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41. Medical Security, Covid Challenge and the U.S. - Japan Alliance

Author:
Kent Calder
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
National security has been classically conceived as a narrowly military and state-centric concept, especially in the Western industrial world. Security is, generations of strategists and statesmen have told us, a matter of defending core nation-state values and interests by force of arms. Two world wars across the first half of the twentieth century, and a long nuclear confrontation to follow, engrained this military and state-centric conception deeply into global consciousness and public discourse. The tragic COVID-19 crisis now confronting us suggests that this logic may be flawed, or at least oversimplified. Over 2.3 million people worldwide died in the first year of this global pandemic, with well over 100 million infected. These figures are likely understated.44 Untold millions of people continue to suffer from “long COVID” maladies around the world.
Topic:
Economics, Health, National Security, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

42. The Essentiality of Cognitive Diversity in American National Security

Author:
Barry R. McCaffrey
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Two decades after UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security was passed, the Biden administration appears poised to usher in a new era of female leadership. Why is this increase in cognitive diversity so important to American national security? The U.S. national security enterprise is undergoing a profound transition. As the world moves toward cyber and information-centric modes of conflict, cognitive and intellectual diversity will arguably play a more decisive role in determining success—more so than the number of infantry divisions, aircraft carriers, or fighter wings a nation can deploy. National security organizations must therefore transform to fully leverage all available talent and innovation in the national security sector to drive success across the spectrum of conflict around the world. The complexity and interconnectedness of nations around the world make effective national security strategy development and operations extremely challenging. Boiled down, successful national security strategy, policy, and operations ensure the continued existence of nations and their way of life. This mandate places immense pressure on presidents when they build their senior leadership team. Presidents must choose a team to deter and defeat potential threats, and thus can neither afford poor nor ineffective leadership.
Topic:
Gender Issues, National Security, Women, Leadership, and Diversity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

43. Do Morals Matter? A Conversation with Dr. Joseph Nye

Author:
Joseph S. Nye, Grady Jacobsen, and Alex Betley
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Fletcher Security Review (FSR): Welcome, Dr. Nye, to The Fletcher Security Review. Thank you very much for spending time with us today. Before we discuss your recent book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, would you mind speaking first about the origins of your career? Many readers of FSR are young professionals pursuing careers in diplomacy and national security. I am sure they would appreciate hearing that background. Joeseph Nye (JN): Well, I came to Harvard to do a Ph.D. Thinking I was going to go into the State Department, I thought it might be useful to have a Ph.D. but, in the process, I wound up doing some teaching and enjoyed it. I went and did my thesis in Africa and enjoyed writing about that. When Harvard offered me a job, I thought I would take it for a little while. A “little while” turned out to be quite a long while. I emphasize this to say that if you do not have all your career moves figured out at this stage, not to worry about it. Leave room for serendipity. In any case, as it turned out, I enjoy the writing and the research. After working in Africa, I went to Central America, and then spent some time in Europe looking primarily at regional integration and then broadened out to a number of things related to trade. . .
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Ethics, Interview, and World System
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

44. Post-Covid Security Landscape: A Conversation with Raffaelo Pantucci

Author:
Raffaello Pantucci
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Fletcher Security Review (FSR): Thank you for joining FSR today. To begin, what challenges do you believe countries or security practitioners will face in preventing terrorism or countering violent terrorism in a postCOVID-19 world? Raffaelo Pantucci (RP): There are going to be a lot of challenges. The difficulty with trying to make judgments about what is going to happen in a post-COVID world is that we are not in the post-COVID world yet. We are still in the midst of the pandemic, so a lot of this work and assumptions that we look into are based on assessments of what we think could happen. I think a number of things will happen. First, I think we are going to see real pressure on security forces’ resources. On the one hand, kinetic security forces—police and intelligence services—probably will not suffer too much. But the real dilemma will come with some of the upstream funding. Money is being used to try to stop people from being drawn to violent groups in the first place. Countering violent extremism projects will face immense challenges since it is very hard to understand and make direct causal links between the issues the programs are addressing and the ultimate threats. We are going to see a push on budgets and that will result in cuts for security forces. These will have an impact in different ways in different places. Unfortunately, terrorist threats are global. You can have a good grip on your threat matrix, but it has links across borders which are beyond your control. This creates a potential risk if a country you are connected to does not have a grip on their security and are under the same sort of budgetary pressures, then it is possible you will see a negative knockon effect.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Interview, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

45. Grievance in Space and Time: The State, Militias, and the Irredentist Temptation

Author:
Bradford McGuinn
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The armed militia is an emblem of political decay. With the weakening of institutions designed to regulate the ambitions and anxieties of those inhabiting a state, and with the erosion of a political culture meant to confer legitimacy upon the rituals of governance, martial energy once held to constitutional prescription in the service of impersonal public rule can be redirected toward private purpose. Dissenting factions within a governmental structure, groups seeking its overthrow, or militias fighting within society itself challenge the viability of states, stability in their regions, and international order. This essay will consider ways in which narratives of grievance play dangerously upon the triangular system of mutual obligation that ideally orders interaction between a state, society, and the military. In this configuration of civil-military relations, the state exercises a “legitimate monopoly” on the production of violence, binding militaries to civilian control. Acting as an acid upon the alloy of this triangle, allowing leakage of “privatized” violence, is a dissatisfaction with a configuration of geography, politics, and culture of such intensity that reality can be considered oppressive.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, State, and Militias
Political Geography:
Global Focus

46. Losing the Long Game: A Conversation with Phillip Gordon (Interviewed by Zach A. Shapiro)

Author:
Philip Gordon and Zach Shapiro
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Fletcher Security Review (FSR): Dr. Gordon, it’s a pleasure to introduce you to our audience. Your new book, Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East, is fascinating and we are excited to hear about it. To get us started, could you briefly describe your argument? Philip Gordon (PG): In briefest form, as the title of the book indicates, the argument is that regime change in the Middle East doesn’t turn out very well. I’ll just unpack that a little bit. First, by “regime change” what I’m talking about is when the United States sets out as a matter of policy to bring about a different government and political system in a country for whatever reason. It’s not when it happens naturally or internally. We have to have it as a policy and we have to do something about it. It turns out that we’ve done this fairly regularly in the post-World War II period. In fact, we’ve done it on average about once per decade. In the book, I look back all the way to the first time in 1953, to the CIA-backed coup in Iran, and look at all the episodes for the track record. I started thinking about this in particular as the Trump administration was pivoting towards what looked like a regime-change policy in Iran. It wasn’t their official, announced policy, but it looks like that’s what they were trying to achieve in Iran. That led me to think more about the track record: when have we done this before, why have we done it, and how it has turned out?...
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regime Change, and Interview
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

47. Cybersecurity: State Attack and Response Strategies

Author:
Josephine Wolff and Ta-Chun Su
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
. One of the questions that has always been very interesting to me is “Who do we hold responsible when something goes wrong with cybersecurity?” While that is a technical question—because often when something goes wrong, there is a technical component since you are dealing with a computer and the Internet—it also very much has to do with what our liability regimes say, what our policies say, what our social norms and expectations say about who we hold accountable and who is expected to pay for the damage. So for me, I think cybersecurity is about trying to understand what we mean when we talk about the "secure Internet,” what it looks like to have a secure Internet, and who we hold responsible for all the different components of how you get there. To whom do we say “It’s your job not to answer the phishing emails,” or “It’s your job to look for bug traffic on the network.” How do we piece together that entirely complicated ecosystem of different stakeholders, and how do we identify what their different roles and responsibilities should be? ...
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Interview
Political Geography:
Global Focus

48. Synthetic Biology and the Risks of Misuse

Author:
Gigi Gronvall
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Synthetic biology is a relatively new scientific field that aims to make biology easier to engineer and, thus, more useful. It is already delivering on its enormous promise, yielding FDA-approved chimeric antigen receptor (CAR) T-cell cancer therapeutics, as well as non-medical products such as laboratory-produced fabrics, flavorings, adhesives, and detergents.[1][2] Despite such progress, however, the rapid growth and democratization of synthetic biology — almost all of which is taking place in the private sector — brings security challenges. Like all areas of the life sciences, it is “dual-use” and able to be exploited. To make misuse more limited and difficult to en‐ force, the United States will need to partner with other nations, international organizations, and international businesses to govern areas of the synthetic biology field...
Topic:
Science and Technology, Biology, and Medicine
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

49. India's "Africa Adventure" in the Indian Ocean Commission

Author:
Jagannath P. Panda
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
On March 6, 2020, India secured the distinction of ob‐ server status to the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), an association that consists of five Indian Ocean states—Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, Comoros, and Réunion (France). New Delhi is now formally clubbed in the IOC along with the four other observer countries of China, Malta, the European Union, and the International Organisation of La Francophone (OIF). What does this mean for India’s power play in the Indo-Pacific? ​ Fundamentally, inclusion in the IOC points to a more serious structural maritime engagement for India in the Western Indian Ocean region. The IOC is a key grouping working to foster cooperation on both traditional and non-traditional security matters of the Western Indian Ocean, which connects the Southeastern Coast of Africa with the mainstream Indian Ocean. In other words, this association opens the gateway for a more formal "continental connection" between India and the Eastern African coastal countries bordering the Indian Ocean. It not only enhances India’s stature as a rising maritime power in the Western Indian Ocean, but also exemplifies India’s security-based desire for institutionalized association with countries in the region. It promotes cooperation between India and the littoral countries on the Eastern African Coast in a number of key activities in the region: maritime-military aid and assistance, capacity building, joint military exercises, sea patrolling, logistics and intelligence assistantship, and naval training...
Topic:
Security, Geopolitics, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Africa, South Asia, India, and Indian Ocean

50. Crime in the Northern Triangle

Author:
Mark L Schneider
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Violence and crime in the Northern Triangle Countries (NTC) of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras continue to endanger citizen security in those countries, as well as in Mexico and in the United States. The extent, conditions, and policy responses are important in and of themselves, but also because this violence constitutes one of the significant factors driving migration toward the United States.
Topic:
Security, Crime, Human Rights, and Migration
Political Geography:
Central America, North America, Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador

51. Secure Communities A Conversation with Carrie Conway

Author:
Alexandra Heffern
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
I have worked in development for almost twenty years, but when I declared my focus, I had not originally thought “I definitely want to do conflict-related programming and work in conflict zones.” Given my trajectory though, I organically started to do that. I received my undergraduate degree from the University of Vermont, and at that point the only way to study international development was through their Agricultural Economics program. After finishing school, my first real introduction to the field was when I started working with Oxfam in Boston. At first it was a very administrative position, but then I was lucky and had the opportunity to go overseas as the program officer in Cambodia, which is where I would say I began my career. At that point, I really wanted to work with an NGO — I had not even thought about working with USAID or a contractor — but in Cambodia I had the opportunity to work as a local American hire with USAID. After that I went to Clark University for graduate school, and after Clark I had a number of program management roles for USAID, all of which were in conflict zones. For example, I spent time working in Timor-Leste with Tetra Tech ARD, I spent time in Afghanistan, and I served as Chief of Party in Sudan for a conflict transition program. After being overseas I decided to return to the United States and began working with Chemonics, specifically supporting their Libya and Lebanon programs in the Office of Transition Initiatives...
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Interview, and USAID
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

52. The Rise of Russia’s Hi-Tech Military

Author:
Samuel Bendett
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Following the end of the Cold War, the Russian Federation lagged behind the United States in terms of advanced technology in warfighting. However, after substantial spending on modernization starting in 2008, the Russian military and the nation’s defense sector have been making great strides at developing remotely operated and autonomous technologies and integrating them in their tactics and combat operations. Russia is also starting to invest in Artificial Intelligence (AI) development with specific military applications. These developments affect the ability of the United States to meet the goals in its new National Security Strategy; in order to meet its stated December 2017 objective of renewing American competitive advantage in key military areas, the United States should be aware of key adversarial developments such as Russia’s emerging unmanned, autonomous, and AI capabilities, and prepare itself in terms of appropriate capabilities, tactics, and plans...
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Military Spending, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and United States of America

53. Challenges Technologies Pose to U.S.-Russia Arms Control: A Conversation with Dr. Heather Williams

Author:
Fletcher Security Review Staff and Heather Williams
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Dr. Heather Williams is a lecturer in the Defence Studies Department and Centre for Science and Security Studies at King’s College London. She also does research for the Institute for Defense Analyses on Strategy, Forces, and Resources, and previously was a Research Fellow at Chatham House. Williams received her doctorate from King’s College London for her dissertation on U.S.-Russia arms control from 1968-2010.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Weapons, and Interview
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

54. The Intelligence Cycle of Targeted Killing in the United States

Author:
Christine Sixta Rinehart
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The United States has been using Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) to assassinate terrorist targets since its first RPA strike on November 3, 2002, when a U.S. Predator fired a hellfire missile at a car traveling through the Mar’ib province of Yemen. The intelligence cycle of this targeted killing process is murky at best, and the policy has changed throughout the successive administrations of U.S. presidents. Details exist but there is no defined tangible chain of analysis concerning the selection of the target, the monitoring of the target, and finally, the assassination of the target. This paper attempts to elucidate the intelligence chain of analysis concerning American targeted killing and examine how the intelligence cycle of targeted killing varies through successive presidential administrations. ​ This paper will begin with a short analysis of relevant literature, although sources concerning this topic are scarce. The occurrence of targeted killings of U.S. citizens will also be explained in the literature section. The paper will continue with an elaboration of a generic intelligence cycle model, which will be used to illustrate the intelligence cycle of U.S. targeted killings using both the Reaper and the Predator RPA.[1] The paper will then address differences in the intelligence cycles and processes that have occurred between successive presidents since targeted killing first began in 2002 with President George W. Bush. Lastly, the paper will provide policy prescriptions in reference to improving targeted killing in the Middle East and Africa...
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Drones, and Targeted Killing
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

55. Sino-Indian Nuclear Dynamics: Taking the Global Lead

Author:
Prakash Menon
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Technology often seduces potential adversaries through a promise of relief from security threats only to deceive through the inevitable action-reaction cycle. In the universe of security, technology is contestable both by technology itself and by doctrinal prescriptions and operational countermeasures. The advantage provided by new technology is mostly ephemeral in that provides the momentum for an endless cycle that is best described as chasing one’s own tail. Only political intervention through mutual understanding, doctrinal prudence, and regulating the search for operational supremacy holds potential to escape the stranglehold of the action-reaction cycle. The elusive search for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is a prime example. This paper seeks to interrogate the role of the technology-security dynamics in the context of the Sino-Indian nuclear weapon relationship. ​ The context of the Sino-Indian nuclear weapon relationship is clouded by the enhancing reach of India’s missiles[1], the evolving Chinese reaction to U.S. nuclear modernization accompanied by a shift in nuclear posture, and a shared belief in the role of nuclear weapons that is signified by No First Use (NFU) doctrine. The latter point represents political intervention while the two former signify the action-reaction cycle which is primarily a product of technology. However, both China and India must contend with nuclear powers that espouse First Use. China in dealing with the United States and Russia who are quantitatively superior nuclear powers, while India deals with Pakistan whose claims of quantitative superiority are contested. ​ In technological terms, the rise of China and the U.S. reaction resulting in contemporary geopolitical flux at the global level has impacted the evolution of China’s nuclear arsenal. The most prominent illustration of this is China’s reaction to the United States’ withdrawal from the Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty. Earlier China had eschewed development of BMD, but the United States’ quest to create BMD has caused China to attempt to develop its own BMD system as well as systems that can overcome BMD like multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and Hyper Glide Vehicles (HGVs). Similarly, India has reacted to developments in China and Pakistan by launching an indigenous BMD development program...
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, India, and Asia

56. Re-thinking Biological Arms Control for the 21st Century

Author:
Filippa Lentzos
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
International treaties prohibit the development and use of biological weapons. Yet concerns about these weapons have endured and are now escalating. It is high time to take a hard look at technical and political developments and consider how the international security policy community should respond. ​ A major source of the growing concern about future bioweapons threats stem from scientific and technical advances. Innovations in biotechnology are expanding the toolbox to modify genes and organisms at a staggering pace, making it easier to produce increasingly dangerous pathogens. Disease-causing organisms can now be modified to increase their virulence, expand their host range, increase their transmissibility, or enhance their resistance to therapeutic interventions.[1] Scientific advances are also making it theoretically possible to create entirely novel biological weapons,[2] by synthetically creating known or extinct pathogens or entirely new pathogens.[3] Scientists could potentially enlarge the target of bioweapons from the immune system to the nervous system,[4] genome, or microbiome,[5] or they could weaponize ‘gene drives’ that would rapidly and cheaply spread harmful genes through animal and plant populations.[6] ​ Concurrent developments in other emerging technologies are also impacting potential future biological weapons threats. Developments in artificial intelligence and machine learning could speed up identification of harmful genes or DNA sequences. Artificial intelligence and machine learning could also potentially enable much more targeted biological weapons that would harm specific individuals or groups of individuals based on their genes, prior exposure to vaccines, or known vulnerabilities in their immune system.[7] Big Data and ‘cloud labs’ (completely robotized laboratories for hire) facilitate this process by enabling massively scaled-up experimentation and testing, significantly shortening ‘design-test-build’ timeframes and improving the likelihood of obtaining specificity or producing desired biological functionality.[8] Other developments provide new or easier ways to deliver pathogens or biological systems. Nanotechnology could potentially create aerosolized nanobots dispersing lethal synthetic microbes or chem-bio hybrids through the air,[9] or in vivo nanobots releasing damaging payloads inside human bodies.[10] Aerosol or spraying devices attached to swarms of small unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, could be another potential means to disperse biological agents. Additive manufacturing, or 3D printing, could circumvent barriers imposed by national export control systems on controlled laboratory equipment or dispersal devices. ​
Topic:
Security, Health, Science and Technology, Treaties and Agreements, Biosecurity, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

57. Technology and Tensions in the Global Commons

Author:
Kristi Govella
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
For most of history, the domains of the global commons were unclaimed, largely because the technology to access and utilize them did not exist.[1] In areas such as the high seas and outer space, it was impossible for states to establish and maintain sovereign control. Even as the relevant technologies developed, costliness and controls kept them initially concentrated largely in the hands of just a few major powers such as the Unit- ed States and the Soviet Union. For the United States, “command of the commons” became the military foundation of its hegemony, granting it the ability to access much of the planet and to credibly threaten to deny the use of such spaces to others.[2] Bipolar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union strongly influenced developments in the maritime and outer space domains. In the case of cyberspace, a more recent addition to the traditional global commons, the United States was also initially dominant due to its role in pioneering associated technologies. However, over time and particularly since the end of the Cold War, continuing technological innovation and diffusion have made these domains accessible to a growing number of countries. ​ This technological progress was born of both cooperation and competition between states. While some states chose to develop certain technologies indigenously, many acquired knowledge and equipment from abroad. Globalization of industry has made it easier for states to obtain a variety of foreign technologies, even lowering the threshold for them to procure disruptive military capabilities. In addition, over the last two decades, American primacy has been increasingly challenged by the rise of China, which has impacted the dynamics of technological development and diffusion across multiple domains. As China has acquired the technology to become more active in the commons, it has prompted major regional powers, such as Japan and India, to accelerate their own technological advancement, and other mid-sized and smaller countries have also become increasingly engaged.[3] ​ The consequence of this multiplication of technologically sophisticated actors has been the erosion of American primacy in the global commons. Although the United States still remains the most dominant player, it is faced with a more densely populated field, and management of these spaces has become more difficult. This article examines this trend in the high seas, outer space, and cyberspace since the end of the Cold War, with attention to the ways in which the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States have catalyzed greater engagement with the commons, particularly among the countries in Asia that find themselves most affected by this power transition. I argue that advances in and diffusion of technology have transformed the global commons into increasingly crowded domains characterized by interstate competition and heightened tensions. Whether these tensions prevail depends on the creation and strengthening of regimes to manage interactions and promote shared rules and norms...
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Globalization, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
China, Global Focus, and United States of America

58. The Need for Countries to Establish Robust and Transparent Vulnerabilities Equities Processes

Author:
Sharon Bradford Franklin
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
In 2017, leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community warned that “more than 30 nations are developing offensive cyberattack capabilities.”1 This means that more than 30 countries may be conducting hacking operations as a method for surveillance, disruption, or destruction. Unregulated cyber surveillance and cyberattacks by government actors can pose risks not only to a government’s foreign adversaries, but also to its own citizens. Thus, as the United States and other nations work to enhance their own offensive cyber capabilities, as well as to develop strategies to defend against potential attacks, it is critical that these countries establish legal regimes to govern such conduct in cyberspace. Although Germany has established a legal framework to regulate government hacking activities,[2] few countries have done so.[3] ​ To bring government hacking operations within the rule of law, a crucial step is to design rules regarding the management of vulnerabilities that governments discover or acquire. As with other cyber actors, when governments conduct hacking operations, this frequently involves exploiting vulnerabilities in computer hardware and software systems. But these same flaws can also be manipulated by a government’s foreign adversaries or other malicious actors. Therefore, when countries consider their abilities to rely on hacking as an investigative tool, as well as their interests in exploiting vulnerabilities for military and intelligence operations, they must also evaluate the capacity of information and communications technology providers to repair bugs and protect the cybersecurity of all users. Determining whether to exploit a vulnerability or disclose it to a vendor for patching involves balancing a variety of different security concerns against each other. ​ Some countries have made progress in formalizing the rules for making these decisions and in publicizing these rules to promote public accountability. In November 2017, the United States released a charter governing its Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP), which outlines how the U.S. government weighs the various competing equities.[4] The charter delineates which components of the government will participate in determinations regarding whether to disclose or retain each newly discovered vulnerability, and it sets forth the criteria to be used and the process to be followed in making such assessments. One year later, the United Kingdom (UK) announced its Equities Process, which follows a similar approach.5 Most recently, in March 2019, Australia released its “Responsible Release Principles for Cyber Security Vulnerabilities,”[6] and Germany is currently working to develop a VEP and is expected to make information about its process public in early 2019.[7] However, as described below, the VEP procedures revealed to date need further improvement,[8] and most of the nations with offensive cyber capabilities have not developed—or at least have not announced—any such framework...
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Science and Technology, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

59. How Much Does a “Privacy” Weigh?

Author:
Paul Rosenzweig
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Benjamin Franklin is famous, in part, for having said, “Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.” Though historical evidence suggests Franklin’s quote has been misinterpreted,[1] the aphorism has come to stand for the proposition that privacy and security stand in opposition to each other, where every increase in security likely results in a commensurate decrease in privacy, and vice versa. ​ Couched in those terms, the privacy/security trade-off is a grim prospect. We naturally want both privacy and security to the greatest extent possible. But Franklin tells us this is impossible — that privacy and security are locked in a zero-sum game where the gain of one comes only at the loss of the other. ​ Of course, this characterization is assuredly flawed; it is certainly possible to adopt systems that maximize both privacy and security in a Pareto optimal way. That is one of the reasons why so many privacy and security experts simply revile the “balancing” metaphor — it obscures more than it illuminates... ​
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Privacy
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

60. Learning from Russia’s Influence Campaigns in Eastern Europe: A Conversation with Nina Jankowicz

Author:
Fletcher Security Review Staff and Nina Jankowicz
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Nina Jankowicz is writing a book on the evolution of Russian influence campaigns in Eastern Europe. She has previously worked advising the Ukranian government on communication and managed democracy assistance programs for Russia and Belarus. She is currently a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars’ Kennan Institute and has previously served as a Fulbright-Clinton Public Policy Fellow.
Topic:
Security, Territorial Disputes, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe