Publishing Institution: European Union Institute for Security Studies / Political Geography: Europe

1. Fog in Channel? The Impact of Brexit on EU and UK Foreign Affairs

Author:: Amelia Hadfield and Nicholas Wright
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The UK’s rejection of any institutionalised relationship with the EU in foreign, security and defence policy (FSDP) is arguably the most noteworthy feature of the post-Brexit dispensation. In a stark reversal in early 2020, the British government abandoned pledges made in the 2019 Political Declaration to ‘establish structured consultation and regular thematic dialogues [that] could contribute to the attainment of common objectives’, including on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (1). This gap was intensified by the absence of any reference to foreign affairs in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) or the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (IR) (2). Indeed, the IR essentially ignores the EU, referring only to British ambitions to remain a lead European defence actor, with a focus on multilateral venues (notably the UN and NATO), bilateral relations and ad hoc groupings. In short, an EU-sized hole now exists in British foreign policy thinking. This matters in London and across Europe. While in the EU, the UK exercised significant influence and leadership in FSDP, its EU membership magnifying its global capacities. In leaving, Sir Simon Fraser, formerly permanent under-secretary in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), warned that Brexit represented ‘the biggest shock to [the UK’s] method of international influencing and the biggest structural change to our place in the world since the end of World War Two’ (3). From the EU’s perspective, as observed by High Representative Josep Borrell, ‘with Brexit, nothing gets easier and a lot gets more complicated. How much more complicated depends on the choices that both sides will make’ (4). The choices thus far indicate a rejection of ‘old obligations’ (5) and an essentially transactional relationship that will be ‘structurally adversarial for the foreseeable future’ (6). Nonetheless, Brexit also gives both the UK and the EU a once-in-a-generation opportunity to rethink and reconfigure their approaches to foreign affairs and how they navigate a profoundly changed regional context. To understand the scale of this undertaking, we offer an innovative thematic analysis focused on four ‘Rs’: reputation, responsibility, resources and relevance. Each ‘R’ represents a core element of both sides’ respective foreign policies, offering insights into possible international roles and goals. The four ‘Rs’ also help us identify the main risks and opportunities Brexit encompasses, providing a conceptual symmetry as to how the choices of both the EU and UK might align and impact each other.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

2. Navel Gazing? The Strategic Compass and the EU’s maritime presence

Author:: Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Seventeen days prior to the accidental blockage of the Suez Canal on 23 March 2021 by the super container Ever Given, a French aircraft carrier strike group had passed through the canal on its way to the Indian Ocean (1). It does not take an active imagination to think what could have transpired had these naval forces become trapped in the Suez Canal following a hostile act on their navigation systems. It is only possible to envision such scenarios because maritime security is increasingly beset by geopolitical tensions. We know that the European Union is heavily dependent on maritime trade routes for power projection and its economic prosperity — 75 % of goods entering Europe do so by sea today and Europe’s navies and shipping firms rely on free navigation. However, China’s naval expansion in the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s naval presence in the High North and the Baltic, Black and Mediterranean Seas and Turkey’s hostile maritime acts in the Eastern Mediterranean call into question the relative freedoms Europeans have enjoyed at sea for decades. Of course, it remains to be seen whether the EU can generate a greater maritime presence in such a context. The Union has accrued experience in deploying naval operations, undertaking border and coastguard functions, performing maritime safety tasks, countering piracy and conducting maritime surveillance assignments. More recently, the EU has even established new maritime initiatives such as the Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) concept, which is designed to enhance maritime security in fragile areas such as the Gulf of Guinea. EU member states such as France, Germany and the Netherlands have also invested in national strategies and guidelines for maritime engagement in the Indo-Pacific, and the EU will follow suit by the end of 2021 with its own strategy. A new EU Arctic strategy will be released in October 2021. NATO is also about to revise its own Strategic Concept, which will undoubtedly focus on maritime issues too. At the same time, by March 2022, the EU will present a Strategic Compass for security and defence, which is in part supposed to provide clearer guidance on what type of maritime actor the Union should become. This is a challenging task. There is limited political agreement on the Union’s maritime security role, and there is uncertainty about how far the EU should geographically extend itself when it has concerns closer to home. There is also the question of limited European naval capabilities. Tackling these issues, this Brief asks how the Strategic Compass can make a tangible difference to the Union’s role as a maritime security provider. Our first port of call, however, is to better understand the contemporary nature of maritime threats, risks and challenges.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:: Europe

3. Green Digital Diplomacy: Time for the EU to Lead

Author:: Patryk Pawlak and Fabio Barbero
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: In the second that just elapsed, over 116 terabytes of data were exchanged throughout the internet, an amount comparable to ten times that produced by the Hubble Space Telescope in one year. Data has become an essential resource for economic growth, job creation and societal progress. It will ‘reshape the way we produce, consume and live’. However, our increasingly digital way of life comes at a cost for the environment. The 2020 speech ‘The state of the planet’ by UN Secretary-General António Guterres made it clear: the world economy needs to transform to embrace a sustainable economic model with cleaner infrastructure, including digital and internet infrastructure. It is a global problem that requires a concerted international effort. And yet the environmental impact of new technologies is hardly addressed as a foreign policy issue. The EU–Japan Green Alliance signed in May 2021, despite being relatively comprehensive, does not make any reference to the environmental challenges of digital transition. The partnership between the European Commission and Breakthrough Energy Catalyst to boost investments in critical climate technologies focuses on green hydrogen, direct air capture, long-duration energy storage and sustainable aviation fuels, but not on the information technology sector. This is puzzling given that data centres that power the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector generate up to 2 % of global carbon emissions, a number comparable to the aviation sector. The ICT sector accounts for around 7 % of global electricity use, but according to certain predictions, it could be using one fifth of all the world’s electricity by 2025. By the same year, the ICT sector may be responsible for 5.5 % of the world’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. If the ICT sector were a country, this would make it the fifth largest polluter in the world, after China, the United States, India and Russia. Consequently, any international actor aspiring to global leadership on climate change needs to look beyond the energy consumption, GHG emissions and natural resources related to design, production and end-of-life of the digital sector. To be responsible digital players, states need to address the environmental cost of using digital services that rely on large volumes of data and to promote green solutions as part of their international digital engagement strategies. For the EU’s foreign policy, this means embracing ‘green digital diplomacy’ as one of the priorities. Such an approach would bring digital and climate – two of the EU’s key policy priorities – under the same roof and contribute to promoting a ‘European way, balancing the flow and wide use of data, while preserving high privacy, security, safety and ethical standards’. It also offers a new opening for the EU’s commitment to strengthening multilateralism and a rules-based international order, including through setting norms and principles for the world’s digital transition, and the EU’s capacity-building and development cooperation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, European Union, Data, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:: Europe

4. How Russia Does Foresight: Where is the world going?

Author:: Andrew Monaghan
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Thinking about the long-term future is a prominent feature of the Russian official strategic planning and public policy debate. Speaking in 2008, for instance, President Putin indicated the horizons of strategic planning when he stated that a concrete development plan for the period through to 2010 had been elaborated, and “now we need to look beyond this horizon – look at least 10 years ahead”. “Today we are deciding one of the most important issues for Russia’s future – defining its development strategy through to 2020”, he stated, and in setting out Russia's long-term vision for the future, "our long-term references must be clear to everyone”, and “must have the support of our citizens.” By the mid-2010s, policy-oriented public organisations were looking even further ahead. The Valdai Club, for instance, was conducting a project entitled Club 2035, to “look beyond the horizon” at a number of themes, including technological and socio-cultural trends, and the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) was running a “World in 100 Years” project, including the series “On the eve of 2037”. Other major institutes, such as the Institute of World Economics and International Affairs (IMEMO) and the Moscow State Institute of International Affairs (MGIMO), also hold regular major events and publish substantial volumes reflecting on twenty-first century megatrends and strategic forecasting up to 2030 and beyond.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Energy Policy, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

5. Appeasement and Autonomy: Armenian-Russian relations from revolution to war

Author:: Narek Sukiasyan
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Armenia’s foreign policy and its role in the post-Soviet space are often characterised as ‘pro-Russian’. While such a description is partially true, it is overly simplistic. This Brief analysis the main trends and evolutions in Armenia’s Russia policy after the 2018 Velvet Revolution: how the changes have influenced Russia’s approach towards Armenia, how these dynamics affect Armenia’s autonomy and what the consequences of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war are for Armenia’s regional security and alliances. After the revolution and up until the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, no substantial strategic changes were made to Armenian foreign policy. The leadership has avoided framing its external affairs in geopolitical ‘pro or against’ terms, promoting a ‘pro-Armenian’ policy that aims to maintain good relations in all directions and prioritises sovereignty as a foreign policy principle. Instead, the revolutionary ambitions of the new leadership have been directed towards domestic issues such as fighting corruption, reforming the judiciary and law enforcement bodies, improving the business environment and addressing social issues.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economy, Conflict, Regional Integration, Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, and Appeasement
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Armenia

6. Under Pressure: Can Belarus resist Russian coercion?

Author:: Anaïs Marin
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Belarus is traditionally considered to be Russia’s closest ally, and their alliance is a cornerstone of post-Soviet integration projects, both military (the Collective Security Treaty Organisation - CSTO) and economic (the Eurasian Economic Union - EAEU). But bilateral relations have entered a different and more conflictual phase. The paradigm shift started in 2014, when Belarus invoked its constitutional neutrality pledge to refuse to side with Russia in its ongoing conflict with Ukraine and the West. Playing this card allowed President Lukashenka to appear as a security guarantor both in the eyes of Belarusians and the West. Irritated by such autonomy, Moscow indicated that it now wants more for its money. Russia is no longer ready to subsidise the Belarusian economy in exchange for its neighbour’s fleeting geopolitical loyalty. In linking, in 2018, the resumption of economic privileges to ‘deeper’ political integration within the Union State that the two countries nominally established 20 years ago, Russia stepped up the pressure. Yet Vladimir Putin made Belarus an offer he knew Aliaksandr Lukashenka would refuse: the Belarusian president had repeatedly stated that Belarus’s sovereignty was ‘not for sale’. Given its dependence on Russia and current economic hardships, Belarus might not be able to resist Moscow’s ‘coercion to integrate’, however. Its capacity to uphold its sovereignty is being challenged from outside, while Lukashenka’s regime survival is under stress from within: in the wake of the 9 August presidential election, unprecedented opposition forces emerged which the Belarusian regime started cracking down on.1 Should repression intensify, leading the West to reintroduce sanctions, Minsk’s efforts of the past years towards normalising relations with Brussels and Washington would come to nothing. Yet renewed (self-)isolation of Belarus is exactly what Russia needs to reach its strategic goal of keeping Belarus in its orbit, and extract more concessions from its fragile leadership. This presents the EU with a dilemma it knows all too well: how can it support Belarus’s efforts to preserve its independence, without increasing the resilience of Lukashenka’s authoritarian regime or making Russia more assertive?
Topic:: European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Belarus

7. Uncharted Territory? Towards a common threat analysis and a Strategic Compass for EU security and defence

Author:: Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Words have meaning. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen took up her mandate calling for a ‘geopolitical Commission’ and Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), echoed this by stating that the EU needs to ‘learn the language of power’. Reflecting the current geopolitical turbulence facing Europe, the EU’s rhetorical shift could split opinion – at the very least, the choice of language is open to interpretation. It could be argued that the word ‘geopolitics’ sits uneasily alongside terms such as ‘multilateralism’, especially when one considers the historical connotations of geopolitics. The implication is that visions of peace and international cooperation cannot simultaneously sit alongside ideas such as the military control of the ‘heartland’ or mastery of the seas – to put it differently, if the EU is Monnet, can it ever survive in the world of Mackinder or Mahan? EU member states would react to this statement in different ways and this is one among many reasons why it is so difficult to form a ‘common strategic culture’ in Europe. Behind the EU’s mosaic of various national strategic cultures lie profound differences between geopolitical interests and strategic histories. As the 2017 French Defence and National Security Strategic Review observes, ‘[g]eography and history remain important factors in the manner in which European states rank threats and risks, and more generally, in the diversity of their strategic cultures.’ Despite the direction offered by the EU Global Strategy, there is as yet no common approach to how member state governments understand threats to the EU’s security. Defining ‘threats’ is not an easy task and it has split security scholars. Nevertheless, member states have stressed the need for a strategic reflection on security and defence based on ‘a shared assessment of threats and challenges.’ This echoes the EU Global Strategy, which stated that ‘European security hinges on better and shared assessments of internal and external threats and challenges.’
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Europe and Global Focus

8. Sovereignty Over Supply? The EU’s ability to manage critical dependences while engaging with the world

Author:: Daniel Fiott and Vassilis Theodosopoulos
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Fears about the EU’s trade, resource and technology dependences have only grown since the outbreak of the pandemic, even though US-China trade disputes and the rolling out of 5G have played a significant role, too. Some analysts have pointed to the beginning of a ‘decoupling’ of certain supply chains away from China, and, while evidence suggests that some ‘reshoring’ has taken place since at least 2011, there are debates about whether the production of certain technologies should be relocated back to Europe after decades of de-industrialisation. Decoupling and/or reshoring are a reaction to geopolitically risky dependences, with the fear being that certain products, technologies or raw materials will be unavailable during times of crisis or that a reliance on third-party supplies will limit political freedom. In the digital age – where data dominates – there are also concerns that dependences may lead among other things to espionage or a curtailment of personal rights and freedoms. Despite the fact that decoupling is unfeasible, save perhaps for in very specific critical technology domains, the threat perception surrounding critical supplies has given rise to a different vocabulary and EU communiques and strategies are today replete with references to ‘technological sovereignty’, ‘open strategic autonomy’ and ‘digital sovereignty’. Yet, in conjunction with this rhetoric has come a raft of new policy initiatives. In February 2020, the European Commission released a bundle of strategies on data, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the digital future, which stressed the importance of reducing technological dependences in strategic areas. This is why the Commission is to invest €8 billion in supercomputing and help leverage €20 billion per year for AI. In March, a new ‘Industrial Strategy for Europe’ was published that stated that critical raw materials are ‘crucial for markets such as e-mobility, batteries, renewable energies, pharmaceuticals, aerospace, defence and digital applications’. It will be much harder for the EU to develop supercomputers and batteries without secure supplies of raw materials. To this end, on 3 September a ‘Commission Action Plan on Critical Raw Materials’ was released along with an updated List of Critical Raw Materials and a foresight study looking at strategic technologies and dependent sectors over the 2030-2050 horizon. This bundle of initiatives has made the case for the EU to diversify resource supplies, especially in an era of digitalisation that demands increasing amounts of strategic resources found outside of the Union’s territory.
Topic:: Climate Change, Science and Technology, Sovereignty, European Union, Geopolitics, Supply, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

9. Revitalising the NPT: Preparing the EU for the tenth RevCon

Author:: Clara Portela
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Almost 20 years ago, an early assessment of the role of the EU in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons concluded that it performed better at addressing the arms control agenda in multilateral fora than at resolving proliferation crises.1 The reasons for this seemed straightforward: a composite actor like the EU can coordinate better in a multilateral setting, where it is able to rely on ample preparation time, than in the context of international crises that often arise unexpectedly. A decade after that initial assessment, the situation was the opposite. In 2015, France, Germany and the UK – the E3 – assisted by successive EU High Representatives, secured a deal with Iran after years of painstaking talks alongside the US, China and Russia, putting the EU on the map as a non-proliferation actor. However, in the Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that took place in the same year, the EU appeared divided in a session that eventually failed to agree a final document.2 How can this evolution be explained – and ideally improved – with a view to the upcoming Review Conference (RevCon) of the NPT in April-May 2020? The present Brief outlines the record of the EU in this context, highlighting the difficulties encountered in the 2015 edition, and identifying the stakes for the EU in the forthcoming RevCon as well as a possible way forward.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Nonproliferation, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:: Europe

10. Devil in the Detail: Local versus regional approaches to peace in Donbas

Author:: Karen Madoian
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Following the Euromaidan protests and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine has witnessed continued violence in the east of the country, with approximately 13,000 people killed, including more than 3,300 civilians, and as many as 30,000 wounded. After a period of stalled negotiations, 2019 brought new momentum to the peace process: Ukraine’s new president, Volodymyr Zelensky, and his political party ‘Servant of the People’ won an unprecedented majority in the 2019 elections, gaining full control over the executive and legislative branches of power with more than 70% of all votes cast across the country. One of the instrumental factors for President Zelensky’s victory was his promise to end the war in Donbas. To this end, he agreed to revive negotiations in the Normandy Format (between France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine) and reactivated direct communication channels with the Kremlin. The president’s message regarding reconciliation with the separatist, Russia-backed ‘People’s Republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk appears to resonate with the majority of Ukrainians: more than 50% of citizens believe that Kyiv should negotiate a peace deal with separatist leaders and more than 70% support the Ukrainian president’s engagement in direct dialogue with Russia.
Topic:: Civil Society, Regional Cooperation, War, Conflict, and Decentralization
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

11. Digital Divide? Transatlantic defence cooperation on Artificial Intelligence

Author:: Simona R. Soare
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Emerging technologies, including Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum computing, big data, 5G and biotechnology are paving the way towards defence modernisation in a growing number of states, particularly in the US, Russia and China. While AI technologies and their impact have been on the radar of European governments, there has been little scrutiny in Europe of how the evolving US approach to AI affects European defence and the broader transatlantic partnership. At the heart of the US defence modernisation programme is the Artificial Intelligence Strategy unveiled by the Department of Defense (DOD) in 2019. What implications does this have for Europe and for transatlantic cooperation? In examining this question this Brief finds that cooperation with the US on the digital modernisation of defence remains a strategic necessity for Europe, but a mix of new and pre-existing dynamics in the relationship risks the emergence of a transatlantic digital divide. The Brief is structured in three parts. The first part explores the key tenets of the DOD AI Strategy. The second part examines challenges to the adoption of AI technologies in the US, many of which are shared by European partners. The third part of the Brief explores the implications of the DOD AI Strategy for European security.
Topic:: Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Partnerships, Artificial Intelligence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

12. Digitalising Defence: Protecting Europe in the age of quantum computing and the cloud

Author:: Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Any discussion about the digitalisation of defence is hampered by the imprecision of associated terms and words. ‘Cyber’, ‘the cloud’, ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT), ‘block chain’ and ‘quantum computing’ are widely used but their exact meaning or application can be quite fuzzy. The truth is that we may be intellectually ill-equipped to understand the full intricacies and implications of digitalisation, even if the economic rationale for digitalisation is clear. In fact, some estimates show that the digitalisation of products and services could add more than €110 billion to industrial revenue in Europe over a relatively short time frame of five years, so it is easy to see why the economic rationale for greater digitalisation is so powerful. Yet digitalisation is clearly not just about economics and the geopolitical ramifications of a proliferation of digital technologies is becoming a mainstay of international politics today. The assumption is that the competition to control new technologies (both hardware and associated software and algorithms), and the willingness to use them to gain an advantage over other states, underlines the growing importance of ‘digital power’. It is for this reason that the European Commission has stated that it is imperative for the EU to establish ‘technological sovereignty’ in areas of key strategic importance such as defence, space, mobile networks (5G and 6G) and quantum computing.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, European Union, and Quantum Computers
Political Geography:: Europe

13. A Blacklist is (Almost) Born: Building a resilient EU human rights sanctions regime

Author:: Clara Portela
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: In December 2018, the Council of the European Union initiated discussions about the creation of a new sanctions regime designed to address gross human rights violations, following a proposal from the Netherlands. So far, the EU only operates three thematic sanctions regimes: those targeting terrorism, cyberattacks and chemical weapons attacks. Unlike classical sanctions packages addressing crises in specific countries, such as Guinea or Venezuela, horizontal sanctions regimes apply to individuals and entities considered to have committed severe human rights abuses. Once approved, the planned blacklist is set to become the EU’s fourth horizontal sanctions regime, enlarging its vast body of autonomous sanctions regimes, i.e. restrictions adopted in the absence of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate. Over a year after the initial Dutch proposal was tabled, the sanctions regime is still under discussion, which contrasts with the rapid adoption of previous thematic regimes. On first inspection, the slow pace of preparations is puzzling: the vast majority of EU sanctions regimes were traditionally imposed in response to human rights breaches.3 Most EU autonomous sanctions regimes currently in force cite human rights violations as the rationale for their adoption. Indeed, the emphasis on human rights as a key motivation for the imposition of sanctions sets EU autonomous sanctions apart from the practice of other international sanctions senders like the United Nations (UN).4 Given that the promotion of human rights is a centrepiece of EU foreign policy, consensus among member states in support of such a regime should be forthcoming. If human rights breaches constitute the dominant motivation for the imposition of EU autonomous sanctions, what is holding up the approval of the prospective regime? Designing a horizontal sanctions regime in the EU is a much harder task than meets the eye. The present Brief aims to unravel the challenges that make it difficult for this regime to take shape, and suggests ways in which the obstacles identified may be surmounted or, at the very least, mitigated.
Topic:: Human Rights, Sanctions, European Union, and Transnational Actors
Political Geography:: Europe and Global Focus

14. Cyber Conflict Uncoded: The EU and conflict prevention in cyberspace

Author:: Patryk Pawlak, Eneken Tikk, and Mika Kerttunen
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: When the Supreme Leader of Iran promised revenge in response to the killing of General Suleimani in January 2020, the possibility of offensive cyber operations against US targets was suggested. Eventually, Iran resorted to a more conventional response, launching missiles against US military bases in Iraq. However, this episode points to a shift in our understanding of what conflict means. In January 2019, the French Minister of Armed Forces, Florence Parly, stated that “cyber warfare has begun and France must be ready to fight it” as she announced the new French Military Cyber Strategy. In a similar vein, the UK Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, announced in September 2019 that Britain is “at war every day” due to constant cyber-attacks from Russia and elsewhere and warned that with the evolving character of warfare, the distinction between peace and war no longer exists in the modern world. The proliferation of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), both the expansion of usage and the increased availability of harmful means, has brought about new ways of power projection. Political and economic contestation between states now involves targeted cyber-attacks against other countries’ utilities, financial networks, election infrastructure and governance systems. Cyber-attacks – a deliberate use of malicious software for exploiting or altering computer code, data or logic to cause harm – offer new methods to target internet infrastructure, telecommunications networks, information systems, as well as computers and computer systems. Such activities might have the objective of destroying or affecting the proper functioning of these systems with adverse effects for their users – whether states, companies, public service providers or individuals. As a result, power projection does not have to involve tanks or missiles; nor does it have to result in direct death and destruction comparable to armed conflict. Confrontation is, however, a constant in states’ ambitions, attitudes and capabilities, blurring the line between war and peace. This Conflict Series Brief examines the current practices and future possibilities of preventive action in relation to conflict in cyberspace. When categorising state uses of ICTs as a form of conflict, attention should be paid to three considerations. First, hostile uses of ICTs rarely occur outside of a pre-existing or broader politico-military dispute. Second, a malicious state use of ICTs can lead to an escalation in pre-existing adversarial relations. Third, the use of cyber capabilities in a conflict situation often includes the targeting of civilian infrastructure and therefore has wide-ranging implications for the proper functioning of societies. Against this background, this Brief argues that the use of malicious cyber tools for power projection can and must be prevented.
Topic:: European Union, Cybersecurity, Conflict, Transnational Actors, and Information Technology
Political Geography:: Europe

15. Arctic Stress Test: Great power competition and Euro-Atlantic defence in the High North

Author:: Simona R. Soare
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The Arctic is again becoming a region of strategic focus. For three decades after the Cold War, when the region was at the centre of great power competition, successful cooperation transformed the Arctic into a ‘low tension’ zone and consolidated the perception of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’, the sense that the region is uniquely cooperative and immune from broader geopolitical tensions. For the eight Arctic states that comprise the Arctic Council – Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Russia and the US – there has been hope that regional dynamics can be insulated from global geopolitical shifts. However, two phenomena are challenging the notion of Arctic exceptionalism and testing the limits of regional governance. First, climate change is accelerating the melting of polar ice at a historically unprecedented pace. Ever larger swathes of the Arctic are becoming accessible, and with them the region’s untapped natural resources, raising the prospect of increased human activity. Second, great power competition between the US, Russia and China in and for the Arctic is intensifying, changing regional power dynamics and exposing the region to ‘spillover’ effects from competition in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. These changes are accentuated by the erosion of the rules-based international order which underpins Arctic governance, the dismantling of the arms control regime, and the rapid proliferation of advanced military capabilities. Physical presence and ownership of infrastructure are becoming vectors of influence, as evidenced by President Trump’s offer to ‘buy Greenland.’ Meanwhile, Russian bombers regularly approach European and North American airspace and Russian submarines are increasingly present in the Norwegian and North Seas, constantly probing the agility of Euro-Atlantic defences. The growing Chinese presence in the region creates economic and financial dependencies. Consequently, what happens in the Arctic affects more than just regional actors. What does great power competition for access to and control of the Arctic mean for Euro-Atlantic security? In answering this question, this Brief argues that the Arctic will be a strategic stress test for European defence and for the transatlantic bond. The paper is structured in three parts. The first part outlines the security challenges and the drivers of geopolitical change in the Arctic. The second part examines the features of great power competition in this region and the implications for European and transatlantic defence. The final section of the Brief offers policy considerations for European and transatlantic decision-makers on how to mitigate the negative consequences of these regional dynamics.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Power
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Arctic, and United States of America

16. The Poison Pill: EU defence on US terms?

Author:: Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: It took two letters. One, sent to Brussels on 1 May 2019 by two US undersecretaries, accused the EU of damaging transatlantic cooperation and hindering US access to Europe’s defence market through the rules it plans to set for the participation of third states in the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The other, sent to Washington on 16 May 2019 by senior EU officials of equal standing, refuted these claims by showing the objective and transparent way in which the EU had established the EDF and PESCO. Unlike the letter from Washington, which was laced with robust language and questionable accusations, the EU response argued that, even with the introduction of the two initiatives, the European defence market would remain more open than that of the US. The EU institutions also stated that by creating the EDF and PESCO, the Union was showing its collective determination to reduce European capability duplication and enhance interoperability, while also ensuring the competitiveness of Europe’s defence industry. In essence, the EU pointed out that its security and defence initiatives are designed to contribute to transatlantic burden sharing – something the US has been requesting from European allies for some time. While the US welcomes that the Fund allows for the participation of third states, it objects to the fact that recipients and subcontractors supported by the EDF will not be permitted to transfer sensitive information and/or Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) outside of the EU.1 Additionally, the US fears that the unanimity principle governing PESCO could ensure that any future US participation in the initiative could be vetoed by a single EU member state. At the core of Washington’s fears is the idea that EDF and PESCO could lock US firms out of the European market. However, the EU has made it clear that the EDF and PESCO will not alter EU defence procurement rules, lead to EU-owned defence capabilities, affect bilateral defence agreements between the US and individual member states and/or harm NATO defence planning targets and processes. Furthermore, given the US’ own long-standing and legitimate protection of its core defence industrial interests, there is a certain irony to its accusations of the EU because the Union has equally legitimate security interests. Following the exchange of letters between the partners, a number of questions have surfaced. First, despite a sustained campaign of influencing the EU to adopt favourable conditions for the US,2 why has Washington raised tensions with the Union now? Second, given that €13 billion has been earmarked under the EDF, and its own defence budget stood at $650 billion in 2018, why is the US so concerned? With a view to answering these questions, this Brief begins with an analysis of US government data that shows the asymmetry between US and EU defence markets. It then moves on to a discussion about a web of regulations and laws which effectively provides the US government with the discretionary power to control its defence market and technologies. The Brief ends with some reflections on why the US has decided to formally raise objections about the EDF and PESCO now and the deeper reasons underlying American concerns.
Topic:: European Union, Transatlantic Relations, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

17. Russia in the Western Balkans: Tactical wins, strategic setbacks

Author:: Stanislav Secrieru
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Over the last few years, news about Russia’s conduct in the Western Balkans has resembled dispatches coming from the trenches of political and economic warfare: Moscow has slashed gas supplies, banned imports of agro-food products, conducted coordinated disinformation campaigns, nurtured nationalist organisations, deployed Cossack paramilitary groups, tested cyber defences and allegedly even tried to overthrow legitimate governments. This flurry of disruptive operations caught Europe by surprise and generated debate: does this resurgence herald Russia’s return to the region and if so, what is driving the comeback? What does Moscow want to achieve? What is the Russian modus operandi in the region? Is it confined only to coercion, as the headlines suggest, or is there a softer side to Russia’s power? Finally, looking retrospectively, did Russia’s approach bear fruit? This Brief addresses this set of questions in greater detail, with two key findings. First, Russia’s policy in the region is executed by a network of Russian state and non-state actors who are blurring the traditional lines between the public and private domains. This allows the Kremlin to tap into the resources of informal institutions and hide behind a fog of deniability. Second, Russia has raised the cost of Western Balkan integration in the EU and NATO by exploiting the region’s political and economic vulnerabilities. That said, although Moscow was able to slow down the process, it has hitherto failed to alter the region’s steady drift towards Western institutions, at least for now.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Balkans

18. Stress Tests: An insight into crisis scenarios, simulations and exercises

Author:: Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Until the arrival of General Norman Schwarzkopf to United States Central Command (CENTCOM) in November 1988, American war planners assumed that the US’ biggest threat in the Middle East would come from a Soviet invasion of Iran. The Soviet Union had been a net exporter of oil until the late 1960s, but in order to meet its own growing industrial and energy demands Moscow looked increasingly to the Middle East and countries such as Iran to bolster its oil reserves. Based on his own reading, however, Schwarzkopf turned this planning assumption on its head and with CENTCOM he worked on a wargame based on an intra-regional conflict between Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia rather than a Soviet invasion. Apart from the precise details about potential US fatalities (Schwarzkopf and his team believed the US would suffer more casualties than it actually did), the general and his wargamers were right: Iraq eventually invaded and annexed Kuwait in August 1990 and Operation Desert Storm was over before the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Schwarzkopf’s wargame had been prophetic in preparing the US military for war with Iraq. Of course, the history of wargaming and scenario planning does not always mirror the success achieved by Schwarzkopf. Companies such as Shell that are famed for their in-house scenario planning departments do have notable periods of success, but the company’s ‘futures branch’ was nearly shut down three times in almost 50 years of scenario planning at the firm because Shell’s leaders saw little value in its work. In some cases, sound scenario planning and the assessments they lead to are not taken seriously enough: for example, vulnerability assessments of the Fukushima nuclear plant showed that there was a risk from natural disasters such as tsunamis but the consequences of these assessments were downplayed. Most of the time, however, crisis scenario planning unfortunately emerges in the wake of a major crisis such as the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the US or the global financial crisis of 2007.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Crisis Management, Hybrid Threats, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Europe and Global Focus

19. The EU as a Maritime Security Provider

Author:: Eva Pejsova
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Maritime security is one of the fundamental strategic interests of the European Union. Then HR/VP Federica Mogherini reiterated this fact at the conclusion of the informal meeting of EU defence ministers in Helsinki at the end of August 2019, adding that there was a ‘growing demand for an EU role as a maritime security provider not only in our region, but also further away’ – especially in Asia and the Indian Ocean. As a global trading power, the EU is vitally dependent on free, open and safe maritime shipping: 90% of its external and 40% of its internal trade is seaborne. The value of goods transported by sea is 1.8 times higher than that of goods transported by air and almost three times higher than that of goods transported overland.1 In 2018 alone, the value of trade between the EU and Asia, home to its main economic partners, reached €1.4 trillion, with 50% of it transiting through the Indian Ocean. As a result, the EU has a vested interest in a secure maritime domain and it is only natural that it should contribute to its preservation, especially in waters connecting it to its main economic partners in Asia. It is also natural that Asian countries want to see Europe becoming more proactively involved in addressing the many maritime security challenges – both traditional and non-traditional – in the Indo-Pacific, especially given its aspiration to play a greater security role in the region. The question is: can the EU perform such a role? How realistic is its ambition to become a maritime security provider in the region and how might it go about accomplishing this? The purpose of this Brief is to look into why, where and how Europe could contribute to improving the maritime security environment in the Indo-Pacific. A closer look at the current situation and the multitude of maritime security challenges facing littoral states in the region reveals several niches that the EU could fill. Analysing the Union’s key attributes and achievements in the maritime security field, the Brief identifies features and capacities that can effectively add value to regional security and stability.
Topic:: Security, Governance, European Union, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:: Europe and Indo-Pacific

20. Sochi: games with frontiers

Author:: Gerald Stang
Publication Date:: 02-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Russia is often seen as a land of extremes – and the narratives for this month's Winter Olympics in Sochi reflect that view. From the record-length 65,000 km Olympic torch run (which included trips to outer space, the north pole and the bottom of the world's deepest lake) to the incredible $51 billion price tag and the Ian Flemingesque threat of attacks from black widow terrorists, the Sochi games have a distinctly Russian flavour. The Kremlin appears to have envisioned the games as a national triumph, not unlike the 2008 Beijing Olympics, with organisational, architectural and sporting successes that could unite the country. However, with global headlines dominated by stories of corruption, human rights abuses, anti-gay laws and the very real threat of terrorist attacks, one might be forgiven for wondering whether the Russian government regrets its decision to bid for the games.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Security, Political Violence, Islam, and Insurgency
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Asia

21. EU-Russia: overcoming stagnation

Author:: Nicu Popescu
Publication Date:: 01-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: For the best part of the last two decades, EU-Russia summits have alternated between being upbeat events where new grand integration initiatives were launched – the creation of four common spaces in 2005, the partnership for modernisation in 2010 – and rather unfriendly encounters where success was seemingly measured on how impolite the partners could be to one another.
Topic:: Economics, Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Asia

22. The EU and its (cyber) partnerships

Author:: Patryk Pawlak and Catherine Sheahan
Publication Date:: 03-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The benefits of an open and accessible internet for growth and development have been acknowledged on numerous occasions. But as the potential of the digital economy for fostering innovation and creating new business opportunities grows, so too do the difficulties with protecting it. In February 2014, the European External Action Service presented the Friends of the Presidency on Cyber Issues with a Food for Thought Paper ('Further Strengthening European Cyber Diplomacy'). According to the document, 'the EU and its Member States should be in a position to present a coherent and comprehensive suite of policies which keep pace with the ever shifting international landscape, taking into account the strategic policy goals of other actors in the field'.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, and Terrorism
Political Geography:: Europe

23. EU cyber-defence: a work in progress

Author:: Neil Robinson
Publication Date:: 03-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The EU's cyber defence agenda provides an opportunity to ask questions about what the EU could do in terms of setting security priorities. Furthermore, as a possible area for cooperation, cyber defence shares with military air logistics the peculiarity of being a common capability which does not require explicit war-like conditions to demonstrate its utility. Indeed, the diversity and complexity of the threat environment – coupled with challenges of attribution – suggests the opposite: military cyber defence capabilities might offer better value for money in peacetime rather than in times of war.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, and Terrorism
Political Geography:: Europe

24. The Eurasian Customs Union: the economics and the politics

Author:: Nicu Popescu and Iana Dreyer
Publication Date:: 03-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Long ignored by the West, the Eurasian Customs Union (consisting of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) has recently been brought into the international limelight. The project – an attempt by the Kremlin to create a rival to the European Union and its Eastern Partnership project – attracted attention when Moscow, with its characteristic bluntness, began to pressure Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to join the grouping and drop their plans to sign Association Agreements with the EU. Although Russia has not succeeded in convincing all these states to join, it managed to do so with Armenia in September 2013, and the political tussle over the issue with Ukraine played a central role in triggering the country's current crisis.
Topic:: Economics, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, and Power Politics
Political Geography:: Europe, Eurasia, and Asia

25. One size to fit all? Setting standards for European defence

Author:: Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:: 04-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: While the crisis in Ukraine may contribute to a revision of defence expenditures in a number of European countries, the task of finding the right balance between cost-effective and strategicallyrelevant defence spending in Europe is still critical. As defence expenditure generally remains in decline across Europe, a range of innovative measures to ensure that defence budgets are spent more efficiently and effectively are being devised.
Topic:: Defense Policy and Economics
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

26. Energy moves and power shifts: EU foreign policy and global energy security

Author:: Iana Dreyer and Gerald Stang
Publication Date:: 02-2014
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Energy security has climbed the list of EU energy and foreign policy priorities in the last decade. This process was accelerated by the shock of the 2006 and 2009 disruptions in Russian gas supply through Ukraine, and by the new possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty. Efforts have been directed at interconnecting national gas and electricity markets, diversifying energy suppliers and promoting rules-based energy trade in the wider European neighbourhood. The EU's primary energy security goals are to reduce the strategic dependence of individual member states on single external suppliers and to ensure that energy markets are liquid, open and functioning according to stable market rules rather than power logics. Yet energy security also needs to be balanced against environmental and economic competitiveness concerns.
Topic:: Economics, Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, and Border Control
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

27. The EU-China partnership: 10 years on

Author:: Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:: 10-2013
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The establishment of the EU-China 'strategic partnership' on 30 October 2003 came at a time of converging priorities between the two actors. It also coincided with one of the worst crises in transatlantic relations, mainly due to disagreements over the US-led war in Iraq and the foreign policy stance of the first Bush ad¬ministration. As a result of the partnership, the then EU-15 and China adopted three initiatives which caught the attention of US policymakers.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Biosecurity
Political Geography:: China, Iraq, and Europe

28. Engaging Indonesia

Author:: David Camroux
Publication Date:: 09-2013
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The presence of Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono at the G20 Summit in St Petersburg in early September went virtually unnoticed by the European media. That his attendance was overlooked can be explained by immediate factors, namely the overriding importance of the Syrian conflict in the discussions among leaders, and the fact that SBY (as President Yudhoyono is commonly known) is a lame-duck president with less than a year to go before the end of his two-term limit. Lacking BRIC status (for now at least), Indonesia – unlike China, India or even Brazil – barely registers on the radar screen of public awareness in Europe. Symptomatic of this neglect is the fact that, almost four years after its signing in November 2009, two EU member state parliaments (and the European Parliament itself) have yet to ratify the EU-Indonesia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Europe, India, Brazil, Syria, and Southeast Asia

29. Cyber world: site under construction

Author:: Patryk Pawlak
Publication Date:: 09-2013
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The Union's cyber security policy may still be in its infancy and hampered by difficulties, but the EU could yet become a key player in the field – if it plays its cards wisely. While the US has been seriously hit by the scandal surrounding the secret NSA surveillance programmes, the struggle over how to frame internet governance goes on and, more than ever, needs core stakeholders capable of defending freedom, democracy and the rule of law in cyberspace.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Intelligence, Science and Technology, and Communications
Political Geography:: United States and Europe

30. The added value of CSDP operations

Author:: Hadewych Hazelzet
Publication Date:: 09-2013
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Over the past two years, many high-level discussions within the EU have centred around the question of the 'added value' of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In times of fiscal austerity, member states want to make sure they invest their resources where their impact is strongest. In the current climate of financial crisis and retrenchment, there are no resources or time to waste on a 'beauty contest' between organisations or instruments. In order to prepare for the next decade of deployments, the question to ask is therefore not whether but under what conditions CSDP has brought added value, to date, in responding to given contingencies.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Economics, Regional Cooperation, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:: Europe

31. Partnering in crisis management: ten years of EU-UN cooperation

Author:: Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:: 09-2013
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: A decade ago, on 24 September 2003, the UN and the EU signed a Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management. At the time, the two institutions had limited experience of one another, and apart from some cooperation between the European Commission and UN agencies dealing with development and humanitarian affairs, very little had brought them together in the field of crisis management.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Conflict Prevention, International Cooperation, United Nations, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:: Europe and United Nations

32. Drones for Europe

Author:: Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:: 09-2013
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The emergence of unmanned vehicles has dramatically reshaped intelligence and warfare over the past two decades. This is particularly clear in the air domain where the so-called drones have come to prominence as major force multipliers: at relatively affordable costs, they can deliver powerful surveillance capabilities, thus enhancing military planners' and political decision-makers' situation awareness and intelligence, as well as reducing troops' presence on the ground for both combat and non-combat missions. Moreover, over the next few decades, combat drones will reshape – if not completely revolutionise – air warfare thanks to superior aerodynamic, ground-attack and swarming capabilities, whatever one may think about their ethical implications.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Intelligence, Science and Technology, and War
Political Geography:: Europe

33. Feed the world? The challenges of global food security

Author:: Costanza Caputi
Publication Date:: 06-2013
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: According to the UN's Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), food security exists when 'all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life'. This is determined by the four key dimensions of availability, access, utilisation and stability of food supply.
Topic:: Security, Agriculture, Development, and Food
Political Geography:: Europe and United Nations

34. Renewables: do they matter for foreign policy?

Author:: Iana Dreyer
Publication Date:: 06-2013
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Energy has played an important role in the geopolitics of the 20th century and continues to do so today. But the politics of renewable energy has remained largely confined to national boundaries and has had few international ramifications. Is this set to change? What is and could be the role of renewables in European energy diplomacy?
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Development, Energy Policy, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:: Europe

35. Europe: spread (not lost) in space

Author:: Lucia Marta
Publication Date:: 06-2013
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Since the launch of its two 'flagship programmes' in the late 1990s, the European Union (EU) has been increasingly involved in space activities. The earth observation programme GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security, recently renamed Copernicus) and Galileo (positioning and navigation, just like the American GPS) will soon be operational and will support a whole spectrum of European policies, from environment and transport to security and defence.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Economics, Science and Technology, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: America and Europe

36. Nuclear multilateralisation - and Europe's role

Author:: Christian Dietrich
Publication Date:: 04-2013
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Civilian nuclear energy programmes have a bearing on non-proliferation as they can be expanded to produce the radioactive ingredients required for nuclear weapons. By identifying dual-use operations and bringing them under the auspices of the international community, multilateral approaches to the management of the nuclear fuel cycle seek to contain the dissemination of such sensitive technologies. In return, they offer assured access to the products and services needed to run a nuclear energy programme.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:: Europe

37. Global commons: between cooperation and competition

Author:: Gerald Stang
Publication Date:: 04-2013
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Rapid economic development and increasing international trade are leading to a more crowded international stage and raising new challenges in the 'global commons' – those domains that are not under the control or jurisdiction of any state but are open for use by countries, companies and individuals from around the world. Their management involves increasingly complex processes to accommodate and integrate the interests and responsibilities of states, international organisations and a host of non-state actors.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Emerging Markets, Globalization, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Governance
Political Geography:: Europe

38. How EU sanctions work: a new narrative

Author:: Francesco Giumelli
Publication Date:: 05-2013
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The European Union has devoted growing attention to sanctions since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty.1 In total, the Council has imposed Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) sanctions targeting countries, economic sectors, groups, individuals and entities on 27 different occasions. The novelty in the area of sanctions is that targets are not only states, as in the recent cases of Iran and Syria, but they are also individuals and non-state entities, e.g. anti-terrorist lists, President Robert Mugabe and his associates, and several companies connected with the military junta in Burma/Myanmar. Additionally, the contexts in which sanctions are utilised can be diverse, ranging from the protection of human rights to crisis management and non-proliferation. Despite the fact that the effectiveness of sanctions has been much debated, the EU has developed a sanctioning policy and intensified its adoption of sanctions. Sanctions were traditionally seen as a way to impose economic penalties as a means of extracting political concessions from targets, but EU sanctions do not always impose a cost nor do they always seek to induce behavioural change. To this extent, a new narrative may be needed.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Human Rights, International Cooperation, International Law, and Sanctions
Political Geography:: Europe, Burma, and Myanmar

39. Engaging African diasporas for peace: cornerstones for an emerging EU agenda

Author:: Judith Vorrath
Publication Date:: 06-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Over the last decade, researchers and policy-makers have paid increasing attention to diasporas. They have focused on diasporas not merely as a challenge, but as a source of largely untapped potential. Their transnational nature and peculiar position as non-state actors linking host and home countries has been identified as an important basis for engagement. Diaspora groups from sub-Saharan Africa in Europe, which according to a 2008 Council of Europe parliamentary report on immigration are roughly estimated to comprise between 3.5 and 8 million people, are not only a relevant force, but often come from homelands that have experienced or are still facing armed conflict. Against this background, this Occasional Paper addresses the question of what contribution diaspora communities can make to promoting peace in their homelands and how the European Union can engage with African diasporas in the field of peace and security.
Topic:: Development, Globalization, Migration, Diaspora, and Immigration
Political Geography:: Africa and Europe

40. The EU and Mindanao: innovative avenues for seeking peace

Author:: Alistair MacDonald and Gabriel Munuera Viñals
Publication Date:: 06-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The confrontation between Muslim and Christian inhabitants of Western Mindanao, between the 'Moros' and the Philippine State, belongs to that category of 'forgotten conflicts' of which most international relations practitioners are often only vaguely aware. The conflict has historical roots that reach back centuries and has evolved with many twists and turns, culminating in an equally long and no less convoluted peace process. However, this conflict has important international ramifications and is one in which the international community is today actively involved, with facilitating and monitoring mechanisms involving states as well as non-state actors. In particular the European Union has been playing an increasingly important role, including in relation to diplomatic efforts aimed at finding a lasting solution to the conflict, based on its holistic approach to crises and interaction with European NGOs.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Islam, and Religion
Political Geography:: Europe, Israel, Philippines, and Australia/Pacific

41. The EU's and China's institutional diplomacy in the field of climate change

Author:: Pietro De Matteis
Publication Date:: 06-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: This Occasional Paper aims at providing a new perspective on the relevance of climate change for the EU's external action. Considering its linkages with various areas such as energy security, economic growth and diplomacy, and indeed its importance in terms of future political stability, climate change is a major 'game-changer' in international relations. The issue of climate change, and how to deal with it, therefore presents governments with a significant opportunity to reshape the international order in the light of the major global transformations currently underway. The development of the climate change regime presents the EU with both an opportunity and a threat, in as much as it may either accelerate Europe's decline as a foreign policy actor or, on the contrary, reinvigorate its diplomatic ambitions.
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, Diplomacy, Environment, and Industrial Policy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

42. EU engagement in the Sahel: lessons from Somalia and AfPak

Author:: Damien Helly
Publication Date:: 11-2012
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: On 19 November, the Council of the EU welcomed the Crisis Management Concept for a possible EU training mission for Mali, paving the way for the launch of a CSDP operation replicating the work done in Uganda with Somali troops. And many in Brussels have started to speak of EUTM Mali, as if EUTM and more generally the EU approach to the crisis in Somalia was a relevant model for action in Mali.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Security, Terrorism, and Insurgency
Political Geography:: Uganda, Afghanistan, Africa, Europe, Somalia, Mali, and Mauritania

43. After austerity: futures for Europe's defence industry

Author:: Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:: 11-2012
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: In October 2012, the merger between BAE Systems (GB) and EADS (France, Germany and Spain), two of the biggest defence contractors in the world, failed. Despite this setback, further consolidation within the European defence industry is likely to occur in the near future. Because of the eurozone crisis, in recent years EU countries have significantly curtailed their public expenditure, defence included. This has important implications for the structure of the European defence industrial base. Specifically, defence companies are dependent on public defence expenditure. When defence spending declines, industrial overcapacity results. This, in turn, calls for restructuring and consolidation. Inevitably, EU countries will have to go down this road. However, given their ongoing concerns regarding sovereignty, technology and jobs, there are good reasons to think that they will promote the consolidation of their defence industry through a mix of Europe, NATO, extra-EU and purely national solutions.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Economics, and Industrial Policy
Political Geography:: Europe, France, Germany, and Spain

44. The Agenda for the EU-US strategic partnership

Author:: Álvaro de Vasconcelos (ed)
Publication Date:: 10-2011
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Nothing is perhaps more fundamental to EU foreign policy than the imperative of defining a common agenda with the US. Unfortunately, however, in Europe relations with the United States are marked by ideological divergences or antagonisms which are largely a legacy of the Cold War era. But such a rift is clearly dysfunctional in a polycentric world, which is no longer characterised by a bipolar world order, but by the need to define much larger coalitions, across ideological divides, than just the Euro-American one.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Cold War, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: United States, America, and Europe

45. The EU and China's engagement in Africa: the dilemma of socialisation

Author:: Liu Lirong
Publication Date:: 07-2011
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: China's engagement in Africa has obliged the EU to re-evaluate its own relationship with Africa. Since 2008, in an attempt to resolve the conflicts of norms and interests, the EU has proposed establishing a trilateral dialogue and cooperation mechanism between the EU, China and Africa, which so far has not yielded any substantial results. The differences between China's and the EU's Africa policies are mainly visible in two areas: aid and security. The contradiction between their respective aid policies lies in China's 'no-strings-attached aid' versus European 'conditionality' or emphasis on 'fundamental principles'. The contradiction between their security approaches in Africa lies in China's non-interference policy and the European concept of human security. Promoting common normative values and principles is at the core of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which is important for the EU's self-construction at present. China's non-interference policy is related to its domestic security and stability and in this context it engages in its own rhetoric. In matters of principle it is difficult for both sides to make compromises or accept limitations imposed by the other.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Europe

46. Alternative futures for Russia: the presidential elections and beyond

Author:: Simon Saradzhyan and Nabi Abdullaev
Publication Date:: 05-2011
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: This Occasional Paper outlines alternative scenarios for Russia's short-term future with a focus on potential outcomes of the March 2012 presidential elections. To construct these scenarios, the paper first identifies key predetermined factors in Russia's domestic and foreign policy domains. The paper then outlines and analyses key factors of uncertainty, which the authors define as events that could be 'game changers', having the potential to lead to a significant change in the course of Russia's development over the coming twelve months. The paper goes on to present three scenarios, based on three different interpretations of key areas of uncertainty and their interaction with predetermined factors. The paper concludes which scenarios are more probable and which are more favourable for Russia and by extension for its partners, and primarily the European Union.
Topic:: Corruption, Democratization, and Politics
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

47. The role of EU defence policy in the Eastern neighbourhood

Author:: Ariella Huff
Publication Date:: 05-2011
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The launch of the EU's Eastern Partnership in 2009 intended to signal a new, elevated level of EU engagement with its Eastern neighbourhood. Yet there remain several long-simmering and potentially destabilising conflicts in the region, with which EU engagement thus far has been sporadic at best. The Union's use of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the region and to help solve these disputes has been particularly ad hoc and inconsistent, wracked by inter-institutional incoherence and undermined by Member States' inability to agree on a broad strategic vision for engagement with the area.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Security, and Defense Policy
Political Geography:: Europe

48. The internal-external security nexus: more coherence under Lisbon?

Author:: Florian Trauner
Publication Date:: 03-2011
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU has intensified its efforts to establish closer coordination between the internal and external dimensions of the EU's security policies - i.e. between the fields of justice and home affairs (JHA) and foreign and security policy - based on the assumption that this serves the interests of all actors involved. More inward-looking actors, typically from the ministries of the interior and justice in individual Member States, believe that they can strengthen their internal problem-solving capacities if the EU uses its foreign policy instruments and capabilities in a targeted and focused way to improve internal security and to engage third countries in achieving its goals in the JHA domain. At the same time, JHA expertise and actors have become an indispensable resource for traditional foreign policy actors in terms of dealing with today's security challenges and achieving the EU's main foreign policy objectives, such as promoting the rule of law and preventing state failure.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:: Europe and Amsterdam

49. The EU-US security and justice agenda in action

Author:: Patryk Pawlak (ed)
Publication Date:: 12-2011
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The development of homeland security policies in the post 9/11 context has given rise to several interesting debates at the transatlantic level, the most important of which has focused on the balance between liberty and security. EU-US cooperation in this domain has resulted in a strengthening of the security dimension of numerous policy areas which in the view of civil liberty organisations and certain EU bodies and institutions has entailed an unacceptable intrusion into the private lives of citizens and limitation of their freedoms. The implementation of the commitments to 'work in partnership in a broad coalition to combat the evil of terrorism' and to 'vigorously pursue cooperation' adopted at the Joint EU-US Ministerial of 20 September 2001 has proven particularly difficult. While initial disagreements were mostly caused by the unilateralist approach of the United States and a lack of mutual trust and understanding on both sides of the Atlantic, the discussions have slowly evolved towards increasing consensus on substantive points leading to specific policy choices. Many of the objections expressed by the European Parliament and civil liberties organisations in Europe have concerned the increasing powers of government agencies and the diminishing rights of citizens. The debate has gradually become more heated, fuelled by press reports about the expanding use of personal information collected by private actors for commercial purposes (e.g. PNR, SWIFT) or the application of advanced technologies to protect the homeland (e.g. terrorist profiling and data mining). All this has positioned the transatlantic security dialogue between two poles: security and liberty.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Terrorism, Bilateral Relations, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: United States and Europe

50. The Western Balkans and the EU: 'the hour of Europe'

Author:: Jacques Rupnik (ed)
Publication Date:: 06-2011
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Today, more than fifteen years after the end of the wars of Yugoslavia's dissolution, the 'Balkan question' remains more than ever a 'European question'. In the eyes of many Europeans in the 1990s, Bosnia was the symbol of a collective failure, while Kosovo later became a catalyst for an emerging Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In the last decade, with the completion of the process of redrawing the map of the region, the overall thrust of the EU's Balkans policy has moved from an agenda dominated by security issues related to the war and its legacies to an agenda focused on the perspective of the Western Balkan states' accession to the European Union, to which there has been a formal political commitment on the part of all EU Member States since the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003. The framework was set, the political elites in the region were – at least verbally – committed to making Europe a priority and everyone was supposedly familiar with the policy tools thanks to the previous wave of Eastern enlargement. With the region's most contentious issues apparently having been defused, the EU could move from stability through containment towards European integration.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Security, Ethnic Conflict, Political Economy, Sectarian violence, and Self Determination
Political Geography:: Europe, Bosnia, Kosovo, Yugoslavia, and Balkans

51. Interparliamentary scrutiny of the CFSP: avenues for the future

Author:: Corine Caballero-Bourdot
Publication Date:: 10-2011
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: This report examines a number of possible future orientations with regard to the interparliamentary scrutiny of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It sets out the democratic challenges facing European integration and the new context surrounding the CFSP in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty, focusing in particular on the existing legal provisions for the interparliamentary scrutiny of the CFSP. The paper surveys previous initiatives as well as current discussions regarding the future interparliamentary scrutiny of the CFSP. The author analyses the various options on the table and makes a number of recommendations for the best possible organisation of such interparlamentary scrutiny in the future.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, International Affairs, and Governance
Political Geography:: Europe

52. Security developments in East Asia: what implications for the EU?

Author:: Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:: 02-2011
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: East Asia is home to some of the most important trading partners of the Union. China is foremost among these, ranking second only to the US - in 2009, EU-China trade totalled a massive €296 billion - while the EU is China's most important trading partner. Japan is the sixth-largest trade partner of the EU - in 2009, EU-Japan trade was almost €92 billion. South Korea is the EU's eighth-largest trade partner and the EU has become South Korea's second largest export destination - total trade in 2009 was above €53 billion. Furthermore, on 6 October 2010 the EU and South Korea signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) which is the most ambitious bilateral trade agreement ever negotiated by the EU, and the first with an Asian country.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, Israel, Asia, and South Korea

53. Franco-British military cooperation: a new engine for European defence?

Author:: Ben Jones
Publication Date:: 02-2011
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The St. Malo Agreement on European Defence Cooperation of 1998 set out a new approach to defence cooperation in pursuit of a new goal – an autonomous European military capability. By contrast, the Franco-British cooperation launched in November 2010 by Prime Minister Cameron and President Sarkozy is once again a new approach, but it is one that seeks to sustain the status quo – in support of sovereign foreign and defence policies.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, and France

54. The EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Powers, Decisions and Legitimacy

Author:: Bart M. J. Szewczyk
Publication Date:: 03-2010
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: This Occasional Paper analyses the issue of the Bonn Powers in Bosnia – whereby the Office of the High Representative (OHR) can enact laws and remove elected officials – by comprehensively assessing the legitimacy of past OHR decisions. Adopting an established theory of legitimacy developed by Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal, it argues that empirical legitimacy is best conceived as serving common interests of effective actors within an authorised process, and normatively prescribes that such process should be shaped to maximise values of human dignity. Given this theoretical framework, it examines the process authorised under the Dayton Agreement, which created the political structure that currently exists in Bosnia. It discusses the origins of the Bonn Powers and surveys the various criticisms that have been levelled against them. It then develops an overall analysis of all OHR decisions to date and provides a critique of those categories of decisions that appear inconsistent with the Dayton order and its proclaimed organising principles. Moreover, it provides a focused assessment of a sample of the most problematic decisions, e.g. the removal of elected officials, to show how their empirical legitimacy can be analysed. Finally, the paper concludes with policy recommendations, focusing on the issue of whether the Bonn Powers should be renounced or retained in the future.
Topic:: Government, Treaties and Agreements, International Affairs, and Political Theory
Political Geography:: Europe, Bosnia, and Balkans

55. Command and Control? Planning for EU Military Operations

Author:: Luis Simón
Publication Date:: 01-2010
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: This paper assesses the effectiveness of the European Union's capability for the planning and conduct of military operations. Given the fact that the planning and conduct phases of an operation can never be fully isolated from each other, the paper does include some references to the conduct dimension, i.e. command and control (C2). However, it is with planning issues that this paper is most directly concerned. It argues that the lack of a permanent planning and conduct capability cripples the Union's planning and C2 performance as well as the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) more broadly. This capability, though, need not adopt the form of a fully-fledged Operational Headquarters (OHQ). The paper explains that the nature and evolution of the Union's planning and C2 capability is largely the result of compromises between France, Britain and Germany (the Union's 'Big Three') and argues that a coincidence in British-German objectives – the 'awkward alignment' – is particularly responsible for the continuing absence of a permanent military planning and C2 capability.
Topic:: International Cooperation and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:: Britain, Europe, France, and Germany

56. Human rights challenges in EU civilian crisis management

Author:: Wanda Troszczynska-van Genderen
Publication Date:: 08-2010
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Over the years, human rights have become an area of programmatic focus in the crisis management operations conducted by the EU. Nevertheless, the geopolitical reality after the launch of the so-called 'war on terror' witnessed the emergence of new practical impediments to human rights implementation in civilian crisis response operations. The militarisation of the humanitarian space and blurred boundaries between military and civilian tasks resulted in the increased vulnerability of civilians working in ground operations. Simultaneously, the scale of human rights violations, coupled with security threats to civilians due to both attacks by insurgents and interventions carried out by international military personnel, created operational challenges going well beyond what previous Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) civilian crisis management operations had to deal with.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Human Rights, and War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Europe

57. Transforming the Quartet principles: Hamas and the Peace Process

Author:: Carolin Goerzig
Publication Date:: 10-2010
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Despite the clear necessity of an inclusive approach that involves all relevant actors, the Middle East Quartet (comprising the United Nations, the United States, the European Union and Russia) has made political and financial cooperation with the Palestinian Authority dependent on the recognition of the three Quartet principles — the recognition of Israel, the renunciation of violence and adherence to previous diplomatic agreements — in exchange for the recognition of a Palestinian government. But instead of compelling Hamas to consider compliance, the Quartet principles have in fact led the group to become more entrenched in its defiant stance. There is a fundamental problem with the three Quartet conditions. While decision-makers proclaim that the three principles come as a package and are inseparable, it is precisely the fact that they are so interlocked and that Hamas is required to comply with them simultaneously that makes compliance problematic. This is the case because the three principles are mutually constraining to such an extent that complying with one principle effectively prevents Hamas from complying with another. Originally, the three Quartet principles were intended as a basis or a framework for a potential peace process. They define the conditions a negotiating partner has to fulfil in order to take part in Middle East peace talks. In reality, however, they have acted as an impediment. This paper seeks to find a way of overcoming the constraints that the EU has imposed upon itself by insisting on simultaneous adherence to the three Quartet principles. It looks at what room for manoeuvre there remains for the EU within the framework of the Quartet conditions and at how they can be modified in such a way that they facilitate rather than obstruct compliance.
Topic:: Political Violence, Islam, Politics, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, Europe, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Arabia, and United Nations

58. A new farewell to arms: Viewing disarmament in a new security environment

Author:: Jean Pascal Zanders
Publication Date:: 12-2010
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: In 1909 Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, Viscount Grey of Fallodon, prophesied the outbreak of World War I when he declared that the naval arms race between Britain and Germany had become the most important single factor increasing tensions and the risk of war in Europe. The judgement captures the kernel of disarmament: certain types of weaponry are inherently so destabilising to international peace and security that they should preferably be removed from the military arsenals. Disarmament became a major objective of the League of Nations in the 1920s and 1930s. Under the Charter of the United Nations it is a responsibility of the General Assembly (Article 11) and the Security Council (Article 26). Today, as in the past, disarmament is one of the policy options available to governments to enhance national security. Barring a decision to unilaterally renounce a particular weapon category or coercive destruction of military equipment following defeat in war, it forms an integral part of cooperative security that aims for stability, predictability and transparency in international relations based on equal rights and obligations for all parties concerned.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, and United Nations

59. Risky business? The EU, China and dual-use technology

Author:: May-Britt U. Stumbaum
Publication Date:: 10-2009
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: This paper argues that it is high time for the European Union to adopt a proactive policy of managing the risks of sensitive technology transfer to the People's Republic of China (PRC). On the basis of a common understanding of the challenges of transferring dual-use technology, economically, politically and security-wise, the European Union can optimise benefits from opportunities available in the promising and technologically rapidly advancing Chinese market.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:: China and Europe

60. The interpolar world: a new scenario

Author:: Giovanni Grevi
Publication Date:: 06-2009
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Everyone agrees the world is changing. The question is in which direction? This paper offers an original contribution to the debate on the future shape of the international system. Based on a diagnosis of current developments, it argues that many factors point to the emergence of an 'interpolar' world. Interpolarity can be defined as multipolarity in the age of interdependence. The redistribution of power at the global level, leading to a multipolar international system, and deepening interdependence are the two basic dimensions of the transition away from the post-Cold War world. All too often, however, they are treated as separate issues. The real challenge lies in finding a new synthesis between the shifting balance of power and the governance of interdependence.
Topic:: International Relations, Cold War, Economics, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:: United States and Europe

61. Back from the cold? The EU and Belarus in 2009

Author:: Grzegorz Gromadzki, Vitali Silitski, Margarita M. Balmaceda, Sabine Fischer, Andrei Liakhovich, Astrid Sahm, and Leonid Zlotnikov
Publication Date:: 11-2009
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The EU and Belarus have arrived at an important but difficult crossroads. After a long freeze, relations between Brussels and Minsk have been thawing over the past year. In September 2008, the Council of the European Union announced its readiness to 'begin to review the restrictive measures against Belarusian leaders and to take positive and concrete measures that may lead to a gradual engagement, including via a meeting between the European Union troika and the Belarusian Minister for Foreign Affairs'. A month later, on 13 October, the Council decided to restore political dialogue with the Belarusian authorities and to suspend travel restrictions against leading Belarusian officials for a period of six months. The package of restrictive measures imposed on Belarus in 2006 was extended for one year. Since October 2008, three Troika meetings between the EU and Belarus have taken place. They were complemented by a visit to Minsk by EU High Representative Javier Solana in February, and a visit by EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner in June. Mean- while, the European Commission and the Belarusian govern-ment held consultations and began technical cooperation in the fields of energy, transport, phytosanitary regulations and agriculture at the beginning of 2009. In May 2009, Belarus was included in the multilateral dimension of the Eastern Partner- ship. The EU and Belarus launched a dialogue on human rights issues in June 2009.
Topic:: Development, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Europe and Asia

62. Global security in a multipolar world

Author:: Radha Kumar, Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Andrei Zagorski, Paulo Wrobel, Feng Zhongping, Robert Hutchings, Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, and Luis Peral
Publication Date:: 10-2009
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: This is the second Chaillot Paper in a series exploring the various strands of a global topic: multilateralising multipolarity. Through the essays collected in the first study, we set out to assess the scope of change in the international system and how EU action could best be suited to bringing about a multilateral order. After the fall of the Berlin Wall brought about the end of bipolarity, the world has changed no less dramatically since the 1990s witnessed the Balkan wars and the first EU military crisis-management operations. Basically, the post-Cold War 'unipolar' world turned 'multipolar', and as a result the West can no longer tackle global issues – made more pressing indeed due to this very transformation – on its own any more than it can deal single- handedly with regional crises. The comparative analysis of the strategic vision of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, the so-called BRICs, showed that the best policy mindset for the European Union, contrary to some suggestions, was not to try to become a normal hard-power player. It further concluded that, in a multi- polar world, this was simply not a viable option. For the European Union to survive and to influence the outcome of the international order, it must succeed in giving a multilateral dimension to the current multipolarity; in other words, Europe must be able to define together with other world and regional powers the norms and rules that are needed to drive concerted efforts to stay clear of some future clash of competing unilateralisms.
Topic:: Security, Globalization, Intelligence, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, India, and Brazil

63. Strength in numbers? Comparing EU military capabilities in 2009 with 1999

Author:: Daniel Keohane and Charlotte Blommestijn
Publication Date:: 12-2009
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: EU governments formally launched the European Security and Defence Policy (now renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy) in lune 1999, shortly after NATO's war in Kosovo. That war exposed huge equip¬ment gaps between US and European armed forces. Euopeans did not have adequate transport or communica¬tions equipment, or enough deployable soldiers. Since the Helsinki summit in December 1999 therefore, EU governments have committed themselves to a number of military reform plans. The essential aim of these plans has been to develop more useful equipment for international peacekeeping, such as transport planes and helicopters, and encourage a reform of national armies oriented away from territorial defence towards external deployments.
Topic:: Security and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:: Europe, Kosovo, and Balkans

64. Beyond international trusteeship: EU peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Author:: Stefano Recchia
Publication Date:: 02-2007
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia successfully ended the war in late 1995. However, the price for peace was an extremely weak and dysfunctional postwar state that would probably not have survived without substantial international support over the following decade. This paper argues that things have begun to visibly change on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) only with the emergence of the EU as the main international peacebuilding actor in more recent years, and notably since 2003. The EU's increased peacebuilding role in BiH, carried out within the framework of the European Security Strategy, has allowed for critical progress towards making Bosnia's common state institutions increasingly self-sustaining. There is no doubt that the potential does now exist to turn postwar Bosnia into a sustainable multi-ethnic democracy.
Topic:: Development and Peace Studies
Political Geography:: Europe, Bosnia, and Herzegovina

65. International terrorism: the changing threat and the EU's response

Author:: Paul Wilkinson
Publication Date:: 10-2005
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: If any Europeans observing the 9/11 atrocities in the United States had comforted themselves with the belief that Western Europe was immune from such attacks, this illusion should have been dispelled by the train bombings in Madrid in March 2004 and the July 2005 bombings of Underground trains and a double-decker bus in London, apparently by suicide bombers with links to the Al Qaeda network.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, and Terrorism
Political Geography:: United States, Europe, and London

66. The EU in Moldova - settling conflicts in the neighbourhood

Author:: Nicu Popescu
Publication Date:: 10-2005
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: A key objective of the European Union is to have a stable, secure, prosperous and democratic neighbourhood. Failing an offer of accession to close neighbours in the medium term, the EU should and can offer stronger CFSP engagement. Contributing to conflict resolution in the neighbourhood is key to the achievement of EU objectives. However, the conflict resolution dimension of the ENP is under-developed. It is time for the EU to focus on the conflicts in its immediate neighbourhood. Promoting the security aspect of ENP can start with the Transnistrian conflict in Moldova. This conflict is the closest geographically to the EU; at the same time, it is the most 'solvable.' The conflict features high on the agenda of EU-Russia and EU-Ukraine relations. A settlement of the conflict in Transnistria would attenuate the soft security challenges the EU faces on its eastern border. Settlement would also assuage an irritant in EU-Russia relations, and set a positive precedent in building the EU-Russia common space for external security. It would also be an example of positive cooperation with Ukraine under ENP. The focus of EU policy should be to alter the context in which the conflict is situated and sustained, rather than hoping for an early agreement on the status of Transnistria. The primary objective should be to increase Moldova's 'attractiveness' while decreasing the benefits of maintaining the current status quo. The Transnistrian separatist project is to a large degree based on false economic arguments for independence. Undermining these claims will be central to efforts to reunify the country. The EU has already appointed an EU Special Representative for Moldova and is expected to launch an EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine that would monitor the border between the two countries, including the section controlled by the secessionist authorities of Transnistria. EU border monitoring is necessary, but is not a sustainable long-term solution. The EU should help Moldova strengthen its own capacity to control the Transnistrian section of the border by launching an EU Police Mission to Moldova. Building a sustainable context for the resolution of the conflict in Transnistria can be achieved through greater support to Moldova's Europeanisation and implementation of the ENP Action Plan, more active support to democracy inside Transnistria and greater engagement with Ukraine under CFSP.
Topic:: Security and Democratization
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, and Moldova

67. Promoting security sector governance in the EU's neighbourhood

Author:: Heiner Hänggi and Fred Tanner
Publication Date:: 07-2005
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: With the European Union's enlargement eastwards and southwards, its neighbourhood now stretches from the Balkans to the south Caucasus, and from Russia to the southern Mediterranean. The EU's eastern and southern neighbourhood is composed of areas which, to a greater or lesser extent, have serious deficits in security, development and democracy. There are many types of security problems, ranging from weak states and rampant international crime to spoilers in post-conflict reconstruction and unpredictable authoritarian leaders who pursue regime security often at the expense of national or regional security. In terms of socio-economic development, most of the countries in the EU's neighbourhood are fragile, often struggling with the effects of black market economies and cronyism, and burdened by bloated defence and security sectors that escape any accountability. As regards political systems, the EU's neighbourhood is composed of regime types ranging from new but weak democracies to regimes with authoritarian features and limited political participation.
Topic:: Security, Development, and Government
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Caucasus, and Balkans

68. The European Union and the United Nations Partners in Effective Multilateralism

Author:: Sven Biscop, Francesco Francioni, Kennedy Graham, Tânia Felício, Jeffrey Laurenti, Thierry Tardy, and Jean-Marie Guéhenno
Publication Date:: 06-2005
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: In a famous speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 23 September 2003, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan launched a reflection process on the future of the organisation. He pointed out: we have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded. At that time, a group of far-sighted leaders, led and inspired by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, were determined to make the second half of the twentieth century different from the first half. They saw that the human race had only one world to live in, and that unless it managed its affairs prudently, all human beings may perish. So they drew up rules to govern international behaviour, and founded a network of institutions, with the United Nations at its centre, in which the peoples of the world could work together for the common good. Now we must decide whether it is possible to continue on the basis agreed then, or whether radical changes are needed.
Topic:: Security, Development, and United Nations
Political Geography:: Europe

69. The democratic legitimacy of European Security and Defence Policy

Author:: Wolfgang Wagner
Publication Date:: 04-2005
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Since the EU has assumed responsibility for military operations, questions of democratic legitimacy have become more prominent in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Although democracy has been a contested concept, four 'pillars' can be distinguished that contribute to a democratically legitimate ESDP. This Occasional Paper analyses each of these pillars.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, and Government
Political Geography:: Europe

70. Effective non-proliferation -- The European Union and the 2005 NPT Review Conference

Author:: Bruno Tertrais, Darryl Howlett, John Simpson, Harald Muller, and Burkard Schmitt
Publication Date:: 04-2005
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Ever since its entry into force in 1970, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been the cornerstone of the fight against the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At the same time, it is one of the most universal international legal instruments, with 189 states parties in early 2005 (only India, Israel and Pakistan remain outside the Treaty).
Topic:: International Relations, Security, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:: Europe

71. EU security and defence - Core documents 2004

Publication Date:: 02-2005
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: 1. On 8th December 2003, the Council mandated that the EU's military rapid response capability should be further developed. Separately, UK, France and Germany have considered how the Union can contribute further to conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in close co-operation with the United Nations (UN). Together, we have proposed that the EU should aim to build upon the precedent set by Operation ARTEMIS in the DRC by developing a number of battle-group size forces available to undertake autonomous operations at short notice, principally in response to requests from the UN. These forces should be capable of operating under a Chapter VII mandate. 2. This paper aims to set out in more detail the battle-groups (BG) concept, to establish its context within the ongoing development of EU rapid response and EU-UN co-operation, and to propose a process of consultation (including with the UN) and implementation.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Defense Policy, and United Nations
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, Turkey, and Ukraine

72. Information security: A new challenge for the EU

Author:: Burkard Schmitt, Alain Esterle, and Hanno Ranck
Publication Date:: 03-2005
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Since the invention of the wheel, technical innovations have driven the history of mankind. Some of them have been particularly important and have changed profoundly the way societies work and individuals live. The Internet is a perfect example of such an innovation. Based on common protocols to send electronic messages and identify machines, it has opened up a new area of communication and information, enabling us to transfer vast amounts of digital data for a great variety of applications within fractions of a second around the globe. Moving into the new domain of cyberspace, the Internet has overcome the barriers of distance and time, and is therefore rightly considered to be the symbol of globalisation.
Topic:: International Relations, Civil Society, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:: Europe

73. What Russia sees

Author:: Dov Lynch, Dmitri V. Trenin, Dmitry A. Danilov, Sergei Karaganov, Alexey K. Pushkov, and Andrei Zagorski
Publication Date:: 01-2005
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The Cold War is finally ending in Europe and the shape of a new order is visible. Certainly, its institutional structure is different from that of the bipolar era or even the transition years of the 1990s. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is assuming a more global profile and less direct responsibility in Europe itself. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has entered a deep crisis, in which major participating states are challenging its enduring utility. Meanwhile, a new organisation is emerging as the continent's security provider – the European Union (EU). With enlargement in 2004, a new Europe has been born, founded around the ambitions and values of the EU. So much is clear.
Topic:: Security, NATO, and Cold War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

74. From America's protégé to constructive European. Polish security policy in the twenty-first century

Author:: Marcin Zaborowski
Publication Date:: 12-2004
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Following the events of 11 September 2001, Poland emerged as one of the United States's key allies, arguably its protégé, in Central and Eastern Europe. The close affinity of interests on security matters between the United States and Poland became particularly apparent in Iraq, where Warsaw proved to be a strong and highly vocal supporter of Washington. However, at the same time, Poland has been progressively drawn into the internal workings of the EU, and as a consequence its perspectives on European security have evolved towards a more 'EU-positive' attitude. This, coupled with disappointment over the war in Iraq, has meant that Poland's Atlanticism is increasingly questioned, with calls for a more pro-European attitude growing. This paper will reflect upon these debates and argue that Poland's Atlanticism is indeed changing. Focusing on the Iraq conflict and perspectives towards the EU's security ambitions, this paper will show that Warsaw has strived to reconcile its Atlanticism with a concomitant engagement in the European Union's CSFP and ESDP. The paper concludes that Poland's Atlanticism is likely to be toned down in the future as Poland becomes more focused on developing its policies in an EU context and in cooperation with individual member states.
Topic:: Security and Terrorism
Political Geography:: United States, America, Europe, Washington, and Poland

75. Global views on the European Union

Author:: Amitav Acharya, Toshiya Hoshino, Marcel F. Biato, Babacar Diallo, Francisco E. González, Terence O'Brien, Gerrit Olivier, and Yi Wang
Publication Date:: 11-2004
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Over the last 25 years, the European regional integration process has advanced very quickly on four different fronts. During the 1980s, the Common Market and its associated freedoms (free movement of goods and of persons, the right to establish and freedom to provide services) were completed. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1992 added a second dimension, when it set up a monetary union and established a European Central Bank and shared budgetary rules–a development that was eventually confirmed by the introduction of the euro in January 2002. Also in the 1990s, as a result of the creation of the European Union, which was born on 1 November 1993, a third, political dimension was developed. The Union entailed inter alia a leading role for the European Council and the various councils of ministers, some coordination of member states' foreign policies through a CFSP, and the growing importance of the European Parliament, which gradually enlarged its areas of competence.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, and Defense Policy
Political Geography:: Europe and Balkans

76. For our eyes only? Shaping an intelligence community within the EU

Author:: Bjorn Muller-Wille
Publication Date:: 04-2004
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Developing international and cross–agency intelligence cooperation has become imperative in today's security environment. If the so–called 'new threats' are to be tackled collectively, it is not only desirable but also necessary to make collective threat assessments.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, and Politics
Political Geography:: Europe

77. From Copenhagen to Brussels European defence: core documents, Volume IV

Author:: Antonio Missiroli
Publication Date:: 12-2003
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: With the present issue, the 'European defence core documents' annual collection reaches its fourth volume – stretching from Copenhagen, where the last European Council of 2002 was held, to Brussels, where the last one of 2003 took place. In actual fact, the Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003 was the last one to be hosted by the country holding the rotational EU presidency. From now on, all European Councils will take place in Brussels – thus crucially depriving this collection of a distinctive title for each issue.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Government
Political Geography:: Europe

78. Space and security policy in Europe

Author:: Stephano Silvestri
Publication Date:: 12-2003
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Space technology is linked to collective security, with the term “security” referring to the protection of European citizens from potential risks of both military and non-military origin. The European Commission Green Paper on “European Space Policy” included a statement on how security can be enhanced through space technologies. Space assets are fundamental for many common European endeavours, such as developing a “knowledge-based economy” or more integrated transport policies (single sky for example). At the same time, the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and a European Security and Defence Policy requires many new military capabilities. The increasing use of information technology is linked to these efforts to increase European capabilities, especially to meet data transmission and information requirements. The ECAP (European Capacities Action Plan) calls for concrete actions to increase asset availability.
Topic:: Security, Politics, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:: Europe

79. EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?

Author:: Taras Kuzio
Publication Date:: 11-2003
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: EU enlargement raises important questions: How much further can the EU enlarge? Should the EU encompass geographic 'Europe' or stop at the western border of the CIS? Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) clearly allows any geographically based European state to apply for membership. Is Ukraine then eligible? On 15 March 2001, the European Parliament supported Ukraine's future membership; in contrast, the EU continues to fudge any answer to this question. The difficulty in answering these questions lies with the criteria that should be used to formulate a response. Whatever the answer, with enlargement it has become a matter of urgency for the EU to engage strategically with its new neighbours in Eastern Europe. In particular, the EU must develop a realistic strategy for Ukraine, its largest new neighbour within Europe. Of these neighbours only two – Ukraine and Moldova – seek EU membership. One reason why Ukraine needs greater attention on the part of the EU is geopolitical. European Commission President Romano Prodi and Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson wrote: 'Any political instability, regressive economic development or fragmentary reform in these countries would threaten to create a new discontinuity in Europe – a political, economic and social divide – in the wake of EU enlargement.' 1 Ukraine borders three, and soon to be four, new EU members. All four of these are or will soon be NATO members. With enlargement, Ukraine's geostrategic importance becomes an issue that the EU must address. This Occasional Paper discusses critical issues in the EU-Ukrainian relationship and provides a number of policy recommendations that could contribute towards fashioning an EU strategy towards Ukraine. At the heart of the current stalemate in relations are virtual policies adopted by the EU and Ukraine towards each other. 2 The EU has never adopted a clear strategy towards Ukraine and other western CIS states that seek EU membership, and in general has paid far too little attention to the region. Ukraine straddles the Central and East European-Eurasian divide. This makes it all the more imperative that the EU devise a strategy that would support a potential shift within Ukraine towards a more Central and East European identity. This potential is more present in Ukraine than in other CIS states. The most effective manner to support Ukraine's 'European choice' may be by offering it an 'open-door' policy. The 2004 elections will have a decisive impact upon Ukraine's 'European choice'. If the front-runner in polls since 2000, Viktor Yushchenko, won the elections, the EU would be forced to change its 'closed-door' approach. Yushchenko would no longer continue a virtual 'European choice' strategy and the EU would be forced to drop its own virtual policy towards Ukraine. The policy proposals developed in this Occasional Paper outline a possible EU strategy towards Ukraine.
Topic:: International Relations and Politics
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

80. EU-Russian security dimensions

Author:: Dov Lynch
Publication Date:: 07-2003
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: EU-Russian security cooperation remains nascent, but some important ground has been cleared since 2000. Yet, the dialogue is neither without ambiguity or problems. It is replete with both. This Occasional Paper examines three facets of EU-Russia security relations. The first chapter, by Hiski Haukkala, compares EU and Russian perceptions of the other in security terms. Haukkala traces the evolution of EU thinking on Russia throughout the 1990s, highlighting the obstacles that held up the development of a strategic vision of the 'partnership'. Following an analysis of how Russia views the EU, he concludes that both have different visions of the other which lie at the source of problems of perception and expectation. In the second chapter, Thomas Gomart concentrates on a single aspect of the EU's Common Strategy on Russia (1999), that of preventive diplomacy, examined through the cases of Belarus and Macedonia. Gomart notes the absence of coordination between the EU and Russia in the former Soviet Union and the Balkans, and stresses the need for greater effort. Gomart notes also the danger of blurring the lines between the 'preventive' and the 'pre-emptive', particularly with regard to counter-terrorism. Anaïs Marin concludes this Occasional Paper with an examination of the Northern Dimension. Marin notes the unique utility of the 'dimensionalist' approach to EU- Russian relations, which takes in a wide range of subjects and different types of actors within a flexible framework. In conclusion, she rejects calls for a greater institutionalisation of the Northern Dimension, arguing that flexibility and 'lightness' are its strength.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, and Politics
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

81. €uros for ESDP – financing EU operations

Author:: Antonio Missiroli
Publication Date:: 06-2003
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The financing of EU-led crisis management operations is a somewhat neglected yet nevertheless crucial factor affecting the external effectiveness and internal consistency of the Union's foreign and security policy. Until recently, CFSP's operational acquis has been minimal, its legal underpinning limited and tortuous, its budgetary fundament ludicrous, and its administrative practice mostly contradictory and often fraught with inter-institutional turf battles between Council, Commission and Parliament. With the launch of the first ESDP operations proper (EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Concordia in FYROM) in 2003, the forthcoming Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the possible takeover of SFOR after 2004, it has become all the more important and urgent to devise more appropriate arrangements and incentives for common action. The European Convention and the ensuing Intergovernmental Conference represent additional opportunities to be seized. In this respect, the main issues to be addressed regard: a) the speed and readiness of budgetary allocations, on the one hand, and their long-term sustainability, on the other; b) the coherence of the relevant provisions, in both institutional and functional terms, and their consistency with the peculiarities of the EU as an international actor; and c) the degree of transparency, accountability and internal fairness compatible with the imperatives of crisis management. The experience of other international organisations operating in this field (NATO, OSCE, UN) can also be taken into consideration with a view to selecting rules and modalities that may be helpful in tackling the problems highlighted here. First and foremost, it is desirable that the current fragmentation of CFSP expenditure in separate EU budgetary lines be overcome. The appointment of an EU 'Minister for Foreign Affairs' (or whatever title is given to the new foreign policy supremo) is expected to help solve this problem and reduce some inter-institutional tensions and bottlenecks. For example, it is desirable for all expenditure related to civilian crisis management (with the possible exception of the salaries of seconded national personnel) to be borne by the EU bud- get in a more transparent fashion. To this end, the relevant procedures have to be made less tortuous and more flexible. Secondly, expenditure for operations 'having military or defence implications' — in so far as it will remain distinct and separate from the rest — should be pooled in a more systematic, sustainable and explicit manner. Neither the current 'ad hocery' (as exemplified by EUPM and Concordia ) nor the minimalist approach adopted by the Convention's Praesidium (with the proposal of a subsidiary 'start-up' fund) address the essential issues. In fact, if a subsidiary budget has to be set up, then it should be more ambitious and create a long- term basis for covering all the 'common costs' arising from military operations. Such an EU Operational Fund could usefully draw upon the precedent of the European Development Fund and adopt a distinct 'key' for national contributions. Such a 'key' should take into account e.g. the member states' ability to pay but also their ability to contribute in kin through the actual involvement of personnel and equipment in EU operations. It should also be periodically adjustable and help overcome potential 'burden-sharing' disputes inside the Union by setting agreed criteria against which to measure and assess national contributions without resorting to the crude GDP scale. At the same time, the Fund's financial cycle should be the same as that of the EU budget. And, in perspective, the “common costs” thus covered should include also accommodation and transportation costs, especially if the Union develops common capabilities in the fields of strategic lift and logistics. By doing so, the EU would eventually have two main modalities for common operational expenditure at its disposal: the EU budget for all non-military aspects, and the Operational Fund. Both would guarantee a reliable financial perspective. If the separation between civilian and military aspects were ever to be bridged, their merger would not represent a problem. Thirdly, the European Parliament could consider reimbursing those member states who participate in ESDP operations a fixed somme for faitaire to cover partially the per diems of their seconded personnel (civilian as well as military). Such reimbursement could be made through the EU budget annually, ex post facto, with no political conditions attached. On the one hand, it would prove that the EU budget covers not only internal benefits (agriculture and structural funds) but also external commitments. On the other, it would add transparency to ESDP in that the Parliament could organise hearings with experts and officials as well as plenary debates. For their part, the member states would gain an additional incentive – however modest – to provide adequate human resources for external operations. Finally, participating 'third' (and especially remaining and future candidate) countries could well be associated with all these arrangements, either case by case or more systematically. And none of the proposals outlined here necessarily require treaty change, although it would be preferable to insert some 'enabling' clauses in the Constitutional Treaty. All proposals, however, would require collaboration — rather than competition — between EU institutions.
Topic:: Economics, Government, and Politics
Political Geography:: Europe, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Democratic Republic of the Congo

82. The Galileo satellite system and its security implications

Author:: Gustav Lindström and Giovanni Gasparini
Publication Date:: 04-2003
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Aiming to reach operational status in 2008, the Galileo satellite system is planned to offer positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) services worldwide. It will join the ranks of the current GPS and GLONASS systems, allowing users to pinpoint their exact locations. While a civilian project, Galileo also has a security dimension. As a dual-use system, it will offer numerous applications in the security and defence field. PNT services give military planners and commanders means to manage assets, troops and munitions more effectively. Given its global coverage, Galileo will offer a large portion of these services to any interested party, thus opening the door for unintended users and uses. This has implications for the EU and its allies. Even if Galileo remains a civilian project, security issues will persist. With a growing number of users dependent on precise positioning services to carry out their daily functions, economic security would be negatively impacted should there be an intentional or accidental service shutdown. Thus, besides protecting the system from unauthorised use, it will be important to safeguard the system to ensure signal continuity at all times. Given the dual nature of the system, it is critical that European policy-makers consider the security dimensions of Galileo and take practical steps to limit its potential misuse. Among the required steps that need to be taken are: protecting the physical and electronic integrity of the system, establishing a permanent EU-US framework to handle outstanding security issues (such as the 'M-code overlay'), creating a clear chain of command for Galileo, expanding EU capacities to deal with space issues and limiting public regulated service signals (PRS) for security and defence-related purposes.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:: Europe

83. Fighting proliferation—European perspectives

Author:: Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt
Publication Date:: 12-2003
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is important to European policy-makers. This has been especially evident throughout 2003. On 6 June 2003, the European Union unveiled its basic principles for an 'EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD'. Among its first principles, the EU underscores that 'the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction (i.e. biological, chemical and nuclear weapons) and means of delivery such as ballistic missiles constitutes a threat to international peace and security'.
Topic:: Security and Terrorism
Political Geography:: Europe and Central Asia

84. The South Caucasus: a challenge for the EU

Author:: Dov Lynch
Publication Date:: 12-2003
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The South Caucasus contains three states that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Geographically, the region is populated by some fifteen million people, links the Caspian Sea basin to the Black Sea on an east-to-west axis, and is the juncture between the greater Middle East, Turkey and Iran, and the Russian Federation. This chapter will introduce a number of themes that run through this Chaillot Paper. The first part examines the nature of the 'transition' that the three South Caucasian states have undergone with a view to understanding the scale of their transformation. A second part discusses dimensions of state weakness across the region. Next, the chapter considers the impact of third parties on regional security/insecurity, and finally it outlines the structure of the volume.
Topic:: Security and International Organization
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, Central Asia, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Soviet Union, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

85. Partners and neighbours: a CFSP for a wider Europe

Author:: Dov Lynch, Antonio Missiroli, Martin Ortega, Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, and Judy Batt
Publication Date:: 09-2003
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: This Chaillot Paper is the product of collegial reflection by the EUISS research team. As the current enlargement process moves towards its culmination with the accession of ten new member states in May 2004, its effects are already making themselves felt not only on the internal but also the external policies of the widening Union. New borders and neighbours bring new challenges while reconfiguring old ones. This new reality requires more than just additions to already existing policies. The entire neighbourhood, or proximity, policy of the enlarged EU will have to be reassessed and reformulated.
Topic:: International Relations, International Cooperation, and Politics
Political Geography:: Europe

86. The European Union and armaments Getting a bigger bang for the Euro

Author:: Burkard Schmitt
Publication Date:: 08-2003
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The proposals of the Convention on the Future of Europe and the recent European Commission Communication on a Defence Equipment Policy have revived the debate about the EU's possible involvement in armaments. There is indeed a chance today that a European Agency for Armaments, Research and Capabilities will be set up and anchored in the new EU Treaty. At the same time, there is a growing consensus that the EU Commission should have certain competencies in the field of security-related research, and even the establishment of a common defence equipment market is (again) under discussion.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Economics, and Government
Political Geography:: Europe

87. The European Union and the crisis in the Middle East

Author:: Martin Ortega
Publication Date:: 07-2003
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: In summer 2000 the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians hosted by President Clinton at Camp David raised the prospect of a peaceful resolution of the most sensitive aspects of their controversy, after almost nine years of difficult but promising exchanges following on from the Madrid Conference of November 1991. Nevertheless, Yasser Arafat's refusal to accept the terms negotiated at Camp David and the outbreak of a second intifada on 28 September 2000 led to a spiral of violence that dashed hopes for peace, leading instead to low-intensity war. Nor did the election of Ariel Sharon as Prime Minister in February 2001 make a return to the negotiating table any easier. The two parties considered that they would have more to gain from acts of violence than from negotiations and agreements. Therefore, violence in the Middle East was the continuation of diplomacy by other means. The external actors did not want, or were unable, to break this vicious circle. The most bitter regional conflict since the Second World War was thus rekindled following a phase of pacification that had appeared to be permanent. The European Union and its member states, but also the European public, viewed this negative development with great concern, because the breakdown of the peace process symbolised the end of a decade of optimism that the international community could promote peace not only in the Middle East but also in many other regions, such as southern Africa, Central America, the Balkans or South-East Asia.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, South Africa, Balkans, Central America, and Southeast Asia

88. EU cooperative threat reduction activities in Russia

Author:: Burkard Schmitt
Publication Date:: 06-2003
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: To strengthen the security structure of an erstwhile enemy, and a country that hard-nosed defence analysts and military planners - think of the last two US Nuclear Posture Reviews – still view as a potential threat, is quite an unorthodox and innovative way to address one's own security concerns. Yet cooperative threat reduction (CTR) has become part and parcel of Western security policy. A considerable number of NATO and European Union (EU) member states are involved in this sort of activity, as is the EU itself, including its most genuinely European actor, the European Commission (EC).
Topic:: International Cooperation and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, Europe, and Soviet Union

89. Russia faces Europe

Author:: Dov Lynch
Publication Date:: 05-2003
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The crisis on Iraq has challenged key features of international relations. The United States and Britain intervened in Iraq without the specific support of the United Nations, avoiding a second resolution in February 2003 precisely because they feared coercive action would be vetoed. The UN has taken a serious blow and the parameters of international law on self-defence and the use of force are being redefined by US and British actions. The crisis has also left the transatlantic relationship in tatters, with the appearance of serious divisions in Europe and inside the European Union. France, Germany and Russia coordinated their positions against coercive actions within the UN Security Council, adopting a number of joint declarations in 2003 on how to strengthen the inspection regime. With all this, the very notion of the West as it existed in the Cold War seems under question.
Topic:: Security and International Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, America, Europe, France, Kosovo, Germany, United Nations, and Syria

90. European armament cooperation Core documents

Author:: Burkard Schmitt
Publication Date:: 04-2003
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: There is a long tradition of armaments cooperation in Europe. The first cooperative programmes were launched in the 1960s, and their number increased considerably over the following decades. Projects such as Transall, Tornado, HOT, Milan and Eurofighter – to name just a few – have illustrated both the political will and the technological capability to develop and produce high-tech weapons systems jointly.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Government, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe

91. Terrorism, proliferation: a European threat assessment

Author:: Harald Müller
Publication Date:: 03-2003
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Since 11 September, it has become fashionable to maintain that nothing is as it was before. This statement is, however, much less reasonable a proposition than the memory of the unforgettable images of that day may suggest. It is thus useful, at the beginning of a study of security in today's circumstances, to list those items that have emphatically not changed: Power relations in the world have not changed. The United States was the dominant power before the attacks on its territory, and it is more dominant today than ever before. The problems resulting from globalisation, such as financial instability, poverty, unequal development and damage to the world's ecology are still there, and there are still no comprehensive solutions to them. Regional conflicts continue to cost lives, and continue without let-up. Conflict between the great powers is looming in East Asia as before. The need for instruments of global governance, though largely ignored in the most important capital city of the world, is becoming increasingly urgent, and is not being properly addressed. Finally, the sources of large-scale, extremely violent terrorism have existed for more than a decade and will not go away quickly and easily. Thus, there is much more continuity than the superficial comments that abound in public discourse would have it.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:: Europe

92. From Laeken to Copenhagen European defence: core documents

Author:: Jean-Yves Haine
Publication Date:: 02-2003
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The year 2002 was characterised by the stabilisation of Afghanistan, the prospect of war in Iraq, the suicidal, deadly impasse in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and North Korea's declared nuclear proliferation. There was thus a significant deterioration in the international environment. In these conditions of growing uncertainty, in both the short and long term, the Union, which now extends to the borders of the Russian and Arab-Muslim worlds, appears as a haven of stability and peace. The peaceful reunification of the European continent that the enlargement of both the Union and the Atlantic Alliance represents will stand out as one of the positive events of 2002. Yet this pacification of Europe has taken place in a world that is still suffering the consequences of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. To start with, the United States has developed a conception of its security that is both more sovereign and more comprehensive. The new National Security Strategy includes pre-emptive war among its ways of fighting terrorism and seems to favour coalitions of convenience rather than institutionalised alliances. There is no doubt that this attitude has raised questions in Europe and led to transatlantic difficulties. But this unilateralist fever early in the year gave way to more realistic, pragmatic attitudes with President Bush's speech to the UN on 12 September 2002 and the subsequent adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1441.
Topic:: Terrorism and War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Israel, North Korea, Palestine, and United Nations

93. Iraq: The Transatlantic Debate

Author:: Philip H. Gordon
Publication Date:: 12-2002
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Most Americans see the regime of Saddam Hussein as a major threat to regional and international security that must be thwarted, even if that means threatening or even using military force. If Saddam were to acquire nuclear weapons, they fear, he would seek to use them to dominate the Middle East, possibly invading his neighbours as he has in the past and perhaps deterring the United States from stopping him. His nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, moreover, might end up in the hands of Islamic terrorists who would show no compunction about using them against the United States, or Saddam himself might do so out of a thirst for vengeance. Whereas failure to act in Iraq would make a mockery of the United Nations Security Council and international law, a decisive action to topple Saddam would liberate the Iraqi people, allow the United States to lift sanctions on Iraq and withdraw its forces from Saudi Arabia, and perhaps make progress toward a freer and more democratic Middle East.
Topic:: Security and NATO
Political Geography:: United States, Iraq, Europe, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and United Nations

94. Iraq: A European Point of View

Author:: Martin Ortega
Publication Date:: 12-2002
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: UNSC Resolution 1441 has given the Iraqi regime a last opportunity to abandon any WMD programmes. If Iraq does not comply fully with the resolution or if inspections show that Iraq is indeed hiding WMD, the Security Council will have to consider the situation and decide what measures must be taken to maintain international peace and security.
Topic:: Security and NATO
Political Geography:: Iraq, Europe, and Middle East

95. International Terrorism and Europe

Author:: Thérèse Delpech
Publication Date:: 12-2002
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The events of 11 September moved all Europeans, but were never understood for what they really were: the return of war to the most developed societies. Thus, the emotion quickly gave way to the belief that an isolated event had taken place, or at least one that would not be repeated on the same scale. The entry of the Americans and their Afghan allies into Kabul a month after the first air strikes reinforced this belief. Even if the military operations in Afghanistan were far from over then, the Europeans, more so than the Americans – who at that time still had to cope with a biological attack – began to lose their focus. The first reason for that short-lived emotion is that 11 September, even when perceived as an attack on the entire Western world, had not happened in Europe. There is also a widespread refusal in Europe, after the turbulent history of the previous century, to admit that European territory might again be vulnerable to serious threats. Lastly, European leaders were anxious not to frighten their populations or to strain relations with the Muslim minorities living in Europe.
Topic:: Security, Religion, and Terrorism
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, America, Europe, and Kabul

96. Getting There: Building Strategic Mobility Into ESDP

Author:: Katia Vlachos-Dengler
Publication Date:: 11-2002
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The commitment to create a credible military capability for Europe lies at the heart of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). A credible defence capability does not depend exclusively on sound armed forces but also on swift projection of these forces into theatres of operations. A European Rapid Reaction Force will be expected to be capable of intervening in any area where European interests are affected and to intervene rapidly enough to conduct effective crisis management.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:: Europe

97. What model for CFSP?

Author:: Hans-Georg Ehrhart
Publication Date:: 10-2002
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: An opinion poll throughout Europe, conducted by Eurobarometer and released in July 2001, indicated increasing scepticism and indifference among Europeans towards the ongoing process of European integration. Following these findings, EU foreign ministers acknowledged 'that an abyss had opened up between European citizens and their institutions'.The citizens of the four largest member countries in particular are increasingly dissatisfied with the way in which the EU is run. Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel concluded that 'the link between the Union's objectives and the actions it takes through its policies is no longer clear'.
Topic:: Security, Religion, and Terrorism
Political Geography:: Europe

98. The United States: The Empire of Force or the Force of Empire?

Author:: Pierre Hassner
Publication Date:: 09-2002
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: There is no society or policy that does not have its contradictions, but some have more than others, and that is certainly true of the United States. Raymond Aron evoked a classic paradox in giving his book on the United States the title The Imperial Republic. That paradox has two aspects. Firstly, are the republic's institutions (which are designed to guarantee citizens' rights and a separation of powers) suited to the running of an empire, or are they prejudicial to the decision-making ability and continuity that that implies? Conversely, does not the expenditure on empire, in terms of resources and time, and in particular the methods used to acquire and preserve it, affect the economic, political and moral health of the republican homeland? These dilemmas are made even more acute since, on the one hand, this is not a classic empire, like that of Rome, but rather a bourgeois, individualist one based on the acquisition of wealth rather than the winning of wars and, on the other hand, this is the first truly world-wide empire and has appeared at a moment when the threats facing humankind raise key questions on the interests of the international system and the planet itself, over and above those of the 'hyperpower'.
Topic:: Security and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:: United States and Europe

99. From Candidate to Member State: Poland and the Future of the EU

Author:: Rafal Trzaskowski
Publication Date:: 09-2002
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The official Polish position on the future of the European Union is characterised above all by:Continuity – there are no major differences between the previous centre-right government and the current social democratic one when it comes to the future of Europe.Evolution – the official Polish position on the future of Europe is evolving. At the outset it was very vague, cautious and sometimes even defensive, but with time it has become more concrete,less cautious and more constructive.
Topic:: Security
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, and Poland

100. Enlargement and European Defence After 11 September

Author:: Pal Dunay, Jiri Sedivy, and Jacek Saryusz-Wolski
Publication Date:: 06-2002
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: The jury is still out on the extent to which 11 September has changed the concept – let alone the perception – of security. All the more so for European security at large, whose contours are still quite blurred. As for the European Union proper, 11 September has triggered a prompt response in the field of internal security, while the military reaction has been either channelled through NATO and the UN or managed individually (and bilaterally with the United States) by both member and applicant states. More indirectly, 11 September has increased the pressure towards enlargement by pushing for a faster and broader accession of the current candidates in order to further stabilise the Union's immediate neighbourhood: a quintessential case of security policy by other means, one is tempted to say, in line with a long tradition in the European integration process. Moreover, for similar reasons, the Atlantic Alliance, too, is likely to enlarge more quickly and more extensively than previously envisaged. Key decisions in those directions are to be taken in Prague (NATO) and Copenhagen (EU) later this year. For the Union, anyway, the endgame has already started. With it, the enlargement process will have come almost full circle: 'from Copenhagen to Copenhagen', so to speak, in just under ten years.
Topic:: Security and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:: United States, Europe, and United Nations

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS