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62. Cryptocurrencies and All That: Two Ideas from Monetary Economics
- Author:
- Jesús Fernández‐Villaverde
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Cato Journal
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- The monetary arrangements of societies are the result of the interplay of technology and ideas. Technology determines, for example, which coins can be minted and at what cost. For centuries, minting small‐denomination coinage was too costly to induce Western European governments to supply enough small change (Sargent and Velde 2002). Only the arrival of steam‐driven presses fixed this problem (Doty 1998). Simultaneously, ideas about private property and the scope of government determined whether private entrepreneurs were allowed to compete with governments in the supply of small change (Selgin 2008). Technology and ideas about money engage dialectically. Technological advances shape our ideas about money by making new monetary arrangements feasible. Ideas about desirable outcomes direct innovators to develop new technologies.
- Topic:
- Economics, Science and Technology, Monetary Policy, and Cryptocurrencies
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Global Focus
63. Ten Stablecoin Predictions and Their Monetary Policy Implications
- Author:
- Caitlin Long
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Cato Journal
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- Stablecoins are financial obligations issued on a blockchain. They are generally fully collateralized with either fiat currency deposits at a bank, or with short‐term government bonds held at a custodian. They’re issued only by nonbanks, although FINMA in Switzerland does allow Swiss banks to issue Swiss franc–denominated stablecoins. Usually stablecoins do not pay interest, and they are designed to trade at par with the fiat currency. Because they are issued on a blockchain, they usually settle in minutes, with irreversibility, and — critically — they are “programmable,” which means users can build their own software applications to interact with them.
- Topic:
- Monetary Policy, Banks, and Digital Currency
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus and United States of America
64. Promise and Peril of Digital Money in China
- Author:
- Martin Chorzempa
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Cato Journal
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- Digital currency and fintech have been some of the most powerful forces for freedom and personal liberty in China for the past decade, but their future influence is uncertain. Starting as a disruptive force that gave Chinese unprecedented autonomy in their financial lives, connected either to global cryptocurrency networks or local tech ecosystems built by private firms, a new chapter is beginning. In this new era, one speech urging an emphasis on innovation instead of regulation can seemingly bring the full force of the Chinese state to bear onto a firm that once disrupted state banks with impunity. Technologies like blockchain first embraced by libertarians and cryptography enthusiasts as freeing money from dependence on the state look poised to become tools for governments to increase their ability to monitor and shape financial transactions. Meanwhile, disruptive fintech tools have become symbiotic with the major state banks, which will retain their role as the core of the financial system.
- Topic:
- Economics, Science and Technology, Finance, Digital Currency, and Transactions
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
65. Financial Freedom and Privacy in the Post‐Cash World
- Author:
- Alex Gladstein
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Cato Journal
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- The future of currency is digital. The majority of transactions made every day are already electronic and controlled by banks or tech companies. These payments are easily surveillable, confiscatable, and censorable. Physical cash still functions as an essential savings mechanism and privacy tool for millions of people worldwide. With cash, individuals can buy goods and services or save without sharing their identity with a third‐party merchant or custodian. But as banknotes fade from daily use, the future of financial freedom and privacy comes into serious jeopardy.
- Topic:
- Finance, Privacy, Freedom, Digital Currency, and Cash
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
66. Tunnels, Bunkers, and Escape Hatches: Defending Economic Rights under Fire
- Author:
- Jill Carlson
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Cato Journal
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- Possessions, or property, have been reiterated as a human right over the course of the centuries since Locke first wrote — enshrined in everything from the U.S. Declaration of Independence to the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (1948: 217, A III). Nevertheless, executives, judiciaries, legislative bodies, and central banks around the world have continually broken their social contract on this front: not only failing to defend the natural rights of possessions and property, but often actively harming individuals’ ability to hold value and to freely transfer and exchange assets. Access to a free, open, and functional financial system is a fundamental human right. One that is continuously violated by states and policymakers globally.
- Topic:
- Economics, Finance, Money, and Economic Rights
- Political Geography:
- South America and Venezuela
67. The Case for Central Bank Digital Currencies
- Author:
- Eswar S. Prasad
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Cato Journal
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- New financial technologies — including those underpinning cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin — herald broader access to the financial system, quicker and more easily verifiable settlement of transactions and payments, and lower transaction costs. Domestic and cross‐border payment systems are on the threshold of major transformation, with significant gains in speed and lowering of transaction costs on the horizon. The efficiency gains in normal times from having decentralized payment and settlement systems needs to be balanced against their potential technological vulnerabilities and the repercussions of loss of confidence during periods of financial stress.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Finance, Central Bank, and Digital Currency
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
68. Should the State or the Market Provide Digital Currency?
- Author:
- Lawrence H. White
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Cato Journal
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- Private commercial banks have been providing trusted money to the public for hundreds of years, in the form of banknotes (where allowed) and transferable deposit balances, as an integral part of their business model. Economically, money balances are a private good: they are rival in consumption (you and I can’t both simultaneously spend a given banknote or deposit balance) and excludable in supply (you and your bank can stop me from spending the funds in your wallet or account) (White 1999: 89). Accordingly, the market does not inherently fail to provide money efficiently.
- Topic:
- Markets, Monetary Policy, Economy, State, Banks, and Digital Currency
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
69. Technology Development of Digital Currency
- Author:
- Neha Narula
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Cato Journal
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- We often spend a lot of time talking about the regulatory aspects of what a digital currency might look like, or the economic aspects. But if we take a look at the largest companies, the most influential on our ways of life, they’re tech companies. Technology is incredibly important and influences what we can do with policy and what kinds of functionality we can even enable. So, what I hope to tell you today is a little bit about how I’m seeing the technology development of digital currency.
- Topic:
- Development, Science and Technology, Monetary Policy, and Digital Currency
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
70. Public and Private Money Can Coexist in the Digital Age
- Author:
- Tobias Adrian and Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Cato Journal
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- a card, waving a phone, or clicking a mouse. Or we might hand over notes and coins, though in many countries increasingly less often. Today’s world is characterized by a dual monetary system, involving privately issued money — by banks of all types, telecom companies, or specialized payment providers — built upon a foundation of publicly issued money — by central banks. While not perfect, this system offers significant advantages, including innovation and product diversity, mostly provided by the private sector, and stability and efficiency, ensured by the public sector. These objectives — innovation and diversity on the one hand, and stability and efficiency on the other — are related. More of one usually means less of the other. A tradeoff exists that countries — central banks especially — have to navigate. How much of the private sector to rely upon, versus how much to innovate themselves? Much depends on preferences, available technology, and the efficiency of regulation. So it is natural, when a new technology emerges, to ask how today’s dual monetary system will evolve. If digitalized cash — called central bank digital currency — does emerge, will it displace privately issued money or allow it to flourish? The first is always possible, by way of more stringent regulation. We argue that the second remains possible, by extending the logic of today’s dual monetary system. Importantly, central banks should not face a choice between either offering central bank digital currency, or encouraging the private sector to provide its own digital variant. The two can coincide and complement each other — to the extent central banks make certain design choices and refresh their regulatory frameworks.
- Topic:
- Monetary Policy, Banks, Money, Digital Policy, and Digital Currency
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
71. Reflections on Monetary Policy and Its Future
- Author:
- Jeb Hensarling, Phil Gramm, and John B. Taylor
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Cato Journal
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- The Fed’s huge balance sheet allows it to engage in credit policy (the composition of the balance sheet is by definition credit policy), which inherently auto‐resides in fiscal policy — but should auto‐reside with Congress. This discussion, moderated by John B. Taylor, took place at the Cato Institute’s 38th Annual Monetary Conference on November 19, 2020. The transcript has been edited for publication.
- Topic:
- Economics, Monetary Policy, Federal Reserve, and Credit
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
72. The New Faces of Internationalism: How Generational Change Is Reshaping American Foreign Policy Attitudes
- Author:
- A. Trevor Thrall and Erik Goepner
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- Observers of American foreign policy have been worried for years about eroding public support for international engagement, especially in light of increasing public discontent after nearly two decades of military conflict since 9/11. Low support for international engagement and military intervention among younger Americans, in particular, has led some to worry that the age of American internationalism has passed. There is little agreement, however, about how serious the erosion of public support is and what its causes are. Relying on an analysis of seven decades of polling data, we argue that generational effects have slowly reshaped patterns of American foreign policy preferences. Since World War II, Americans have come of age during periods increasingly less conducive to support of military intervention, leading them to adopt worldviews increasingly at odds with those carried by older Americans. As a result, the United States is undergoing a slow motion changing of the guard, as older and more hawkish Americans die and are replaced by younger, less hawkish ones. These findings have important implications for the debate about the state of public support for American leadership of the liberal international order and the evolution of American foreign policy.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Engagement, International Order, and Generation
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
73. Questioning Industrial Policy: Why Government Manufacturing Plans Are Ineffective and Unnecessary
- Author:
- Scott Lincicome and Huan Zhu
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and rising U.S.-China tensions, American policymakers have again embraced “industrial policy.” Both President Biden and his predecessor, as well as legislators from both parties, have advocated a range of federal support for American manufacturers to fix perceived weaknesses in the U.S. economy and to counter China’s growing economic clout. These and other industrial policy advocates, however, routinely leave unanswered important questions about U.S. industrial policy’s efficacy and necessity: What is “Industrial Policy”? Advocates of “industrial policy” often fail to define the term, thus permitting them to ignore past failures and embrace false successes while preventing a legitimate assessment of industrial policies’ costs and benefits. Yet U.S. industrial policy’s history of debate and implementation establishes several requisite elements – elements that reveal most “industrial policy successes” not to be “industrial policy” at all. What are the common obstacles to effective U.S. industrial policy? Several obstacles have prevented U.S. industrial policies from generating better outcomes than the market. This includes legislators’ and bureaucrats’ inability to “pick winners” and efficiently allocate public resources (Hayek’s “Knowledge Problem”); factors inherent in the U.S. political system (Public Choice Theory); lack of discipline regarding scope, duration, and budgetary costs; interaction with other government policies that distort the market at issue; and substantial unseen costs. What “problem” will industrial policy solve? The most common problems purportedly solved by industrial policy proposals are less serious than advocates claim or unfixable via industrial policy. This includes allegations of widespread U.S. “deindustrialization” and a broader decline in American innovation; the disappearance of “good jobs”; the erosion of middle‐class living standards; and the destruction of American communities. Do other countries’ industrial policies demand U.S. industrial policy? The experiences of other countries generally cannot justify U.S. industrial policy because countries have different economic and political systems. Regardless, industrial policy successes abroad – for example, in Japan, Korea and Taiwan – are exaggerated. Also, China’s economic growth and industrial policies do not justify similar U.S. policies, considering the market‐based reasons for China’s rise, the Chinese policies’ immense costs, and the systemic challenges that could derail China’s future growth and geopolitical influence. These answers argue strongly against a new U.S. embrace of industrial policy. The United States undoubtedly faces economic and geopolitical challenges, including ones related to China, but the solution lies not in copying China’s top‐down economic planning. Reality, in fact, argues much the opposite.
- Topic:
- Government, Industrial Policy, Manufacturing, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
74. Manufactured Crisis: “Deindustrialization,” Free Markets, and National Security
- Author:
- Scott Lincicome
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- Both the American left and right often use “national security” to justify sweeping proposals for new U.S. protectionism and industrial policy. “Free markets” and a lack of government support for the manufacturing sector are alleged to have crippled the U.S. defense industrial base’s ability to supply “essential” goods during war or other emergencies, thus imperiling national security and demanding a fundamental rethink of U.S. trade and manufacturing policy. The COVID-19 crisis and U.S.-China tensions have amplified these claims. This resurgent “security nationalism,” however, extends far beyond the limited theoretical scenarios in which national security might justify government action, and it suffers from several flaws. First, reports of the demise of the U.S. manufacturing sector are exaggerated. Although U.S. manufacturing sector employment and share of national economic output (gross domestic product) have declined, these data are mostly irrelevant to national security and reflect macroeconomic trends affecting many other countries. By contrast, the most relevant data—on the U.S. manufacturing sector’s output, exports, financial performance, and investment—show that the nation’s total productive capacity and most of the industries typically associated with “national security” are still expanding. Second, “security nationalism” assumes a need for broad and novel U.S. government interventions while ignoring the targeted federal policies intended to support the defense industrial base. In fact, many U.S. laws already authorize the federal government to support or protect discrete U.S. industries on national security grounds. Third, several of these laws and policies provide a cautionary tale regarding the inefficacy of certain core “security nationalist” priorities. Case studies of past government support for steel, shipbuilding, semiconductors, and machine tools show that security‐related protectionism and industrial policy in the United States often undermines national security. Fourth, although the United States is not nearly as open (and thus allegedly “vulnerable”) to external shocks as claimed, global integration and trade openness often bolster U.S. national security by encouraging peace among trading nations or mitigating the impact of domestic shocks. Together, these points rebut the most common claims in support of “security nationalism” and show why skepticism of such initiatives is necessary when national security is involved. They also reveal market‐oriented trade, immigration, tax, and regulatory policies that would generally benefit the U.S. economy while also supporting the defense industrial base and national security.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, National Security, COVID-19, Free Market, and Deindustrialization
- Political Geography:
- China, North America, and United States of America
75. Espionage, Espionage‐Related Crimes, and Immigration: A Risk Analysis, 1990–2019
- Author:
- Alex Nowrasteh
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- A cost‐benefit analysis finds that the hazards posed by foreign‐born spies are not large enough to warrant broad and costly actions such as a ban on travel and immigration from China, but they do warrant the continued exclusion of potential spies under current laws. Espionage poses a threat to national security and the private property rights of Americans. The government should address the threat of espionage in a manner whereby the benefits of government actions taken to reduce it outweigh the costs of those actions. To aid in that goal, this policy analysis presents the first combined database of all identified spies who targeted both the U.S. government and private organizations on U.S. soil. This analysis identifies 1,485 spies on American soil who, from 1990 through the end of 2019, conducted state or commercial espionage. Of those, 890 were foreign‐born, 583 were native‐born Americans, and 12 had unknown origins. The scale and scope of espionage have major implications for immigration policy, as a disproportionate number of the identified spies were foreign‐born. Native‐born Americans accounted for 39.3 percent of all spies, foreign‐born spies accounted for 59.9 percent, and spies of unknown origins accounted for 0.8 percent. Spies who were born in China, Mexico, Iran, Taiwan, and Russia account for 34.7 percent of all spies. The chance that a native‐born American committed espionage or an espionage‐related crime and was identified was about 1 in 13.1 million per year from 1990 to 2019. The annual chance that a foreign‐born person in the United States committed an espionage‐related crime and was discovered doing so was about 1 in 2.2 million during that time. The government was the victim in 83.3 percent of espionage cases, firms were the victims of commercial espionage in 16.3 percent of the cases, and hospitals and universities were the victims of espionage in 0.1 percent and 0.3 percent of the cases, respectively. The federal government should continue to exclude foreign‐born individuals from entering the United States if they pose a threat to the national security and private property rights of Americans through espionage. A cost‐benefit analysis finds that the hazards posed by foreign‐born spies are not large enough to warrant broad and costly actions such as a ban on travel and immigration from China, but they do warrant the continued exclusion of potential spies under current laws.
- Topic:
- Crime, Immigration, Risk, and Espionage
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
76. Protectionism or National Security? The Use and Abuse of Section 232
- Author:
- Scott Lincicome and Inu Manak
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- With several Section 232 tariffs still in place, and the status of other investigations unclear, the law presents an early test for the Biden administration and a signal about its future trade policy plans. President Biden took office at the height of modern American protectionism. The trade policy legacy he inherited from the Trump administration puts the United States at a crossroads. Will Biden go down the problematic path of executive overreach like his predecessor, or will he forge a new path? We may not need to wait long to find out. In his first trade action, President Biden reinstated tariffs on aluminum from the United Arab Emirates under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which authorizes the president to impose tariffs when a certain product is “being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair national security.” Though infrequently used in the past, Section 232 was a favored trade tool of the Trump administration, which was responsible for nearly a quarter of all Section 232 investigations initiated since 1962. While Congress has constitutional authority over trade policy, Section 232 gives the president broad discretion to enact protectionist measures in the name of national security. Why is this law a problem? First, the statute’s lack of an objective definition of “national security” permits essentially anything to be considered a threat, regardless of the merits. Second, the law’s lack of detailed procedural requirements encouraged the Trump administration to cut corners in applying the law, thus breeding cronyism and confusion. Third, President Trump took advantage of the law’s ambiguity to shield key Section 232 findings from Congress and the public, undermining both transparency and accountability. The Trump administration’s abuse of the rarely used Section 232 has allowed the statute to become an excuse for blatant commercial protectionism, harming American companies and consumers and our security interests. It’s unclear whether the Biden administration will continue this troubling trend or seek reform. The best course of action would be the latter: Biden should avoid using Section 232 and support congressional efforts to rein in presidential power, thus ensuring an end to the calamitous episodes that were common during the Trump era.
- Topic:
- National Security, Trade Policy, and Protectionism
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
77. Private Schooling after a Year of COVID-19: How the Private Sector Has Fared and How to Keep It Healthy
- Author:
- Neal McCluskey
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- In one year, COVID-19 contributed to the permanent closure of at least 132 mainly low‐cost private schools. But that was better than some feared. As COVID-19 struck the United States in March 2020, sending the nation into lockdown, worry about the fate of private schools was high. These schools, which only survive if people can pay for them, seemed to face deep trouble. Many private schools have thin financial margins even in good economic times and rely not only on tuition but also on fundraisers, such as in‐person auctions, to make ends meet. When the pandemic hit, many such events were canceled, and churches no longer met in person, threatening contributions that help support some private schools. Simultaneously, many private schooling families faced tighter finances, making private schooling less affordable. Finally, families that could still afford private schooling might have concluded that continuing to pay for education that was going to be online‐only made little sense.
- Topic:
- Education, COVID-19, and Private Schools
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
78. China: Rise or Demise?
- Author:
- John Mueller
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- China, even if it rises, does not present much of a security threat to the United States. Policymakers increasingly view China’s rapidly growing wealth as a threat. China currently ranks second, or perhaps even first, in the world in gross domestic product (although 78th in per capita GDP), and the fear is that China will acquire military prowess commensurate with its wealth and feel impelled to carry out undesirable military adventures. However, even if it continues to rise, China does not present much of a security threat to the United States. China does not harbor Hitler‐style ambitions of extensive conquest, and the Chinese government depends on the world economy for development and the consequent acquiescence of the Chinese people. Armed conflict would be extremely—even overwhelmingly—costly to the country and, in particular, to the regime in charge. Indeed, there is a danger of making China into a threat by treating it as such and by engaging in so‐called balancing efforts against it. Rather than rising to anything that could be conceived to be “dominance,” China could decline into substantial economic stagnation. It faces many problems, including endemic (and perhaps intractable) corruption, environmental devastation, slowing growth, a rapidly aging population, enormous overproduction, increasing debt, and restive minorities in its west and in Hong Kong. At a time when it should be liberalizing its economy, Xi Jinping’s China increasingly restricts speech and privileges control by the antiquated and kleptocratic Communist Party over economic growth. And entrenched elites are well placed to block reform. That said, China’s standard of living is now the highest in its history, and it’s very easy to envision conditions that are a great deal worse than life under a stable, if increasingly authoritarian, kleptocracy. As a result, the Chinese people may be willing to ride with, and ride out, economic stagnation should that come about—although this might be accompanied by increasing dismay and disgruntlement. In either case—rise or demise—there is little the United States or other countries can or should do to affect China’s economically foolish authoritarian drive except to issue declarations of disapproval and to deal more warily. As former ambassador Chas Freeman puts it, “There is no military answer to a grand strategy built on a non‐violent expansion of commerce and navigation.” And Chinese leaders have plenty of problems to consume their attention. They scarcely need war or foreign military adventurism to enhance the mix. The problem is not so much that China is a threat but that it is deeply insecure. Policies of threat, balance, sanction, boycott, and critique are more likely to reinforce that condition than change it. The alternative is to wait, and to profit from China’s economic size to the degree possible, until someday China feels secure enough to reform itself.
- Topic:
- Government, GDP, Geopolitics, and Economic Growth
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and United States of America
79. Reforming Patent Law: The Case of Covid‐19
- Author:
- Michele Boldrin and David Levine
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Cato Journal
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- Ashort time ago the debate over the proposal to temporarily waive intellectual property rights on Covid‐19 vaccines was raging worldwide; and the suspension of those rights seemed imminent. Public attention reached its peak in May 2021 when the Biden administration endorsed the idea and committed itself to pursuing it under the World Trade Organization–World Intellectual Property Organization (WTO-WIPO) procedural rules for waiving intellectual property (IP) protection. By suspending IP rights, the administration sought to help low‐income countries to start producing vaccines more quickly, reducing the rising and dramatic worldwide vaccine inequality.
- Topic:
- Intellectual Property/Copyright, Inequality, Vaccine, COVID-19, and Patents
- Political Geography:
- Africa, India, and Latin America
80. An Alternative Theoretical Framework for Economics
- Author:
- Meir Kohn
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Cato Journal
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- As a profession, economics is thriving. The number of economists is large and growing. The volume of their output is exploding—more articles are published each year in a growing number of journals. As a science, however, economics is not doing so well. The questions addressed by all those articles seem to be getting smaller and smaller. And there seems to be little or no progress on the big questions of economics such as economic development and growth, economic fluctuations, and the proper role of government in the economy. Most of the articles published are econometric, and the results of many are of questionable quality.
- Topic:
- Economics, Research, Economic Theory, and Commerce
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus