Political Geography: Afghanistan / Journal: PRISM / Topic:

1. The Meaning of Setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan

Author:: Carter Malkasian
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: From 2011 to 2017, similar processes played out in Iraq and Afghanistan that are deeply significant yet understudied. Between 2011 and 2014, after much effort and some success, the United States drew down its military forces in both countries. Hopes were high that the Iraqi and the Afghan government could take over. Their armies and police were vastly superior in numbers, equipment, and training to those of their adversaries. Nevertheless, the Iraqi and Afghan states both came to the brink of collapse. Gains that had come at high cost and sacrifice for the United States unraveled. Terrorist threats re-emerged. The United States re-entered the conflicts. So far, it has not fully withdrawn. Why these events came to pass has not yet been fully studied. This article explores what happened and the implications for U.S. strategy.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Military Intervention, Civil-Military Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

2. Pathologies of Centralized State-Building

Author:: Jennifer Murtazashvili
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: The international community, led by the United States, has invested trillions of dollars in state-building efforts during the past two decades. Yet despite this commitment of substantial resources, conflict and violence remain a challenge in fragile states. It therefore seems especially important to consider the reasons why state-building has not lived up to its expectations. One plausible explanation for the failure of state-building in Afghanistan is that the government remains extremely centralized in all critical dimensions, including the power of the executive, subnational governance, judicial institutions, public budgeting and finance, and the national security forces. Of these, only the Afghan National Army has implemented meaningful reforms. In the other areas, almost no reform has occurred compared to the institutional status quo before 2001. A consequence is that most Afghans continue to experience the same type of centralized, predatory state that they endured prior to 2001. Paradoxically, by resurrecting the centralized, predatory state, the stabilization effort continues to give rise to an antigovernment insurgency across the country.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Governance, and State Building
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Middle East

3. Talking to the Taliban 2010 – 2011: A Reflection

Author:: Marc Grossman
Publication Date:: 03-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: When then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asked in early 2011 if I would become the United States' Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) – after the sudden death of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the first SRAP– she described the foundations Ambassador Holbrooke had laid to manage one of the most challenging tasks facing the nation. Secretary Clinton also said that she wanted to continue the experiment: having the SRAP organization prove that the "whole–of–government" philosophy– the idea that the United States must employ expertise and resources from all relevant parts of government to address the nation's most important challenges –was the right model for 21st century diplomacy.2 The SRAP team brought together experts from across the U.S. Government (and included several diplomats from NATO countries) to develop and implement integrated strategies to address the complex challenges in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region.
Topic:: NATO
Political Geography:: Pakistan and Afghanistan

4. Putting State Legitimacy at the Center of Foreign Operations and Assistance

Author:: Bruce Gilley
Publication Date:: 03-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: It is a commonly expressed idea that a key goal of intervention in and assistance to foreign nations is to establish (or re-establish) legitimate political authority. Historically, even so great a skeptic as John Stuart Mill allowed that intervention could be justified if it were "for the good of the people themselves" as measured by their willingness to support and defend the results. In recent times, President George W. Bush justified his post-war emphasis on democracybuilding in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the Middle East with the logic that "nations in the region will have greater stability because governments will have greater legitimacy." President Obama applauded French intervention in Mali for its ability "to reaffirm democracy and legitimacy and an effective government" in the country
Topic:: Government
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Middle East

5. Rules of Engagement and Abusive Citizens

Author:: Amitai Etzioni
Publication Date:: 03-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: The time has come to draw lessons from the war in Afghanistan. One major concern is how the U.S. military ought to deal with civilians who are sporadic combatants, and civilians who act, part of the time, as support forces for combatants (by serving as intelligence agents, manufacturing ammunition and bombs, supplying provisions and transportation, and so on). Discussion of this topic has often focused on ways to deal with those civilians after they have been caught fighting us and whether they should be treated as soldiers or as criminals, a matter that has not been resolved. (My own position is that they should be treated as a third category: as terrorists, subject to distinct rules and authority.)2 This article focuses on an earlier phase: when these civilians are still acting as combatants or supporting them.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan

6. Confronting the Threat of Corruption and Organized Crime in Afghanistan: Implications for Future Armed Conflict

Author:: Tim Sullivan and Carl Forsberg
Publication Date:: 03-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: As the conflict in Afghanistan has evolved over the last decade, it has become apparent that of the many challenges the country and its international partners face, few are as complex, pervasive, and threatening as corruption and organized crime. Together, corruption and organized crime have undermined efforts to build Afghan institutions, consolidate security gains, achieve political progress, encourage economic growth, and set conditions for enduring stability. These problems, however, are not unique to the war in Afghanistan. Conflicts elsewhere in recent decades have revealed that states engaged in or emerging from insurgencies and civil wars—especially those in which institutions are weak, rule of law is minimal, and substantial international resources have been injected with inadequate oversight—are particularly susceptible to the proliferation of corruption and organized crime.
Topic:: Corruption
Political Geography:: Afghanistan

7. Women and Wars

Author:: Kristen A. Cordell
Publication Date:: 03-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Carol Cohn's December 2012 anthology Women and Wars uses descriptions of the varied roles of women during conflict to push forward an agenda for full inclusion of their perspective in securing the peace. Women and Wars fills the vacuum left by the "women as victims" approach that characterized the early 2000's, with a diverse array of options for understanding the roles and perspectives that women have during conflict, including: soldiers, civilians, caregivers, sex workers, refugees and internally displaced persons, anti-war activists, and community peacebuilders.
Topic:: Civil War and Peace Studies
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Burundi

8. An Interview with Lieutenant General Mike Flynn

Publication Date:: 03-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: When I looked at the intelligence system, as the Chief Intelligence Officer for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces Afghanistan in 2009, I realized that for us to be successful with President Obama's new population-centric strategy we had to refocus on the right aspects of the environment. We were focused to a large degree – I would say 95 percent – on the enemy networks (e.g. Taliban, the Haqqani Network, etc.). We had tremendous fidelity on those issues because we had been studying them for years. What we quickly realized was that we had no knowledge, no real understanding of the various tribal elements within Afghanistan. We had to understand the cultures that existed, the dynamics of the type of government that we were trying to support and the population centers in which we were actually operating. We honestly did not have any deep understanding of any of that. We were trying to figure out who was who, from the local governments on up to the national government, and we did not have any captured data, information or knowledge. We did not have that real depth of understanding that we had in other places – in Iraq it took us a while to get there. Those conditions led me and two colleagues to sit down and put our thoughts together to say we needed to do something different. We needed to completely realign our focus to the population and to the build out of the Afghan National Security Forces. We outlined the color system: the red, the white, the green, and the blue. The red was the enemy; white was the population; green was Afghan National Security Forces; and blue was us. We had a really good picture of the red and the blue, but we had no picture of the green or the white, and it was really stunning. So, we decided to put our thoughts down on paper.
Topic:: Government and National Security
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States

9. Inevitable Conflicts, avoidable Failures Preparing for the Third Generation of Conflict, Stabilization, and Reconstruction Operations

Author:: Liora Danan and Johanna Mendelson Forman
Publication Date:: 12-2013
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Foreign internal conflicts clearly remain a permanent feature of the u.S. foreign policy landscape, especially since the united States regularly participates in efforts to stabilize countries affected by conflict and then helps them recover afterwards. Yet u.S. government officials and the american public in general have difficulty accepting the inevitability of u.S. involvement in such efforts. to ensure lasting progress and security in post-conflict situations, the united States must adjust its approach from a focus on large military operations to preparing adequately for small-scale, long-term interventions. Most u.S. military deployments since the end of the Cold War have been in “small wars” or what the Department of Defense once called “military operations other than war.”1 Yet the military has usually been more prepared to fight large, technologically advanced wars than smaller contingencies that require greater integration with civilian capacities. as a consequence, each time the u.S. military is deployed to a complex–but “small”–emergency, it has had to relearn lessons on the ground about the best way to manage these types of contingencies. Civilian participation in stabilization and reconstruction efforts is likewise inevitable, but civilian institutions are even less prepared for such work than the military. Lessons learned over the last decade are only recently being institutionalized, through offices like Department of State's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and the u.S. agency for International Development's Office of transition Initiatives (OtI). In part this is due to bureaucratic politics.
Topic:: Foreign Policy and Cold War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States

10. Regime Change Without Military Force: Lessons from Overthrowing Milosevic

Author:: Gregory L. Schulte
Publication Date:: 12-2013
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: After a decade of war in afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama administration has adopted a new defense strategy that recognizes the need to limit our strategic ends in an era of increasing limits on our military means.1 the strategy calls for armed forces capable of conducting a broad range of missions, in a full range of contingencies, and in a global context that is increasingly complex. It calls for doing so with a smaller defense budget. Opportunities for savings come from reducing the ability to fight two regional conflicts simultaneously and from not sizing the force to conduct prolonged, large-scale stability operations. Seemingly missing from the new defense strategy are the types of wars we fought in afghanistan and Iraq. Both started with forcible changes in regime – the armed ouster of the taliban and Saddam Hussein from their positions of power. In each case, the rapid removal of leadership was followed by lengthy counterinsurgency operations to bring security to the population and build up a new government. the duration and difficulty of these operations and their cost in deaths, destruction, and debt were not understood at their outset.
Topic:: NATO and War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Iraq

11. Three Design Concepts Introduced for Strategic and Operational Applications

Author:: Ben Zweibelson
Publication Date:: 12-2013
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Many discussions on design theory applications within military contexts often revolve around a small population of design practitioners using complex terms and exclusive language, contrasted by a larger population of design skeptics that routinely demand a universal, scripted, and complete examples for “doing design right.” Design, a form of conceptual planning and sense making, continues to gain traction in strategic political and military institutions, yet faces misunderstanding, disinterest, and outright rejection from military strategists and operational planners for a variety of reasons. this article aims at moving this discourse toward how several design theory concepts are valuable for strategists and decision makers, and how select design concepts might be introduced and applied in a simple language where military practitioners can traverse from strategic intent into operational applications with tangible results. as a lead planner for the afghan Security Force reduction concept and the 2014 (NtM-a) transition Plan, I applied design to strategic and operational level planning using these design concepts as well as others.
Topic:: Security
Political Geography:: Afghanistan

12. Sri Lanka's Rehabilitation Program: A New Frontier in Counter Terrorism and Counter Insurgency

Author:: Malkanthi Hettiarachchi
Publication Date:: 12-2013
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: The liberation tigers of tamil ealam (ltte), sometimes referred to as the tamil tigers, or simply the tigers, was a separatist militant organization based in northern Sri lanka. It was founded in May 1976 by Prabhakaran and waged a violent secessionist and nationalist campaign to create an independent state in the north and east of Sri lanka for the tamil people. this campaign evolved into the Sri lankan Civil War.1 the tigers were considered one of the most ruthless insurgent and terrorist organisations in the world.2 they were vanquished by the Sri lankan armed forces in May 2009. 3 In order to rehabilitate the 11,6644 tigers who had surrendered or been taken captive, Sri lanka developed a multifaceted program to engage and transform the violent attitudes and behaviours of the tiger leaders, members and collaborators. 5 Since the end of the ltte's three-decade campaign of insurgency and terrorism, there has not been a single act of terrorism in the country. Many attribute Sri lanka's post-conflict stability to the success of the insurgent and terrorist rehabilitation program.
Topic:: War and Insurgency
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sri Lanka

13. Great Game, Local Rules and the New Great Power Context in Central Asia By Alexander Cooley

Author:: John Herbst
Publication Date:: 12-2013
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: In Great Game, Local Rules the New Great Power Contest in Central Asia, Alexander Cooley develops an excellent analytical framework for looking at the activities of China, Russia and the United States in Central Asia. Cooley offers three broad arguments. First, he observes that the three big powers have pursued different goals in Central Asia, which has meant that their interests do not necessarily conflict. China's main objective has been to stabilize Xinjiang by ensuring cooperative relationships on Xinjiang's border. This prompted beijing to resolve border disputes with kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and kazakhstan on favorable terms for its Central Asian neighbors. The U.S. has sought to stabilize Afghanistan by establishing supply and base arrangements in Central Asia. Despite the ups and downs with Tashkent which led to the closing of the U.S. base at karshi khanabad in 2005, washington has largely achieved its objectives in the region. Russia has sought to remain the major power or hegemon in the region. Despite this ambitious goal, Moscow has been willing to accept efforts by the U.S. to establish bases in Central Asia because it also is interested in containing, if not defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Topic:: Economics
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, United States, China, and Kazakhstan

14. A U.S. Asian-Pacific Pivot Point: Burma's Natural Resources

Author:: Kirk Talbott, John Waugh, and Douglas Batson
Publication Date:: 09-2013
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Burma wavers on the cusp of a transition from conflict, plunder, and risk towards peace and a more open, stable society. A half-century of armed warfare, largely financed by the rapid exploitation of high-value natural resources, may be coming to an end in mainland Southeast Asia's largest nation. The use and extraction of environmental assets will continue, however, to determine Burma's political and economic future. Unfortunately, natural resources too often play a perverse role in preventing needed reforms in countries emerging from protracted conflict. In an era of fiscal constraint, "sequestration," and a decade of Iraq and Afghanistan nation-building fatigue, how can the U.S. best aid Burma's transformation? The on-the-ground situations in Burma, namely, ethnic conflicts, land grabs, internally displaced persons, each undergirded by a deep distrust of the central government, are as varied as they are fluid. U.S. foreign policy issues regarding the nation also known as Myanmar, beginning with that nation's toponym,2 are so complex as to defy the Interagency and Tactical Conflict Assessment Frameworks, respectively vaunted by U.S. government civilian agencies and military services.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, and United Nations
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Burma

15. Joint Deployable Training Teams: Helping to Focus the Effort

Author:: Andrew Straley
Publication Date:: 09-2013
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: While he was First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill once stated, “Gentlemen, we have run out of money; now we must think.”1 Conducting increasingly diverse, global operations while simultaneously fighting on multiple fronts has become more challenging due to constrained budgets. Conditions where the United States could simply throw large amounts of resources at a problem and solve it through sheer volume no longer exist. This new reality has forced combatant commanders and combined joint task force (CJTF) commanders to be more effective with limited resources when conducting operations across their joint operational area.
Topic:: NATO, Environment, Humanitarian Aid, and United Nations
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States

16. Response to the Decade of War

Author:: James Dobbins
Publication Date:: 09-2013
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Last summer, in response to a directive from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Martin Dempsey, the Joint Staff issued a short summary of lessons learned from the past decade of military operations. The document, entitled Decade of War, Volume 1 frankly and cogently acknowledges mistakes made over this period, and particularly during the first half of the decade, that is to say between the invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001 and the surge of troops into Iraq in early 2007. Among the admitted deficiencies were the failure to adequately grasp the operating environment, a reliance on conventional tactics to fight unconventional enemies, an inability to articulate a convincing public narrative, and poor interagency coordination. The document is testimony to the capacity of the American military for self-criticism and eventual correction, albeit not always in time to avoid costly setbacks.
Topic:: War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, and America

17. An Interview with Dennis Blair

Publication Date:: 09-2013
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: What lessons have you personally drawn from the decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan? Blair: The decade of war is really two decades of war–from the time the Cold War ended in about 1989 through the disappearance of the Soviet threat and the involvement of the United States in a series of individual military actions. What I've learned is that we need to do a better job thinking these conflicts all the way through before we engage in them. Because it turns out that we are relearning an old lesson, which is the use of military force is only a part of improving a situation and protecting American interests in a particular country or region. Too often, we think that a military victory itself will cause the desired result. In fact many other factors come in to play; economic development, social development, government improvement. These are not accomplished by the U.S. alone, and certainly not by American military force alone, but often with allies and other partners, and with other civilian capabilities. I think we have not thought them through carefully as to the end state that we are trying to achieve. Next we need to be realistic about the resources that are required; military, civil, and other. I'm afraid these are old lessons that need to be relearned, not new lessons, but they certainly have been borne out as some of the shortcomings of the interventions we have made in recent years. I would add, by the way, that I am not one who says our military interventions since 1989 have all been disasters. I think on the whole they have made the world a better place; bad people who were around then aren't around now, from Manuel Noriega to Saddam Hussein through Slobodan Milosevic and others; so it is not that our military interventions have been wasted. On the contrary–but we need to make sure that we get the maximum possible benefit from them and intervene in a smart way.
Topic:: Cold War and Government
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq

18. The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War

Author:: Jeff Rice
Publication Date:: 09-2013
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Fred Kaplan's The Insurgents is a highly successful and compelling intermingling of three stories: the rise and eventual fall of General David Petraeus; the intellectual history of counterinsurgency; and the broadening of the learning culture within the United States Military during the Iraq war. Indeed, the heroes of the book are the “insurgents” within the U.S. Army who all but overthrew the dominant paradigm of kinetic warfare in favor of ideas derived from England and France during the end of the colonial era.1 Kaplan's book picks up on the story told by Tom Ricks in The Gamble2 about how this intellectual insurgency transformed the way the U.S. fought the war in Iraq, preferring the counterinsurgency (COIN) approach to protecting civilians from insurgents and lowering their casualty rate, and building alliances in order to reduce the number of insurgents. For Kaplan this is nothing short of a profound alteration of the American way of war, one that caused enormous consternation amongst certain sectors of the military who were wedded to a more conventional approach to war.
Topic:: Government and War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, and America

19. "Left of Bang": The Value of Sociocultural Analysis in Today's Environment

Author:: Michael T. Flynn, James Sisco, and David C. Ellis
Publication Date:: 09-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Hard lessons learned during counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, counterterrorist operations across continents, and the Arab Spring all contributed to a growing recognition within the Intelligence Community (IC)1 of the importance of understanding the “human terrain” of operating environments. The Department of Defense (DOD), its Service branches and combatant commands, and the broader IC responded to the demand for sociocultural analysis (SCA) by creating organizations such as the Defense Intelligence Socio-Cultural Capabilities Council, Human Terrain System, and U.S. Central Command's Human Terrain Analysis Branch, among others. For large bureaucracies, DOD and the IC reacted agilely to the requirement, but the robust SCA capabilities generated across the government over the last decade were largely operationally and tactically organized, resourced, and focused. What remains is for the IC to formulate a strategic understanding of SCA and establish a paradigm for incorporating it into the intelligence process.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq

20. Evolved Irregular Threats

Author:: Ben Fitzgerald and Pia Wanek
Publication Date:: 09-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Almost every aspect of national security is colored by uncertainty. While it would be arrogant to consider that this moment in history carries more uncertainty than others, we presently find ourselves facing a multiplicity of uncertainties that pull us simultaneously in different directions. Drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the future implications of those conflicts, the ongoing events of the Arab Spring, the rise and increased assertiveness of near-peer competitors, a variety of nonstate actors with increasingly sophisticated capability, and economic crises in Europe create additional contingencies that require our attention. Simultaneously, economic uncertainty at home limits our means, requiring prioritization and the acceptance of additional risk.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Europe

21. Logistics Islands: The Global Supply Archipelago and the Topologics of Defense

Author:: Pierre Bélanger and Alexander Scott Arroyo
Publication Date:: 09-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: For the Department of Defense (DOD), the most important difference between Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan is neither cultural nor political, but logistical. Admiral Mike Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, summed up the difference with terse precision: “We don't have a Kuwait.” Lacking a secure staging ground adjacent to the theater of operations exponentially complicates getting materiel to and from forward operating bases (FOBs) and combat outposts (COPs), in turn requiring a longer and more complex logistical supply chain. Landlocked among non– International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) states, unstable allies (Pakistan and China to the east, Kyrgystan and Uzbekistan to the north), and regional “rogue states” (Iran), Afghanistan is, for logistical operations, a desert island.
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Uzbekistan, and Island

22. Political-Military Lessons from U.S. Operations in Vietnam and Afghanistan

Author:: Michael J. Williams
Publication Date:: 09-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Using history to understand the present can be a useful tool, but it is also a limited one. Historical cases are not identical to contemporary ones, and there is a danger of conflating challenges in such a manner that, rather than illuminating a present challenge, history obfuscates it. This problem tends to be evident in the inaccurate use of analogies by policymakers, commentators, and analysts. Such may be the case in the contemporary American debate over the state of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan. Since President Barack Obama came to office in 2009 and deployed an additional 60,000 troops to Afghanistan in the first year of his administration, the debate over continued U.S. involvement has been dogged by analogies to Vietnam. But it is not readily apparent that Vietnam is an appropriate analogy for understanding the current challenge the United States faces in Afghanistan.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and America

23. Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines: Civilian Harm and the Indirect Approach

Author:: Geoffrey Lambert, Larry Lewis, and Sarah Sewall
Publication Date:: 09-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: This study examines the military support provided by U.S. Joint special operations task Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P) to Philippine military operations. Building upon the 2010 Joint Civilian Casualty Study—the first comprehensive examination of U.S. prevention and mitigation of civilian casualties based on U.S. operations in Afghanistan—this current effort aimed to assess civilian casualties in the different context of indirect U.S. operations. We found that the evolution of Philippine civilian and military strategy since the mid 2000s has reduced the occurrence and salience of civilian casualty issues during combat operations. Additionally, the study revealed many related best practices in JSOTF-P and operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines (OEF-P) more broadly, and provided insights into the possible future evolution of the mission and wider implications for foreign internal defense (FID) in the 21st century.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, America, and Philippines

24. The Operators: The Wild and Terrifying Inside Story of America's War in Afghanistan

Author:: George Michael
Publication Date:: 09-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: As the U.S. military enters its 11th year of operations in Afghanistan, public support for the effort dwindles, according to recent polls, as a solid majority of Americans now believe the war is going badly and is not worth fighting. In The Operators, journalist Michael Hastings explores the recent history of America's longest military campaign through the prism of General Stanley McChrystal and his staff. Not long after his story broke in June 2010 in Rolling Stone magazine, General McChrystal was forced to resign. t he episode illustrated the deepening division between the White house and Pentagon over the appropriate prosecution of the war.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and America

25. Galula In Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory

Author:: Riley M. Moore
Publication Date:: 09-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: With the outbreak of insurgency in Iraq (followed by Afghanistan), an urgent requirement emerged for concise and easily comprehensible answers to the complex question of how to counter an insurgency. In the midst of two wars, with no time or current doctrine and with a Presidential mandate for solutions, strategic thinkers and generals were desperately searching for a foothold to halt what seemed to be the inevitable descent into chaos in Iraq. t he works of David Galula played a significant role in fulfilling that mandate. Touted by General David Petraeus and other military leaders—General Stanley McChrystal, for instance, claimed to keep Galula's publications on his nightstand to read every night— Galula's work has been influential in forming current U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. Indeed, his influence on Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, which was authored under the leadership of General Petraeus, is undeniable.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and Algeria

26. Civil-Military Cooperation: A Way to Resolve Complex Crisis Situations

Author:: Hans-Jürgen Kasselmann
Publication Date:: 12-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Discussions about the most effective, efficient, and sustainable approach to resolving complex crisis situations have a long historical tradition, even if ongoing debates among politicians and researchers may suggest otherwise. the discussions about developments in Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, and Afghanistan, as well as evaluations of the disasters in Haiti and Pakistan, call for all participants to find new solutions in response to obvious deficits and the looming prospect of failure. This holds especially true with regard to the question of when, where, and how the military instrument should be integrated with the activities of all the other actors involved in the resolution of complex crisis situations based on an overall political rationale.
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Haiti, and Somalia

27. Making the Afghan Civil-Military Imbalance Conducive to Democratization

Author:: Christian Bayer Tygesen
Publication Date:: 12-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: In-conflict state-building in fragile states (such as Iraq and Afghanistan), defined as building effective and legitimate civilian and military state institutions to advance the stabilization and democratization of the state, creates unbalanced civil-military relations in the host state by producing weak and dysfunctional civilian institutions vis-à-vis relatively stronger and more functional military institutions. This imbalance positions the military to become a dominant political actor in state formation upon the withdrawal of the international military presence. This can have significant implications for the political trajectory of the state.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Iraq

28. Thinking About Strategic Hybrid Threats-In Theory and in Practice

Author:: Frank J. Cilluffo and Joseph R. Clark
Publication Date:: 12-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: As the United States resets in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the face of growing uncertainty in the South China Sea, a good and important debate is occurring about how best to provide for our national security. Reasonable arguments can be made about the threats posed by potential peer competitors such as China, rogue nations such as North Korea, and prospective revisionist powers such as Russia. Arguments can be made about threats arising from political instability or intrastate conflicts, such as in Pakistan, Uganda, and Syria. Arguments can also be made about the threats posed by jihadi terror groups, organized crime syndicates, and drug trafficking organizations. The dangers highlighted by any one of these arguments are real and perhaps grave. They are not, however, novel.
Political Geography:: Uganda, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, United States, China, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria

29. After 2015: The Next Security Era for Britain

Author:: John Mackinlay
Publication Date:: 03-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: The great international intervention in Afghanistan is due to run down to a token presence by 2014. Foreign troops are returning home already, and their continued reduction will change the nature of the operation there. Closer to Europe, the Arab Spring has displaced more than a million people along the north coast of Africa. The efforts of those refugees to migrate toward Europe could begin to unsettle the region. Meanwhile, the European economy seems to be heading for long-term decline, and last summer's rioting in the United Kingdom (UK) has alarmed politicians and damaged British urban areas. Looking ahead, this article argues that 2015 may mark the start of a rather different security era, one in which the British government may have to determine whether the safety of its own population takes priority over supporting U.S. operations overseas.
Political Geography:: Britain, Afghanistan, Africa, United Kingdom, Europe, and Arabia

30. Hearts, Minds, and the Barrel of a Gun: The Taliban's Shadow Government

Author:: Antonio Giustozzi
Publication Date:: 03-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: The predominant image of the Taliban is a military organization bent almost exclusively on wreaking havoc on the Afghan state and whoever sides with it. However, for all their reputation of “warrior mullahs,” the Taliban have not altogether neglected the civilian dimensions of power. In the early post-9/11 period, as an insurgent organization, they were indeed little more than roving bands of warrior mullahs who were trying to regroup and relaunch an insurgency. They did not have the resources or capacity to develop a shadow government structure. After 2003, however, the situation gradually changed and the Taliban started investing greater resources in their shadow government. Apart from the increased availability of financial resources, what might have driven the Taliban's desire for building their own shadow government was their thirst for legitimacy. They wanted to show that they were the authentic government of Afghanistan and not merely an opposition military force. Another reason appears to have been that the Taliban actually realized that a shadow governance structure brought them some practical benefits, such as a greater ability to interact with the population. Particularly since the Taliban started entering relatively heavily populated areas in 2006, their commanders were no longer skilled enough to deal with the villagers. In a sense, the Taliban realized that they could not outfight the forces arrayed against them, which included the strongest military on the planet and a series of allies, also of respectable military capability. They tried, therefore, to outgovern their rivals, identifying the ineffectiveness of Kabul's government as their greatest opportunity.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Taliban

31. CERP in Afghanistan: Refining Military Capabilities in Development Activities

Author:: Vijaya Ramachandran, Gregory Johnson, and Julie Walz
Publication Date:: 03-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Carl Schramm, president and chief executive officer of the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, published a paper in Foreign Affairs in 2010 entitled “Expeditionary Economics,” arguing that the economies of Iraq and Afghanistan have shown few signs of progress. Schramm makes the case for the military to engage broadly in midconflict and postconflict reconstruction using a variety of tools. Economic reconstruction must be a part of a three-legged strategy, following invasion and stabilization. To do reconstruction, the military needs to expand its areas of competence, rid itself of its central planning mentality, and become a more flexible force that can facilitate economic growth while trying to stabilize the regions in which it is engaged.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Iraq

32. The Civilian Uplift and Unified Action Organizing for Stability Operations in Regional Command–East

Author:: Dennis Cahill
Publication Date:: 03-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: For Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)–82, assigned to Regional Command–East (RC–E) from June 2009 to June 2010, rotation 10 of Operation Enduring Freedom was a time of major transition for military operations in Afghanistan. Several changes were made in the way that U.S. forces approached engagement with the civilians and Afghan military forces during that timeframe. Among those changes were the expansion of the presence of U.S. Government civilian agencies in the country and the requirement to integrate representatives from those agencies with military organizations throughout the area of operations. This “civilian uplift” represented the largest deployment of U.S. agencies to a combat zone since the Vietnam War.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States

33. The Afghan Way of War: How and Why They Fight

Author:: Donald Larry Sampler
Publication Date:: 03-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: I began the task of reviewing Robert Johnson's The Afghan Way of War: How and Why They Fight not expecting to enjoy the book at all. I have deep interests in Afghanistan, but am the type of reader who prefers my military history as told by Bernard Cornwell through the eyes of Richard Sharpe in his successful string of historical novels. But to my surprise, I found the book quite compelling. Johnson has produced a readable account of Afghan conflict over the past couple of centuries that, while not profoundly challenging any of my perceptions or expectations, has certainly enriched them and reinforced them by grounding them in history.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan

34. Two Recent Takes on Where We Are in Afghanistan, and How We Got There

Author:: James Kunder
Publication Date:: 03-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: For serious students of Afghanistan specifically, and stabilization operations more generally, two recent books are worth a look. Both Joseph J. Collins's Understanding War in Afghanistan and Dov S. Zakheim's A Vulcan's Tale: How the Bush Administration Mismanaged the Reconstruction of Afghanistan focus on U.S. policy toward that tortured South Asian country.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and South Asia

35. Silver Bullet or Time Suck? Revisiting the Role of Interagency Coordination in Complex Operations

Author:: Andrea Barbara Baumann
Publication Date:: 06-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: American-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan are drawing to an end and the political climate inside the Beltway has turned decidedly hostile toward large deployments of U.S. troops and civilians overseas. Consequently, stability operations have dropped off the radar for many analysts and commentators. The policy community that once feverishly tackled questions over how to stabilize foreign countries through the extended deployment of military and civilian capabilities under various labels (most prominently state- or nation-building and/or population- centric counterinsurgency) is shifting its gaze elsewhere. With growing hindsight, the entire endeavor is often declared as flawed from the start. In addition to this sense of strategic failure, a drop in political attention now heightens the risk of losing hard-earned insights from these operations. This is therefore a crucial time to evaluate the institutional developments that operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have spurred.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and America

36. Finding Innovation in State-building: Moving Beyond the Orthodox Liberal Model

Author:: Mark Sedra
Publication Date:: 06-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: The collapse of a series of postcolonial states in the developing world following the end of the Cold War stimulated a shift in Western security thinking. Influenced by the emerging discourse on globalization, Western policymakers and analysts began to see these newly bankrupt states in the global periphery as posing a distinct threat to the wealthy Western core of the international system. Indeed, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which were partially planned from one of the world's chronic fragile states, Afghanistan, seemed to justify the notion that ungoverned spaces around the world posed a direct threat to global security.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan

37. Lessons from MoDA: Continuing the Conversation on How to Advise Institution-building

Author:: Nadia Gerspacher and Adrian Shtuni
Publication Date:: 06-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Established in 2009, the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program was based on a thorough needs assessment and extensive consultations with U.S., coalition, and Afghan stakeholders as well as possible support and service providers. The program initially recruited, trained, and deployed 17 senior advisors to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission–Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) mission. Most advisors were assigned to the Ministry of Defense (MoD), with a few assigned to the Ministry of Interior (MoI). The goal of the program is to help transform the key security ministries into more efficient, effective, and professional institutions, capable of inheriting and executing the overall national security mission by 2014. By all accounts, the advisors, guided by many other similar capacity-building joint projects, have thus far effectively engaged their counterparts at MoD and MoI, developing rapport and productive professional relationships at a relatively early stage in their tours.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and North Atlantic

38. Recognizing Systems in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned and New Approaches to Operational Assessments

Author:: William P. Upshur, Jonathan W. Roginski, and David J. Kilcullen
Publication Date:: 06-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Until it was overhauled in 2011, the assessments process in Afghanistan's Regional Command South was mired in 240 metrics and indicators—some of which were uncollectable while others were entirely irrelevant. It lacked focus, failed to define the problem, and was divorced from decisionmaking cycles. That is to say, it was representative of how operational assessments are usually conducted. There was a general understanding that measuring the conflict environment was vital to the mission and to operational success. But what that was supposed to look like and how it was supposed to be accomplished were never articulated. What resulted was a frenetic approach that tried to measure the universe—attempting to analyze everything and accomplishing little.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan

39. Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police

Author:: Robert Hulslander and Jake Spivey
Publication Date:: 06-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: This article examines the security and stability programs known as Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP). Created through the combined efforts of the U.S. military, other U.S. Government departments and agencies, and the Afghan government, VSO/ALP enhanced security, governance, and development in strategically important rural areas critical to the Afghanistan campaign but beyond the effective reach of the Afghan government and U.S. conventional forces. VSO/ALP attempts to link and effectively balance centralized and decentralized authority by bolstering traditional governance mechanisms. The program was designed to mitigate shortcomings in Afghan governance and security capacity and capability, while “buying time” for those capabilities to mature. Although the program's official inception was in August 2010, its roots go back to earlier efforts that served as the basis of the current initiative. Ultimately, VSO/ALP aims to provide a framework through which the Afghan government can strengthen its relationship with its citizens and wrest control and influence away from the Taliban, other insurgents, and criminal networks.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban

40. The Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan

Author:: James Stavridis
Publication Date:: 03-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Today, the Afghan people and the international community have an opportunity to secure large areas of terrain and population from the Taliban while simultaneously creating sufficient governance and security capacity in the Afghan government to enable them to take the lead in their own country. Above all, we can prevent the return of al Qaeda, the fundamental reason we are there.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Taliban

41. The Commander as Investor: Changing CERP Practices

Author:: Rebecca Patterson and Jonathan Robinson
Publication Date:: 03-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Postinvasion Iraq and Afghanistan have compelled the United States to expand its focus on and capacity for conflict resolution and postwar reconstruction. Our strategic objective in both countries has become the transformation of dysfunctional and war-affected societies into stable, viable, and sustainable states. To this end, economic development and security are regarded as mutually reinforcing elements: without security, development cannot progress far, yet development is essential to attaining security. With civilian aid agencies impaired by prohibitive security conditions and burdensome bureaucratic requirements, the Department of Defense (DOD) has, for the first time in 60 years, become a dominant player in creating the conditions for economic growth in conflict areas
Topic:: Conflict Resolution
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq

42. Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations

Author:: Norton A. Schwartz
Publication Date:: 03-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: In 2001, the U.S. military, aided by indigenous forces, swiftly toppled a Taliban government responsible for providing sanctuary to al Qaeda. In 2003, the Iraqi military disintegrated in the face of a devastating demonstration of American power that ended the regime of Saddam Hussein. America showcased its unique ability to project power over vast distances to achieve substantial results. Unfortunately, those initial victories were short-lived. As the security situations deteriorated in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States became engaged in longer term irregular conflicts. American and allied militaries struggled to adapt their doctrine, training, and technology to counter an elusive foe. While ground forces relearned and incorporated counterinsurgency (COIN) lessons, Airmen explored how airpower's flexibility, responsiveness, and bird's-eye view of the battlefield could respond to those lessons.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, America, and Taliban

43. Ministerial Advisors: Developing Capacity for an Enduring Security Force

Author:: Frank C. DiGiovanni, William B. Caldwell IV, and James A. Schear
Publication Date:: 03-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: The Taliban and other insurgent elements fighting against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan are convinced that they will succeed if they simply wait us out. They think if they maintain their influence in key areas such as Helmand and Kandahar provinces, they will be poised to regain control of the entire country when coalition forces begin to drawdown in the next few years.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Taliban

44. Metrics for the Haiti Stabilization Initiative

Author:: Robert Grossman-Vermaas and David C. Becker
Publication Date:: 03-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Stabilization in postconflict or low-conflict situations is a growing business around the world. For the United States, stabilization efforts at the moment may seem to focus on U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the recently released Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review noted that there are 36 active conflicts and 55 fragile states in the world. In reality, the United States supports stabilization efforts from Colombia to Lebanon through a variety of programs. Using a parallel non-U.S.-centric indicator, the United Nations (UN) now supports more than 14,000 police in 17 different countries to provide police advice, law enforcement training, and a public security presence in situations where the UN has a mandate to support a government or encourage peace-building efforts.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, Colombia, United Nations, and Lebanon

45. ISAF Lessons Learned: A German Perspective

Author:: Rainer Glatz
Publication Date:: 03-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Following several largely futile attempts to gain control over Afghanistan, the British Empire granted independence to the country in 1919. Seventy years later, Russian forces withdrew having failed to establish control through a pro-Russian government. Today, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) struggles to establish a stable political system in order to prevent the country from again becoming a safe haven for terrorists. The question is: Will the Alliance prevail or will it join the club of losers? The answer is open, and it is up to NATO and the international community to sustain the positive momentum gained in 2010. The difficulty of nation-building in this remote, but nevertheless strategically important, part of the world can be seen in daily media coverage of the setbacks and losses, progress and success.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, North Atlantic, and Germany

46. Criminal Insurgency in the Americas and Beyond

Author:: Robert Killebrew
Publication Date:: 06-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Even before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the global context for American security policy was changing. While the traditional state-based international system continued to function and the United States reacted to challenges by states in conventional ways (for example, by invading Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11), a cascade of enormous technological and social change was revolutionizing international affairs. As early as the 1990s, theorists were writing that with modern transnational communications, international organizations and corporate conglomerates would increasingly act independently of national borders and international regulation. What was not generally foreseen until about the time of 9/11, though, was the darker side: that the same technology could empower corrupt transnational organizations to threaten the international order itself. In fact, the globalization of crime, from piracy's financial backers in London and Nairobi to the Taliban and Hizballah's representatives in West Africa, may well be the most important emerging fact of today's global security environment.
Topic:: International Affairs
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq

47. Irregular Conflict and the Wicked Problem Dilemma: Strategies of Imperfection

Author:: Franklin Kramer
Publication Date:: 06-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Irregular conflict is neither neat nor fair. Definitionally, it is hard to describe, including as it does conflicts ranging from Somalia to Bosnia to Sierra Leone to Colombia to Iraq to Afghanistan (to say nothing of Sudan, the Philippines, or Yemen). Hybrid, counterinsurgency (COIN), stability operations, counterterrorism, and civil war have all been utilized as descriptions, often in combination. But if defining irregular conflict is difficult, even more difficult is knowing how to respond, especially for an outside intervener like the United States. Doctrine has now been developed, but in practice the context of an irregular conflict is generally so complex and contradictory that it is difficult to put the full doctrine effectively into practice.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Sudan, Bosnia, Philippines, Yemen, Colombia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia

48. Transforming the Conflict in Afghanistan

Author:: Joseph A. L'Etoile
Publication Date:: 09-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Many have characterized the war in Afghanistan as a violent political argument between the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (with its coalition partners) and the Taliban, with the population watching and waiting to decide whom to join, and when. The main value of this analogy is not in its characterization of the war but in its explanation of why the Afghan government and the coalition are finding it so difficult to gain traction against a largely unpopular insurgency. By framing the options as a simple binary choice between the government with its hierarchical, remote, and centralized governing structure and the Taliban with its violently repressive but locally present shadow government, the war is represented—or misrepresented—as a matter of unattractive choices that impel the population to remain on the sidelines waiting to see who will win.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Taliban

49. State-building: Job Creation, Investment Promotion, and the Provision of Basic Services

Author:: Paul Collier
Publication Date:: 09-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: Rigorous research on state-building is still in its infancy. In this article, I take three issues that are important and distinctive to state-building situations and discuss what research can potentially contribute. The issues are by no means exhaustive; they are merely a sample of what needs to be a more comprehensive engagement between scholars and practitioners. There is unfortunately a wide gap between what practitioners need to know and what research can currently show with reasonable confidence. There is a further wide gap between what is known and what is likely to be feasible for researchers in the next few years. At least practitioners should be aware of where they must make decisions unsupported by solid evidence; more ambitiously, they can encourage research into those issues that are both feasible and significant.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Europe

50. Reflections on the Human Terrain System During the First 4 Years

Author:: Montgomery McFate and Steve Fondacaro
Publication Date:: 09-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: The Human Terrain System (HTS) is a U.S. Army program that recruits, trains, and deploys mixed military and civilian Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), which embed with military units in Iraq and Afghanistan. These teams conduct social science research about the local popula¬tion to provide situational awareness to the military and “enable culturally astute decision-making, enhance operational effectiveness, and preserve and share socio-cultural institutional knowledge.” The teams rely on the HTS Research Reachback Center to provide secondary source research and the Mapping the Human Terrain Toolkit (MAP–HT) to support analysis, storage, and retrieval of sociocultural information.
Topic:: Military Affairs
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS