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  • Author: Antonio Missiroli
  • Publication Date: 06-2003
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: European Union Institute for Security Studies
  • Abstract: The financing of EU-led crisis management operations is a somewhat neglected yet nevertheless crucial factor affecting the external effectiveness and internal consistency of the Union's foreign and security policy. Until recently, CFSP's operational acquis has been minimal, its legal underpinning limited and tortuous, its budgetary fundament ludicrous, and its administrative practice mostly contradictory and often fraught with inter-institutional turf battles between Council, Commission and Parliament. With the launch of the first ESDP operations proper (EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Concordia in FYROM) in 2003, the forthcoming Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the possible takeover of SFOR after 2004, it has become all the more important and urgent to devise more appropriate arrangements and incentives for common action. The European Convention and the ensuing Intergovernmental Conference represent additional opportunities to be seized. In this respect, the main issues to be addressed regard: a) the speed and readiness of budgetary allocations, on the one hand, and their long-term sustainability, on the other; b) the coherence of the relevant provisions, in both institutional and functional terms, and their consistency with the peculiarities of the EU as an international actor; and c) the degree of transparency, accountability and internal fairness compatible with the imperatives of crisis management. The experience of other international organisations operating in this field (NATO, OSCE, UN) can also be taken into consideration with a view to selecting rules and modalities that may be helpful in tackling the problems highlighted here. First and foremost, it is desirable that the current fragmentation of CFSP expenditure in separate EU budgetary lines be overcome. The appointment of an EU 'Minister for Foreign Affairs' (or whatever title is given to the new foreign policy supremo) is expected to help solve this problem and reduce some inter-institutional tensions and bottlenecks. For example, it is desirable for all expenditure related to civilian crisis management (with the possible exception of the salaries of seconded national personnel) to be borne by the EU bud- get in a more transparent fashion. To this end, the relevant procedures have to be made less tortuous and more flexible. Secondly, expenditure for operations 'having military or defence implications' — in so far as it will remain distinct and separate from the rest — should be pooled in a more systematic, sustainable and explicit manner. Neither the current 'ad hocery' (as exemplified by EUPM and Concordia ) nor the minimalist approach adopted by the Convention's Praesidium (with the proposal of a subsidiary 'start-up' fund) address the essential issues. In fact, if a subsidiary budget has to be set up, then it should be more ambitious and create a long- term basis for covering all the 'common costs' arising from military operations. Such an EU Operational Fund could usefully draw upon the precedent of the European Development Fund and adopt a distinct 'key' for national contributions. Such a 'key' should take into account e.g. the member states' ability to pay but also their ability to contribute in kin through the actual involvement of personnel and equipment in EU operations. It should also be periodically adjustable and help overcome potential 'burden-sharing' disputes inside the Union by setting agreed criteria against which to measure and assess national contributions without resorting to the crude GDP scale. At the same time, the Fund's financial cycle should be the same as that of the EU budget. And, in perspective, the “common costs” thus covered should include also accommodation and transportation costs, especially if the Union develops common capabilities in the fields of strategic lift and logistics. By doing so, the EU would eventually have two main modalities for common operational expenditure at its disposal: the EU budget for all non-military aspects, and the Operational Fund. Both would guarantee a reliable financial perspective. If the separation between civilian and military aspects were ever to be bridged, their merger would not represent a problem. Thirdly, the European Parliament could consider reimbursing those member states who participate in ESDP operations a fixed somme for faitaire to cover partially the per diems of their seconded personnel (civilian as well as military). Such reimbursement could be made through the EU budget annually, ex post facto, with no political conditions attached. On the one hand, it would prove that the EU budget covers not only internal benefits (agriculture and structural funds) but also external commitments. On the other, it would add transparency to ESDP in that the Parliament could organise hearings with experts and officials as well as plenary debates. For their part, the member states would gain an additional incentive – however modest – to provide adequate human resources for external operations. Finally, participating 'third' (and especially remaining and future candidate) countries could well be associated with all these arrangements, either case by case or more systematically. And none of the proposals outlined here necessarily require treaty change, although it would be preferable to insert some 'enabling' clauses in the Constitutional Treaty. All proposals, however, would require collaboration — rather than competition — between EU institutions.
  • Topic: Economics, Government, Politics
  • Political Geography: Europe, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Democratic Republic of the Congo
  • Author: Gustav Lindström, Giovanni Gasparini
  • Publication Date: 04-2003
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: European Union Institute for Security Studies
  • Abstract: Aiming to reach operational status in 2008, the Galileo satellite system is planned to offer positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) services worldwide. It will join the ranks of the current GPS and GLONASS systems, allowing users to pinpoint their exact locations. While a civilian project, Galileo also has a security dimension. As a dual-use system, it will offer numerous applications in the security and defence field. PNT services give military planners and commanders means to manage assets, troops and munitions more effectively. Given its global coverage, Galileo will offer a large portion of these services to any interested party, thus opening the door for unintended users and uses. This has implications for the EU and its allies. Even if Galileo remains a civilian project, security issues will persist. With a growing number of users dependent on precise positioning services to carry out their daily functions, economic security would be negatively impacted should there be an intentional or accidental service shutdown. Thus, besides protecting the system from unauthorised use, it will be important to safeguard the system to ensure signal continuity at all times. Given the dual nature of the system, it is critical that European policy-makers consider the security dimensions of Galileo and take practical steps to limit its potential misuse. Among the required steps that need to be taken are: protecting the physical and electronic integrity of the system, establishing a permanent EU-US framework to handle outstanding security issues (such as the 'M-code overlay'), creating a clear chain of command for Galileo, expanding EU capacities to deal with space issues and limiting public regulated service signals (PRS) for security and defence-related purposes.
  • Topic: Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology
  • Political Geography: Europe
  • Author: Gustav Lindstrom, Burkard Schmitt
  • Publication Date: 12-2003
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: European Union Institute for Security Studies
  • Abstract: Curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is important to European policy-makers. This has been especially evident throughout 2003. On 6 June 2003, the European Union unveiled its basic principles for an 'EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD'. Among its first principles, the EU underscores that 'the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction (i.e. biological, chemical and nuclear weapons) and means of delivery such as ballistic missiles constitutes a threat to international peace and security'.
  • Topic: Security, Terrorism
  • Political Geography: Europe, Central Asia
  • Author: Dov Lynch
  • Publication Date: 12-2003
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: European Union Institute for Security Studies
  • Abstract: The South Caucasus contains three states that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Geographically, the region is populated by some fifteen million people, links the Caspian Sea basin to the Black Sea on an east-to-west axis, and is the juncture between the greater Middle East, Turkey and Iran, and the Russian Federation. This chapter will introduce a number of themes that run through this Chaillot Paper. The first part examines the nature of the 'transition' that the three South Caucasian states have undergone with a view to understanding the scale of their transformation. A second part discusses dimensions of state weakness across the region. Next, the chapter considers the impact of third parties on regional security/insecurity, and finally it outlines the structure of the volume.
  • Topic: Security, International Organization
  • Political Geography: Russia, Europe, Iran, Central Asia, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Soviet Union, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia
  • Author: Dov Lynch, Antonio Missiroli, Martin Ortega, Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, Judy Batt
  • Publication Date: 09-2003
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: European Union Institute for Security Studies
  • Abstract: This Chaillot Paper is the product of collegial reflection by the EUISS research team. As the current enlargement process moves towards its culmination with the accession of ten new member states in May 2004, its effects are already making themselves felt not only on the internal but also the external policies of the widening Union. New borders and neighbours bring new challenges while reconfiguring old ones. This new reality requires more than just additions to already existing policies. The entire neighbourhood, or proximity, policy of the enlarged EU will have to be reassessed and reformulated.
  • Topic: International Relations, International Cooperation, Politics
  • Political Geography: Europe
  • Author: Burkard Schmitt
  • Publication Date: 08-2003
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: European Union Institute for Security Studies
  • Abstract: The proposals of the Convention on the Future of Europe and the recent European Commission Communication on a Defence Equipment Policy have revived the debate about the EU's possible involvement in armaments. There is indeed a chance today that a European Agency for Armaments, Research and Capabilities will be set up and anchored in the new EU Treaty. At the same time, there is a growing consensus that the EU Commission should have certain competencies in the field of security-related research, and even the establishment of a common defence equipment market is (again) under discussion.
  • Topic: Defense Policy, Economics, Government
  • Political Geography: Europe
  • Author: Martin Ortega
  • Publication Date: 07-2003
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: European Union Institute for Security Studies
  • Abstract: In summer 2000 the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians hosted by President Clinton at Camp David raised the prospect of a peaceful resolution of the most sensitive aspects of their controversy, after almost nine years of difficult but promising exchanges following on from the Madrid Conference of November 1991. Nevertheless, Yasser Arafat's refusal to accept the terms negotiated at Camp David and the outbreak of a second intifada on 28 September 2000 led to a spiral of violence that dashed hopes for peace, leading instead to low-intensity war. Nor did the election of Ariel Sharon as Prime Minister in February 2001 make a return to the negotiating table any easier. The two parties considered that they would have more to gain from acts of violence than from negotiations and agreements. Therefore, violence in the Middle East was the continuation of diplomacy by other means. The external actors did not want, or were unable, to break this vicious circle. The most bitter regional conflict since the Second World War was thus rekindled following a phase of pacification that had appeared to be permanent. The European Union and its member states, but also the European public, viewed this negative development with great concern, because the breakdown of the peace process symbolised the end of a decade of optimism that the international community could promote peace not only in the Middle East but also in many other regions, such as southern Africa, Central America, the Balkans or South-East Asia.
  • Topic: Conflict Resolution, Peace Studies
  • Political Geography: Europe, Middle East, South Africa, Balkans, Central America, Southeast Asia
  • Author: Burkard Schmitt
  • Publication Date: 06-2003
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: European Union Institute for Security Studies
  • Abstract: To strengthen the security structure of an erstwhile enemy, and a country that hard-nosed defence analysts and military planners - think of the last two US Nuclear Posture Reviews – still view as a potential threat, is quite an unorthodox and innovative way to address one's own security concerns. Yet cooperative threat reduction (CTR) has become part and parcel of Western security policy. A considerable number of NATO and European Union (EU) member states are involved in this sort of activity, as is the EU itself, including its most genuinely European actor, the European Commission (EC).
  • Topic: International Cooperation, Weapons of Mass Destruction
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States, Europe, Soviet Union
  • Author: Dov Lynch
  • Publication Date: 05-2003
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: European Union Institute for Security Studies
  • Abstract: The crisis on Iraq has challenged key features of international relations. The United States and Britain intervened in Iraq without the specific support of the United Nations, avoiding a second resolution in February 2003 precisely because they feared coercive action would be vetoed. The UN has taken a serious blow and the parameters of international law on self-defence and the use of force are being redefined by US and British actions. The crisis has also left the transatlantic relationship in tatters, with the appearance of serious divisions in Europe and inside the European Union. France, Germany and Russia coordinated their positions against coercive actions within the UN Security Council, adopting a number of joint declarations in 2003 on how to strengthen the inspection regime. With all this, the very notion of the West as it existed in the Cold War seems under question.
  • Topic: Security, International Cooperation
  • Political Geography: Russia, America, Europe, France, Kosovo, Germany, United Nations, Syria
  • Author: Burkard Schmitt
  • Publication Date: 04-2003
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: European Union Institute for Security Studies
  • Abstract: There is a long tradition of armaments cooperation in Europe. The first cooperative programmes were launched in the 1960s, and their number increased considerably over the following decades. Projects such as Transall, Tornado, HOT, Milan and Eurofighter – to name just a few – have illustrated both the political will and the technological capability to develop and produce high-tech weapons systems jointly.
  • Topic: Defense Policy, Government, International Cooperation
  • Political Geography: Europe