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1. COVID-19 and the 2020 US presidential election: Did the pandemic cost Donald Trump reelection?

Author:
Marcus Noland and Eva (Yiwen) Zhang
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
By Election Day 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had killed 234,244 Americans and caused the sharpest macroeconomic downturn in US history. Hypothetical calculations using county-level electoral data show that in a “no pandemic” scenario or a scenario in which the severity of the pandemic was mitigated by 30 percent, Donald Trump would have lost the popular vote but won the electoral vote. In the 20 percent mitigation scenario, the electoral vote would have been tied, giving Trump a presumptive victory in the House of Representatives. For the second time in a row (and the third time since 2000), the candidate who lost the popular vote would have been elected president of the United States.
Topic:
Government, Politics, Elections, Donald Trump, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

2. COVID-19 credit support programs in Europe’s five largest economies

Author:
Julia Anderson, Francesco Papadia, and Nicolas Véron
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
n 2020, European governments mitigated the economic impact of COVID-19 lockdowns and other pandemic-fighting programs through a host of initiatives, including efforts to support credit, such as guarantees for bank loans, particularly to small and medium-sized enterprises. This paper presents detailed information about these national credit support programs in the largest national economies of the European Union (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) and the United Kingdom. The information was collected through thorough examination of published material and extended exchanges with national authorities and financial sector participants. The analysis focuses on (1) how countries positioned themselves on the many tradeoffs that emerged in designing and implementing the programs; and (2) what explains differences in usage across countries and its leveling off everywhere in the second half of 2020.
Topic:
Government, European Union, Finance, Fiscal Policy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

3. How China lends: A rare look into 100 debt contracts with foreign governments

Author:
Anna Gelpern, Sebastian Horn, Scott Morris, Brad Parks, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
China is the world’s largest official creditor, but basic facts are lacking about the terms and conditions of its lending. Very few contracts between Chinese lenders and their government borrowers have ever been published or studied. This paper is the first systematic analysis of the legal terms of China’s foreign lending. The authors collect and analyze 100 contracts between Chinese state-owned entities and government borrowers in 24 developing countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Oceania, and compare them with those of other bilateral, multilateral, and commercial creditors. Three main insights emerge. First, the Chinese contracts contain unusual confidentiality clauses that bar borrowers from revealing the terms or even the existence of the debt. Second, Chinese lenders seek advantage over other creditors, using collateral arrangements such as lender-controlled revenue accounts and promises to keep the debt out of collective restructuring (“no Paris Club” clauses). Third, cancellation, acceleration, and stabilization clauses in Chinese contracts potentially allow the lenders to influence debtors’ domestic and foreign policies. Even if these terms were unenforceable in court, the mix of confidentiality, seniority, and policy influence could limit the sovereign debtor’s crisis management options and complicate debt renegotiation. Overall, the contracts use creative design to manage credit risks and overcome enforcement hurdles, presenting China as a muscular and commercially savvy lender to the developing world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Debt, Government, and Banking
Political Geography:
China and Asia

4. Uncertain prospects for sovereign wealth funds of Gulf countries

Author:
Julien Maire, Adnan Mazarei, and Edwin M. Truman
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Among the best-known sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)—government-owned or controlled investment vehicles—are those funded by hydrocarbon revenues in the member economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which comprises all the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf except Iraq, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. This Policy Brief compares the GCC SWFs with each other and with other funds in terms of their transparency and accountability on the fifth SWF scoreboard, available here. Several factors, including the decline in oil prices in recent years, have slowed the growth of the GCC’s SWFs. This slower growth could further diminish their governance and transparency standards, which are already weaker than those of other SWFs. Efforts to improve their governance and accountability will be important to garner public support for these SWFs.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Government, Markets, Governance, Regulation, and Capital Flows
Political Geography:
Middle East and Gulf Nations

5. Sovereign wealth funds are growing more slowly, and governance issues remain

Author:
Julien Maire, Adnan Mazarei, and Edwin M. Truman
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
In the last two decades, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)—funds accumulated by a government that are invested in whole or in part abroad to benefit the country in the future—have faced increased public scrutiny over their investment patterns, financial results, and governance. This Policy Brief updates and expands a prototype scoreboard rating the transparency and accountability of SWFs, which Truman established in 2007. This fifth edition of the scoreboard shows that the average scores continued to improve for the 64 SWFs examined, but governance issues remain. New funds have emerged—many of them government holding companies or strategic investment funds—but the growth of assets under management by SWFs has slowed, in some cases partly because of withdrawals to help finance expenses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, raising questions about their future role.
Topic:
Government, Markets, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Governance, Regulation, and Capital
Political Geography:
Global Focus

6. Will industrial and agricultural subsidies ever be reformed?

Author:
Gary Clyde Hufbauer
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Open Sub-navigation BackOpen Sub-navigation Publications Back Policy Briefs Working Papers Books PIIE Briefings Open Sub-navigation Commentary Back Op-Eds Testimonies Speeches and Papers Topics & Regions PIIE Charts What Is Globalization? Educational Resources Open Sub-navigation Back Senior Research Staff Research Analysts Trade Talks Open Sub-navigation Back RealTime Economic Issues Watch Trade & Investment Policy Watch China Economic Watch North Korea: Witness to Transformation 中文 Open Sub-navigation Back All Events Financial Statements Global Connections Global Economic Prospects Stavros Niarchos Foundation Lectures Trade Winds Open Sub-navigation Back News Releases Multimedia Media Center Open Sub-navigation Back Board of Directors Staff Employment Contact Annual Report Transparency Policy POLICY BRIEF VIEW SHARING OPTIONS Will industrial and agricultural subsidies ever be reformed? Gary Clyde Hufbauer (PIIE) Policy Brief21-5 March 2021 Photo Credit: REUTERS/Denis Balibouse One economic argument for government subsidies is that they are necessary to compensate firms and industries for benefits they provide to society at large but cannot capture in the prices they charge for goods or services. For example, subsidies to renewable energy are defended because renewable energy limits carbon emissions. When a major economy subsidizes extensively, however, its trading partners are drawn into the game, with losses all around. As the prisoner’s dilemma suggests, a better outcome would entail mutual restraint. But the goal of mutual restraint is no less difficult in international trade than it is in international arms control. Both the European Union and the US federal system try, in different ways, to regulate industrial subsidies. Hufbauer examines efforts to contain unjustifiable subsidies and proposes modest improvements, bearing in mind that as countries struggle to overcome the global economic downturn resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, there is little appetite for restoring a free market economy—one in which firms compete with minimum government assistance or regulation. Selective upgrading of the rulebook may nevertheless be possible.
Topic:
Agriculture, Government, Reform, European Union, Regulation, Manufacturing, Industry, COVID-19, and Subsidies
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America