Political Geography: Afghanistan / Topic: Foreign Policy

1. Helping the Afghan Allies America Left Behind

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: In February 2020, President Donald Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of United States forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement served as the starting point that eventually led to the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power. In January 2021, President Joe Biden entered office. Instead of canceling the flawed agreement with the Taliban—something that was in his power to do—he merely delayed America’s withdrawal date from May to September. By July, almost all US and international forces had left. On August 15, the Taliban took Kabul. By September 11, 2021, the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on September 11, 2001. During the chaotic retreat, the US left an estimated $7 billion in military equipment in Afghanistan, most of which has now fallen into the hands of the Taliban or ended up on the black market around the region. However, this hefty price tag pales in comparison to the moral cost of leaving behind tens of thousands of Afghan allies who sacrificed so much for the United States over 20 years. In the weeks leading up to the final withdrawal, the US and its international partners attempted to evacuate Afghans who helped the international coalition over the years. By any objective measurement, this effort was a failure. The evidence of this failure was clear for the world to see during the final chaotic weeks at Kabul International Airport.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Taliban, and Refugees
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

2. Can the Belt and Road Initiative Succeed in Afghanistan?

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: At a trilateral meeting in Islamabad on May 9, the foreign ministers of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan and reaffirmed their support for multilateral infrastructure projects already underway, including the Central Asia-South Asia (CASA) power project and the Trans-Afghan Railways (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], May 9). Earlier on January 5, the Taliban regime signed an agreement with the Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company (CAPEIC), a subsidiary of the state-owned China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), for the extraction of oil from the Amu Darya basin, under which China will invest $150 million annually for three years and increase it thereafter to $540 million for the contract’s 25-year duration (Kabul Now, January 5). Then on April 13, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Mines and Petroleum announced that the Chinese company Gochin had expressed interest in investing $10 billion in Afghanistan’s lithium reserves (Kabul Now, April 13). Meanwhile, China is reported to be in talks with the Taliban regime over renegotiating the terms of a 2008 contract to mine copper from the Mes Aynak reserves in Logar province (The Print, June 8, 2022). The agreements, including plans to extend CPEC—a key leg of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—into Afghanistan, are a significant development. The deal relating to oil extraction in the Amu Darya basin is the Taliban regime’s first major foreign investment deal. However, in the past, major Chinese projects have failed to take off. Will the recent deals remain in limbo as well? China’s growing role in Afghanistan faces formidable challenges.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Infrastructure, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, and South Asia

3. Biden’s Foreign Policy Casts a Long Shadow

Author:: Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Upon taking office as US president, Joseph R. Biden vowed he would bring the United States back to the centre of the international stage after the erratic course followed by Donald Trump. One year later, it can hardly be said that he has been successful.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iran, North America, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

4. Finland in Afghanistan 2001–2021: From stabilization to advancing foreign and security policy relations

Author:: Katariina Mustasilta, Tyyne Karjalainen, Timo R. Stewart, and Mathilda Salo
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Finland participated in the international stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan for nearly 20 years, contributing around 2,500 soldiers and 140 civilian crisis management experts. During this period, Finland’s development cooperation funds and humanitarian assistance allocated to Afghanistan amounted to around EUR 398 million. When Finland made the decision to join the operations in Afghanistan at the turn of 2001 and 2002, the country was living in uncertain yet optimistic times. The Taliban regime had collapsed quickly after the US-led military intervention, and the international community was broadly committed to supporting the interim administration in changing the country’s course. Finland sent a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan to participate in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and support the stabilization and reconstruction efforts. It also began to channel development cooperation funds to Afghanistan, notably through UN and World Bank programmes, and soon allocated most of its civilian crisis management resources to the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) in Afghanistan. In the second half of the 2000s, however, Afghanistan slid further into a devastating civil war. A decade into the international intervention, the early optimism had given way to Afghans’ growing distrust of their government and the international actors. The Finnish troops, now comprising around 200 soldiers, repeatedly engaged in combat as part of the military operation that was now led by NATO and had become a party in the conflict. While the security arrangements for the international actors required increasing resources, their room for manoeuvre became significantly more limited. After the ISAF mission ended, Finland continued to participate in the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (RSM), which supported the Afghan security forces until the summer of 2021. Finland also remained one of the most important actors to support EUPOL until the end of the mission and took responsibility for co-hosting the 2020 Afghanistan pledging conference to support the country. Afghanistan was the biggest recipient of Finland’s development cooperation funds throughout the second half of the 2010s. In August 2021, Finland suspended its extensive activities in Afghanistan in chaotic circumstances as the international community left the country following the US decision to withdraw its forces and the Taliban’s seize of power. This research examines Finland’s activities in Afghanistan by focusing on why Finland decided to engage in Afghanistan, on what its activities were based, and what can be learned from them for future crises and conflicts. The research is based on the analysis of a broad set of qualitative data consisting of interviews with 64 people who were involved in the intervention in Afghanistan or employed in related activities. Workshop discussions were also held to hear the views of the Afghan diaspora in Finland and experts. In addition, the researchers analysed public documents and previous research literature and held background discussions with experts. This research report broadly examines the consequences of Finland’s objectives, the logic behind its activities and the key challenges from the perspectives of military crisis management, civilian crisis management, and development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. Our research findings suggest that Finland’s activities in Afghanistan were motivated by multiple objectives that were partly unclear and at times conflicting. Based on government reports and other public documents, Finland’s primary aim was to stabilize and support Afghanistan to enhance international peace and security. The proclaimed objectives highlighted Finland’s responsibility as part of the UN-led international community and its efforts to support the development of good governance and the rule of law and promote the rights of women and girls in particular. In our research, these objectives comprise a framework we call “Finland as a benefactor”. On the other hand, our analysis suggests that alongside – and over – these proclaimed objectives, Finland’s participation was primarily guided by its desire to maintain and strengthen its foreign and security policy relations with the US and other international partners, as well as its effort to deepen its collaboration with NATO. Within the limits of this “Finland as a partner” framework, Finland sought to position itself as a reliable benefactor but also to gain advantage by improving its national capacities. Finland’s multiple objectives in Afghanistan might not necessarily have posed a problem in terms of the appropriateness of Finland’s involvement. Indeed, at the beginning they worked in harmony as the operating environment allowed Finland to show solidarity with the US and support it in the fight against terrorism while also appearing as a humanitarian actor that promoted stability and development in Afghanistan. However, tensions emerged between the different rationales when the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated, and the nature and outcomes of the intervention became more conflicted. In the absence of clearly and transparently set objectives, it was challenging to build an action plan and assess the activities. One particular factor that made the planning and monitoring of Finland’s participation difficult was the effort to disguise the fact that it was motivated by a desire to foster transatlantic relations and partnerships. From the perspective of the international partnerships, it was enough that Finland participated in the intervention. In terms of Afghanistan and its development, the objectives of the various activities remained vague, unrealistic and unclear, and they received insufficient attention. Instead of critical analysis and strategic monitoring, both international and Finnish actors attempted to meet the stated objectives by highlighting the progress made in Afghanistan and keeping silent about the combats and difficulties. It is almost impossible to assess to what extent Finland achieved its objectives in Afghanistan, because no clear and transparent objectives had been set. Based on our interviews, Finland’s involvement benefitted its transatlantic relations, Nordic cooperation and position in the international community. Besides defence cooperation, Finland developed its national capacities and raised its profile within the EU’s civilian crisis management framework. It is however difficult to assess in retrospect how the different forms of participation deepened Finland’s relations with the US, for example, and whether Finland’s activities were cost-efficient in terms of its partnership goals and national capacities, because no expectations had been explicitly stated. While temporary successes were achieved in improving security and the conditions for education in some areas, for example, issues such as a lack of understanding of the context of the conflict, challenges related to local ownership and the absence of a coherent long-term strategy became stumbling blocks in the international intervention in Afghanistan. Previous research has already called attention to the negative impacts of the intervention: the civilian victims of the military operations, the changes in local power structures, the displacement of local activities and increased corruption are only some of the examples of the impacts for which Finland has also been partly responsible. During, and partly as a result of, the intervention in Afghanistan, Finland’s policy came to be underpinned by a comprehensive crisis management strategy. In Afghanistan, this meant that Finland participated in multiple sectors and placed emphasis on the interdependence between the development and civilian crisis management efforts and military crisis management. Overall, our interviewees assessed that the activities of Finland and Finnish actors in Afghanistan were of high quality and appreciated. Our research suggests that the comprehensive strategy adopted by Finland served to justify its participation in different areas of the intervention and especially its military participation. However, Finland failed to fulfil the strategy in terms of coordinating its various activities in Afghanistan. Finland’s experiences in Afghanistan provide lessons learned that can be used to guide its activities in future crisis and conflict situations. First, it is necessary to set clearer and more transparent objectives to enable the effective planning and strategic monitoring of activities. In the context of partnership and capacity goals, clear objectives would help to develop the resourcing and targeting of activities. As regards supporting peace and stability, clearer, context-specific objectives would make it possible to monitor the appropriateness and comprehensiveness of activities. However, adopting a comprehensive approach does not mean that Finland should engage in all activities or areas of assistance in the target country; rather, its activities should be targeted to support the overall international aid effort. It is also important to develop Finland’s advocacy and impact efforts in multilateral interventions, in particular in situations in which Finland contributes significant resources. While Finland is in principle a small player, playing an active role in issues such as drawing attention to the possible negative impacts of interventions is consistent with its value-based foreign policy. By collaborating with like-minded actors, Finland has the opportunity to promote its interests through interventions (as far as these interests have been identified). However, sufficient resources are required for effective outcomes: development cooperation funds and inputs from seconded experts will be wasted if the human resources allocated to the comprehensive planning, implementation and monitoring of Finland’s participation are insufficient. The setting and implementation of realistic objectives appropriate to the context require a continuously updated conflict analysis, which in the case of small players such as Finland must also include an analysis of the context of international aid and operations. After interventions, it is also important to effectively put to use the expertise of the people who return to Finland after working in crisis areas so as not to waste the cultural and linguistic knowledge they have acquired. The lessons identified in this research are also relevant for the future of Afghanistan and Afghan people. The international community, including Finland, has been involved in shaping the structures of Afghan society, as well as its conflict dynamics, for nearly 20 years. This means that it also continues to assume its responsibility after withdrawing from the country – all the more so because the decisions to start and terminate the intervention were primarily driven by interests other than those of Afghans themselves. In terms of Finland’s credibility as a foreign policy actor, it is particularly important that it continues to abide by its long-standing commitment to promote the rights of women and girls. In the present difficult circumstances, the cooperation and assistance efforts should be based on placing the needs and priorities of Afghans at the centre. This can be achieved by conducting a careful conflict analysis, listening to and discussing with Afghans, and promoting a strategically coordinated approach to setting the objectives and framework conditions of the cooperation at the level of the international community.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Crisis Management, and Stabilization
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and Finland

5. Treading Lightly: China’s Footprint in a Taliban-led Afghanistan

Author:: Jiayi Zhou, Fei Su, and Jingdong Yuan
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: This SIPRI Insights Paper provides a preliminary assessment of China’s attitudes to and policies on Afghanistan since the August 2021 Taliban takeover. It examines the scope of China’s security, economic and humanitarian interests, and the depth of its engagement so far. It finds that China’s footprint has been minimal due not only to China’s non-interference policy but also to a range of broader challenges: the militant extremist groups that continue to operate on Afghan soil, the risks of investing in a country where the government remains unrecognized by any member of the international community and a fragile stability that is far from conducive to long-term planning. While there may be prospects and opportunities for China to contribute to Afghan peace and development, particularly from a broader regional perspective, current realities mean that China’s overall approach to Afghanistan will remain cautious, pragmatic and limited.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Development, Taliban, and Investment
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, and South Asia

6. Apply the Logic of the Afghanistan Withdrawal to Syria

Author:: Natalia Armbruster
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The logic President Biden used for removing U.S. troops from Afghanistan applies to Syria. Since a U.S. intervention should be defined by clear, achievable goals, and since long-range strikes, instead of occupying forces, can accomplish U.S. counterterrorism goals, there is no good case for keeping U.S. troops in Syria either. Around 900 U.S. forces currently occupy territory in eastern and southern Syria, risking conflict with Syrian forces and local militias, as well as Russian, Iranian, and Turkish forces. ISIS’s territorial caliphate in Syria was eliminated in 2019. The few, small, remote areas the remnants of ISIS now hold are largely within territory held by Syrian government forces. Local forces can fight the remnants of ISIS. None of the other standard rationales for keeping U.S. forces in Syria—protecting the Kurds, countering Iran and Russia, unseating the Assad regime—justifies keeping troops in Syria either.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Islamic State, Military Intervention, Syrian War, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

7. The Wisdom of U.S. Military Withdrawal from Afghanistan

Author:: Andrew Doris
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Afghanistan was not Korea. False analogies to peacetime military garrisons cheapen war and conflate wildly different forms of “support” to U.S. allies. War in Afghanistan was costly—to taxpayers, to civilians, to American soft power, to democratic legitimacy, and to the West’s strategic attention. Thus, withdrawal saved a fortune, saved lives, aided America’s reputation, honored democratic and constitutional principles, and focused Western strategists. War was not protecting Americans from terrorism. Keeping troops in but one of many places terrorists may operate did not meaningfully reduce Americans’ microscopic risk of being harmed in a terrorist attack. War was not helping Afghanistan. Democracy is a strong word for what U.S. forces propped up. Far from maintaining stability, the continued presence of those forces only prolonged armed struggle against a corrupt rentier state, impeding organic or sustainable long-term development. Credibility is highly contextual and unaffected by admitting defeat after 20 years of futile effort. If anything, the resources freed up by withdrawal make the United States better able to honor other commitments.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Affairs, Taliban, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

8. US Has an Opportunity to Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Just over one year ago, the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan. Leading up to this takeover, in February 2020 President Donald Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement served as the starting point that eventually led to the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power. In January 2021, President Joe Biden entered office. Instead of canceling the flawed agreement with the Taliban—something that was in his power to do—he merely delayed America’s withdrawal date from May to September. By July, almost all US and international forces had left. On August 15, the Taliban took Kabul. By the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on September 11, 2021, the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on September 11, 2001. Since the Taliban’s return to power, one credible and non-extremist group has been willing to take up arms in opposition: the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan. Based in the Panjshir Province and operating in a dozen other provinces, the NRF has continued the fight against the Taliban against all odds and without any international support. While the US does not have many good policy options in Afghanistan because of the Biden administration’s actions, the US and international community need to consider how to support the NRF at this perilous time. This assistance can include establishing formal contact with the NRF leadership and inviting Ahmad Massoud to Washington, DC; refusing to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan; providing the NRF with winter gear; allocating a certain percentage of all frozen Afghan central bank funds to the NRF’s political wing, and consulting and coordinating privately with Tajikistan, which harbors sympathies for the ethnic Tajik minority that comprises much of the NRF.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Taliban
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

9. Turkey in Afghanistan: more than one reason to stay

Author:: Ekrem Eddy Güzeldere
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Despite a long history of bilateral contacts, Turkey’s most intensive commitment in Afghanistan only started in 2001 with the NATO mission. A first friendship treaty was signed back in 1921; the first official foreign visit to the Republic of Turkey was made in 1928 by King Amanullah of Afghanistan. Turkey’s engagement in South Asia started with Afghanistan but has recently been Pakistan-centred. As the only majority-Muslim NATO country, Turkey was viewed more positively by the Afghan population and the Taliban than other NATO member states. Ankara has been reaching out to the Taliban since summer 2021. However, the Taliban have not met Turkish demands for a more inclusive government, or in relation to girls’ education. Turkey has become a haven for non-Taliban (opposition) Afghans, who are told not to voice their criticism of the Taliban. There are four main motivations for Turkey’s engagement in Afghanistan: 1) improving relations with the US; 2) stabilizing Afghanistan to prevent migrant flows; 3) getting a foothold in the geopolitics of the region; 4) benefitting from the economic potential. Kabul international airport is important both for the Taliban and for Turkey. For the Taliban, it is their window to the world; for Turkey, it is an opportunity to profit economically and to boost its international status. In Afghanistan, Turkey’s soft power approach includes TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), the Maarif schools, and the Yunus Emre Institute. These institutions have remained operational. In 2020, Afghanistan received the third largest amount of Turkish developmental aid, amounting to 36.5 million USD. Even if the world, and Turkey, are currently focused on Ukraine, Afghanistan will continue to occupy an important place in Turkey’s regional foreign policy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Taliban, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Turkey, and Middle East

10. Dealing with a Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan: Supporting the Afghan People without Legitimizing the Regime

Author:: Lisa Curtis
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Nearly 20 years after U.S. forces overturned Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the fundamentalist Islamist movement is back in power. This follows the U.S. troop withdrawal in summer 2021 and a failed peace agreement between the United States and the Taliban that was concluded during the Trump administration. The U.S. government must continue to monitor terrorism threats emanating from Afghanistan and work with like-minded nations to protect Afghan civil society, especially women and girls. While competing with China may be America’s number one foreign policy priority, managing terrorism threats and protecting women’s rights in Afghanistan also demands continued U.S. attention and resources. First and foremost, the United States and other international donors must help Afghanistan avoid a humanitarian disaster and ensure average Afghans can meet their basic needs for food, shelter, and access to healthcare. While the United Nations and international humanitarian organizations are finding ways to get cash into the system without funneling it through the Taliban, there is a need to identify a more reliable and sustainable solution to Afghanistan’s liquidity crisis. However, releasing to the Taliban without conditions the nearly $7 billion in Afghan foreign reserves that Washington froze following the Taliban takeover of the country is not the answer. The Biden administration must avoid giving these assets to the Taliban interim government, which comprises mostly individuals who have been sanctioned for their involvement in terrorism.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Humanitarian Aid, Terrorism, Taliban, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

11. How Religious Diplomacy and Pan-Islamic Organizations Can Help Stabilize Afghanistan

Author:: Hussam R. Ahmed
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 was followed by a surprisingly quick takeover by the Taliban, the predominantly Pashtun, Islamic fundamentalist group that had initially been ousted in 2001. Their triumphant return to power 20 years has raised numerous questions about what led to the US and Western failure in Afghanistan, the implications for regional and global security, and the policy options now available to Europe and the United States. As of now, the West has no plans to engage with the Taliban government, but continued inaction could result in dire consequences for Afghan citizens as well as for Western interests at large. A severe humanitarian crisis has gripped Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover, pushing nearly 20 million people to the verge of famine. The United Nations Development Programme fears Afghanistan will face near “universal poverty” by the end of 2022 with 97 percent of the population living below the international poverty line. There is also a growing threat that a Taliban regime could enable terrorist organizations to operate more openly on Afghan soil, paving the way for new, aggravated threats to regional and global security. The withdrawal has also compelled European to re-evaluate their partnership with the United States on Afghanistan and to fear that the fallout from the Taliban’s resurgence will be most severe for Europe, including more immediately with social and economic costs of dealing with more refugees. There is widespread agreement in the West that engagement in Afghanistan needs to continue but not the way it was done in the past. To explore what that reimagining Western engagement can look like, this paper presents an analysis of a foreign policy approach that has largely remained absent from the discussion: religious diplomacy. This form of Track Two diplomacy is deeply rooted in religious texts, practices, and traditions, and it is oriented toward the active role of faith leaders in politics, conflict resolution, and peace-building. In Afghanistan, where the sociocultural and political realities have historically remained deeply intertwined with it, an insufficient understanding of religion has led some to argue this was a major blind spot in the Western foreign policy approach. There is a need to revisit religion’s centrality to the war and how religious diplomacy offers an underappreciated peace-building framework that can be operationalized through faith-based organizations that share existing relationships with Afghanistan, a common religious language and cultural affinities with its people, and moral capital to draw from. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Muslim World League, in particular, are two highly influential pan-Islamic nongovernmental organizations, that have leveraged their religious legitimacy and moderate interpretations of Islamic teachings to provide a counter narrative to radical ideas that promote violent extremism, to facilitate dialogue, to mediate conflicts, and to initiate peace-building in previous and ongoing conflicts in the Muslim world. Drawing on their experience, this paper argues that creative religious diplomacy through them can be an effective policy option for the Europe and the United States for a sustainable future engagement in Afghanistan. The paper therefore offers recommendations that flesh out the form this could take.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Religion, Political stability, Domestic Politics, Society, and Community-based Organizations
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

12. Regime Change No More: Coming to Terms with the Greater Middle East

Author:: Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: Reflecting on the ‘farcical retreat from Afghanistan’ back in August 2021, Henrik Larsen discusses the need for a reckoning within US foreign policy and that of its NATO Allies. To focus on the other challenges to transatlantic security with a sense of integrity, these states must come to grips with their failed regime change agenda over the past 20 years. Afghanistan was the first of their interventions in the Greater Middle East since 2001, alongside Iraq, Libya, and Syria, that obscured the pursuit of realistic objectives and prioritised (liberal) ideals that proved to be detached from the local realities. In the wake of NATO’s new Strategic Concept for 2030 and beyond, this Strategic Update seeks to analyse the options for policy in the Middle East going forward.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Regime Change
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, and United States of America

13. When Interventions Fail: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Latin America

Author:: Leticia Abad and Noel Maurer
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: In the middle of 2021, despite two decades of effort, the Afghan government collapsed in just nine days. The United States failed to create a state with the capacity to control its own armed forces or local officials. As early as 2009, eight years into the intervention, Ambassador Karl Eikenberry had already noted that the Afghan government could not carry out most state functions and that its leadership showed little interest in trying. U.S. civilians and soldiers tried to fill the gap.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, State Building, and Intervention
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Latin America, and United States of America

14. Strategic Patience: Sustainable Engagement with a Changed Afghanistan

Author:: Adam Weinstein
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: One year after the United States withdrew its military from Afghanistan, relations between the two countries are stuck in a holding pattern. The United States remains the single largest humanitarian donor to the people of Afghanistan, with over $774 million USD distributed since the Taliban takeover, but the United States maintains no diplomatic presence in the country — nor does it send official diplomatic envoys.1 U.S. sanctions have not altered the Taliban’s calculus on human rights or ties with al-Qaeda. The Taliban has proved intransigent and unrealistic in its relations not only with Washington but with neighboring countries like Pakistan. Its senior leaders lack a coherent vision for the country and its emir remains reclusive.2 Future U.S. policymakers might be tempted to disengage diplomatically and economically from Afghanistan and instead rely primarily on “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism.3 The most likely consequence of this approach would be a more isolated and unstable Afghanistan, which in turn could foster an even more permissive environment for transnational terrorists. Consistent diplomacy tied to long-term U.S. security objectives is likely to produce incremental results at best, but is still preferable to diplomatic disengagement or military intervention. This brief provides a concise background and analysis of the most pressing issues affecting U.S. interests in Afghanistan. It draws on open source data; interviews with government officials — including from the de facto Taliban government; and interviews with private analysts that were conducted remotely or in person — in the United States, Pakistan, and Qatar. Broad policy recommendations • The United States should work closely with regional countries, including Pakistan, India, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to ensure they are prepared to handle security challenges as they emerge. If the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is revived, opportunities may emerge to engage Iran on Afghanistan. These should include routine dialogue, intelligence sharing, and capacity building, such as policing and border security. Washington should engage separately with India and Pakistan to bolster humanitarian aid and limited commerce to Afghanistan. • The United States should reiterate mutual responsibilities under the 2020 agreement it signed with the Taliban in Doha, but recognize that it lacks effective enforcement mechanisms and therefore is better understood as an aspirational framework. • Formal recognition of the de facto Taliban government should be withheld until it demonstrates a clear commitment to its counterterrorism responsibilities and respect for basic human rights, including for women. But Washington should place diplomats in Afghanistan either through the creation of an in-country Afghanistan affairs unit, whether based in the prior U.S. Embassy or inside a friendly third country’s diplomatic mission, or by sending temporary delegations to Kabul, as our allies have. This should be coupled with multilateral steps to remove the leadership’s travel privileges. It is important that U.S. officials interact with Taliban cabinet members in Kabul and other Taliban stakeholders based in Kandahar.4 Direct outreach by U.S. military officials and the intelligence community may have utility but it is not a replacement for a coherent civilian-led diplomatic strategy. • Sanctions intended to target the Taliban as a non-state actor now extend far beyond their original scope, since they became the de facto government of Afghanistan. If not yet determined, the U.S. government should communicate what steps the Taliban must take to be de-listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Group.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Sanctions, and Engagement
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Asia, India, and United States of America

15. A question of balance: India and Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Frédéric Grare
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: European officials are frustrated at India’s apparent fence-sitting over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yet, for Indian policymakers, maintaining a workable relationship with Russia is central to counterbalancing Chinese hegemony in their shared neighbourhood. India also depends significantly on Russia for arms supplies, including advanced systems that help it keep pace with China. Despite this, India has for some time been slowly decoupling from Russia and strengthening its relations with the West, especially the US. Europeans should be aware of how India defines its own strategic positioning, and support India where possible as they negotiate the tricky issues relating to the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Arms Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and India

16. China’s Interests in Afghanistan One Year After the U.S. Withdrawal

Author:: Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In late June, a severe earthquake struck southeastern Afghanistan. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced it would provide 50 million RMB ($7.2 million) in emergency aid, including tents, blankets, cots and other sorely needed supplies to the impacted areas (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FMPRC), June 25). Beijing invests in Afghanistan to further its long-term economic, strategic and political interests. Since the U.S. withdrawal last year, China has had an opportunity to advance its interests and deepen its clout in Afghanistan. When Kabul fell, China did not condemn the move and announced that it respected the choice of the Afghan people—a sign of goodwill from Beijing to the Taliban that it subscribes to the narrative that the new government has the full support of the population (Xinhua, August 16, 2021). China has never been militarily involved in Afghanistan. Uyghur militants have found safe-haven in the country for decades, but the level of threat they pose to the PRC is debated even among Chinese analysts (China Brief, February 11). Despite such long-running concerns, Beijing was unperturbed by the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan last year. The PRC kept its embassy open through the fall of Kabul, and Beijing has sustained extensive diplomatic contact with the Taliban leadership to safeguard its security, economic and strategic interests in Afghanistan (Global Times, August 17, 2021). In fact, the PRC is seeking to carry out a complex balancing act in Afghanistan. Concerns about Afghanistan becoming a safe haven for extremist groups that could target neighboring states persist, but Beijing also perceives huge opportunities in Afghanistan’s natural resources, markets and potential to serve as a key node linking western China with South and Central Asia. In order to achieve a stable and secure Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which will advance China’s interests throughout Central Asia, Beijing needs a stable Afghanistan.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Taliban, Political stability, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Asia, and United States of America

17. The Killing of Al-Zawahiri and the Future of Al-Qaeda

Author:: Dario Cristiani
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In the afternoon of 1 August, Joe Biden gave a speech from the White House confirming the killing of Al-Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in Afghanistan. According to senior sources from the administration, Zawahiri was killed by “a precise tailored airstrike” conducted at around 06:30 am local time in the Sherpur neighbourhood of Kabul.[1] The strike was carried out via two Hellfire missiles (allegedly, two R9X missiles) fired from a drone.[2] The area in which the attack was carried out is particularly significant: the Sherpur neighbourhood is located in a deeply protected area of the capital, in which many Taliban leaders now live. Al-Zawahiri was reportedly killed in the house owned by a top aide to senior Taliban leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani.[3]
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Al Qaeda, and Ayman al-Zawahiri
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

18. Porosity of Tajik-Afghan Border Making Beijing’s Involvement in Region More Ominous

Author:: Paul A. Goble
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In most parts of the world, the lines on maps separating countries are true borders. That is, they are controlled by the governments on one or both sides. But in some places, they remain the quasi-open frontiers they were in the past or have reemerged as such because of recent political changes; those borders are highly porous zones, where people and goods can move more or less freely in one or both directions without much regard to the powers that be. Such situations invite outside involvement that can ramp up quickly and disturb preexisting international arrangements. One poignant example is the adjoining border area shared by Tajikistan and Afghanistan. In recent years, that frontier has attracted attention because of the danger that Islamist militants from Afghanistan could cross it to move north into Tajikistan and beyond. But another danger is emerging: China is establishing increasing control over Tajikistan and, thus, is putting itself in a position to project power southward from Tajikistan into Afghanistan. If Beijing does so, that could fundamentally change the security situation and geopolitical balance in Central and South Asia as a whole.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, South Asia, Central Asia, Asia, and Tajikistan

19. US Credibility and the Afghanistan Withdrawal

Author:: Riccardo Perissich
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Whatever one may think of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, a decision that President Biden shared with his predecessor Donald Trump, most observers on the two sides of the Atlantic seem to agree that both the planning and the execution phases of the withdrawal were botched. Europeans in particular, including the ever-faithful US allies in the UK, complain about not having been adequately consulted or involved in the decision and execution of the withdrawal. Whatever the merits of this debate, it has inevitably led to fundamental questions about US foreign policy and its future trajectories. After four years of Trump, many in Europe are legitimately concerned. Old and by now familiar academic debates about Washington’s priorities, credibility and handling of global affairs have resurfaced as a result. The underlining question is: to what foreign policy tribe does Biden belong? Is he an optimist or a pessimist? A realist or an idealist? A liberal internationalist or a nationalist? Is he a Wilson or a Roosevelt and if the answer leans towards latter, which of the two Roosevelts’ are we referring to?
Topic:: Foreign Policy and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States of America

20. Twenty Years Later: Why 9/11 Has Not Been a Second Pearl Harbor

Author:: Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In the immediate aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, an overwhelming majority of commentators drew a parallel with the surprise blitz by Imperial Japan against the US Pacific fleet in Hawaii’s Bay of Pearl Harbor, on 7 December 1941. The comparison rested on two pillars. The first had its roots in historical analogy and symbolic impact. The Pearl Harbor attack was the closest precedent of an aggression against the United States on its soil. The fact that the United States was caught by surprise, combined with the considerable toll in human lives exacted by the aggressors (more than two thousand people died in Pearl Harbor and almost three thousand on 9/11), lent legitimacy to such comparison. As all US citizens at the time would forever recall what they were doing when news of the Pearl Harbor attack came through, so do all US citizens (and not only) remember what they were busy with when the image of the Twin Towers wrapped in flames appeared on TV screens on that Tuesday back in 2001. The second reasoning underlying the parallel between Pearl Harbor and 9/11 concerned the impact on US domestic politics and, consequently, foreign policy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Terrorism, History, and 9/11
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, North America, and United States of America

21. American Invasion And Withdrawals Post 9/11

Author:: Ibrahim Karatas
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: When the United States was hit by al-Qaida's terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 (hereafter 9/11 attacks), not only Americans but the whole world was shocked: The world’s only superpower was attacked at home and had lost more than three thousand people. To take revenge for the attack as well as to prevent new ones, the Bush administration decided to invade both Afghanistan and Iraq, which they claimed were sheltering and supporting al-Qaida. Afghanistan was invaded on 7 October 2001 because the US wanted (1) to eliminate Osama bin Laden (the mastermind of 9/11) and al-Qaida; (2) to remove the Taliban group from power and bring stability to Afghanistan by creating a democratic and peaceful state.[1] The US Army subsequently invaded Iraq in 2003, claiming that Saddam Hussain was supporting terrorism and producing chemical weapons. There were also allegations that the Hussain regime was behind the 9/11 attacks, but it was never proven. The US eventually removed both Taliban and Saddam Hussain from power and captured Hussain, who was later judged and executed by the new Iraqi government on 30 December 2006. US special forces killed Laden on 2 May 2011. As of today, the US has killed its two archenemies and changed regimes allegedly supporting terrorism in both Afghanistan and Iraq, yet could not bring stability. What is more, the remaining US troops are preparing to leave the two countries. Neither Afghanistan nor Iraq is in better condition than the pre-invasion era as both states have failed, lack a strong authority, and cannot !ght terrorism. In Afghanistan, the Taliban was the enemy to be removed, however the US’s recent agreement with the organization has paved the way for re-control of the country by the group. On the other hand, Iraq has become a land of widespread terrorism, and the country is more divided than before, not mentioning Iranian in"uence on Baghdad. Based on the current situation, my arguments are that (1) the US is about to make the same mistake it did in Vietnam, and (2) Afghanistan and Iraq might again become the hub of terrorist organizations as well as regional rivalries. Although I do not approve of the US invasions, as Afghanistan and Iraq saw the worse with its invasion, these countries will face the worst with the US’s withdrawal.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, War on Terror, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

22. Prospects For Russia’s Policy Towards Afghanistan

Author:: Anna Maria Dyner and Arkadiusz Legieć
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Taking advantage of the withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan, Russia intends to strengthen its influence in that country by increasing contacts with the Afghan government and the Taliban. The aim is to become a key mediator in the peace process, which will enable it to influence the participants, increase control over the situation in Afghanistan, and use it in relations with the countries of the region. Russia’s policy may make the stabilisation of Afghanistan more difficult and undermine the effects of the efforts made by NATO countries during the stabilisation mission.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, South Asia, and Eurasia

23. Afghanistan – Opportunities and Challenges for the Russian Federation

Author:: Giorgio Bilanishvili
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Lately, the discussions about a possible weakening of US influence in international politics has become more frequent. Parallel to this, there is talk about the activation of Russia and, especially, China in this regard with their influence growing on the international stage. The increasing confrontation between these two countries and the United States has also become one of the most pressing matters. Given all of this, it is now stated more frequently that the world order is changing and a new multi-polar international system is being formed which will be followed by the redistribution of the spheres of influence in the world, leading to increased roles played by China and Russia. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan is considered to be a development of such importance that it could influence the aforementioned international processes and, therefore, commands special attention in that regard as well. Apart from this, the political and security situation in Afghanistan concerns a multitude of states which includes the great powers of the region such as India, China, Russia, Iran and Turkey that play important roles regionally or globally. The interests of these countries, including with regard to Afghanistan, converge in certain cases while diverging in others. At the moment, it is largely unclear how the relations of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan created by the Taliban may develop with its neighbors. Experts assess the prospects of Afghan-Indian and Afghan-Iranian relations especially unfavorably. The return of the Taliban in Afghanistan’s leadership is also important in terms of international security. In this regard, the main cause of concern is the threat of the activation of international terrorism. All of the things mentioned above comprise an incomplete list of the important aspects of the current situation in Afghanistan which, as a whole, create a complex and multi-dimensional picture. For Russia, therefore, Afghanistan also does not have a single dimension. It is, on the one hand, a certain opportunity for the Russian Federation in order for it to bolster influence on the international arena. At the same time, however, the threats that have increased in Afghanistan given the new realities naturally cannot stay outside of Moscow’s attention.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, and International System
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, South Asia, United States of America, and Russian Federation

24. US Foreign Policy Challenges and Achievements in the First 8 Months of Joseph Biden's Presidency

Author:: Nika Petriashvili
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: September 20 will mark exactly eight months since Joseph Biden took over the presidency of the United States. The purpose of our review is to assess the activities of his administration in the international political arena, which obviously cannot be understood in isolation from the ongoing processes within the country and the decisions made in domestic politics. When assessing the steps taken by President Biden and his administration in international relations, we must first look at the legacy he inherited from the previous president and his administration. This will be one of the primary elements based upon which we will assess the performance of the 46th President of the United States and his administration. To put it very modestly, the situation that Joseph Biden faced inside the country and abroad after Donald Trump was really not simple: A polarized society within the United States and a complicated relationship with international partners. Naturally, all this was further complicated by the very difficult epidemiological state in the country precipitated by the pandemic, and the significantly deteriorating socio-economic situation. Clearly, the citizens of the United States expected the Joseph Biden administration, first and foremost, to deal quickly and effectively with the major domestic challenges. Tensions reached a peak in American society after radical and extremist groups penetrated the Capitol on January 6. As a result, Joseph Biden's main message and first steps were aimed at calming and uniting society within the country. Of course, it would not be right to discuss these dramatic processes only in a domestic context. The tensions within the country have been closely monitored by both US partners, including Georgia, as well as its rivals and enemies. We cannot really say that Joe Biden was able to heal the American public during these 8 months, as he promised in his inaugural speech, but the situation has calmed down somewhat, and the processes have indeed shifted towards a quieter and more professional course.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States of America

25. The Interests of Turkey and Iran in Afghanistan: Threats and Challenges

Author:: Zurab Batiashvili
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: In the summer of 2021, as the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan, the balance of power in the country changed rapidly, and by August 15, the Taliban was able to capture the capital, Kabul, almost without a fight. On September 7, the Taliban formed a new "government" steered by Sharia Law. The Taliban also renamed the country, and, according to them, Afghanistan is now called the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan." There are no women or members of the Shiite minority in the new government.Of the 33 members of the still-incomplete government, only three belong to ethnic minorities. Interestingly, the four new "ministers" of the country are former inmates of Guantanamo Bay, having served time there for organizing terrorist activities. Sirajuddin Haqqani, the "Minister of Internal Affairs" of the new "government" of Afghanistan, is still wanted by the FBI on the same charges. A reward of $5 million is being offered for his capture. There is already the threat of a humanitarian catastrophe (food shortages), and instability (internal strife) in Afghanistan. Tens of thousands of Afghans are fleeing their homes, many of them heading to Iran and Turkey. This poses a number of threats and challenges to these countries, especially since they have their own interests in Afghanistan.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Government, Taliban, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iran, South Asia, Turkey, and Middle East

26. The Fall of Afghanistan: The Biden Administration's First Crisis

Author:: Mateusz Piotrowski
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan sparked the first major crisis of confidence in President Joe Biden and his administration, both in the U.S. and internationally. It has affected the administration’s relations with Democrats in Congress, whose confidence in the president has weakened. This narrows the president’s freedom to conduct foreign policy. At the same time, the way the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan will be used by its rivals to undermine American guarantees to Allies and the U.S. standing in the international arena.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

27. Afghanistan: The Fog at the End of the Tunnel

Author:: Carl Conetta
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: What is causing the uncertainty about when US ground forces will exit Afghanistan. The Biden administration insists that logistical factors explain its breach of the 2020 US-Taliban agreement, which reset the exit date from May to September. Logistical factors are also supposed to explain why the date may now be walked back to July. Actually, logistical issues explain neither. Using current data and historical precedent, this short analysis shows why. An alternative explanation for the delay is that it gave Washington more time to pursue some of its unfinished goals regarding Afghanistan. In this, the lingering troop presence serves as leverage. What goals? Improve Kabul’s military posture, polish plans and preparations for US forces to “fight from afar,” and pursue dramatic new international initiatives aiming to lock the Taliban into a cease-fire, peace settlement, and government reform plan substantially defined by the USA. This high risk-gambit won’t succeed, but it might prolong the conflict and America’s involvement in it.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, War, Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Taliban, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

28. Celebrating American Diplomacy

Author:: Chris Van Hollen
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: There’s no question that this program’s theme, what diplomacy does for Americans, is on the front of everyone’s minds especially given the current challenges in Afghanistan and the fast-paced events around the world. In recent weeks in Afghanistan, our diplomats have been on the front lines working overtime to orchestrate the safe evacuation of Americans and many of our closest Afghan partners. Even though the last American soldier has left Afghanistan, America’s diplomats are still working around the clock in capitals around the world to bring people to safety. I believe we have an obligation to ensure the safety and help those Afghans who for years have worked closely in support of our common mission. Our nation’s diplomats display extraordinary courage each and every day, often putting themselves in harm’s way for the rest of us.
Topic:: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States of America

29. President Biden: Try for a Double Play on Iran and Afghanistan

Author:: Jon Greenwald
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:: Southwest Asia is increasingly dangerous. Negotiations about Iran’s nuclear program appear stuck near a breakpoint. With the Kabul government’s precipitous collapse, President Biden’s courageous decision to remove U.S. troops from Afghanistan has gone badly. Each situation threatens grave consequences for the administration. Together they suggest more deadly chaos looms from the Middle East to China’s borders. Iran is an important common factor, central to the first case, important in the second due to geography and potential leverage. The concurrence of threat – but also perhaps opportunity – justifies a new strategy for dealing with it that cuts across both situations. Joe Biden said before taking office that it was a priority to restore the nuclear deal that was working well until Donald Trump took the U.S. out. He pledged to conclude the endless war in Afghanistan. Today neither objective appears promising. Iran has more enriched and closer to weapons level uranium than when the original deal was signed. U.S. officials acknowledge that negotiating time is limited and, by implication, that military action may be required to keep the president’s pledge never to allow an Iranian bomb. As the Taliban takes over Afghanistan, Washington is focused as it should be on safely extracting U.S. citizens and the many thousands of Afghans whose lives are at risk for having helped the Americans over 20 years. Soon, however, there will be new proposals, including preparations for off-shore responses to what many anticipate will be a revival of the kind of civil war that ravaged Afghanistan in the 1990s. Any reasonable proposal should include at the least a significant diplomatic component in which Afghanistan’s neighbors, Iran prominent among them, apply their weight to persuade the Taliban to rule more moderately than it did its first time in power and in particular to keep out international terrorists. Most acknowledge that a key weakness of that approach is U.S. inability to work with Tehran.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

30. Afghanistan: Before Time Runs Out

Author:: Owen Kirby
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:: The withdrawal of remaining U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan is nearly complete. As they go, the country begins a new, uncertain chapter in a long uncertain history. With the U.S. and our allies having made significant investments and great sacrifices in an attempt to develop self-sustaining Afghan institutions – and the Taliban now rampaging through the countryside – this is the moment of truth for the country’s government and post-9/11 political order. Whether Afghanistan’s institutions, security forces, and civil society prove sufficiently resilient to meet current challenges is not solely a matter of local capacity and resolve (or wisdom of previous donor decisions). Nor is it a matter of free choice between competing political views, as Afghans are not going to the voting booth to decide the outcome. It is equally about the commitment of the U.S. and our allies to continue supporting the equality of Afghan women and minorities, rule of law, free speech, and basic human rights. These are not foreign impositions, as some might argue, but rather vital weapons, absent U.S. troops, in the Afghan people’s own struggle against extremism and political regression. For many, there is justifiable fatigue with America’s “forever war” and its costs; but the Taliban’s repressive rule and its consequences are not a specter of another lifetime. It has only been 20 years since Afghan girls were banned from going to school; women barred from the workforce and life outside the home; and summary justice, including stoning and decapitation, for transgressions against the Taliban’s medieval code meted out in the national stadium. It has only been 17 years since Afghans were first given the constitutional right to choose their leadership at the ballot box. Progress is recent, and the Taliban is determined to make it reversible.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Military Strategy, Transition, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

31. Afghanistan’s Ripples: Can the US withdraw from Iraq?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The Taliban’s control of Kabul and the extension of its sovereignty over the majority of Afghanistan, following the withdrawal of US forces, have raised debates regarding the fate of the US forces in Iraq. Is Washington going to withdraw from Iraq as well, particularly in light of previous US threats to do so, or will the Afghan experience not be repeated in Iraq?
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Iraq War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, South Asia, Middle East, and United States of America

32. Potential Cooperation: Iranian Possible Cooperation with Taliban to Curb Threats

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The situation in Afghanistan, after the Taliban took over the country, is the second key issue that the new Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi’s, foreign policy agenda, after reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Taliban, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iran, South Asia, and Middle East

33. The Interests of Turkey and Iran in Afghanistan: Threats and Challenges

Author:: Zurab Batiashvili
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: In the summer of 2021, as the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan, the balance of power in the country changed rapidly, and by August 15, the Taliban was able to capture the capital, Kabul, almost without a fight. On September 7, the Taliban formed a new "government" steered by Sharia Law. The Taliban also renamed the country, and, according to them, Afghanistan is now called the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan." There are no women or members of the Shiite minority in the new government. Of the 33 members of the still-incomplete government, only three belong to ethnic minorities.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Taliban, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey

34. Afghanistan: What Just Happened? What Comes Next?

Author:: Carl Conetta
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: in short order, a 20-year $1.2 trillion US effort at nation-building evaporated, disintegrated, went up in smoke. And while unreconstructed interventionists pummel President Biden for surrendering Afghanistan, the truth is that we never had it. What we held instead was a hollow construct of our own imagination and creation – a client pseudo-state. And when it was finally and fully tested, it (for the most part) threw down its arms and ran away. In a sense, the sudden collapse of Kabul’s government and security services provides the surest litmus test of America’s 20-year enterprise in Afghanistan. It tells us that coercive nation-building by a foreign power – indeed, an alien power – is an impossible mission. Outsiders lack the knowledge, indigenous roots, legitimacy, and degree of interest to succeed against local resistance. Their very presence is provocative, especially given differences of language, religion, and culture. It’s as likely to spur resistance as it is to quell it. At the same time, such interventions risk becoming intractable given domestic political dynamics and Washington’s fixation on preserving its superpower reputation, its claim to being the “indispensable power”.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Taliban, Conflict, and Military
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

35. US Exit from Afghanistan: Impacts on Pakistan and India

Author:: Muhammad Muzaffar, Zahid Yaseen, and Naila Afzal
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Political Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The aim of this qualitative study is to explore the impacts, challenges, and opportunities for Pakistan and India if United States of America applies full exit policy in Afghanistan. USA invade Afghanistan after 9/11 incident, almost 20 years close to pass, and Barak Obama peace deal withdrawal from Afghanistan is shortly to apply till the 20th anniversary of the said incident. Whole world has fixed her attention on this issue that how would USA successfully exit from Afghanistan by applying adequate intra-Afghan peace deal having a number of interests in the region. Ramification of the study is that USA full exit from Afghanistan is nightmare and for peace process and development of the reign Pakistan and Afghanistan must be cooperate instead of playing in enemy’s hands. It is also recommended that Pakistan need to review foreign policy on sound basis for the preservation of her interests in Afghanistan.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

36. Toppling Foreign Governments: The Logic of Regime Change, Melissa Willard-Foster

Author:: Alexander B. Downes
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Political Science Quarterly
Institution:: Academy of Political Science
Abstract:: The rapid-fire overthrow of the theocratic Taliban regime in Afghanistan (2001) and Saddam Hussein’s Baathist dictatorship in Iraq (2003) by the United States—and the disastrous aftermaths of those and other recent interventions (such as the ouster of Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi in 2011)— has sparked popular and scholarly interest in the causes and consequences of foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC). One of the enduring puzzles about FIRCs is that, as highlighted in Melissa Willard-Foster’s terrific book Toppling Foreign Governments, three-quarters of them are carried out by great powers against minor powers in situations of extreme power asymmetry. “Though this asymmetry of power makes an imposed change feasible,” writes Willard-Foster, a political scientist at the University of Vermont, “it should also make that change unnecessary” because “militarily weak leaders who are bereft of allies should back down when confronted by stronger states” (pp. 2–3). The 133 regime changes in Willard-Foster’s study, however, testify that the weak regularly defy the strong—and pay the price for it.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Government, Regime Change, and Political Science
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, and United States of America

37. Is a Plan B Needed to Save Afghanistan?

Author:: Marvin G. Weinbaum, Saad Mohseni, Anthony H. Cordesman, Muqaddesa Yourish, David Sedney, and Ali Jalali
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: The future of Afghanistan’s constitutionally liberal democratic system is very much at issue. On its survival rests the aspiration of the greatest number of its people, the deep investment of the international community in the country’s stability and wellbeing, and ultimately the security of the region and beyond. Negotiations are beginning in what is certain to be a lengthy process that may in the name of a compromise trade away social and economic gains realized over nearly two decades. Afghanistan has additionally to cope with the disengagement of foreign forces just at a time when their leverage militarily and diplomatically could be critical. In the absence of a verifiable ceasefire, the country confronts a prospect of exploding violence and possible descent into chaos. Can Afghanistan pull itself together to not only protect its achievements but to overcome past errors? Should Afghans and their international partners think about formulating a Plan B to save the republic while striving for true reconciliation with the insurgency? The Middle East Institute is pleased to host a panel of experts to discuss these questions and more.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Political stability, Domestic Politics, and Violence
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States of America

38. Narrowing Interests in the Middle East: Planning for Great Power Competition

Author:: Aaron Stein
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: The United States dramatically increased the commitment of troops and military equipment to a string of permanent bases in the Middle East after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the defeat of the Iraqi army after its 1991 invasion of Kuwait. In the nearly two decades since the Al Qaeda-linked attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States has deepened its military and political commitment to the region, following the decisions to invade Afghanistan and Iraq, and then to intervene militarily in Syria. The Barack Obama and Donald Trump administrations have sought to focus more on Asia, but have failed to disentangle the United States from conflicts in the Middle East. This report assumes that the United States will retain an overwhelming interest in ensuring close alliances and partnerships with America’s transatlantic allies (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and close partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific even if President Trump is re-elected in 2020. It also assumes that the United States will begin to focus primarily on Asia, with the Russian Federation being considered of secondary importance to the rise of the People’s Republic of China. Given these twin assumptions, the role of American forces and Washington’s policy priorities in the Middle East require new thinking about how to wind down wars that are draining American resources and to re-allocate finite, high-demand assets that could be leveraged for operations in Europe or the Indo-Pacific. This report proposes an interlinked political and military policy that would allow for the United States to retain a robust presence in the Middle East, but in a way that would de-escalate tensions with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and alter how U.S. forces are deployed around the world.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Power Politics, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

39. China’s Influence on Conflict Dynamics in South Asia

Author:: USIP China-South Asia Senior Study Group
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: China has embarked on a grand journey west. Officials in Beijing are driven by aspirations of leadership across their home continent of Asia, feelings of being hemmed in on their eastern flank by U.S. alliances, and their perception that opportunities await across Eurasia and the Indian Ocean. Along the way, their first stop is South Asia, which this report defines as comprising eight countries—Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—along with the Indian Ocean (particularly the eastern portions but with implications for its entirety). China’s ties to the region are long-standing and date back well before the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Alliance, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, South Asia, India, Asia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and Maldives

40. The US in Afghanistan: Consequences of an Untimely Withdrawal

Author:: Dayyab Gillani
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The following paper attempts to analyze the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan by critically evaluating the insurgent ideology, its past, current and future relevance. The paper draws on lessons from the recent Afghanistan history and discusses the irrelevance for the future of Afghanistan. It traces the success of Taliban insurgency by highlighting the role of „mullahs‟ and „madrasas‟ in the Afghan society. It argues that the US policy in Afghanistan thus far has failed to isolate the public from the insurgents, which poses serious present and future challenges. By drawing parallels between the sudden Soviet withdrawal in the early 1990s and a potential US withdrawal in the near future. It also points out that an untimely US withdrawal from Afghanistan may entail an end of US engagement but it will not be an end of war for Afghanistan itself. The essay stresses the importance of a consistent long-term US policy aimed at addressing the very root causes of insurgency in the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, War, Military Strategy, Insurgency, Taliban, and Islamism
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, Central Asia, Punjab, and United States of America

41. U.S. Policy Priorities for Afghanistan: A Conversation with U.S. Representative Mike Waltz

Author:: Michael Waltz and Marvin G. Weinbaum
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted U.S. Representative (FL) Michael Waltz to address U.S. policy priorities for Afghanistan. In conversation with Dr. Marvin Weinbaum, director of Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies at MEI, Rep. Waltz will discuss the many complicated challenges facing Afghanistan, key regional challenges to consider, and policy prescriptions given the fallout of the deal with the Taliban.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Taliban, Conflict, and Negotiation
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, North America, and United States of America

42. Underlying Implicating factors of U.S. War on Terror and its Unintended Consequences for Pakistan

Author:: Asifa Jahangir
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Political Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Pakistan‟s reactive foreign policy attitudes and actions negate (or seem contradictory to) the core principle of realist paradigm, which says that intentions may vary independently without having any influential peer-pressure. Holistically, the critical analysis of Pakistan‟s foreign policy history exhibits that this country always chooses to pursue a reactive policy rather than proactive one. The best and recent example is Pakistan‟s dealing with Afghanistan problem since 9/11. This study uses archival evidence of long-simmering tensions about the continuing Afghanistan War and its unexpected consequences of Pakistan‟s policy decision to examine hypotheses derived from Barry Buzan‟s Regional Security Complex Theory. This paper aims to make the following inquiries: (1) how did Pakistan react in the response to U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and its War on Terror? (2) What have been the factors implicating Pakistan in Afghanistan War? (3) Why has Pakistan been failed in designing a proactive policy to prevent the challenges surfaced from enduring Afghan conflict and pose the serious threats to its security? (4) What are the unintended consequences of Pakistan‟s reactionary policy towards Afghanistan and in which direction have these outcomes guided Pakistan towards? While foreseeing the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and its spillover effect on region, this paper will provide Pakistan‟s proactive strategies in the form of National Action Plan and CPEC so as to overcome such possible effects in future over the internal security situation and economic condition of the country.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, and War on Terror
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

43. Australia-Afghanistan relations: Reflections on a half-century

Author:: William Maley
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: It is now fifty years since diplomatic relations were formally established between the Commonwealth of Australia and the Kingdom of Afghanistan. Superficially, the two countries might seem to have little in common. Nonetheless, there is more to unite Australians and Afghans than one might think at first glance. Even before the Australian colonies federated, Afghans made their way to Australia to provide transport by camel in Australia’s inland. By the time of the 2016 census 46,800 Afghans were living in Australia. And since 2001, more than 25,000 members of the Australian Defence Force have served in Afghanistan. Recent years have brought Australia and Afghanistan far closer to each other than ever before in their history. Professor William Maley explores some of the key dimensions of the development of this relationship. Since 2001, the state-to-state relationship has developed additional dimensions – diplomatic, military, developmental, and humanitarian – which have been augmented by significant people-to-people ties despite all the difficulties that surround travel between the two countries. Yet for all this, what ultimately binds the two countries together is that Australia has a strong interest in seeing the transition in Afghanistan that was inaugurated in 2001 – a complex mixture of statebuilding, institutional development, economic change, civil society activism, and enhancement of human rights and freedoms – continue down the broad path that was laid out at that time. A failure in Afghanistan is likely to involve serious adverse strategic consequences for Australia.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, History, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, Australia, and Australia/Pacific

44. The Foreign Policy Decision Making Approaches and Their Applications Case Study: Bush, Obama and Trump’s Decision Making towards Afghanistan and the Region

Author:: Sharifullah Dorani
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: Students of International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) have been confused as to what factors influence foreign policy. FPA focuses mostly on human decision-makers. However, generally speaking, IR theories, realism in particular, instead have focused mostly on the nation-state as the level of analysis to explain foreign policy or foreign policy behaviour. Both fields have found shortcomings within each other. The author of this article, however, applied a number of decision-making approaches from FPA to inform his study of George W. Bush, Barrack Obama and Donald Trump Administrations’ decision-making towards Afghanistan and the broader region and found the discipline of FPA to be extremely helpful. Based on the personal experience of the author, this article attempts to provide a comprehensive introduction to FPA with the aim that students of IR and FPA learn answers to the following questions: What is FPA? How is FPA different from IR? How can decision- making approaches from FPA be employed to inform a foreign policy choice? What (and how) methods can be used to access primary and secondary sources? What are the weaknesses of FPA and is it applicable as an analytical framework outside of the United States (US) or the West (in a country like Afghanistan)? The main objective is to make it easier for students to learn how to apply approaches from FPA as analytical frameworks to analyse a foreign policy decision.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Leadership, and Bureaucracy
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

45. FRAMEWORK DEAL: A LONG-TERM PATH TO PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN

Author:: Matthew Hauenstein and Madhav Joshi
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: Two weeks ago, the US envoy to Afghanistan announced that American and Taliban negotiators had drafted a negotiation framework to end the 17-year long war in Afghanistan. Though American troops ousted the Taliban government following September 11th, the Taliban initiated a long-running insurgency against the US-backed Afghan government. After more than a decade of fighting, the Afghan government, the United States, and Taliban insurgents each failed to secure victory and, instead, the conflict has reached an unfavorable equilibrium for each of the parties. The framework deal, therefore, is expected to shift the status quo in Afghanistan’s politics and provide an exit strategy for US troops.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Taliban, Negotiation, and Peace
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

46. HOW US MILITARY AID CAN BACKFIRE

Author:: Daniel Karell and Sebastian Schutte
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: Can military forces mitigate insurgent activity—“win hearts and minds”—by implementing small, localized aid projects? Evidence from the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has provided contradictory answers to the question of aid’s ability to mitigate violence. Some research finds that aid projects increase the legitimacy of the state among civilians and, under specific circumstances, dampen violence. Other studies, however, show that aid projects provoke insurgent activity, even when delivered by non-military organizations. Despite this ambiguous understanding of counterinsurgency (COIN) aid projects, the US military and its allies spent billions of dollars in Afghanistan and Iraq on projects meant to “win hearts and minds’’ among the populace. After all, there are good theoretical reasons for doing so. Aid projects might make the option of taking up arms less attractive by offering employment opportunities and stimulating local economies (i.e., the “opportunity cost” model of participation in rebellion). They might also encourage locals to share vital anti-insurgent intelligence with military forces.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Counterinsurgency, Violence, and Military Aid
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, North America, and United States of America

47. Afghanistan Imbroglio: The Unintended Consequences of Foreign Interventions

Author:: Asifa Jahangir and Umbreen Javaid
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The war-torn Afghanistan has long suffered from the dynastical contests and fraught economic strategies of foreigners, which instigated constant internal strife and regional instability. The foreign interventions have made this land a sphere of influence and initiated the great game politics sporadically. This paper attempts to examine the historical geostrategic tussles in Afghanistan between international players on the one hand and regional actors on the other hand over control and manipulation of Afghanistan and its surrounding regions through the lens of conceptual framework of unintended consequences approach, which deals with irrational aspect of foreign policy of the states. This study makes interesting contribution to the existing literature of the [old] Great Game of the late 19th century between Czarist Russia and Great Britain or New Great Game by re-conceptualizing this idea into a new concept of the Grand Great Game or the 3G in place of explaining the unintended consequences of the historical events i.e. the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan of 1979, the post-Cold War era when the regional players Pakistan and India got involved in Afghanistan; and the US invasion of Afghanistan of 9/11 incident. The findings of the paper suggest that the unintended consequences of these historical events are bitter than the reality. The foreign interventions have paralyzed the Afghan society and made it more insecure by promoting clandestine terrorist activities and proxies. The interview technique helps to verify the 3G concept and present its unintended consequences. The critical content analysis of the primary and secondary data is of assistance to understand that the current 3G to be not only multidimensional competition, embodying multiple stakeholders but also incorporating complex self-defined rational as well as irrational foreign policy objectives and national interests.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Terrorism, History, Power Politics, Territorial Disputes, Taliban, Geopolitics, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Europe, South Asia, India, Punjab, and United States of America

48. Making Sense of Russia’s Policy in Afghanistan

Author:: Stephen Blank and Younkyoo Kim
Publication Date:: 09-2018
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: For some time, Western sources have been accusing Moscow of backing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. However, little effort has been done to analyze the modalities of this support and the way it relates to Moscow's overall policies and objectives in Central and Southern Asia. This essay sets out to explain both the trend in Russia’s policies towards Afghanistan between 2013 and 2017, and the reasons underneath them. It explores Russia's actions vis-à-vis contending forces in Afghanistan and Central Asia in the broader context of Moscow’s rapprochement with Pakistan, its ties to India and China and overall anti-Americanism that has grown exponentially since 2014. We argue that this approach would provide a better understanding of Russia’s policies and objectives in Afghanistan.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Taliban, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, and Central Asia

49. China’s New Afghan Diplomacy: Awakening from Inertia or Exception to Old Habits?

Author:: Abdur Rehman Shah
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: For decades, China has pursued a policy of hands-off diplomacy towards regional and international affairs, while narrowly focusing on internal development. Beijing’s recent approach to the Afghanistan conflict, however, has been a major shift. Getting Pakistan’s full support to help end the Afghan insurgency is a possibility given that the U.S. and Afghan governments have utterly failed to bring it to a close. China’s change may signal a shift in China’s “non-interference” approach. However, despite its early activism in the form of outreach to major actors—hosting the Taliban for talks, participation in Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) and now Russia-led talks—China’s Afghan diplomacy has not produced any desirable results to alter Pakistan’s approach towards the Afghan insurgency. One explanation for this lackluster approach is that Pakistan has successfully stemmed the flow of cross-border militants toward China. Furthermore, post-2014 uncertainty in Afghanistan rather than strategic alterations prompted the shift of China’s Afghanistan policy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and International Affairs
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, and Asia

50. Shift of Power from West to East and Rise of China

Author:: Mushtaq Ahmed Abbasi and Nazir Hussain
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Political Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The US Exit Strategy 2014 from Afghanistan has now entered one of their final phase, which happens to be the Withdrawal from Afghanistan. The US has already lessened its troops, though there were certain changes after Trump came to power. But still there is a looming confusion which exists regarding the aftermath of the event. That is how this Withdrawal will come to play and what would the Afghanistan’s post-US withdrawal would look like. Moreover, Pakistan will also be affected in more than one ways. The US is going to be leaving quite a vacuum upon which many regional and foreign powers have set their eyes on. India, Iran, China and Russia are all going to be a part of the post-US Afghanistan but this might only produce more instability. Moreover, it will have drastic security, political and strategic implications for Pakistan. The picture which comes to the mind is going to be of an everlasting loop of security complexes and strategic undertones after the withdrawal.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Al Qaeda, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, North America, and United States of America

51. US Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Implications for Pakistan

Author:: Mushtaq Ahmed Abbasi and Nazir Hussain
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Political Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The US Exit Strategy 2014 from Afghanistan has now entered one of their final phase, which happens to be the Withdrawal from Afghanistan. The US has already lessened its troops, though there were certain changes after Trump came to power. But still there is a looming confusion which exists regarding the aftermath of the event. That is how this Withdrawal will come to play and what would the Afghanistan’s post-US withdrawal would look like. Moreover, Pakistan will also be affected in more than one ways. The US is going to be leaving quite a vacuum upon which many regional and foreign powers have set their eyes on. India, Iran, China and Russia are all going to be a part of the post-US Afghanistan but this might only produce more instability. Moreover, it will have drastic security, political and strategic implications for Pakistan. The picture which comes to the mind is going to be of an everlasting loop of security complexes and strategic undertones after the withdrawal.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Al Qaeda, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, North America, and United States of America

52. Full Issue: Money & War

Author:: Sarah Detzner, James Copnall, Alex de Waal, Ian M. Ralby, Joshua Stanton, Ibrahim Warde, Leon Whyte, Richard Weitz, Jessica Knight, John H. Maurer, Alexander Tabarrok, Alex Nowrasteh, Tom Keatinge, Emily Knowles, Karolina MacLachlan, Andrew Lebovich, Caroline Troein, and Anne Moulakis
Publication Date:: 01-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The Fletcher Security Review: Managed and edited by students at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, we build on the Fletcher School’s strong traditions of combining scholarship with practice, fostering close interdisciplinary collaboration, and acting as a vehicle for groundbreaking discussion of international security. We believe that by leveraging these strengths – seeking input from established and up-and-coming scholars, practitioners, and analysts from around the world on topics deserving of greater attention – we can promote genuinely unique ways of looking at the future of security. Each issue of the Review is centered around a broad theme – in this issue, we tackle “Money & War.” Money influences every aspect of warfare, conventional or unconventional. No nationstate military, insurgent group, terrorist network, trans-national criminal organization, or hybrid actor can be understood, or countered, without knowing where the money is coming from – as well as where, and how, it gets spent. Evolutions and revolutions in financial tools and practices quickly translate to transformations in military affairs, and some cases, vice versa.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Human Rights, Governance, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Finance, Islamic State, Navy, Arab Spring, Maritime, Conflict, Multilateralism, Islamism, Drugs, and Currency
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Africa, China, Iran, Sudan, Darfur, Middle East, Asia, North Korea, Mali, Asia-Pacific, Sahel, United States of America, and North America

53. Old Habits, New Consequences: Pakistan's Posture toward Afghanistan since 2001

Author:: Khalid Homayun Nadiri
Publication Date:: 01-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Since September 11, 2001, Pakistan has pursued seemingly incongruous courses of action in Afghanistan. It has participated in the U.S. and international intervention in Afghanistan at the same time as it has permitted much of the Afghan Taliban's political leadership and many of its military commanders to visit or reside in Pakistani urban centers. This incongruence is all the more puzzling in light of the expansion of indiscriminate and costly violence directed against Islamabad by Pakistani groups affiliated with the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan's policy is the result not only of its enduring rivalry with India but also of historically rooted domestic imbalances and antagonistic relations with successive governments in Afghanistan. Three critical features of the Pakistani political system—the militarized nature of foreign policy making, ties between military institutions and Islamist networks, and the more recent rise of grassroots violence—have contributed to Pakistan's accommodation of the Afghan Taliban. Additionally, mutual suspicion surrounding the contentious Afghanistan-Pakistan border and Islamabad's long record of interference in Afghan politics have continued to divide Kabul and Islamabad, diminishing the prospect of cooperation between the two capitals. These determinants of Pakistan's foreign policy behavior reveal the prospects of and obstacles to resolving the numerous issues of contention that characterize the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship today.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Government, and Politics
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban

54. Govern LIke Us: U.S. Expectations of Poor Countries

Author:: M. A. Thomas
Publication Date:: 05-2015
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: Columbia University Press
Abstract:: In the poorest countries, such as Afghanistan, Haiti, and Mali, the United States has struggled to work with governments whose corruption and lack of capacity are increasingly seen to be the cause of instability and poverty. The development and security communities call for "good governance" to improve the rule of law, democratic accountability, and the delivery of public goods and services. The United States and other rich liberal democracies insist that this is the only legitimate model of governance. Yet poor governments cannot afford to govern according to these ideals and instead are compelled to rely more heavily on older, cheaper strategies of holding power, such as patronage and repression. The unwillingness to admit that poor governments do and must govern differently has cost the United States and others inestimable blood and coin. Informed by years of fieldwork and drawing on practitioner work and academic scholarship in politics, economics, law, and history, this book explains the origins of poor governments in the formation of the modern state system and describes the way they govern. It argues that, surprisingly, the effort to stigmatize and criminalize the governance of the poor is both fruitless and destabilizing. The United States must pursue a more effective foreign policy to engage poor governments and acknowledge how they govern.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Corruption, Development, Poverty, Fragile/Failed State, and Governance
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, Haiti, and Mali
Publication Identifier:: 9780231171205
Publication Identifier Type:: ISBN

55. Afghanistan: the view from Russia

Author:: Józef Lang
Publication Date:: 02-2014
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Russia's current and foreseeable policy towards Afghanistan is multi-vectored, complex and shows, at times, signs of incoherence. Russia views developments in Afghanistan as a strategic challenge and is expressing growing concern over the country's prospects for stability after the withdrawal of ISAF forces by the end of 2014. Russian decision-makers fear that a security vacuum emerging after the withdrawal could destabilise Central Asia and have a negative impact on Russia itself. At the same time, Moscow is concerned with Western military presence in the region, which it regards as interference in its neighbourhood. At tactical level, Russia also sees the situation in Afghanistan as an opportunity to secure its interests both regionally (consolidating its influence in Central Asia) and more widely (in terms of its relations with NATO).
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, and Central Asia

56. TSG IntelBrief: Foreign Fighters in Syria: A Growing Threat

Publication Date:: 06-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: The number of foreign fighters is high, 12,000 and counting, and the spread of countries they come from covers much of the globe. Two recent events involving foreign fighters show the radicalizing influence of the war. With the support to bolster Syria's more secular rebel forces at times inconsistent and tepid, the lack of an alternative has accelerated a natural gravitation towards extremist elements. It will be hard to know which returnees pose a threat, and harder still to deal with them. Given that the number of foreign fighters already exceeds those that went to Afghanistan, government resources will be severely strained to monitor all returnees and will have to rely on the help of local communities.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United Kingdom, Middle East, and Syria

57. Revisiting Chicago: The Critical Need To Maintain Support For Afghanistan's National Security Forces Post-2014

Author:: William A. Byrd
Publication Date:: 06-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: Two years ago, the Chicago international summit agreed on long-term targets for the size of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and committed to continued international financial support until 2024. Since then, the ANSF have taken over lead responsibility for Afghanistan's security and have by most accounts performed well, taking substantial casualties but holding their own against the Taliban. However, the ANSF still rely heavily on U.S. financial and logistical support and military "enablers" in such roles as air support, medevac and reconnaissance. The Afghan government's failure to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States during the past eight months has coincided with, and undoubtedly contributed to, declining political support for the international engagement in Afghanistan. Not only has U.S. civilian aid in the current fiscal year been halved, but the White House recently announced a complete U.S. troop pull-out by the end of 2016, except for "normal levels" to protect the U.S. Embassy and oversee military assistance. That is close to a "zero option," albeit in 2016 and not 2014. The announcement raises serious questions about the staying power of international security funding (which would amount to billions of dollars per year into the early 2020s if the Chicago commitments hold); management of security assistance; provision of logistical support and enablers; whether Afghanistan's domestic revenues will grow fast enough to meet its own ANSF funding commitments; and timing of any future ANSF reductions in relation to possible negotiations with the Taliban insurgency. The ANSF (especially the Afghan National Army, or ANA) was largely a creation of the United States, which has advocated for and endorsed its current size and cost. It would be irresponsible to create such a force and then turn around and undermine it.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Terrorism, International Security, Military Strategy, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Chicago

58. Understanding the Bergdahl Prisoner Exchange

Author:: Mieke Eoyang and Ben Freeman
Publication Date:: 06-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Over Memorial Day weekend, President Obama announced that Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl, the longest-held American captive in the Afghanistan conflict, had been released in exchange for five Taliban detainees in Guantanamo Bay. While the initial response to Bergdahl's release was positive, the deal quickly came under fire from the Right, including some who previously had advocated for his release.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, and Terrorism
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and North America

59. Iran's Foreign Policy in Post-Taliban Afghanistan

Author:: Kayhan Barzegar
Publication Date:: 06-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Since 2001, this Iranian scholar argues, Iran has sought to establish security and stability, while advancing regional cooperation in Afghanistan. The only way to manage conflict in the post-exit era is for the West to accept the legitimacy of increased regional cooperation, including Iran's involvement.
Topic:: Foreign Policy and Economics
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iran, and Taliban

60. The Saudi Factor in Pakistan-Iran Relations

Author:: Muhammad Salman Khan
Publication Date:: 12-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs
Institution:: Center for Strategic Research (CSR)
Abstract:: National interest often forms the core of bilateral ties between states. No matter how much idealism is peddled to explain the unassailability of the State's bilateral relations, the national interests and related diplomatic preferences spawn abrasion in these ties. The change of leadership is a consequence of elections results in a national reassessment of foreign policy. This paper attempts to highlight Pakistan's foreign policy dilemma regarding the walking of a tightrope between Tehran and Riyadh. It is argued that the balancing act of Islamabad in this triad is further complicated in the aftermath of 2013 general elections in Pakistan. The new Nawaz Sharif administration's unveiled connection with the Saudi Kingdom, the current tides in the Saudi-Iran-U.S. triangle, and the impending and complex drawdown of international forces from Afghanistan further confounds the trajectory of Pakistan's foreign policy, especially in the zero sum dynamics of Saudi-Iran rivalry.
Topic:: Foreign Policy
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Iran, East Asia, Tehran, Saudi Arabia, and Riyadh

61. Changing US Security Strategy: The Search for Stability and the "Non-War" against "Non-Terrorism"

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 09-2013
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: More than a decade into the “war on terrorism,” much of the political debate in the US is still fixated on the legacy of 9/11. US politics has a partisan fixation on Benghazi, the Boston Marathon bombing, intelligence intercepts, and Guantanamo. Far too much US attention still focuses on “terrorism” at a time the US faces a much broader range of threats from the instability in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) and Islamic world. Moreover, much of the US debate ignores the fact that the US has not actually fought a “war on terrorism” over the last decade, and the US failures in using military force and civil aid in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US has not fought wars as such, but rather became involved in exercises in armed nation building where stability operations escalated into national building as a result of US occupation and where the failures in stability operations and nation building led to insurgencies that forced the US into major counterinsurgency campaigns that had little to do with counterterrorism. An analysis of the trends in the Iraq and Afghan conflicts shows that the US has not been fighting a war on terrorism since Bin Laden and Al Qaida Central were driven into Pakistan in December 2001. The US invaded Afghanistan and Iraq and then made stability operations and armed nation building its key goals. It was US mishandling of these exercises in armed nation building that led to major counterinsurgency campaigns although – at least in the case of Afghanistan --the US continued to label its military operations as a struggle against “terrorism.” By 2013, the US had committed well over $1.4 trillion to these exercises in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, the US made massive increases in its domestic spending on homeland defense that it rationalized as part of the fight against terrorism but often had little or nothing to do with any aspect of counterterrorism. At the same time, the US failed to develop consistent or useful unclassified statistics on the patterns in terrorism and its counterterrorism activities. The US government has never provided a meaningful break out of federal activities and spending at home or abroad which actually focus on terrorism, or any unclassified measures of effectiveness. The OMB has lumped a wide range of activities that have no relation to terrorism it its reporting on the President's budget request – activities whose total cost now approach $60 billion a year. The Department of Defense has never provided a meaningful estimate of the total cost of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, or a break out of the small portion of total overseas contingency operations (OCO) spending actually spent on counterterrorism versus counter insurgency. The State Department and US intelligence community provide no meaningful unclassified data on the cost of their counterterrorism effort and it is unclear that they have developed any metrics at any level that show the cost-benefits of their activities. The annual US State Department country reports on terrorism come as close to an unclassified report on the status of terrorism as the US government provides. While many portions are useful, the designation of terrorist movements is often political and shows the US designation of terrorist movements conflates terrorism and insurgency. The closest the US has come to developing any metrics on terrorism has been to develop an unclassified database in the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) that never distinguished terrorism from insurgency. This database formed the core of the statistical annex to State Department reporting, but has since been withdrawn without explanation. As this analysis shows in detail, it now has been replaced by a contractor effort that makes all of the previous mistakes made by the NCTC. The end result is a set of official reporting and statistics in the annex to the State Department report where “terrorism” remains remained poorly defined, badly structured, ignored in parts of the world, and conflates terrorism with counterinsurgency, instability, and civil war. A review of the Afghan, Iraq conflicts, and other recent conflicts in the MENA region shows just how serious these problems are in distorting the true nature of the wars the US is fighting and the threats it faces. The same is true of the unclassified reporting the US government provides on terrorism. A detailed review of the most recent State Department report on terrorism provides important insights into key terrorist movements, but the narratives generally ignore their ties to insurgent movements, their statistical data include some major insurgent movements and exclude others, and many of the data seem to include violence that is not truly terroristic in character.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, Middle East, and North Africa

62. Transition in Afghanistan: 2009-2013

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 08-2013
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The US is already at least six months behind in shaping an effective Transition in Afghanistan. It has not laid credible plans for the security, governance, and economic aspects of Transition. It has not made its level of future commitment clear to its allies or the Afghans, and it has failed dismally to convince the Congress and the American people that there is a credible reason to support Transition beyond the end of 2014.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Development, Economics, Islam, War, and Fragile/Failed State
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States

63. Afghanistan After the Drawdown

Author:: Seth G. Jones and Keith Crane
Publication Date:: 11-2013
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Afghanistan will undergo three major transitions in 2014: from a Hamid Karzai–led government to one presumably headed by another president following the 2014 election; from a U.S.-led to an Afghan-led counterinsurgency; and from an economy driven by foreign expenditures on military support and assistance to one more reliant on domestic sources of growth, as the United States and other countries reduce their presence. The United States and its allies will need to shape each of these transitions in ways that safeguard their interests.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Islam, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States

64. Inevitable Conflicts, avoidable Failures Preparing for the Third Generation of Conflict, Stabilization, and Reconstruction Operations

Author:: Liora Danan and Johanna Mendelson Forman
Publication Date:: 12-2013
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Foreign internal conflicts clearly remain a permanent feature of the u.S. foreign policy landscape, especially since the united States regularly participates in efforts to stabilize countries affected by conflict and then helps them recover afterwards. Yet u.S. government officials and the american public in general have difficulty accepting the inevitability of u.S. involvement in such efforts. to ensure lasting progress and security in post-conflict situations, the united States must adjust its approach from a focus on large military operations to preparing adequately for small-scale, long-term interventions. Most u.S. military deployments since the end of the Cold War have been in “small wars” or what the Department of Defense once called “military operations other than war.”1 Yet the military has usually been more prepared to fight large, technologically advanced wars than smaller contingencies that require greater integration with civilian capacities. as a consequence, each time the u.S. military is deployed to a complex–but “small”–emergency, it has had to relearn lessons on the ground about the best way to manage these types of contingencies. Civilian participation in stabilization and reconstruction efforts is likewise inevitable, but civilian institutions are even less prepared for such work than the military. Lessons learned over the last decade are only recently being institutionalized, through offices like Department of State's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and the u.S. agency for International Development's Office of transition Initiatives (OtI). In part this is due to bureaucratic politics.
Topic:: Foreign Policy and Cold War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States

65. A U.S. Asian-Pacific Pivot Point: Burma's Natural Resources

Author:: Kirk Talbott, John Waugh, and Douglas Batson
Publication Date:: 09-2013
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Burma wavers on the cusp of a transition from conflict, plunder, and risk towards peace and a more open, stable society. A half-century of armed warfare, largely financed by the rapid exploitation of high-value natural resources, may be coming to an end in mainland Southeast Asia's largest nation. The use and extraction of environmental assets will continue, however, to determine Burma's political and economic future. Unfortunately, natural resources too often play a perverse role in preventing needed reforms in countries emerging from protracted conflict. In an era of fiscal constraint, "sequestration," and a decade of Iraq and Afghanistan nation-building fatigue, how can the U.S. best aid Burma's transformation? The on-the-ground situations in Burma, namely, ethnic conflicts, land grabs, internally displaced persons, each undergirded by a deep distrust of the central government, are as varied as they are fluid. U.S. foreign policy issues regarding the nation also known as Myanmar, beginning with that nation's toponym,2 are so complex as to defy the Interagency and Tactical Conflict Assessment Frameworks, respectively vaunted by U.S. government civilian agencies and military services.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, and United Nations
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Burma

66. Turkish-Russian Relations in The Post-Cold War Period: Current Dynamics, Future Prospects

Author:: Habibe Özdal, M. Turgut Demirtepe, Kerim Has, and Hasan Selim Özertem
Publication Date:: 07-2013
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Strategic Research Organization (USAK)
Abstract:: Turkey and Russia have succeeded in developing a constructive dialogue since the Cold War era. The roots of this dialogue go back to the 1920s. Following the Bolshevik Revolution, throughout the Turkish War for Independence and the establishment of the Turkish Republic, and up until 1936 the two countries had cooperated in several areas. During the Cold War, Turkey and Russia (in the form of the USSR) were in opposite blocs, but being located in the same geography, both countries found various ways to keep dialogue channels open.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Cold War, International Trade and Finance, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Turkey, and Asia

67. Crisis Stability and Nuclear Exchange Risks on the Subcontinent: Major Trends and the Iran Factor

Author:: Thomas F. Lynch III
Publication Date:: 11-2013
Content Type:: Working Paper
Abstract:: Crisis stability—the probability that political tensions and low-level conflict will not erupt into a major war between India and Pakistan—is less certain in 2013 than at any time since their sequential nuclear weapons tests of 1998. India's vast and growing spending on large conventional military forces, at least in part as a means to dissuade Pakistan's tolerance of (or support for) insurgent and terrorist activity against India, coupled with Pakistan's post-2006 accelerated pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons as a means to offset this Indian initiative, have greatly increased the risk of a future Indo-Pakistani military clash or terrorist incident escalating to nuclear exchange. America's limited abilities to prevent the escalation of an Indo-Pakistani crisis toward major war are best served by continuing a significant military and political presence in Afghanistan and diplomatic and military-to-military dialogue with Pakistan well beyond 2014.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, America, Iran, India, and Asia

68. Iran, Afghanistan, and South Asia: Resolving Regional Sources of Instability

Author:: Barbara Slavin and Fatemah Aman
Publication Date:: 11-2013
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: When compared to its often rocky relations with Arab countries to the west, the Islamic Republic of Iran has managed to retain largely cordial ties with its neighbors to the east. Historic linguistic, religious, and cultural connections have helped Iran keep its influence in South Asia and become a key trading partner despite US-led sanctions. Because of its strategic location on the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, Iran provides India with access to Afghanistan and Central Asia that does not require transit through Pakistan. However, Iran and its neighbors, including Pakistan, face acute challenges such as scarce and poorly managed water resources, ethnic insurgencies, energy imbalances, and drug trafficking that require regional solutions.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Iran, South Asia, Central Asia, Middle East, Arabia, North America, and Persia

69. Not only "Containerspotting" - NATO's Redeployment from Landlocked Afghanistan

Author:: Heidi Reisinger
Publication Date:: 10-2013
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: On 31 December 2014, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the largest military mission of NATO, will be history. In line with the political decision taken at NATO's Lisbon Summit in 2010, ISAF troops will be leaving. With them will go all their equipment: a range of items, from weapon systems and armored vehicles to chairs, kitchens and fitness centers used by more than 100,000 troops and approximately the same amount of civilian personnel. This is a gigantic project. If one thought getting into Afghanistan was difficult, getting out is a lot harder. It represents the biggest multi-national military logistical challenge in modern history. Millions of tons of material have to be de-militarized, dismantled, handed over, sold, scrapped, recycled, donated to the Afghans and/or third nations, or transferred home. More than 125,000 containers and 80,000 military vehicles have to be disposed of or brought back home to NATO nations and NATO partner countries. If the containers and the vehicles were placed one after the other, end to end, they would form a line as long as the distance from Berlin to Paris.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, and International Security
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Europe, Paris, Asia, and Berlin

70. Revising COIN: The Stakeholder Centric Approach

Author:: Karsten Friis, Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, and Harald Håvoll
Publication Date:: 11-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: With the apparent lack of progress and success in Afghanistan, counter- insurgency (COIN), both as a theory and practice, is falling out of favor within the political and military establishment in the US. This comes at a time when the US is redirecting its geopolitical focus away from global instability towards the Asia-Pacific and the 'New Great Power Game'.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Emerging Markets, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and Australia/Pacific

71. How to get out of Afghanistan: NATO's withdrawal through Central Asia

Author:: Heidi Reisinger
Publication Date:: 06-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: NATO's decision to withdraw combat troops from Afghanistan has forced the Alliance to think long and hard about the "how" associated with such a withdrawal. As a result the strategic importance of the five Central Asian states Kazakhstan, Kyrrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, a politically neglected region, mostly seen as a supplier of raw materials and energy, is likely to increase significantly. During the past ten years the ISAF mission has focused its attention on Afghanistan itself. The only neighboring country taken into serious consideration has been Pakistan, as emblematically shown in the US AfPak policy approach. North of Afghanistan, the Central Asian states have been left on the sidelines and their strategic and political role has been underestimated. However, they are now back on the political agenda as an indispensable transit ground.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Asia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan

72. After Combat, the Perils of Partnership: NATO and Afghanistan beyond 2014

Author:: Sten Rynning
Publication Date:: 07-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: NATO is set to terminate its combat mission in Afghanistan and establish Afghan security leadership by the end of 2014 - a process which the Alliance defined as "irreversible" at its Chicago summit on 20-21 May 2012. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will thus complete its mission after thirteen years, and become history. However, NATO is not just packing up and going home. In 2010 the Alliance launched its proposal for an Enduring Partnership with Afghanistan, and in Chicago it declared: "Afghanistan will not stand alone." Afghanistan can count on NATO's "enduring commitment" to the country, and NATO will now prepare "a new training, advising and assistance mission" that can begin in January 2015.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and International Security
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Asia

73. Emerging Security Challenges: A Glue for NATO and Partners?

Author:: Ioanna-Nikoletta Zyga
Publication Date:: 11-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) formed as a defensive military alliance more than six decades ago, one of its fundamental tasks was to deter Soviet aggression against Western Europe. Since the end of the Cold War, the Allies have come to understand that their security depends on their ability to face threats emerging from well beyond the Euro-Atlantic space. NATO has thus broadened its focus from collective defense to security management beyond its borders: its numerous operations in this capacity have included peace support, peacekeeping, disaster relief and counter-piracy missions. These operations have taken place not only in NATO's traditional areas of intervention such as the Balkans, but also as far afield as the Gulf of Aden, the Horn of Africa, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, International Security, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Africa, Europe, and North Atlantic

74. Can NATO Find a Role for Itself vis-À -vis China?

Author:: James Boutilier
Publication Date:: 12-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: NATO is at a crossroads. This is not the first time that Brussels has been faced with critical decisions about the direction, character and raison d'être of this unique and remarkable organization. But this time the stakes are even higher. The major centers of global power are all weak simultaneously for individual and inter-connected reasons. The greatest power on earth and NATO's banker, the United States, is confronting almost insurmountable levels of debt and talk about the end of the American empire has become commonplace. The European community is reeling from the cumulative effect of debt crises. And China, the 21st century's "workshop of the world" (and in the eyes of some a potential savor of ailing economies in Europe) has begun to see its economy slow disturbingly. At the same time, two other phenomena are unfolding; the rapid and profound shift in the global centre of economic gravity from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific region and the winding down of NATO's involvement in Afghanistan. The latter, of course, raises the inevitable question: "What next?" The former raises a related question: "Does NATO's future lie in Asia?"
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Europe, and Asia

75. Remaking Bagram: The Creation of an Afghan Internment Regime and the Divide over U.S. Detention Power

Publication Date:: 09-2012
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Open Society Foundations
Abstract:: This report by the Open Society Foundations highlights concerns about the transition of the U.S. detention facility in Bagram, Afghanistan, from U.S. to Afghan control. Remaking Bagram exposes a deep divide between U.S. and Afghan officials on the eve of the planned handover that puts U.S. intentions to maintain detention authority in Afghanistan against the Afghan government’s insistence that Afghans can no longer be detained by the United States on “Afghan soil.” Remaking Bagram, which was released on September 6, also highlights the Afghan government’s efforts to take custody of detainees held by the United States by creating an Afghan internment regime that would detain individuals without trial. Many Afghan legal experts call this new system unconstitutional and have expressed fears that it is susceptible to abuse.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Military Intervention, State Building, and Detention
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States

76. India in Afghanistan: A Rising Power or a Hesitant Power?

Author:: Harsh Pant
Publication Date:: 04-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Peace and Security Studies
Abstract:: Indian diplomacy faced a major setback at the Afghanistan Conference in London in January 2010, where Indian concerns were summarily ignored. In one stroke, Pakistan rendered New Delhi irrelevant in the evolving security dynamic in Afghanistan. When Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna underscored the folly of making a distinction “between good Taliban and bad Taliban,” he was completely out of sync with the larger mood at the conference. Days before this much-hyped conference, senior U.S. military commanders were suggesting that peace talks with the Taliban may be imminent and that Taliban members might even be invited to join the government in Kabul. The West had made up its mind that it was not a question of if, but when and how to exit from Afghanistan, which seemed to be becoming a quagmire for the leaders in Washington and London.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, War, Power Politics, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Washington, India, Taliban, London, and New Delhi

77. Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2012

Author:: Hans Mouritzen (ed) and Nanna Hvidt (ed)
Publication Date:: 06-2012
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The Permanent Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs analyses Danish foreign-policy priorities in 2011. The troublesome situation for the global econ-omy, including an uncertain outlook for the future, was the most impor-tant backdrop for Danish foreign policy in that year. Low growth prospects, combined with high levels of public debt, had wide foreign-policy implica-tions, amongst other things for the agenda of the EU and as a result also for the preparations for the Danish EU Presidency in the first half of 2012. This article therefore takes its point of departure in the state of the global economy, the state of the European economies and the challenges that this presented to the EU. It then goes on to discuss the emerging world powers, the Arab Spring, the world's conflict areas, security policy, Denmark's north-ern neighbours and various global issues, such as development cooperation, green growth and human rights. Finally, some reflections are offered on the core tasks of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at a time when there is increased pressure on Denmark's public finances and the world influence of Denmark's traditional partners and allies is waning.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Europe, Middle East, Asia, Arab Countries, Denmark, and North Africa

78. What It Will Take to Secure Afghanistan

Author:: Max Boot
Publication Date:: 06-2012
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Afghanistan is approaching a major inflection point in its long and turbulent history. In 2014 most of the foreign military forces are due to pull out. With them will go the bulk of foreign financing that has accounted for almost all of the state's budget. Twenty fourteen is also the year that Afghanistan is due to hold presidential elections. Hamid Karzai, the only president the country has known since the fall of the Taliban, has said he will not seek another term in office. Thus Afghanistan is likely to have a new president to lead it into a new era. This era will be shaped by many factors, principally decisions made by Afghans themselves, but the United States has the ability to affect the outcome if it makes a sustained commitment to maintain security, improve the political process, and reduce Pakistani interference so as to build on the tenuous gains achieved by the U.S. troop surge since 2010.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Democratization, Islam, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban

79. Avoiding Meeting Fatigue: How to make the numerous international meetings on Afghanistan more effective

Author:: William Byrd
Publication Date:: 07-2012
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: The numerous high-profile international meetings on Afghanistan since 2001 have helped keep attention focused on Afghanistan, elicit financial support, give a “seat at the table” to all partners, generate good strategic documents, and provide a forum for the Afghan government. However, the meetings often have raised excessive expectations; lacked meaningful follow-up; undermined their own objectives; prioritized diplomacy over substance; focused more on donors' issues than Afghan problems; oriented the Afghan government toward donors; diverted resources toward meetings; resulted in meeting fatigue; and sometimes seemingly substituted for action. These meetings can be made more effective by: (1) keeping to realistic expectations; (2) not expecting meetings to substitute for difficult decisions and actions; (3) having substantive, disciplined agendas and avoiding co-optation by diplomatic priorities; (4) matching objectives with the issue(s) the meeting is supposed to address; (5) ensuring quality background work; (6) focusing follow-up on key areas and a few simple, monitorable benchmarks; and (7) keeping the number and frequency of meetings manageable.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Peace Studies, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Afghanistan

80. Waiting for the Taliban in Afghanistan

Author:: Gilles Dorronsoro
Publication Date:: 09-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan will leave the country worse than it was before 2001 in some respects. There is no clear plan for the future. Washington will progressively lose its influence over Kabul, and drone operations in Pakistan are not a credible way to fight jihadist groups on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The situation will only worsen after 2014, when most U.S. troops are out of the country and aid going to the Afghan government steeply declines.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Islam, Terrorism, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Washington, and Asia

81. The FY2013 Defense Budget, Deficits, Cost-Escalation, and Sequestration

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman and Robert Shelala II
Publication Date:: 09-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The US may not face peer threats in the near to mid term, but it faces a wide variety of lesser threats that make maintaining effective military forces, foreign aid, and other national security programs a vital national security interest. The US does need to reshape its national security planning and strategy to do a far better job of allocating resources to meet these threats. It needs to abandon theoretical and conceptual exercises in strategy that do not focus on detailed force plans, manpower plans, procurement plans, and budgets; and use its resources more wisely. The US still dominates world military spending, but it must recognize that maintaining the US economy is a vital national security interest in a world where the growth and development of other nations and regions means that the relative share the US has in the global economy will decline steadily over time, even under the best circumstances. At the same time, US dependence on the security and stability of the global economy will continue to grow indefinitely in the future. Talk of any form of “independence,” including freedom from energy imports, is a dangerous myth. The US cannot maintain and grow its economy without strong military forces and effective diplomatic and aid efforts. US military and national security spending already places a far lower burden on the US economy than during the peaceful periods of the Cold War, and existing spending plans will lower that burden in the future. National security spending is now averaging between 4% and 5% of the GDP – in spite of the fact the US has been fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – versus 6-7% during the Cold War.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Economics
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and Asia

82. The U.S. Surge and Afghan Local Governance: Lessons for Transition

Author:: Frances Z. Brown
Publication Date:: 09-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: The U.S. military and civilian surge into Afghanistan starting in late 2009 aimed to stabilize the country through interconnected security, governance, and development initiatives. Despite policymakers’ claims that their goals for Afghan governance were “modest,” the surge’s stated objectives amounted to a transformation of the subnational governance landscape. Three years later, the surge has attained localized progress, but it has not achieved the strategic, sustainable “game change” in Afghan subnational governance it sought. The surge has not met these objectives because its success depended upon three initial U.S. assumptions that proved unrealistic. First, surge policy assumed that governance progress would accrue as quickly as security progress, with more governance-focused resources compensating for less time. Second, surge policy assumed that “bottom-up” progress in local governance would be reinforced by “top-down” Afghan government structures and reforms. Third, surge policy assumed that “absence of governance” was a key universal driver for the insurgency, whereas in some areas, presence of government became a fueling factor. Once the surge was in motion, other miscalculations emerged: the confusion of discrete successes with replicable progress, the mistaking of individuals’ improvements with institution building, the confusion of “local” with “simple,” and the overreliance on technological solutions to address problems that were fundamentally political in nature. As the surge draws down, the U.S-Afghan Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement represents a promising opportunity for longer-term strategic planning. As the international community moves to transition, it should exert its remaining leverage to impact select systemic issues—such as by resolving district council makeup, improving line ministries’ recurring services, and bolstering provincial administrations—rather than tactical-level ones. The international community should also prioritize a few key, attainable efforts, such as providing training that is consistent with current Afghan government functions, while avoiding creating additional structures. Finally, all the usual Afghan local governance recommendations still apply: resolving Afghanistan’s subnational challenges requires long-term commitment and systematic execution.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Insurgency, and Governance
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and Asia

83. Between freedom and fear: Explaining the consensus on terrorism and democracy in US foreign policy

Author:: Michael J. Boyle
Publication Date:: 03-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Politics
Institution:: Palgrave Macmillan
Abstract:: Why have two successive US administrations concluded that fighting terrorism must involve democracy promotion? This assumption became prevalent in US political discourse following the events of September 11 despite the fact that the empirical evidence linking democracy and terrorism is weak or ambiguous. More strikingly, it has persisted even after the missions to establish democracies in Afghanistan and Iraq have led to increasing violence, including a worldwide increase in terrorist attacks. This article argues that the link between democracy and terrorism was established by the combined effect of three factors: (a) the framing of the September 11 attacks in a way that increased the receptivity to this conceptual opposition between freedom and fear; (b) the ideological influence of the Wilsonian tradition, as manifested today in an unusual consensus between modern neo-conservatives and liberal internationalists on the desirability of democratic reform as a means of changing foreign policy behaviour; and (c) a powerful bipartisan domestic constituency in favour of democracy promotion. Owing to these three factors, the contraposition of democracy and terrorism in American political discourse is effectively over-determined because it mirrors the dominant ideological and political preferences of American elites. This fixed preference for democracy promotion explains why the Obama Administration has remained wedded to the binary distinction between freedom and fear in its public statements despite its efforts to break in style and substance with the policies of its predecessor.
Topic:: Foreign Policy
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, and America

84. Don't Expect Much from Japan in the Indian Ocean

Author:: Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes
Publication Date:: 01-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Japan is an Indian Ocean power of long standing. Ten years ago, in a post-9/11 show of solidarity with the United States and to exercise a more muscular foreign policy, Tokyo committed vessels of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF, or MSDF) to the coalition naval contingent supporting combat operations in Afghanistan. JMSDF tankers resupplied coalition warships, while Aegis destroyers guarded against air and surface threats in the Arabian Sea. Japanese seamen posted impressive statistics for this naval enterprise. The Japan Ministry of Defense reported that JMSDF vessels supplied about 137 million gallons of fuel oil and some 2.8 gallons of water to customers from about a dozen countries, including the United States, Pakistan, France, Britain, and Germany. Tokyo spent over $110 million on the logistics mission in its final two years according to Defense Ministry spokesmen, even as demand for such support dwindled.
Topic:: Foreign Policy
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Britain, Afghanistan, United States, Japan, India, France, Arabia, Germany, and Tokyo

85. Interview with Historian John David Lewis about U.S. Foreign Policy and the Middle East

Author:: Craig Biddle
Publication Date:: 06-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Objective Standard
Institution:: The Objective Standard
Abstract:: I recently spoke with Dr. John David Lewis about American foreign policy, the uprisings in the Muslim world, the killing of Osama bin Laden, and the light that history can shed on such matters. Dr. Lewis is visiting associate professor in the philosophy, politics, and economics program at Duke University and he's the author, most recently, of Nothing Less Than Victory: Decisive Wars and the Lessons of History. —Craig Biddle Craig Biddle: Thank you for joining me, John. John David Lewis: I'm glad to be here. Thank you for having me. CB: Before we dive into some questions about U.S. foreign policy and the situation in the Middle East, would you say a few words about your work at Duke? What courses do you teach and how do they relate to foreign policy and the history of war? JL: The courses I teach all bring the thought of the ancients into the modern day and always dive to the moral level. For example, I teach freshman seminars on ancient political thought. I also teach a course on the justice of market exchange in which I draw upon the thought of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, etcetera, and approach the question from a moral perspective. In regard to foreign policy and the history of war, I just finished a graduate course at Duke University on Thucydides and the Realist tradition in international relations. International relations studies have been dominated by a school of thought called Realism. This course explores the ideas of Thucydides and how they've translated through history into modern international relations studies and ultimately into the formulation of foreign policy in the modern day. I also teach courses at the University of North Carolina on the moral foundations of capitalism, which use Ayn Rand's Atlas Shrugged as its core text. I've been involved in speaking to Duke University medical students on health care where, again, I approach the issue from a moral perspective, namely, from the principle of individual rights. CB: That's quite an array of courses, and I know you speak at various conferences and events across the country as well, not to mention your book projects. Your productivity is inspiring. Let's turn your historical lights to some recent events. On the second of May, U.S. SEALs killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. This is certainly worthy of celebration, but it's also almost ten years after he and his Islamist cohorts murdered nearly three thousand Americans on American soil. In the meantime, America has gone to war in Afghanistan and Iraq, where more than five thousand additional American soldiers have been killed, and now we're at war in Libya as well. In all of this, neither the Bush administration nor the Obama administration has so much as touched the regimes that everyone knows are the main sponsors of terrorism, those in Iran and Saudi Arabia. What's more, neither administration has identified the enemy as Islamists and the states that sponsor them. Bush called the enemy “terror” and “evildoers,” and Obama, uncomfortable with such “clarity,” speaks instead of “man-caused disasters” and calls for “overseas contingency operations.” Are there historical precedents for such massive evasions, and whether there are or aren't, what has led America to this level of lunacy? JL: That's a very interesting question, with many levels of answers. . . .
Topic:: Foreign Policy and War
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, America, and Middle East

86. Optimism and Obstacles in India-Pakistan Peace Talks

Author:: Stephanie Flamenbaum and Megan Neville
Publication Date:: 08-2011
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: Following March 2011's “cricket diplomacy,” there is reason to be optimistic about progress on South Asian normalization as India and Pakistan have resumed bilateral dialogues. Improved relations are critical to U.S. interests in South Asia with respect to the stabilization of Afghanistan, reduction in Pakistan-based militant threats, and alleviation of regional nuclear tensions. Terrorism and the Kashmir issue remain the most toxic points of divergence which could derail progress as in past bilateral talks. Bilateral economic agreements should be pursued in order to enable commercial progress to facilitate political reconciliation. With the looming drawdown of international forces from Afghanistan in 2014, and the subsequent shift in the regional power balance, it is imperative that the international community utilize its leverage to ensure that Pakistan-India talks progress.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, South Asia, and India

87. Afghanistan: The Impossible Transition

Author:: Gilles Dorronsoro
Publication Date:: 06-2011
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: A combination of two critical problems threatens to undermine the mission of the United States-led coalition in Afghanistan: the failure of the counterinsurgency strategy and a disconnect between political objectives and military operations. If anything, the current strategy is making a political solution less likely, notably because it is antagonizing Pakistan without containing the rise of the armed opposition. That has put the coalition in a paradoxical situation, in which it is being weakened militarily by a non-negotiated and inevitable withdrawal while at the same time alienating potential negotiating partners.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States

88. The Triple Compact: Improving Accountability in State Building

Author:: Ben Rowswell
Publication Date:: 08-2011
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:: As a result of international state-building efforts, progress has been made in Afghanistan, however, political dysfunction and a lack of accountability remain problems. It has been suggested that failures of accountability may, in fact, be a product of the state- building effort itself. In the hybrid form of governance where authority is divided between the government and the international community, it can be difficult for the population to determine where accountability lies, leading to feelings of frustration and disempowerment.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, War, Foreign Aid, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:: Afghanistan

89. Pakistan's future policy towards Afghanistan

Author:: Qandeel Siddique
Publication Date:: 09-2011
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: What factors are likely to govern the course of Pakistan's future policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan? This question has increasing relevance for regional security, especially in the light of the imminent endgame in Afghanistan and of the ongoing dialogue with the Taliban. This report probes the implications of the volatile US–Pakistan relationship and of Indo–Pak rivalry in the Af–Pak war theatre, in particular for Pakistan's reliance on militant extremist groups to secure and further its strategic interests. Developments pertaining to the role and engagement of the United States in the region and Indian ties to Afghanistan and the US affect Pakistan's perceived power status in the Indian subcontinent. The extent to which Pakistani interests are met in the process and out - come of brokering a deal with the Taliban is an additional determinant of whether Pakistan will continue with, or veer from, the status quo.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Pakistan and Afghanistan

90. Afghanistan in Transition: The Security Context Post-Bin Laden

Author:: Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:: 06-2011
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In 2011 NATO initiated the Inteqal process, i.e. the "transition" of security responsibilities from ISAF to the Afghan state and its security forces. The main pillars of this process are the build up of the Afghan Army and Police and the improvement of Afghanistan's governance system at both national and local level. Progress has been made in this respect, although challenges remain. NATO aims to complete the transition by 2014, while reducing its military presence in the country, but a substantial Allied footprint is likely to remain in Afghanistan beyond that date. The death of Bin Laden has brought about little changes to the situation on the ground, while it may have a significant impact on the US's attitude towards peace talks with the Taliban and thus influence the transition timeline and nature.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Terrorism, and Insurgency
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States

91. u.s. and iranian strategic competition: Competition in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Pakistan

Author:: Erin Fitzgerald and Varun Vira
Publication Date:: 09-2011
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The US has many hard decisions to make in shaping its policies toward Central and South Asia – driven primarily by the war in Afghanistan, the growing instability in Pakistan, and whether the US should actively pursue strategic interest in Central Asia in the face of Russian and Chinese pressures and advantages, than by strategic competition with Iran.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Terrorism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Central Asia

92. Reconstruction Zones in Afghanistan and Haiti

Author:: Graciana del Castillo
Publication Date:: 10-2011
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: The longest war and one of the largest relief efforts in U.S. history- in Afghanistan and Haiti, respectively-are testing the cost-effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance in conflictravaged or disaster-torn countries. U.S.-led economic reconstruction in both countries is clearly off track and becoming increasingly costly and unpopular-both at home and in the respective countries. Reconstruction zones (RZs), consisting of two distinct but linked areas to ensure synergies between them-a local-production reconstruction zone (LRZ) producing for local consumption and an export-oriented reconstruction zone (ERZ) producing exclusively for export- could be used to replace the fragmented way aid is provided to these countries with an integrated strategy for economic reconstruction. With an appropriate legal and regulatory framework, ERZs-operating as free-trade zones- could create appropriate links to the national economy as well as positive externalities or spillovers. Such a framework would avoid the problems created by these zones operating as enclaves in Haiti in the past. By targeting aid to provide adequate infrastructure and services within the RZs at a manageable scale, countries could jump-start their productive sectors and create jobs and entrepreneurship in agriculture, light manufacturing, and services, both for domestic consumption and for exports. By creating dynamic and inclusive growth, RZs could help countries stand on their own feet, consolidate peace, and overcome the unsustainable aid dependency to which they have grown accustomed.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Humanitarian Aid, War, Natural Disasters, and Foreign Aid
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and Caribbean

93. The Afghanistan Question and the Reset in U.S.-Russian Relations

Author:: Richard J. Krickus
Publication Date:: 10-2011
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has said that the ability of the United States and Russia to cooperate in Afghanistan will be a solid test of their reset in relations. That proposition is the thesis of this monograph. Many analysts in both countries would agree with this assessment, but a significant number of them believe a fruitful reset is implausible.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Cold War, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, and United States

94. The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward

Author:: Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent
Publication Date:: 11-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Foreign Affairs
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: The United States can no longer afford a world-spanning foreign policy. Retrenchment -- cutting military spending, redefining foreign priorities, and shifting more of the defense burden to allies -- is the only sensible course. Luckily, that does not have to spell instability abroad. History shows that pausing to recharge national batteries can renew a dominant power's international legitimacy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, and Cold War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and Washington

95. Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age

Author:: Jon Western and Joshua S. Goldstein
Publication Date:: 11-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Foreign Affairs
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: No sooner had NATO launched its first air strike in Libya than the mission was thrown into controversy -- and with it, the more general notion of humanitarian intervention. Days after the UN Security Council authorized international forces to protect civilians and establish a no-fly zone, NATO seemed to go beyond its mandate as several of its members explicitly demanded that Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi step down. It soon became clear that the fighting would last longer than expected. Foreign policy realists and other critics likened the Libyan operation to the disastrous engagements of the early 1990s in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, arguing that humanitarian intervention is the wrong way to respond to intrastate violence and civil war, especially following the debacles in Afghanistan and Iraq. To some extent, widespread skepticism is understandable: past failures have been more newsworthy than successes, and foreign interventions inevitably face steep challenges. Yet such skepticism is unwarranted. Despite the early setbacks in Libya, NATO's success in protecting civilians and helping rebel forces remove a corrupt leader there has become more the rule of humanitarian intervention than the exception. As Libya and the international community prepare for the post-Qaddafi transition, it is important to examine the big picture of humanitarian intervention -- and the big picture is decidedly positive. Over the last 20 years, the international community has grown increasingly adept at using military force to stop or prevent mass atrocities. Humanitarian intervention has also benefited from the evolution of international norms about violence, especially the emergence of “the responsibility to protect,” which holds that the international community has a special set of responsibilities to protect civilians -- by force, if necessary -- from war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide when national governments fail to do so. The doctrine has become integrated into a growing tool kit of conflict management strategies that includes today's more robust peacekeeping operations and increasingly effective international criminal justice mechanisms. Collectively, these strategies have helped foster an era of declining armed conflict, with wars occurring less frequently and producing far fewer civilian casualties than in previous periods.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and United Nations
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Libya, Rwanda, and Somalia

96. Strained Alliances: Iran's troubled relations to Afghanistan and Pakistan

Author:: Janne Bjerre Christensen
Publication Date:: 04-2011
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: This report offers a critical examination of Iran's influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Two points are made: that Iran's top priority is its own regime's survival and its regional policies are directed by its national security concerns. Secondly, that Iran's engagements in Afghanistan are clearly guided by the presence of the US. Iran's predominant interest is in stabilizing Afghanistan, but as long as Afghanistan is neither safe nor stable, Iran will play a double game and engage with its regional neighbours according to the US–Iran equation. Deterrence, counter-containment and competition are the keywords in these complex relations. The report outlines Iran's reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, its political platform and 'soft power', and the bonds of mutual dependency in terms of water rights, refugees and drug trafficking. It examines Iran's alleged military interventions and the reasons for playing this double game. Lastly, the report discusses Iran's tense relationship with Pakistan with regard to both Afghanistan and the troubled region of Baluchistan.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Development, Power Politics, and Foreign Aid
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Iran

97. After bin Laden: What's Next for Obama

Author:: James Lindsay
Publication Date:: 05-2011
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: James Lindsay discusses how bin Laden's death will influence U.S. foreign policy, President Barack Obama's public opinion, and the war in Afghanistan.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States

98. Pakistan 2020: A Vision for Building a Better Future

Author:: Hassan Abbas
Publication Date:: 05-2011
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: In recent years, Pakistan has stumbled from one crisis to another. A number of political and socioeconomic challenges threaten to further destabilize a country that already is reeling from insurgencies along its northwestern border. Pakistan's newest democratic government is struggling to maintain control over parts of its territory where militant religious groups are intent on challenging its authority and legitimacy. The country's conflict with India over Kashmir, now in its seventh decade, appears as intractable as ever, and the war in neighboring Afghanistan has deepened instability throughout Pakistan. The transition from a near-decade-long rule under a military dictatorship is slow and complicated, as rampant corruption and politicization of the bureaucracy present huge obstacles to the state-building process.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Democratization, Development, Economics, Education, and Health Care Policy
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

99. "Strategically Lonely" Iran Exploits Opportunities for Regional Influence

Author:: Barbara Slavin
Publication Date:: 03-2011
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Over the past three decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has shown remarkable endurance. It has survived an eight-year war with Iraq, mounting economic sanctions, and serious domestic unrest. It has benefited from the missteps of adversaries, which have created opportunities for Iran to expand ties to militant movements in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories, and to increase its influence in Afghanistan. Recent uprisings against Arab governments long allied with Washington have encouraged the Iranian government to portray itself as the fulcrum of a "new" anti-Western Middle East.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Islam, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, Middle East, Palestine, and Lebanon

100. Russia's strategies in Afghanistan and their consequences for NATO

Author:: Marlène Laruelle
Publication Date:: 11-2011
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: In July 2011, the first U.S. troops started to leave Afghanistan - a powerful symbol of Western determination to let the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) gradually take over responsibility for national security. This is also an important element in the strategy of Hamid Karzai's government, which seeks to appear not as a pawn of Washington but as an autonomous actor in negotiations with the so-called moderate Taliban. With withdrawal to be completed by 2014, the regionalization of the "Afghan issue" will grow. The regional powers will gain autonomy in their relationship with Kabul, and will implement strategies of both competition and collaboration. In the context of this regionalization, Russia occupies an important position.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, and United States

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS