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101. US Trade Policy Options for Pacific Islands States Require Washington’s Political Commitment

Author:
Marcus Noland
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The Pacific Islands have emerged as a zone of contestation in the ongoing rivalry between China and the United States. While the US has long been the dominant military power in the region, China is raising its profile through activities like port visits, military exercises, and establishing diplomatic and security ties with regional states like Kiribati and the Solomon Islands. In 2018, Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Papua New Guinea for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. President Biden was supposed to visit PNG in May 2023, in the first ever visit of a sitting US president to the Pacific Islands, but that trip was scuttled due to the debt ceiling fiasco in Washington. In the economics sphere, the US has attempted to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) together with Japan and Australia through the Blue Dot Network and the Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Trilateral to promote high-quality, transparent, and sustainable infrastructure development. The region contains considerable natural resources, and the US has been working with Pacific Island nations to promote sustainable resource management, in contrast to China’s alleged illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the Pacific. What has been missing, however, is a trade policy component to the US strategy to counterbalance China’s exploration of a free trade agreement with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:
China, North America, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

102. Sustaining Congressional Engagement with Southeast Asia

Author:
Erik Ashida
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
As a representative institution whose members can outlast presidential administrations, Congress plays a vital role in sustaining long-term US foreign policy commitments. The perception of long-term commitment is particularly important in Southeast Asia, where most states seek to maximize their strategic autonomy by balancing relations among great powers. Thus, expectations about the future behavior of great powers can significantly affect foreign policy choices. Congress speaks through the exercise of its formal powers but also in more subtle ways. Congressional actions on foreign relations operate along three channels. The first channel is support for policies initiated by the executive branch, e.g., passing appropriations, making requested statutory changes, or, at the very least, not obstructing what an administration seeks to do. The second channel is symbolic support for a relationship, such as meetings with foreign officials or public statements of support. Though these actions are generally nonbinding, they can be a more meaningful gauge of support than the first channel because legislators must seek them out and can define the terms of their engagement—something not always possible when voting on legislation. The third channel is policy advanced independently from the executive branch, such as standalone bills, conditions placed on funding, or rigorous oversight. Each of these tools is available to individual legislators, groups of legislators such as caucuses or committees, or the entire legislative branch acting collectively.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Politics, and Governance
Political Geography:
Asia, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

103. What North Korea Has Been Learning From Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Tereza Novotná
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
A year ago, in February 2022, Russia invaded its neighbor, Ukraine. Russian aggression has upended the post-war security mechanisms in Europe and made the international multilateral system, including the UN Security Council, more fragile and ineffective than ever. Even though the war in Ukraine has implications for security in Northeast Asia, many Asian nations consider it a distant issue for Europeans to solve. However, this perspective mirrors what Europe’s Asian counterparts, especially the Koreans, have faced for decades. It serves as an apt analogy for explaining the dangers of North Korea to Europe. North Korea is also watching the war closely to discern what lessons or leverage can be extracted from the unfolding conflict. This short article reflects on two lessons and three opportunities that the War in Ukraine presents to Kim Jong Un and concludes with recommendations on what the Europeans could do in the near future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Asia, and North Korea

104. Two Peripheries: The Ukraine War's Effect on North Korea-Russia Relations

Author:
Anthony V. Rinna
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Spanning the Eurasian landmass, Russia’s actions in adjacent Ukraine invariably affect the geopolitical state of play on the similarly adjacent Korean Peninsula. Although ties between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Russia have been of largely secondary importance for both countries since their veritable rupture in the early- and mid-1990s, Moscow-Pyongyang relations became more mutually beneficial in 2022. Whereas most countries have outright condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or taken up an ambiguous position, the DPRK has been vocal in its support for Russia. From the DPRK perspective, the Kremlin’s post-2022 diplomatic and economic estrangement from much of the world has provided Pyongyang with an opening to leverage ties with Russia to push for an easing of its own diplomatic and economic isolation. Meanwhile, strengthening its DPRK ties allows Russia to undermine US influence on its Asian periphery. In supporting Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, North Korea appears to be aiming toward obtaining economic benefits from closer ties with Russia, a country whose economy has managed to stay afloat despite heavy Western sanctions. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has provided the impetus for Pyongyang’s outreach to Moscow. However, the roots of the current upswing in Moscow-Pyongyang relations go back to the April 2019 summit between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin. Kim received an invitation to meet with Putin in May 2018 yet waited eleven months to meet with the Russian leader, even as Kim regularly met with the leaders of other major players on the Korean Peninsula. Kim may have decided after the February 2019 Hanoi summit yielded few results that strengthening ties with Russia, which was more reluctant than China to support UN sanctions against Pyongyang in 2017, was a more viable option for sanctions relief. Aside from the fact that Russia has demonstrated a clear unwillingness to impose new sanctions against the DPRK, North Korean citizens are reported to still be working in Russia in contravention of UN Resolution 2397. North Korean workers’ earnings are said to have suffered because of Russia’s reduced access to hard currency. Yet, the ruble’s continued resilience may mean that earning currency in Russia is still worthwhile for laborers dispatched at Pyongyang’s behest.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, and North Korea

105. United Kingdom Engagement with North Korea

Author:
Alastair Morgan
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
As one of the Allied Powers, The United Kingdom was involved in Post-World War II planning for the Korean peninsula, including the November 1943 Cairo Conference declaration that “… in due course, Korea shall become free and independent.” However, US President Roosevelt’s proposal at the February 1945 Yalta Conference did not establish a formal role for the UK in the trusteeship of Korea. Subsequently, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to divide the peninsula at the 38th parallel in August 1945, and direct British involvement in the peninsula was limited prior to the Korean War. The United Kingdom’s Korean War contribution to the United Nations Command was second only to the United States, with significant deployments of maritime and air assets in addition to the provision of ground troops. Almost 60,000 British troops saw action, with nearly 5,000 killed, wounded, missing in action, or taken prisoner. Following the armistice, the United Kingdom has continued to send representation to the United Nations Command. The armistice agreement includes an obligation on so-called “Sending States” to respond to renewed hostility. Although there is no automatic UK commitment to send forces, the armistice agreement remains a consideration in engagement with North Korea.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, Education, Politics, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

106. North Korea-Germany Relations: An Ambassador's Perspective of Diplomacy with Pyongyang

Author:
Armin Schäfer
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Germany established diplomatic relations with North Korea, also known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), in 2001 at the request of the South Korean government, which hoped that Germany and the European Union (EU) would play a more active role in supporting the “Sunshine Policy.” Since then, Germany, together with the other EU states, has sought to moderate North Korea through a “Policy of Critical Engagement” to convince it of the benefits of international cooperation, respect for the rule of law, and improving the political and economic situation of its people. In doing so, Germany could build on the long relationship between North Korea and the former East Germany. “Critical engagement” means being willing to talk and get involved, but without holding back on criticism—and, if need be, imposing sanctions. It also implies that comprehensive engagement is not (yet) possible because of the circumstances. There is ample cause for a constrained approach from North Korea’s aggressive foreign policy and systematic human rights violations to the absence of suitable economic and fiscal conditions for business and development cooperation. Moreover, the lack of will on the part of considerable segments of the North Korean regime to engage with other countries also hampers broader engagement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Education, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, North Korea, and Germany

107. North Korea-Guyana Relations in the Burnham Era

Author:
Moe Taylor
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
During the reign of Forbes Burnham (1923-85), the South American republic of Guyana (formerly British Guiana) became one of North Korea’s greatest foreign policy success stories. Pyongyang not only acquired a new trading partner in the Americas but also gained a vocal advocate for its position on Korean unification on the international stage. These close ties grew in large part from Burnham’s admiration for North Korea, where he saw a highly disciplined citizenry united around the Great Leader, willing to work hard and sacrifice for the collective good. Guyana perhaps did more than any other single actor to help North Korea become viewed as an economic model for developing countries. First elected Premier of the colony of British Guiana in 1964, Burnham became Prime Minister upon independence in 1966 and ruled until his death in 1985. A lawyer and trade unionist from the capital’s Afro-Guyanese middle class, his rise to power was backed by the United States, which viewed him as the only realistic alternative to the communists. While Burnham veered to the Left once in power and frequently irritated Washington, he was more or less tolerated because his pro-Soviet opposition would almost certainly fill his absence.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, South America, and Guyana

108. Ending Counterproductive U.S. Involvement in Yemen

Author:
Annelle Sheline
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
• The Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis maintain a de facto truce; however, should the Saudis choose to begin dropping bombs again, they would do so with the assistance of the United States. • Washington should use the current lull in fighting to withdraw support for military actions by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. • If the Biden administration fails to withdraw, Congress should pass a War Powers Resolution ending U.S. involvement in the conflict. In the absence of a War Powers Resolution, Saudi Arabia or the UAE could drag the United States into deeper involvement in the war. • The Biden administration justifies its opposition to a War Powers Resolution on the basis of its support for negotiations. However, evidence indicates that the longevity of the de facto truce reflects a mutually painful stalemate rather than American diplomacy. • To protect current and future negotiations, the Biden administration should address the threat import restrictions pose to diplomacy. Congress should request information as to why, after the United States arranged to rehabilitate Hodeidah port, almost no containerized goods, including medical equipment and supplies, have been permitted through the port. • Foreign intervention in the war has failed to undermine the Houthis militarily and instead has strengthened their legitimating narrative.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, War, Military Intervention, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

109. The Ukraine War & European Security: How Durable Is America’s Strategy?

Author:
Zachary Paikin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
More than a year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the morale of the United States and its Western allies appears high.1 Spurred into action by Moscow’s act of aggression, NATO appears more united, the EU has seemingly become more of a geopolitical actor, and Ukraine has resisted and repulsed the Russian onslaught to a degree that few initially thought possible. The Biden administration has thus far laudably managed to ramp up assistance to Kyiv without directly confronting Moscow. However, while the current U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine may be sustainable for some time, that does not mean it will never run out of road. Sanctions against Russia — a major global economy — have been ramped up to a level previously unseen, but they have not been effective in compelling Moscow to change course. The United States and its allies have yet to agree on what they deem to be an acceptable endgame to the war. Great power or not, Russia will remain a populous, powerful and potentially disruptive actor in Europe. Without clearly and credibly proposing policies that can lower the temperature, and without beginning to envisage what a future European security order might look like, the United States risks prolonging the conflict — with potentially unforeseeable consequences if popular war–weariness continues to grow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, Strategy, Military Aid, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

110. Paths to a Ceasefire in Ukraine: America Must Take the Lead

Author:
Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Barring an improbable complete victory for Ukraine or Russia, the conflict in Ukraine will end, or more likely be suspended, in the form of a compromise. The fighting is therefore now essentially about the geographical and political lines along which this compromise will be drawn. These will become much clearer once the results of the forthcoming Ukrainian counter–offensive are known, and the aftermath of the offensive will be the time for an intensive diplomatic effort to bring about a ceasefire. Ideally, this compromise should take the form of a peace settlement like Northern Ireland’s in 1999, that would end the war and allow the creation of a stable, consensual and peaceful security order in Europe. More likely, however, is a ceasefire that (as in the cases of Kashmir, Korea, and Cyprus) will freeze the existing battle–line, wherever that runs. Such a ceasefire will in any case be necessary if talks aimed at a formal peace settlement are to take place; and even if such a treaty cannot be reached, such a ceasefire, if far from ideal, might still prove reasonably stable and permanent. Both the U.S. and Ukrainian administrations stated after it began that the war would inevitably end in a negotiated peace. In the first month of the war President Volodymyr Zelensky put forward peace proposals that included suspending the issues of Crimea and the eastern Donbas for future negotiation. Since then, however, both Ukraine and Russia have adopted positions that make any agreement between them exceptionally difficult. Given these circumstances, the United States must play the greatest role in achieving a ceasefire.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Engagement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

111. Defense Contractor Funded Think Tanks Dominate Ukraine Debate

Author:
Ben Freeman
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Think tanks in the United States are a go–to resource for media outlets seeking expert opinions on pressing public policy issues. But think tanks often have entrenched stances; a growing body of research has shown that their funders can influence their analysis and commentary. This influence can include censorship — both self-censorship and more direct censoring of work unfavorable to a funder — and outright pay–for–research agreements with funders. The result is an environment where the interests of the most generous funders can dominate think tank policy debates. One such debate concerns the appropriate level of U.S. military involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since Vladimir Putin’s illegal and disastrous decision to launch a full–scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States has approved approximately $48.7 billion in military spending.1 Despite the very real risk that escalations could lead to direct U.S. military involvement in the war, few think tanks have critically scrutinized this record setting amount of U.S. military assistance. Within the context of public debate about U.S. military involvement in the Ukraine war, this brief investigates Department of Defense (DoD) and DoD contractor funding of think tanks, those organizations advocacy efforts for policies that would benefit those funders, and the media’s predominant reliance on think tanks funded by the defense sector. The analysis finds that the vast majority of media mentions of think tanks in articles about U.S. arms and the Ukraine war are from think tanks whose funders profit from U.S. military spending, arms sales and, in many cases, directly from U.S. involvement in the Ukraine war. These think tanks also regularly offer support for public policy solutions that would financially benefit their funders without disclosing these apparent conflicts of interest. While this brief did not seek to establish a direct causality between think–tank policy recommendations and their arms industry funding in the case of the Ukraine war, we find a clear correlation between the two. We also found that media outlets disproportionately rely on commentary from defense sector funded think tanks.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Think Tanks, Russia-Ukraine War, and Military-Industrial Complex
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

112. Ethnic Divisions and Ensuring Stability in Kazakhstan: A Guide for U.S. Policy

Author:
Suzanne Loftus
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
This brief assesses ethnic divisions in Kazakhstan, analyzes the potential risks of ethnic and geopolitical tension and makes recommendations for U.S. policy. Kazakhstan’s current approach to managing its internal divides and overall stability is assessed and drivers of potential risk are evaluated. Due to renewed cold war tensions with China and Russia, the United States must resist any temptation to become involved in Kazakhstan’s internal politics and refrain from any efforts to sway Kazakhstan to ally itself with the West. This would only cause internal instability and hostile relations with its neighbors, Russia and China. Given Kazakhstan’s potential for domestic strife, U.S. interests are best served by a restrained approach to the country that better preserves its internal and external stability. Kazakhstan’s vast land mass and sparse population leave the country vulnerable to potential external threats. Kazakhstan borders Russia and China, its strongest security and economic partners respectively. These two powers are very close while the United States is far and consequently plays a relatively minor role in the country. The United States can and should, however, engage economically with Kazakhstan to support its development.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political stability, Ethnicity, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and United States of America

113. Normalizing U.S.–Pakistan Relations

Author:
Adam Weinstein
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The U.S.–Pakistan relationship is often portrayed negatively among the lawmakers, media, and general public of both countries, with a focus on mutual resentment and dysfunction. The early relationship was burdened by mismatched expectations regarding support in conflicts with India. Different priorities from the start of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan during the 1980s further strained the relationship. The United States also sanctioned Pakistan and India for developing nuclear weapons, which had a disparate impact on Pakistan, causing ongoing tension. Many in Washington’s policy and journalistic communities hold negative views of Pakistan, viewing it as an enabler of terrorism that seeks geopolitical rents but rarely delivers. Pakistanis often resent what they view as Washington’s use of the country as a “frontline state” in both the Cold War and the War on Terror, claiming tens of thousands of lives, only to discard it later. These grievances are largely dismissed in Washington as self–inflicted. Despite the negative public debate, serving officials in both governments generally hold a more nuanced view, recognizing the broad overlapping interests shared by the United States and Pakistan in areas like climate change, trade, and counterterrorism. There is already an exhaustive literature on terrorism in Pakistan, nuclear security, and potential conflicts along the Line of Control with India. This brief will instead focus on revitalizing U.S.–Pakistan relations through innovative diplomacy in areas that have received less attention, such as trade, regional integration, people–to–people connections, and climate change. Its principal recommendation is that Washington should resist viewing Pakistan through the narrow lens of the “War on Terror” or great power competition. Instead it should pursue its interests through more normalized relations, while recognizing U.S. limitations in influencing events in Pakistan or the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Counter-terrorism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

114. Winning the Majority: A New U.S. Bargain with the Global South

Author:
Sarang Shidore
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The ongoing Ukraine war has exposed the waning influence of the United States in the vast arc of the world stretching from Latin America to Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands known as the Global South. Most Global South states, while opposed to the Russian invasion, have not backed the United States on its strategies of sanctioning Russia or seeking a defeat of Moscow. Some have explicitly criticized what they see as Washington’s double standards. Despite the region’s great diversity and heterogeneity, a new nonalignment is emerging in the Global South. However, it is not the same as its previous version (of the Non-Aligned Movement) in important respects — being much less institutionalized, less ideological, and based more on national interests. This makes it more durable and harder to counter through tools that the United States has traditionally employed. The United States cannot succeed in a world where power is increasingly diffuse without strong ties to the Global South. It is the region where the majority of humanity lives. It contains sites of crucial natural resources, supply chains, major markets, and increasing innovation. It is an essential partner to solve the climate challenge. Its states are wealthier and more assertive when it comes to their interests and resources. Over the past two decades, most have built deep economic ties with China, and continue to value ties with Russia. In general, the states of the Global South wish to leverage all of their international relationships for their own benefit and not take sides in or support a new cold war between the great powers. Most are unconvinced or alienated by Washington’s rhetoric of “democracy v. autocracy” and the “rules–based order.” They feel particularly threatened by U.S. policies of secondary sanctions designed to limit or end their ties with U.S. rivals. But the current U.S. strategy is inadvertently pushing the Global South toward Beijing and Moscow. This is an unforced error Washington can ill afford.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Interests, Russia-Ukraine War, and Nonalignment
Political Geography:
United States of America and Global South

115. Competition Versus Exclusion in U.S.–China Relations: A Choice Between Stability and Conflict

Author:
Jake Werner
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The Biden administration’s China policy is pulling in two different directions, but the tension is not widely recognized because every antagonistic measure aimed at China is filed under the heading of competition. As a result, Washington’s debate on China loses the crucial distinction between “competition” — a kind of connection with the potential to be carried on in healthy ways — and “exclusion,” an attempt to sever connection that necessarily leads to conflict if the domain is significant. Biden’s exclusion policies focus on cutting China out of the principal growth sectors in the global economy and the most lucrative and strategically important markets. Administration officials think their approach is sensible and moderate compared to more extreme voices in Washington calling for exclusion in all realms. Even so, the Biden approach is highly destabilizing because both countries consider the targeted areas vital to the future of global authority and economic prosperity, and because the attempt to trap China in a position of permanent subordination represents a serious threat to the legitimacy of China’s leaders. Healthy competition requires a shared stake in the future. In earlier periods, despite sharp tensions and mutual suspicions suffusing the relationship, U.S.–China ties were stabilized first by the joint project of containing Soviet power and then by a shared commitment to market–led globalization. Now that leaders on both sides are disenchanted with key facets of globalization, the two countries are caught in an escalatory cycle of exclusion and retaliation that risks hardening zero–sum pressures in the global system into a permanent structure of hostility. In such a scenario, each country would organize its own society and international partners to undermine the other, dramatically increasing the likelihood of violent conflict. The warning signs are already clear on both sides, as each increasingly interprets every action on the other side as part of a conspiracy to achieve domination. Notwithstanding widespread complacency about the risks of conflict after a tentative diplomatic opening in recent months, the rise of securitized thinking in both countries is steadily building institutional and ideological momentum for confrontation that can only be broken by a new and inclusive direction for the relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Political stability, Conflict, Strategic Competition, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

116. Common Good Diplomacy: A Framework for Stable U.S.–China Relations

Author:
Jake Werner
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
One curious feature of the emerging U.S.–China conflict is that each side claims to be defending the existing international order against the threat the other poses to it. Hidden beneath this seemingly irreconcilable dispute is a crucial truth: both the United States and China are status quo powers, sharing a deep interest in a stable global security environment and an open global economy. At the same time, both countries are pursuing urgently needed reforms to a global system increasingly defined by zero–sum pressures. Yet both are prone to exclusionary impulses that threaten to ruin the possibility of a shared reform agenda and instead throw the world into conflict. Working with China to revitalize the international order would not only prevent such a conflict, it would also establish the conditions for healthy forms of both competition and cooperation in the U.S.–China relationship. But how can U.S. leaders pursue such a project without simply giving a pass to China’s sometimes undesirable behavior? The focus should be diplomacy to frame an inclusive global system, focusing on actions that would reduce zero–sum constraints. In the three key realms of global authority and security, the global economy, and climate change, China is currently engaged in counterproductive moves that exacerbate existing tensions but is also pursuing promising reforms that could expand the scope for positive–sum outcomes. Rather than seeking to counter every Chinese initiative, U.S. leaders should carefully distinguish between beneficial and damaging outcomes, affirming and building on China’s constructive proposals and managing differences through negotiation rather than polemics and confrontation. Some potentially fruitful areas for cooperation include joint action to limit climate change, development in the Global South, revising the global guidelines for economic statecraft, and reforming international institutions to create a more open and inclusive world order. Pursuing cooperative efforts in such areas would both create direct benefits and improve U.S. credibility as a responsible leader of the world order rather than simply a rival of China. It would also open space to pursue competition within a rules–based order rather than risk a slide into destructive zero–sum conflict.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Political stability, and International Order
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

117. Deciphering Erdoğan's Regional Paradigm Shifts

Author:
Ofra Bengio
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In our latest issue of Turkeyscope, Professor Ofra Bengio analyses the trajectory of Turkish foreign and domestic policies by examining three paradigms in Erdogan's strategy since the early 2000s. In addition, we offer our sincere condolences to the victims of the earthquake last week.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Weapons, Arab Spring, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, and Middle East

118. Less is More: A New Strategy for US Security Assistance to Africa

Author:
Elizabeth Shackelford, Ethan Kessler, and Emma Sanderson
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
The US strategy toward Africa today is neither effective nor sustainable. It’s time to flip the script. US policy in Africa has for too long prioritized short-term security to the detriment of long-term stability by prioritizing the provision of military and security assistance. This is done in hopes that partner countries will use this capacity to suppress radical groups at home and reduce the likelihood that they will spread disorder in the region or create threats to US interests at home and abroad. Yet, this strategy has neither produced security in Africa nor reduced threats to the United States and its interests. Washington should rein in its use of security assistance with partners that fail to demonstrate commitment to the reforms necessary to build long-term stability. Partnerships and military assistance with illiberal, undemocratic countries have delivered little, if any, sustainable security improvements, and in many cases have prompted further instability and violence by building the capacity of abusive security forces. They have also provided harmful associations between the US government and the abuses committed by those we arm and assist. Since terrorism in Africa poses a low threat to US national security interests, there is no justification for focusing on short-term security issues at the cost of good governance, rule of law, and other factors that contribute to long-term stability. The costs of doing so are increasingly being recognized, with Congress today more likely to apply existing legal provisions to end security cooperation with abusive regimes. But these interventions typically come too late and are too inconsistent to influence behavior of illiberal regimes. A more systemic approach is needed to break the pattern of poor outcomes. The rise of great-power competition exacerbates the risk that the US national security establishment will double down on its security cooperation strategy in the region out of concern that doing otherwise would leave a vacuum that America’s competitors might fill. In reality, however, the argument for being more selective in distributing security assistance is even stronger with the return of great-power competition, as values and reputation become increasingly important in attracting support for the United States over other great powers. Security and military assistance will continue to play a role in the region. However, the United States would be better off being more deliberate and cautious, only pursuing it after completing a holistic assessment of the potential impact of such assistance on governance, human rights, and broader stability. Security assistance can and must be more closely scrutinized with enhanced US government oversight tools to ensure it does not undermine governance and stability, and Washington should be more willing to choose different tools when shaping relationships with weak partners, to condition assistance to ensure it does not facilitate bad outcomes, and to cut it off when partner countries use it to abuse civilians.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military Aid
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, and United States of America

119. The Quad's Next Chapter

Author:
Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Advancing the group's pillars of prosperity and development will be at the very heart of competition with China in the coming decade. The Quad—the country grouping including the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—now stands at a crossroads as it enters its third phase. The Quad 3.0 comes as the grouping has established the dialogue as a meeting place for leaders of the four countries but must now decide what shape competition with China will take and how to best address that competition. Thus far the Quad has struggled to find function for its form. Statements issued by Quad leaders stress the importance of “development, stability, and prosperity” in an effort to roll back China’s influence across the Indo-Pacific. However, its most high-profile activities focus on stability via high-profile military exercises. Closer internal coordination along the security axis serves to highlight the lack of visible progress on the external delivery of development and prosperity to countries outside the Quad. Efforts to deliver development and prosperity are hemmed in by the Quad itself. Neither the United States or India are party to either of the major regional trade agreements—the CPTPP and RCEP. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), held up by the Biden administration as America’s economic engagement with Asia, remains a mirage. Meanwhile, as the United States de-risks its economic relationship with China, it is effectively warning that doing business with Beijing may come at a cost to relations with Washington—an unpopular message across much of the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, any hint of security cooperation with China by smaller countries in the region creates a flurry of diplomatic reaction from the United States. To move forward, the Quad needs to better balance its portfolio and how it messages that portfolio. The overt promotion of the security agenda is actively undermining perceptions of the Quad’s ability to engage on development and prosperity. A first corrective step is to balance the group’s internal goal of improved security coordination and cohesion with the Quad’s external goal of delivering development and prosperity to countries in the region. Committing to an agenda that brings the people of the region, not its seas, to the fore of the Quad mission should be a top priority. This means rejecting the dogma that every China initiative in the region needs a Quad alternative. Instead, advancing Quad goals requires identifying China’s activities that can be co-opted for Quad purposes. This will mean working around, and sometimes with, China’s initiatives to better serve not only the Quad’s goals in prosperity and development but also the people of the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Geopolitics, Trade, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, South Asia, India, East Asia, Australia, North America, United States of America, and Oceania

120. Incivility in Diplomacy as a Reflection of the Crisis in Foreign Policy Culture

Author:
V. Chumakov
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
The 2020s have been characterized by a profound crisis of confidence in international relations and world politics manifested in the use of political, psychological, and rhetorical methods and techniques that are atypical of traditional diplomatic practices and do not correspond to generally recognized norms of diplomatic protocol. Such manifestations include, for example, the use of unverified information and disinformation, the dissemination of deliberately false information (“fake news”), the unilateral disclosure of confidential face-to-face or telephone conversations to the media, and the publication of diplomatic correspondence not only as an unofficial translation but also as direct copies of informational documents (notes, letters, telegrams, and attachments to them). We also see the use of undiplomatic expressions (accusations, insults, namecalling, threats, blackmail, jokes) against counterpart or senior foreign or international officials, albeit primarily behind their backs, as well personal correspondence between such individuals on publicly available electronic mail services, instant messengers, and social networks.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, European Union, OSCE, New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

121. FACTORS IN CONSTRUCTING INDONESIA’S PERSPECTIVES ON THE INDO-PACIFIC

Author:
Mohd. Agoes Aufiya
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
The term “Indo-Pacific” became increasingly significant and was accepted by several countries, including Indonesia. The government welcomed the term as part of its foreign policy projection, which developed its unique perspective or interpretation, including inclusivity, a rule based on international law, and ASEAN’s centrality and cooperation for regional growth. This study would answer the question of how the concept of Indo-Pacific will be interpreted within Indonesia's unique context compared to other countries. Thus, this research aimed to describe several key factors in constructing the Indonesian perspective on the Indo-Pacific concept, particularly under President Jokowi’s leadership. This research applied qualitative with library methods from the primary and secondary data sources. This paper argued six factors that constructed Indonesia’s perspective on Indo-Pacific: maritime historical legacy; the “Bebas-Aktif” principle; ASEAN values; geographical position; and democratic values. The research concluded that Indonesia is one of the major countries that consistently championed the term “Indo-Pacific” within the regional and international spheres, with a “moderate” status in terms of its foreign policy implementation, which is mainly characterized by inclusivity and cooperation in the economy by constructively engaging all countries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Economy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and Indo-Pacific

122. MILITARY SANCTIONS: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE CASE OF UZBEKISTAN

Author:
Jonathan Honig
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
States frequently find themselves disbursing or receiving military aid, cooperation, and access to military products. Using foreign policy options like "military sanctions" (the suspension of military projects, aid, cooperation, and access) is a desirable, widely publicized way for one state to express its discontent to another while presumably influencing desired policy changes in the client state. However, the small amount of evidence on military sanctions indicates that they are ineffective, short-lived, and may even be counterproductive. This analysis attempted to elucidate this subject by advancing a theory stating that states will impose military sanctions in response to domestic audience pressures shortly after high-profile examples of undesirable behavior by client states. However, military sanctions will be eased as time progresses and public attention has waned. This analysis qualitatively examined Uzbekistan and its relationship with the US, finding support for this theory. It concluded that following high-profile incidents and periods of undesirable behavior by an aid-recipient state, military sanctions would likely be employed by the state providing the military aid and programs. Further, military sanctions are eased or scrapped as time moves from public incidents and attention involving human rights abuses.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Conflict, War on Terror, and Military
Political Geography:
Central Asia and Uzbekistan

123. HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY STRATEGY FOR SYRIAN REFUGEES AND ITS EFFECT ON JORDAN’S FOREIGN POLICY

Author:
Emad Ayasreh
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
This research examined the effect of Jordan’s humanitarian diplomacy strategy for Syrian refugees on its foreign policy and attempted to determine whether the strategy is financially sustainable. Humanitarian diplomacy is persuading decision-makers and leaders worldwide to act at all times and in all circumstances in the best interest of vulnerable populations by completely respecting fundamental humanitarian principles. Jordan has allowed many Syrian refugees to cross over and settle in Jordan. This study used a qualitative systematic literature review and quantitative data from the UNHCR to determine the effect of the strategy on Jordan’s foreign policy and whether the strategy could be sustained. The findings showed that Jordan’s stature in terms of its foreign policy has grown, leading to bilateral agreements and participation in international negotiations. However, its humanitarian strategy may not be sustainable with the current level of funding. The funding from foreign countries and international organizations has been insufficient to support the growing number of Syrian refugees in Jordan. The literature on this topic is limited, and comprehensive quantitative research is recommended to determine the future effect of the strategy on health care and education for Syrian refugees in Jordan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Humanitarian Aid, Refugees, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and Jordan

124. INDIA@75: ASSESSING INDIA’S USE OF SOFT POWER AS A FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENT

Author:
Mohammad Reyaz
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
The term soft power has become a catch-all-phrase for public and cultural diplomacy since Joseph Nye introduced it in 1990. India has had several historical and cultural advantages regarding its influence in foreign countries. While India and Indians enjoyed goodwill in most countries, the sudden interests in India among the policymakers, businesses, and politicians were mainly after the 1992 economic liberalization that had opened the Indian markets to foreign investments. Besides the nation-branding exercises globally, New Delhi employed soft power instruments in countries it deemed to have more significant interests, from traditional allies like Bhutan and Afghanistan to the countries in the West in the last three decades. Nevertheless, how successful has India been in exploiting its cultural linkages and using its soft power in its branding? This question becomes pertinent as, in recent years, India has often received negative press coverage in international media, and on several freedom/democratic indices, its rankings have gone down. As India celebrates 75 years of independence as Azadi ka Mahotsav (a grand celebration of independence), this paper assesses the scope of its soft power as a foreign policy instrument, points out its shortcomings, and recommends the possibilities.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Soft Power, Cultural Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, and Bollywood
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

125. WHAT DOES “BIG DATA” TELL? A NETWORK ANALYSIS APPROACH TO THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY’S ROLE PERFORMANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST BETWEEN 2015 AND 2020

Author:
Hikmet Menguaslan and Sadullah Celik
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
In this paper, we exploited big data (The Global Database Events, Language and Tone - GDELT) by utilizing network analysis to elaborate on the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) Middle East (ME) policy for 2015 and 2020 - our conceptual framework built on the role theory. We identified two dynamics - the positioning of the “Transatlantic” link in Turkish Foreign Policy’s (TFP) orientation and the shape and politics of the JDP elites’ conception of activism - based on which we developed two hypotheses to conceptualize the JDP’s role performance for the period: 1) There was a mismatch between national role conceptions and systemic role prescriptions for Turkey in the period of analysis; 2) This mismatch led the appeal of partnership with non-Western actors to rise. We utilized network analysis by exploiting the GDELT big data set to test our hypotheses empirically. The empirical findings proved the validity of our conceptual arguments.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Political Science, and AKP
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

126. CHINA-INDIA COUNTERBALANCING MEASURES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL CORRIDORS AND PORTS: THE FOCUS ON CHABAHAR AND GWADAR PORTS

Author:
Kashif Hasan Khan and Ali Omidi
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
Beijing and New Delhi, as new world emerging powers, despite border skirmishes, have not considered themselves arch-rivals. Still, the necessities of real politics have forced India to take counter-measures towards China’s grand connectivity strategy in the framework of BRI and the Maritime Silk Road. This article assumes that China’s grand connectivity strategy has not targeted India in particular, but unavoidably it has affected India’s strategic interests in the Indian Ocean and Eurasia. In a qualitative and case study methodology, this research explains China’s grand connectivity strategy and how it affects Indian strategic interests. It also elaborates on India’s counter-measures vis-à-vis China policy. It concluded that the Chinese connectivity strategy has affected Indian strategic interests in the Indian Ocean and Eurasia. Therefore, Chabahar, Gwadar ports, and Malacca Strait are centers of gravity in these great connectivity rivalries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Silk Road, Port, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China and India

127. OVERLAPPING COMMUNICATION LOGIC FOR GLOBALIZING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: THE CASE OF JORDAN

Author:
Emad Ayasreh
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
This paper explored how Jordan used overlapping communication logic to enhance its global public diplomacy. Few studies have examined Jordan’s public diplomacy, so this research presents vital information about Jordan’s diplomacy nationally, regionally, and internationally. Because of the dynamic cultures, values, and norms brought about by globalization, nations need to use effective communication strategies to promote public diplomacy. In this case, the public referred to both the domestic and foreign public. The three main communication logics explored were individual, relational, and holistic logic. The research adopted a qualitative systematic literature review, and a sample of ten articles was obtained from Google Scholar and Z-Library. The study found that Jordan has used overlapping communication logic to enhance its public diplomacy domestically, in the Middle East, and globally on different occasions. The limitation of this research was its small sample size. Comprehensive quantitative analysis research is recommended to learn how satisfied Jordanians are with their country’s public diplomacy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Communications, and Public Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Middle East and Jordan

128. THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY ON THAILAND’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

Author:
Sanyarat Meesuwan
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
This study uses the theory of collective memory in international politics to examine the connection between collective memory and foreign policy to investigate why the Belt and Road Initiative has witnessed slow progress in Thailand. Qualitative data were gathered from various sources, including books, newspapers, journals, policy documents, and textbooks. The study concludes that cooperation between states is essential for achieving shared objectives but is contingent upon establishing mutual trust. Collective memories that one country maintains concerning another country can influence mutual understanding and trust, becoming ingrained even if the situation responsible for the memories changes or no longer exists. In the case of Thailand and China, the Thai government’s push for the high-speed rail project faced criticism and concerns due to the public’s deep-seated fears and distrust of China, the result of historical events and past experiences. This paper’s findings highlight the state’s role in creating collective memory and otherness, recognizing that external variables such as major power activities play a significant role.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Collective Memory
Political Geography:
China, Thailand, and Southeast Asia

129. A New Horizon in U.S. Trade Policy: Key Developments and Questions for the Biden Administration

Author:
Trevor Sutton and Mike Williams
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
This issue brief examines some of the key trade initiatives pursued by the Biden administration to date. It then sets out key questions facing U.S. trade policy in a global environment defined by volatility and renewed ambition to tackle the great challenges of the 21st century, such as climate change, inequality, and great power competition.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Inequality, Economy, Trade Policy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific, United States of America, and Americas

130. Who is to suffer? Quantifying the impact of sanctions on German firms

Author:
Holger Görg, Anna Jacobs, and Saskia Meuchelbock
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
In this paper, we use a novel firm level dataset for Germany to investigate the effect of sanctions on export behaviour and performance of German firms. More specifically, we study the sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia in 2014 in response to the annexation of Crimea and Russia's countermeasures. We find a substantial negative effect on both the extensive and intensive margin of German exports. While the negative effects are strongest for firms exporting products subject to trade restrictions, we provide further evidence on the indirect effects of sanctions. Analysing the impact on broader measures of firm performance, we document that the cost of sanctions is heterogeneous across firms but overall modest. Our results reveal that the negative impact of the shock was concentrated primarily among a small number of firms that were highly dependent on Russia as an export market and those directly affected by the sanctions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Russia-Ukraine War, and Firm Dynamics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Germany

131. A post-Western global order in the making? Foreign policy goals of India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa

Author:
Sinikukka Saari, Toni Alaranta, Bart Gaens, Katariina Mustasilta, and Lauri Tahtinen
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa are striving for a more multipolar, post-Western world order in which they would not be seen merely as auxiliary powers to the bigger players, but as independent great powers. For them, a key foreign policy goal is to transform global governance institutions. They all call for a permanent seat for their country on the UN Security Council. To achieve that, the states need backing from more than the Western states – and this logically strengthens the multi-aligned logic of their foreign policies. India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa see Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and the Western countermeasures from their own perspective. They describe Russia’s invasion as a violation of international law, but see the war primarily as a Western concern, not theirs. Although these states are critical towards the West, they are not anti-Western and they all value multilateral institutions; their foreign policy goals and features offer opportunities for the EU to engage with them, but that needs to happen on a more equal footing than what has traditionally been the case.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, UN Security Council, Multipolarity, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Turkey, India, Asia, Brazil, and Latin America

132. The role of space technologies in power politics: Mitigating strategic dependencies through space resilience

Author:
Markus Holmgren
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Space activity is experiencing a boom with the scope and importance of space technologies and services fuelling rapid growth upon growth. While the space boom is catalysing transferral of the ownership of previously public infrastructure and capabilities to corporate control, many space technologies have critically important military and civilian applications. As the importance of space sectors grows, both public and private cyberoperations targeting space infrastructure proliferate. This makes it more difficult to attribute the perpetrators of cyber operations. The United States’ lead in the space sector is increasing. Starlink, a satellite internet constellation operated by the US-based company SpaceX, will serve to bind many nations to one more US-controlled communication architecture. As a result of the implications of space technologies for comprehensive security, building space resilience is becoming paramount. States must diversify their supply of space-related services and tighten cooperation with like-minded states.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economic Policy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

133. New Frontiers: Estonia’s Foreign Policy in Africa

Author:
Kristin Adeoti
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Estonia’s renewed foreign policy engagement in Africa holds a historical foundation proving that the country’s approach to diplomacy is a gradual development and a work in progress. In recent years, Estonia has taken several strategic steps to enhance its ties with African nations across the realms of diplomacy, security, economic relations, business partnerships, development cooperation, and humanitarian aid – and has already had some success stories. This drive reflects both an ambition and a commitment to building stronger bonds between Estonia and Africa. To strengthen ties with African states, Estonia must commit to continuous engagement on the levels of government, businesses, and people-to-people cooperation, while acknowledging the current challenges and limitations. Such a comprehensive approach – albeit a demanding endeavour involving multiple stakeholders – would foster mutual trust, forming the basis for genuine partnerships and sustainable progress. Today, it is of essence to recognise the immense potential that this relationship promises. Demographic growth, rapid economic development, and expanding IT markets on the continent boost its global influence. As Africa gains more weight in international affairs, Estonia can engage in a mutually beneficial exchange. Africa’s prospective influence and Estonia’s existing expertise lay the foundation for a partnership that will fuel innovation and drive progress.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economics
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and Estonia

134. Turkey’s New Foreign Policy: Ankara’s Ambitions, Regional Responses, and Implications for the United States

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
For the past century, Turkey’s foreign policy has been driven by the need to preserve the achievements of the Lausanne Treaty in the face of often serious threats from major powers. As a result, Turkey was a predominantly status quo country, and its relations with neighboring states were largely shaped by its place in broader geopolitical struggles. With the end of the Cold War, however, and the subsequent growth of Turkey’s economic, military and diplomatic strength, this has changed. Turkish foreign policy has begun to focus on reshaping the regional order in accordance with its growing desire for influence. Going forward, the nature of Ankara’s efforts, and the response they provoke from Turkey’s neighbors, will be an increasingly crucial factor in determining Turkey’s relations with the United States and Europe. Turkey’s new dynamics will remain a source of tension under any future Turkish government, but they need not, if managed well by all sides, lead to a lasting rift between Turkey and the West. The more deeply embroiled Turkey becomes in disputes with key US allies from Western Europe to the Persian Gulf, the more difficult it will be for Washington and Ankara to have a cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship. And the more Turkey views itself as a revisionist power, the more it will come into conflict with America’s allies. As a result, it is more important than ever for US policymakers to understand the historic trajectory of Turkey’s place in its region. Turkey emerged from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as a status quo power, an orientation that it maintained for the better part of the last hundred years. Though the new country had been shorn of its former territories in Southeastern Europe and the Middle East, it had also forcefully defeated foreign efforts to occupy the territory of Anatolia itself. For modern Turkey’s founders, the success in avoiding complete colonization far outweighed the failure to preserve the full geographic scope of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, they forged a pragmatic foreign policy tradition that prioritized preserving their achievement: a Turkish state sovereign and secure within its current borders. This goal remained constant over a long and turbulent 20th century, even as its implications changed, and allowed for Ankara to be flexible about which countries to work with to maximize its self-declared interests. In the inter-war period, when threats came largely from powerful European empires like France, Italy, and Britain, the defense of Turkish sovereignty called for a policy of neutrality and non-alignment. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, however, Turkey’s geopolitical position changed dramatically. Suddenly, the Soviet Union emerged as the most direct and dangerous threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. In this new strategic context, seeking the support of the United States and NATO became the only feasible way to preserve the imperiled status quo, equip the country’s armed forces, and ultimately defend its borders. The result was a strong and mutually beneficial alliance with the United States and much of Europe. The success of this alliance, however, sometimes obscured the complex, constantly evolving and often paradoxical relationship between Turkey’s status quo orientation and its historically-grounded relationships with regional states. The circumstances surrounding the collapse of the Ottoman Empire created a bitter legacy, giving almost all of Turkey’s neighbors both emotional and practical reasons to feel hostility towards it. With other countries that shared a commitment to the status quo, however, Ankara had equally good reason to overcome this animosity. For countries that found themselves on the wrong side of Turkey’s geopolitical alignment, by contrast, these resentments and unresolved problems were consistently exacerbated. The history of Turkey’s regional relationships can be read through the ever-shifting dynamics of power politics and unsettled history. In the case of Greece, for example, Ankara and Athens began an ambitious rapprochement in the 1930s when they both felt their security was threatened by Italian irredentism in the Eastern Mediterranean. When this shared threat was supplanted by the Soviet Union, the two countries were brought into an even closer alignment under the NATO umbrella. Soon though, the growing rebellion against British rule on Cyprus rendered the status quo unsustainable, leaving Athens and Ankara with radically divergent views on what should come next. Only in this context were a number of longstanding questions re-opened, such as maritime borders and the status of historic minorities in both countries. Crucially, even as tensions over Cyprus worsened, both sides still had Washington to help remind them of their shared security interests. Throughout the Cold War, the United States was in a position to manage Turkish-Greek tensions in order to pre-empt the risk of an intra-NATO war between two allies that would benefit the Soviets. In other words, by acting as a forceful advocate for the status quo, Washington helped ensure that both Greece and Turkey maintained their shared commitment to it. With the end of the Cold War and the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party, Turkey embraced not just a new foreign policy but a new foreign policy orientation. Ankara is no longer interested in maintaining the status quo—it now wants to transform it. Just as Turkey’s status quo orientation led to different policies as circumstances change, Turkey’s new anti-status quo orientation has also led Erdoğan’s government to pursue different strategies. But to make sense of these shifts, and the reaction they have provoked in the region, it is crucial to appreciate that, no less than in the previous century, Turkey’s neighbors have responded in light of their history but also, more importantly, their own orientation toward the regional status quo.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, AKP, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

135. Russia Is Down, But Not Out, in Central Asia

Author:
Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has weakened its influence in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan. Russia is no longer a regional hegemon, which may increase regional instability. Tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are especially dangerous. Despite Moscow’s diminished influence in Central Asia, regional states cannot afford to completely ignore Russian interests. Western hopes for Central Asian gas resources to be pumped westwards and circumvent Russia remain unlikely to be fulfilled.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Gas, Political stability, Regional Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan

136. Fighting to Win: Ukraine, Russia, and the War for Survival

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Both the Kremlin and Ukrainians see the war as an existential conflict, even as a “holy war,” and are prepared to fight for years to achieve victory. Russian war aims vis-à-vis Ukraine have morphed into creating a “frozen conflict” to maintain its land bridge with Crimea. However, its primary war aim remains weakening NATO to regain its sphere of influence in the former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states. To achieve this, Russia will conduct a prolonged strategic defense in Ukraine to demonstrate that Ukraine will never regain its territorial integrity and to show that American support will eventually end as it has for other client states. Ukraine’s primary war aim of restoring its territorial integrity is shared across its society. To achieve this, Ukraine’s strategy is to break the will of the Russian army and then reclaim Crimea, even if that takes several years. Ukrainians do not fear a long war but an inconclusive one that reignites in five or ten years. They want to settle this conflict with Russia once and for all, and see NATO membership as the only way to prevent it from happening again. For US policymakers, the dangers arising from the war overshadow opportunities. One opportunity is a Russian defeat that can serve both as a brake against further Kremlin aggression and as a catalyst for Russia to possibly change her imperial identity. Another opportunity is the chance to strengthen NATO’s conventional forces and geographic position to give it an overwhelming advantage against any possible future Russian aggression. For that to happen, Ukraine must enter the alliance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

137. The Frontline States: Conversations and Observations About Russia’s Other War in Europe

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
From late June to mid-July 2023, I visited Georgia, Moldova, Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania on a research trip. The analysis and conclusions in this report are based, in part, on conversations with a wide variety of individuals from former government officials, university students, academics, and members of non-governmental organizations to ordinary citizens. The Kremlin desires to reestablish a sphere of influence in former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states between the Black and Baltic Seas. To do so, it is fighting a conventional war in Ukraine and political wars elsewhere to remove Western influence and reestablish hegemony. Russia’s political warfare operations have a major flaw; they only offer people the past and not a future. However, US efforts against them could be more effective and citizens in frontline states facing Russian subversion have constructive criticisms to improve them. Resisting Russian subversion depends as much on the political health of the targeted state as Western countermeasures. Efforts to oppose backsliding on democratic norms are vital, even if they spark tensions with partners and allies. Several countries in the region will hold elections between the fall of 2023 and 2025 that will determine their geopolitical orientation. If the war in Ukraine is a battle of modern weapon systems, these elections will be a war of ideas between East and West. It is important that the United States not cede the narrative for these elections to Moscow and work with allies and partners to counteract anti-Western propaganda.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

138. The Dragon and the Bear in Africa: Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This report is based on a chapter of my forthcoming book on the relationship between China and Russia. For the US, this is arguably the most important bilateral relationship in the world today. A robust, resilient partnership between Beijing and Moscow has the potential to remake world order. It would usher in an era of international relations based on power and polarity, eroding the role of international law and institutions, and undermining the sovereignty and agency of smaller states. This world order would represent a serious threat to US interests, as currently defined. On the other hand, transactional, “thin” ties between China and Russia allow the US some breathing space. Instead of a revisionist authoritarian alliance, the US would confront two states that represent different types of challenges. In this case, Washington could deal with the acute, militarized threat of Russia in the near term, while remaining postured to confront the “pacing” threat of China—the only potential peer competitor to the US—over the longer term. The academic and policy worlds have been seized with the China-Russia relationship for almost two decades. Policy debates revolve around how to confront the two, with some arguing that the current focus on reversing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine puts the US at risk of being unprepared for the threat China represents. Others argue that Russia is not merely a disruptive power but represents a profound and immediate danger to US interests. Competition for resources often lurks in the background of this debate: US government organizations focused on Europe tend to argue for focusing on Russia first; those with an Indo-Pacific focus tend to argue that China should be the focus. What this debate often fails to consider is the nature of their relationship and its impact on US policy options. The scholarly debate fills this gap by focusing directly on the nature of the relationship: one camp defines it as a strategic partnership and the other defines it as an “axis of convenience.” Often missing from scholarly analysis, though, is an analysis of the implications for US policy. In other words, scholars often argue forcefully for one of these characterizations of the China-Russia relationship but then fail to advise what the US should do in response. Instead, their analysis focuses on the implications of the relationship for theoretical approaches to international relations. The book that will include this report aims to close this gap between the policy and scholarly debates. It aims to provide a better understanding of the nature of the China-Russia relationship and use that understanding to inform US policy options. It will do this through a novel approach. Instead of focusing on Chinese-Russian interaction at the level of the international system, as most approaches do, it focuses on their interaction “on the ground” in regions where both have important interests at stake. This report examines Chinese-Russian interaction in Africa; other chapters of the book focus on Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and East Asia. Africa and Central Asia provide good testing grounds for the China-Russia relationship because both have important but different interests there. How they advance and defend those interests and how they interact in doing so, can yield important insights into the nature of their overall relationship. These regions are also important because the US footprint is light. The US has been called the “binding agent” in ties between Beijing and Moscow. The idea here is that shared resistance to the US is the only major thing they have in common. In this view, removing the US from the equation will make China and Russia more likely to find reasons to compete rather than cooperate.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

139. Japan’s New National Security Strategy Is Making Waves

Author:
Ryan Ashley
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) contains several groundbreaking commitments, including plans to deploy long-range counterstrike capabilities and to raise defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product. A slim-but-significant majority of Japan’s public now seemingly supports efforts to strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities, a political consensus once nearly unthinkable. The United States, India, Taiwan, and others that share Japan’s concern about military aggression from China, North Korea, and Russia have welcomed Japan’s NSS. Some countries in the Indo-Pacific, including South Korea and certain Southeast Asian nations, have expressed mixed reactions to the NSS, as some still harbor distrust toward Japanese military power due to the historical memory of the Second World War. China and North Korea continue to cultivate anti-Japan sentiment within their domestic populations and within other countries in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Deterrence, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

140. Russia Is Down, But Not Out, in Central Asia

Author:
Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has weakened its influence in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan. Russia is no longer a regional hegemon, which may increase regional instability. Tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are especially dangerous. Despite Moscow’s diminished influence in Central Asia, regional states cannot afford to completely ignore Russian interests. Western hopes for Central Asian gas resources to be pumped westwards and circumvent Russia remain unlikely to be fulfilled.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Gas, Regional Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan

141. Democracy Promotion After the Iraq War

Author:
Sarah Bush
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The Iraq War has justifiably left Americans skeptical about democracy promotion. Despite its flaws, US democracy promotion is still needed to advance political rights globally. Supporting women’s rights has become an important facet of US democracy promotion. Although autocracies can manipulate women’s rights for their own ends, real and valuable progress has also been made.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Democracy, and Iraq War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

142. Operation Iraqi Freedom: Learning Lessons from a Lost War

Author:
Heather S. Gregg
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
American-led efforts to state and nation-build in Iraq all but failed, resulting in the deaths of 4,431 US troops, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi fatalities, and mixed-at-best results in creating a viable state. Despite these failed efforts in Iraq, the United States will most likely need to work with allies, partners, and the Ukrainian people to reconstruct their country in the wake of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Therefore, learning lessons from the war in Iraq is critical for future efforts at state stabilization.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Alliance, Iraq War, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

143. Big Changes in United Arab Emirates Foreign Policy

Author:
Joshua Krasna
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
After a decade of activist policies in the region following the Arab Uprisings, Emirati foreign policy has undergone massive shifts in the past two years. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has de-escalated and normalized relations with four of the major, and competing, states in the region—Iran, Israel, Turkey and Qatar—as well as with Syria. The UAE is taking a more non-aligned and mediating position in regional and wider issues. The Emirati leadership has made significant progress in using their energy-derived wealth to diversify their economy and ensure retaining a leading position in the world economy in the post-fossil fuels era. Abu Dhabi’s foreign policy is driven, in part, by a perceived need to adapt to a multipolar, “post-American” reality in the region. The country has been irritated, but largely unmoved, by America’s attempts to enlist or coerce them into supporting its policies with respect to Russia and China. The UAE has gained from the crisis between Russia and the West. Oil prices have risen, Russian capital has flown into Emirati financial institutions and investments, and the country has seen a flood of hundreds of thousands of Russian visitors and new residents, leading to a real estate boom.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Oil, Leadership, Arab Spring, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
United Arab Emirates and Gulf Nations

144. What America Can Learn from France’s Mistakes in Africa

Author:
Komlan Avoulete
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
In recent years, France has suffered geopolitical setbacks in Africa. Tensions with Burkina Faso and Mali over French counter-terrorism operations led Paris to withdraw its troops from both of those countries. Russia is exploiting France’s failure to defeat terrorist groups in Africa as well as the feeling among many Africans that Paris exerts undue influence over its former colonies. The United States should learn from France’s mistakes and strive to build partnerships in Africa based on mutual respect, rather than focus too directly on competing with Russia or China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, Partnerships, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Africa, France, Mali, and United States of America

145. Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
A debate over the nature of the China-Russia relationship has raged for almost two decades. One side believes the two are strategic partners; the other believes their ties are an “axis of convenience” lacking depth. Understanding the true nature of their relationship is of vital importance to U.S. national security. A true strategic partnership represents a grave threat; less robust ties between the two give the U.S. more latitude in dealing with them. We can gain a deeper, more nuanced understanding of China-Russia ties by observing how they interact in regions of the world where they both have important interests at stake. Four regions emerge as key here: Central Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and East Asia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

146. Erdoğan’s Syria Policy: Continuation of the Status Quo?

Author:
Sinem Adar
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Erdoğan’s victory was driven by rhetoric stoking further conflict with Kurdish actors in Turkey and Syria. He is unlikely to back down from this position in the future. Turkey will seek to balance its “forever war” with the PKK against desires to repatriate Syrian refugees in potential negotiations with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Refugees, Syrian War, Kurds, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

147. When Diplomats Are Undiplomatic

Author:
Charles Ray
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The US ambassador to South Africa recently accused South Africa of shipping arms to Russia. The ambassador was criticized by some—including the South African government—for breaking with diplomatic protocol by so openly condemning his host government. However, maintaining an effective working relationship does not mean that a diplomat must never say or do anything that the host country might not like. Far from it. Effective diplomacy is built on trust, honesty, and respect, and the diplomat who never disagrees or who comes across as a sycophant, will be neither trusted nor respected. On the other hand, a diplomat who is consistently honest, but who strives to be polite and considerate, might not be universally liked, but will earn respect.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, South Africa, and United States of America

148. The Long Game: Saudi Arabia and Professional Golf

Author:
Sean L. Yom
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The alliance between the PGA Tour and Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (which is chaired by Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman and includes the LIV Golf league) is a strategic victory for Saudi Arabia, which has sought a more integrated presence in global and Western institutions. The merger opens up serious commercial leverage for Saudi Arabia, including control over the PGA Tour’s lucrative licensing operation. The deal has resolved a year-long legal dispute between the two organizations, but questions will be raised about the PGA Tour’s nonprofit status as well as monopoly issues that are being investigated by the US Congress.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sports, Soft Power, and Golf
Political Geography:
Middle East and Saudi Arabia

149. Wagner’s Head is Dead, Now Bury the Body

Author:
Marcel Plichta, Christopher Faulkner, and Raphael Parens
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The core of Wagner leadership was effectively decapitated with the deaths of Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitri Uktin, but the group’s fingerprints won’t disappear quickly. Although the Kremlin may attempt to appoint new leadership, semi-nationalize Wagner, or attempt a full takeover, a Wagner descendant organization will continue causing problems for the West. The Wagner model of weaponizing private military companies to use as a foreign policy tool, will continue as well. U.S. and European authorities should avoid complacency by intensifying efforts to counter Wagner and its employees, so that Wagner members cannot slip into anonymity amidst Russian gray zone warfare.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Leadership, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

150. The Eagle in the South Caucasus: Armenia Tests Alternative Geopolitical Waters

Author:
Walter Landgraf and Nareg Seferian
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The US-Armenia “Eagle Partner” joint military exercise from September 11–20 may signal the beginning of a shift in the foreign policy direction of Armenia, historically a close ally to Russia. Armenia has been growing frustrated at the lackluster response of the Collective Security Treaty Organization to its appeals for assistance in the deepening conflict with Azerbaijan. However, it would be difficult to imagine a wholesale change in the geopolitical orientation in Yerevan, given the strong military, economic, energy, and cultural ties between Armenia and Russia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Military, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Armenia, North America, South Caucasus, and United States of America

151. Hamas Allegations Threaten Another Breakdown in US-South Africa Ties

Author:
Michael Walsh
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
A reported call between South African Minister Naledi Pandor and Hamas Leader Ismail Haniyeh has renewed concerns that the African National Congress and government of South Africa are undermining US national security and foreign policy in the Middle East. This incident comes quickly on the heels of a springtime allegation that the African National Congress and South African government undermined US national security and foreign policy with respect to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Over the summer, members of Congress called into question the eligibility of South Africa for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and its suitability to host the AGOA Forum. This was in response to the prior allegation that South Africa transferred arms or enabling technologies to Russia. Prior to next month’s AGOA Forum, there is an expectation that the AGOA eligibility determinations for 2024 will be delivered to Congress. This sets the stage for another potential showdown over the AGOA eligibility of South Africa and its suitability to host the AGOA Forum. At this stage, it is unlikely that South Africa will be deemed ineligible for AGOA trade benefits or removed as the host of the AGOA Forum. However, a political debate over its AGOA eligibility could cast a long shadow over the event and lead to another breakdown in the strategic partnership between South Africa and the United States. The White House will want to avoid both of those outcomes.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Hamas
Political Geography:
Africa, Israel, South Africa, Palestine, and United States of America

152. Between Swords of Iron and the Al Aqsa Deluge: The Regional Politics of the Israel-Hamas War

Author:
Brandon Friedman and Joshua Krasna
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The Hamas-Israel war has derailed but not destroyed the trend towards regional de-escalation and integration. Hamas’ “success” has revived fears in the region of a Muslim Brotherhood resurgence and led aspiring regional powers to compete to steer the Muslim world’s attitudes and responses to the crisis . Egypt and Jordan, Israel’s peace partners, face particular domestic challenges that both constrain and incentivize engagement in the crisis. Egypt’s strategic interests have led to a discreet, but more active role, while Jordan’s domestic pressures have led it to keep the crisis at arm’s length. The United Arab Emirates and other conservative Arab states emphasize the need to prevent escalation, to limit civilian deaths, and to implement an immediate ceasefire, and at least publicly, minimize the relevance of “who started” the war.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, War, Hamas, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

153. The Involvement of Civil Society Organizations in Arctic Governance

Author:
Emilie Broek, Nicholas Olczak, and Lisa Dellmuth
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The Arctic is faced with growing environmental and geopolitical challenges, which require international governance involving a range of actors. Existing research has a limited understanding of the role played by civil society organizations (CSOs) in the emerging governance of the region. This SIPRI Insights paper has reviewed the existing literature and used novel survey data to analyse the involvement of CSOs in terms of their roles and their beliefs in Arctic governance. It finds that CSOs monitor agreements and push for regional accountability, support the implementation of policies, engage in advocacy work, support information sharing and provide input during geopolitical crises. It also finds that CSOs have weak levels of belief in the legitimacy of Arctic governance institutions, or in the appropriateness and impact of their governance of the region. Based on these findings, the paper makes recommendations for the further involvement of CSOs in Arctic governance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Civil Society, Governance, Geopolitics, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Arctic and Global Focus

154. Mapping Pathways for Peace through the Composition of Official Development Assistance

Author:
Jannie Lilja and Gary Milante
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Mapping the changing composition of official development assistance (ODA) against peace and conflict patterns in recipient countries over time can enhance the understanding of how pathways to peace look like in practice. This working paper presents empirical findings from more comprehensive research into the composition of ODA across aid recipient countries in the period 1990–2020. ODA is broken down into humanitarian, development and peacebuilding aid components. While development assistance is found to dominate across all types of country contexts, and the humanitarian share tends to be larger during conflict, peacebuilding assistance varies by conditions in countries. Post-conflict countries that avoid conflict relapse receive significantly higher shares of peacebuilding aid compared to post-conflict countries that relapse. A ternary graph is introduced to strategically track the composition of the total ODA envelope at the country level during different time periods. The findings suggest that a more effective future deployment of ODA for the advancement of peace and stability is possible.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

155. The Arctic is Hot: Addressing the Social and Environmental Implications

Author:
Emilie Broek
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The Arctic is becoming more hotly contested and attracting new developments. The European Union (EU) is one actor that is turning to the Arctic to achieve its climate, energy, space-related and security goals. However, this increased interest can result in negative social and environmental local implications if not properly planned for and considered. This SIPRI Policy Brief provides an overview of the EU’s focus on the Arctic, with a particular focus on Kiruna, and the importance of human-centred and precautionary approaches.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Environment, European Union, Space, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and Arctic

156. Bankrupting Iran’s Empire of Terror

Author:
Nate Sibley
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel has left thousands of innocent people dead, set the stage for a bloody and protracted conflict in Gaza, and precipitated a crisis that threatens to engulf the Middle East in a devastating new conflict. To prevent further escalation, the United States needs to act swiftly to intensify economic pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran and dismantle its terrorist financing networks. Though Iran has denied any involvement, Hamas could not have planned an operation of this scale without critical support from its chief state sponsor. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has devoted enormous resources to building up proxy terrorist organizations in order to encircle Israel. According to a 2020 US government estimate, the IRGC provides as much as $700 million to Lebanese Hezbollah and $100 million to Hamas and other Palestinian groups each year. So far, this strategy appears to be working. Hezbollah, the IRGC’s most powerful terrorist partner, is poised to attack from the north, while other Iranian proxies threaten Israel from within Syria and elsewhere. Israel’s newly cordial relations with its Arab neighbors—including its nascent détente with Saudi Arabia—hang precariously in the balance. President Joe Biden’s immediate response to the attacks rightly focused on delivering Israel the political backing and military assistance that it urgently needs. But as the overseer of the global financial system, the United States can also deploy its unique capabilities to constrict the Islamic Republic’s revenues and shut down its global terrorist financing networks. Whether the United States succeeds in doing so will shape events far beyond the Middle East. This conflict is not just another flare-up in a long-troubled region. It reflects an ongoing global realignment wherein powerful adversaries test American strength and resolve with growing coordination and assertiveness. As Russia wages war in Ukraine and Beijing watches carefully, the stakes call for nothing less than a major US endeavor to bankrupt the Islamic Republic’s empire of terror once and for all.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Terrorism, and Hamas
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

157. The Fourteen Facts about US Aid to Ukraine

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Since Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time in eight years, Russian troops have ravaged Ukraine’s cities, raped its women, and stolen its children. Russian missiles and Iranian drones strike Ukrainian cities daily, often hitting civilian targets. Russia is the aggressor. Ukraine is the victim. For Americans who believe in respect for national borders, the primacy of national sovereignty, and the right to self-defense, support for Ukraine is natural. Ukrainians are not asking for, nor do they want, US troops to help them fight Russia. All they ask for is the resources required to give them a fighting chance. Meanwhile, Russia is among America’s top geopolitical adversaries. As former Secretary of State and Hudson Distinguished Fellow Mike Pompeo said last week, a Russian victory “would be felt well beyond Ukraine’s borders, including by strengthening a Russia-China-Iran alliance that aims to weaken the US and our allies across the globe.” As Congress debates additional support for Ukraine, detractors will spread false and misleading information. It is important to understand the facts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

158. Escape from the Syrian Labyrinth: A Road Map

Author:
Michael Doran and Omer Ozkizilcik
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The Ukraine war has led Americans to rediscover what first drew them, some seven decades ago, into a military alliance with the Turks: Turkey’s indispensability as a counterweight to Russia. However, even as Washington and Ankara have found common cause in Ukraine, they continue to work at cross purposes in Syria. In a demonstration of bold, fresh, and practical thinking, Turkish scholar Ömer Özkizilcik offers us a road map for aligning American and Turkish policies there too. But first, to set the stage for Özkizilcik’s plan, Hudson Senior Fellow Michael Doran surveys the strategic logic and the diplomatic context that make the road map compulsory reading.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

159. Southeast Asia Is the Soft Underbelly of American Power in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Southeast Asia is not just the swing sub-region in the Indo-Pacific but also the soft underbelly of the region—the area most susceptible to Chinese coercion, influence, and expansion. Except for Vietnam, Southeast Asian states have strong fence-sitting tendencies and are reluctant to properly balance and counter Beijing due to their proximity to China, smaller size, limited capabilities, and economic integration with and reliance on China. They are also constantly fearful that the US and its allies will abandon and leave them to fend for themselves against a hostile China. This means that while one can identify pockets of creative and proactive thinking in this sub-region, the prevailing inclinations of the region’s countries are to never back a side before the result is obvious, do the minimum when it comes to burden sharing, and receive maximum economic and security benefits for minimum risk, price, and commitment. In short, they are often inclined toward free riding. It is easy for the US and its allies to become frustrated with Southeast Asian states that give the impression they are seeking various forms of “strategic welfare.” The more constructive approach is to understand their domestic and external vulnerabilities and work within these.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Strategic Competition, ASEAN, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Southeast Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

160. Time to Recalibrate America’s Middle East Policy

Author:
Raphael BenLevi and Michael Doran
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Our understanding of reality in the Middle East has changed significantly in the last seven years. At a conference on US-Israel relations in 2016, then Secretary of State John Kerry highlighted, now famously, the impossibility of Israel making peace with the Gulf states. In an obvious reference to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his associates, Kerry said, “I’ve heard several prominent politicians in Israel sometimes saying, ‘Well, the Arab world is in a different place now. We just have to reach out to them. We can work some things with the Arab world, and we’ll deal with the Palestinians.’” Kerry dismissed Netanyahu’s thesis with total certainty: “No. No, no, and no. I can tell you that I’ve talked to the leaders of the Arab community. There will be no advanced and separate peace with the Arab world without the Palestinian process and Palestinian peace. Everybody needs to understand that. That is a hard reality.” Just two years later, Netanyahu refuted Kerry’s view of reality by, with the help of President Donald Trump, signing the Abraham Accords with Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani and Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. But the flaws that Trump and Netanyahu revealed were not Kerry’s alone. Nor were the flaws limited to thinking about Arab-Israeli relations. Trump and Netanyahu were attacking the entire strategic belief system of the Obama administration, which had identified reconciling with Iran and brokering a Palestinian-Israeli peace as the two top priorities of the United States in the Middle East. In the Trump-Netanyahu conception, the Abraham Accords were the cornerstone of a regional alliance that aimed not just to improve relations between Israel and its neighbors but also to contain Iran militarily and to prevent it, through the application of hard power, from acquiring a nuclear weapon. With a Middle East staff consisting almost entirely of veterans of the Obama administration, the Biden administration intended to prove the utility of Obama’s effort to reconcile with Iran. It therefore rejected the Trump-Netanyahu view of the accords as a key component of an Iran-containment strategy. However, the accords have fashioned a new “hard reality” of Arab-Israeli coordination that the administration cannot ignore. That reality includes formal Israeli representation at US Central Command, the military’s combatant operations command responsible for, among other things, deterring Iran. In other words, beneath the umbrella of the United States military, the Israeli military and its Arab counterparts are now liaising daily. Weren’t Trump and Netanyahu pursuing this outcome? The simple answer is no. To prevent trilateral military cooperation among the Arab states, Israel, and the United States from turning into a coalition designed to pressure Iran regarding the aggression of its proxy forces and the expansion of its nuclear weapons program, the Biden administration instructed CENTCOM to focus exclusively on defensive measures and integrated missile defense, and to avoid any offensive countermeasures against Iran. But defending against an aggressor with only a shield is impossible. Arming oneself with a sword is also necessary. Enter Raphael BenLevi, the director of the Churchill Program for Strategy, Statesmanship and National Security at the Argaman Institute of Tikvah Fund Israel. BenLevi is at the forefront of a new generation of foreign policy strategists in Israel who have come of age in an era when what seemed like a “hard reality” to the generation of John Kerry is now obviously history. In this article, he lays out a strong case for the potential of the kind of trilateral cooperation to which the Biden administration, under the weight of stale ideas, has turned a blind eye.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and United States of America

161. The “Odious” Legacy of Chinese Development Assistance in Africa: The Case of Angola

Author:
Rafael Marques de Morais and Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Within days of taking office, China’s new foreign minister, Qin Gang, was on a plane to his country’s main African client: Angola. Landing in Luanda on January 12, Qin Gang was ostensibly bringing a gift—a $250 million loan to help Angola expand high-speed broadband. Some gifts, however, are not what they seem, and some of the recent financial gifts from Chinese sources have been toxic. Soon after Qin visited Angola, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen traveled to three African countries but skipped Angola, possibly because of its checkered history with Chinese development assistance. The case of Angola raises questions about the extent and nature of Chinese loans and infrastructure aid to a growing number of African nations, as well as the consequences of such loans on those countries’ relations with the US.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Infrastructure, Trade, Development Assistance, and Loans
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Angola, and United States of America

162. A New Black Sea Strategy for a New Black Sea Reality

Author:
Luke Coffey and Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
With Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there is a new geopolitical reality in the Black Sea region. Following the capture of the Ukrainian city of Mariupol in May, Russia has effectively turned the Sea of Azov into a Russian lake and is also seeking maximum control of the Black Sea. Turkey has reminded the world of Ankara’s regional importance by closing the Turkish Straits to the belligerent parties’ vessels (in practice the Russian Navy, except for the platforms home-ported in the Black Sea), which it carried out under authority granted by the 1936 Montreux Convention. Despite the overwhelming odds, Ukraine has been able to deliver significant blows to the Russian Navy—most sensationally by sinking the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship Moskva missile cruiser and by striking Russian platforms with unmanned surface combatants in October. Black Sea geopolitics is a complex phenomenon. Any comprehensive regional political-military policy must therefore offer a multidomain strategy. This report will focus on the maritime agenda. Future reports will present findings on air warfare and land warfare trends in the broader Black Sea region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Black Sea

163. Transparency and Accountability: US Assistance to Ukraine

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Americans are raising questions about the tracking and oversight of aid to Ukraine. Russia has long sought to dominate Ukraine, and wherever Russia hooks its tentacles, corruption naturally follows. By helping Ukraine defeat Russia on the battlefield, the United States can strike a major blow against corruption in Europe. In the meantime, the US government is carefully tracking American aid to Ukraine. The Department of Defense (DoD) established a Security Assistance Group Ukraine last fall that tracks military shipments. (By contrast, the US did not establish a similar effort in Afghanistan until seven years into the war). Moreover, Congress required significant reporting on oversight and accountability in each major assistance package passed to date: the four Ukraine supplementals, the FY2023 NDAA, and the FY2022 and FY2023 omnibus bills. Specifically, Congress mandated the creation of a list of all security assistance and defense articles provided to Ukraine—and enhanced monitoring of that equipment once it enters Ukraine. Congress also mandated that the DoD reports on all end-use of military equipment. As of this writing, the DoD has found no evidence of Ukraine diverting US-supplied defense equipment. This makes basic sense: a smaller, weaker country like Ukraine could not defeat its much larger Russian adversary if Western weapons were not reaching the front lines. Indeed, Ukraine’s battlefield successes follow a basic rhythm. In June, the US released Harpoon coastal defense systems to Ukraine. Later that month, the British Defense Ministry announced that Ukraine used this Western system to sink a Russian ship on its way to Snake Island, causing the Russians to abandon the strategic outpost. The HIMARS launcher, first sent last summer, propelled Ukraine’s counteroffensives in the south and east, enabling Ukraine to liberate Kherson and take back major territories in the Kharkiv region. And the US shipment of over 100 M777 Howitzers proved effective against Russian equipment at a time when the Ukrainians were running dangerously low on artillery systems. Still, in keeping with its responsibilities, the new Republican majority in the House is standing watch and directing new efforts. Earlier this month, Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, led a congressional delegation to Romania and Poland to oversee the distribution of Ukraine aid. Following the trip, the bipartisan group of lawmakers agreed that they “came away with a clear understanding of the various safeguards the US government, in partnership with the Ukrainians and other nations, have put in place to ensure each article is accounted for and tracked to the frontline of the war.” Because Congressman Rogers sees oversight as a top priority of his committee, he will press the point in an oversight hearing on Tuesday, February 28.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

164. Greater than the Sum of Its Parts: Abraham Accords Free Trade Area

Author:
Robert Greenway
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The Abraham Accords provide an unprecedented opportunity to increase trade and investment among its members significantly by establishing a regional free trade area that would ensure progress toward their aspirations, preserve the integrity and stability of global markets, fuel growth, and constrain China’s predatory trade practices. Signatories to the accords committed to a shared vision of peace and prosperity and recognized that economic integration can enable members to achieve their long-term economic goals. The accords have paved the way for comprehensive partnerships on a variety of issues related to security, trade, investment, the environment, innovation, tourism, energy, and other key sectors. While the growth in bilateral trade is of great significance, the true transformative power of these peace agreements lies in expanding regional integration and cooperation. This is already underway. Israel concluded a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in December 2022 and is currently negotiating a free trade agreement with Bahrain. Both will significantly accelerate economic development and provide incentives for others to follow suit. Israel's new foreign minister, Eli Cohen, recently stated that the volume of trade with Arab countries that normalized relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords in 2020 exceeded $2.8 billion dollars in 2022. While progress has been remarkable, its potential is far greater. According to RAND analysis of the potential of bilateral free trade agreements (FTA) between Israel and current signatories, the accords could create 46,000 new jobs and $24 billion in new economic activity for Israel's four partners. The benefits of a multilateral FTA encompassing current signatories would triple the overall benefit, creating more than 150,000 new jobs and new economic activity exceeding $75 billion. A multilateral FTA among an expanded number of potential signatories to the accords could create as much as 4 million new jobs and $1 trillion in new economic activity through 2030. This potential is not lost on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP represents one of the most significant threats challenging the United States and its partners and allies. China’s state-directed economic policies, predatory lending, cyber intrusions, theft of intellectual property, illicit technology transfer and other coercive practices, industrial subsidies, and market access restrictions on key sectors of China’s economy constitute the most significant threats of the coming century. Several trends exacerbate the need for integrating markets aligned toward common goals. The global pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Brexit, tariff tensions, political instability, protectionist policies, and regulatory uncertainty have threatened global trade by disrupting established supply chains and their underlying constellation of business models and trade relationships. As is often the case, these complex and interrelated challenges constitute an opportunity to realign our trade to safeguard the integrity of global markets and pursue US goals and objectives in collaboration with our partners and allies. The Abraham Accords offers just such an opportunity.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Free Trade, and Abraham Accords
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel

165. The System Is Blinking Red over Iran

Author:
Jonathan Schachter
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In his testimony to the 9/11 Commission, then-CIA Director George Tenet described the harrowing intelligence picture that had emerged in the summer of 2001. “The system was blinking red,” he famously recalled. What followed, of course, was the well-documented, multi-agency failure to prevent an avoidable disaster that changed the course of history. The system is blinking red again, and the American response appears frighteningly familiar. Earlier this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that its inspectors in Iran had discovered uranium particles enriched to about 84 percent purity. Most reports have noted that this is just shy of the 90 percent level generally considered to be “weapons grade.” Others correctly point out that uranium enriched to around 80 percent fueled the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Almost no one mentions that Iran has no civilian need to enrich uranium in the first place. During the nearly four years leading up to the IAEA’s finding, Iran has engaged in increasingly grave violations of its international nuclear obligations, only some of which derive from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran still refuses to cooperate with at least three separate IAEA investigations of undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and sites, in violation of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With Iran’s long history of nuclear lawbreaking, the discovery of undeclared, highly enriched uranium is unsurprising. Iran does not have a peaceful uranium enrichment program. Uranium enrichment remains part and parcel of the regime’s effort to develop and maintain the ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons on demand. Rather than dismantling Iran’s illegally built military enrichment program, the JCPOA decriminalized it. Even if the US had not withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018, the deal’s limited and temporary terms explicitly permit Iran to expand its enrichment capability and capacity and increase its stockpile of enriched uranium, legally and without limitation, by the end of this decade. In a February 24 interview with CBS News, the current CIA director, William Burns, downplayed the danger. He reaffirmed that “we don’t believe that the Supreme Leader in Iran has yet made a decision to resume the weaponization program that we judge that they suspended or stopped at the end of 2003.” The materials Israeli intelligence spirited out of a Tehran warehouse (the “Atomic Archive”) in 2018, which Israel shared with the United States, raise disturbing questions about the assessment Burns presented and its persistence. The archive materials showed that the regime did not stop or suspend its weaponization program in 2003, but, in the Iranians’ own words, modified it. What had been a crash program geared toward testing a nuclear device on a short timeline became a dispersed, long-term effort—part clandestine, part under the cover of civilian research—to develop and maintain capabilities relevant to the production of nuclear weapons. The program went from sprint to marathon, though both have a nuclear weapons finish line. More broadly, the archive showed that the Iranian nuclear weapons program was more advanced and comprehensive than previously understood. Israel and the United States became aware of how much so 15 years after the fact and only thanks to one of the most stunning intelligence coups in modern history. Despite this long lag and the long odds of repeating such an intelligence feat, Burns seems to believe that we will know in near-real time if and when Iran’s leader decides to switch the program back to an even shorter nuclear sprint. This belief seems to reflect, as the saying goes, the triumph of hope over experience. Perhaps this too is unsurprising. The JCPOA was always built on little more than hope. The largely unspoken logic behind the agreement was that an engaged, wealthier Iran would lose interest in nuclear weapons before the deal’s restrictions expired. Iran quickly proved the optimists wrong. In the years immediately after striking the deal, Tehran increased defense spending by more than 30 percent; offered substantially more support to terrorist groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis; and intensified its aggression across the region. Iran continues to develop missiles and, as Burns pointed out, the associated ability to deliver a nuclear warhead. Now Iran is using the same uranium enrichment infrastructure guaranteed by the JCPOA to violate its terms. The Biden administration’s policy toward Iran reflects a clear and consistent preference for diplomacy over the use of force, and understandably so. But the White House treats the two as contradictory, rather than complementary. For over two years, the administration has demonstrated its reticence to use, or even credibly threaten to use, force against Iran. Manifestly undeterred, Iran has continued and accelerated its drive toward the nuclear threshold. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine and Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia mean that even if the IAEA Board of Governors were to refer Iran’s nuclear crimes to the United Nations Security Council, Russia surely would veto any punitive measure toward the Islamic Republic. In other words, America’s soft-handed approach and global events are making a diplomatic solution less likely. If Washington continues on its current path, the world almost certainly will face a nuclear-armed Iran, a war to prevent that eventuality, or both. It is not too late to act. First, the United States can press its European partners to activate the JCPOA’s snap-back mechanism, which is not subject to a Russian (or Chinese) veto. Doing so would reimpose international sanctions and the UN arms embargo on Iran that the deal lifted in 2020. It also would prevent the planned lifting of the UN missile embargo on Iran in October of this year. Second, the president, his administration, and Congress can make clear that the United States and its allies can and will use force to prevent Iran from violating its nuclear obligations. The United States would not be moving its red lines, but rather enforcing them. Doing so would send a powerful message to Iranian leaders that they have already crossed America’s red lines and need to back down. Such a threat might not be effective. But without a credible American commitment to use force, no diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem is possible. This moment could be America’s last chance to change course on Iran. If it does not, one wonders what Director Burns and his colleagues in the administration might say in their future testimony about why they failed to act when the system was blinking red on their watch.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

166. Seven Ways to Deepen NATO-Ukraine Relations at the Vilnius Summit

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
NATO will hold a major summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, from July 11 to 12, and Ukraine will undoubtedly be a top agenda item. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba recently said that the summit should present “a clear plan on when and how Ukraine will enter [NATO].” Meanwhile, Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said that “there is no alternative to Ukraine's accession to NATO.” With expectations high, NATO leaders and policymakers need to start developing a plan to keep Ukraine on the path to eventual membership while deepening NATO-Ukraine relations. With some creative thinking and political will, the summit could serve NATO’s interests and meet the Ukrainian government’s reasonable and understandable expectations.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

167. Winning in Ukraine Is Critically Important for Deterring a War in Taiwan

Author:
John P. Walters
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Below are remarks by Hudson President and CEO John P. Walters during a debate over whether winning in Ukraine is important for deterring a war in Taiwan. To view the debate, click here. I support the judgment of the commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), Admiral John Aquilino, who was recently asked by Senator Roger Wicker, “There’s some people who feel our support for Ukraine is taking away from our capability and credibility in the Indo-Pacific. . . . What do you say?” Adm. Aquilino replied, “Senator I do not . . . I believe we have to do both to maintain the peace.” Why is Adm. Aquilino correct in linking the defense of Taiwan and deterrence of Communist Chinese aggression to our support for Ukraine? First, US victory in Ukraine is essential for generating support for Taiwan at home. Winning in Ukraine will help generate the domestic resolve to fight for Taiwan. If we pull back from Ukraine, however, the US will strengthen those isolationists who pit baby formula against defense spending. Success creates a slipstream of confidence, which the country is currently lacking after our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. A victory in Ukraine can restore confidence in our ability to win wars—at home and abroad.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

168. America’s Best Choice in Sudan Is the Least Bad Option

Author:
Joshua Meservey
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Long-simmering tensions between Sudan’s two most powerful generals broke into open warfare on April 15. A series of ceasefires have failed, and fighting continues in the capital city, Khartoum, and in other areas throughout the country. Street protests in April 2019 prompted Sudan’s security services to oust the former dictator, Omar al-Bashir, and forced them to include civilians in the subsequent transitional government. Ever since, the United States has tried to help those civilians consolidate power.1 In October 2021, however, the two most senior generals in the transitional government—Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (usually known as “Hemeti”), leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)—forced the civilians out. Still, the United States supported negotiations between the junta and elements of the civilian protest movement until both generals’ desire for supreme power forced the confrontation that now threatens to dismember the country.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, Leadership, Armed Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Sudan, and United States of America

169. Fighting into the Bastions: Getting Noisier to Sustain the US Undersea Advantage

Author:
Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Airpower enthusiasts concluded after World War I that “the bomber will always get through.”1 Fast, high-flying aircraft seemed to hold a decisive edge over air defenses and offered commanders the assurance they could attack targets deep inside an opponent’s territory. But airpower advocates’ spirits were quickly dampened during World War II by the advent of interceptor fighters, radar-guided artillery, and electromagnetic warfare (EW), which together demonstrated that bombers could be stopped—often with devastating results. Air forces adapted, adding escort fighters, radar jammers and decoys, and higher-altitude bombers to sustain their ability to strike behind enemy lines. During the Cold War, this move-countermove competition continued. New surface- and air-launched missiles targeted bombers, and countries developed specialized aircraft and weapons to suppress and destroy enemy air defenses or use stealth to avoid detection and targeting altogether. Today, the US submarine force faces a similar challenge. The US fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) has long been considered an asymmetric advantage against potential adversaries like the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, which lacked robust and effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Relying on this advantage, the US Department of Defense (DoD) has increasingly relied on SSNs to compensate for the impact of improved air defenses on the ability of bombers and strike fighters to execute attacks.2 However, the unfailing ability of US SSNs to reach their targets is eroding as emerging technologies and weapons proliferation combine in new approaches to ASW that could neutralize America’s undersea advantage. During the last decade, the PRC and Russian Federation began fortifying their undersea defenses in the South and East China Seas and Arctic Ocean, respectively. Leveraging geographic constraints, US adversaries have instrumented these bastions with networks of fixed and mobile acoustic and non-acoustic sensors, complemented by aircraft and ships capable of pouncing on contacts or deploying dense mine barriers.3 Improved adversary defenses could degrade or defeat US undersea operations, preventing US submarines from conducting critical missions such as sinking a Chinese invasion fleet or tracking Russian ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). To sustain its offensive undersea advantage, the US Navy will need to take some lessons from air warfare and begin supporting submarines with systems designed to suppress or destroy enemy undersea defenses. This imperative will fundamentally shift the paradigm for US submarine operations from “alone and unafraid” to “it’s all about team.” Moreover, the emergence of new generations of capable long-range active sonars will demand that the US undersea force increasingly rely on jamming and deception to counter enemy sensors, much as their counterparts already do above the water. The US submarine force will need to learn how to use noise, rather than avoid it. The Navy should pursue four lines of effort, outlined below, to sustain its offensive undersea advantage. Except for features to be incorporated into the next-generation nuclear-powered attack submarine, the SSN(X), the concepts and capabilities proposed in this report leverage mature or maturing technologies and can be fielded within five years. Implementing these recommendations will require the US Navy to refine its use cases for offensive undersea warfare to use available uncrewed vehicle technologies, rather than continue pursuing purpose-built systems that may take a decade or more to be fielded.4
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

170. Success in the Struggle against the People's Republic of China

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In April 2023, the Australian government released the officially commissioned but independently produced Defence Strategic Review. Intended to assist the government of Australia with its strategic and defense policies over the next decade and beyond, the report offered the fundamental assessment that the Indo-Pacific region “faces increasing competition that operates on multiple levels—economic, military, strategic and diplomatic—all interwoven and all framed by an intense contest of values and narratives.”1 The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy, which had been released several months earlier (October 2022), stated the challenge in even starker terms: “The People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit.”2 At the heart of these statements is the perception that China poses a systemic and comprehensive challenge, not just to the vital interests and values of the United States and Australia, but to the entire system and order that was cobbled together after the Second World War. These postwar rules, norms, institutions, conventions, practices, alliances, and security relationships have been underwritten by US material power. They constitute a liberal order that is under intense challenge from China.3 This report explores what success in relation to China looks like for the US, Australia, and allies such as Japan. Several substantial and thoughtful pieces have described what victory would look like for China,4 and there have also been many good efforts to describe what victory would look like for the US and its allies, given China’s goals and objectives. The current report focuses on a US and Australian vision of success in which the geopolitical contest and struggle are enduring and do not end with a victory for any side. Victory generally means defeating an enemy or opponent in a specific context or activity. Unsurprisingly, the term is commonly associated with defeating an enemy during a battle or compelling the unconditional surrender of the enemy when engaging in war. In victory, there is a clear winner and loser. By way of contrast, success or successful struggle means the accomplishment of an aim or purpose in general or specific contexts. It might include subduing an opponent and attaining victory over that opponent. But success can also be achieved without the strict formal requirement of victory, depending on one’s objective. The term success is used here because the scope of this report is broader than victory in a traditional war context (even if the use of force is always an option to achieve success or deny it to the opponent). It will be apparent that the Chinese notion of war is far broader than the Western notion. The West holds that war is fought within and across identified air, sea, land, space, and cyber domains, and that war has a discernible beginning and end. In the Chinese conception, war has no boundaries or restrictive form and does not necessarily involve the kinetic use of force. It is material, but also ideational, psychological, and structural.5 Indeed, for the Chinese, the apogee of conflict is to win without fighting, even if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sees the environment as one of perpetual struggle. Hence, war may have no formal beginning or end. For this reason, a US and Australian vision of success cannot simply be about achieving specific key objectives, like maintaining Taiwanese de facto independence or preventing further Chinese militarization of the South China Sea. To be sure, a vision of success is based on certain fundamental end states (such as preventing Chinese material and normative dominance in East Asia). However, it also accepts the likelihood of a constant struggle against a formidable China, just as China assumes the long-term existence of a formidable US with significant allies in the region. In other words, the authors work on the prudent assumption that China will be neither defeated nor terminally weakened, and that its expansionist ambitions and substantial capabilities will remain. Rather than focusing on a final victory or endpoint, a vision of success conceptualizes an advantageous and enduring state of affairs or system of arrangements in the region that supports the fundamental objectives of the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. This report is about successful struggle, but not in the context of a major war where one side wins decisively and the next step is to establish a sensible peace. This is not to discount the possibility that the use of force could be decisive in shaping the region. But the report focuses on scenarios of an increasingly tense competition and rivalry occurring over the next decade and explores what success looks like in that context. It does not discount the possibility or necessity of limited military action, but does not assume that any such action would be decisive in producing a permanent winner and loser.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, Australia, and United States of America

171. Xi Jinping’s Vision for the Middle East

Author:
Yair Albeck
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Chinese leader Xi Jinping clearly aspires to establish a new global economic order centered around Beijing, not Washington. However, a new global economic order cannot be built in a day. The immensity of this challenge has forced Xi to set his sights on a set of interim goals. These include cementing the Communist Party’s control of the Chinese economy and shielding supply chains, capital flows, and strategic bilateral and multilateral relationships from hostile American policies. These goals equate to the creation of a Sinocentric global economic subsystem. This would be partially integrated into the current Western-led system but would be sufficiently decoupled from the West to protect the pillars of the Chinese Communist Party’s political economy. In Beijing’s grand design, the Middle East plays an indispensable role. But Western analysts have often misjudged China’s interests in the region as purely commercial. While Xi values the region for its economic potential, he sees it as one of the most important arenas of competition with the United States. Yet when United States National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently discussed American leadership of the global economy, he focused on Europe and the Indo-Pacific and mentioned Africa and Latin America. He did not mention the Middle East once.1 Washington’s persistent blind spot in the Middle East has obscured its view of Beijing’s global ambitions. If the US does not rectify this mistake, it risks losing more influence in the region and aiding China’s effort to supplant the US atop the global economic order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Political Economy, Foreign Direct Investment, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China and Middle East

172. Eritrea’s Growing Ties with China and Russia Highlight America’s Inadequate Approach in East Africa

Author:
Joshua Meservey
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China and Russia have recently increased their engagement with Eritrea, a small but strategically located country in East Africa. Meanwhile, American influence in the region is amid a yearslong slide. Despite the obvious risks, the United States has failed to muster a committed response and has even taken some counterproductive measures that demonstrate a lack of strategic thinking. If these trends continue, a vital region may fall under the conclusive influence of Washington’s primary geopolitical competitors.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Eritrea, and United States of America

173. Why a Ukrainian Victory Matters to Americans

Author:
Peter Rough and Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Ukraine aid is a good investment for the US. The United States has given Ukraine $43.7 billion in military assistance since Russia’s full-scale invasion last year. This is about 5 percent of America’s fiscal year 2023 defense budget, or less than two-tenths of 1 percent of its gross domestic product. Ukraine is degrading one of America’s two major adversaries. Ukraine has destroyed more than 11,350 pieces of Russian military equipment, including 2,164 main battle tanks, 2,566 infantry fighting vehicles, more than 500 pieces of towed artillery and multiple rocket launchers, 84 aircraft, 99 helicopters, and 12 naval ships—all without shedding a single drop of US blood. President Zelensky: “Ukraine never asked American soldiers to fight on our land instead of us.” Ukraine matters to the US economy. In 2021, Europe accounted for $3.19 trillion of foreign capital investment in the US (out of a total of $4.98 trillion). In 2022, 45 out of 50 states—including the largest single-state economy, California—exported more goods to Europe than to China. Ukraine shapes global commodities markets. Ukraine ranks in the top ten in the production of corn, wheat, barley, sunflower, sunflower oil, sunflower meal, and canola. It has reserves of 117 of the 120 most widely used minerals and metals in the world, including titanium, iron, lithium, coal, and other energy deposits. At present, Russia occupies Ukrainian territory containing at least $12.4 trillion worth of raw materials.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and North America

174. Strength in Unity: A Sustainable US-Led Regional Security Construct in the Middle East

Author:
Robert Greenway
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China and Russia are exploiting US indifference toward the Middle East and efforts to integrate Iran into the region, threatening regional stability, Israel’s security, and global markets. The convergence of threats encompasses an Iranian nuclear threshold state controlling a constellation of terrorist groups, resurgent non-state terrorist groups including ISIS and al-Qaeda, and Russian and Chinese exploitation of receding American presence. We are reaching an inflection point at which the United States risks the irrevocable loss of a favorable balance of both trade and forces, resulting in instability that will threaten our vital interests and the global economy. This constitutes an unprecedented range of challenges beyond our capacity, and the capacity of our partners and allies, to address threats to global energy and trade as we struggle to recover from a global pandemic. We have not faced a similar period of risk in the Middle East since the turmoil following the Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and storming of the Grand Mosque in 1979. The US shares vital national security interests with longtime partners in the region and, as a result, they prefer US leadership in both the economic and security domains. A sustainable US-led regional security construct in the Middle East that includes effective partners based on convergent interests is the most efficient way to address the unacceptable risk, which results from the disconnect between the vital national interests of the US and its partners and the resources both have committed. A constellation of mutually beneficial trade relationships providing both the resources and rationale for a regional security construct would strengthen such an arrangement.1 Establishing a US-led enduring regional security architecture comprised of more capable partners and allies is the most effective way for the United States to safeguard our vital national security interests in the Middle East. This architecture would provide five key benefits: Secure our vital interests. The US and global economies depend on the uninterrupted flow of energy from and trade through the Middle East, which remains a vital national security interest. Compete with China. China depends on the Middle East for energy to sustain its economy and military. Beijing is exploiting the vacuum created by US indifference to securing the Middle East. Manage risk and uncertainty. Threats in the region are approaching a quantitative military advantage over America’s partners, which creates unacceptable risk to US interests. Leverage our relationships. We retain advantages in the long-term diplomatic, economic, and security relationships that we have derived from convergent interests with partners. Build on a sound foundation. Historic efforts to build collective security constructs, many of which have occurred within the Middle East, provide valuable lessons.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and Middle East

175. Helping the Afghan Allies America Left Behind

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In February 2020, President Donald Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of United States forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement served as the starting point that eventually led to the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power. In January 2021, President Joe Biden entered office. Instead of canceling the flawed agreement with the Taliban—something that was in his power to do—he merely delayed America’s withdrawal date from May to September. By July, almost all US and international forces had left. On August 15, the Taliban took Kabul. By September 11, 2021, the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on September 11, 2001. During the chaotic retreat, the US left an estimated $7 billion in military equipment in Afghanistan, most of which has now fallen into the hands of the Taliban or ended up on the black market around the region. However, this hefty price tag pales in comparison to the moral cost of leaving behind tens of thousands of Afghan allies who sacrificed so much for the United States over 20 years. In the weeks leading up to the final withdrawal, the US and its international partners attempted to evacuate Afghans who helped the international coalition over the years. By any objective measurement, this effort was a failure. The evidence of this failure was clear for the world to see during the final chaotic weeks at Kabul International Airport.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Taliban, and Refugees
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

176. From Fueling Victory to Running on Empty: Lessons from American Energy Policy in War and Peace

Author:
Arthur Herman
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The purpose of this study is to draw important lessons from how the United States has handled its national energy policy in the past in order to guide policymakers and industry leaders in the future. In the end, this is a study in contrasts. In the case of World War II, the federal government successfully used America’s energy independence and abundance to help Great Britain survive the Nazi onslaught and then to win a two-front world war, the greatest victory in history. In the case of the 1970s, the United States became dependent on others, specifically the Middle East, for its energy prosperity. As a result, America lost control over not only its ability to conduct foreign policy but also its economy. Construction of the Big Inch oil pipelines, the most extensive government energy project ever created, epitomized America’s successful national energy strategy in World War II. This project enabled the United States to literally fuel victory over the Axis. The Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the dramatic rise in the price of oil imposed by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) severely damaged the US economy, set back global growth for nearly a generation, and symbolized the failure of America’s energy strategy in that decade. The end of this study will summarize the key lessons from these two contrasting approaches to a national energy strategy. However, two stand out: Energy independence—and having access to cheap, abundant energy—is an essential prerequisite for American national and economic security. A national energy strategy that relies on the expertise of leading energy executives and engineers in the private sector will tend to be successful; one that ignores their advice and assistance will tend to fail. Whether America will enjoy energy security as it faces the challenges of the twenty-first century will depend on many factors. But drawing the right lessons from these two contrasting historical eras can prepare the way for a new era of energy abundance and national power.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, History, and Energy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

177. Saudi-Houthi Talks Sow Cracks in Coalition – The Yemen Review, January & February 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Ongoing bilateral talks between Saudi Arabia and the armed Houthi movement have renewed optimism that a negotiated political settlement in Yemen might yet be possible. But the talks are an exclusively Saudi initiative and threaten to serve only the narrow interests of their current participants. To date, their primary effect has been the easing of restrictions on imports to Hudaydah, a development quickly weaponized by the Houthis, who have sought to coerce traders to use the port exclusively, which would deprive the internationally recognized government of much-needed customs revenue. Importantly, the talks include neither the government, whose sidelining does little for its popular legitimacy, nor Saudi Arabia’s primary coalition partner, the UAE. On the heels of its massive military reengagement in Yemen over the last eighteen months, the UAE has so far rejected Houthi overtures. The divergent interests of the coalition have come to the fore in Hadramawt, where the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council has sought to extend its influence by agitating against forces affiliated with the Islamist Islah party. This has come up against resistance from local tribal groups, increasingly supported by Saudi Arabia, who are now recruiting thousands of local fighters and protesting outside interference. Increased Saudi involvement in Hadramawt is a blow to the aspirations of the STC and has been compounded by the formation of the new Nation’s Shield forces under President Rashad Al-Alimi. Paid directly by Saudi Arabia, the force could go some way toward enshrining Alimi’s administration; unlike most other members of the council, he previously had no military forces of his own.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Negotiation, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

178. Steppe change: How Russia’s war on Ukraine is reshaping Kazakhstan

Author:
Marie Dumoulin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine came as an additional shock for Kazakhstan, which had already experienced serious domestic unrest in January 2022. Kazakhstan has consistently distanced itself from Russia’s aggression and diversified its relationships with various countries, while preserving its bilateral relationship with Moscow. The war has further highlighted the need for political reforms in Kazakhstan, yet complicated the government’s ability and willingness to implement them. Kazakhstan is now cautiously navigating political change both domestically and in its foreign policy. The EU has shown interest in engaging more with Kazakhstan. It can help the country to overcome this critical juncture by encouraging and supporting its genuine domestic transformation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan

179. Fragile unity: Why Europeans are coming together on Ukraine (and what might drive them apart)

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
A recent multi-country poll for ECFR suggests that Europeans have come closer together in their support for Ukraine. Europeans now agree that Russia is their adversary or rival. Three factors have supported this remarkable coming together: Ukrainian successes in the first year of the war; the way the war has united the political left and right; and the perceived return of a strong West led by the US. But these factors are fragile and European leaders should be careful in their optimism. European policymakers should take advantage of this unity to equip Ukraine, while doing everything they can to mitigate divisions caused by changing circumstances at home and abroad.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

180. The politics of dialogue: How the EU can change the conversation in Kosovo and Serbia

Author:
Engjellushe Morina
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The EU is concerned at rising tensions in the north of Kosovo and the prospect of Russian interference in disputes between Kosovo and Serbia. To address this, the EU drew up a new proposal for engagement between Kosovo and Serbia, which the two sides have agreed to. The agreement makes some progress on the unresolved question of mutual recognition but is not yet a roadmap to full normalisation. Tepid EU efforts to enable Western Balkans states to advance Euro-Atlantic ambitions are part of the reason for the unresolved issues in northern Kosovo. The EU can transform this dynamic by setting out clearer prospects for accession for both Kosovo and Serbia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, European Union, Normalization, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, and Serbia

181. United West, divided from the rest: Global public opinion one year into Russia’s war on Ukraine

Author:
Timothy Garton Ash, Ivan Krastev, and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
A new poll suggests that Russia’s war on Ukraine has consolidated ‘the West;’ European and American citizens hold many views in common about major global questions. Europeans and Americans agree they should help Ukraine to win, that Russia is their avowed adversary, and that the coming global order will most likely be defined by two blocs led respectively by the US and China. In contrast, citizens in China, India, and Turkiye prefer a quick end to the war even if Ukraine has to concede territory. People in these non-Western countries, and in Russia, also consider the emergence of a multipolar world order to be more probable than a bipolar arrangement. Western decision-makers should take into account that the consolidation of the West is taking place in an increasingly divided post-Western world; and that emerging powers such as India and Turkiye will act on their own terms and resist being caught in a battle between America and China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Multipolarity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

182. Strategic interdependence: Europe’s new approach in a world of middle powers

Author:
Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, Julien Barnes-Dacey, Susi Dennison, Marie Dumoulin, and Frédéric Grare
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The world is changing – and European governments are struggling to decide how to position themselves within it. Middle powers outside Europe are preparing for a fragmented, not a bipolar world, and approaching the emerging order with some confidence. The EU can learn a great deal from their strategies. The EU has a myriad of interdependencies with other powers and will never be totally self-sufficient. To protect its interests and values, it needs a foreign policy strategy that acknowledges this: strategic interdependence. The EU should anchor this approach in an understanding of where it needs partnerships – and the potential power it wields within them. It should prepare for political coexistence and competition, privilege de-risking over decoupling, and invest in key relationships rather than in defending the old order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Partnerships, Multipolarity, and Interdependence
Political Geography:
Europe

183. House in disorder: How Europeans can help Palestinians fix their political system

Author:
Hugh Lovatt
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Thirty years after the Oslo accords, Israel’s annexation of Palestinian territory is entrenching open-ended conflict and what is increasingly recognised as apartheid. A third intifada is simmering in the West Bank amid expanding Israeli military raids, growing settler violence, and the resurgence of Palestinian armed groups. Conflict in the West Bank and East Jerusalem is further destabilising Gaza and southern Lebanon, risking a serious interlocking regional crisis. A weak and unpopular Palestinian Authority, combined with deepening rivalries among Palestinian leaders and factions, are increasing Palestinian political dysfunction, and exacerbating instability. Confronting Israel’s international law violations remains key. But Europeans can help mitigate negative dynamics by leveraging their funding relationship with the PA to revive Palestinian institutions and reverse the PA’s authoritarian slide. The EU should work with Gulf monarchies to reconfigure post-Abraham accords diplomacy in support of Palestinian rights and national representation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Politics, Institutions, and Palestinian Authority
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

184. Democratic defence: How Italy can lead the fight against Russian disinformation

Author:
Gabriele Carrer, Teresa Coratella, and Silvia Samorè
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
New research for ECFR suggests pro-Russia and pro-China narratives are present in online and traditional forms of discourse in Italy. It finds that forms of anomalous activity spiked just ahead of the country’s 2022 general election. Despite the shock to Italian foreign policy caused by Russia’s war on Ukraine, economic ties between the countries remain. Moreover, the political environment in Italy remains conducive to Russian influence, with the leaders of four of the five largest parties in parliament prone to echoing talking points favourable to Moscow or advocating for “peace” while suggesting the withdrawal of military support to Ukraine. Italy has been slow to put in place the structures needed to combat foreign influence. The new governing coalition appeared to place little value on tackling the problem, but it has now started to build on the more considerable progress made under former prime minister Mario Draghi. Italy should seize opportunities to strengthen the battle against disinformation, such as: encouraging the next European Commission to incorporate this task into its mandate; and placing the topic in Rome’s forthcoming G7 presidency programme.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Democracy, Disinformation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Italy

185. Keeping America close, Russia down, and China far away: How Europeans navigate a competitive world

Author:
Jana Puglierin and Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine has shown European citizens that they live in a world of non-cooperation. But their cooperative foreign policy instincts are only slowly adapting to this new reality. Europeans want to remain neutral in a potential US-China conflict and are reluctant to de-risk from China – even if they recognise the dangers of its economic presence in Europe. However, if China decided to deliver weapons to Russia, that would be a red line for much of the European public. Europeans remain united on their current approach to Russia – though they disagree about Europe’s future Russia policy. They have embraced Europe’s closer relationship with the US, but they want to rely less on American security guarantees. European leaders have an opportunity to build public consensus around Europe’s approach to China, the US, and Russia. But they need to understand what motivates the public and communicate clearly about the future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

186. Brace yourself: How the 2024 US presidential election could affect Europe

Author:
Célia Belin, Majda Ruge, and Jeremy Shapiro
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
A profound debate is taking place among US political parties about America’s future foreign policy orientation. Democrats and Republicans are aligned on some issues, such as the strategic rivalry with China, protecting domestic manufacturing, and access to strategic technologies. But the parties also disagree on subjects of crucial importance to Europeans such as climate action, the war in Ukraine, and the United States’ relationship with its allies. Within both the Democratic and Republican parties, three tribes exert influence over party foreign policy and will shape the stance of future administrations. On America’s global posture and military presence abroad, the parties are split between those who believe in limited international US engagement, others who argue for prioritising the Indo-Pacific, and advocates of continued US global leadership or even primacy. Europeans must not simply hope they can accommodate potentially dramatic shifts in US policy in the coming years, but should instead take steps now to enhance and protect their own position in the world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

187. From shock and awe to stability and flaws: Iraq’s post-invasion journey

Author:
Hamzeh Hadad
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
In the 20 years since the US-led invasion, Iraq’s political order and elite have proven surprisingly resilient in the face of numerous challenges, including terrorism, civil war, threats of secession, and mass protests. The informal consociational system, party politics, patronage networks, and competing paramilitaries are enduring features of Iraqi governance that have maintained stability even as they present many long-term problems. Despite the system’s resilience, Iraq remains deeply challenged by corruption, a lack of economic diversity and development, climate vulnerability, and some persistent security deficits. Europeans should acknowledge the realities of Iraqi governance and work within them to achieve shared European-Iraqi interests rather than seeking to impose their own ideals or solutions. Europeans could, for example, help Iraqis to manage their youth bulge problem, digitise the economy, and prepare for and adapt to climate change.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political stability, Iraq War, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, and Middle East

188. Feeling the chill: Navigating Arctic governance amid Russia’s war on Ukraine

Author:
Joanna Hosa
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine has highlighted the strategic importance of the Arctic and upended structures of cooperation between the western Arctic states and Russia, including the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council includes six organisations of indigenous peoples alongside the eight Arctic states, providing a platform for inclusive governance and the recognition and representation of the Arctic’s indigenous population. The participation of indigenous peoples in Arctic governance is key to upholding Europe’s values-based foreign policy and effective governance in the region, particularly against the backdrop of Russia’s values war with the West. The war has divided the Arctic into two camps – one including the Western Arctic states and the other comprising the Russian Arctic – with both sides exploring alternative avenues for cooperation. In this uncertain context, European governments need to preserve indigenous peoples’ participation in existing and emerging forums of cooperation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Governance
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Arctic

189. Turkey after the elections, what direction it will take

Author:
Vít Marek
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
On Wednesday, June 7, a debate took place as part of the Café Evropa cycle, on the topic: "Turkey after the elections, which direction will it go?". The invitation to the debate was accepted by Lucia Najšlová, political scientist and author of the book Turkey and the EU: The Politics of Belonging, as well as by Deník N journalist Dominika Píhová and Břetislav Tureček, head of the Center for Middle East Studies at the Metropolitan University in Prague. The debate was moderated by Žiga Faktor, the head of the Brussels office of the EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, European Union, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:
Europe and Turkey

190. The Soviet Union as a Development Actor in West Africa: An Interview with Alessandro Iandolo on Arrested Development

Author:
Alessandro Iandolo and Mirek Tobiáš Hošman
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:
The recently published work Arrested Development: The Soviet Union in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, 1955–1968 (Cornell University Press, 2022) explores the Soviet Union’s economic partnership with three newly-independent countries in West Africa during the Nikita Khrushchev era. The Toynbee Prize Foundation interviewed the author, Alessandro Iandolo, on the story and the main arguments of his book. Alongside discussing the emergence of the Soviet Union as an international development actor and the challenges it encountered in post-colonial Africa, Iandolo explained the characteristics of the Soviet development model, its similarities and differences to the Western alternatives, and why the Soviet development assistance in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali was not primarily oriented around spreading the communist ideology. Alessandro Iandolo is a historian of the Soviet Union and the world. His research interests cover the USSR’s economic, intellectual, and political interactions with external ideas, states, and people. His current project investigates intellectual exchanges between Soviet and Latin American economists on theorizing “backwardness” and “dependency.” He is a Lecturer in Soviet and Post-Soviet history at University College London.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Economics, Partnerships, and Interview
Political Geography:
Africa, Soviet Union, West Africa, Ghana, Mali, and Guinea

191. Towards an Intersectional Feminist Development Policy for Germany

Author:
Aïssa Boodhoo and Damjan Denkovski
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy
Abstract:
In the development of Germany’s Feminist Development Policy Strategy, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) conducted a consultative process which included online consultations, a high-level conference, and civil society dialogues. While the broadest consultative process by the German government to date, the BMZ process had limitations in terms of Global South participation and language accessibility. To complement the official BMZ-led process, the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy (CFFP) initiated a comprehensive co-creation process involving diverse feminist civil society organisations from the Global South, Germany, and other Global North countries. Guided by position papers from various perspectives, desk research, and interviews, the CFFP feminist convenings process involved over 100 feminists from diverse backgrounds, spanned over 25 countries, provided compensation to small and Global South organisations, and incorporated intersectional perspectives. The process consisted of in-person and online convenings held in multiple languages, ensuring broad accessibility. This report is a summary of the rich discussions and recommendations of feminists. It aims to influence policymakers and initiate action in shaping Germany's Feminist Development Policy. This report opens by discussing five action areas in chapter 1, which serve as comprehensive guidelines for immediate transformative action across policy areas. The second chapter discusses feminist reflections in six thematic areas: economic justice, climate justice, food sovereignty and agriculture, sexual and reproductive health and rights, protecting minority rights, and education.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Agriculture, Climate Change, Development, Economics, Education, Minorities, Partnerships, Feminism, Reproductive Rights, Digitalization, Funding, and Food Sovereignty
Political Geography:
Germany and Global Focus

192. The Restraining Effect of Nuclear Deterrence

Author:
William D'Ambruoso
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Recent developments in international affairs and military technology have led some analysts to conclude that the nuclear revolution, which purportedly prevents war between nuclear powers, no longer has much effect—that the world is getting safer for nuclear war or conventional war beneath the nuclear umbrella. This conclusion is wrong; technological change has not meaningfully shifted the political calculus pacifying relations between nuclear weapons states. The war in Ukraine demonstrates the continued strength of nuclear restraint: while Russian President Vladimir Putin is risk-acceptant and brutal, he did not attack a country protected by U.S.-extended deterrence, and, like NATO members, he appears deterred by the possibility that a Russia-NATO war could escalate out of control. North Korea provides another example of the endurance of mutual deterrence: Despite heated rhetoric and a barrage of missile tests, North Korea remains deterrable, and its small arsenal has also been able to deter the United States. Because the chances of nuclear war are usually low but never zero, the nuclear age should continue to be an era of great power restraint. Traditional foreign policy approaches emphasizing strategic ambiguity and arms control, including with China, remain useful tools to help keep the peace.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, International Affairs, Deterrence, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America

193. Overreach in Africa: Rethinking U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy

Author:
William Walldorf
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Due to an overly broad definition of threat, the United States currently commits far too many military resources to counterterrorism, especially in Africa. The United States is pursuing military action against at least thirteen terrorist groups in Africa, but only one of those groups has the “global reach” to be a threat to Americans. Consequently, the U.S. military is fighting a slew of counterinsurgency—not counterterrorism—wars in Africa today, a strategy that borders on nation-building. Counterintuitively, U.S. security assistance, training, and military activity in Africa since the 2000s has inadvertently aided the growth of terrorist groups in the region. Most concerning, U.S. policy today could be helping to inspire the next generation of global jihadists tomorrow, intent on attacking the United States and its closest democratic allies. U.S. military activity in Africa has expanded significantly over the past decade and a half and this trend will likely continue even further without an intentional course correction. The potential for further mission creep and overexpansion is high. Washington should wind down direct military activity and close most military bases in Africa, while also curbing security assistance to local regimes.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Counter-terrorism, and Military Aid
Political Geography:
Africa and United States of America

194. Reset U.S.-Syria Policy

Author:
Daniel Depetris
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
After 12 years of civil war, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government has consolidated its power and defeated credible threats to its rule. The anti-Assad armed opposition, which once controlled half of Syria, is relegated to the northwestern province of Idlib. While the Biden administration recognizes that Assad will likely remain in office, U.S. policy remains punitive, maintaining comprehensive sanctions on Syria until Assad negotiates political reforms with his opponents and agrees to free and fair elections. This policy will not produce the desired results. Assad is firmly entrenched, benefits from the help of security partners in Iran and Russia, who prefer that he stays in power, and remains highly unlikely to comply with U.S. demands. The status quo amounts to collective punishment of the Syrian population. Approximately 900 U.S. troops remain in eastern Syria, allegedly to train and advise the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS. But ISIS lost its territorial caliphate more than four years ago. The risk of keeping U.S. forces there in perpetuity which includes sporadic attacks on U.S. positions and escalation risks with various actors, outweighs any rewards. Neither the sanctions nor the occupation of eastern Syria serves U.S. security interests. The former does no good, and the latter risks embroiling the United States in a mission without an end date. The United States should withdraw its remaining forces and offload what is left of the counter-ISIS mission to local actors. The United States should also reduce if not end its failing sanctions regime.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Armed Forces, Islamic State, Syrian War, and Bashar al-Assad
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

195. Moving to an Offshore Balancing Strategy for East Asia

Author:
Peter Harris
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Those calling for Washington to expand U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific have misread the regional security environment. The United States can reduce its military footprint in East Asia without jeopardizing its national security or the stability of the region. China is not poised to dominate East Asia or any other part of the Indo-Pacific region. While the distribution of power in East Asia has shifted in favor of Beijing, it does not follow that China constitutes a major threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of all neighboring states. Regional powers can deter China from launching wars of aggression by investing in the right kinds of defensive weaponry to capitalize on geographic advantages. The United States should play the role of an “offshore balancer” by helping China’s neighbors to become more resilient to coercion from Beijing. The leaders of several prominent states in East Asia are anxious to avoid a “cold war” between the United States and China. Washington should heed their calls for restraint. Pushing these governments to choose a side in the U.S.-China rivalry would needlessly antagonize them. The issue of Taiwanese security presents a special challenge for the United States and its allies. Taiwan has the most to lose from China’s rise and perceives U.S. military support as essential to its survival as a de facto independent entity. However, the United States can retrench from East Asia without “abandoning” Taiwan to China. Peace in East Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific does not depend upon the United States enjoying primacy in the region. On the contrary, the pursuit of U.S. military primacy in the Western Pacific will make it more difficult to maintain regional security and promote economic prosperity over the long term.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Deterrence, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, and United States of America

196. Is Realism Policy Relevant? Evidence from Ukraine and Taiwan

Author:
Nikolaos Lampas
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Criticism of realism is based on a largely superficial understanding of the paradigm. Critics treat realism as a one-dimensional approach. Realism is a paradigm that encompasses different and sometimes mutually contradictory approaches. Realist scholars strongly opposed U.S. military interventions, such as Iraq, which have proved disastrous. Offensive realism’s rationale is unconvincing in the case of Ukraine. However, the international community’s response falls well within the realist paradigm. Deterrence remains a vital policy recommendation of realism, as evidenced by the U.S. response to the Taiwan debacle.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Intervention, and Realism
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, and Asia

197. The Syrian Civil War Twelve Years On: Can There Be a Constructive Role for Greece?

Author:
Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Loukas I. Papavasileiou
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Continual and ever-growing foreign involvement led to the internationalization of the armed conflict and turned Syria into a battleground for the strategic competition of several powers. The Kremlin has long viewed Hafez and Bashar al-Assad as indispensable partners in the Middle East and has repeatedly offered its diplomatic and military support in an attempt to achieve its own strategic objectives. Given the destabilizing effects the unending Syrian crisis has had on Middle Eastern and Eastern Mediterranean security, Greece maintains a profound interest in the resolution of the conflict. Greece appointed a Special Envoy for Syria in May 2020 with a view to reinvigorating its policy vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis. Greece’s successful re-engagement with key Arab countries and improved relations with other regional actors could pave the way for a more prominent Greek role in Syria. This could entail reinforcing its diplomatic cooperation with the EU Delegation to Syria, leading the EU humanitarian relief effort following the devastating earthquakes that hit Syria on 6 February 2023, and formulating a realistic and forward-looking strategy for the future of the Syrian people, including provisions for the voluntary repatriation of refugees and the protection of minority rights.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Refugees, Political stability, Syrian War, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Greece, and Syria

198. A New New Turkey? What an Opposition Victory Would Mean for Ankara’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Nicholas Danforth
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
The opposition foreign policy platform seeks to improve relations with the West while simultaneously continuing to pursue a more independent foreign policy. Securing the safe, voluntary and legal return of Syrian refugees through rapprochement with the Assad regime, as the opposition proposes, will prove a non-starter. Ultimately, a democratic Turkey that calibrates its foreign policy to the interests of its citizens rather than the interests of one man will be a stronger and more reliable actor on the global stage.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

199. Diplomatic scramble: Greek foreign policy towards Libya

Author:
Constantine Capsaskis
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Libya became a country of immediate interest to Greece following its 2019 Memorandum of Understanding with Turkey. Greece engaged in a flurry of diplomatic activity in the aftermath of the MoU, both within Libya and the wider region, to counter Turkey’s momentum with Tripoli. The complex political situation in Libya and its many facets (proxy conflicts between regional and international players, competition for energy resources, and other factors including religion) compound the difficulties confronting Greek efforts to shield Greece’s interests. European division over Libya has led Greece to seek other bilateral approaches, primarily through cooperation with France and Egypt. Turkey’s attempts to normalize relations with its regional interlocutors (primarily Egypt, Israel and Greece) following the devastating earthquake that struck the country in February 2023 may yet change conditions on the ground in Libya, though it is still too early to tell.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Turkey, Greece, Libya, and North Africa

200. Continuismo, contra reacción y triangulación: el desembarco de China en América Latina y la coexistencia de líneas de acción exterior de España hacia la región

Author:
Javier Martín Merchán
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Las relaciones entre España y América Latina siempre han conformado un pilar en la estrategia de integración internacional del país ibérico. No obstante, ante la singular coyuntura que supone el auge exponencial de China en la región latinoamericana, ¿qué riesgos afronta hoy España en América Latina? ¿Ha influido dicha coyuntura en las líneas maestras de acción exterior de España hacia la región? Este artículo arroja algo de luz en torno a tales preguntas, y su conclusión es doble. Por un lado, sugiere que el desembarco chino supone un serio desafío para España. Por otro, se sostiene que la política exterior española ha hecho coexistir tres tipos de actitudes como respuesta: una más continuista, otra que capitaliza esta nueva coyuntura y busca aprovechar sus oportunidades, y una última más reactiva a las amenazas que suscitaría la pujanza china en América Latina.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Latin America, and Spain