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1. Recipe for Success: Israeli and Lebanese Analytical Perspectives on the Maritime Delimitation Negotiations

Author:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The Israel-Lebanon maritime boundary agreement is not a direct agreement between the two countries, but rather two separate agreements with the United States. It is unique: the first such agreement reached between countries with no diplomatic relations, the first between adjacent states in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the first in the region to be resolved through indirect negotiations facilitated by a mediator. A confluence of domestic and geopolitical events contributed to the signing of the agreement, including elections in Israel, the deterioration of Lebanon’s economy and the country’s descent into political crisis, and the consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for the global energy market. Effective mediation between parties was more important than the degree of trust the parties had in the mediator or the mediator’s relative neutrality on the issue. The United States was not an unbiased mediator, but because of its own incentives to deliver an agreement and its leverage over both parties it was the only possible one. International oil and gas companies influenced the negotiations, but did not directly participate in them. Due to their vested interest in securing their existing or prospective investments, they used public communications and discrete engagements with the Israeli and Lebanese governments to encourage a deal. This agreement could serve as a model for other maritime disputes by demonstrating at least two things. Firstly, solutions can be achieved when parties delink their maritime negotiations from the core issues in their bilateral relationship. Secondly, if two sides are committed to reaching an agreement, the international law of the sea is sufficiently flexible for them to find a solution, even when one party is a signatory of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the other is not.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Maritime, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Lebanon

2. The Future of Neutrality

Author:
Pascal Lottaz
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Neutrality is a naturally occurring phenomenon. There have always been actors on the world stage that have remained outside the conflicts of others, be they countries, religious institutions or international organisations (IOs). Even during the two world wars and the first Cold War (i.e. the US and its allies versus the USSR and its allies), some actors managed to avoid the battlefields or claimed a position separate from the various alliance systems. Despite the beliefs of some commentators that neutrality is coming to an end, there is no indication that world politics is actually about to change dramatically enough to eradicate the reasons and logic for neutrality. In fact, the least conductive international environment for neutrality – unipolarity – seems to be ending. What could be called the “New Cold War” (the West-aligned countries versus Russia in Europe and versus China in Asia) and the emerging multipolar world will likely produce the dynamics leading to more neutrality as a counter-reaction to the new great power rivalry. We should expect neutrality and neutralism – i.e. political movements demanding the adoption of neutrality policies – to strengthen. Nevertheless, neutrality is shifting. It is moving from Europe to other regions of the world, and, in the process, will likely also change conceptually. This Policy Brief will first describe the nature of neutrality and the three basic motivations for actors to opt for its policies. It then discusses the challenges any neutrality policy faces and will conclude by providing concrete recommendations for policymakers seeking to maintain neutrality vis-à-vis either hot or cold conflicts.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Hegemony, Rivalry, and Neutrality
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. India's G20 Presidency: Opportunity to Resume Engagement in the Arctic

Author:
Anurag Bisen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The Arctic lies at the intersection of several issues with global consequences such as climate change, increased accessibility to and availability of resources, and global strategic contestation that have made the region increasingly relevant to the world. Temperatures in the Arctic continue to rise at four times the global annual average, driving many of the changes under way there, most prominently sea-level rise and the thawing of permafrost, which impact both local ecosystems and the global climate system. International scientific cooperation and data monitoring and sharing are crucial to understanding the impact of climate change, counteracting its negative effects, and enhancing living conditions and economic activity. Apart from a few limited pockets of cooperation that still exist, cooperation between Russia and the West with regard to the Arctic has largely been put on hold since the start of the conflict in Ukraine. The current absence of research and data sharing among scientists is threatening to jeopardise scientists’ understanding of the warming trends in the Arctic, exacerbating the environmental emergency the region in particular is facing. One of the few channels that still exists for constructive dialogue on a range of Arctic-related issues is the GCSP’s “‘High North Talks”’, through which discreet exchanges on various important issues continue. Among other things, the G20 agenda includes climate change, sustainable development and the environment, all of which are under threat due to the cessation of Artic-related scientific engagement. The G20 also represents a rare platform where engagement between Russia and the West has not yet ceased. The suspension of dialogue and scientific exchange vis-à-vis the Arctic is driven by a deep distrust that needs to be overcome by an interlocutor that is acceptable to all stakeholders. India's theme for its G20 presidency resonates strongly with the Arctic and its impact on the world. The resumption of Arctic-related scientific exchange is an easy deliverable with global benefits that India, which has the necessary legitimacy, credibility and relevance, should use its G20 presidency to strive for.
Topic:
Climate Change, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Science and Technology, G20, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
India, Asia, and Arctic

4. Commitment to Control Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security

Author:
Anna Nadibaidze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Recent technological and political developments in OSCE participating States suggest a strong interest in pursuing, testing and using weaponised AI and weapons systems with increasingly autonomous features controlled by algorithms. In May 2021 Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that Russia had begun producing combat robots “capable of fighting on their own”,1 while the French Army is planning to introduce robotic systems by 2040.2 The United Kingdom (UK) government has stated its objective of achieving “a leading role in critical and emerging technologies”3 and has established a Defence Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy Unit to better understand them.4 In the United States, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence has urged the government “not [to] be a witness to the AI revolution in military affairs”.5 The global discussion about autonomous weapons systems is often framed in a futuristic way and focuses on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) – colloquially called “killer robots” – or the “AI arms race”. But weaponised AI is already a reality of European security. Thus far participating States have been reluctant to utilise the OSCE platform to address the risks caused by the increasing autonomy of weapons systems. Building on this issue, this essay intends to address the following questions: (1) how does the lack of regulation of weaponised AI affect security and stability in Europe? and (2) what role can the OSCE play in mitigating the risks related to weaponised AI?
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. Blockchain Technology: An Innovative Policy Tool for Enhancing Conventional Arms Control and Verification

Author:
Nicolo Miotto
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Blockchain has the potential to revolutionise our societies by radically transforming multiple sectors ranging from financial services to health care, and from international trade to logistics.1 Governments, businesses, research centres, and international organisations are becoming increasingly interested in this cutting-edge technology because it can be utilised to provide a decentralised system for data management with high levels of transparency, reliability, and security.2 Recently, inter- governmental organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the OSCE have emphasised the relevance of blockchain, which can be utilised to improve international security.3 Blockchain has already proved that it can effectively enhance human security. For instance, the World Food Programme has pioneered a blockchain-based humanitarian aid programme to support refugees in Jordan with the use of cryptocurrencies.4 Similarly, the International Committee of the Red Cross has developed a distributed ledger technology (DLT)-based local trading system in Kenya to help fragile communities.5 In 2015 the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund even launched “Unicoin” – its own cryptocurrency – which children from poor families can exchange for goods. Although researchers have been exploring the impact of this technology on multiple fields, the implications of blockchain-based systems for CAC are still under-explored. This paper aims to fill this research gap by demonstrating that blockchain can play a crucial role in enhancing CAC monitoring and verification. It argues that blockchain offers a positive behavioural model and has advantageous practical implications for conventional arms control. The analysis is guided by the following research questions: (1) what psychological impact does blockchain have on confidence building? and (2) how do smart contracts enhance CAC?
Topic:
Infrastructure, Governance, and Blockchain
Political Geography:
Global Focus

6. Mine Action as a Confidence- and Security-building Measure in the OSCE Region

Author:
Claudia Ditel
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Landmines are designed to maim or kill indiscriminately and can lie inactive in the soil for years. As such, they represent a constant threat to local populations, restrict people’s freedom of movement, and pose an obstacle to the return of refugees and to development during post- conflict reconstruction.1 Currently tens of millions of landmines have been laid in more than 60 countries and many of them are still unmapped.2 Among the most contaminated countries worldwide, four are in the OSCE region: Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Turkey. Armenia, Ukraine, and Georgia are also highly contaminated.3 In addition, several OSCE countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Russia, the United States, and Uzbekistan) did not join the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (generally known as the Ottawa Convention), which bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines; encourages mutual assistance among states parties to destroy existing landmines and stockpiles as soon as possible; and provides assistance to mine victims.4 Some of the non-signatory states are engaged in protracted conflicts in which the OSCE has played a role for years as mediator or facilitator in negotiations. This paper investigates whether mine action could be implemented as a CSBM as part of conflict transformation in the OSCE region, taking three post-Soviet ethnic conflicts as case studies (Georgia, Eastern Ukraine, and Nagorno-Karabakh), where the problem of landmines and protracted conflicts are two interconnected dimensions of the same complex scenario, although with the possibility of generalising results to other areas. The study starts by illustrating the evolution of mine action and then moves on to address the multitrack approach to peacebuilding to explain how this can be combined with mine action. By reviewing the literature on conflict transformation and good practices worldwide, the study concludes that there is sufficient ground to consider mine action to be a promising CSBM in the OSCE area.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, United Nations, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, Landmines, and OSCE
Political Geography:
Europe

7. Mine Action as a Confidence- and Security-building Measure in the OSCE Region

Author:
Claudia Ditel
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Mine action has the potential to incentivise confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), because it could contribute to development and reconciliation through the creation of communities of practice among individuals from civil society and at the grassroots level as part of post-conflict reconstruction. Although many Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) participating States are contaminated by mines, mine action as a CSBM has scarcely been included in peace negotiations, because it is thought that it might hinder the peace process. Yet mine action, if “depoliticised”, could be implemented independently of peace negotiations through the creation of spaces for cooperation in demining projects of common interest to rival communities. The OSCE is well placed to propose these strategies, especially in Eastern Ukraine, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, which are not only affected by protracted conflicts with limited engagement of the population in the peace process but are also highly contaminated by mines.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Violence, and Landmines
Political Geography:
Europe

8. Blockchain Technology: An Innovative Policy Tool for Enhancing Conventional Arms Control and Verification

Author:
Nicolo Miotto
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Blockchain represents an unprecedented opportunity for enhancing conventional arms control (CAC) and verification. Based on the principles of transparency, verifiability, and predictability, this state-of-the-art technology could build confidence and facilitate the implementation of arms control mechanisms. Blockchain-based so-called “smart contracts” have advantageous practical implications for CAC. They could improve the verification of countries’ compliance with their CAC obligations by enhancing monitoring procedures and could strengthen arms export controls by improving treaty signatories’ ability to monitor weapons and ammunition supply chains. Reinforcing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) framework for conventional ammunition control with a permissioned blockchain would provide greater confidentiality and improve monitoring and data verifiability, thus strengthening the OSCE’s CAC regimes.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Blockchain
Political Geography:
Europe

9. Commitment to Control Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security

Author:
Anna Nadibaidze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The global debate on weaponised artificial intelligence (AI) often focuses on futuristic “killer robots”, which risks overlooking the fact that these technologies are already part of the security landscape. Diminishing human control over the use of force and the differences in states’ discourse pose a considerable risk for European security and stability. The impact of AI is not inevitable, and states should address this issue through political means, such as a political declaration with a commitment to ensuring human control over the use of force. With its inclusive membership, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) can and should become the platform through which its participating States can take a step forward in the global debate on weaponised AI.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, and OSCE
Political Geography:
Europe

10. The Technology of Terror: from Dynamite to the Metaverse

Author:
Christina Schori Liang
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Non-state actors have always been interested in obtaining and mastering innovative weapons. According to “lethal empowerment theory”, new technologies will be rapidly adopted and adapted by violent non-state actors when they are accessible, cheap, simple to use, transportable, concealable, and effective. Terrorists are interested in weapons that are useful in a wide range of contexts – “that magnify effects, are symbolically resonant and can be given to unexpected uses.” It is thus important to be vigilant in analysing how actors will leverage and innovate new technologies for malicious purposes, in order to confront the “unknown unknowns” and not repeat the mistakes based on a “failure of imagination”, as highlighted in the 9/11 Commission Report.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Terrorism, Governance, Social Media, and Innovation
Political Geography:
Global Focus