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11. After Hegemony: Japan’s role and dilemma in maintaining the rules-based order

Author:
Yu Inagaki
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The phrase “rules-based order” has recently become a recurring theme in the Japan-US alliance . This is based on the recognition that the liberal international order (LIO)—which the United States built and maintained, and that Japan has significantly benefited from—is now being challenged. While the war in Ukraine has heightened the sense of crisis over global power dynamics, China has been considered the main threat to the LIO. The United States has identified China as not just a security threat but a “ most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge ,” and Japan has come to view the current international environment from a larger perspective, international order. In fact, Japan has expected to play a leading role in maintaining the LIO as US international engagement weakened under the Trump administration. However, is it possible for Japan, a constrained middle power, to maintain the existing order in the face of a declining hegemon and rising challengers? This raises a classic question in international relations: What will happen to the international order after hegemony; and what can and will Japan, occupying a particular place and role in the international system, be able and willing to do regarding international order?
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Politics, Hegemony, and International Order
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

12. Three Dilemmas Facing the Indo-Pacific’s Regional Order

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
For decades, an international order delivered security and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific. The order was based on U.S. military hegemony and alliances that preserved the strategic status quo and multilateral cooperation that enabled economic development and growth. That order is now under strain. The COVID-19 pandemic is challenging the order’s founding principles, prompting some regional states to limit their interdependency in certain sensitive sectors under the guise of supply chain resilience. The pandemic was not the first challenge to test the order; serious threats began to emerge over a decade ago, with the global financial crisis of 2008, and were sharply exacerbated by China’s economic rise and strategic revisionism, which threatens U.S. military and economic primacy and the territorial status quo. The United States, India, and like-minded middle-power partners from the Indo-Pacific and Europe have struggled to respond effectively. The other contributions in this series on navigating U.S.-China competition in the Indo-Pacific show how these states have sought to recover from the pandemic while also answering structural threats of revisionism and economic headwinds from decoupling, protectionism and changing integration patterns. Cutting across those specific policy issues are three overarching dilemmas that each state will be forced to resolve when making policy. How policymakers navigate these dilemmas will define the policy settings of their regional strategy.
Topic:
Security, Economic Growth, Multilateralism, Regional Integration, Economic Development, Strategic Competition, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Europe, South Asia, India, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

13. Covid’s Impact on India’s Soft Power in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Rani Mullen
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Understanding India’s soft power in the Indo-Pacific and the possible impact of its recent decline is essential to a well-informed American strategy in the region. As the world’s second-most populous country and largest democracy, India is an important power and American partner, as highlighted in President Biden’s March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which also identified the Indo-Pacific as vital to American national interests. The Great Power competition in the Indo-Pacific and India’s hard power has been analyzed in other articles in this series. As Joseph Nye pointed out in the 1980s, successful states require both hard and soft power–the wherewithal to coerce as well as the ability to entice and influence the behavior of other countries without force. America’s partnership with India is based not only on the mutual strategic interest of countering China but also on the soft power element of shared democratic values. At the same time, India’s ability to persuade regional countries to partner with it, despite it not having China’s deep pockets or hard power, is key to keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open.
Topic:
Soft Power, COVID-19, Strategic Interests, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

14. Re-thinking Coalitions: The United States in a World of Great Power Competition

Author:
Timothy D. Hoyt
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
In 2018, the United States government released The National Security Strategy of the United States and its related National Defense Strategy.1 Each document identified key changes in the national security environment, focusing on the emergence of “great power competition” with both Russia and China. President Biden’s interim national security guidance, issued in March 2021, is more circumspect. The guidance avoids the term “great power competition” but points out China’s increased assertiveness and its potential to mount a challenge to the current international system, as well as Russia’s continued interest in expanding global influence.2 The US-China competition, in particular, is regularly compared to the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.3 The Cold War analogy should be used with great caution. It is relatively anomalous in the history of international relations – the result of a unique combination of catastrophic war, which destroyed most of the then great powers, and fundamentally incompatible ideological positions of the two remaining great powers. Similarly, efforts to compare the U.S.-China competition to other bipolar competitions should be made cautiously as well.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Power Politics, and Coalition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

15. India’s Networking Response to the Chinese Threat

Author:
Rajesh Basrur
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
India has experienced rising tensions with China in recent years, as demonstrated by two border crises in 2017 and 2020-21. The second event saw the death of some 20 Indian troops, and at least 4 Chinese soldiers, in hand-to-hand combat – the first fatalities in nearly half a century of periodic border face-offs. New Delhi’s policy response has spanned both internal and external balancing. The former has involved augmenting India’s capacity to engage in limited combat of the type that nuclear-armed states have occasionally fought, as did the Soviet Union and China in 1969 and India and Pakistan in 1999. The Indian military has bolstered its border by deploying combat troops, cruise missiles, and advanced combat aircraft. However, China has done much the same, putting pressure on India to upscale its military capabilities. Simultaneously, India has tried to reduce its dependence on the Chinese economy, a more complicated task. Despite a 10 percent decline in bilateral trade owing to the Covid-19 pandemic and border tensions, China was India’s largest trading partner ($77.7 billion) in 2020. The Narendra Modi government sharply cut Chinese investment when the 2020 border confrontation in Ladakh broke out, expelling major Chinese companies like TikTok, WeChat, and UC Browser. Despite these measures, India’s ability to shut China out of its economy is limited. The Indian market depends heavily on Chinese electronic components (70 percent in value terms), pharmaceutical ingredients (70 percent), and consumer durables (45 percent).
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

16. India’s Options in a Contested Environment: Constraints and Prospects

Author:
Prakash Gopal
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The past year has witnessed tumultuous and unforeseen changes in the global geopolitical landscape due to the pandemic. While India struggles to contain its devastating second wave, it is simultaneously confronted with a significant national security challenge from across the disputed Himalayan border with China. A skirmish along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that started in May 2020 escalated rapidly into a full-blown crisis, with clashes in Galwan on June 15, 2020, causing casualties on both sides. After multiple rounds of talks, the crisis remains unresolved and has starkly exposed India’s lack of credible deterrence that could either deny or punish China’s belligerence across the unsettled border. In response to the border crisis, the Indian government promoted and contributed to the rapid coalescence of the quadrilateral security dialogue (Quad)—a loose coalition of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India. Notable milestones in the Quad’s accelerated development include the addition of Australia in the Malabar series of naval exercises and several high-level meetings of officials from the four countries, the highest-profile of which being the first leaders’ summit in March 2021. The assumption that India’s sudden moves to consolidate the Quad were driven primarily by Chinese actions along the LAC may be debated. Nevertheless, if that is the case, it follows that India views its renewed efforts in coalition-building as part of a solution to its China problem. Though the Quad may be useful in tackling security threats in the larger Indo-Pacific region, in the near term, it is unlikely to meaningfully contribute to bolstering India’s ability to deter China along land borders or in the maritime domain.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Geopolitics, Borders, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, and India

17. The Prospects of Thailand-U.S. Economic Cooperation

Author:
Kaewkamol Karen Pitakdumrongkit
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr. Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) of Nanyang Technological University, Singapore., explains that “data runs contrary to the perception that Bangkok is leaning towards Beijing… Thailand embraces American economic clout while dreading its Chinese counterpart.”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Trade, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, North America, Thailand, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

18. Hun Sen's Mistake? The Domestic Political Ramifications of His Chinese Shelter

Author:
Charles Dunst
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s close relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has led scholars and policymakers alike to suggest that Beijing’s backing will keep him in power. While Hun Sen himself seems to believe this to be true, his reliance on China is actually enflaming Cambodian discontent to such an extent that his planned patrimonial succession is at risk. Given the fragility of regimes mid-succession, Hun Sen’s Chinese shelter is augmenting the potential of his clan’s fall. Yet as Hun Sen faces increased domestic opposition, he will only further deepen ties with China in hopes of remaining in power, thereby creating a vicious cycle from which escaping will prove difficult.
Topic:
International Relations, Power Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Cambodia, and Southeast Asia

19. Negotiating Transboundary River Governance in Myanmar

Author:
Khin Ohnmar Htwe
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Myanmar lies in the northwestern part of Indo-Chinese Peninsular or mainland South-East Asia. It is bounded by China on the north and north-east, Laos on the east, Thailand on the south-east, and Bangladesh and India on the west. There are 7 major drainage areas or catchment areas in Myanmar comprising a series of river- valleys running from north to south. The drainage areas in Myanmar are Ayeyarwady and Chindwin Rivers and tributaries (55.05%), Thanlwin (Salween) River and tributaries (18.43%), Sittaung River and tributaries (5.38%), Kaladan and Lemyo Rivers and tributaries (3.76%), Yangon River and tributaries (2.96%), Tanintharyi River and tributaries (2.66%), and Minor Coastal Streams (11.76%). Myanmar possesses 12% of Asia’s fresh water resources and 16% of that of the ASEAN nations. Growing nationwide demand for fresh water has heightened the challenges of water security. The transboundary river basins along the border line of Myanmar and neighboring countries are the Mekong, Thanlwin (Salween), Thaungyin (Moai), Naf, and Manipu rivers. The Mekong River is also an important transboundary river for Myanmar which it shares with China, Laos, and Thailand. The Mekong River, with a length of about 2,700 miles (4,350 km), rises in southeastern Qinghai Province, China, flows through the eastern part of the Tibet Autonomous Region and Yunnan Province, and forms part of the international border between Myanmar (Burma) and Laos, as well as between Laos and Thailand. The Mekong River meets the China–Myanmar border and flows about six miles along that border until it reaches the tripoint of China, Myanmar, and Laos. From there it flows southwest and forms the border of Myanmar and Laos for about 60 miles until it arrives at the tripoint of Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand. This is also the point of confluence between the Ruak River (which follows the Thai–Myanmar border) and the Mekong.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Water, Governance, and Borders
Political Geography:
Bangladesh, China, India, Thailand, Southeast Asia, Laos, and Myanmar

20. Challenges and Responses to COVID-19: Experience from Asia

Author:
Nancy Davis Lewis and Jonathan D. Mayer
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Experience in Asia suggests that public health and medical capacity are critical for an effective response to an emerging infectious disease. Political will and previous experience with disease outbreaks also play a role. Singapore ignored an important segment of its population and is now experiencing a huge spike in cases. China and Vietnam were able to enforce draconian measures, while in Japan and Hong Kong, civil society had a greater role in initiating effective controls. In several countries, local political outcomes have been affected by the perceived success or failure of leaders in controlling the crisis.
Topic:
Health Care Policy, Leadership, Crisis Management, Public Health, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, Vietnam, Singapore, and Hong Kong