Political Geography: / Journal: Fletcher Security Review / Topic: Security

1. Strange Intimacies: Indo-Afghan Relations and the End of the War on Terror

Author:: Mou Banerjee
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Riding the Afghan tiger has always been an incredibly risky venture, as history is witness, and getting off safely has almost always been impossible. There is no reason to believe that the new political dispensation in Afghanistan will not experience or exercise more violent changes in the near future. This is a tinderbox situation, and as always, Afghanistan is serving as a proxy for external neo-imperial ideologies and political maneuvers. This genealogical pattern is not unfamiliar to historians—Afghanistan served the same purpose in the nineteenth century between Britain and Russia, in the twentieth century between the USSR and the United States at the height of the Cold War, and in the twenty-first century between the so-called enlightened and liberal Western world order led by the United States and the dark forces of “jihadi” terrorism. China, India, and Pakistan are perhaps setting the board for a new iteration of this eternal “Great Game.”
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and War on Terror
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and India

2. Grayzone Aggression: The Need for Deterrence by Denia

Author:: Elisabeth Braw
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Cyber deterrence needs to rely on a combination of deterrence by punishment of select attacks and deterrence by denial. By definition, punishment means that deterrence has failed, but given that it’s impossible to deter all cyber attacks and intrusions, Western governments with offensive cyber capabilities could retaliate against specific cyber attackers. The harm done to targets of such retaliation and the arbitrary nature of how they’re selected for punishment would increase the cost in most cyber attackers’ cost-benefit analysis. The public also expects the government to avenge, particularly egregious cyber attacks.
Topic:: Security, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, and Non-Traditional Threats
Political Geography:: Global Focus

3. Outer Space, Information Warfare, and the Truth

Author:: Gabrielle Lim and Joan Donovan
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Despite the distance, outer space and Earth are linked. However, our increasing dependence on space-based assets makes parsing the multitude of challenges and tradeoffs more difficult. Amidst talks of great power competition, space weapons, and commercialization there are equally pressing issues concerning production of knowledge, truth, and accountability. Though these topics sometimes overlap with national security (as with arms treaties or interstate war), they also affect the broad concept of human security—the wellbeing and safety of individuals and communities. As states and international organizations consider what to do to ensure the sustainable development and use of outer space, concerns should go well beyond simply reducing the level of debris, whether asteroids should be mined, or what qualifies as a space weapon.
Topic:: Security, Development, Strategic Competition, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:: Global Focus and Space

4. Sea Denial and a Scorched Earth Policy in the West Philippine Sea

Author:: Jay L. Batongbacal
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The escalating trend in China’s assertion operations is unmistakable, and it would not be unreasonable to expect that in the near future the next escalatory step would be to engage in a limited application of force as a demonstration of its intent and resolve. This could perhaps take place in relation to the tenuous hold of the Philippines on Second Thomas Shoal, about which China has clearly displayed increasing belligerence and employed steady pressure to expel the token Philippine presence on it. Another possible scenario may involve a provocative warning shot or actual ramming of government ships. As such, other contingencies within the realm of possibility should be seriously contemplated and prepared for.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:: China, Asia-Pacific, and West Philippines

5. What Next for Climate and Security at the UN Security Council: Ireland's View

Author:: Simon Coveney
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Before Ireland assumed its seat as an elected member of the United Nations Security Council in January last year, I, together with colleagues and advisors, reflected on what our priorities would be. As a Minister with two portfolios, for Foreign Affairs and for Defence, it was clear that global security in this century cannot be contemplated without a climate lens.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Global Focus, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:: Europe and Ireland

6. Reframing U.S. Military Strategy Toward Africa

Author:: John Griswold
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: How can the U.S. military best support the achievement of national strategic objectives in Africa? While much of the foreign policy discourse since President Biden’s inauguration has focused on China’s growing military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, curbing the effects of climate change, and the implications of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, scant attention has been paid to U.S. engagement in Africa. It is noteworthy that the Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG) mentions a continent of more than 1.3 billion people — whose population is expected to double by 2050 — in one paragraph out of 23 substantive pages...
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: Africa and United States of America

7. Big Power Competition in the Indian Ocean: Will Economic or Strategic Logic Prevail?

Author:: Deepa Ollapally
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The Indian Ocean is becoming an area of competition between India and China later than Robert Kaplan foresaw in his seminal 2009 article in Foreign Affairs, but sooner than its resident powers might have predicted. So far, the competition has rung high decibel alarm bells in India (and the United States), without having reached the inflection point of actual military “power plays” that Kaplan implied. India and China witnessed military clashes on land in 2020 and currently face an impasse over their disputed border.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:: China, India, and Indian Ocean

8. Sanctions Run Amok – The Undermining of U.S. Power

Author:: Keith A. Preble
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Well into its second year, the Biden administration has continued to grapple with persistent foreign policy challenges while new ones have emerged: North Korea has not curtailed its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs; negotiations with Iran on resuscitating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) remain stalled; and a Russian troop buildup near Ukraine may signal a potential invasion and full-scale conflict. In confronting these and other challenges, the United States continues to use economic sanctions as a mean of punishing, signaling, and coercing rivals into changing their foreign policy behaviors. As a tool of American economic power, policymakers often see sanctions as “Goldilocks” instruments that are “just right,” albeit ones that require time and patience to facilitate policy change.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

9. The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: A Conversation with Matthew Kroenig

Author:: Matthew Kroenig and Dylan Land
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Matthew Kroenig is Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. His latest book is The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy Versus Autocracy From the Ancient World to the U.S. and China. Dr. Kroenig has served in several positions in the U.S. Department of Defense and the intelligence community in the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations, including in the Strategy, Middle East, and Nuclear and Missile Defense offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the CIA’s Strategic Assessments Group. Dr. Kroenig is also Director of the Global Strategy Initiative and Deputy Director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Interview
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

10. "Is the Internet Trying to Kill Us?" And other Technology Security Unknowns In the New Roaring Twenties

Author:: Miles Taylor
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Machines are poised to transform life as we know it... and America isn’t ready. A hundred years ago, machines remade the world. Society in the 1920s was transformed by a proliferation of cars, radios, movies, and airplanes, dramatically altering the way we lived, worked, and played. We did not know it then, but the sweeping technology revolution was poised to change the way we fought, too. The 1930s saw a revolution in military affairs as warfare became deadlier and faster-paced, a foreseeable consequence of the previous decade’s innovations.278 This nevertheless caught many nations by surprise, such as those affected by the German blitzkrieg. We are entering a New Roaring Twenties, and again we are unprepared for how it will affect national security in the decades to come. Make no mistake: today’s innovations will be tomorrow’s economic drivers, which is why we should be actively investing in the bleeding-edge tech of the future. But we must also be vigilant about how such developments will affect our security at home and reshape international conflict, or else risk a reordering of the global balance of power. This article previews several emerging technology dilemmas, what’s being done about them, and why—in some cases—it’s already too late.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Internet, and Innovation
Political Geography:: Global Focus

11. Transforming Military Technology Through Aquisition Policy

Author:: Rabia Altaf
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The Trump administration’s 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphasized the need for continued technological modernization of the U.S. Armed Forces.324 This notion, first brought to light by the Obama administration, is underlined by the military’s inability to adapt and modernize at the pace necessary to restore the United States’ military dominance. At the root of this issue is the relationship between the Pentagon and the defense industry, which currently operates with an inadequate military technology acquisition process. Acquisition allows the Department of Defense (DoD) to communicate its strategic vision and shape the military to meet current and future threats. As it stands, this deficient process results in the mis-regulation of the defense industry. Improving the acquisition process by clearing hurdles, creating policy with innovation in mind, and carefully crafting regulation is critical for the United States to regain its competitive military advantage to tackle the global security issues of the coming decades. The Pentagon must also rethink its relationship with the private sector to induce more companies to join its supply chain and provide fresh solutions and perspectives to problems the United States has never faced before. As a notoriously difficult customer, the Pentagon must remove unnecessary roadblocks to attract a more diverse group of companies to supplement the defense industrial base.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Armed Forces, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: United States of America and north amer

12. The Climate-Security Century: Three Climate Hotspots

Author:: Mark Nevitt
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The climate-security century is here. With global temperatures rising, climate change is poised to massively destabilize the physical environment. This century may well be defined by our ability (or inability) to reduce our collective greenhouse gas emissions. We must also adapt and respond to climate change’s multivariate security impacts. From raging wildfires in Australia and California to melting ice sheets and permafrost in the Arctic, climate change acts as both a threat accelerant and a catalyst for conflict. Climate change is also unlike any other traditional security threat. It accelerates and exacerbates existing environmental stressors—such as sea level rise, extreme weather, drought, and food insecurity—leading to greater instability. Climate change impacts are already taking center stage this century, forcing us to think more broadly about climate change’s relationship with human security and national security. Complicating matters, climate-driven temperature increases do not rise in a neat, uniform fashion around the globe. The pace of climatic change unfolds unevenly and erratically. Some parts of the world—such as the Arctic—are warming at a rate two to three times faster than the rest of the world. Three specific climate-security “hotspots” foreshadow greater destabilization and serve as climate “canaries in a coal mine”—a sneak preview of our climate-destabilized future.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, National Security, and Human Security
Political Geography:: Global Focus

13. Forget China: A Policy for an Interconnected Region

Author:: Scott McDonald
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The United States (U.S.) must approach the growing assertiveness and revisionism of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by deemphasizing its importance to U.S. policy formation. Although this will seem counterintuitive to most observers, it is an important first step in placing the very real challenges posed by the PRC in their appropriate context. Neither is this to suggest the intentions and actions of the PRC do not pose a serious threat to the interests of the U.S., for in many areas they do. However, in crafting foreign policy, the U.S. government must first focus on promoting and defending its own interests. By contrast, the popular emphasis on “countering” other states is a second-handed approach that cedes the initiative and allows one’s adversary to control one’s policy. That is not to say that U.S. policy should not, where appropriate, be confrontational. Washington should not feel the need to kowtow or appease an increasingly aggressive Beijing. However, any action—cooperative or confrontational—must be taken in pursuit of a larger, positive purpose. The starting point for any policy towards the PRC, therefore, is a grand strategic approach to the Indo-Pacific as a region. It lies in a positive, provalue orientation towards building the world in which the U.S. wants to live.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, and Defense Policy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

14. Pandemic Preparedness: A Conversation with Dr. Jennifer Nuzzo (Interviewed by Dana Hatic)

Author:: Jennifer Nuzzo and Dana Hatic
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Fletcher Security Review (FSR): Dr. Nuzzo, thank you for taking the time to speak with FSR today. I would love if you could give us a brief introduction and tell me about what your role has been like since the start of the pandemic. Jennifer Nuzzo (JN): I am an assistant professor at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. I am also a senior scholar at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. I have been involved working on COVID-19 since the first news of an outbreak in China. I run a project called the Outbreak Observatory, which does operational research to improve outbreak responses. One of our activities is to publish a weekly blog, which we do to take stock of what is going on in the world and to try to learn about events—even if we are not actively doing research projects on them, just reminding people that things are happening all the time.
Topic:: Security, Interview, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

15. Do Morals Matter? A Conversation with Dr. Joseph Nye

Author:: Joseph S. Nye, Grady Jacobsen, and Alex Betley
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Fletcher Security Review (FSR): Welcome, Dr. Nye, to The Fletcher Security Review. Thank you very much for spending time with us today. Before we discuss your recent book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, would you mind speaking first about the origins of your career? Many readers of FSR are young professionals pursuing careers in diplomacy and national security. I am sure they would appreciate hearing that background. Joeseph Nye (JN): Well, I came to Harvard to do a Ph.D. Thinking I was going to go into the State Department, I thought it might be useful to have a Ph.D. but, in the process, I wound up doing some teaching and enjoyed it. I went and did my thesis in Africa and enjoyed writing about that. When Harvard offered me a job, I thought I would take it for a little while. A “little while” turned out to be quite a long while. I emphasize this to say that if you do not have all your career moves figured out at this stage, not to worry about it. Leave room for serendipity. In any case, as it turned out, I enjoy the writing and the research. After working in Africa, I went to Central America, and then spent some time in Europe looking primarily at regional integration and then broadened out to a number of things related to trade. . .
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Ethics, Interview, and World System
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

16. Post-Covid Security Landscape: A Conversation with Raffaelo Pantucci

Author:: Raffaello Pantucci
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Fletcher Security Review (FSR): Thank you for joining FSR today. To begin, what challenges do you believe countries or security practitioners will face in preventing terrorism or countering violent terrorism in a postCOVID-19 world? Raffaelo Pantucci (RP): There are going to be a lot of challenges. The difficulty with trying to make judgments about what is going to happen in a post-COVID world is that we are not in the post-COVID world yet. We are still in the midst of the pandemic, so a lot of this work and assumptions that we look into are based on assessments of what we think could happen. I think a number of things will happen. First, I think we are going to see real pressure on security forces’ resources. On the one hand, kinetic security forces—police and intelligence services—probably will not suffer too much. But the real dilemma will come with some of the upstream funding. Money is being used to try to stop people from being drawn to violent groups in the first place. Countering violent extremism projects will face immense challenges since it is very hard to understand and make direct causal links between the issues the programs are addressing and the ultimate threats. We are going to see a push on budgets and that will result in cuts for security forces. These will have an impact in different ways in different places. Unfortunately, terrorist threats are global. You can have a good grip on your threat matrix, but it has links across borders which are beyond your control. This creates a potential risk if a country you are connected to does not have a grip on their security and are under the same sort of budgetary pressures, then it is possible you will see a negative knockon effect.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Interview, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Global Focus

17. Grievance in Space and Time: The State, Militias, and the Irredentist Temptation

Author:: Bradford McGuinn
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The armed militia is an emblem of political decay. With the weakening of institutions designed to regulate the ambitions and anxieties of those inhabiting a state, and with the erosion of a political culture meant to confer legitimacy upon the rituals of governance, martial energy once held to constitutional prescription in the service of impersonal public rule can be redirected toward private purpose. Dissenting factions within a governmental structure, groups seeking its overthrow, or militias fighting within society itself challenge the viability of states, stability in their regions, and international order. This essay will consider ways in which narratives of grievance play dangerously upon the triangular system of mutual obligation that ideally orders interaction between a state, society, and the military. In this configuration of civil-military relations, the state exercises a “legitimate monopoly” on the production of violence, binding militaries to civilian control. Acting as an acid upon the alloy of this triangle, allowing leakage of “privatized” violence, is a dissatisfaction with a configuration of geography, politics, and culture of such intensity that reality can be considered oppressive.
Topic:: Security, Armed Forces, State, and Militias
Political Geography:: Global Focus

18. Losing the Long Game: A Conversation with Phillip Gordon (Interviewed by Zach A. Shapiro)

Author:: Philip Gordon and Zach Shapiro
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Fletcher Security Review (FSR): Dr. Gordon, it’s a pleasure to introduce you to our audience. Your new book, Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East, is fascinating and we are excited to hear about it. To get us started, could you briefly describe your argument? Philip Gordon (PG): In briefest form, as the title of the book indicates, the argument is that regime change in the Middle East doesn’t turn out very well. I’ll just unpack that a little bit. First, by “regime change” what I’m talking about is when the United States sets out as a matter of policy to bring about a different government and political system in a country for whatever reason. It’s not when it happens naturally or internally. We have to have it as a policy and we have to do something about it. It turns out that we’ve done this fairly regularly in the post-World War II period. In fact, we’ve done it on average about once per decade. In the book, I look back all the way to the first time in 1953, to the CIA-backed coup in Iran, and look at all the episodes for the track record. I started thinking about this in particular as the Trump administration was pivoting towards what looked like a regime-change policy in Iran. It wasn’t their official, announced policy, but it looks like that’s what they were trying to achieve in Iran. That led me to think more about the track record: when have we done this before, why have we done it, and how it has turned out?...
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Regime Change, and Interview
Political Geography:: Middle East and United States of America

19. Cybersecurity: State Attack and Response Strategies

Author:: Josephine Wolff and Ta-Chun Su
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: . One of the questions that has always been very interesting to me is “Who do we hold responsible when something goes wrong with cybersecurity?” While that is a technical question—because often when something goes wrong, there is a technical component since you are dealing with a computer and the Internet—it also very much has to do with what our liability regimes say, what our policies say, what our social norms and expectations say about who we hold accountable and who is expected to pay for the damage. So for me, I think cybersecurity is about trying to understand what we mean when we talk about the "secure Internet,” what it looks like to have a secure Internet, and who we hold responsible for all the different components of how you get there. To whom do we say “It’s your job not to answer the phishing emails,” or “It’s your job to look for bug traffic on the network.” How do we piece together that entirely complicated ecosystem of different stakeholders, and how do we identify what their different roles and responsibilities should be? ...
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Interview
Political Geography:: Global Focus

20. India's "Africa Adventure" in the Indian Ocean Commission

Author:: Jagannath P. Panda
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: On March 6, 2020, India secured the distinction of ob‐ server status to the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), an association that consists of five Indian Ocean states—Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, Comoros, and Réunion (France). New Delhi is now formally clubbed in the IOC along with the four other observer countries of China, Malta, the European Union, and the International Organisation of La Francophone (OIF). What does this mean for India’s power play in the Indo-Pacific? Fundamentally, inclusion in the IOC points to a more serious structural maritime engagement for India in the Western Indian Ocean region. The IOC is a key grouping working to foster cooperation on both traditional and non-traditional security matters of the Western Indian Ocean, which connects the Southeastern Coast of Africa with the mainstream Indian Ocean. In other words, this association opens the gateway for a more formal "continental connection" between India and the Eastern African coastal countries bordering the Indian Ocean. It not only enhances India’s stature as a rising maritime power in the Western Indian Ocean, but also exemplifies India’s security-based desire for institutionalized association with countries in the region. It promotes cooperation between India and the littoral countries on the Eastern African Coast in a number of key activities in the region: maritime-military aid and assistance, capacity building, joint military exercises, sea patrolling, logistics and intelligence assistantship, and naval training...
Topic:: Security, Geopolitics, and Maritime
Political Geography:: Africa, South Asia, India, and Indian Ocean

21. Crime in the Northern Triangle

Author:: Mark L Schneider
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Violence and crime in the Northern Triangle Countries (NTC) of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras continue to endanger citizen security in those countries, as well as in Mexico and in the United States. The extent, conditions, and policy responses are important in and of themselves, but also because this violence constitutes one of the significant factors driving migration toward the United States.
Topic:: Security, Crime, Human Rights, and Migration
Political Geography:: Central America, North America, Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador

22. Secure Communities A Conversation with Carrie Conway

Author:: Alexandra Heffern
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: I have worked in development for almost twenty years, but when I declared my focus, I had not originally thought “I definitely want to do conflict-related programming and work in conflict zones.” Given my trajectory though, I organically started to do that. I received my undergraduate degree from the University of Vermont, and at that point the only way to study international development was through their Agricultural Economics program. After finishing school, my first real introduction to the field was when I started working with Oxfam in Boston. At first it was a very administrative position, but then I was lucky and had the opportunity to go overseas as the program officer in Cambodia, which is where I would say I began my career. At that point, I really wanted to work with an NGO — I had not even thought about working with USAID or a contractor — but in Cambodia I had the opportunity to work as a local American hire with USAID. After that I went to Clark University for graduate school, and after Clark I had a number of program management roles for USAID, all of which were in conflict zones. For example, I spent time working in Timor-Leste with Tetra Tech ARD, I spent time in Afghanistan, and I served as Chief of Party in Sudan for a conflict transition program. After being overseas I decided to return to the United States and began working with Chemonics, specifically supporting their Libya and Lebanon programs in the Office of Transition Initiatives...
Topic:: Security, Conflict, Interview, and USAID
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

23. The Rise of Russia’s Hi-Tech Military

Author:: Samuel Bendett
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Following the end of the Cold War, the Russian Federation lagged behind the United States in terms of advanced technology in warfighting. However, after substantial spending on modernization starting in 2008, the Russian military and the nation’s defense sector have been making great strides at developing remotely operated and autonomous technologies and integrating them in their tactics and combat operations. Russia is also starting to invest in Artificial Intelligence (AI) development with specific military applications. These developments affect the ability of the United States to meet the goals in its new National Security Strategy; in order to meet its stated December 2017 objective of renewing American competitive advantage in key military areas, the United States should be aware of key adversarial developments such as Russia’s emerging unmanned, autonomous, and AI capabilities, and prepare itself in terms of appropriate capabilities, tactics, and plans...
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Military Spending, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and United States of America

24. Challenges Technologies Pose to U.S.-Russia Arms Control: A Conversation with Dr. Heather Williams

Author:: Fletcher Security Review Staff and Heather Williams
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Dr. Heather Williams is a lecturer in the Defence Studies Department and Centre for Science and Security Studies at King’s College London. She also does research for the Institute for Defense Analyses on Strategy, Forces, and Resources, and previously was a Research Fellow at Chatham House. Williams received her doctorate from King’s College London for her dissertation on U.S.-Russia arms control from 1968-2010.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Weapons, and Interview
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

25. The Intelligence Cycle of Targeted Killing in the United States

Author:: Christine Sixta Rinehart
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The United States has been using Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) to assassinate terrorist targets since its first RPA strike on November 3, 2002, when a U.S. Predator fired a hellfire missile at a car traveling through the Mar’ib province of Yemen. The intelligence cycle of this targeted killing process is murky at best, and the policy has changed throughout the successive administrations of U.S. presidents. Details exist but there is no defined tangible chain of analysis concerning the selection of the target, the monitoring of the target, and finally, the assassination of the target. This paper attempts to elucidate the intelligence chain of analysis concerning American targeted killing and examine how the intelligence cycle of targeted killing varies through successive presidential administrations. This paper will begin with a short analysis of relevant literature, although sources concerning this topic are scarce. The occurrence of targeted killings of U.S. citizens will also be explained in the literature section. The paper will continue with an elaboration of a generic intelligence cycle model, which will be used to illustrate the intelligence cycle of U.S. targeted killings using both the Reaper and the Predator RPA.[1] The paper will then address differences in the intelligence cycles and processes that have occurred between successive presidents since targeted killing first began in 2002 with President George W. Bush. Lastly, the paper will provide policy prescriptions in reference to improving targeted killing in the Middle East and Africa...
Topic:: Security, Intelligence, Drones, and Targeted Killing
Political Geography:: Africa, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

26. Sino-Indian Nuclear Dynamics: Taking the Global Lead

Author:: Prakash Menon
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Technology often seduces potential adversaries through a promise of relief from security threats only to deceive through the inevitable action-reaction cycle. In the universe of security, technology is contestable both by technology itself and by doctrinal prescriptions and operational countermeasures. The advantage provided by new technology is mostly ephemeral in that provides the momentum for an endless cycle that is best described as chasing one’s own tail. Only political intervention through mutual understanding, doctrinal prudence, and regulating the search for operational supremacy holds potential to escape the stranglehold of the action-reaction cycle. The elusive search for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is a prime example. This paper seeks to interrogate the role of the technology-security dynamics in the context of the Sino-Indian nuclear weapon relationship. The context of the Sino-Indian nuclear weapon relationship is clouded by the enhancing reach of India’s missiles[1], the evolving Chinese reaction to U.S. nuclear modernization accompanied by a shift in nuclear posture, and a shared belief in the role of nuclear weapons that is signified by No First Use (NFU) doctrine. The latter point represents political intervention while the two former signify the action-reaction cycle which is primarily a product of technology. However, both China and India must contend with nuclear powers that espouse First Use. China in dealing with the United States and Russia who are quantitatively superior nuclear powers, while India deals with Pakistan whose claims of quantitative superiority are contested. In technological terms, the rise of China and the U.S. reaction resulting in contemporary geopolitical flux at the global level has impacted the evolution of China’s nuclear arsenal. The most prominent illustration of this is China’s reaction to the United States’ withdrawal from the Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty. Earlier China had eschewed development of BMD, but the United States’ quest to create BMD has caused China to attempt to develop its own BMD system as well as systems that can overcome BMD like multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and Hyper Glide Vehicles (HGVs). Similarly, India has reacted to developments in China and Pakistan by launching an indigenous BMD development program...
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Weapons
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, India, and Asia

27. Re-thinking Biological Arms Control for the 21st Century

Author:: Filippa Lentzos
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: International treaties prohibit the development and use of biological weapons. Yet concerns about these weapons have endured and are now escalating. It is high time to take a hard look at technical and political developments and consider how the international security policy community should respond. A major source of the growing concern about future bioweapons threats stem from scientific and technical advances. Innovations in biotechnology are expanding the toolbox to modify genes and organisms at a staggering pace, making it easier to produce increasingly dangerous pathogens. Disease-causing organisms can now be modified to increase their virulence, expand their host range, increase their transmissibility, or enhance their resistance to therapeutic interventions.[1] Scientific advances are also making it theoretically possible to create entirely novel biological weapons,[2] by synthetically creating known or extinct pathogens or entirely new pathogens.[3] Scientists could potentially enlarge the target of bioweapons from the immune system to the nervous system,[4] genome, or microbiome,[5] or they could weaponize ‘gene drives’ that would rapidly and cheaply spread harmful genes through animal and plant populations.[6] Concurrent developments in other emerging technologies are also impacting potential future biological weapons threats. Developments in artificial intelligence and machine learning could speed up identification of harmful genes or DNA sequences. Artificial intelligence and machine learning could also potentially enable much more targeted biological weapons that would harm specific individuals or groups of individuals based on their genes, prior exposure to vaccines, or known vulnerabilities in their immune system.[7] Big Data and ‘cloud labs’ (completely robotized laboratories for hire) facilitate this process by enabling massively scaled-up experimentation and testing, significantly shortening ‘design-test-build’ timeframes and improving the likelihood of obtaining specificity or producing desired biological functionality.[8] Other developments provide new or easier ways to deliver pathogens or biological systems. Nanotechnology could potentially create aerosolized nanobots dispersing lethal synthetic microbes or chem-bio hybrids through the air,[9] or in vivo nanobots releasing damaging payloads inside human bodies.[10] Aerosol or spraying devices attached to swarms of small unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, could be another potential means to disperse biological agents. Additive manufacturing, or 3D printing, could circumvent barriers imposed by national export control systems on controlled laboratory equipment or dispersal devices.
Topic:: Security, Health, Science and Technology, Treaties and Agreements, Biosecurity, and Weapons
Political Geography:: Global Focus

28. Technology and Tensions in the Global Commons

Author:: Kristi Govella
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: For most of history, the domains of the global commons were unclaimed, largely because the technology to access and utilize them did not exist.[1] In areas such as the high seas and outer space, it was impossible for states to establish and maintain sovereign control. Even as the relevant technologies developed, costliness and controls kept them initially concentrated largely in the hands of just a few major powers such as the Unit- ed States and the Soviet Union. For the United States, “command of the commons” became the military foundation of its hegemony, granting it the ability to access much of the planet and to credibly threaten to deny the use of such spaces to others.[2] Bipolar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union strongly influenced developments in the maritime and outer space domains. In the case of cyberspace, a more recent addition to the traditional global commons, the United States was also initially dominant due to its role in pioneering associated technologies. However, over time and particularly since the end of the Cold War, continuing technological innovation and diffusion have made these domains accessible to a growing number of countries. This technological progress was born of both cooperation and competition between states. While some states chose to develop certain technologies indigenously, many acquired knowledge and equipment from abroad. Globalization of industry has made it easier for states to obtain a variety of foreign technologies, even lowering the threshold for them to procure disruptive military capabilities. In addition, over the last two decades, American primacy has been increasingly challenged by the rise of China, which has impacted the dynamics of technological development and diffusion across multiple domains. As China has acquired the technology to become more active in the commons, it has prompted major regional powers, such as Japan and India, to accelerate their own technological advancement, and other mid-sized and smaller countries have also become increasingly engaged.[3] The consequence of this multiplication of technologically sophisticated actors has been the erosion of American primacy in the global commons. Although the United States still remains the most dominant player, it is faced with a more densely populated field, and management of these spaces has become more difficult. This article examines this trend in the high seas, outer space, and cyberspace since the end of the Cold War, with attention to the ways in which the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States have catalyzed greater engagement with the commons, particularly among the countries in Asia that find themselves most affected by this power transition. I argue that advances in and diffusion of technology have transformed the global commons into increasingly crowded domains characterized by interstate competition and heightened tensions. Whether these tensions prevail depends on the creation and strengthening of regimes to manage interactions and promote shared rules and norms...
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Globalization, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:: China, Global Focus, and United States of America

29. The Need for Countries to Establish Robust and Transparent Vulnerabilities Equities Processes

Author:: Sharon Bradford Franklin
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: In 2017, leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community warned that “more than 30 nations are developing offensive cyberattack capabilities.”1 This means that more than 30 countries may be conducting hacking operations as a method for surveillance, disruption, or destruction. Unregulated cyber surveillance and cyberattacks by government actors can pose risks not only to a government’s foreign adversaries, but also to its own citizens. Thus, as the United States and other nations work to enhance their own offensive cyber capabilities, as well as to develop strategies to defend against potential attacks, it is critical that these countries establish legal regimes to govern such conduct in cyberspace. Although Germany has established a legal framework to regulate government hacking activities,[2] few countries have done so.[3] To bring government hacking operations within the rule of law, a crucial step is to design rules regarding the management of vulnerabilities that governments discover or acquire. As with other cyber actors, when governments conduct hacking operations, this frequently involves exploiting vulnerabilities in computer hardware and software systems. But these same flaws can also be manipulated by a government’s foreign adversaries or other malicious actors. Therefore, when countries consider their abilities to rely on hacking as an investigative tool, as well as their interests in exploiting vulnerabilities for military and intelligence operations, they must also evaluate the capacity of information and communications technology providers to repair bugs and protect the cybersecurity of all users. Determining whether to exploit a vulnerability or disclose it to a vendor for patching involves balancing a variety of different security concerns against each other. Some countries have made progress in formalizing the rules for making these decisions and in publicizing these rules to promote public accountability. In November 2017, the United States released a charter governing its Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP), which outlines how the U.S. government weighs the various competing equities.[4] The charter delineates which components of the government will participate in determinations regarding whether to disclose or retain each newly discovered vulnerability, and it sets forth the criteria to be used and the process to be followed in making such assessments. One year later, the United Kingdom (UK) announced its Equities Process, which follows a similar approach.5 Most recently, in March 2019, Australia released its “Responsible Release Principles for Cyber Security Vulnerabilities,”[6] and Germany is currently working to develop a VEP and is expected to make information about its process public in early 2019.[7] However, as described below, the VEP procedures revealed to date need further improvement,[8] and most of the nations with offensive cyber capabilities have not developed—or at least have not announced—any such framework...
Topic:: Security, Intelligence, Science and Technology, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

30. How Much Does a “Privacy” Weigh?

Author:: Paul Rosenzweig
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Benjamin Franklin is famous, in part, for having said, “Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.” Though historical evidence suggests Franklin’s quote has been misinterpreted,[1] the aphorism has come to stand for the proposition that privacy and security stand in opposition to each other, where every increase in security likely results in a commensurate decrease in privacy, and vice versa. Couched in those terms, the privacy/security trade-off is a grim prospect. We naturally want both privacy and security to the greatest extent possible. But Franklin tells us this is impossible — that privacy and security are locked in a zero-sum game where the gain of one comes only at the loss of the other. Of course, this characterization is assuredly flawed; it is certainly possible to adopt systems that maximize both privacy and security in a Pareto optimal way. That is one of the reasons why so many privacy and security experts simply revile the “balancing” metaphor — it obscures more than it illuminates...
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Privacy
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

31. Learning from Russia’s Influence Campaigns in Eastern Europe: A Conversation with Nina Jankowicz

Author:: Fletcher Security Review Staff and Nina Jankowicz
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Nina Jankowicz is writing a book on the evolution of Russian influence campaigns in Eastern Europe. She has previously worked advising the Ukranian government on communication and managed democracy assistance programs for Russia and Belarus. She is currently a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars’ Kennan Institute and has previously served as a Fulbright-Clinton Public Policy Fellow.
Topic:: Security, Territorial Disputes, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

32. The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age by David Sanger

Author:: David Sanger and Travis Frederick
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: In The Perfect Weapon, David Sanger argues that the nature of global power itself is undergoing dramatic changes, brought about by the proliferation of highly advanced cyber capabilities. Today, internet access is nearly ubiquitous, the cost of entry is low, and, particularly in the domain of cyberwarfare, there is one fundamental fact: offensive capabilities have critically outpaced cyber defenses. A weak and impoverished nation like North Korea can hold large swaths of public and private infrastructure in America at risk, steal military OpPlans, and pilfer millions of dollars from foreign banks. A Kremlin reeling from sanctions, low oil prices, and historically low public trust is able to threaten the very foundations of American democracy through targeted social media campaigns and hacking and leaking the emails of a major political party. But while the offensive advantage has given weaker powers greater capacity to pursue their geopolitical objectives, U.S. leadership has found that their response options have not similarly benefitted. America’s offensive cyber prowess so exceeds its own defensive capabilities that officials often hesitate to strike back for fear of establishing norms of retaliation against vulnerable infrastructure or inciting unintended escalation. Sanger argues that without an open public debate among government policy makers, military planners, and academics to coordinate a grand strategy, the United States will be forced to accept a world of constant cyberattacks, limited response options, and the greater risk of capitulating to foreign coercion...
Topic:: Security, Intelligence, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Book Review
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

33. A Healthier Way for the Security Community to Partner with Tech Companies

Author:: Douglas Yeung
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Digital data captured from social media, cell phones, and other online activity has become an invaluable asset for security purposes. Online mapping or cell-phone location information can be used to collect intelligence on population movement, or to provide situational awareness in disasters or violent incidents. Social-media postings may be used to vet potential immigrants and job applicants, or to identify potential recruits who may be likely to join the military. However, breakdowns in relationships between the tech industry and would-be consumers of technology’s handiwork could imperil the ability of security stakeholders to use this data. Ongoing issues have already begun to shape some technologists’ views on the ethical use of artificial intelligence and other technologies in war and conflict and their impact on human rights and civil liberties. It isn’t difficult to imagine a series of future incidents further souring collaboration between technologists and security stakeholders. In contrast to its reluctance over security matters, the tech industry has been a willing partner for government agencies and communities that promote health and wellbeing—topics that present less of an ethical challenge. Although it may not be immediately apparent, wellbeing and security have much in common. Could the security community take a page from wellbeing efforts to improve their collaboration with the tech industry?...
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Business, Surveillance, and Private Sector
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

34. Nuclear Weapons with 21st Century Technology: A Conversation with John Borrie

Author:: John Borrie and Fletcher Security Review Staff
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: John Borrie is the research coordinate and program lead at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. He’s currently working on continuing and expanding dialogues about disarmament and the impact of nuclear weapons on humanitarian affairs. He previously worked on weapons control for both the International Committee of the Red Cross and as a New Zealand diplomat. Borrie holds a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Bradford.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Interview
Political Geography:: United Nations and Global Focus

35. Resilient Power: A New Model for Grid Security

Author:: Lewis Milford and Samantha Donalds
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: In the last few years, Washington has been preoccupied with a debate about the security of the nation’s electric grid. The debate is as old as the grid itself: as electrification has come to drive all commerce and government, making it a key element of the country’s national security, what is the best way to protect the grid from terrorist, weather, or cyber-related threats or attacks? As with most things of a political nature, where you stand depends on where you sit. Proponents of coal, oil, and nuclear make the argument that traditional large-scale power plants are not only vital to grid stability, but also that this centralized generation model is the only economically or techno- logically feasible option.[1] It’s an old argument wrapped in new national security rhetoric, and it’s increasingly straining against the facts. More and more analysis and real-life examples show that distributed renewable energy, combined with energy storage technologies, can provide reliable power more affordably and reliably than the centralized generation alternatives...
Topic:: Security, Energy Policy, Infrastructure, and Electricity
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

36. Threat Multiplier: The Growing Security Implications of Climate Change: A Conversation with Sherri Goodman

Author:: Sherri Goodman and Eli Stiefel
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Sherri Goodman is an experienced leader and senior executive, lawyer and director in the fields of national security, energy, science, oceans and environment. She is a Senior Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center and CNA (Center for Naval Analyses), and a Senior Advisor for International Security at the Center for Climate and Security. At CNA, Goodman also served as Senior Vice President and General Counsel and was the founder and Executive Director of the CNA Military Advisory Board, whose landmark reports include National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (2007), and National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change (2014), Advanced Energy and US National Security (2017), and The Role of Water Stress in Instability and Conflict (2017), among others. Previously, she served as the President and CEO of the Consortium for Ocean Leadership. From 1993-2001, Goodman served as the first Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Environmental Security).
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

37. From Energy to Climate Security: The EU’s Evolving Views

Author:: Ellen Scholl
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The European Union (EU) has increasingly interconnected energy and climate policy, with the formulation of the Energy Union as one notable — if yet incomplete — step in this direction. In addition to the linkages between energy policy and efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to meet climate goals under the Paris Agreement, the EU has been increasingly vocal about the link between climate and security, and under- taken (at least rhetorical) efforts to incorporate climate security concerns into broader externally focused policy areas. This shift toward a focus on climate security, however, raises questions of how energy security and climate security relate, the impact of the former on the latter, and how the Energy Union fits into this shift, as well as how the EU characterizes climate risk and how this relates to geopolitical risks in its broader neighborhood. It also begs the question of how to go beyond identifying and conceptualizing the security risks posed by climate change to addressing them. This paper charts changes in the EU’s energy and climate security discourse, focusing on their intersection in the Energy Union and the EU’s promotion of the energy transition to lower carbon forms of energy, and the relevant risks in the European neighborhood. The paper concludes that while the EU has evolved to include climate priorities and climate risks into foreign and security policy thinking, the complicated relation- ship between climate change and security complicates efforts to operationalize this in the EU, in relations with the broader European neighborhood, and beyond...
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Energy Policy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe, Global Focus, and European Union

38. In a World of War, Could it Be ‘From Russia with Love’: A Conversation with Igor Istomin

Author:: Igor Istomin and Akshobh Giridharadas
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Igor A. Istomin is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Applied Analysis of International Issues at MGIMO University. He holds Ph.D. and M.A. degrees from MGIMO University as well as an undergraduate degree from Saint Petersburg State University. Istomin teaches undergraduate and graduate classes in methods of applied analysis of international affairs. He is an executive editor at International Trends, a leading Russian academic journal. He is also a visiting fellow at the School of International and Public Affairs at Jilin University in China. Istomin is the author of more than 50 publications on U.S. foreign policy, relations in the Euro-Atlantic space, and international security. His most recent book is The Logic of State Behavior in International Politics (2017). He has also prepared policy reports and papers for the Russian International Affairs Council, the Valdai Discussion Club, the Center for Strategic Research in Moscow, and the European Leadership Network.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Cold War, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

39. Building Trust and Confidence in International Security: A Conversation with OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger

Author:: Thomas Greminger and Ryan Rogers
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Ambassador Thomas Greminger was appointed Secretary General of the OSCE on 18 July 2017 for a three- year term. Ambassador Greminger joined the diplomatic service of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) in 1990 and has held numerous senior management positions during his career. Prior to his appoint- ment as OSCE Secretary General, he was Deputy Director General of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, overseeing an annual budget of USD 730 million and 900 staff in Bern and abroad. From 2010 to 2015, Greminger was the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the OSCE, serving as Chair of the Permanent Council during Switzerland’s 2014 OSCE Chairmanship. Prior to his assignment at the Per- manent Delegation of Switzerland to the OSCE, Greminger was Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affair’s Human Security Division, Switzerland’s competence centre for peace, human rights, and humanitarian and migration policy. Thomas Greminger holds a PhD in history from the University of Zurich and the rank of Lieutenant Colonel (General Staff) in the Swiss Armed Forces. He has authored a number of publications on military history, conflict management, peacekeeping, development and human rights. His mother tongue is German; he speaks fluent English and French, and has a working knowledge of Portuguese. In 2012, he was awarded the OSCE white ribbon for his long-standing support for gender equality.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Regional Cooperation, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, and European Union

40. The Future of Strategic Intelligence

Author:: Robert Hutchings
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: We begin with a puzzle: the need for strategic analysis is more important than ever in this period of great flux and uncertainty, but the disdain for analysis of any kind has never been greater than under the administration of President Donald J. Trump. The very premise that leaders need reasonably objective intelligence analysis to inform their policy decisions – a premise that has guided every U.S. administration since World War II – is under assault. If we are to rebuild our capacity for strategic thinking, we need to go back to the beginning. When President Harry Truman created the strategic intelligence function at the end of World War II, he understood that the United States had been thrust into a global role for which it was not prepared. The world was simply too complex, and American interests too extensive, to operate on the basis of impulse or ad hoc decision making. Moreover, when Truman issued National Intelligence Authority No. 5 on July 8, 1946, instructing the Director of Central Intelligence to “accomplish the evaluation and dissemination of strategic intelligence,” he deliberately set up this function outside of the White House, the Department of State, and the military, so that strategic analysis would be kept at a critical distance from policy making. Yet Truman, like every president since, was ambivalent about the role of strategic intelligence and the degree of autonomy it ought to have. The story actually begins earlier, when President Franklin Roosevelt, in a military order of June 13, 1942, formally established the Office of Strategic Services with William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan at its head, and directed it to “collect and analyze... strategic information” and to “plan and operate special services.” The cloak- and-dagger wartime operations of the OSS are the stuff of legend, as are the notable figures recruited to serve, including the poets Archibald MacLeish and Stephen Vincent Benét, the banker Paul Mellon, the psychologist Carl Jung, the philosopher Herbert Marcuse, the anthropologist Margaret Mead, and the movie director John Ford. Less well known is its role in strategic intelligence analysis through its Research and Analysis (R&A) Branch, led initially by James Phinney Baxter III, president of Williams College, and after 1943 by Harvard historian William Langer, identified in war correspondence as “OSS 117.”
Topic:: Security, Intelligence, History, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

41. Historical Trajectory of the U.S.-Russia Relationship: Perception and Misperception: A Conversation with Professor Tatiana Shakleina

Author:: Tatiana Shakleina and Ryan Rogers
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Professor Tatiana Shakleina sat down with the Fletcher Security Review in November 2017 in conjunction with the Conference on U.S.-Russia Relations between The Fletcher School and Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). In a detailed and engaging conversation that spanned over 25 years of history, Professor Shakleina traced the post-Cold War origins of the current tension between the United States and Russia. While personnel within the Trump Administration have moved on to new positions or left government altogether since the interview, Professor Shakleina’s rich historical overview of post-Cold War U.S.-Russia relations remains extremely relevant in understanding the recent trajectory and current state of the bilateral relationship.
Topic:: Security, Cold War, Government, History, Bilateral Relations, and Trump
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

42. Looking Inward to Improve National Security: A Conversation with Former Congressman Christopher Gibson

Author:: Christopher Gibson
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Chris Gibson is a former Republican Congressman from upstate New York, and is currently the Stanley Kaplan Distinguished Visiting Professor of American Foreign Policy at Williams College. Prior to his congressional service, Mr. Gibson had a 24-year career as an Army officer before retiring as a Colonel. His services included tours in the First Gulf War, the Balkans, multiple combat tours in Iraq and a humanitarian tour to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake. His new book Rally Point addresses the current divisions within U.S. politics and the risks we face if they continue to inhibit the U.S. government from fulfilling its necessary functions.
Topic:: Security, Government, National Security, and Interview
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

43. The Ghost: The Secret Life of CIA Spymaster James Jesus Angleton by Jefferson Morley

Author:: Jefferson Morley and Brian O'Keefe
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: In his new biography The Ghost: The Secret Life of CIA Spymaster James Jesus Angleton, veteran journalist Jefferson Morley probes an enigma others have chronicled but none satisfactorily explained. Angleton, “a founding father of U.S. mass-surveillance policies,” joined the Agency’s predecessor, the OSS, in its early years and reigned as chief of its Counterintelligence Staff for an extraordinary two decades until his abrupt retirement in 1974.[1] His personal mystique and complicated tenure have given rise to a small but formidable contingent of biographies, novels, and film characters. What Morley adds to the intrigue is a refusal to be seduced by the beguiling charm of his subject, preferring instead to deliberately scrutinize Angleton’s expansive power, ideological intransigence, and lasting influence. Morley’s timeline spans Angleton’s career, though he peppers his narrative with nods to formative experiences at Yale, post-CIA pursuits, and family affairs. The story unfolds chronologically through four tersely titled and equally distributed sections (Poetry, Power, Impunity, Legend), each of which is further demarcated under a dozen or more pithy subheadings (Mole, Oswald, Kim...). Readers might experience the rhythm as too serial for the genre, and while the chronological method is helpful in charting Angleton’s ascent, Morley rarely lingers long enough with a scene to breathe life into its cast. Save a few animated vignettes, the reader is less a participant in the sensory and internal worlds of Morley’s subjects than a recipient of his detective digging, sundry sources, and interpretive reflections...
Topic:: Security, Intelligence, History, Book Review, and Surveillance
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

44. Energy Security in Armenia and the South Caucasus

Author:: Ursula Kazarian
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The independent development of renewable energy resources — and especially solar energy production, in the short term — may present the best opportunity for both intrastate and interstate autonomy in the South Caucasus, and may particularly benefit the Republic of Armenia, whose current energy portfolio is almost entirely supplied, owned, and, until recently, operated by Russia.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Climate Change, Energy Policy, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:: Russia, Armenia, and South Caucasus

45. Energy and Security in Mexico: The Real Winners of a Drug War

Author:: Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The rapid growth of organized crime in Mexico and the government’s response have driven an unprecedented rise in violence and impelled major structural economic changes, including the recent passage of energy reform. My latest book entitled Los Zetas Inc. asserts that these phenomena are a direct and intended result of the emergence of the brutal Zetas criminal organization and the corporate business model they have advanced in Mexico. Because the Zetas share some characteristics with legal transnational businesses that operate in the energy and private security industries, the criminal corporation is compared in the book with ExxonMobil, Halliburton, and Blackwater (renamed “Academi” and now a Constellis company). Combining vivid interview commentary with in-depth analysis of organized crime as a transnational and corporate phenomenon, I propose a new theoretical framework for understanding the emerging face, new structure, and economic implications of organized crime in Mexico. Arguing that the armed conflict between criminal corporations (like the Zetas) and the Mexican state resembles a civil war, I identify the key winners and losers of this episode in Mexico’s most recent history. The groups that seem to have benefited — or will potentially benefit — the most (directly or indirectly) from the novel criminal scheme introduced by the Zetas, the Mexican government’s reaction to it, and the resulting brutality appear to be corporate actors in the energy sector, transnational financial companies, private security firms (including private prison companies), and the United States border-security/military-industrial complex.
Topic:: Security, Crime, Energy Policy, and Drugs
Political Geography:: North America and Mexico

46. U.S.-Russia Relations: Energy Security & Beyond: A Conversation with Dr. Celeste Wallander

Author:: Ishan Khokar and Celeste Wallander
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Celeste Wallander is President and CEO of the U.S.-Russia Foundation. She served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia/Eurasia on the National Security Council (2013-2017), as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia (2009 to July 2012), professor at American University (2009-2013), visiting professor at Georgetown University (2006-2008), Director for Russia/Eurasia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (2001-2006), Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (2000- 2001), and professor of Government at Harvard (1989-2000). She is the author of over 80 publications on European and Eurasian security issues, focused on Russian foreign and defense strategy. She received her Ph.D. (1990), M.Phil. (1986) and M.A. (1985) degrees from Yale University. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Atlantic Council of the United States, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Topic:: Security, Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Interview
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

47. Human Trafficking and Climate Change: Understanding the Disastrous Relationship

Author:: Alice C. Hill
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Human trafficking is a horrendous crime: it degrades human security and undermines the rights of people around the globe. Although the exact number of victims worldwide remains elusive, the extent of human trafficking stands to increase in coming years for several reasons, including the accelerating rate of climate change. A warming world will almost certainly bring more disasters that result in greater displacement of people from their homes and livelihoods. This, in turn, puts them at greater risk of trafficking. Human trafficking is a highly lucrative crime, with few perpetrators successfully prosecuted and transnational criminal and terrorist groups repeatedly using it as a source of revenue. These factors, in combination with worsening climate change impacts will, in all likelihood, yield ever more human trafficking victims. At its core, human trafficking involves forcing another against his or her will to work, perform sex acts, or succumb to debt bondage. Despite its name, the crime does not necessarily involve movement: the key element is coercion. Over 170 nations have signaled their opposition to human trafficking by joining the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and virtually all countries have registered official opposition to trafficking in humans. Despite these pronouncements, human trafficking occurs with staggering frequency. While precise estimates of the number of persons trafficked are difficult to obtain, the U.S. Department of State speculated in its 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report that there may be “tens of millions” of victims worldwide.[1] Other international organizations “estimate that about 25 million people are victims” of human trafficking in the world.[2] In all likelihood, those numbers will grow due in part to the increasing effects of climate change...
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Crime, and Human Trafficking
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

48. Outlook: Chechnya and Terrorism, Putin and Kadyrov: A Conversation with Julie Wilhelmsen

Author:: Julie Wilhelmsen and Maia Brown-Jackson
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Julie Wilhelmsen is a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. She conducts research in the fields of critical security studies, Russian foreign and security policies and the radicalization of Islam in Eurasia. Wilhelmsen has also written about convergence in Russian and Chinese interests in Central Asia and about Russian approaches to the fight against terrorism. She holds a master’s degree in post-Soviet and Russian studies from the London School of Economics and holds a PhD in Political Science at the University of Oslo.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, History, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Soviet Union, and Chechnya

49. Understanding Myanmar: History and Current Perspectives: A Conversation with Derek Mitchell

Author:: Derek Mitchell and Maia Brown-Jackson
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Derek Mitchell is senior advisor to the Asia Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Ambassador Mitchell was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on June 29, 2012, as the first U.S. ambassador to the Republic of the Union of Myanmar in 22 years. He took up his post in July 2012, and departed March 2016. Ambassador Mitchell has authored numerous books, articles, and opinion pieces on Asian security affairs. He received an M.A. in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School at Tufts University and a B.A. from the University of Virginia.
Topic:: Security, Human Rights, Ethnicity, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Southeast Asia and Myanmar

50. Intersectionality of Conflict in Africa The African Union’s Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division (CPEWD) Mechanism

Author:: Frederic Gateretse-Ngoga
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Over the years the African continent has made significant strides in ensuring its voice is heard on the global scene. Despite this progress, Africa is still not perceived as a credible business partner. Although Africa has experienced significant economic growth, it is still considered “jobless” growth. A “youth bulge” is also appearing across the continent, which can be both an asset and a ticking time bomb. Overall, Africa continues to witness diverse threats to its peace and security, ranging from communal, ethno-religious, and pastoralist conflicts to violent extremism, and most recently, the increasing impacts of climate change. Combined, these threats have claimed an enormous number of lives and properties, displaced millions, and destroyed sources of livelihoods all while stunting socio-economic progress. It is critical for the African Union (AU) and its member states to collectively address the root causes and to understand the multidimensionality of security in Africa to avoid further bloodshed. Understanding what breeds instability is essential in preventing the outbreak of violence and conflict. Instability is often caused by four main factors: power contestation, lack of inclusivity, unequal distribution of resources, and impunity. If these root causes are not addressed in a timely manner, instability is inevitable. Over the years, several strategies have been employed at national, regional, and continental levels to address conflicts. We are perplexed by the dynamics of the existing threats, as well as the patterns of the emerging threats. Assessments reveal an increasing inter-relatedness of the existing and emerging threats and predict their escalation if they are not adequately addressed in a timely manner. More often than not, the signs of potential violent conflicts exist, but the corresponding responses are relatively weak or late. This trend has compelled world leaders to advocate for prevention at the earliest stage given the enormous humanitarian, psychological, and socio-economic costs of violence. As such, the imperatives of matching early warning with early response to prevent and or mitigate violent conflicts cannot be overemphasized. However, these strategies should not be implemented separately or haphazardly, but in concerted and coordinated manners to ensure tangible impacts...
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Security, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Africa and African Union

51. Identity and Conflict, Permanent Deconfliction or Eventual Reset? A Conversation with U.S. Army Colonel Robert E. Hamilton

Author:: Robert Hamilton
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: U.S. Army Colonel Robert E. Hamilton is a Black Sea Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and is a professor in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. He has served as a strategic war planner and country desk officer at U.S. Central Command, as the Chief of Regional Engage- ment for Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan, and as the Chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Georgia and as the Deputy Chief of the Security Assistance Office at the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan. Colonel Hamilton was a U.S. Army War College fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, where he authored several articles on the war between Russia and Georgia and the security situation in the former Soviet Union. Colonel Hamilton holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of Virginia. Colonel Robert Hamilton spoke with The Fletcher Security Review in early November 2017 at Fletcher’s Religion, Law and Diplomacy Conference. The following conversation is an excerpt from their extensive interview.
Topic:: Security, Conflict, Syrian War, Identities, and Interview
Political Geography:: Bosnia, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

52. Where Are We Now? Important U.S.-Russia Geo-Strategic Flashpoints: A Conversation with Dr. Evelyn N. Farkas

Author:: Evelyn Farkas and Ryan Rogers
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Dr. Evelyn N. Farkas is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and a national security analyst for NBC/MSNBC. She served from 2012 to 2015 as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia/Ukraine/ Eurasia, responsible for policy toward Russia, the Black Sea, Balkans, and Caucasus regions and conventional arms control. From 2010 to 2012 she served as senior adviser to the supreme allied commander Europe and special adviser to the secretary of defense for the NATO Summit. Prior to that, she was a senior fellow at the American Security Project, and executive director of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. From April 2001 to April 2008, she served as a professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Asia Pacific, Western Hemisphere, Special Operations Command, peace and stability operations, combatting terrorism, counternarcotics, homeland defense, and export control policy. Dr. Farkas obtained her MA and PhD from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. She is a member of the board of trustees of Franklin & Marshall College and Aspen Institute Socrates Seminar, and Harold Rosenthal Fellowship advisory boards. She has received several Department of Defense and foreign awards and an honorary doctorate from Franklin & Marshall College. In January 2018, Dr. Farkas discussed a range of issues concerning Russia and the post-Soviet space with the Fletcher Security Review. The conversation took place in the run-up to the March 2018 presidential elections in Moscow and before President Putin’s highly publicized Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, in which he unveiled a number of new nuclear weapon systems currently under development by the Russian Federation.
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Syria, North America, and United States of America

53. What We Can Learn from Inclusive Security: A Conversation with Ambassador Swannee Hunt

Author:: Eli Stiefel and Swannee Hunt
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Swanee Hunt is an activist, philanthropist, academic, author, and internationalist. She is the Eleanor Roosevelt Lecturer in Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School. She was the Founding Director of the school’s Women and Public Policy Program and is currently core faculty at the Center for Public Leadership and senior advisor to the Working Group on Modern Day Slavery at the Carr Center for Human Rights. She has taught The Choreography of Social Movements at Harvard College and lectured at Harvard's business, law, divinity, and education graduate schools. Hunt also chairs the Washington-based non-profit Inclusive Security, conducting research, training, and advocacy to integrate women into peace processes. Her work in this area began when, as the US Ambassador to Austria from 1993 to 1997, she hosted negotiations and international symposia focused on stabilizing the neighboring Balkan states and advancing women’s leadership in Eastern Europe. Her fourth book, Rwandan Women Rising will be released in May 2017 (Duke U. Press).
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Civil Society, Diplomacy, Women, and Interview
Political Geography:: United Nations, Balkans, and United States of America

54. Sociopolitical Movements and the Development of Non-Violent Civil Resistance: A Conversation with Ches Thurber

Author:: Ches Thurber and Austin Bowman
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Ches Thurber is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Northern Illinois University. He was previously a research fellow at the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism at the University of Chicago and at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. His current book project, Strategies of Violence and Nonviolence in Revolutionary Movements, examines why political movements seeking to overthrow the state embrace strategies of either armed insurgency or civil resistance.
Topic:: Security, Islam, Non State Actors, Sectarianism, Social Movement, Conflict, and Interview
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

55. Water for Security

Author:: Peter Engelke
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: In February 2017, California’s Oroville Dam threatened to collapse due to an unprecedented level of water in its reservoir. Faced with the possibility of calamity (Oroville Dam is the nation’s tallest at 770 feet), state officials evacuated 200,000 people from downstream areas.[1] The Oroville incident followed another high-profile water tragedy in the United States. In December 2015, Flint, Michigan Mayor Karen Weaver declared a state of emergency because lead contamination from Flint’s ancient water pipes poisoned the city’s water supply, making it unsafe to drink.[2] Michigan’s governor, Rick Snyder, and President Obama both followed with similar declarations. Flint sadly became a national symbol of incompetence, to some even proof of deliberate malfeasance by public officials. Despite remedies to fix the problem, Flint’s water remains unsafe, and the city’s residents continue to go about their lives drinking bottled water. These cases are more than just poignant demonstrations of the truism that water is life. They show that even in advanced societies, there is a fine line between water security and insecurity, between having and not having on-demand clean water in exactly the right quantities at precisely the right moment. In the United States, we are the beneficiaries of past investments in water infrastructure that have removed water insecurity from our lives. We believe that simply turning a tap provides clean, drinkable water as a free good of nature, as readily available to everyone as it is to us. Unfortunately, this assumption is not only untrue, it is dangerous to boot. A great many societies around the world are water insecure, meaning their inhabitants do not enjoy what Americans take as a given. As water is fundamental to public health, economic activity, energy and agricultural production, and countless other uses, the poor supply of water or disruption in that supply is a serious threat to domestic and international security...
Topic:: Security, Environment, Health, Water, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

56. Epidemiological Insurgency: Polio Persistence on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border

Author:: Rand Quinn
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Despite a profound global impact over the first half of the twentieth century, polio is largely an afterthought throughout the developed world. Vaccines engineered in the late 1950s paved the way for a precipitous drop in global disease burden with the onset of the World Health Organization-led (WHO) Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) starting in 1988. Recent indicators of the program’s success include a declaration of eradication in India[1] and a teeteringly low infection rate in Nigeria;[2] two of the disease’s last bastions. This progress, however, has been notably stifled by the steady persistence of a wild poliovirus reservoir centered in northern Pakistan along the Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) border. Throughout significant portions of recorded history this region’s volatility has been well-documented, including a currently sustained network for the training of terrorist fighters dating back to the period of the 1979 Afghan-Soviet War.[3] These networks serve to both attract fledgling radical jihadist recruits and supply fighters globally, markedly providing many of the transnational fighters taking part in the Syrian Civil War. Their movement in and out of the Af-Pak region has provided a major disease vector for poliovirus. The location of a terrorist network transit hub in by far the world’s largest remaining reservoir of wild poliovirus poses a major challenge for policymakers. Due to several factors, including a decline in healthcare infrastructure throughout the western world, the situation presents a legitimate epidemiological threat. However, the issue is more importantly an exemplar of the morphing nature of multidimensional threats, which are likely to become more prevalent in an era of globalization, failed states, and an inability to effectively address social issues amidst the threat of kinetic warfare...
Topic:: Security, Environment, Health, Terrorism, World Health Organization, Infectious Diseases, and Borders
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Asia, Middle East, and United States of America

57. The Future of U.S. Partnerships: A Conversation with Hans Binnendijk

Author:: Robert Pulwer and Hans Binnendijk
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Dr. Hans Binnendijk is Vice Chairman of the Fletcher School Board. He has served in senior positions at the National Security Council, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the State Department. He has directed think tanks at Georgetown University, the National Defense University, and in Europe. He writes frequently on national security policy.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Government, Politics, Partnerships, and Trump
Political Geography:: Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

58. A Curriculum of Fear: Homeland Security in U.S. Public Schools, by Nicole Nguyen

Author:: Harry Oppenheimer and Nicole Nguyen
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Nicole Nguyen’s A Curriculum of Fear: Homeland Security in U.S. Public Schools presents an ethnography of Milton High School (a pseudonym), which, when presented with dwindling resources, a reputation for disciplinary issues, and poor marks, made a Faustian bargain with the national security apparatus. The book was meticulously researched, with rich detail on social and environmental forces at play in its educational context. However, the author’s own political and normative biases will leave many readers frustrated that the book’s presentation does not live up to its content.
Topic:: Security, Education, Homeland Security, Book Review, and Ethnography
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

59. Human Rights, Democracy, and Ethics at the Forefront of Education of Public Security Forces in the Western Hemisphere: The WHINSEC Experience

Author:: Otto H. Van Maerssen
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: In a fairly humid, subtropical section of the United States, there is a site where sporadic gunfire sometimes rattles the windows of buildings nearby. At times, plaintive howls can be heard through those windows: the wails of wounded officers lying on neatly trimmed fields under the bright sun, waving their arms desperately to attract the attention of medics converging on a nearby field ambulance. Meanwhile, scores of military officers, civilian officials and law enforcement personnel inside the buildings barely notice, and all resist the presumably well-ingrained temptation to spring into action. Ignoring the noise outside is certainly understandable, for the sounds are from just some of many training exercises on the Army’s sprawling military base at Fort Benning, Georgia. The military officers, civilian officials and law enforcement personnel are students at one of the base’s facilities, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), and are deadly serious about their studies – on countering transnational threats, UN peacekeeping operations, and intelligence analysis of transnational operations, among other courses offered. But, there is one notable feature that distinguishes the educational exercises at this building from any other, and which unites the students in this particular facility: every student in every course begins studies with classes on human rights and democracy, as delineated by the U.S. experience.
Topic:: Security, Education, Government, Human Rights, Regional Cooperation, Military Affairs, and Democracy
Political Geography:: South America, North America, and United States of America

60. Space Cooperation and Space Security in the Asia-Pacific Region

Author:: Zhao Yun
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Space cooperation is already taking place in the Asia-Pacific region. At the moment, there are three ongoing space cooperation platforms in this region. Japan and India host two regional forums respectively: the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) (1993) and the Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP) (1995). The APRSAF is a loose platform for voluntary information exchange on an annual basis. It does not pursue any legally binding agreements, but rather provides a flexible framework “to promote regional cooperation in space development and utilization through voluntary cooperative efforts of participating countries and organizations.”
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Science and Technology, and Space
Political Geography:: United Nations and Asia-Pacific

61. Challenges in Common European Defense Policy: Russia’s Involvement in Ukraine

Author:: Monica M. Ruiz
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: There are often misunderstandings among member states in international organizations (IO) regarding the legal nature of certain acts. Issues of privileges and immunities based on the principle of functional necessity, both inherent and implied powers, and the principle of good faith under common law are continuously criticized and debated by both member states and IOs alike. For this reason, international legal order can be a process of continuous transition and constant evolution. This essay analyzes the development and changes of legal norms in the European Union’s (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). On that basis, it will unfold by looking at the EU’s legal structure to create a solid framework for understanding the current challenges for common European defense policy in relation to Russia’s involvement in Ukraine. Although there have been substantial legal improvements introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam (effective 1999) and by the Treaty of Nice (effective 2003) to help clarify the ambiguous nature of the CFSP, its objectives remain wide and abstract. This further precludes the EU from formulating a joint and coherent stance on issues related to defense...
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Law, International Organization, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and European Union

62. Below the Threshold: Gray Warfare and the Erosion of U.S. Influence: A Conversation with Hal Brands

Author:: Austin Bowman
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Hal Brands is a Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is also the author and editor of several books, the most recent including Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order (2016) and What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (2014).
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Alliance, Conflict, and Gray Zone
Political Geography:: North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

63. ISIS and Reporting: A Conversation with Graeme Wood

Author:: Graeme Wood and Eli Stiefel
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Graeme Wood is a correspondent for The Atlantic. He was the 2015 - 2016 Edward R. Murrow Press Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and is a lecturer in political science at Yale University. He was formerly a contributing editor to The New Republic and books editor of Pacific Standard. He was a reporter at The Cambodia Daily in Phnom Penh in 1999, then lived and wrote in the Middle East from 2002 to 2006. He has received fellowships from the Social Sciences Research Council (2002-2003), the South Asian Journalists Association (2009), the East-West Center (2009-2010), and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Center for the Prevention of Genocide (2013-2014). He has appeared many times on television and radio (CNN, ABC, BBC, MSNBC, et al.), was the screenwriter of a Sundance Official Selection (2010, short film), and led a Nazi-hunting expedition to Paraguay for a History Channel special in 2009.
Topic:: Security, Non State Actors, Islamic State, and Journalism
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

64. Full Issue: Money & War

Author:: Sarah Detzner, James Copnall, Alex de Waal, Ian M. Ralby, Joshua Stanton, Ibrahim Warde, Leon Whyte, Richard Weitz, Jessica Knight, John H. Maurer, Alexander Tabarrok, Alex Nowrasteh, Tom Keatinge, Emily Knowles, Karolina MacLachlan, Andrew Lebovich, Caroline Troein, and Anne Moulakis
Publication Date:: 01-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The Fletcher Security Review: Managed and edited by students at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, we build on the Fletcher School’s strong traditions of combining scholarship with practice, fostering close interdisciplinary collaboration, and acting as a vehicle for groundbreaking discussion of international security. We believe that by leveraging these strengths – seeking input from established and up-and-coming scholars, practitioners, and analysts from around the world on topics deserving of greater attention – we can promote genuinely unique ways of looking at the future of security. Each issue of the Review is centered around a broad theme – in this issue, we tackle “Money & War.” Money influences every aspect of warfare, conventional or unconventional. No nationstate military, insurgent group, terrorist network, trans-national criminal organization, or hybrid actor can be understood, or countered, without knowing where the money is coming from – as well as where, and how, it gets spent. Evolutions and revolutions in financial tools and practices quickly translate to transformations in military affairs, and some cases, vice versa.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Human Rights, Governance, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Finance, Islamic State, Navy, Arab Spring, Maritime, Conflict, Multilateralism, Islamism, Drugs, and Currency
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Africa, China, Iran, Sudan, Darfur, Middle East, Asia, North Korea, Mali, Asia-Pacific, Sahel, United States of America, and North America

65. Nonviolent Struggle Versus the Islamic State: A Strategic Perspective

Author:: Alia Braley and Srdja Popovic
Publication Date:: 07-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Attacking terrorism at its root, through slow and incremental cultural change, will pay off in the end, but this process is a difficult sell to those facing IS now. Such a long-term view neither benefits the people struggling to survive each day under IS’s murderous and authoritarian reign, nor does it equip the international security community concerned about IS’s immediate threat to regional stability. There is another solution. If what is needed is a relatively rapid rearrangement of social conditions that would cut off IS’s critical sources of power, then there may be no better route than collective nonviolent action undertaken by Iraqi and Syrian civilians. Collective nonviolent movements have been shown to be more effective than violent movements, even against highly violent or authoritarian opponents. Such a movement might take a page from IS’s own book, and tap into the same sources of power that have been indispensible to its success. After all, IS did not attract an army of nearly 30,000 fighters and capture a cumulative swathe of land larger than the United Kingdom merely because it had weapons. IS has flourished by successfully filling at least two critical power vacuums within Iraqi and Syrian society. It has seized upon a powerful narrative during a time of turbulence and confusion, and it has delivered necessary human services in places where the state has proved incompetent. However, a nonviolent collective movement of Syrian and Iraqi citizens could fill these power vacuums much more convincingly than IS, and in so doing, cripple IS’s power in the short term and impede the growth of new terrorist movements in the long term...
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Authoritarianism, Islamic State, and Civilians
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

66. The Littoral World

Author:: Howard J. Fuller
Publication Date:: 07-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The role of seapower in nurturing American security and prosperity has long been exaggerated, if not wholly misrepresented. Throughout the nineteenth century, the nation’s first generations of leaders exhibited a healthy skepticism toward free trade and the maritime hegemony of the British Empire. By focusing on domination of the country’s littoral space during the Civil War, the U.S. Navy succeeded in shielding the Union from European interference. It was not the assumption of the British mantle that safeguarded the nation; rather, U.S. preeminence was secured by rejection of maritime overreach. Strong anti-British tariffs and industrial protectionism were the cornerstones of sustained commercial growth and genuine national independence. The unique problem with seapower, even in the contemporary period, is how easily we can glorify it. We love the sea, and mighty ships, and we tend to flaunt what we love, but this relationship has no place in a grand strategy that acknowledges the limited historical contribution of free trade to the American economy.
Topic:: Security, History, Economy, Maritime, Oceans and Seas, Trade, and Seapower
Political Geography:: Britain, North America, United States of America, and Oceans

67. The Four Horseman of the Modern World: FSR Interviews Dr. Harlan Ullman

Author:: Harlan Ullman
Publication Date:: 07-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Dr. Harlan Ullman, a distinguished Fletcher School alumnus, sat down with the Fletcher Security Review recently to discuss the past, present, and future of U.S. and global security, as well as his most recent book, A Handful of Bullets: How the Murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand Still Menaces the Peace. He is Chairman of the Killowen Group, which advises leaders in business and government; Chairman of CNIGuard Ltd and CNIGuard Inc. which are infrastructure protection firms; Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council and Business Executives for National Security, both in Washington, D.C.; on the Advisory Board for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe; and Director Emeritus of the Wall Street Fund, one of the nation’s first mutual funds. A former naval officer with 150 combat operations and missions in Vietnam in patrol boats and other commands at sea, he was principal author of the ’Shock and Awe’ doctrine, which was released in 1996. With seven books and thousands of articles and columns to his credit, he was made UPI’s Arnaud de Borchgrave distinguished columnist earlier this year.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, War, History, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Iraq and United States of America

68. Weak Sanctions Breathe Life Into North Korean Defiance of International Community: FSR Interviews Joshua Stanton

Author:: Joshua Stanton
Publication Date:: 07-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Joshua Stanton, an attorney in Washington, D.C., has advised the House Foreign Affairs Committee on North Korea-related legislation, including the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act, and blogs at OneFreeKorea. His article, "North Korea: The Myth of Maxed-Out Sanctions", a legal analysis of North Korean sanctions, refuted the idea that there is nothing left that the world community can do to bring them to the negotiating table. In this interview, he expands further on this idea addressing why people think that nothing more can be done and how the Iranian nuclear deal will affect relation with North Korea. The views expressed are solely his own.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Sanctions, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Iran, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

69. Trading Security: A Case Study on Maritime Security Decision Points in the Context of Global Trade

Author:: Caroline Troein and Anne Moulakis
Publication Date:: 01-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The term maritime security often evokes destroyers and aircraft carriers, disputes over territorial waters or islands, or piracy and terrorist attacks such as the USS Cole bombing in 2000. High profile crises can lead us to forget that maritime security is an everyday event; it is about enabling safe transit. Each step within the maritime transport of goods has security challenges and considerations. At the same time, the continued stability and effectiveness of maritime trade is itself a broader security matter of importance to consumers, businesses, and governments. With the “weaponization of finance” maritime trade will play a central role in economic actions being taken out of geopolitical concerns.
Topic:: Security, Maritime Commerce, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, Maritime, and Trade
Political Geography:: Global Focus and Oceans

70. Money and War: Corruption as the Hidden Enemy of Mission Success

Author:: Emily Knowles and Karolina MacLachlan
Publication Date:: 01-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Corruption, instability, and conflict tend to go hand in hand. Twelve of the fifteen lowest-ranking countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index are currently experiencing violent insurgencies, extremist activity, or other signs of deep-seated instability. [1] Systemic, embedded corruption is a thread that runs through such seemingly disparate events as the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the conflict in Ukraine, the failure of the Malian army in 2012, the growth of Boko Haram in Nigeria, and the retreat of the Iraqi security forces in the face of ISIS. However, the effects of corruption are not limited to exacerbating the risk of conflict; corruption also makes it more difficult for states to respond to threats and for international institutions and other actors to offer effective assistance.[2] Assistance to fragile and failing states tends to include two types of engagement: international peacekeeping and/or stabilization operations and defense capacity building (i.e. assistance to the recipient states’ security forces). But without anticipating and mitigating the risks that corruption poses, the international community risks the intent of security assistance being subverted, the assistance wasted, and the success rate of stabilization operations being severely impaired. In particular, misappropriation of funds, vanishing resources, and a reliance on malign power-brokers can irreparably damage the operational success of a mission. This article is based on the research investigating the international community’s approach (or lack thereof) to tackling corruption in Afghanistan carried out by Transparency International UK’s global Defence and Security Programme (TI-DSP) and based on over 75 interviews with civilian and military officials. This work is supported by insights from TI-DSP’s long-term engagement in the Building Integrity training for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.[3] In the resulting report, we argue that corruption has had a significant impact on ISAF mission success and that the international community’s reaction to corrupt practices was too little, too late. We point to three main ways in which corruption and uncontrolled money flows can diminish the effectiveness of the mission and offer a planning and risk assessment framework as the first step toward addressing corruption risks on operations...
Topic:: Security, Corruption, Peacekeeping, Arab Spring, Conflict, and Transparency
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Middle East, Nigeria, and Mali

71. Enough to Go Around? Money Matters Complicate U.S. Strategic Rebalance to Asia-Pacific

Author:: Leon Whyte and Richard Weitz
Publication Date:: 01-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The U.S. Strategic Rebalance to Asia – also known as the “Asia Pivot” – has been a cornerstone of the Obama administration’s foreign policy since 2011. Hillary Clinton offered a detailed explaination of the concept in a 2011 Foreign Policy article.[1] The basic idea behind the Rebalance is that many U.S. core economic and security interests are increasingly centered in the Asia-Pacific region, so the United States needs to allocate more diplomatic, economic, military, and other assets towards the region. The Strategic Rebalance would do just that. The Defence Strategic Guidance relaeased by the Defence Department in January 2012 made supporting the rebalance a key Pentagon objective. The Obama Administration accordingly plans to increase the percentage of naval assets in the Pacific to 60 percent by 2020[2] in addition to stationing 2,500 Marines in Darwin, Australia, and 4 littoral combat ships in Singapore.[3][4] Given the region’s economic importance, this makes sense. The Asia-Pacific region accounted for 40 percent of global economic growth in 2013. In 2012, the U.S. exports to the region totaled $555 billion, which supported 2.8 million U.S. jobs.[5]
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economy
Political Geography:: Asia-Pacific and United States of America

72. Accountability for Armed Contractors

Author:: Ian M. Ralby
Publication Date:: 01-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: On 16 September 2007, the accountability of private armed contractors became a global concern. A team of armed guards from the US company Blackwater Worldwide, operating on a US State Department contract, opened fire that day in Baghdad’s Nisor Square, killing seventeen Iraqi civilians and injuring an additional twenty. It took more than seven years before four of the individuals responsible were ultimately convicted of either first degree murder or voluntary manslaughter by a jury in a U.S. Federal District Court. A fifth member of the Blackwater team had previously pleaded guilty to manslaughter.[1] The initial lack of consequences and the slow speed of justice provided the watchful world with strong evidence that armed contractors operate in a zone of legal twilight, devoid of accountability. The rise of private armed contracting was one of the most distinctive operational developments of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Erik Prince, founder of Blackwater, famously stated: “Our corporate goal is to do for the national security apparatus what FedEx did to the postal service.”[2] Throughout both conflicts, the hiring policies of several Western governments, particularly those of the United States, helped Blackwater and numerous other companies move toward that goal. By December 2008, for example, 69% of the United States’ total force in Afghanistan was comprised of private contractors, roughly 15% of which were armed.[3] While there are no reliable statistics on the size of the global private armed security industry, there is little doubt that it has grown and contracted with the surge and decline of Western engagement in armed conflict. New conflicts on the horizon, however, suggest the possibility of a resurgence of the industry, reigniting concerns about accountability. The proliferation of private armed security companies has coincided with a proliferation of initiatives aimed at developing accountability for the industry. Numerous codes, standards, mechanisms and proposals – developed by governments, international organizations, civil society groups, private companies, trade associations, individuals, academics and multi-stakeholder bodies – have sought to address different issues surrounding armed contractors. Most of them, however, have been developed in response to incidents that already occurred. This reactive approach to accountability, while useful for addressing past problems, may leave the industry exposed to future problems. In other words, a code, standard or mechanism set up to prevent another Nisor Square incident may be very effective in doing so, but may fail to prevent a different and even more worrying incident in the future. This article begins with a brief overview of the most credible accountability initiatives, suggesting that the resulting collection forms a patchwork, rather than a framework for governing the conduct of armed contractors. The analysis then focuses on the process of selecting contractors, with a particular emphasis on the US Government. While cost has been a key factor in determining selection, the various initiatives discussed have made it possible for accountability and quality to be added as essential metrics. Ultimately, however, the failure of the accountability initiatives to remain current, much less forward-looking, means that the objective determinants of ‘accountability and quality’ may not be fit for purpose as the US and other Western powers begin to engage the services of armed contractors for assistance in new conflicts...
Topic:: Security, War, Governance, Military Affairs, Regulation, and Accountability
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, Middle East, and United States of America

73. Full Issue: Emerging Domains of Security

Author:: Meg Guliford, Thomas McCarthy, Alison Russell, Michael M. Tsai, Po-Chang Huang, Feng-tai Hwang, Ian Easton, Matthew Testerman, Nikolas Ott, Anthony Gilgis, Todd Diamond, Michael Wackenreuter, Sebastian Bruns, Andrew Mark Spencer, Wendy A. Wayman, and Charles Cleveland
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The theme of this special edition is “Emerging Domains of Security.” Coupled with previously unpublished work developed under a prior “Winning Without War” theme, the articles therein honor Professor Martel’s diverse, yet forward-leaning, research interests. This edition maintains the journal’s four traditional sections of policy, history, interviews, and current affairs. Our authors include established academics and practitioners as well as two Fletcher students, Nikolas Ott and Michael Wackenreuter. Each of the articles analyzes critical issues in the study and practice of international security, and our authors make salient arguments about an array of security-related issues. The articles are borne out of countless hours of work by FSR’s dedicated editorial staff. I deeply appreciate the time and effort they devoted to the publication of this volume. They are full-time graduate students who masterfully balanced a host of responsibilities.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Intelligence, International Cooperation, International Law, History, Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, Cybersecurity, Navy, Conflict, Space, Interview, Army, Baath Party, and Norms
Political Geography:: China, Iraq, Europe, Middle East, Taiwan, Germany, Asia-Pacific, Global Focus, and United States of America

74. Roadmap for a Code of Conduct for Cyberspace

Author:: Thomas McCarthy and Alison Russell
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Professor Martel, author of Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy, offers three guiding principles for U.S. grand strategy: rebuilding domestic foundations of power; exercising American leadership to restrain sources of disorder that directly threaten U.S. vital interests; and forging both alliances and partnerships to confront the most pressing threats to global stability.[2] The last of Martel’s three principles foreshadows the three cyber security activities at the heart of the newly released U.S. Department of Defense Cyber Strategy. The three activities around which the new U.S. DoD cyber strategy revolves are: Information sharing and interagency coordination; building bridges to the private sector; and building alliances, coalitions, and partnerships abroad.[3] These three coordinating and collaborating activities are the key to building relationships between actors influencing the development of the cyber domain, and are necessary to identify and counter threats. To advance global cyber security, the Cyber Strategy suggests the U.S. must “build and maintain robust international alliances and partnerships to deter shared threats and increase international security and stability.”[4] As part of this effort, the United States seeks to build security relationships to respond to shifts in the international environment, including sources of disorder. These relationships are built upon trust and cooperation of many actors with varied interests and objectives in cyberspace. Given the wide variety of actors and interests within the cyber domain, establishing relationships of trust based on a shared understanding of acceptable conduct, expected behavior, and governing principles represents a daunting challenge...
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Cybersecurity, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

75. Special Operations Today: FSR Interviews LTG Cleveland (Ret.) Former Commanding General, USASOC

Author:: Charles Cleveland
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Lieutenant General Charles T. Cleveland, an Army Special Forces Officer, relinquished command of the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and retired after 37 years of military service on 01 July 2015. He previously commanded the Special Operations Command Central and Special Operations Command South as well as the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-North during Operation Iraqi Freedom. LTG Cleveland is a native of Arizona and a 1978 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. His military awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal and the Legion of Merit Medal.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Interview, Army, and Special Operations
Political Geography:: Africa, North America, Panama, and United States of America

76. Profiles in Security: CW5 Wendy A. Wayman

Author:: Wendy A. Wayman
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Wendy Ann Wayman never imagined she would still be serving her country more than three decades after enlisting in the United States Army, let alone rise to rank of Chief Warrant Officer 5 and become the first Command Chief Warrant Officer for Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). Born and raised in Aberdeen, South Dakota, CW5 Wayman has traveled the world and advised the highest-ranking military leaders in the United States. She has also amassed a legion of professional colleagues who describe her using such phrases as “no one better,” “shaping the future of military intelligence,” “a consummate professional,” “my dear mentor,” and “a complete badass.” The Fletcher Security Review is honored to feature INSCOM Command Chief Warrant Officer, CW5 Wendy Wayman’s “Profile in Security."
Topic:: Security, Military Affairs, Interview, and Army
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

77. Moving East and South: U.S. Navy and German Navy Strategy in the Eurasian Theater 1991- 2014, A View from Germany

Author:: Sebastian Bruns
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The Cold War ended rather suddenly in 1991. With it went the model on which the United States’ maritime strategy of the 1980s had rested. Driven by individuals like John Lehman, President Ronald Reagan’s long-time Secretary of the Navy, that series of strategic documents promulgated a forward, offensive, counter-force approach and the famous ‘600-ship Navy’ force structure. With the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, the sole challenger to U.S. naval power vanished practically overnight. Red Fleet warships were rusting away in port or dismantled altogether. In the United States, the military lost significant human capital through a number of force reduction rounds, which reflected how the U.S. Navy could and would take on the post-Cold War world intellectually. In the wake of this strategic recalibration, allied militaries and their navies—such as the Federal German Navy, soon to be renamed German Navy—also underwent substantial transformations. These were often guided by the shifting geopolitical landscape as well as the popular desire to reduce the inflated defense budgets of Cold War days in order to obtain a peace dividend. This analysis will focus on the Eurasian theater—very broadly speaking, the waters that surround the European and Southwest Asian landmasses[1]—in U.S. and German naval strategy between 1991 and 2014. The maritime sphere has become increasingly important as a domain of emerging security since the end of the Cold War, yet comparatively little time and resources are being devoted to research on naval strategy and relationships between allies at sea. As a result, the use of naval force for political and diplomatic ends and the dynamics of maritime geopolitics have suffered. This essay seeks to underline the challenges that have confronted the U.S. Navy in the past generation and analyze their long-term effects. While the U.S. Navy’s geographic focus and operational interests have increasingly shifted from Europe to the Middle East and Asia, and from control of the “blue water” high seas to the littorals, these key interests should not be overlooked. In the view of the author, the fall of the Soviet Union and the implication that allies like Germany would do more to patrol their own maritime neighborhood provided the U.S. Navy with a convenient reason to de-emphasize their previously highly valued naval hub in the Mediterranean Sea. In rebalancing from the Sixth Fleet area of responsibility (AOR) to other regions of the world, the U.S. Navy accepted the consequences for fleet design and ship numbers, perhaps willingly using it as a bargaining chip for force reduction rounds in Washington, D.C. Implicitly, European allies and the U.S. Air Force[2] were expected to fill the gap left behind in terms of naval presence and crisis response, in particular after the successful campaigns in the Adriatic Sea in responding to unrest and war in the Balkans. European allies, however, were largely uninterested in stepping up to the plate; they considered their near abroad safe enough. Most importantly, they were somewhat wary of delivering a combined ‘pocket Sixth Fleet’ of their own. Finally, they were preoccupied with managing German unification, enlargement of the European Union, and establishing a common market and currency, among other things. Accordingly, this paper sheds a light on some key German strategic documents for a time when the reunited country sought its new place in the security environment of the post-Cold War world. By taking a unique view from Germany, one of the U.S. Navy’s premier NATO allies, this analysis also considers the transformation of the Bundesmarine from an escort navy to an expeditionary navy.[3] It seeks to conceptually explain how Germany’s security policy addressed the maritime challenges of the new era. The German Navy was principally drawn south- and eastward geographically after 1991, usually in close cooperation with other allied and friendly navies (and mandated by NATO, the EU, or the UN).[4] It was increasingly asked to address maritime security challenges to which the U.S. Navy no longer, or only in a supporting role, responded. The German Navy went into the breach with what were essentially Cold War assets and a mindset fundamentally dominated by the inability to think strategically. This paper is split into two sections. The first section discusses the 1991-2001 timeframe and the second section covers the period from 2001-2014. 2001 marked the inauguration of President George W. Bush in January and the terrorist attacks on September 11 eight months later. Each section looks at the strategic developments of the U.S. Navy and the German Navy, their major naval operations, and some areas of cooperation between the two navies in Eurasia...
Topic:: Security, Cold War, History, Military Strategy, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

78. The Bypass: Ahmad Chalabi, Dick Cheney and the Disbanding of the Iraqi Army

Author:: Michael Wackenreuter
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: On March 12, 2003, a week before the invasion of Iraq, a Principals Committee meeting of the National Security Council was held at the White House to formally decide the fate of the Iraqi Army.[1] The participants, having all received extensive briefings on the subject prior to meeting, voted unanimously and with little discussion that after disbanding the Republican Guard, the “regular soldiers” of the Iraqi Army would be called “back to duty.”[2] In spite of this decision, on May 23, 2003, L. Paul Bremer III—President Bush’s “special envoy” in Iraq—announced Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 2, “Dissolution of Entities.” Among the relevant entities to be dissolved by the decree was the Iraqi Army.[3] In an interview with the journalist Robert Draper at the end of his presidency, President Bush commented on this apparent dissonance when he remarked, “The policy was to keep the army intact; didn’t happen.” When asked further of his reaction when he found out about the decree, Bush replied, “Yeah, I can’t remember, I’m sure I said, ‘This is the policy, what happened?’”[4] Having endured significant criticism over CPA Order No. 2, Mr. Bremer was quick to defend himself, providing letters to The New York Times to and from the president “in order to refute the suggestion in Mr. Bush’s comment that Mr. Bremer had acted to disband the army without the knowledge and concurrence of the White House.”[5] Such a puzzling exchange over such an important topic serves to illustrate a larger point. That is, despite its centrality to America’s involvement in Iraq, from the emergence of the insurgency onward to its current conflict with ISIS, it still remains unclear how and why the decision to disband the Iraqi Army was made. In this paper, I demonstrate that the impetus for CPA Order No. 2 came from the prominent Iraqi exile Ahmad Chalabi, and was carried out under the authority of Vice President Richard “Dick” Cheney by a small group of Chalabi’s supporters in the Office of the Vice President and the Pentagon. I do so first by establishing the lengths to which those in the vice president’s office, in concert with like-minded officials at the Defense Department, were willing to go in order to support Chalabi, who favored disbanding the army. Secondly, I identify the striking similarities between the events surrounding the order and other instances involving the vice president that involved a bypass of the normal interagency policy-making process...
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, History, Army, Baath Party, and Iraq War
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

79. The Role of Special Operations Forces in a Sustainable U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy: Moving Beyond Kinetic Targeting in the Future Operating Environment

Author:: Anthony Gilgis
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: For the past two decades, the United States military and the national security apparatus have focused their energy and capabilities on confronting Islamic terrorism as a kinetic target. Much of U.S. counterterrorism policy today consists of lethal raids and unmanned aerial vehicle strikes against targeted individuals. The U.S. government has come to rely heavily on the Special Operations Forces (USSOF) in particular for lethal raids, also termed “Direct Action” assaults, one of the ten “Core Activities” that Title X identifies for USSOF. Unfortunately, Direct Action has come to overshadow the broad array of missions that USSOF was originally intended to conduct. Unconventional Warfare, for example, is a core USSOF mission intended to prevent radical ideology from taking root in a society with a range of activities to build local good will towards friendly forces and animosity towards extremists. The U.S. can more effectively incorporate USSOF into a “whole-of-government” approach to counterterrorism by refocusing attention on non-kinetic, counter-ideology operations. To move beyond the recognized battlefields of the past decade, U.S. officials must embrace a multidimensional operating environment that requires simultaneous focus along multiple lines of effort. Future warfare will include complex, adaptive systems of ideology, economy, physical infrastructure, governance, and energy — which cannot be defeated through kinetic operations alone. The USSOF will need to transform its operations accordingly. During the last two decades of the twentieth century, a paradigm shift occurred in the realm of transnational terrorism and how nations responded to it. Shifting away from a focus on political goals, transnational terrorist groups began using religion as a motivating factor — both in their operations and in their recruitment. This new form of terrorism required a shift in response from the international community. It took the West almost a decade to recognize this shift and adjust its response to the emergent threat. Following 9/11, the United States fully engaged Special Operations Forces and paramilitary elements to actively counter this new religious ideology. SOF and paramilitary units were tasked to conduct raids against members of radical extremist groups. However, after almost 15 years of continuous warfare, the U.S. has arguably experienced limited success with its counterterrorism efforts as groups continue to conduct attacks and grow, gaining notoriety and establishing affiliated movements around the globe. Kinetic actions have created an entire generation of potential radicals who are victims of our counterterrorism “successes.” Populations sensitive to radicalization are also vulnerable to state-level terror in the form of unexpected and unpredictable military strikes. The battle against terrorism to date leaves the question, “As the United States looks to the future operating environment, can the Special Operations community find a more effective method to counter the ideology that creates the modern Islamic terrorist?” Since 2001, the West has increasingly focused on lethal targeting of individuals within religious-based extremist organizations. This method of conducting kinetic operations — either through direct action assaults by military or paramilitary units, or through the use of missile strikes from aerial platforms — has become the public face of the United States counter-terrorism effort. While the United States military has arguably raised man-hunting of individuals from an imprecise task to a methodical science, targeted lethal actions are nonetheless perceived as little more than indiscriminate state-level terror within the populations in which the operations are conducted. Looking to the future operating environment, the current policy of countering terrorist actions with targeted killing is unlikely to sway the underlying ideology in Americans’ favor. As such, it is necessary to develop a sustainable counterterrorism strategy that considers the human domain of local opinion as the future battlefield. The Special Operations Forces of the U.S. military will play a central role in any long-term strategy to counter violent extremist organizations; they are specifically designed to create a counter-ideology within the scope of unconventional warfare. Before looking at the role of U.S. Special Operation Forces within this emerging strategy, an understanding of the changing nature of warfare within a complex environment is necessary. Moving forward in the concept of developing a long-term counterterrorism strategy beyond the use of kinetic operations, we must understand that Islamic extremism is rooted in an ideology the West has displayed overt ignorance of and has been unprepared to counter. As stated by Patrick Sookhdeo, “Equally damaging has been the desire for a quick-fix and the reluctance to engage in a long-term struggle against the ideological struggle that nourishes and promotes Islamist terrorism.”
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and Special Operations
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

80. When War is Not Worth Winning

Author:: Matthew Testerman
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Winning a war requires the capacity to wage a war and an understanding of an end-state that equates to winning. These fundamental concepts, however, are not well defined. This essay draws from recent historical examples, contemporaneous strategy documents, and formal game theory to provide some additional degree of conceptual clarity that will enhance the debate about winning without war. In the past two decades, the U.S. has developed a demonstrated capacity to win with war. Victory in kinetic war fighting is nearly assured and can be accomplished with limited cost. Despite this, in the modern context, war has evolved to the point that war is not worth winning. It is far from the case that there are no wars to be fought, but the political and economic constraints of the international system have transformed the environment in which the U.S. operates militarily. Evidence of this is found in the strategic outlook of the U.S. military as documented in the revised U.S. naval strategy, especially when compared to earlier maritime strategy. To inform this discussion, game theoretic explanations of strategic interactions are helpful. The assumptions underlying recent U.S. naval strategy can be understood by applying the basic construct of a “game of strategic entry." Applying this construct, one finds that war is not worth winning– a conclusion that has substantive consequences for designing, organizing, and employing naval forces.
Topic:: Security, War, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Iraq War
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

81. The Strategic Duel over Taiwan

Author:: Ian Easton
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are firmly entrenched in what will be a long and intense strategic competition for dominance over the Pacific Rim. American strategists Andrew Marshall, Robert Kaplan, and Aaron Friedberg began foretelling of this great power struggle over a decade ago.[1]. They recognized before anyone else that there are strong forces underpinning the U.S.-China rivalry. The two countries’ political systems and national interests stand in fundamental opposition. This is why, despite Washington’s reluctance to officially admit it, strategic competition between the U.S. and the PRC is unavoidable. The United States, while an imperfect democracy, is an inspiration to people everywhere who yearn for the freedom and dignity that comes from having a representative government, independent legal system, and market economy. In the PRC, on the other hand, power is monopolized by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a political organization that is directly responsible for more human suffering than possibly any other regime past or present, anywhere in the world.[2] Numerous State Department reports detail the past and continuing human rights violations occurring under the watch of the CCP.[3] For all its much ballyhooed economic reforms, China’s economy is still largely controlled by massive state-owned corporations, making it a mercantilist country, not a capitalist one.[4] Much of Beijing’s economic power ultimately stems from its remarkable ability to lure foreign business elites with promises of access to its huge market. Once the hook is set, China pockets their investments, steals their intellectual property, and undercuts their market competitiveness.[5] Yet it is not the PRC’s unsavory political or economic practices that will ensure sustained U.S.-China competition over the coming decades, although future American presidents, like Barack Obama, will undoubtedly be tempted to paper over ideological differences for expedience sake. Rather, Beijing’s insecure and aggressive nature is at the root of the problem. In recent years, China has stoked maritime tensions with Japan and the Philippines, both treaty allies of the United States; provoked border clashes with India, a democratic nation and American security partner; and enabled nuclear missile proliferation amongst its friends: North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran.[6] Track records tell a compelling story. The PRC’s track record indicates that a growing number of geostrategic issues could eventually result in a clash between the United States and China...
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Economy, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

82. China’s Development of Space Warfare and Its Operational Applications

Author:: Feng-tai Hwang
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: As early as March 2011, the journal Aerospace America featured an article with the title “China’s Military Space Surge,”[1] which warned that there had been a rapid increase in China’s capability to conduct warfare in space. Such capabilities would then in turn threaten and jeopardize the ability of the carrier battle groups of the United States to conduct operations in the Pacific. This article was soon translated into Japanese and published in Space Japan Review. This and other high profile articles highlight the anxieties on the part of the U.S. and Japan about China’s increasing ability to militarize space, and also their concerns about its implications for the peace and security of East Asia and the entire Pacific Asia region. On December 31, 2015 China announced the creation of three new branches of armed forces to be added into the reformed People’s Liberation Army (PLA): Army General Command, Strategic Support Force, and the PLA Rocket Force. While the PLA Rocket Force replaced the old Second Artillery Corps, what is even more intriguing is the mission of the new Strategic Support Force. According to Chinese media, the Strategic Support Force will be responsible for overseeing intelligence, technical reconnaissance, satellite management, electronic warfare, cyberwarfare, and psychological warfare. It is no coincidence that Gao Jin (高津), the newly appointed commander of the Strategic Support Force, is also an expert on rocket science, which has further fueled media speculations that the Strategic Support Force has been created for the purpose of conducting future space warfare.[2] In fact, China has been increasing the focus on the military applications of space since the end of Persian Gulf War in the 1990s. During that war, the United States mobilized dozens of satellites to aid the American-led coalition forces, enabling them to defeat Iraqi forces with extraordinary efficiency and ease. The Persian Gulf War greatly shocked PLA observers at the time, and served as a reminder that the conduct of modern warfare had been transformed by the arrival of a new generation of technology. Chinese military theorists then began to study the concept of “space warfare.” The most influential was Chang Xian-Qi (常顯奇), who categorized space warfare into three distinct phases based on his observations of U.S. planning: the “Entry into Space,” the “Utilization of Space,” and the “Control of Space.” “Entry into Space” is represented by the delivery of a military-purpose spacecraft into its designated orbit path. “Utilization of Space” is to harness the power of existing space assets to aid military operations across the land, naval, and air domains. For example, such power can manifest in the forms of using space sensors to conduct surveillance and gather intelligence for Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) against potential foes, to provide ballistic missile early warning, satellite navigation and communications, among other purposes. The “Control of Space” phase focuses on establishing “space superiority” with the missions of: (1) increasing survivability of one’s own military satellites and systems; (2) disrupting, sabotaging, or destroying opposing countries’ satellites and their systems when necessary; and (3) directly using space-based weapons to aid in combat operations on the ground.[3]...
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, War, Military Affairs, and Space
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

83. China’s United Front Strategy and its Impacts on the Security of Taiwan and Asia-Pacific Region

Author:: Michael M. Tsai and Po-Chang Huang
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: In 1949, Mao Zedong, leader of the Communist Party of China (CCP), defeated Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) troops and succeeded in establishing the communist dictatorship of the People’s Republic of China out of the “barrel of a gun.” At the beginning of its rule, the CCP believed that the use of violent instruments as provided by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was in and of itself sufficient to both suppress “reactionaries” at home and defeat “invaders” from abroad. In this vein, during the Korean War of the early 1950s, the CCP regime sent a million-strong “Volunteer Army” into the Korean Peninsula and fought against the U.S.-led United Nations forces, thus cementing the political division of Korea and its complications that linger to this day. Between 1958 and 1960, PLA troops heavily bombarded the Chiang Kai-shek-controlled island of Kinmen, resulting in significant casualties on both sides. Between the 1960s and 1980s, the PLA and militia troops engaged in a series of border conflicts and clashes with the Soviet Union, India, and Vietnam. Throughout this period, the CCP regime still believed that military force alone was sufficient to serve as the primary bargaining chip and policy instrument in its dealing with other states.[1] However, from the late 1980s to 1990s, the collapse of Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc marked the end of Cold War and the confrontation between two global superpowers. The CCP’s strategy in the international arena evolved from an overreliance on hard military force to one that utilizes both “soft power” and the “carrot and stick.” From the Chinese perspective, the concept of “soft power” encompasses the exploitation of any policy or tool outside the traditional definition of “hard” military power to achieve its desired political, economic, and diplomatic objectives. Such exploitation takes place via political, societal, commercial, economic, legal, psychological, cultural, and other means. Mass media and even tourist groups could all be used as a means of penetration to funnel and support Chinese agents deep inside enemy territory and to create conditions that are conducive to achieving China’s desired outcome. This is the essence of China’s strategy of the “United Front.” This article examines the United Front strategy and the ways in which China’s deployment of this strategy impacts the national security of Taiwan as well as neighboring countries such as Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and even the United States.[2] The article concludes with proposed policy recommendations for how Taiwan can counter such strategies...
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Cold War, History, Military Strategy, and Soft Power
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Taiwan, Soviet Union, Vietnam, Philippines, and United States of America

84. Fletcher Opening Arctic Conference

Author:: Rabia Altaf, Molly Douglas, and Drew Yerkes
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Many Western leaders point to the Arctic as a zone of cooperation—and we have observed such cooperation with the formulation of the Arctic Council, joint scientific endeavors, Search and Rescue agreements, and the very recent Arctic Coast Guard Forum—but disputes between Russia and other Arctic nations in regions to the south have raised concerns in certain quarters. While an ongoing struggle for dominance over the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage and competing continental shelf claims may reflect these tensions, tit-for-tat military exercises and plans for expanded military infrastructure in the Arctic certainly do. The Russian government recently announced completion of a new military base in Franz Josef Land capable of supporting 150 soldiers, as well as its intention to rebuild six existing airfields. While such a nominal increase in military personnel posted to the Arctic may merely be seen as a posturing act, taken in context with Russia’s recent actions in Europe and the Middle East, it might also be seen as a bold move to project power from a previously overlooked region.
Topic:: Security, Economics, International Cooperation, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

85. Russia's Arctic: A Necessary Space for Dialogue

Author:: Andrew Yerkes
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Over the weekend of November 21st, 2015, Russia flew 141 sorties over Syria, hitting 472 targets in eight different provinces throughout the country.[1] While the deployment of the Russian Air Force over Syria has been in full affect since last September, the events of November 20th proved to be unique. Two of the TU-160 blackjack bombers that participated in the weekend’s campaign took flight not from a base in southern Russia, but rather from Olenegorsk Airbase on the Kola Peninsula of the Russian Arctic.[2] The two bombers traveled southwest along the coast of Norway, skirting United Kingdom airspace, turning east through the straits of Gibraltar, and achieved their goal of firing cruise missiles on Syria from the eastern Mediterranean. After their mission was complete, they flew northeast over Iran and the Caspian Sea to their home base in Engles, Saratov Oblast, in Southern Russia.[3] In total, the flight lasted 16 hours, with the aircraft traveling 8,000 miles, while motivating Norway[4] and Britain,[5] among other nations, to scramble fighter jets in the process. Presumably, the Russians chose such a circuitous route along the edges of Europe to demonstrate its long range bombing capabilities. In doing so, the Russian Federation also showed the rest of the world that its capabilities might rival those of the United States, proving that Russia too could attack targets all throughout the world. This use of an Arctic airbase for active bombing missions also marks a turning point in history; not even during the Cold War did the Russians demonstrate Arctic-based military capabilities with such expansive reach.[6] While this mission did not focus on targets within the Arctic, the use of an Arctic base for active bombing missions draws attention to Russia’s military buildup in the region...
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Weapons
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Syria, Arctic, and United States of America

86. Arctic Strategy: Trust the Invisible Hand

Author:: Victor Marsh
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: On April 18, 1775, Massachusetts businessman and U.S. revolutionary Paul Revere alerted fellow patriots that British military action against the rebellion in Boston would come by sea rather than by land. The warning that “the [British] regulars are coming” was a verbal intelligence report. It was based on what Revere and his associates had seen with their own eyes. They interpreted the visual data correctly; British military action came the very next day via an initial naval landing of troops that engaged in the first battles of the United States’ Revolutionary War. Intoning the urgency of Mr. Revere, these U.S. analysts and Alaskan politicians seek to inspire a sense of urgency within United States decision-making, warning that the Russians are coming to dominate the north. While taking exhaustive notes on the ambiguous “duality” in Russia’s Arctic policies, the pessimists have nonetheless quickly resolved this open question and pronounced with alarm the fear that Russia is secretly deploying a “new ice curtain,” meaning actions to deny the United States access to the allegedly vital Arctic region.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Security, Diplomacy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, Arctic, and United States of America

87. The Realities and Challenges of Russia's Northern Sea Route

Author:: Lawson W. Brigham
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR)[1] across the top of Eurasia is tied directly to Arctic natural resources and the future economic security of the Russian Federation. This national Arctic waterway has two primary purposes: to maintain marine access in all seasons to the Russian North’s remote regions for an effective sovereign presence, security, law enforcement, and supply (to coastal communities and government outposts), and also to facilitate the movement of natural resources out of the Russian Arctic to global markets. It is the latter purpose, as a marine transportation corridor, that garners international attention and is linked firmly to the regional development of Siberian onshore and offshore resources. However, the NSR is unlikely to be a major global maritime trade route in the coming decades that will attract large numbers of container ships away from the Suez and Panama canals. Certainly plausible are niche markets, more limited but economically viable roles, between the Pacific and Europe where trans-Arctic voyages can be established and maintained on a seasonal (summer) basis. But the majority of the new Arctic marine traffic will plausibly sail on voyages along the NSR with bulk cargo ships, liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers, and tankers carrying resources out of the region to European and Pacific-rim markets. The length of the NSR navigation season has yet to be established as it will be maintained in the future by a fleet of nuclear and non-nuclear escort icebreakers, several of which are being constructed today in Russia. According to Russian Arctic shipping experts, it is highly plausible the NSR will develop in future decades as a ‘seasonal supplement’ to the Suez Canal route.[2]...
Topic:: Security, Maritime Commerce, Natural Resources, and Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Arctic, and North Sea

88. Za'atari: Feral or Resilient City?

Author:: Charles Simpson
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: In 2003, Dr. Richard Norton presented a gloomy picture of urbanization: “Imagine a great metropolis covering hundreds of square miles… a territory where the rule of law has long been replaced by near anarchy in which the only security available is that which is attained through brute power.” Norton is describing his vision of the “feral city,” a space where political, economic, and military stressors bring about a city’s decline, a concept that became a major concern of security thinkers over the next decade. Reading Norton’s descriptions, large urbanized refugee communities of the Syrian crisis appear especially vulnerable to feral relapse. However, despite superficial parallels to Norton’s description, field research presented in this article will argue that the 82,000-resident Za’atari Syrian refugee camp—perhaps the most grimly reported refugee camp in the region—stands significantly in contrast to the “feral city” model: rather than declining to a “feral” state, Za’atari’s residents and authorities have demonstrated incredible resilience while maintaining, strengthening, and innovating new governance mechanisms for achieving human security. A wider search for feral cities in Mogadishu and Syria suggests that this resilience to feral decline is more the rule than the exception for modern cities.
Topic:: Security, Development, Urbanization, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, Jordan, and Somalia

89. Strategic Blindspots: Essentializing, Securitizing, and Empowering Women and Men to Counter Violent Extremism

Author:: Sahana Dharmapuri
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Today, the international community has at its disposal an underutilized tool to address the multidimensional problem of violent extremism: UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on Women, Peace and Security. October 2015 marked the fifteenth anniversary of the adoption of the resolution, and the first time that the Security Council recognized that gender equality is a critical component of maintaining international peace and security. It is now widely recognized that conflict and peacebuilding are highly gendered activities, and that women and men experience violence and security differently. Recognizing that the roles of women vary greatly from perpetrators or victims of violence, to their role as peacebuilders and political actors, is an important first step by security actors to take into account women’s different experiences and perspectives in international security and peace decision-making. However, basing preventative approaches to violent extremism on a narrow understanding of what it means to be male or female—e.g. solely focusing on the roles of women or men—not only limits policy options but perpetuates two strategic blindspots: essentializing women and securitizing women’s roles in CVE. Both essentializing and securitizing prevents a diverse examination of how both men and women are affected by and influence the promotion and the prevention of extremist violence in of CVE policies and programs. This is because a narrow focus on the roles of women and men excludes an examination of the context-specific, socially and culturally relevant opportunities and constraints that both men and women experience. As such, an exclusive focus on men and women’s roles obscures the entry points available to understand and counter violent extremism more effectively. UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security can help shed light on these blindspots in CVE because it requires both the participation of women and a gender perspective in policies and programs related to international security and peace. As such, the resolution offers analytical tools to help CVE practitioners analyze the complex issue of violent extremism, namely the use of a gender perspective. A gender perspective helps to reveal solutions and courses of action that would otherwise be overlooked in highly localized, context-specific, socially and culturally sensitive conflicts.
Topic:: Security, Gender Issues, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, and Women
Political Geography:: United Nations and Global Focus

90. Paris 2015: Terrorism, Climate Change, and the Politics of Securitization

Author:: Wilfrid Greaves
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: In the closing months of 2015, two separate events thrust the city of Paris into the epicentre of global security politics. On November 13th, the French capital was the site of a series of coordinated terrorist attacks. At least nine individuals claiming allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) used suicide vests and assault weapons to target citizens and symbols of the Republic. The attacks, which took place in cafés, restaurants, the national soccer stadium, and a crowded music venue, killed more than 130 people and precipitated the largest state of emergency across France since the Second World War. Just two weeks later, the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) convened in Paris. The conference, known as COP21, was a pivotal moment in the global effort to reach a multilateral agreement on global climate change. The juxtaposition of terrorism and climate change, two of the most pressing security issues of our time, encapsulate the complex and intertwined nature of contemporary threats to global security. The political and normative implications of the November events in Paris demonstrate the intricacies of securitization theory, a “radically constructivist” approach to understanding the nature of security threats.[1] This theory provides a framework for understanding the process through which political issues are transformed into security issues, while offering a series of cautionary warnings about the adverse consequences of security discourse and practices within democratic societies. The application of securitization theory lends a unique understanding to both the terrorist attacks and popular engagement in the climate summit. This framework also clarifies the resulting trade-off between renewed securitization of terrorism and democratic mobilization at COP21.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Terrorism, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Europe, Paris, and France

91. A Parochial Nexus? Crime and Terror in Europe

Author:: Colin P. Clarke
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: On November 5, 2015, authorities in the Molenbeek neighbourhood of Brussels, Belgium shut down Café del Beguines. The bar was frequently host to drug deals and other illicit activities, known to “[compromise] public security and tranquillity.”[1] The bar manager, Ibrahim Abdesalam, was one of the attackers involved in the Paris terror events in mid-November 2015. The attacks shook France and shocked the world, and at the year end, investigation of the events still posed many unanswered questions. French and international investigators have focused their efforts on exposing the source of funding for the attacks. Although an important part of any investigation, it must be understood that the funds necessary to plan and conduct attacks like these are minimal, often requiring less than $10,000[2] Unfortunately, terrorists have learned that small sums of money collected over time through the use of somewhat banal criminal activities can be effective, and even reliable, sources of funding.
Topic:: Security, Crime, Terrorism, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, and Spain

92. Proxy wars in cyberspace: The Evolving International Law of Attribution

Author:: Michael N. Schmitt and Liis Vihul
Publication Date:: 06-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Cyberspace offers a relative degree of anonymity for states to conduct hostile activities against other states, as the challenges of accurate attribution remain a strong barrier to retaliation for these activities. As international law grapples with how to govern this theater of conflict, what should the international community to do if states increasingly turn to using non-state actors as proxies to further cover their tracks? Schmitt and Vihul examine the current legal landscape for such proxy operations.
Topic:: Security, International Law, Non State Actors, Cybersecurity, Conflict, International Community, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:: Global Focus

93. Plausible Deniability: Proxy Wars in Africa

Author:: Jennifer L. De Maio
Publication Date:: 06-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: In the decades since independence, proxy wars have frequently threatened regional security in Africa. Many interstate and intrastate wars on the continent have become increasingly complicated by the involvement of opposing nation states using third parties as surrogates for fighting each other directly. As civil wars threaten to spill across borders and destabilize entire regions, the nature and extent of states using these wars as proxies for their own agendas needs to be studied more systematically. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union relied on proxy wars as a means of engaging the enemy indirectly and advancing their foreign policy agendas, while leaving minimal visible blood on their hands. These proxy wars between the superpowers played out across Africa, from the Horn to Angola to Mozambique. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the superpower competition for regional supremacy has been replaced by new proxy wars and trans-border alliances between African states and local armed groups. As Joseph argues, the recourse to proxy wars reflects the challenges faced by the African state and its inability to institutionalize democratic structures. But the problem is much deeper. Engaging in proxy wars is a critical strategy for state-building, and develops from calculations by state leaders to advance their policy agendas. Threatened regimes wishing to maintain their hold on power may allow and enable civil tensions to spill across borders and destabilize neighboring countries. This approach can be used as a means to consolidate power domestically and spread influence internationally. A civil war thereby becomes a proxy war between states, with the advantage that governments can distance themselves from atrocities committed by their proxies by either attributing blame to rebel factions or by just claiming that they are in fact not sponsoring any group. This essay proposes that governments have an incentive to allow civil wars to spread across borders in order to engage in proxy battles with neighboring states. Governments can utilize proxy wars to strengthen their hold on the domestic state apparatus and to gain regional superiority. This strategy can include using militarily weak countries as proxies in order to assert their regional dominance and broadcast domestic power. Proxy wars can then advance domestic and foreign policy agendas while allowing states to avoid engaging in costly and bloody direct combat. The use of proxy war as a tool of statecraft is thus calculated and controlled...
Topic:: Security, War, Proxy War, and Statecraft
Political Geography:: Africa, Soviet Union, and United States of America

94. Purveyors of Terror: Counterterrorism in Africa's Failing States

Author:: Thomas Dempsey
Publication Date:: 06-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Weak and failing states in Africa continue to offer challenging environments for counterterrorism campaigns in both a military and a civil law enforcement context. Weakly governed and ungoverned spaces in these states offer venues that violent extremist groups continue to exploit as platforms for terrorism. These groups – Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Shabaab in Somalia are simply two of the more prominent examples – use these weakly governed and ungoverned spaces to recruit new followers, build capability and capacity, and launch new terrorist attacks while avoiding the scrutiny and attention of African security sectors and their international partners. A defining feature of these weakly governed and ungoverned spaces in Africa is the predominance of non-state security actors, including local militias, neighborhood watch organizations, traditional hunting societies, and traditional, customary, or religious justice processes that operate outside of the formal court system. Some of these non-state actors themselves represent violent extremist groups involved in acts of terror. Others play central roles in the mediation of disputes (administration of justice), delivery of police services, or as military surrogates in providing for local defense. I argued in Counterterrorism in African Failed States that collaboration between U.S. military forces and law enforcement agencies is essential to effective counterterrorism interventions in African failed states.[i] Subsequent counterterrorism operations in the region have confirmed that argument, and African senior police and militaryleaders increasingly emphasize the importance of collaboration between military and police forces.[ii] In addition to military forces and law enforcement services, counterterrorism in Africa must effectively address the need for effective partners in the justice sector – prosecutors (and defense counsels), courts, prisons and corrections – in implementing counterterrorism strategies. All three components of counterterrorism strategies must confront the reality that weakly governed and ungoverned spaces are ground zero for counterterrorism on the continent, and that non-state security actors are a defining feature of those spaces. To address the purveyors of terror – in most cases, non-state security actors like Al-Shabaab in Somalia or AQIM in the Sahel – counterterrorism strategies in ungoverned and weakly governed spaces in Africa must address all of the non-state security actors that proliferate in those areas.
Topic:: Security, Fragile/Failed State, Non State Actors, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, and Al Shabaab
Political Geography:: Africa

95. A Temporary Marriage of Convenience: Transnational Jihadists in Proxy Warfare

Author:: Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
Publication Date:: 06-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Cecily G. Brewer of the U.S. Department of State defines proxy wars as “inter-state conflicts fought via intra-state means.” She notes that traditionally in such conflicts, “the intra-state symptoms of the conflict draw attention,” while the inter-state driver — the support an actor receives from outside the country — “is ignored.” A prototypical example, albeit one where outside support given to the non-state actors at the heart of the conflict has received copious attention, is the Afghan-Soviet war. Not only did the Afghan mujahedin force the powerful Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan following a costly and humiliating defeat, but the conflict also gave birth to the preeminent transnational jihadist group, al-Qaeda. This article examines how proxy warfare functions in the context of jihadist groups that share al-Qaeda’s transnational outlook, arguing that they create more difficulties for the state attempting to exploit them than do traditional proxies. Pakistan’s policies, and the resulting costs inflicted upon the Pakistani state, provide a powerful case study in the dangers involved in relying on jihadist proxies. The Afghan-Soviet war was a key event in shaping Pakistan’s self-destructive use of proxies. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 quickly became notorious throughout the Muslim world. The invasion triggered stiff resistance from Afghan mujahedin, and encouraged both state and non-state actors to support the various mujahedin factions. In the Cold War context, the United States perceived the Soviet invasion as an opportunity to give the U.S.S.R. its own Vietnam War, according to President Carter’s national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski.[2] The mujahedin thus became a proxy of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, each with their own somewhat divergent interests in supporting these factions. The largest U.S. covert aid program since Vietnam, with American support (totaling around $3 billion) matched dollar for dollar by Saudi Arabia, flowed to the anti-Soviet fighters. American and Saudi aid was routed through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI).
Topic:: Security, Cold War, Conflict, Transnational Actors, Jihad, and Proxy War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Soviet Union, and United States of America

96. Ukraine - Europe's New Proxy War?

Author:: Geraint Hughes
Publication Date:: 06-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Ukraine - Europe's New Proxy War? Dr. Geraint Hughes | 22 May 2014 DOWNLOAD PDF On February 27 and 28, 2014, shortly after the revolution in Kiev that toppled Viktor Yanukovych’s government, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was taken over by thousands of masked and armed Russian troops, backed by armor and attack helicopters. In an unconvincing attempt to hide their origin, the soldiers wore no insignia and passed themselves off as a ‘self-defense’ militia drawn from the ethnic Russian majority of the peninsula, which until 1954 had belonged to Russia itself. In fact, this occupation force consisted either of personnel from the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) based in Crimea or troops sent from the Russian Federation. Russia’s parliament subsequently voted to grant President Vladimir Putin powers to order further interventions in Ukraine to ‘protect ethnic Russians’, whilst a ‘referendum’ held in Crimea on March 16 produced an overwhelming vote in favor of union with the Russian Federation. Three days later, Russian troops and ‘self-defense’ militias forcibly evicted Ukrainian naval personnel from their own bases, formalizing the annexation of Crimea. This landgrab by Russia, and the separatist turmoil it is currently inciting in Eastern Ukraine, constitutes the most serious crisis in Europe since the Georgian war of August 2008. Although the post-Yanukovych government in Ukraine has acted cautiously and focused on mustering diplomatic support, the country has become the location of a diplomatic confrontation between Russia and the West (the United States, its NATO allies, and member states of the European Union) that could potentially deteriorate into a military clash between Kiev and Moscow. There are repeated instances in history where states have resorted to proxy warfare rather than the overt use of force, using non-state para-military actors to subvert and undermine an adversary. In the process, sponsor states have armed, equipped, trained, and sheltered proxies, and have at times even reinforced them with advisors and special forces personnel, as is the case with Russian military intelligence (GRU) and special forces (spetsnaz) troops reportedly reinforcing local ‘separatists’ in the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. Proxy warfare has also sometimes preceded an overt military intervention. Given both Putin’s threats to ‘defend’ ethnic Russians and the mobilization of Russian army and air force units over the past two months, this remains a very real possibility in Ukraine. The overall objectives of a sponsor state usually involve the coercion of an adversary, its disruption, or the attainment of a transformative objective, which in turn can involve the successful encouragement of separatism, the annexation of territory, or regime change. Allowing for the absence of solid information on Russian aims it is likely that Moscow’s present reasons for destabilizing Ukraine involve an opportunistic combination of these three outcomes. Putin may well hope that the turmoil he is inciting in the East of the country will forestall the forthcoming elections on May 25 and will force Kiev to subordinate its foreign policy to Russian interests. It is likely that he may consider the takeover of more Ukrainian territory if its government persists in its efforts to forge closer ties with the United States and EU.
Topic:: Security, History, Conflict, and Proxy War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

97. When Proxies Fail, Force Must Prevail U.S.-Iran Relations

Author:: Jonathan Ruhe
Publication Date:: 05-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: For decades, the United States and Iran have pursued fundamentally incompatible strategic objectives. Yet despite having expansive goals and minimal mutual interests, each side has recognized that direct confrontation would jeopardize its ultimate goal. Thus competition between the two countries often has taken less decisive, but also less risky, forms of behavior, namely: diplomacy, sanctions, and the use of proxy forces. Given the stakes involved, however, relying entirely on such measures to convey the seriousness of one’s intentions is insufficient. Indeed, the United States has been most successful influencing Iranian policy when it has demonstrated its own willingness to use force or supported actors using military force directly against Iran – and conversely, least successful when it has failed to do so. The two countries have long held mutually exclusive aims. The United States wants to remain predominant in the Middle East to ensure the free flow of natural resources and the security of its allies, even as it withdraws troops after more than a decade of war and faces an uncertain fiscal future. The Iranian regime pursues nuclear weapons capability to protect against its perceived danger from a U.S.-supported overthrow, provide an umbrella under which it can project unmatchable power against its neighbors, and validate its continuing right to rule, among other goals. Both objectives are highly ambitious and in direct conflict with each other. Therefore the lethargy of peace suits both rivals well, as neither side feels it can afford an overt rupture. For the United States, direct conflict would critically endanger its efforts to maintain regional stability with a receding regional footprint. For Iran, it would seriously delay its approach to a nuclear weapons capability. There is little middle ground for diplomacy to secure, given the two countries’ ultimately irreconcilable goals.
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Proxy War
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

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