feature article, Michael Knights assesses the future of Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) and Iran’s other proxies in Iraq. He notes that in the wake of the death of KH’s founder and leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in a U.S. airstrike on January 3, 2020, “KH is still the engine room of anti-U.S. attacks in Iraq but it is less politically agile and operates in a more hostile counterterrorism environment where deniability and secrecy have become more important again.” He assesses that the “the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force is also leaning on a more diversified model in Iraq, drawing on non-KH factions like Saraya al-Jihad and Saraya al-Ashura, and engaging more directly with Iraq’s minorities, including Sunni communities and the Shi`a Kurdish Faylis and Turkmen. History may be repeating itself as Iran develops new smaller and more secure Iraqi cells that are reminiscent of the formation of Kata’ib Hezbollah itself.” Our interview is with Drew Endy, Associate Chair, Bioengineering, Stanford University, who has served on the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. He argues the United States urgently needs a bio strategy to take advantage of rapid advances in biotechnology, protect against the growing danger posed by its potential malevolent use, and prevent the United States from permanently falling behind as a biopower. “First, we need to demonstrate operational mastery of cells by learning to build them. Second and third, we need to build and secure the bio net. And we have to do this now, within the decade, so that we can translate these advances as infrastructure undergirding a uniquely American bio economy that projects power while advancing life, liberty, pursuit of happiness. If we do this, then we have a chance of taking infectious disease off the table. If we don’t develop and implement a coherent bio strategy, it’s game over, not to be dramatic.” In early August 2020, fighters loyal to the Islamic State captured the town and port of Mocimboa da Praia in Mozambique’s northernmost province of Cabo Delgado. They have yet to be dislodged from the town. Tim Lister examines a jihadi insurgency in Mozambique that has grown in sophistication and reach. This month marks 20 years since al-Qa`ida’s attack on the USS Cole, which killed 17 American sailors. Lieutenant Colonel Pete Erickson, Seth Loertscher, First Lieutenant David C. Lane, and Captain Paul Erickson assess the search for justice.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Insurgency, Counter-terrorism, Hezbollah, Justice, Jihad, Proxy War, and USS Cole
Political Geography:: Africa, Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Mozambique

30. November/December 2020 Issue

Author:: Seth G. Jones, Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, Jason Warner, Ryan O'Farrell, Heni Nsaibia, and Ryan Cummings
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: In this month’s feature article, Seth Jones examines the evolving threat posed by the Taliban in Afghanistan. “The Taliban is in many ways a different organization from the one that governed Afghanistan in the 1990s. Yet most of their leaders are nevertheless committed to an extreme interpretation of Islam that is not shared by many Afghans, an autocratic political system that eschews democracy, and the persistence of relations with terrorist groups like al-Qa`ida. These realities cast serious doubt about the possibility of a lasting peace agreement with the Afghan government in the near future,” he writes, adding that “without a peace deal, the further withdrawal of U.S. forces—as highlighted in the November 17, 2020, announcement to cut U.S. forces from 4,500 to 2,500 troops—will likely shift the balance of power in favor of the Taliban. With continuing support from Pakistan, Russia, Iran, and terrorist groups like al-Qa`ida, it is the view of the author that the Taliban would eventually overthrow the Afghan government in Kabul.” In a feature commentary, Hamish de Bretton-Gordon outlines the urgent action needed on biosecurity in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. He writes: “For years, the United States and many other countries have neglected biosecurity because policymakers have underestimated both the potential impact and likelihood of biological threats. COVID-19 has had a devastating effect on the planet and could be followed by outbreaks of even more dangerous viral diseases. Meanwhile, advances in synthetic biology are transforming the potential threat posed by engineered pathogens, creating growing concern over biological attacks and bioterror. Given the scale of the threat, biosecurity needs to be a top priority moving forward. Not only do efforts need to be stepped up to try to prevent the next pandemic (natural or engineered), but resilience needs to be built by developing early warning systems, the capacity to track outbreaks, and medical countermeasures, including ‘next generation’ vaccines.” He stresses that “winning public acceptance for public health measures will be imperative to tackling biological emergencies in the future.” Jason Warner, Ryan O’Farrell, Héni Nsaibia, and Ryan Cummings assess the evolution of the Islamic State threat across Africa. They write that “the annus horribilis Islamic State Central suffered in 2019, during which the group lost the last stretch of its ‘territorial caliphate’ in Iraq and Syria and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed, does not appear to have had a discernible impact on the overall operational trajectory of the Islamic State threat in Africa” underscoring “that while connections were built up between Islamic State Central and its African affiliates—with the former providing, at times, some degree of strategic direction, coordination, and material assistance—the latter have historically evolved under their own steam and acted with a significant degree of autonomy.”
Topic:: Terrorism, Biosecurity, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Africa, and Middle East

31. The Dominance of Terrorism: Aspects of the Socio-Political Challenges in Post-Independence West AfricA: Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Mali

Author:: Osiomheyalo O. Idaewor
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:: The West African countries, namely, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Mali, all gained independence in 1960. Since the attainment of independence, these countries have continued to witness peculiar socio-political and economic challenges. These include the contemporary menace of terrorist groups such as the Boko Haram, ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province), and their local and international affiliates. These challenges had been precipitated by both local and external socio-political and economic dynamics in the sub-region. Apparently, the challenge of terrorism has intensified in a way that it has overshadowed and compounded existing challenges in West Africa in the contemporary period. [...] Placed in perspectives, this paper gives an overview of the linkage between the post-colonial and post-independence periods, thereby under-scoring the contemporary intensification of terrorism. It further examines the contributions of the UN, ECOWAS, MINUSMA, G5-Sahel and other interventionists’ initiatives towards the development of the sub-region. It concludes by proffering some prospects for development.
Topic:: Security, Political Economy, Post Colonialism, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Africa, West Africa, Nigeria, Mali, and Burkina Faso

32. Nigeria and the Great Powers: The Impacts of

Author:: Sunday Omotuyi and Modesola Vic. Omotuyi
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: This paper argues that two incidents in the terrorism of Boko Haram primarily attracted the attention of the international community. First, the mass abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls by the group and secondly, the pledge of allegiance by Islamist sect to the Islamic State group in the Middle East. It is against this background that this study examines the interventions of the United States, France and Russia in the counterterrorism operation in Nigeria. It contends that while their responses have only had a slight impact on the war against terrorism in the country, they have had ramifications for Nigerian foreign relations. The paper shows that the wavering attitude of the United States to the war based on human rights issues, strained US- Nigerian diplomatic relations, while France’s participation further helped to improve Franco-Nigerian relations.The involvement ofRussia, which primarily revolved around economic imperative, reignited the largely lukewarm Russo-Nigerian relations.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Terrorism, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

33. The Strategic Efficacy of Drones for US Grand Strategy

Author:: Francis N. Okpaleke and Al-Chukwuma Okoli
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: This paper assesses the role of drones in furthering or undermining US grand strategy. This is against the backdrop of the thinking that contemporary use of drones in the context of post 9/11 era undermine the successive US administration’s strategic objectives as evidenced by the rise of anti-Americanism in Muslim world, proliferation of drones by US near peer competitors, civilian death toll and weakening support for the US in targeted countries. This implies that while drones has played a historical and significant role for the US in power projection and asserting its unilateralism and military hegemony when dealing with rogue states and terrorist groups post 9/11, the political and strategic utility of drone strikes for US grand strategy is not apparent. Thus, this paper posits that though armed drones has played a quintessential role as a key instrument of statecraft for facilitating US offensive strategy in targeted states, the aftermath of drone strikes and its controversial aspects engender inimical outcomes that serve to undermine US strategic objectives. Based on qualitative analysis of secondary data, the paper questions the wisdom and benefits of using and shifting greater reliance towards armed drones, as a pathway for furthering US grand strategy.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and Drones
Political Geography:: Africa, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

34. Stabilising the Sahel. The Role of International Military Operations

Author:: Kalev Stoicescu
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The key question of this analysis is whether EU and/or NATO allies, including Estonia, would be willing and able to continue to support international efforts in Sahel (including military operations and missions – MINUSMA, EUTM and Barkhane), in particular following the Covid-19 pandemic. It is addressed to civilian and military decision makers and experts, especially in the countries that contribute to international military operations and missions in the Sahel.
Topic:: Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Terrorism, Military Affairs, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Africa and Sahel

35. No Competition Without Presence: Should the U.S. Leave Africa?

Author:: Katherine Zimmerman
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: American blood and treasure should be prioritized to secure U.S. national interests. The United States military is not the world’s police force, and where others can share the burden, the United States should add only its unique capabilities. But defending U.S. interests extends even into faraway lands, including Africa. While Africa may never be a top national security concern for the United States, a convergence of gains by state and nonstate actors alike there affect U.S. security and economic interests globally. Yet the Pentagon’s recent effort to rebalance its resources against great power competitors—especially China and Russia—after almost two decades of counterterrorism dominance places the commitment of U.S. military resources to Africa in question. Drawing down too far militarily in Africa risks losing influence on the continent to those very same state actors, erasing hard–fought counterterrorism gains, and compromising U.S. global interests.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Counter-terrorism, Military Intervention, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Africa, North America, and United States of America

36. How Counterterrorism Drives U.S. Foreign Policy in Somalia

Author:: Abukar Arman
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:: The United States is home to over 200,000 Somali refugees most of whom fled civil war in Somalia. Their Black, Muslim, and immigrant identities puts them in the crosshairs of America's racialized counterterrorism regime, resulting in the surveillance, investigation, and prosecution of Somali American communities across the country. These domestic factors converge with US foreign policy that effectively criminalizes political opposition to imperial and militarized US action in Somalia.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Counter-terrorism, and Refugees
Political Geography:: Africa, Somalia, and United States of America

37. Where We Fight: US Counterterror War Locations 2017-2018

Author:: Stephanie Savell
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University
Abstract:: This new map shows for the first time that the United States is now combating terrorism in 40 percent of the world’s nations.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Counter-terrorism, and War on Terror
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, South Asia, Central Asia, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

38. Returnees in the Maghreb: Comparing Policies on Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia

Author:: Thomas Renard
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The conflict in Syria and Iraq has mobilised an unprecedented number of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). More than 50,000 individuals travelled to the Levant to join jihadi groups. While fighters have flocked from virtually every corner of the world, a significant contingent came from North Africa. This has created an unprecedented challenge for individual countries, as well as for the broader Maghreb and Mediter- ranean regions. The ‘Caliphate’ has now been defeated with the loss of its remaining territories. While many people were killed, thousands of fighters and family members are either in detention in Syria or in Iraq – or still on the run. Authorities worldwide are contem- plating – or should be contemplating – the possible return of these fighters in the short to medium term and how to deal with them. In fact, more than a thousand North African fighters have already returned home since 2012. Following this unprecedented number of jihadi volunteers, countries must now handle an unprecedented number of jihadi veterans who present a multi-faceted security and societal challenge from prosecution to detention and rehabilitation. Arguably, whether they return or not, some of these fighters are likely to have a lasting effect on the global jihadi movement and on local dynamics in their country of origin. As highlighted in this report, history is a reminder that even small numbers of veteran fighters can have a significant impact on local, regional and global security. There has been a growing amount of research into (returning) foreign fighters recently.1 This research was needed to better understand the phenomenon, either in general terms or at a country-specific level. Most of this research focused on departures rather than returns, and it focused often more on the individual dynamics and motivations rather than on governments’ debates and responses. Yet, as most governments still grapple with returnees, it is important to look into governments’ responses, with a view to opening a discussion and possibly making some recom- mendations. In this report, we have therefore decided to focus on governments’ responses to the issue of returning foreign fighters in North Africa, in light of the unprecedented regional mobilisation. Tunisia, notably, has often been described as the largest provider of foreign fighters to the Levant, or certainly one of its top purveyors. Egypt and Morocco have also seen a significant mobilisation for jihad, justifying their inclu- sion in our study. We offer a comparative analysis of the situation in these three North African countries: Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. Such an approach, using similar guidelines for all contributing authors, allows for interesting comparisons between the circum- stances that led to the departure of fighters and the responses to dealing with their return. Contributors were asked to look into domestic perceptions and debates related to the threat from returnees, and the specific policies developed to handle them. They were also asked to compare current perceptions and responses with previous jihadi mobilisations.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Africa, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia

39. April 2019 Issue

Author:: Aaron Edwards, Paul Cruickshank, Stephen Hummel, Douglas McNair, F. John Burpo, James Bonner, Audrey Alexander, Bennett Clifford, and Caleb Weiss
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: The murder earlier this month of journalist Lyra McKee in Northern Ireland on the night before Good Friday illustrates the fragility of peace in a region in which terrorist violence has persisted. In our cover article, Aaron Edwards writes that this was “the latest in a series of incidents that have raised the specter of a surge in terrorist violence in Northern Ireland.” In examining the evolution of the threat from militant groupings on both sides of the sectarian divide, he notes there has been a “blurring of the concepts of terrorism and criminality that challenges orthodox perspectives on the security landscape in Northern Ireland.” Our interview is with Edmund Fitton-Brown, the Coordinator of the ISIL (Daesh)/Al-Qaida/Taliban Monitoring Team at the United Nations. This issue features the concluding article of a two-article series focused on IED and WMD network convergence. The first article, published in our February 2019 issue, warned there was a high risk that profit-minded suppliers within vast, transnational IED networks may expand in the future into WMD proliferation. In the second article, Major Stephen Hummel, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas McNair, Colonel F. John Burpo, and Brigadier General James Bonner examine in greater detail the ways this could happen. Audrey Alexander and Bennett Clifford examine the threat posed by Islamic State-affiliated hackers and hacking groups. Through “analysis of several U.S. prosecutions of Islamic State-affiliated hackers and their networks, proficiencies, and activities,” they argue that “very few of these actors demonstrate advanced hacking or cyberterrorism capabilities.” Caleb Weiss examines the evolution of the threat posed by the Islamic State in Somalia, noting the group, “which is believed to only number in the low hundreds of fighters, appears to have significantly expanded its operations across Somalia, albeit from a relatively low base.” He argues the resulting reignition of tensions with the much larger al-Qa`ida affiliate al-Shabaab means “it is far from clear whether the Islamic State in Somalia will be able to sustain its operational expansion.”
Topic:: Science and Technology, Terrorism, United Nations, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Al Shabaab, and Doxxing
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Middle East, Ireland, and Somalia

40. July 2019 Issue

Author:: Matt Bryden, Premdeep Bahra, Paul Cruickshank, Graham Macklin, Joana Cook, Gina Vale, and Robin Simcox
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: In our cover article, Matt Bryden and Premdeep Bahra trace the evolution of the jihadi terrorist threat in East Africa over the last three decades. They argue that al-Shabaab’s January 2019 attack on the Dusit D2 luxury hotel compound in Nairobi, Kenya, “brought together three strands of al-Shabaab’s organizational DNA: its Somali provenance, its ideological affiliation with al-Qa`ida, and its growing cohort of trained, experienced East African fighters. The successful combination of these traits in a single operation suggests that al-Shabaab’s longstanding ambition to transcend its Somali origins and become a truly regional organization is becoming a reality, representing a new and dangerous phase in the group’s evolution and the threat that it poses to the region.” Our interview is with Catherine De Bolle, the Executive Director of Europol, who previously served as Commissioner General of the Belgian Federal Police between 2012 and 2018. Graham Macklin outlines what is now known about the Christchurch terrorist attacks. He writes: “In the space of 36 minutes on March 15, 2019, it is alleged that Brenton Tarrant, an Australian far-right extremist, fatally shot 51 people in two mosques in Christchurch in the deadliest terrorist attack in New Zealand’s history. What was unique about Tarrant’s attack—at least insofar as extreme-right terrorism is concerned—is that he livestreamed his atrocity on Facebook and in doing so, highlighted the Achilles heel of such platforms when faced with the viral dissemination of extremely violent content.” Joana Cook and Gina Vale provide an updated assessment of the numbers of foreign men, women, and minors who traveled to or were born in the Islamic State, examine the proportion that have returned ‘home,’ and outline the continuing challenges foreign women and minors affiliated with the Islamic State pose to the international community. Robin Simcox assesses the terrorist threat from “frustrated travelers” in Europe by examining the 25 plots (eight of which resulted in attacks) by such individuals since January 2014.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Terrorism, History, Counter-terrorism, Women, Internet, Islamic State, Youth, and Jihad
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Middle East, New Zealand, and East Africa

41. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA) – Volume 11 Issue 02: Geographically Diverse, Organisationally Complex and Gender Inclusive Islamist Terrorist Landscape

Author:: Amalina Abdul Nasir, Mustapha Kulungu, and Shafi Mostofa
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The landscape of Islamist terrorism is diverse, multifaceted and fractious, simultaneously characterised by inter and intra-group rivalries and various forms of cooperation at the operational, tactical and strategic levels. It cuts across geographical, gender and ideological lines/boundaries. More importantly, it evolves at a very rapid pace resulting in fluid security and conflict environments in different geographical locales. For instance, there are local groups like Nigerian Boko Haram that are trying to globalise their jihadist agenda through affiliations with the Islamic State (IS). However, this cooperation is not entirely collegial and is marked by friction and a trust deficit on both ends. In contrast, Al-Qaeda’s (AQ) South Asian affiliate, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), despite its regional character is localising its recruitment and operational strategies to avoid visibility from media and security agencies. AQIS is abstaining from violence while Boko Haram is engaging in violence to gain public attention. At the same time, the evolution of the terrorist landscape in Indonesia and Malaysia from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and AQ-dominated to IS-led and inspired, has affected the recruitment and participation of women. The growing involvement of female militants in diverse roles gives rise to further security threats. In this issue, the first article by Mustapha Kulungu examines the genesis of Boko Haram in Nigeria as a local movement representing grievances of Muslims to its transformation as an operationally strong terrorist group. The author writes that the growing links over the last few years between IS and Boko Haram have added to the lethality and brutality of the latter, which has relied on narratives of Muslim victimhood in Nigeria to expand its footprint outside the country. The article analyses Boko Haram’s organisational structure, operational strategies, sources of funding and ideological ambitions. While it is argued that Boko Haram’s growing capabilities will undermine the US’ interests in Africa, enhancing US-Nigerian security cooperation may act as a counter Boko Haram’s threat. The second article by Shafi Mostofa discusses AQIS’ online and offline propaganda operations in Bangladesh and the various political and ideological narratives the group has used to grow further. Along with issuing several online videos and pamphlets, AQIS publishes two Bengali language magazines: Al-Balagh and Azan. In these publications, AQIS has frequently invoked four themes to justify its activities in Bangladesh. These four themes are: Indian hegemonic ambitions in South Asia, Muslim persecution, religious credentials of the head of a Muslim state and Islamic values. The author argues that AQIS is targeting affluent Bangladeshi youth for recruitment. AQIS’ continued online propaganda is likely to have negative security implications. As such, the author recommends adoption of long-term kinetic and non-kinetic counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategies to neutralise AQIS. The last article by Amalina Abdul Nasir observes how women’s roles in terrorism have evolved in Indonesia and Malaysia from JI to an IS-dominated threat landscape. Overall, the roles of women have become more diverse due to IS’ physical inroads in the region, particularly in light of online recruitment through the open and close media platforms. The author discusses the evolution of women’s roles from wives and mothers to suicide bombers and combatants as recently witnessed in Indonesia and Malaysia. This development will need to be addressed by counter-terrorism agencies so as to mitigate its impact on the security threat landscape. It also requires an examination of the current perception of women in terrorist groups, and developing policies that factor in the gender-inclusive nature of the terrorist landscape in parts of Southeast Asia.
Topic:: Security, Gender Issues, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Women, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, and Boko Haram
Political Geography:: Bangladesh, Africa, South Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Middle East, North Africa, Nigeria, and Southeast Asia

42. Possible Rivalry: What is the Impact of al-Baghdadi Video Message on Boko Haram?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Mutual escalation has come to define the constant confrontations between the Nigerian movement Boko Haram and the Multinational Joint Task Force, formed by some West African countries, to confront its activity and weaken its ability to expand beyond the national borders, namely to Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. This escalation may continue over the coming period, as the movement becomes one of the main branches of ISIS, on which the latter relies to stage counter-strikes in response to the losses sustained in Syria and Iraq.
Topic:: Security, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Boko Haram
Political Geography:: Africa, Iraq, Middle East, West Africa, Syria, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger

43. Africa and the Threats to Its Security

Author:: Francisco Proenca Garcia
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: This essay begins by addressing the security context in Africa and the structural violence that is felt throughout the Continent. Later, it addresses the main threats that are manifest in such a differentiated space, emphasizing that in the current context it seems to be the fragility of the States the greatest threat, incapable of guaranteeing their inhabitants the ultimate ends - security, justice and well-being. Despite the failure of the state, people continue to live in these spaces, having various forms of social organization, which subsist and compete with other state structures, in the collection of taxes, in the use of force and also having different forms of social responsibility over the populations they control. The second threat emphasized in the essay, is one of those social structures that seek to impose itself in several geographic spaces: global subversion, which today is materialized in the two main factions of the global jihadist movement (al-Qaeda and Daesh), which seek the conquest of spaces and power also in Africa, using not only political mechanisms, but also, and when necessary, violent actions. Finally, a spectral analysis of other security threats in Africa, whether natural, such as climate change and pandemics, or man-made, such as organized crime and piracy, is presented.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Piracy, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Africa

44. The Entanglement between Peacekeeping and Counterterrorism

Author:: Theo Neethling
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: African Journal on Conflict Resolution
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: A growing emphasis on stabilisation and counterterrorism in international peacekeeping operations has increasingly become apparent. In Africa, the phenomenon of terrorism has become of special importance in contemporary peacekeeping activities and has significantly influenced the nature and profile of peacekeeping operations on the continent. Bloodshed, death, displacement and destruction caused by terrorism and violent extremism are increasingly posing challenges to peacekeepers in African conflict theatres. In view of this, this article analyses the tasks and contours of two of the most important peacekeeping operations on the African continent, namely those in Mali and Somalia. These operations could be considered laboratories for further exploration and innovation in the African peacekeeping landscape. At the same time, any scholarly discussion on contemporary peacekeeping and counterterrorism would be incomplete without reflections on scholars and analysts who consider an increasing entanglement between peacekeeping and counterterrorism as highly problematic. In this regard, the discussion touches on some of the fundamental questions that have started to surface on the future of United Nations and (to some extent) African Union peacekeeping operations.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Peace, and African Union
Political Geography:: Africa, Somalia, and Mali

45. Boko Haram and the African Union's Attitude Towards Terrorism

Author:: Michael Asiedu
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Global Political Trends Center (GPoT)
Abstract:: This paper attempts to capture the African Union’s attitude towards terrorism in a relatively lesser extent to the activities of Boko Haram. In so doing, a brief background is coined together with this introductory section. This is followed by sub-sections which shall explore the following, Boko Haram’s territorial capture, Boko Haram’s status as a terrorist group and what encompasses terrorism. Subsequently, AU’s evolving attitude towards terrorism will be traced in addition to how it has set its agenda against terrorism. The AU’s counter-terrorism activities in the context of Boko Haram will be assessed with its role in the prevention and combat of terrorism in Africa analyzed. The AU’s challenges as far as terrorism is concerned will also be highlighted with suggestions on possible alternatives as well as concluding thoughts.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Boko Haram, and African Union
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

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