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1. Course Correction: Charting a More Effective Approach to U.S.-China Trade

Author:
Clark Packard and Scott Lincicome
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Over the past several years the U.S.-China economic relationship has soured and become subordinated to broader concerns about national security and geopolitics. After a decades‐​long reform agenda in China that lifted hundreds of millions out of grinding poverty, Chinese president Xi Jinping has increasingly turned inward—reembracing Maoist socialism and heavy‐​handed central planning. Washington’s response to these worrisome developments has been reflexively hawkish economically, scattershot, and woefully inadequate for the economic challenge that China presents.
Topic:
National Security, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2. Biden and Trade at Year One: The Reign of Polite Protectionism

Author:
James Bacchus
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
As a presidential candidate, Joe Biden promised a change from the go‐​it‐​alone, my‐​way‐​or‐​the‐​highway approach to trade policy of Donald Trump. Disappointingly, during the first year of his presidency, Biden has instead largely embraced the failed Trump policy of unilateralism and protectionism in trade. He and his administration have done so politely, without Trump’s bluster and bombast. Yet, the results have been mostly the same: a turn toward more trade protection and managed trade, toward a proposed industrial policy that would add more restrictions on trade, and toward a destructive unilateralism that threatens to continue undermining the multilateral trading system overseen by the World Trade Organization. If Biden continues to pursue this misguided trade policy, American recovery and prosperity are at risk. There is still time—at least three years—for him to end this reign of polite protectionism by framing and pursuing a new trade policy that will benefit all Americans: a policy that will achieve more trade liberalization, stop managed trade, halt trade‐​restrictive industrial policy, renew trade multilateralism, and give restored and unflinching support to the international rule of law in trade.
Topic:
Tariffs, Trade, Donald Trump, Protectionism, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3. Policy Experimentation in China: The Political Economy of Policy Learning

Author:
Shaoda Wang and David Y. Yang
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Determining what policies to implement and how to implement them is an essential government task. Policy learning is challenging, as policy effectiveness often hinges on the nature of the policy, its implementation, the degree that it is tailored to local conditions, and the efforts and incentives of local politicians to make the policy work.
Topic:
Political Economy, Politics, Policy Implementation, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

4. Industrial Policy Implementation: Empirical Evidence from China’s Shipbuilding Industry

Author:
Panle Barwick, Myrto Kalouptsidi, and Nahim Bin Zahur
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Industrial policy has been widely used in developed and developing countries. Examples include the United States and Europe after World War II; Japan in the 1950s and 1960s; South Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s; and Brazil, China, India, and other developing countries more recently. Industrial policies are now back in the spotlight in developed countries, such as Europe and the United States. Designing and implementing industrial policies is a complicated task. Governments seeking to promote the growth of selected sectors have a wide range of policy tools at their disposal, including subsidies on output, provisioning loans at below‐​market interest rates, preferential tax policies, tariff and nontariff barriers, and so on. They must also choose the timing of policy interventions and whether to target selected firms within an industry.
Topic:
Government, Industrial Policy, Economic Policy, and Shipbuilding
Political Geography:
China and Asia

5. Effects of Sanctions on North Korea’s Refined Oil Prices

Author:
Kyoochul Kim
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
During 2016 and 2017, North Korea conducted three nuclear tests and four missile launches, and, in response, the international community strengthened its sanctions against North Korea. The sanctions were aimed at deterring North Korea from developing nuclear weapons; the means to achieve this included blocking the inflow of foreign currency into North Korea and banning the import of goods related to its nuclear development efforts. Specifically, the sanctions against North Korea banned the exports of anthracite, processed garments, and marine products to limit its foreign currency acquisition; they banned the import of machinery; and they limited the amount of oil (crude oil and refined oil products) introduced, thus hurting its economy.
Topic:
Oil, Sanctions, Weapons, and Trade
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

6. U.S. Trade Policy toward China: Learning the Right Lessons

Author:
Scott Lincicome
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Cato Journal
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Labor market and cultural disruptions in the United States are real and important, as is China’s current and unfortunate turn toward illiberalism and empire. But pretending today that there was a better trade policy choice in 2000—when Congress granted China “permanent normal trade relations” (PNTR) status and paved the way for broader engagement—is misguided. It assumes too much, ignores too much, and demands too much. Worse, it could lead to truly bad governance: increasing U.S. protectionism; forgiving the real and important failures of our policymakers, CEOs, and unions over the last two decades; and preventing a political consensus for real policy solutions. Indeed, that is happening now.
Topic:
International Relations, Economics, Markets, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Protectionism
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

7. Financial Development in Hong Kong and China: A Hayekian Perspective

Author:
Kam Hon Chu
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Cato Journal
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
In addition to foreign investment absorption, Hong Kong plays a pioneering role in the internationalization of the renminbi (RMB). Despite the lack of comprehensive statistics on the volume of offshore RMB transactions, Hong Kong is for sure one of the largest, if not the largest, global centers for offshore RMB businesses. According to the Triennial Central Bank Survey (BIS 2019), for instance, Hong Kong was the largest global offshore RMB foreign exchange market, with an average daily turnover of US$107.6 billion as of April 2019, considerably higher than the US$56.7 billion for London and the US$42.6 billion for Singapore.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Investment, and Financial Development
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Hong Kong

8. Promise and Peril of Digital Money in China

Author:
Martin Chorzempa
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Cato Journal
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Digital currency and fintech have been some of the most powerful forces for freedom and personal liberty in China for the past decade, but their future influence is uncertain. Starting as a disruptive force that gave Chinese unprecedented autonomy in their financial lives, connected either to global cryptocurrency networks or local tech ecosystems built by private firms, a new chapter is beginning. In this new era, one speech urging an emphasis on innovation instead of regulation can seemingly bring the full force of the Chinese state to bear onto a firm that once disrupted state banks with impunity. Technologies like blockchain first embraced by libertarians and cryptography enthusiasts as freeing money from dependence on the state look poised to become tools for governments to increase their ability to monitor and shape financial transactions. Meanwhile, disruptive fintech tools have become symbiotic with the major state banks, which will retain their role as the core of the financial system.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Finance, Digital Currency, and Transactions
Political Geography:
China and Asia

9. Questioning Industrial Policy: Why Government Manufacturing Plans Are Ineffective and Unnecessary

Author:
Scott Lincicome and Huan Zhu
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and rising U.S.-China tensions, American policymakers have again embraced “industrial policy.” Both President Biden and his predecessor, as well as legislators from both parties, have advocated a range of federal support for American manufacturers to fix perceived weaknesses in the U.S. economy and to counter China’s growing economic clout. These and other industrial policy advocates, however, routinely leave unanswered important questions about U.S. industrial policy’s efficacy and necessity: What is “Industrial Policy”? Advocates of “industrial policy” often fail to define the term, thus permitting them to ignore past failures and embrace false successes while preventing a legitimate assessment of industrial policies’ costs and benefits. Yet U.S. industrial policy’s history of debate and implementation establishes several requisite elements – elements that reveal most “industrial policy successes” not to be “industrial policy” at all. What are the common obstacles to effective U.S. industrial policy? Several obstacles have prevented U.S. industrial policies from generating better outcomes than the market. This includes legislators’ and bureaucrats’ inability to “pick winners” and efficiently allocate public resources (Hayek’s “Knowledge Problem”); factors inherent in the U.S. political system (Public Choice Theory); lack of discipline regarding scope, duration, and budgetary costs; interaction with other government policies that distort the market at issue; and substantial unseen costs. What “problem” will industrial policy solve? The most common problems purportedly solved by industrial policy proposals are less serious than advocates claim or unfixable via industrial policy. This includes allegations of widespread U.S. “deindustrialization” and a broader decline in American innovation; the disappearance of “good jobs”; the erosion of middle‐​class living standards; and the destruction of American communities. Do other countries’ industrial policies demand U.S. industrial policy? The experiences of other countries generally cannot justify U.S. industrial policy because countries have different economic and political systems. Regardless, industrial policy successes abroad – for example, in Japan, Korea and Taiwan – are exaggerated. Also, China’s economic growth and industrial policies do not justify similar U.S. policies, considering the market‐​based reasons for China’s rise, the Chinese policies’ immense costs, and the systemic challenges that could derail China’s future growth and geopolitical influence. These answers argue strongly against a new U.S. embrace of industrial policy. The United States undoubtedly faces economic and geopolitical challenges, including ones related to China, but the solution lies not in copying China’s top‐​down economic planning. Reality, in fact, argues much the opposite.
Topic:
Government, Industrial Policy, Manufacturing, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

10. China: Rise or Demise?

Author:
John Mueller
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
China, even if it rises, does not present much of a security threat to the United States. Policymakers increasingly view China’s rapidly growing wealth as a threat. China currently ranks second, or perhaps even first, in the world in gross domestic product (although 78th in per capita GDP), and the fear is that China will acquire military prowess commensurate with its wealth and feel impelled to carry out undesirable military adventures. However, even if it continues to rise, China does not present much of a security threat to the United States. China does not harbor Hitler‐​style ambitions of extensive conquest, and the Chinese government depends on the world economy for development and the consequent acquiescence of the Chinese people. Armed conflict would be extremely—even overwhelmingly—costly to the country and, in particular, to the regime in charge. Indeed, there is a danger of making China into a threat by treating it as such and by engaging in so‐​called balancing efforts against it. Rather than rising to anything that could be conceived to be “dominance,” China could decline into substantial economic stagnation. It faces many problems, including endemic (and perhaps intractable) corruption, environmental devastation, slowing growth, a rapidly aging population, enormous overproduction, increasing debt, and restive minorities in its west and in Hong Kong. At a time when it should be liberalizing its economy, Xi Jinping’s China increasingly restricts speech and privileges control by the antiquated and kleptocratic Communist Party over economic growth. And entrenched elites are well placed to block reform. That said, China’s standard of living is now the highest in its history, and it’s very easy to envision conditions that are a great deal worse than life under a stable, if increasingly authoritarian, kleptocracy. As a result, the Chinese people may be willing to ride with, and ride out, economic stagnation should that come about—although this might be accompanied by increasing dismay and disgruntlement. In either case—rise or demise—there is little the United States or other countries can or should do to affect China’s economically foolish authoritarian drive except to issue declarations of disapproval and to deal more warily. As former ambassador Chas Freeman puts it, “There is no military answer to a grand strategy built on a non‐​violent expansion of commerce and navigation.” And Chinese leaders have plenty of problems to consume their attention. They scarcely need war or foreign military adventurism to enhance the mix. The problem is not so much that China is a threat but that it is deeply insecure. Policies of threat, balance, sanction, boycott, and critique are more likely to reinforce that condition than change it. The alternative is to wait, and to profit from China’s economic size to the degree possible, until someday China feels secure enough to reform itself.
Topic:
Government, GDP, Geopolitics, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America