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Begin New Search Topic Public Opinion Publishing Institution The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Publication Year within 3 Years

1. Turkish Backlash: How Street Interviews Spread Anti–Syrian Refugee Sentiment

Author:
Sude Akgundogdu
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In early February, two major earthquakes shook Turkey’s southeast, as well as parts of Syria, claiming at least 45,000 Turkish lives in what has become the biggest natural disaster in modern Turkish history. The country’s most pressing challenge is to provide relief for the more than 13 million citizens who live in areas directly affected by the tremors. In the meantime, however, in addition to exposing egregious zoning and building code violations, the powerful quakes have revealed new dimensions of anti-Syrian feeling in Turkey. In the days that followed, gruesome videos circulated on social media showing vigilantes battering individuals they accused of looting in the affected provinces. Syrian refugees have seen their noncitizen status exacerbated by local resentment, resulting in limited access to earthquake relief resources; they have likewise been especially vulnerable to the vigilantism. “Looting” and “Syrian” have become synonymous in some corners of social media, fueling public resentment centered on the refugee population. But hate directed at Syrians on the Turkish web is nothing new. Turkey has seen an overall uptick in anti-refugee violence since 2021, often targeting Syrians. In a particularly violent episode in August 2021, residents of the Altindag district in Ankara vandalized and looted Syrian-run businesses and homes. Across 2022 and into 2023, even before the earthquakes, hate crimes against Syrians have continued to increase. Turkey hosts at least 4 million refugees—3.7 million of them Syrian nationals or stateless people who have migrated from Syria. This is an almost 5 percent addition to Turkey’s existing population, which stood at about 74 million before their arrival, making it the largest influx to Turkey since the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, amid the Ottoman Empire’s collapse. Since the Syrian war began in 2011, the Turkish government has welcomed large numbers of Syrian refugees and given them “temporary protected status.” While the public in general welcomed them, since Turkey fell into recession in 2018, tolerance has worn thin. This public unease has found expression in a media trend known as “street interviews,” which simultaneously spread intolerance and misinformation regarding Turkey’s Syrian refugee population. By way of context, the Turkish government has cracked down on conventional media over the past decade and a half, giving loyal media a monopoly on information and pushing Turkish citizens to seek alternative sources of news. Creative new initiatives have emerged as a result, some anchored in social media, and while these can fill gaps and contribute in meaningful ways, some, such as street interviews, are quasi-journalistic and can disseminate dangerous messages. If the Turkish government does not ease its hold over the media, other such trends will likely persist and continue shaping public opinion, hurting chiefly Turkey’s vulnerable Syrian population.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Refugees, Discrimination, Syrian War, and Hate Speech
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

2. The United States Is Rapidly Losing Arab Hearts and Minds Through Gaza War, While Competitors Benefit

Author:
Munqith Dagher and Karl Kaltenthaler
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Throughout the fifteen years that following the 2011 withdrawal from Iraq, each American presidential administration has experienced domestic calls to leave the Middle East. However, each time these voices grew louder, a new regional variable emerged that compelled the American administration to return to its traditional role dictated by urgent strategic security and economic interests. After the withdrawal from Iraq, a strategic vacuum led to the emergence of and fight against ISIS, with the deaths of thousands both locally and internationally, and millions from the region displaced. The U.S. military was forced to return to the region to contribute to the efforts to eliminate ISIS. When this goal was declared completed, new regional threats emerged in the form of Iran and its weapons, which threatened not only America’s allies but also the free flow of global oil supplies. While the Biden administration thought this problem could be resolved through a package of incentives and agreements with Iran, the war in Gaza has emerged to confirm once again the error of U.S. assessments that contend that this region is no longer important to America’s strategic interests. According to the third section of the U.S. National Security Strategy document signed by President Biden in October 2022, America's top priority on the global stage is to surpass China, followed by limiting Russia's influence. The national security priorities also include combating terrorism in the Middle East.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Islamic State, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

3. New Poll Sheds Light on Saudi Views of Israel-Hamas War

Author:
Catherine Cleveland and David Pollock
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
AWashington Institute poll conducted from November 14 to December 6, a nationally representative sample of 1,000 Saudi citizens measured how Saudi attitudes have shifted due to the Israel-Hamas war. According to responses, the Saudi popular attitude towards the outcome of the war is clear: the overwhelming majority (91%) express agreement with the statement that “despite the destruction and loss of life, this war in Gaza is a win for the Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims.” And as for the role of the broader Arab world, almost all (96%) agree with the proposal that “Arab countries should immediately break all diplomatic, political, economic, and any other contacts with Israel, in protest against its military action in Gaza.” Polling during a war is likely to produce more volatile results as circumstances shift quickly on the ground—during the current polling period, for instance, the Israel-Hamas war had several major shifts, including a temporary ceasefire from November 24-30 and the subsequent expansion of Israel’s incursions into southern Gaza. However, comparisons with Saudi polling fielded in August can help provide a barometer as to just how sharply this conflict has, at least temporarily, shifted certain attitudes, and how little it has moved others. While Hamas as a movement remains unpopular among the majority of Saudis—in contrast to a new trend of widespread popular support in countries like Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt—just 16% of Saudis say that “Hamas should stop calling for the destruction of Israel, and instead accept a permanent two-state solution to the conflict based on the 1967 borders.” Nor do most believe that Hamas’s attack on October 7 targeted Israeli civilians—the overwhelming majority of Saudis (95%) responded that Hamas did not actually kill civilians when asked about whether they believed the Hamas killing of civilians was against Islam. This view is widespread across the eight countries polled by TWI, and similar results appear in a recently released poll of Palestinians from PSR. There, the overwhelming majority reported that they had not seen any videos of Hamas members committing atrocities, and only 10% of Palestinians (17% of Gazans and 5% of West Bankers) stated that they believed that Hamas committed war crimes in the current war, in comparison to 95% who say the same about Israel. While the majority of Saudis continue to express a negative opinion of Hamas, the Israel-Hamas war has generated a significant boost in its popularity. There has been a thirty point shift in positive attitudes towards Hamas, from just 10% in August to 40% in November/December. Responses in the most recent poll, alongside those in 2014 and 2021, demonstrate the increased popularity Hamas achieves among some Saudis during or in the immediate aftermath of conflict between Hamas and Israel, along with its likely disappearance over time. In the aftermath of the 2021 Hamas-Israel conflict, for instance, five years of steadily decreasing popularity in Saudi Arabia suddenly reversed, though just to a quarter (23%) of the total population.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Conflict, Hamas, and Polls
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Gulf Nations

4. New Bahrain Poll Reveals Support for Russia, Entente with Iran, Split on Israel

Author:
David Pollock
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On Iran, Bahrainis (especially among the country’s Shia majority) mostly favor rapprochement, and oppose military action or cooperation with Israel against it. Popular acceptance of business ties with Israel is steady, at around 40% in this small yet strategic island nation that joined the Abraham Accords in late 2020. But other measures show strong anti-Israel sentiment, probably in part because the survey was taken during Ramadan, a time of heightened tension with the Palestinians.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Public Opinion, Polls, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Israel, Bahrain, and Gulf Nations

5. Syrians' Reactions to the First Weeks of Israel-Hamas War

Author:
Ammar Musarea
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
When the al-Qassam Brigades—the military wing of Hamas which the United States classifies as a terrorist organization—launched their al-Aqsa Flood operation, Syrians were already on edge. They had been following news of peaceful protests that have been taking place for almost two months in the Suwayda Governorate, which is majority Druze, as well as in other Syrian governorates. Protestors have called for the end of the Assad regime, the release of tens of thousands of prisoners, and the implementation of UN resolutions on Syria. Meanwhile, the Syrian regime and Russian aircraft have carried out daily bombings on civilians in Idlib and the surrounding countryside, which have displaced more than 100,000 Syrians. The Syrian Network for Human Rights stated that the Assad regime and Russia’s attacks on northwestern Syria have resulted in around 45 civilian deaths including 13 children, 9 women, and 3 humanitarian aid workers. They said that 51 critical facilities had also been targeted during October 2023. Al-Aqsa Flood also comes at a time when Syrians in regime-controlled areas face increasingly difficult living conditions. Concurrently, the International Court of Justice is beginning initial proceedings for Canada and the Netherlands’ case against the Assad regime for crimes of torture. The response to events in Israel and Gaza have not been monolithic; reactions have varied significantly depending on factions’ alliances and proximity to the conflict. On the one hand, there is widespread disillusionment with actors claiming to liberate Palestine, a reflection of how groups like Hamas failed to support the Syrian people’s revolution against the Assad regime. However, Syrians as a whole empathize with Palestinians and reject the killing and forced displacement of Palestinians and destruction of their homes. Simultaneously, Syrians have not forgotten the crimes that the terrorist organization Hezbollah has carried out against them in support of the regime, as well as Hamas’ backstabbing in trying to reestablish ties with the Assad regime. Hamas' close ties with Iran, the main backer of the Damascus government, are another source of anger in anti-regime circles.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Syrian War, Hamas, and October 7
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Syria

6. Morocco and North Africa Are Feeling Anti-Normalization Ripples from the Gaza War

Author:
Sabina Henneberg
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The conflict will make it more difficult for Washington and Israel to preserve—let alone expand—the diplomatic progress they have made with North African governments in recent years, particularly as public opposition intensifies. North Africa has not been spared from the reverberations of the Hamas-Israel war. Morocco may be the country most profoundly affected given its relatively strong relations with Israel and the United States, while anti-normalization trends elsewhere in the region are being firmly reinforced, creating new challenges for Washington.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Conflict, Normalization, and Hamas
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, North Africa, and Morocco

7. Beyond Elections: Evolving Arab Public Opinion on Democracy and Human Rights

Author:
Catherine Cleveland and David Pollock
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
U.S. efforts in the region stand a better chance of success if they consider rising demand for accountable governance, skepticism about democratic institutions, and various nation-specific trends. Against the backdrop of simmering protests, endemic economic challenges, the continuing struggle to contain the Covid-19 pandemic, and fallout from the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, The Washington Institute launched a series of policy papers to help guide the Biden administration’s approach on democracy, reform, human rights, and political change across the Middle East and North Africa. The series addresses a range of questions: How do changes in the region over the last decade affect the new administration’s approach to these issues? How should the administration best prepare for the “new normal” of protests in the region? What are the policy tools at America’s disposal, and how might they be improved upon? How can Washington turn much-needed attention to new areas of focus, such as corruption and public-sector reform? What does public opinion research tell us about what the region’s publics want in their countries—and from the United States? And where might enhanced U.S.-EU coordination play a constructive role? The proposed answers will assist policymakers in advancing opportunities for reform, preserving U.S. interests, and navigating Middle East realities in the context of America’s global priorities. In the fourth essay in the series—covering public opinion on democracy and human rights in Arab states—Catherine Cleveland and David Pollock note a cooling toward democratic institutions, a trend undoubtedly driven by failures in Tunisia, Lebanon, and Iraq. They discuss corresponding distrust in legislative bodies and high frustration with corrupt governance. Islamist leaders, they observe, come in for increasingly sharp critique. All in all, the findings emphasize a strong public demand for better governance outcomes and, in turn, the benefits as well as limits of U.S. democracy and human rights promotion in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Islam, Politics, Public Opinion, Reform, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

8. Collective Memory of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution: Surveying Egyptians a Decade After

Author:
Hazem Albassam and Coline Ferrant
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
A recent poll gauges Egyptians' lasting impressions of their chapter in the Arab Spring. In 2011, after just eighteen days, from January 25 to February 11, the Egyptian public overthrew the 30-year-long dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak. A decade afterwards, we sought to have Egyptians reflect on the collective memory of those days. What fueled the revolution? Was it successful? Did it lose its way? Attempts to explain the Revolution in public discourse point to inequality, economic stagnation, poverty, unemployment, and corruption. Reflecting on these indicators, we compare them to Egyptians’ own recollections through the analysis of an exploratory survey conducted in November 2020.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Arab Spring, Memory, and Revolution
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, and Egypt