Search

Begin New Search Political Geography North Korea Publishing Institution Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)

1. Will Artificial Intelligence Hone North Korea's Cyber “All-Purpose Sword”?

Author:
Scott W. Harold, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Jenny Jun, and Diana Myers
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
How is the increasing spread of artificial intelligence (AI) likely to shape the cyber capabilities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK; North Korea) in the coming years? Over the past decade, cyber tools have become an important enabler of the Kim Jong Un regime’s quest to achieve its policy objectives. Today, as a result of sustained investments by Pyongyang, the DPRK has developed an increasingly sophisticated set of cyber capabilities, which it has used to substantial effect against foreign militaries, banks, companies, media outlets, and individuals. While the regime has been able to achieve much through cyberattacks relying on traditional human operators, there are some areas where automating cyberattacks may prove attractive to the North. At the same time, demand for trained cybersecurity professionals usually far outstrips supply, and AI for cyberdefense may be an area where the regime ultimately feels compelled to invest, either to offset human capital shortfalls, or as adversary AI-enabled cyberattacks grow more sophisticated. Is North Korea about to make the leap to AI-enabled cyberattacks or cyber defense? Or will the country’s international isolation impair its ability to pair up AI with its existing cyber capabilities?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

2. Defying United Nations Sanctions: Three Reasons for African Engagement with North Korea

Author:
Tycho van der Hoog
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The United Nations (UN) sanctions against North Korea are weakened by structural evasion techniques and weak enforcement. The African continent is a crucial node in the global illicit networks of North Korea. This paper examines three motives for African states to cooperate with North Korea, with a particular focus on the context of southern Africa: historical affinity (reciprocity), the practical issue of maintenance dependency (necessity), and the presence of weak enforcement regimes (opportunity). Based on a deep reading of UN Panel of Experts reports, academic literature and policy papers, novel archival material, and an interview with a defected North Korean diplomat, this paper argues that solutions to strengthen the sanctions regime can be successful only if they are grounded in African initiatives.
Topic:
Security, Economics, United Nations, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Africa, Asia, and North Korea

3. Debunking the Korean Peninsula "Arms Race": What's Behind South Korea's Military Force Development?

Author:
Markus Garlauskas and Axel Catellier
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Following a record number of North Korean missile launches, as well as tests by South Korea, assertions have been widely and uncritically made that Seoul is participating in an inter-Korean arms race. This paper challenges that paradigm by arguing that South Korea’s military acquisitions, displays, and testing of new weapons are better explained as proactive efforts to build military capabilities to support national security priorities in a broader context, rather than reactions to the threat from North Korea. While North Korea’s reasons for weapons testing are well-documented, South Korea’s military buildup in recent years has received far less attention. This paper examines drivers behind South Korea’s military investments and makes recommendations for how the Republic of Korea (ROK)-United States alliance could incorporate these capabilities into alliance military operations beyond simply deterring or defeating North Korea. To do so, it examines how broader drivers affect ROK strategic thinking, the demands this puts on the ROK military, and how those demands translate to specific defense acquisitions. With the start of a new ROK presidential administration, it is an opportune time for Seoul and Washington to coordinate approaches on capabilities development in ways that would benefit both countries in the years to come.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Arms Race, and Military
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

4. Inter-Korean Reconciliation and the Role of the U.S.: Facilitator or Spoiler?

Author:
Gabriela Bernal
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Although the Korean Peninsula has been divided for over 70 years, North and South have not been able to make lasting progress in terms of reconciliation. While there are multiple factors directly influencing the extent to which inter-Korean relations can progress, this paper focuses on the role of the United States. When it comes to inter-Korean reconciliation efforts, is the U.S. more of a facilitator or a spoiler? By looking at three case studies spanning three South Korean administrations—Roh Tae-woo, Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in—this paper attempts to find patterns and lessons related to Washington’s role in the complex inter-Korean reconciliation process. The cases reveal that the U.S. has played the role of both facilitator and spoiler in each case, and that whatever role the U.S. plays depends on its own relationship with North Korea at that time. The U.S. is most likely to play a facilitating role when the administrations in Washington and Seoul are both willing to engage diplomatically with Pyongyang, when progress is being made in denuclearization talks, when the geopolitical environment is conducive towards diplomacy and engagement with North Korea, and when the U.S. adopts a reciprocal negotiating strategy. The paper concludes by considering the conditions necessary to achieve inter-Korean reconciliation and to establish long-term peace on the peninsula. Key factors include the need for trust-building and reciprocity between the U.S. and North Korea, and adopting a more holistic approach that goes beyond the nuclear problem and aims to establish a lasting relationship between Washington and Pyongyang.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

5. Takeaways From a Time of Increased Friction: South Korea-Japan Security Cooperation From 2015 to Present

Author:
Naoko Aoki
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
South Korea and Japan share common challenges and liberal democratic values but have been unable to build a close security relationship, due mainly to their political differences. This paper examines the two countries’ defense cooperation in the bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral arenas over the past six years to explore how the external security environment, as well as bilateral political problems, have affected their joint activities. The paper’s analysis shows that defense cooperation between South Korea and Japan is not always a binary choice between full cooperation or no cooperation. The two countries not only weigh external threats and bilateral problems, but also ponder such factors as U.S. encouragement to adjust the scope of their cooperation. The paper also shows that while the main constraint for security cooperation between South Korea and Japan is their historical animosity, in recent years, frictions involving the countries’ armed forces have become a new reason for limiting cooperation. As a result, grassroots military-to-military exchanges between the two countries, which in the past continued despite political problems, have largely stopped since late 2018. The paper concludes by proposing that South Korea and Japan work to restore routine bilateral working-level exchanges. It also recommends that the United States continue to urge the two countries to cooperate, and that multilateral exercises be employed as forums for cooperation between the two armed forces, as that is an area that is least impacted by bilateral problems.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

6. The Vision Group on U.S.-ROK Relations: Insights and Recommendations

Author:
KEI
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI), with the generous support of the Korea Foundation, organized six “Vision Group” roundtable conversations with leading American scholars and commentators to discuss the United States’ relationship with the Republic of Korea. The first was held in December 2019, the last in November 2020. The intent was to consider the future of relations during a time of change. The Vision Group comprised a wide range of expertise and opinion. This record conveys some of the insights and recommendations that arose during the conversations.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Human Rights
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

7. Through the Looking Glass: Chinese Open Source Assessments of North Korea's Ballistic Missile Capabilities

Author:
Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Scott W. Harold
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
North Korea’s ballistic missile program has long been a concern for the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Foreign researchers have increasingly leveraged advanced open source intelligence technology and cooperated across countries to track the North’s developments over the last 25 years. But one country has been left out – China. Are there open source Chinese analyses of DPRK ballistic missiles, do they align with U.S. assessments, and is there anything for other researchers to gain from reading these analyses? This report examines Chinese assessments of North Korean ballistic missile capabilities between 1998 and 2017. We find that Chinese analysts have paid growing attention to the North’s missile capabilities but are still not as attentive as Western observers, from whom they draw most of their information and analytic insights. Chinese analyses broadly mirror Western experts’ conclusions about the state of North Korea’s missile capabilities, most notably that North Korea has a functional, if not fully perfected, intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM) that can reach the United States with a nuclear weapon. However, there is little original Chinese analysis that would enhance foreign experts’ preexisting understanding of DPRK missiles.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Weapons, and Research
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

8. Moon Jae-in: Putting North Korea at the Center

Author:
Kathryn Botto
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
While President Moon Jae-in has a calmer demeanor than his mentor and friend, former President Roh Moo-hyun, there can be no doubt that his vision for transforming Northeast Asia is as far-reaching. While Moon has been more careful to assuage the U.S. president, less abrasive in his language toward Japan, and more strategic in reaching out to leaders in China and Russia, his strategy of putting North Korea at the forefront of regional realignment has similar geopolitical ambition. The objective is the rejuvenation of a reintegrated peninsula with the capacity to steer actions by all of the great powers rather than falling prey again to their machinations that are not in Korea’s interest.
Topic:
Politics, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

9. Chinese Media: Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next?

Author:
Danielle Cohen
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Chinese media sources reflect a widespread propensity in 2019 to reassure the United States while not compromising vital national interests on the Korean Peninsula. They heartily welcomed Kim Jong-un’s turn to diplomacy. They enthusiastically endorsed Donald Trump’s embrace of Kim. They strongly approved of Moon Jae-in’s bold moves to straddle the two sides and find a way to build momentum. After praising the Singapore summit’s accomplishments, the Chinese faced the uncomfortable reality of failure in Hanoi, with calls to redouble efforts to put diplomacy back on track and repeated idealistic assertions about how the differences could be bridged. At the same time, they left mostly implicit the true objectives of a deal that Pyongyang was expected to accept and that China would consider suitable in order to satisfy its geopolitical aspirations. Reassurances consisted of the following claims: China, as asserted in its 2017 white paper, is not trying to squeeze the U.S. out of the region or break the U.S.–ROK alliance, unlike its earlier policy indications; the Sino–DPRK alliance treaty is a relic of a past era without substantive importance; China is firmly committed to denuclearization, but considers it realizable only by means of talks and a long-term, multi-stage process that encourages Pyongyang to abandon its isolation; China does not take sides on whether a “big deal” is needed first to produce “small deals”; and Moon should be encouraged to keep engaging with Kim Jong-un even if Moon is correct in recognizing that he cannot be a mediator since the ROK is a U.S. ally. Yet, Chinese optimism is premised on notions about limits to North Korean demands, on North Korean willingness to denuclearize in return for conditions that are left vague, and on often unstated assumptions about how the peninsula would evolve during the process of denuclearization and how the U.S. military presence would change.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

10. Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next? The View from Russia

Author:
Artyom Lukin
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This chapter provides an overview of Russian expert commentary found in Russia’s media during the run-up to the Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi and in its aftermath, covering the period of January to April 2019. The chapter also covers Kim’s first meeting with Vladimir Putin that took place in Vladivostok in late April. With regard to the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear problem, Russia’s commentariat traditionally splits into three groups. The first includes specialists who are more or less neutral toward North Korea. The second one is formed by experts who sympathize more with Pyongyang and tend to blame Washington and American allies for anything that goes wrong on the Korean Peninsula. The third group, now almost extinct in Russia, represents liberal and pro-Western pundits who loath the North Korean regime and view it as a major threat to international, and Russia’s, security. Similar to Western media, the Russian press has extensively covered the preparations for the Hanoi summit, the event itself, and its outcomes. The tone of the Russian reporting did not differ much from that of the world’s media. Most of the Russian commentators sounded moderately optimistic prior to the two-day summit, expecting that at least something would come out of it. That the second Kim-Trump rendezvous failed to produce any deliverables came as a somewhat disappointing surprise to most Russian observers. Still, the general mood remained cautiously optimistic even after Hanoi’s apparent failure, with the prevailing majority of Russia’s Korea watchers believing diplomacy between Pyongyang and Washington would continue and might eventually succeed. The Russian commentary on the Vladivostok summit was generally positive, hailing the symbolism of Moscow’s return to the major leagues of Korean Peninsula geopolitics. At the same time, many experts pointed out that, beyond displaying the decorum of the traditional Russia-DPRK friendship, the Kim-Putin summit produced modest outcomes.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:
Russia, Asia, and North Korea

11. Japanese Media: Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next?

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Japanese coverage of the diplomacy between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un as well as the broader spectrum of international relations over North Korea has been intensive over the first months of 2019. Assessments of what to expect and then what really happened involve interpretations of North Korean intentions, the character of U.S. diplomacy, the role of South Korean diplomacy, the impact of China, and the geopolitical situation in Northeast Asia. Each development over this period has been scrutinized closely, often with an addendum: What does it mean for Japan? The fate of North Korea looms very large for a nation fearful of a missile attack from it, cognizant of the absence of any settlement after 1945 of its claims against Japan’s occupational conduct, and nervous about the regional balance of power and U.S. trustworthiness as an ally and nuclear umbrella, when the United States itself is quickly coming under threat from the North’s nuclear weapons. Below, the views on the political right range from Sankei Shimbun to the establishmentoriented Yomiuri Shimbun, and on the political left from Asahi Shimbun to Tokyo Shimbun. While editorials figure heavily into the analysis, much of the regular news coverage also serves to differentiate Japanese sources. What negative outcomes does Japan fear from the success or failure of ongoing diplomacy over North Korea? In recent coverage we can identify at least eight worrisome outcomes: 1) failure of the talks resulting in a war scare beyond what occurred in 2017; 2) suspension of U.S.-DPRK talks and China as well as Russia breaking with the UN sanctions regime, fueling prospects of three-way coordination with China taking the lead; 3) discord about how to proceed with damaging U.S.-ROK relations, weakening the U.S. military presence in South Korea at a cost to Japan’s defense; 4) South Korea splitting with the U.S. on the North and raising the specter of inter-Korean nationalism deemed hostile to Japan; 5) success of the talks based on “America First,” agreeing to a deal on denuclearization (as a process) that leaves Japan’s concerns about missiles and abductees aside, isolating Japan; 6) success of the talks leading toward reunification, also strengthening national identity versus Japan; 7) a new geopolitical framework replacing the talks, as the U.S. retreats from the region; and 8) a period of instability, where Trump only delays making decisions and Japan is left frustrated. Four general responses to the Hanoi Summit and its early aftermath could be discerned in Japanese publications: 1) Trump outfoxed Kim, has a strategy reassuring to Japan, and the outcome in sight is positive; 2) Trump erred in his diplomacy but has been brought to his senses and now will follow a course welcome in Japan, however uncertain the outcome; 3) the situation is growing more dangerous, Trump does not know what to do, and Japan has to keep its eyes on the other players; and 4) Trump will renew diplomacy, keeping Japan off balance in coordinating with the U.S. as Japan struggles with its isolation in this diplomacy. When anticipating what should come next, sources understandably suggest what their own government should do. Many in Japan emphasize the abductions issue and willingness to offer economic assistance when that along with denuclearization and missiles is addressed. One can discern how Abe Shinzo should proceed in diplomacy with each of the leaders active in the region. Of course, most attention centers on how he should deal with Trump or the alliance.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and North Korea

12. South Korean Print Media on Why the Hanoi Summit Failed and What Comes Next

Author:
Kimberly Kim
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Since the first historic summit meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un last June in Singapore yielded a two-page joint agreement without a clear definition of or a timeline for denuclearization, expectations and misgivings further escalated for the second U.S.-DPRK summit, which was officially announced during Trump’s State of the Union address to be held on February 27 and 28 in Vietnam. As the dates approached, a hailstorm of news reports from Seoul hinted at the possibility of a “small deal” to be signed in Hanoi; North Korea would make progress on denuclearization, which would likely involve dismantling its Yongbyon nuclear facility and/or intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and, in return, the U.S. would offer economic aid by easing sanctions, probably along with officially ending the Korean War and building liaison offices. This forecast partially stemmed from the political plight Trump faced in Washington due to the impending Mueller report with a Democrat-controlled House and the 2020 election nearing, meaning that he would have to show some progress in nuclear negotiations with Kim so as to break through the ongoing domestic challenge. Against this backdrop, Stephen Biegun, the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea, said at Stanford University1 in late January, “President Trump is ready to end this war [the Korean War]. It is over. It is done.” This was followed by remarks from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo during an interview2 with CBS in mid-February, “It’s our full intention of getting a good outcome in exchange for relieving those sanctions [economic sanctions.]” Such comments hailed the possibility of a deal quite favorable to Kim. News delivered just prior to the summit, that South Korean president Moon Jae-in and Trump shared a positive outlook for the meeting over the phone, hyped the likelihood of a promising result in Hanoi between Washington and Pyongyang. Moon, during the phone conversation3 with Trump, suggested his vision of inter-Korean economic cooperation as one of the “corresponding measures” that could be awarded to Kim, lessening the burden on Washington’s shoulders, if North Korea gives up its nuclear program and, according to the Blue House, Trump gave a positive response. Moon reportedly said that South Korea is “ready to take over the role of undertaking anything from reconnecting railways and roads between Seoul and Pyongyang to other inter-Korean economic projects.”4 Such an approach was brought up earlier during an interview which the special adviser to the South Korean president, Moon Chung-in, had with Joongang in January,5 right after Kim Jong-un’s New Year’s address came out; he proposed incremental economic exchanges, limited to only between Seoul and Pyongyang, to bring about the North’s denuclearization, and said, “economic exchanges between the two Koreas can exceptionally be exempted from the target of UN sanctions as the two Koreas of the same ethnic group have a special relationship with each other.”
Topic:
Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

13. Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next? Coverage in Four Countries

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The summit on February 27-28 in Hanoi between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un ended on a sour note, casting doubt on the one-year old diplomatic process that had produced an upbeat summit between the two in Singapore the previous June. Much speculation followed on what had gone wrong, who was to blame, and how diplomacy could be put back on track. Given the importance of the four countries caught between the U.S. and North Korea in setting the course for addressing the North Korean challenge, their media and journal coverage of the state of diplomacy after the Hanoi summit merits close attention, which is provided below. The following chapters examine how the South Korean, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian media and journal articles have covered the Hanoi summit and its immediate aftermath. They tell us about the hopes and concerns of four countries and point to differences in thinking about the nature of the diplomacy between the U.S. and North Korea and the expectations for what will follow. Coverage ranges from anticipation of the summit in the first two months of 2019 to immediate reporting on what transpired on February 27-28 to interpretations over the next month or longer of the impact of the summit for U.S. and North Korean policy and for the geopolitics of Northeast Asia and, specifically, the foreign policies of each of the four countries. Each chapter pays special heed to the apprehensions related to the talks or how they could leave one’s country in dire straits, and to the range of responses to what is transpiring. Close attention is given to what one’s own country should do either if progress is made in diplomacy or if a breakdown occurs. Also of interest is whether coordination with other states is sought.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

14. North Korea’s Sharp Power and the Divide Over Korean Identities

Author:
Aram Hur
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This chapter examines the nature and motivations of North Korea’s sharp power toward South Korea. Unlike China or Russia, to secure long-term survival, North Korea ultimately needs cooperation from the rival democracy it seeks to undermine. I argue that this produces a particular North Korean brand of “Trojan horse” sharp power: the hijacking of South Korea’s value diplomacy apparatus to disseminate a dual narrative. Externally, North Korea aims to project soft power hand in hand with South Korea to the international community, while internally, it exploits South Korea’s nationalist divisions to its desired ends. I illustrate this strategy through in-depth case studies of North Korea’s most significant sharp efforts in 2018. The analysis contests a simplistic understanding of sharp power and shines a different light on the regime’s recent diplomatic efforts.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

15. Japan's Strategy to Keep the North Koreans and Chinese Down, the Americans in, and the Russians Neutral

Author:
James D. J. Brown
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Japanese government makes no secret of its intensifying security concerns. The Ministry of Defense’s most recent annual white paper includes the assessment that, “The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute.” The report is also explicit about the source of these challenges. The most immediate danger is identified as North Korea, whose “military development such as its nuclear and missile development constitute unprecedented, serious and imminent threats to the security of Japan.” Second on the list is China, which is singled out for the non-transparent strengthening of its armed forces, as well as the increase in its military activities in the vicinity of Japan. Lastly, the white paper notes that “Russia has been modernizing its forces including its nuclear capability not only in the Europe region but in the periphery of Japan,” and that close attention needs to be paid to these developments. The country faces not only the individual security challenges posed by North Korea, China, and Russia, but also the danger of increased cooperation between these three nuclear-armed neighbors. What is more, at just the time when Tokyo needs reliable partners, it finds itself dealing with a South Korean government that it considers chronically untrustworthy and a U.S. administration that often seems less like a loyal friend and more like an increasingly expensive supplier of commercial security services. Having identified the nature of this problem, the remainder of this essay focuses on explaining Japan’s strategy for addressing it. It does so by adapting Lord Ismay’s famous description of the fundamental goal of NATO as being to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”13 Correspondingly, Japan’s current strategy can be characterized as aiming to keep the North Koreans and Chinese down, the Americans in, and the Russians neutral. After outlining the details of each part of this strategy, the essay will identify the main challenges to overcome in its implementation.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and National Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, North Korea, and United States of America

16. The North Korean Factor in the Sino-Russian Alliance

Author:
Stephen Blank
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Kim-Putin summit in April 2019 and the abortive Trump-Kim summit in February 2019 compel us to review Korean issues from the regional security standpoint, rather than primarily as a proliferation question. Despite apparent failure of the Trump-Kim summit, the search for denuclearization and peace in Korea will continue. North Korea is obviously resuming discussions with Russia and China to decide their future course of action, inasmuch as Kim went to Vladivostok. The summit with Putin in April only reinforced those considerations, as it is clear from the subsequent press conference that Kim asked Putin to transmit his views to Washington and that Putin agreed to do so. Likewise, Washington must rethink its approach. Instead of emphasizing denuclearization, Washington would likely benefit from viewing Korean issues primarily as regional security questions. Certainly, Russia and China do so. Therefore, rethinking Russo-Chinese ties to North Korea offers valuable insights in the quest for a lasting Korean peace, especially as Russia and China have become allies.5 The argument of a Sino-Russian alliance is admittedly a minority view among scholars, but the mounting evidence of their alliance is apparent not only in regard to Korea—as the other chapters in this collection show—but in larger military-political affairs as well.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

17. Sino-Russian Relations, South Korea, and North Korea

Author:
Robert Sutter
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This examination of the relations among these four governments assesses the ever-closer China-Russia relationship featuring stronger strategic alignment against the United States and its interests in many parts of the world, including the Korean Peninsula. It also considers how the Sino-Russian relationship reacted to the major changes in the Korean Peninsula brought on by the string of remarkable developments on the peninsula since 2017. Those developments include: the Donald Trump administration’s heavy pressure against North Korean nuclear weapons development in 2017; North Korea’s abrupt shift away from confrontation and toward negotiations with the U.S. and South Korea in early 2018; the subsequent dramatic shift toward top-level U.S.-North Korea negotiations to ease tensions and improve relations seen in Trump’s meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in June 2018 and February 2019; and active, related North Korean summitry with South Korea and China. In this period, China and Russia in relations with South Korea and North Korea repeatedly worked together to offset U.S. pressures and undermine U.S. influence. Developments over the past two years have seen China emerge as a critically important player with a major role in all aspects of negotiations involving the crisis caused by North Korea’s rapid development and repeated testing of nuclear weapons and related development and testing of ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead as far as the continental U.S. By contrast, Russia’s role and influence have declined in importance. The failed revival of the Six-Party Talks, in which Russia and Japan played a direct role along with North and South Korea, China, and the U.S. in dealing with the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis, and the current regional dynamic focused on only the four latter powers means that Moscow and Tokyo have been marginalized by recent developments. Such an outcome challenges the Russian government of President Vladimir Putin and its drive to play a prominent role as a leading world power on issues important to Russian interests. Demonstrating new prominence, Putin hosted visiting Kim during a brief summit long sought by Russia in Vladivostok on April 25. The Russian leader said North Korea’s security concerns would be better met with international guarantees involving Russia and China rather than bilateral North Korean agreements with the U.S. Up until this point, Russia had been playing second fiddle to Beijing, repeatedly siding with China in matters regarding the Korean Peninsula. China, for its part, seemed comfortable with close cooperative relations with Russia as it deals with Korean matters. Whatever differences the two may have over Korean issues have been difficult to discern amid their collaboration and cooperation, which focus on weakening the American position in Korea and Northeast Asia.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

18. The China-Russia-North Korea Triangle After Kim Jong-un's Turn to Diplomacy

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The triangle of Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang has great significance for the geopolitics of not only Northeast Asia, but the globe. It played a critical role in the 1950 launching of the Korean War, when the Cold War took shape. It became the subject of much speculation in the 2000s, when the Six-Party Talks offered hope that the post-Cold War framework could become one of trust based on shared interests in peace and stability and joint prosperity focused on Northeast Asia. Today, it is again worthy of close attention, as diplomacy has intensified in an atmosphere of increasing polarization. Various alternatives for the future of this triangle have recently been suggested. The options offered for the emerging China-Russia-North Korea triangle include the following. One, a North Korean defection centered on a deal with the United States and an understanding with South Korea allowing for gradual inter-Korean integration with economics in the forefront. Two, a Chinese sphere of influence, which Russia is too weak to resist and North Korea prefers to the danger of regime change through Korean integration and U.S. demands for openness and human rights. Three, a balanced triangular alliance, where North Korea resumes playing off its allies in Beijing and Moscow without having to take the side of either, but this time without a serious split between the two great powers. Four, maximum autonomy of Pyongyang carving space among the five states most concerned with its destiny, leaving this triangle with no more significance than the triangle with the U.S. and South Korea. Fast-moving, diplomatic developments in 2018-2019 provide some evidence for assessing these alternative outcomes.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

19. Economic Relations between Russia and South Korea in the New Northern Policy

Author:
Liudmila Zakharova
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The New Northern Policy, proclaimed by the South Korean President Moon Jae-in in Vladivostok in September 2017, is designed to boost economic cooperation between Russia and South Korea. However, two years after a special presidential committee was created to plan and coordinate joint economic efforts, few results have been achieved. Bilateral trade has continued to increase with limited change to its structure: Russia mostly sends its mineral resources to South Korea and receives industrial products in return. New ROK investment in the Russian Far East has yet to occur, despite South Korea’s efforts to assist its businesses in finding profitable Russian projects. Seoul tried to convince Moscow that concluding a free trade agreement in the near future is necessary for intensified cooperation, but Russia prefers a more gradual approach to trade liberalization. InterKorean rapprochement in 2018 laid a foundation for further progress in the implementation of multilateral economic projects involving Russia if the international sanctions against North Korea were to be eased. Therefore, bilateral relations between Russia and the ROK can also be viewed from the perspective of promoting regional cooperation with North Korean participation.
Topic:
International Relations, Economics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

20. From Failed Economic Interfaces to Political Levers: Assessing China-South Korea Competition and Cooperation Scenarios on North Korean Special Economic Zones

Author:
Théo Clément
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
While North Korea has developed Special Economic Zones for several decades now, these zones have attracted little attention from foreign investors, due to a mix of lack of economic reforms in the DPRK, the tense geopolitical situation, and China’s peculiar economic engagement towards North Korea. With the denuclearization process and North-South dialogue moving forward, this situation could change as South Korea’s announced policy of economic engagement with the North could provide Pyongyang the opportunity to play Beijing against Seoul to maximize its interests and attract foreign investment in Special Economic Zones from partners keen to maintain close ties with the DPRK.
Topic:
Economics, Bilateral Relations, Investment, Trade, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

21. Hypothesizing Kim Jong-un: A Framework for Analyzing North Korean Behavior

Author:
Bryan Port
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
A coherent North Korea strategy must proceed from a theory of North Korean politics, strategy, and decision-making. Structured analytic techniques, particularly the analysis of competing hypotheses (ACH), are instrumental in developing a theory and strategy. North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs serve a blend of internal and external purposes. A successful strategy that renders North Korean denuclearization must account for both types of purposes, determining which of the two are predominant. Applying ACH can assist in making such an assessment, setting a level of confidence, designing a strategy, and determining measures to assess the analytic foundation of the strategy and the measures used in executing the strategy. This paper tees up four potential hypotheses intended to explore North Korean intentions and assist in developing strategy. However, the intention of the paper is not primarily to make a case for a given hypothesis, but rather to explore the method in the hope that others may find the method useful and apply it to the important undertaking of North Korean denuclearization.
Topic:
International Relations, Weapons, Kim Jong-un, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and Korea

22. Is Pyongyang Different in Washington and Seoul? English and Korean Language Policy Discourse on North Korea

Author:
Jeffrey Robertson
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
During 2017-18, international attention turned to the Korean Peninsula as the threat of conflict reached new heights. This led to an explosion in the growth of “North Korea watchers”— the community of scholars, analysts, government officers, NGO advocates, and journalists who commit a portion of their lives to following events in North Korea. Divides emerged in overlapping regional, professional, institutional (political), and linguistic differences that saw individuals take conflicting positions on key issues. This paper investigates just one of these divides—how language and culture impact policy discourse on North Korea. The study explores language as a source of division in the North Korea watching community. It uses Einar Wigen’s argument that international relations should be conceptualized as inter-lingual relations, which suggests that despite the narrowing of political vocabularies, residues of politico-cultural differences remain in how concepts are contextualized into discourse, even between close partners. The study assesses compatibility between English and Korean language conceptualizations of North Korea, through an assessment of core inputs into policy discourse. The study then discusses the implications for U.S.-South Korea relations, and ongoing efforts to strengthen Korean Peninsula security.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, Korea, and United States of America

23. Converting Maximum Pressure to Maximum Leverage: The Role of Sanctions Relief in Negotiations with North Korea

Author:
Daniel Wertz
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign has led to the imposition of a nearly comprehensive international sanctions regime targeting North Korea and its nuclear weapons program. With negotiations underway, the question of whether to provide North Korea with partial sanctions relief in exchange for limited concessions on its nuclear program has been a major point of dispute between Washington and Pyongyang. This paper looks at sanctions as a form of coercive bargaining and examines the logic and challenges behind a strategy of incrementally exchanging relief from pressure for compliance with the sanctioner’s demands. It argues that taking an “all-or-nothing” approach to sanctions relief risks missing an opportunity to reduce the threat of North Korea’s nuclear program and squandering hard-won negotiating leverage, and outlines a framework for how a step-by-step approach might proceed.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

24. Renewable Energy in Trade Wars: Solar Power in South Korea’s Energy Mix and the Impact of Protectionism

Author:
June Park
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper examines the impacts of global competition in solar panel production and the conflict of domestic interests among solar-related industries in the U.S. on South Korea’s solar-focused renewable energy policy. Examining the Moon Jaein administration’s energy policy amid the impact of the U.S. safeguard on South Korean solar panels, the paper argues a) the U.S. safeguard is a hindrance to South Korea’s path forward on solar panel production, and b) Moon’s sole focus on sustainability and his ambitious solar energy target will result in further adoption of lower-cost Chinese solar panels, foregoing the opportunity to upgrade South Korean panels. As South Korean firms announce their decisions to relocate to the U.S. to avoid U.S. safeguard tariffs, the paper recommends the destinations of South Korean solar panel exports be diversified and the goals of South Korean energy policy be centered on balancing cost, stability, and sustainability. The paper does not necessarily recommend a full-fledged drive on expanding solar energy use in South Korea; rather, it calls for the strategic reevaluation of energy policy upon which a clear and sound strategy for solar energy should be formulated.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Trade Wars, Renewable Energy, and Solar Power
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, Korea, and United States of America

25. North Korea’s Military Strategy, 2018

Author:
Chun In-bum
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
As the focus shifted from North Korea’s military advances in 2017 to its diplomatic offensive in 2018, we should not lose sight of the strategic thinking behind gaining the maximum time to develop the capacity to extend its military threat. At present North Korea needs time to perfect its nuclear strike capability. It has been very successful in developing missile capabilities, but it needs additional time to achieve its goals. Starting with high-level North-South talks on March 5, 2018, the DPRK has just gained what it needs most: time. Whenever the first talks begin with the United States and the DPRK, there should be no surprise if the DPRK comes with an improved capability to threaten the alliance. Thus, for an extended period in 2018, as diplomacy proceeds, we should expect a subdued North Korean approach: not flaunting its nuclear weapons and missiles, while striving to boost capabilities for the struggle ahead. In the seven years since Kim Jong-un officially inherited the leadership of the DPRK, his stated policy has been byungjin ( 병진, 竝進), the pursuit of both economic and military development. In conjunction with purges and efforts to eliminate rivals, byungjin may, in part, derive from Kim’s efforts at the outset of his tenure to consolidate political power. Through it, Kim displayed moderate economic flexibility, thereby gaining favor with the North Korean people through facilitating an improvement in living standards. It is tempting to see byungjin as a sign of the regime’s weakness, or as an indication of moderation, either of which would prompt the eventual collapse of the Kim regime. Correspondingly, one might see it as a reflection of Kim’s immaturity, inexperience, and lack of political and strategic acumen. These viewpoints reflect mirror imaging more than a sophisticated understanding of North Korea. Byungjin may be more of a political device and a strategic communications element of a grand strategy, as opposed to the regime’s strategy. It may be a significant instrument in the regime’s effort to maintain elite cohesion and focus the energies of the North Korean people toward productive pursuits that likewise add to the regime’s legitimacy and staying power. It by no means suggests any diminishing of the priority of making advances in nuclear and missile development in order to pose a more serious threat. Since taking power, Kim’s regime has fired close to one hundred missiles of wide variety and range compared to thirty-one for his father and grandfather combined. He has also conducted four nuclear tests, boasting of a thermal nuclear capability. During his 2018 New Year’s address, Kim Jong-un proclaimed that the DPRK had perfected its nuclear and intercontinental missile capabilities, supporting North Korea’s constitutional claim to be a nuclear power. Despite an upsurge in diplomacy after this address, we should keep our eyes on its military advances.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, International Security, Military Strategy, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and Korea

26. North Korea’s Economic Strategy, 2018

Author:
William B. Brown
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This chapter takes the perspective of North Korea’s leadership as it confronts difficult economic problems in the remaining months of 2018. The major current and potential issues are listed and prioritized. Short and longer-term remedies are presented, each with trade-offs that affect other economic and policy issues. Given the absence of direct reporting from North Korea, the issues and debates presented are speculative, designed to give the reader a more comprehensive understanding of North Korea’s current problems than is ordinarily presented in western media. Kim Jong-un’s recent diplomatic offensive, reaching out to South Korea, China, and the United States is, in this view, suggestive of these internal economic troubles in addition to the nuclear security issues. The troubles are both short-term—the collapse in trade with China in just the past few months—and long-term, the slow-motion collapse of the communist country’s “command” economy. And much more than in the past, the problems relate to the regime’s unusual and dangerous monetary system, money being a normal issue for most governments but a relatively new one for this still partially rationed, or planned, oriented system. The leadership may have little choice but to let the domestic economy move further from the plan—allowing decentralized market and private activities more sway—than ever before. This would help cushion the central government from losses due to the sanctions and open the door to a much more prosperous future. Without major moves in this direction, inflation and unemployment may cascade into social crisis. It should be noted, that the recent Assembly Meetings, which annually focus on the economy, gave little official indication of policy changes, only a sense of digging in further to protect the regime from outside forces. But just a week later, Kim may have telegraphed an upcoming sea change when, in his address to the Party Central Committee plenum, that he is instituting a new Party Line, socialist economic construction, as the total focus of the Party and the country. Major changes, if they are to occur, will likely come after the upcoming important summits with South Korea and the U.S.1 There is little doubt that the economy in 2018 is in very poor condition, delivering one of the worst productivity rates—productivity in terms of labor and of capital—in the world, but it is important to recognize that this is due not to natural circumstances but to decisions the government has made over the years, and trade-offs it has already made. This suggests that astute government policy can create solutions and restore growth. Remedies of the sort expressed here, for example in liquidating, that is selling or leasing state assets to private buyers, raising fixed prices for state delivered electricity and for water and other utilities, and giving large pay raises to the millions of state workers who now rely on rations, while culling their numbers, would require difficult economic and social trade-offs; one might say there is no free lunch for Kim and his regime although no doubt they are looking for one, even in these summits. The chapter discusses just what kinds of decisions might be made and the likely consequences. Negotiations being set with South Korea and with the United States, and likely more discussions with China, may weigh heavily in how far Pyongyang will be willing to go in these respects. In my view the regime will be looking for: outright aid, payments for pushing back the nuclear weapons program, and premature relief from sanctions, which would only give the regime time to avoid the hard choices needed to permanently fix the broken economic system.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Sanctions, Services, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, and Korea

27. North Korea’s Diplomatic Strategy, 2018

Author:
Mark Tokola
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
With an outbreak of diplomacy under way for the Korean Peninsula, a review of North Korea’s approach to negotiations is timely. A summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in was held on April 27. President Trump has accepted an invitation to meet with Kim Jong-un.1 The secretive nature of the North Korean state makes it difficult to assess how it will engage with and what it expects to gain from talks with the international community—not just with the United States and South Korea, but with China, Japan, Russia, the EU, and others. However, its past behavior, official statements, the testimony of defectors, and the expert opinion of North Korea watchers can provide helpful insights. This chapter presents a brief history of talks and agreements with North Korea prior to the inauguration of Trump, followed by an overview of North Korea’s diplomatic outreach in 2018 to date. It then presents indicators as to what North Korean diplomacy may look like through the rest of the year based on assessments of its stated and implicit objectives—ends it would wish to attain in any event, either through diplomacy or by coercion. I conclude with a list of key upcoming dates and scenarios describing how North Korean diplomacy may play out for the remainder of 2018. North Korea’s recent diplomatic moves mark an abrupt policy change. During 2017, it carried out in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions three test flights of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); conducted its fifth and sixth underground nuclear tests, the latter being the most powerful to date and almost certainly thermonuclear; threatened an “unimaginable attack” against the United States;2 and officially announced that it would “never give up its nuclear weapons.”3 If North Korea is indeed now willing to negotiate denuclearization with the United States and South Korea, its diplomacy can at least be described as agile.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

28. North Korea’s Public Relations Strategy, 2018

Author:
Eun A Jo
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Tension on the Korean Peninsula had reached a boiling point by the time Kim Jong-un delivered his New Year’s address—a tradition set by his grandfather that he had revived in 2013. Beyond the talk of a “nuclear button,” which triggered another round of fiery exchanges with Donald Trump, Kim devoted a considerable segment of his speech to calling for improved inter-Korean relations. Though signaling an ambiguous friendly overture to the South has become an annual exercise for Kim, this year’s speech was uncharacteristically specific in that he offered to send a delegation to South Korea’s highly anticipated Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. But sports diplomacy is hardly new to Kim; an avid sports fan himself, Kim is acutely aware of its propaganda value and utility as a channel for diplomacy. For Kim, the Pyeongchang Olympics presented a timely opportunity to remake the regime’s flailing image at home and abroad. In this chapter, the Pyeongchang Olympics are used as a case study to understand Kim’s public relations strategy. Before exploring the strategic intentions behind Kim’s diplomatic campaign, both the old and new features of his image-making efforts are examined, focusing in particular on his use of sports diplomacy. How Kim’s charm offensive in Pyeongchang is communicated internally and received externally is then analyzed, yielding important insights about the prospects of reconciliation between the two Koreas post-Olympics.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Weapons, Public Relations, Olympics, and Kim Jong-un
Political Geography:
South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

29. North Korea's Strategy in 2018

Author:
Korea Economic Institute of America
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
What does North Korea seek at a time of unprecedented sanctions and pressure against it and suddenly developing opportunity, as South Korea and four great powers explore diplomatic overtures? This set of four chapters completed at the height of anticipation for summits in 2018 approaches Pyongyang’s strategy from diverse angles: public relations—how it is striving to shape images of itself, beginning by taking advantage of the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics; diplomacy—how it is engaging one state after another to forge an ideal diplomatic environment for securing maximum concessions; economy— how it is coping with sanctions and preparing to realize byungjin by boosting the economic side while deriving credit from the military side; and military—how it continues to develop threat capacities and prepare for contingencies. There is a lot that is unknown about what is driving Kim Jong-un’s behavior with some accentuating the strength achieved by building his threat capacity and others emphasizing the weakness exposed by draconian sanctions. These chapters explore the drivers behind his moves through the lens of strategic objectives, recognizing that the North Korean leader sees a mix of opportunities. This volume covers well into the spring of 2018—including the New Year’s Day address by Kim Jong-un that opened the door to a public relations blitz, the delegations sent to South Korea to kick-start “smile diplomacy” against the backdrop of the Winter Olympic Games, the personal diplomacy by Kim with South Korean officials followed by his outreach to Donald Trump and then a hurried visit to Beijing to meet Xi Jinping, and finally the Panmunjom summit with Moon Jae-in in the last week of April. This whirlwind of public relations and diplomacy against diverse interpretations of their economic and military background captured the world’s attention. Yet, Kim’s strategic intentions largely remain a mystery. Does he expect to retain his missiles and nuclear weapons and be recognized as one of the nuclear powers on essentially equal footing with the world’s great military powers? Does he seek to cut a grand bargain, eliminating these threatening weapons in return for acceptance in the international community with guarantees of security and bountiful economic assistance? Is Kim Jong-un playing a multi-stage game with long-term objectives hidden as he capitalizes on differences among five countries to maneuver in ways still difficult to fathom? Much remains unknown, as we delve into his strategic choices.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
South Korea and North Korea

30. Advancing East Asia’s Trade Agenda: A Korean Perspective

Author:
Kijm Sangkyom
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
According to the WTO, in 2018 there are 459 regional trade agreements, the most in the institution’s recorded history.1 Countries are now more actively engaged in regional trade agreements as a policy option to achieve their outward growth strategy. In addition to efforts to build up trade and investment links, regional integration is expected to spill over to more complicated socioeconomic issues, covering a wide range of areas such as gender, environment, labor, and cultural exchanges. Given this upsurge, policy coordination within the framework of regional agreements has attracted considerable attention from policymakers and other stakeholders. This is certainly the case in Korea, where the promise of such agreements is widely recognized, and recent challenges are actively discussed in the hope of overcoming them. Regionalism is a relatively new concept for most East Asian countries.2 Through most of the 1990s, East Asian countries generally engaged in regional integration discussions as a pathway to eventual multilateral trade liberalization under the auspices of the ASEAN and ASEAN+ processes. The subsequent proliferation of FTAs was the result of a number of economic and political factors, which had much in common with similar processes in other world regions, but advanced with particular intensity in East Asia and states closely connected to it. Today, all Asia-Pacific economies are involved in the regional economic process and are active participants in the establishment of multilayered FTAs. The growing interdependence and interconnectedness of the global economy has intensified the need for most East Asian countries, including Korea, to engage in regional economic cooperation and integration. Korea’s high dependency on trade explains its preference for the rapid expansion of regional trade agreements. This chapter begins with a review of the trends, key characteristics, and implications of East Asian economic integration, followed by an examination of potential opportunities and challenges facing regional integration. Korea’s FTA strategies are then reviewed, and its expected role in advancing the regional trade agenda is addressed.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, World Trade Organization, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

31. Re-Energizing Economic Integration between South Asia and East Asia

Author:
Pradumna B. Rana
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This chapter focuses on economic integration (linkages) between South Asia and East Asia.2 The topic is important for three reasons. First, South Asia-East Asia (SA-EA) trade is a component of South-South trade and could be a useful buffer should North-South trade soften, or populism lead the North to view trade as a “zero-sum” game, as is presently the case in the United States and several countries in Europe. The withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in January 2017 and President Trump’s reiteration of his “America First” trade policy at the 2017 APEC meetings in favor of bilateralism and “fair trade” has generated interest in alternate trade policy options in the EA region.
Topic:
Economy, Regional Integration, Trans-Pacific Partnership, and Trade
Political Geography:
South Asia, East Asia, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

32. Chinese Views of Korean History in the Cold War Era

Author:
Jin Linbo
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This chapter draws a rough sketch of the evolution of Chinese views on Korean history in the Cold War era in three parts. The first focuses on the formulation of Chinese views of the Korean War in 1950 and the mainstream assessment of the war after Sino-South Korean diplomatic normalization in 1992. The second focuses on China’s attitudes and policies toward the two Koreas in the Cold War years. The third deals with the changes and limits of perceptions on Korean history after diplomatic normalization and their impact on bilateral relations between Beijing and Seoul. For centuries many Chinese have firmly believed that the relationship between China and the Korean Peninsula is like that between lips and teeth, they are not only close to but also dependent upon each other. If the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold. From the middle of nineteenth century, the geopolitical proximity and interdependence between the two have become the determining factors in formulating Chinese perceptions towards Korea. Since then the national security concerns symbolized by the sense of lips and teeth had been frequently stressed by some Chinese intellectuals and officials when both China and Korea were exposed to the growing imperialist expansion and geopolitical competition in East Asia. In order to maintain the traditional tributary relationship between China and Korea, China fought the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95. Although it was miserably defeated, and Korea was consequently annexed to the Japanese empire in 1910, the Chinese sense of lips and teeth remained undiminished. Rather, it was further strengthened among ordinary Chinese when the Cold War began and especially when the Korean War broke out in 1950. After the end of World War II, China faced a new situation on the peninsula. Korea was liberated from Japanese rule but soon divided into the Soviet backed socialist North Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the U.S. backed capitalist South Korea, the Republic of Korea (ROK). As a newly established socialist country, China naturally allied itself with the Soviet Union and viewed the DPRK as a close friend while regarding the United States and ROK as hated foes. The intensified Cold War confrontation between the two camps and two Koreas triggered the outbreak of the Korean War. In order to safeguard its own political, ideological, and security interests, China quickly got involved in the war by sending the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA) to fight together with its DPRK friend against their common enemies. The war ended with a cease-fire armistice and created a friend and foe Cold War framework, which the new China was compelled to face even beyond the Cold War era. Under these circumstances, the majority of Chinese held the view that it was the capitalist enemy rather than the socialist friend who started the Korean War with a view to overthrowing not only the socialist government in Pyongyang but also the similar one in Beijing. Therefore, it was against this background that China’s attitudes and policies toward the two Koreas in the post-Korean War era were doomed to be ideologydriven and DPRK sympathetic.
Topic:
International Relations, Cold War, History, and Korean War
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

33. Chinese Views of Korean History in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries

Author:
Kirk W. Larsen
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In July 2014, Ambassador Qiu Guohong in preparation for Xi Jinping’s visit to Seoul stated that the “relationship between South Korea and China couldn’t be any better.”1 Among the many reasons for this—economic, geostrategic, cultural—was a shared sense of history. China and Korea, officials and commentators in both nations claimed, were close because of their agreement regarding the significance of their experiences as victims of foreign, particularly Japanese, imperialism in the 19th and 20th centuries. History, that constellation of memories, stories, and notions about the past, has often been deployed to reinforce conceptions of identity, to support certain courses of action, and to demarcate between the in-group and the other. But history is ever malleable and protean. Not only do individuals, institutions, and ideas change but so does the understanding of them. When one draws on the past, one inevitably focuses on a limited set of events or narratives that best serve one’s interests—to the exclusion of potentially equally valid candidates. Their utility can vary over time; one need only think of how figures such as Zheng He or Confucius have been imagined and re-imagined over the last century. This has been the case with the history of relations between China and Korea from the latenineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. For many Chinese, Korea has served first as a subject of contestation as China’s position in Korea was challenged by both Western and Japanese powers. Then, when it became increasingly clear that China (or the Qing Empire) was losing this contest, Korea became an omen of China’s own fate absent significant course changes. As Japan’s growing empire engulfed Korea and subsequently threatened parts of China, resistance served to bring China and Korea closer; many in China celebrated what they saw as courageous resistance to Japan—such as when An Chunggun assassinated Ito Hirobumi in 1909. Shared status as victims of Japanese imperialism in an age of “humiliation” brought the two closer, and the mutually shared memory of “humiliation” has been deployed by contemporary Chinese and South Korean leaders—Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye—to foster greater levels of cooperation. However, past conceptions of China, Korea, and the Sino-Korean relationship have sometimes ranged far afield from the cherished tropes of humiliation and the struggle for independence. Even seemingly universally agreed upon symbols, such as An’s heroic 1909 assassination, find themselves subject to changing interpretations such as recent emphasis by some on his pan-Asian vision of Sino-Korean-Japanese cooperation rather than his bold anti-Japanese act. As interests and priorities change, so does the utility of any particular historical narrative.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Imperialism, and History
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

34. Chinese Views of Korean History to the Late 19th Century

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In the tradition of imperial China and communism, Chinese publications see history as a morality tale. In the case of Korean history to the late decades of the nineteenth century there are essentially three actors: virtuous China, evil Japan, and variable Korea. There are three critical periods which receive the bulk of attention: the 7th century, the late 16th century trailing into the 17th century change of dynasty in China, and the last decades of the 19th century. The narrative advances the notion of competing visions of regional order, contrasting Chinese and Japanese frameworks and examining Korean policies in light of the choices made between these options. Official Chinese narratives couch today’s opportunities in historical context. A battle rages between socialism and capitalism, offering China a unique prospect to tip the balance. This is not only a present-day challenge; it is a struggle over consciousness of history—a campaign against “historical nihilism” that disagrees with orthodoxy in support of communist party legitimacy and the rectitude of Chinese civilization. A speech given by Xi Jinping in July 2010 at the Central Party School and only recently made available leaves no doubt about the tight censorship imposed on publications about history. South Korea’s history is especially sensitive as the poster-child for the benevolence of the imperial Chinese regional order, the battleground for the key war fought by China to maintain its surroundings against capitalist encroachment, and a chief testing grounds for the rejuvenation of China against U.S. hegemonism and Western civilization. Premodern history is an inseparable part of this agenda.
Topic:
Imperialism, Politics, History, Capitalism, and Socialism
Political Geography:
China, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

35. The Candlelight Mandate & Moon Jae-in’s Inter-Korean Dilemma

Author:
John Delury
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The question of the proper relationship between domestic sentiment and foreign policy is a vexed one. Historically, statesmen and strategists have tended to distrust or disparage the role of the demos in the elite enterprise of foreign affairs. In the immortal words of the then vice president Richard Nixon: “If we indulge in the kind of thinking which assumes that foreign policy decisions should be made on the basis of public opinion polls we might as well decide now to surrender our position of world leadership to the communists.” Yet from even the most condescending foreign policy establishment perch, it is hard to dispute the significance of securing public support for key foreign policy moves. Nixon as president was fully aware of this, carefully stage-managing his most dramatic maneuver, the visit to China in February 1972, in a way that would maximize support back home. And of course, Nixon’s loss of public trust over the Watergate scandal brought about the abrupt end of his influence on everything, including foreign affairs. Nixon’s impeachment, after years of public opposition to the war in Vietnam, strengthened the view in the United States that unsupervised elites were in fact the worst possible stewards of the instruments of national power, and that popular, democratic checks were critical ingredients in wise and prudent foreign policy. Once the public is accorded a decisive role in foreign affairs deliberation, we have to grapple with the problem of determining what “the public” thinks in the first place. Who represents “the public”? How can we assert “it” thinks one way or another? What do we mean by expressions such as “the public seems to have changed its mind”? French theorist Pierre Bourdieu, for example, challenged the validity of statistical representations of “public opinion” based on polling data. Bourdieu argues that public opinion so constructed is an “artefact” of the pollsters, rather than a reflection of an actual thing in the world. Polling data creates a false sense of certainty about public preferences—the illusion of a static and knowable thing, “the public,” where one does not exist. Despite the epistemological limitations and political biases embedded in the art of polling, public sentiment must be brought into the equation of foreign policy analysis. Particularly in a South Korean context, given the highly participatory nature of political culture, it would be foolish to adopt an elitist premise that the public factor can be ignored. South Korean president Moon Jae-in, for one, emphasizes the critical importance of democratic legitimacy and public input in all aspects of governance, including foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, Governance, and Public Policy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

36. Salvaging the Sunshine Policy

Author:
David Straub
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Shortly before his election as South Korea’s president in May 2017, candidate Moon Jaein issued his most detailed North Korea policy statement. As president, he declared, he would “inherit” the engagement-based, inducements-oriented Sunshine Policy approach of Korea’s only other progressive presidents, Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moohyun (2003-2008)1. Moon judged the North Korea policies of his immediate predecessors a failure; Presidents Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013-2017), both conservatives, had disagreed with key aspects of the Sunshine Policy and suspended the major inter-Korean projects undertaken by Kim and Roh. Moon’s emphasis on incentives to Pyongyang contrasted with United Nations Security Council resolutions adopted during the preceding decade; far from offering inducements, the UNSC had imposed increasingly stringent sanctions on the regime in response to its accelerating pursuit of a full-fledged nuclear weapons capability. Moon also struck quite a different tone than the new Trump administration in Washington, which had only recently concluded a North Korea policy review and characterized its approach as one of “maximum pressure and engagement. This chapter assesses Moon’s North Korea policy, its implementation during his initial year in office, and its prospects under difficult circumstances. It begins by reviewing the Sunshine Policy concept, its practice by previous progressive governments, and the significantly different approach of South Korea’s succeeding conservative administrations. It then argues that Moon and many progressives continue to believe in the basic Sunshine Policy approach, even though, unlike when the policy was first formulated, North Korea now already has a limited nuclear weapons capability and may soon be able to credibly threaten the United States homeland with nuclear attack. It reviews how Moon, as president, has attempted to salvage the policy and how North Korea and other concerned countries have responded. The chapter concludes by considering the prospects for Moon’s North Korea policy and offering recommendations to modify it to maximize the interests of both the ROK and the international community as a whole.
Topic:
Government, Politics, Governance, and Public Policy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

37. The Sun Sort-of Rises: The “Strong and Prosperous” Slogan in Recent North Korean Fiction

Author:
Meredith Shaw
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Kim Jong-un’s sudden ascent as leader came at a significant time for North Korea—a year that had coincidentally been long foreshadowed in state media as the “dawn of the strong and prosperous era.” Yet the new leader had different priorities and a different idea of what strength and prosperity looked like than his forebears, and this has resulted in notable changes to lifestyle and landscape. In a state notoriously resistant to policy changes, propaganda tools such as state fiction were able to repurpose the existing “strong and prosperous” slogan to lend legitimacy to new initiatives and social trends encouraged by the new leadership. Through a thematic analysis of new North Korean fiction, this paper examines how “strong and prosperous” and related buzzwords have been tied to changes in architecture, culture, science and technology, leisure, entertainment, and daily living. In addition to the author’s close reading of recent North Korean literature, this research draws upon analysis by leading South Korean analysts of North Korean literature and the testimony of North Korean defectors.
Topic:
Culture, Media, Literature, and Propaganda
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

38. Unification in Action? The National Identity of North Korean defector-Migrants: Insights and Implications

Author:
Christopher Green and Stephen Denney
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
What can the resettlement of North Korean defector-migrants into South Korean society today tell us about Korean national identity and the likely challenges of integrating the two Koreas tomorrow? In this paper, we report findings from a 2016 national identity survey of 334 North Korean defector-migrants currently residing in South Korea. It compares responses to that of native South Koreans and considers in-group differences of opinion. Overall, we find no substantive identity divergences between those from North Korea and native South Koreans. We do, however, find evidence of significant in-group identity differences, namely cohort effects. Older defector-migrants are more likely to see their “Koreaness” as defined by ethnocultural traits, feel closer to South Korea, and be more “patriotic” than younger migrants.
Topic:
Demographics, Migration, Refugees, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

39. The Evolution of the North Korean Nuclear Program: from Survival Strategy to Ideological Legitimization

Author:
Marco Milani
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In recent years the North Korean nuclear program has increasingly become a major concern for East Asian security. Pyongyang has repeatedly demonstrated its advancements in both missile and nuclear technology, with the final goal of acquiring a credible nuclear deterrent. To achieve this goal, the regime has committed a vast amount of state resources and has jeopardized relations with neighboring countries and major powers. This dangerous situation has created instability in the region and has hindered the possibilities of inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation. The traditional interpretation of the North Korean nuclear program focuses on the survival of the regime and emphasizes the military aspect of security. While these factors play a significant role, over the last twenty-five years new roles have emerged for the nuclear program. Survival remains the priority, but in addition to the military level of nuclear deterrence this paper introduces two different aspects directly connected to the security of the regime: economic security and domestic ideological legitimization. The development of nuclear weapons has been repeatedly used by Pyongyang as leverage in negotiations and to strengthen its political legitimacy. Understanding the complexity and the different factors behind this strategy is crucial to design and implement a viable and effective strategy aimed at limiting or eliminating the North Korean nuclear threat.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

40. A Way Out of the North Korean Labyrinth

Author:
Stephen Blank
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The sudden announcement of a North Korea-U.S. summit in March 2018 upended all previous diplomacy concerning North Korea’s nuclear program. In return for a bilateral presidential summit, Pyongyang has agreed to suspend testing of its nuclear and missile programs and accepted the continuation of scheduled U.S.-South Korea exercises as planned. While this unexpected development reduces tensions and opens up a political path to a solution on the Korean Peninsula, it also imparts increased urgency for a well-conceived U.S. diplomatic strategy so that the summit and any ensuing negotiations lead to positive outcomes for Washington and Seoul and the other interested parties, thus ensuring its sustainability. In this context, the author advances an assessment of the current situation and a proposal for a U.S. program that could reduce military tensions in and around Korea, lead to the stabilization of a new and legitimate equilibrium in Northeast Asia, and advance shared American, South Korean, and Japanese objectives.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Weapons, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

41. Chinese Views of Korean History in the Cold War Era

Author:
Jin Linbo
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This chapter draws a rough sketch of the evolution of Chinese views on Korean history in the Cold War era in three parts. The first focuses on the formulation of Chinese views of the Korean War in 1950 and the mainstream assessment of the war after Sino-South Korean diplomatic normalization in 1992. The second focuses on China’s attitudes and policies toward the two Koreas in the Cold War years. The third deals with the changes and limits of perceptions on Korean history after diplomatic normalization and their impact on bilateral relations between Beijing and Seoul. For centuries many Chinese have firmly believed that the relationship between China and the Korean Peninsula is like that between lips and teeth, they are not only close to but also dependent upon each other. If the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold. From the middle of nineteenth century, the geopolitical proximity and interdependence between the two have become the determining factors in formulating Chinese perceptions towards Korea. Since then the national security concerns symbolized by the sense of lips and teeth had been frequently stressed by some Chinese intellectuals and officials when both China and Korea were exposed to the growing imperialist expansion and geopolitical competition in East Asia. In order to maintain the traditional tributary relationship between China and Korea, China fought the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95. Although it was miserably defeated, and Korea was consequently annexed to the Japanese empire in 1910, the Chinese sense of lips and teeth remained undiminished. Rather, it was further strengthened among ordinary Chinese when the Cold War began and especially when the Korean War broke out in 1950. After the end of World War II, China faced a new situation on the peninsula. Korea was liberated from Japanese rule but soon divided into the Soviet backed socialist North Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the U.S. backed capitalist South Korea, the Republic of Korea (ROK). As a newly established socialist country, China naturally allied itself with the Soviet Union and viewed the DPRK as a close friend while regarding the United States and ROK as hated foes. The intensified Cold War confrontation between the two camps and two Koreas triggered the outbreak of the Korean War. In order to safeguard its own political, ideological, and security interests, China quickly got involved in the war by sending the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA) to fight together with its DPRK friend against their common enemies. The war ended with a cease-fire armistice and created a friend and foe Cold War framework, which the new China was compelled to face even beyond the Cold War era. Under these circumstances, the majority of Chinese held the view that it was the capitalist enemy rather than the socialist friend who started the Korean War with a view to overthrowing not only the socialist government in Pyongyang but also the similar one in Beijing. Therefore, it was against this background that China’s attitudes and policies toward the two Koreas in the post-Korean War era were doomed to be ideologydriven and DPRK sympathetic.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

42. Chinese Views of Korean History in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries

Author:
Kirk W. Larsen
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In July 2014, Ambassador Qiu Guohong in preparation for Xi Jinping’s visit to Seoul stated that the “relationship between South Korea and China couldn’t be any better.”1 Among the many reasons for this—economic, geostrategic, cultural—was a shared sense of history. China and Korea, officials and commentators in both nations claimed, were close because of their agreement regarding the significance of their experiences as victims of foreign, particularly Japanese, imperialism in the 19th and 20th centuries. History, that constellation of memories, stories, and notions about the past, has often been deployed to reinforce conceptions of identity, to support certain courses of action, and to demarcate between the in-group and the other. But history is ever malleable and protean. Not only do individuals, institutions, and ideas change but so does the understanding of them. When one draws on the past, one inevitably focuses on a limited set of events or narratives that best serve one’s interests—to the exclusion of potentially equally valid candidates. Their utility can vary over time; one need only think of how figures such as Zheng He or Confucius have been imagined and re-imagined over the last century. This has been the case with the history of relations between China and Korea from the latenineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. For many Chinese, Korea has served first as a subject of contestation as China’s position in Korea was challenged by both Western and Japanese powers. Then, when it became increasingly clear that China (or the Qing Empire) was losing this contest, Korea became an omen of China’s own fate absent significant course changes. As Japan’s growing empire engulfed Korea and subsequently threatened parts of China, resistance served to bring China and Korea closer; many in China celebrated what they saw as courageous resistance to Japan—such as when An Chunggun assassinated Ito Hirobumi in 1909. Shared status as victims of Japanese imperialism in an age of “humiliation” brought the two closer, and the mutually shared memory of “humiliation” has been deployed by contemporary Chinese and South Korean leaders—Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye—to foster greater levels of cooperation. However, past conceptions of China, Korea, and the Sino-Korean relationship have sometimes ranged far afield from the cherished tropes of humiliation and the struggle for independence. Even seemingly universally agreed upon symbols, such as An’s heroic 1909 assassination, find themselves subject to changing interpretations such as recent emphasis by some on his pan-Asian vision of Sino-Korean-Japanese cooperation rather than his bold anti-Japanese act. As interests and priorities change, so does the utility of any particular historical narrative.
Topic:
International Relations, History, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

43. The Candlelight Mandate & Moon Jae-in’s Inter-Korean Dilemma

Author:
John Delury
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The question of the proper relationship between domestic sentiment and foreign policy is a vexed one. Historically, statesmen and strategists have tended to distrust or disparage the role of the demos in the elite enterprise of foreign affairs. In the immortal words of the then vice president Richard Nixon: “If we indulge in the kind of thinking which assumes that foreign policy decisions should be made on the basis of public opinion polls we might as well decide now to surrender our position of world leadership to the communists.” Yet from even the most condescending foreign policy establishment perch, it is hard to dispute the significance of securing public support for key foreign policy moves. Nixon as president was fully aware of this, carefully stage-managing his most dramatic maneuver, the visit to China in February 1972, in a way that would maximize support back home. And of course, Nixon’s loss of public trust over the Watergate scandal brought about the abrupt end of his influence on everything, including foreign affairs. Nixon’s impeachment, after years of public opposition to the war in Vietnam, strengthened the view in the United States that unsupervised elites were in fact the worst possible stewards of the instruments of national power, and that popular, democratic checks were critical ingredients in wise and prudent foreign policy. Once the public is accorded a decisive role in foreign affairs deliberation, we have to grapple with the problem of determining what “the public” thinks in the first place. Who represents “the public”? How can we assert “it” thinks one way or another? What do we mean by expressions such as “the public seems to have changed its mind”? French theorist Pierre Bourdieu, for example, challenged the validity of statistical representations of “public opinion” based on polling data. Bourdieu argues that public opinion so constructed is an “artefact” of the pollsters, rather than a reflection of an actual thing in the world. Polling data creates a false sense of certainty about public preferences—the illusion of a static and knowable thing, “the public,” where one does not exist. Despite the epistemological limitations and political biases embedded in the art of polling, public sentiment must be brought into the equation of foreign policy analysis. Particularly in a South Korean context, given the highly participatory nature of political culture, it would be foolish to adopt an elitist premise that the public factor can be ignored. South Korean president Moon Jae-in, for one, emphasizes the critical importance of democratic legitimacy and public input in all aspects of governance, including foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Governance, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

44. Salvaging the Sunshine Policy

Author:
David Straub
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Shortly before his election as South Korea’s president in May 2017, candidate Moon Jaein issued his most detailed North Korea policy statement. As president, he declared, he would “inherit” the engagement-based, inducements-oriented Sunshine Policy approach of Korea’s only other progressive presidents, Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moohyun (2003-2008)1. Moon judged the North Korea policies of his immediate predecessors a failure; Presidents Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013-2017), both conservatives, had disagreed with key aspects of the Sunshine Policy and suspended the major inter-Korean projects undertaken by Kim and Roh. Moon’s emphasis on incentives to Pyongyang contrasted with United Nations Security Council resolutions adopted during the preceding decade; far from offering inducements, the UNSC had imposed increasingly stringent sanctions on the regime in response to its accelerating pursuit of a full-fledged nuclear weapons capability. Moon also struck quite a different tone than the new Trump administration in Washington, which had only recently concluded a North Korea policy review and characterized its approach as one of “maximum pressure and engagement. This chapter assesses Moon’s North Korea policy, its implementation during his initial year in office, and its prospects under difficult circumstances. It begins by reviewing the Sunshine Policy concept, its practice by previous progressive governments, and the significantly different approach of South Korea’s succeeding conservative administrations. It then argues that Moon and many progressives continue to believe in the basic Sunshine Policy approach, even though, unlike when the policy was first formulated, North Korea now already has a limited nuclear weapons capability and may soon be able to credibly threaten the United States homeland with nuclear attack. It reviews how Moon, as president, has attempted to salvage the policy and how North Korea and other concerned countries have responded. The chapter concludes by considering the prospects for Moon’s North Korea policy and offering recommendations to modify it to maximize the interests of both the ROK and the international community as a whole.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

45. North Korea’s Military Strategy, 2018

Author:
Chun In-bum
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
As the focus shifted from North Korea’s military advances in 2017 to its diplomatic offensive in 2018, we should not lose sight of the strategic thinking behind gaining the maximum time to develop the capacity to extend its military threat. At present North Korea needs time to perfect its nuclear strike capability. It has been very successful in developing missile capabilities, but it needs additional time to achieve its goals. Starting with high-level North-South talks on March 5, 2018, the DPRK has just gained what it needs most: time. Whenever the first talks begin with the United States and the DPRK, there should be no surprise if the DPRK comes with an improved capability to threaten the alliance. Thus, for an extended period in 2018, as diplomacy proceeds, we should expect a subdued North Korean approach: not flaunting its nuclear weapons and missiles, while striving to boost capabilities for the struggle ahead. In the seven years since Kim Jong-un officially inherited the leadership of the DPRK, his stated policy has been byungjin ( 병진, 竝進), the pursuit of both economic and military development. In conjunction with purges and efforts to eliminate rivals, byungjin may, in part, derive from Kim’s efforts at the outset of his tenure to consolidate political power. Through it, Kim displayed moderate economic flexibility, thereby gaining favor with the North Korean people through facilitating an improvement in living standards. It is tempting to see byungjin as a sign of the regime’s weakness, or as an indication of moderation, either of which would prompt the eventual collapse of the Kim regime. Correspondingly, one might see it as a reflection of Kim’s immaturity, inexperience, and lack of political and strategic acumen. These viewpoints reflect mirror imaging more than a sophisticated understanding of North Korea. Byungjin may be more of a political device and a strategic communications element of a grand strategy, as opposed to the regime’s strategy. It may be a significant instrument in the regime’s effort to maintain elite cohesion and focus the energies of the North Korean people toward productive pursuits that likewise add to the regime’s legitimacy and staying power. It by no means suggests any diminishing of the priority of making advances in nuclear and missile development in order to pose a more serious threat. Since taking power, Kim’s regime has fired close to one hundred missiles of wide variety and range compared to thirty-one for his father and grandfather combined. He has also conducted four nuclear tests, boasting of a thermal nuclear capability. During his 2018 New Year’s address, Kim Jong-un proclaimed that the DPRK had perfected its nuclear and intercontinental missile capabilities, supporting North Korea’s constitutional claim to be a nuclear power. Despite an upsurge in diplomacy after this address, we should keep our eyes on its military advances.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

46. North Korea’s Economic Strategy, 2018

Author:
William Brown
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This chapter takes the perspective of North Korea’s leadership as it confronts difficult economic problems in the remaining months of 2018. The major current and potential issues are listed and prioritized. Short and longer-term remedies are presented, each with trade-offs that affect other economic and policy issues. Given the absence of direct reporting from North Korea, the issues and debates presented are speculative, designed to give the reader a more comprehensive understanding of North Korea’s current problems than is ordinarily presented in western media. Kim Jong-un’s recent diplomatic offensive, reaching out to South Korea, China, and the United States is, in this view, suggestive of these internal economic troubles in addition to the nuclear security issues. The troubles are both short-term—the collapse in trade with China in just the past few months—and long-term, the slow-motion collapse of the communist country’s “command” economy. And much more than in the past, the problems relate to the regime’s unusual and dangerous monetary system, money being a normal issue for most governments but a relatively new one for this still partially rationed, or planned, oriented system. The leadership may have little choice but to let the domestic economy move further from the plan—allowing decentralized market and private activities more sway—than ever before. This would help cushion the central government from losses due to the sanctions and open the door to a much more prosperous future. Without major moves in this direction, inflation and unemployment may cascade into social crisis. It should be noted, that the recent Assembly Meetings, which annually focus on the economy, gave little official indication of policy changes, only a sense of digging in further to protect the regime from outside forces. But just a week later, Kim may have telegraphed an upcoming sea change when, in his address to the Party Central Committee plenum, that he is instituting a new Party Line, socialist economic construction, as the total focus of the Party and the country. Major changes, if they are to occur, will likely come after the upcoming important summits with South Korea and the U.S.1 There is little doubt that the economy in 2018 is in very poor condition, delivering one of the worst productivity rates—productivity in terms of labor and of capital—in the world, but it is important to recognize that this is due not to natural circumstances but to decisions the government has made over the years, and trade-offs it has already made. This suggests that astute government policy can create solutions and restore growth. Remedies of the sort expressed here, for example in liquidating, that is selling or leasing state assets to private buyers, raising fixed prices for state delivered electricity and for water and other utilities, and giving large pay raises to the millions of state workers who now rely on rations, while culling their numbers, would require difficult economic and social trade-offs; one might say there is no free lunch for Kim and his regime although no doubt they are looking for one, even in these summits. The chapter discusses just what kinds of decisions might be made and the likely consequences. Negotiations being set with South Korea and with the United States, and likely more discussions with China, may weigh heavily in how far Pyongyang will be willing to go in these respects. In my view the regime will be looking for: outright aid, payments for pushing back the nuclear weapons program, and premature relief from sanctions, which would only give the regime time to avoid the hard choices needed to permanently fix the broken economic system.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Leadership, Trade, and Economic Strategy
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

47. North Korea’s Diplomatic Strategy, 2018

Author:
Mark Tokola
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
With an outbreak of diplomacy under way for the Korean Peninsula, a review of North Korea’s approach to negotiations is timely. A summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in was held on April 27. President Trump has accepted an invitation to meet with Kim Jong-un.1 The secretive nature of the North Korean state makes it difficult to assess how it will engage with and what it expects to gain from talks with the international community—not just with the United States and South Korea, but with China, Japan, Russia, the EU, and others. However, its past behavior, official statements, the testimony of defectors, and the expert opinion of North Korea watchers can provide helpful insights. This chapter presents a brief history of talks and agreements with North Korea prior to the inauguration of Trump, followed by an overview of North Korea’s diplomatic outreach in 2018 to date. It then presents indicators as to what North Korean diplomacy may look like through the rest of the year based on assessments of its stated and implicit objectives—ends it would wish to attain in any event, either through diplomacy or by coercion. I conclude with a list of key upcoming dates and scenarios describing how North Korean diplomacy may play out for the remainder of 2018. North Korea’s recent diplomatic moves mark an abrupt policy change. During 2017, it carried out in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions three test flights of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); conducted its fifth and sixth underground nuclear tests, the latter being the most powerful to date and almost certainly thermonuclear; threatened an “unimaginable attack” against the United States;2 and officially announced that it would “never give up its nuclear weapons.”3 If North Korea is indeed now willing to negotiate denuclearization with the United States and South Korea, its diplomacy can at least be described as agile.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

48. North Korea’s Public Relations Strategy, 2018

Author:
Eun A Jo
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Tension on the Korean Peninsula had reached a boiling point by the time Kim Jong-un delivered his New Year’s address—a tradition set by his grandfather that he had revived in 2013. Beyond the talk of a “nuclear button,” which triggered another round of fiery exchanges with Donald Trump, Kim devoted a considerable segment of his speech to calling for improved inter-Korean relations. Though signaling an ambiguous friendly overture to the South has become an annual exercise for Kim, this year’s speech was uncharacteristically specific in that he offered to send a delegation to South Korea’s highly anticipated Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. But sports diplomacy is hardly new to Kim; an avid sports fan himself, Kim is acutely aware of its propaganda value and utility as a channel for diplomacy. For Kim, the Pyeongchang Olympics presented a timely opportunity to remake the regime’s flailing image at home and abroad. In this chapter, the Pyeongchang Olympics are used as a case study to understand Kim’s public relations strategy. Before exploring the strategic intentions behind Kim’s diplomatic campaign, both the old and new features of his image-making efforts are examined, focusing in particular on his use of sports diplomacy. How Kim’s charm offensive in Pyeongchang is communicated internally and received externally is then analyzed, yielding important insights about the prospects of reconciliation between the two Koreas post-Olympics.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Public Relations, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

49. North Korea's Strategy in 2018

Author:
KEI
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
What does North Korea seek at a time of unprecedented sanctions and pressure against it and suddenly developing opportunity, as South Korea and four great powers explore diplomatic overtures? This set of four chapters completed at the height of anticipation for summits in 2018 approaches Pyongyang’s strategy from diverse angles: public relations—how it is striving to shape images of itself, beginning by taking advantage of the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics; diplomacy—how it is engaging one state after another to forge an ideal diplomatic environment for securing maximum concessions; economy— how it is coping with sanctions and preparing to realize byungjin by boosting the economic side while deriving credit from the military side; and military—how it continues to develop threat capacities and prepare for contingencies. There is a lot that is unknown about what is driving Kim Jong-un’s behavior with some accentuating the strength achieved by building his threat capacity and others emphasizing the weakness exposed by draconian sanctions. These chapters explore the drivers behind his moves through the lens of strategic objectives, recognizing that the North Korean leader sees a mix of opportunities. This volume covers well into the spring of 2018—including the New Year’s Day address by Kim Jong-un that opened the door to a public relations blitz, the delegations sent to South Korea to kick-start “smile diplomacy” against the backdrop of the Winter Olympic Games, the personal diplomacy by Kim with South Korean officials followed by his outreach to Donald Trump and then a hurried visit to Beijing to meet Xi Jinping, and finally the Panmunjom summit with Moon Jae-in in the last week of April. This whirlwind of public relations and diplomacy against diverse interpretations of their economic and military background captured the world’s attention. Yet, Kim’s strategic intentions largely remain a mystery. Does he expect to retain his missiles and nuclear weapons and be recognized as one of the nuclear powers on essentially equal footing with the world’s great military powers? Does he seek to cut a grand bargain, eliminating these threatening weapons in return for acceptance in the international community with guarantees of security and bountiful economic assistance? Is Kim Jong-un playing a multi-stage game with long-term objectives hidden as he capitalizes on differences among five countries to maneuver in ways still difficult to fathom? Much remains unknown, as we delve into his strategic choices.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Sanctions, Economy, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

50. Strategies for Development of Transport Infrastructure in North Korea for Unification and Beyond

Author:
Kwon Young-in, Na Hee Seung, and Kim Kyoung-Sik
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
It has been reported that passenger transport and logistics between regions in North Korea are very difficult due to deterioration and imperfect maintenance of transport infrastructure and limited investment in the facilities for several decades. If South Korea and North Korea are unified, massive investment in the development of transport infrastructure is inevitable. This investment would mainly be supported by South Korea as well as through cooperation with Multilateral Development Banks such as the World Bank Group (WBG), Asian Development Bank (ADB), and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In addition, special and efficient plans for transporting people and goods need to be established in case of reunification considering the current transport environment in North Korea. Thus, well-prepared strategies should be in place for short, mid, and long-term perspectives.
Topic:
Development, Infrastructure, Banks, and Peace
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

51. Present Conditions of North Korean Industry and Possible Reconstruction Plans

Author:
Lim Soo-ho and Hong Seok-ki
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Since the collapse of industry during the 'Arduous March' (1995-1997), Pyongyang has continuously launched reconstruction plans but has failed to see a rebound. The key is to restore industrial linkages; however, the DPRK allocated a majority of state investment to the defense industry under the 'Military First Economic Policy.' As long as the 'strategic sector' retains priority, a sound outcome seems to be out of reach. In reality, North Korea's comparative advantage lies on labor-intensive business, with abundant labor forces at a low cost. After unification, such industries will have bright prospects with technology and capital not only from South Korea, but also from China and Japan. The economic integration scenario of the two Koreas -- whether radical or gradual -- will decide industrial policies for the upper half of the peninsula in the post-unification era.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, History, Reconstruction, and Industry
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

52. History, International Relations, and Public Health - The Case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 1953-2015

Author:
John Grundy
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The historical legacy of North Korea is characterized by occupation and conflict, and economic rehabilitation and then collapse, with tragic and widespread consequences for population health. From the standpoint of the historical determinants of health, this paper reviews the health system in North Korea between 1953 and 2016. Ideology and political relations have been dominant forces in determining the evolution of the health care system and population health. Despite the development of an extensive primary health care system in the country from the early 1960s following the establishment of the DPRK state in 1948, the public health system experienced a major decline in the 1990s, with catastrophic implications for the health and survival of the population. In recent years, evidence has emerged of some important public health gains, particularly through immunization, women's and children's health, and communicable disease control initiatives. This experience demonstrates that, within the overall policy context dominated by the historical and political determinants of health, there remains the capacity for implementation of public health programs that can yield both tangible health benefits for the population in North Korea, as well as assist the health system to edge closer to a regional standard.
Topic:
International Relations, History, Ideology, and Public Health
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

53. Soap Operas and Socialism: Dissecting Kim Jong-un’s Evolving Policy Priorities through TV Dramas in North Korea

Author:
Jean Lee
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Romance, humor, tension — everyone loves a good sitcom, even North Koreans. But in North Korea, TV dramas are more than mere entertainment. They play a crucial political role by serving as a key messenger of party and government policy. They aim to shape social and cultural mores in North Korean society. And in the Kim Jong-un era, they act as an advertisement for the “good life” promised to the political elite. Through TV dramas, the North Korean people learn what the regime says constitutes being a good citizen in Kim Jong-un’s North Korea today: showing loyalty to the party, using science and technology to advance national interests, thinking creatively in problem-solving, and facing the nation’s continued economic hardships with a positive attitude. The soaps and sitcoms reveal a shift in social priorities: Viewers are encouraged to put their families first, to nurture and elevate the next generation, and to be bold in thinking outside the box rather than settling for the status quo. These contrast with themes popular in films made during the Kim Jong-il era, which emphasized putting the state before family, the military above the party, and conformism over originality. The props in today’s dramas, including laptops, drones, fashionable clothes, and gold wristwatches, are prominently positioned in such settings as elevators, computer labs, and newly built high-rise apartment buildings. These consumer products are the arsenal of the new generation of Kim Jong-un elites — not the tanks and rifles of his father’s era of filmmaking.
Topic:
Media, Kim Jong-un, and Elites
Political Geography:
South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

54. A U.S. Perspective on the Impact of Sanctions

Author:
James Walsh
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Despite a crowded news agenda, North Korea has managed to draw the attention of both political leaders and the public at large. Missile tests, an assassination employing VX nerve agent, and preparations for a nuclear test have drawn strong reaction from Washington to Kuala Lumpur. Each new controversy sends policymakers scrambling for a response and, more often than not, that response has been a call for new and tougher sanctions. And not surprisingly, each new call for sanctions resurrects the old question: do sanctions on North Korea have any impact?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

55. A South Korean Perspective on the Impact of Sanctions

Author:
Kim Joong-ho
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
There is no way to hurt the regime of the DPRK without hurting its people; and there is no way to support the people of the DPRK without supporting its regime. Thus, discussing the effectiveness of sanctions against North Korea demands hard labor in fact-finding and tremendous patience until the desired effects are witnessed. Sanctions are time and energy consuming. In order to curb North Korea’s enthusiasm for long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, the sanctions regime needs to be upgraded.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

56. A Russian Perspective on the Impact of Sanctions

Author:
Alexander Gabuev
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The situation on the Korean Peninsula is moving in a dangerous direction. In order to affect the behavior of the North Korean regime and change its calculations, ultimately forcing Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear and missiles programs, the international community has imposed a set of tough economic sanctions. The recent set of sanctions was codified in the UN Security Council Resolution 2321. So far, the impact of these and other sanctions in order to change the DPRK’s actions appears to be limited. Russia is one of the active players on the Korean Peninsula. A geographical neighbor of the DPRK and a former Cold War ally, Russia is engaged in looking for solutions to the North Korean nuclear problem. Still, when it comes to economic sanctions against North Korea, Moscow has an ambiguous position. Its national interests on the Korean Peninsula include prevention of nuclear tests by the DPRK, positioning Russia as one of the leaders of the international community on nonproliferation; non-expansion of the U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula; and growth in Russian trade with both Korean states. The sanctions envisaged in Resolution 2321 do not support most of these goals, since Russia thinks that nuclear disarmament of DPRK is impossible in principle. However, Moscow is ready to play along with the sanctions track as long as Russia maintains the appearance of a critical player.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and North Korea

57. A Chinese Perspective on the Impact of Sanctions

Author:
Cheng Xiaohe
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Since the Korean War, North Korea (the DPRK) has endured sanctions imposed by the United States and other western countries, but the sanctions began to acquire a dramatic impact only in 2006 when North Korean ballistic missile blasts invited a punitive reaction from the UN Security Council. In addition to sanctions imposed by individual countries, for the first time, international organizations, notably the Security Council, passed punitive resolutions in an effort to rein in North Korea’s missile and nuclear development. In order to supervise implementation of the sanctions, the Security Council set up a committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 in 2006 (the sanctions committee), which now comprises all 15 members and makes its decisions by consensus. To North Korea’s dismay, as it continues to fight against western countries’ economic sanctions and military embargo, it now has to bear the brunt of sanctions from its traditional allies, China and Russia. Even so, it has been defying international pressure and pressing ahead with its missile and nuclear weapons programs. Despite tougher sanctions, North Korea is poised to possess missiles with nuclear warheads that could hit South Korea, Japan, and the United States. This paper explores the effectiveness of the sanctions, asking whether the North’s steady progress on nuclear and missile weapons demonstrates their failure.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

58. The Impact of Chinese National Identity on Sino-South Korean Relations

Author:
See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
How do Chinese national identity narratives affect Sino-South Korean relations? The Koguryo history war more than a decade ago was a turning point in bilateral relations since diplomatic normalization in 1992, generating enduring competition over representations of history.1 In 2010, China’s commemoration of its entry into the Korean War raised early warnings in South Korea over Beijing’s hostile foreign policy orientation under Xi Jinping. Contrary to such expectations, however, the earliest summit agreements between presidents Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye after both took office in 2013 were on history cooperation as common victims of Japanese colonialism. Most notably in 2015, Park’s participation in Beijing’s 70th anniversary celebrations of the end of World War II consolidated joint claims of what was called the best period in bilateral relations.2 This chapter assesses the impact of Chinese national identity on China-Republic of Korea (ROK) relations under the Xi and Park administrations since 2013. It examines Chinese constructions of national identity and their implications for the security, economic, and cultural dimensions of the Sino-South Korean relationship. Rather than promoting partnership, competing identities across these dimensions reinforce enduring differences over the region’s political, economic, and cultural order. These differences surfaced most saliently in 2016, following an initial period of engagement that corresponds with the downward trend in China-Japan relations since 2012. Managing them requires the very trust-building that both Beijing and Seoul have prioritized since 2013.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Identity
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

59. A View from the United States on Sino-U.S. Relations

Author:
Joel Wuthnow
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
During the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, the candidates reached a bipartisan consensus on one issue: how to deal with North Korea. Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump both called for China to do more to convince Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program once and for all. Candidate Trump said that China has “absolute control” over North Korea and promised to do whatever it takes to convince Beijing to use that leverage, including imposing penalties on Chinese firms. As president, however, Trump will have to navigate the reality of China’s extreme hesitance to use the only type of pressure likely to divert North Korea’s nuclear ambitions—the threat of regime-endangering punishment. If and how China should continue to fit into U.S. strategy for dealing with North Korea will thus be a key issue facing Trump and his advisors.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

60. Intro | Establishing Triangular Talks Among Washington, Beijing, and Seoul

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Of five alternative approaches to addressing the North Korean threat to stability in East Asia and beyond, this section is concerned with the possibility of just one—a diplomatic approach via Three-Way Talks among China, South Korea, and the United States. We single out this approach as the golden mean for reconciling the conflicting interests among the parties best positioned to reshape the calculus of Pyongyang. It represents the path to compromise. Among the alternatives, there is the Chinese appeal for a dual-track approach through Six-Party Talks, aimed at a peace treaty on terms attractive to North Korea and greatly transformative to the security architecture in Northeast Asia. This could hardly be called a compromise, since Seoul and Washington regard this as a win for Pyongyang and evidence that Beijing actually has been siding with Pyongyang. Another alternative is Strategic Patience, which is a misnomer for the policy of the Obama administration, but, in any case, refers mainly to reliance on increased deterrence as pressure is ratcheted up. In fact, Obama was seeking a pathway to three-way talks, giving China time to shift in that direction bolstered by new sanctions, while in 2016 also moving closer to a fourth approach: Unilateral Sanctions targeted at the Chinese firms assisting North Korea. A fifth option is Alliance Triangularity to force change in Pyongyang.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Sanctions, Instability, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

61. Nothing to be Afraid of? North Korean Political Economy and Economic Reform

Author:
Ian E. Rinehart
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) President Kim il-Sung explained to his counterpart Erich Honecker, President of the German Democratic Republic, in 1977 that building socialism in the DPRK is the foundation for establishing a new social order in the entire nation.1 Socialist principles have guided the North Korean political economy since the country was established after World War II. The 1972 constitution repeatedly stressed the achievement of “true socialism” as a goal and declared that the DPRK “exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat.”2 In the North Korean system, urban residents received monthly rations for household goods distributed at nominal prices, while workers on agricultural cooperatives and state farms received consumer goods in return for agricultural output sold to the state at an artificially low price. The government’s top-down central planning set production-based targets for factories and farms.
Topic:
Economics, Political Economy, Politics, and Reform
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

62. North Koreans Have Cell Phones - Why cell phones won’t lead to revolution and how they strengthen the regime

Author:
Peter Nesbitt
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Until the recent passing of Kim Jong-il, the world thought of North Korea as a Stalinist, Hermit Kingdom run by a crazy, nuclear weapon-building, grey jumpsuit-wearing dictator known as the Dear Leader. Yet, against a narrative of repression, torture, and brinksmanship, North Korea has dramatically expanded its mobile telecommunication infrastructure over the last three years. Most scholars agree that cell phones increase individuality while providing an opportunity for dissent. From the 2001 “text-message revolution” in the Philippines to the more recent role of cell-phones during the Jasmine Revolutions in the Middle East, mobile telecommunication has supported political upheaval and the overthrow of governments.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Domestic Policy, Telecommunications, and Cell Phones
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

63. Selling North Korea in New Frontiers: Profit and Revolution in Cyberspace

Author:
Jane Kim
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
When the Internet became accessible to the international public in the 1990’s, it forever revolutionized the way people exchange information and communication. Demands for connection to the virtual world spurred global economic growth as new firms emerged to supply wanted products and services. And as commercial transactions became possible online, the Internet transformed into a legitimate economy, enticing highly authoritarian regimes such as China and Cuba.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Internet, Economic Growth, Cyberspace, Telecommunications, and Information
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea