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1. KDP and PUK in Sadir’s Chess Game

Author:
Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
Muqtada Al-Sadir, the Shiite Cleric Grandmaster, is playing to win; whatever the expense. In the build-up to the game, the Sunnis got their act together and seized the opportunity to become the main winners of the first round. However, the Kurds entered the fight on one leg, lost sight of the bigger picture and intensified their internal power rivalry. This has already proven costly for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), and if they keep on as they started, the second round will be even dearer. Fortunately, it is not too late to minimise their losses or even end up winning future rounds. To do this, they need to take into account the complex power dynamics within not just the Shiite component of Iraq (Shiite House), but also the Shiite ‘Universe’ inside and outside Iraq.
Topic:
Governance, Leadership, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

2. Sectarianism and Sectarianisation in Iraq: Ambassadorial Appointments as an Exemplar

Author:
Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
Sectarianisation of Iraq’s governance has already become a powerful driver of conflict. Left unaddressed, it can become irreversible. Here, ambassadorial appointments are used to underline the depth of sectarian divisions within the legislative and executive institutions, and offer ways forward.
Topic:
Governance, Sectarianism, Leadership, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

3. State-Building in Iraq

Author:
Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
Following decades of authoritarian rule and highly centralised governing system, the people of Iraq adopted a democratic Constitution in 2005, designed to put Iraq on an evolutionary roadmap for democracy, rule-of-law and economic prosperity. The Constitution consists of 144 Articles which, together, define the main pillars of a democratic governance and provide frameworks and boundaries for their enactment, with or without mandating new legislations. However, translating the Constitution into reality proved extremely challenging. Over the past 16 years, the political and institutional leaders have engaged in overt sectarian political dynamics that proved detrimental to the state-building process. They were highly selective in enacting, key constitutional Articles. Many essential institutions and/or legislations that are mandated by the Constitution are awaiting establishment, some of which are critical for enhancing the rule-of-law, safeguarding the Constitution, streamlining the legislative cycle, institutionalising the centre-periphery relations, empowering the local government and optimising the management of national resources and assets. As a consequence, there are currently numerous structural and functional gaps or weaknesses in Iraq’s governing system, which have added to the country’s fragility and acted as independent drivers of conflict. In this report, attempts are made to: (a) Identify the key structural and functional gaps or weaknesses in the governing system that have arisen from inadequate implementation of the Constitution; (b) highlighting the relevant historical context and political barriers for progress; and (c) offer appropriate policy recommendations to stakeholders.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Governance, Leadership, and State Building
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

4. Decentralisation in Iraq: Process, Progress & a New Tailor-Made Model

Author:
Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
The Iraqi state has become increasingly fragile for decades and is plagued with instability, social conflicts and wars. Many drivers have contributed to the country’s intractable fragility, one of which relates to its highly centralised and poorly institutionalised governing system, which has failed to manage centre-periphery tensions and integrate local communities into the country’s polities. Rebuilding Iraq’s governance along the lines of its democratic Constitution, which adopts decentralisation at its core, will be a critical step toward stabilisation, reconstruction, and socioeconomic recovery. The Iraqi Council of Representatives adopted two transformative legislations in 2008, namely Law No. 21 of the Governorate not Incorporated into a Region, and Law No. 36 of the Provincial, District and Subdistrict Council elections. These put Iraq on a decentralisation pathway that is still evolving. However, after more than a decade of experimentation, the decentralisation process has failed to tackle the on-going crises of legitimacy and a lack of trust in government. It has failed to address problems of rampant corruption, inefficiency and an inability to improve the lives of citizens. It is, therefore, paramount to review the existing system and propose ways forward, hence this timely report. Here, Nineveh is used as a representative governorate to review the challenges facing the decentralisation process and explore possible models that can be piloted.
Topic:
Sovereignty, Governance, Fragile States, State Building, and Decentralization
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

5. Iraqi Kurdistan: Priority issues for international mediation

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
In the last decade, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) has seen many moments of crisis – budget cuts, Daesh’s assault on Erbil, the halving of oil prices (twice!) and armed conflict with the Iraqi government over Kirkuk. Today’s situation feels different and arguably worse than these episodes: there’s COVID, a deep oil recession in Baghdad and Kurdistan, intensifying tensions with Turkey and Iran, and an unpleasant undercurrent of resentment against the Kurds among many of the MPs in the Baghdad parliament. What makes this moment uniquely dangerous, however, is the near-breakdown of cooperation between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Iraq’s Kurds have shown that they can weather any storm when they pull together as a people. The KRI’s international partners tend to support the Iraqi Kurds more effectively when the two parties work in harmony, but often back away when they cannot identify a cohesive counterparty to deal with in the KRI. International memories of the intra-Kurdish civil war in the 1990s undermined the Kurdish cause in Iraq in the 2000s, when the Kurds’ greatest opportunity for self-governance lay before them. Looking forward, it is clear that the futures of Iraq and the KRI are linked. If Baghdad’s economy and currency collapses, so does Kurdistan’s. If the Kurdish people starve, the blame will fall on Baghdad. If the Islamic State returns, it will emerge first in the strip of disputed territories between federal Iraq and the KRI. The success of U.S. policy in Iraq is the success of both the fifteen provinces of federal Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, not one or the other. The U.S.-Iraq strategic dialogue will continue in the late summer, hopefully including a visit of the Iraqi leadership to Washington DC. This presents an opportunity to re-energize the role of the U.S. and international partners in the issues facing the KRI. It is important to stress the importance of a multilateral mission to support intra-KRI cohesion and Baghdad-KRI relations because America does not have all the answers on Kurdistan, nor does it tend to focus enough attention there. U.S. power and leadership are most effective when combined with the perceptive insights and good instincts of many other partners on Kurdistan, such as the French, British, and Canadians, to name just a few. There is an argument that the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement should either have a specific working group or committee on KRI issues (or on decentralization more generally), or a cross-cutting mechanism that ensures the KRI is worked into each of the security, political, economic and energy working groups. The list of topics that require persistent attention is quite long. Most important, the KDP and PUK need to be led towards a de-escalation that will allow the region to speak with one cohesive voice in Baghdad and with international partners. This is a foundational issue that affects all the other issues the KRI faces. An adversarial relationship between the two parties undermines everything that is attempted in the KRI and is deeply off-putting for international partners and potential investors. It can result in armed standoffs, affecting key industries like LPG trucking, or in security crises such as the Zina Warte armed confrontation between KDP and PUK Peshmerga in mid-March 2020. Almost nothing – from oil and gas investment to counter-terrorism to fighting COVID to negotiations with Baghdad – works as well as it should due to the KDP-PUK schism. It would be magical thinking to imagine that the two parties can easily reconcile. Even so, the U.S. and its various partners should prioritize efforts to get the powerful leaders in the same room to hammer out a minimal level of cooperation and start a dialogue, however stilted or tense at the outset. The U.S. and other internationals also need to help Baghdad and the KRI complete the promising steps that have been taken on political, security and economic cooperation. The Kurds worked well with former premier Adel Abdul-Mahdi’s government in Baghdad, and they have overcome their initial caution towards a change in Baghdad to support the new Prime Minister Mustapha al-Kadhimi, another old friend. For the Kurds, however, the relationship will be almost solely judged on what it delivers in terms of budget support. Having watched six Iraqi prime ministers negotiate and renegotiate budget deals with the Kurds every year for over a decade, the U.S. is intimately familiar with every possible configuration of give and take – more so than the Iraqi and Kurdish leaders themselves. What has always been clear is that politics trump economics in such discussions: typically, the solution is political and the numbers and formulas get fudged to fit the required compromise. This is why, for the remainder of 2020, Kurdistan will probably keep selling its oil and gathering customs revenue while Baghdad will provide a reduced top-up to the Kurdish exchequer each month, which is basically what has been happening for the last two years. A lot of discussion tends to end up right back where the parties began. This pattern of recurrent budget crises is not sustainable for two reasons. First, the annual showdown complicates an already fraught budgeting process and Iraqi MPs are becoming more hostile to the KRI economy every time the cycle is undertaken. Second, the KDP and PUK are increasingly fighting over the revenue-sharing mechanism, with Sulaymaniyah seeking more direct transfers from Baghdad or other guarantees of a fair share. The U.S. and its international partners need to back a multi-year arrangement that has buy-in at the highest levels: the Iraqi Prime Minister, speaking for a sizable bloc in Iraq’s body politic, and key leaders within the KDP and PUK. This is yet another reason why the two parties must be able to sit down together at the highest political levels. The sweet spot for a Baghdad-KRI budget deal would seem to be about $800mn per month, requiring the KDP and PUK to agree on a no-blame, non-politicized and permanent reduction of KRI obligations (salaries, social services and allowances) by about 30%. The U.S. and other internationals need to put strong and well-intentioned pressure on the KRI to appoint an empowered and dedicated Minister of Natural Resources to salvage investor confidence in the energy sector, which will serve as a signpost for the KRI’s future non-oil investors. A quick win for Baghdad-KDP-PUK cooperation may be possible in the realm of counter-terrorism. The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, the KDP-led Counterterrorism Department (CTD) and the PUK-led Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG) are three highly professional services that work closely with the international Coalition against Daesh. They have worked together before and can work in the disputed areas with relative ease now. The creation of joint counter-terrorism coordination centers should initially focus on these elite units and their related intelligence arms, not necessarily the “big military” units like the Iraqi Army, Federal Police and Peshmerga. One important symbol for Baghdad-KRI cooperation could be an investment in the deployment, for short periods, of some Iraqi Air Force F-16 aircraft to the airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. These fighter-bombers were notoriously viewed as a stick that Baghdad might use against the Kurds, but today the F-16 fleet and its American technicians are struggling to stay in service as Iran-backed militias surround their operating base at Balad. Perhaps an out-of-the-box idea might be to cycle a fragment of the F-16 fleet through the safe operating environments of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, as the Italian Air Force did with a small complement of Eurofighters during the war against Daesh. The common thread in all these options is a desire to “go big” in the Baghdad-KDP-PUK relationship, and for international players to encourage and support new thinking. The Kurdistan Region is currently cycling downwards, with less stability and less attractiveness as an investment environment, largely because Kurdish leaders are allowing themselves to be divided by personality politics. The U.S. intervention in Iraq in 1991 helped to free the Iraqi Kurds and the intervention in 2003 saw the U.S. ask those same Kurds to rejoin Iraq on the basis of U.S. guarantees. It is time to begin to make good on those guarantees. U.S. intervention transformed Iraq from a dictatorship to a democracy (imperfect, like all democracies), but an equally great transformation would be to help create an Iraqi state at peace with all of its components, first and foremost its Kurdish population. That moment can and should start in earnest now.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Governance, Peace, and Mediation
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan

6. The Status of Erbil-Baghdad Relations

Author:
Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
In Iraq, politics is personal, and the politics of Baghdad-Erbil relations is no exception. Improvements and deteriorations in this relationship have largely been dictated by interpersonal dynamics, such as the rapport and mutual confidence between leaders. In May 2020, the Kurdistan Region’s major political parties played an unusually decisive role in having Mustafa Al-Kadhimi selected as the Prime Minister (PM) of Iraq. The Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan declared their support for his designation before he was officially nominated by the Iraqi President, Barham Salih. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) leaders knew Al-Kadhimi personally and had enjoyed good working relations with him when he was the chief of intelligence. Importantly, they believed that demonstrating early support was a worthwhile investment that could help to extend the period of tension-free engagement between Erbil and Baghdad, similar to what they experienced with Al-Kadhimi’s predecessor, Adil Abdul Mahdi. After a period of frozen relations that followed the Kurdish referendum for independence in September 2017, Erbil-Baghdad relations regained a degree of normality in the run up to the 2018 elections and were further bolstered by the appointment of Adil Abdul Mahdi, a personal friend and close associate of many KRG leaders. In 2019, Baghdad agreed to send Erbil 12.67% of the federal budget; in return, the KRG agreed to offer Baghdad 250,000 barrels of exported oil per day. For various reasons, the KRG never delivered the oil or its revenue, and the Shia political parties exerted unbearable pressure on the PM to cut the KRG from the national budget altogether. Nevertheless, Abdul Mahdi’s government continued to send the Kurdistan Region its share of the budget. Negotiations continued, and both sides eventually reached a comprehensive agreement to resolve the revenue issues from the KRG’s oil sales and border crossing customs. These negotiations, as well as the implementation of previous agreements, were suspended upon the resignation of Abdul Mahdi’s government at the end of November 2019. Nevertheless, budgetary payments to the KRG, minus the calculated revenue from the agreed KRG oil exports, continued until April 2020 (total IQD 454b, c. $278m). Unexpectedly though, in the final few weeks of his premiership, Abdul Mahdi ordered the finance ministryto halt the delivery of the KRG’s public-sector salary payments.
Topic:
Politics, Governance, Leadership, and Local
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

7. A debate with the Kurdistan Region’s President

Author:
Middle East Research Institute
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
This timely session was dedicated to a debate with the President of Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) to discuss central geo-political and domestic developments, including the protests and the crisis of governance in Baghdad; the Turkish invasion of Northern Syria (particularly Rojava); and finally, the effects of internal political fissures within the KRI.
Topic:
Development, Governance, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Baghdad, Syria, and Kurdistan