Search

Begin New Search Topic Security Publishing Institution Center for Strategic and International Studies

181. Argentina Alert-Argentine Election: Fateful Choice

Author:
Carlos M. Regúnaga
Publication Date:
04-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Observers unfamiliar with Argentine history may see in the present campaign a lack of real confrontation and choice of ideas. And they may be misled in that direction by the fact that candidates have devoted great time and effort to expose flaws in their opponents' character and background and very little to explain platforms and proposals. One should not be deceived, however, by appearances. The ideological spectrum represented by the five candidates is much wider than has been seen in any U.S. election in recent history. That statement needs, however, some historical perspective.
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
Argentina, South America, and Latin America

182. Brazil Alert: President Lula

Author:
William Perry
Publication Date:
04-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
100 days have now passed since Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva donned Brazil's presidential sash on January 1, 2003. Perhaps use of this traditional U.S. benchmark, even for preliminary judgments, is a bit unfair, as the Brazilian political calendar with Carnival holidays off, precludes Congress from really beginning to function until early March. Nevertheless, the past three months have been instructive in terms of gauging the problems and prospects of the new Workers' Party (PT) government.
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
Brazil, South America, and Latin America

183. Mexico Alert: Economic Competitiveness in Mexico: Recent Evolution, Prospects, and Repercussions for the United States

Author:
Mariano Ruiz-Funes
Publication Date:
04-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
A country's economic competitiveness can be analyzed on two closely interrelated levels: microeconomic com-petitiveness and competitiveness in attracting investment. The first level (microeconomic competitiveness) relates to goods and services offered in the country and refers to competition arising from goods and services that are produced in another country. That competition takes place in international markets (export competitiveness) as well as in the domestic market (with imports).
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
United States, Latin America, North America, and Mexico

184. Mexico Alert: The Impact of the War in Iraq on Canada, the Caribbean, and Latin America

Author:
Phillip McLean
Publication Date:
04-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Once again events elsewhere have driven news of Canada, the Caribbean and Latin America off the front pages— even from newspapers in the region. Lack of attention may be the least of those countries' concerns about the war. The more serious consequence is likely to be that the war will accentuate the hemisphere's already evident problems. To the degree that the war slows the growth of world trade, the region's near-term economic prospects will suffer, and global uncertainties will dim the promise of more open and dynamic markets.
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
Iraq, Canada, South America, Latin America, Central America, Caribbean, and North America

185. Mexico Alert: The Impact of the War in Iraq on Mexico

Author:
Armand Peschard-Sverdrup
Publication Date:
04-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
When looking at the ramifications of the war in Iraq on the Western Hemisphere, it is clear that the conflict will have the greatest impact on the two nations with which the United States shares borders—Mexico and Canada. From a national security standpoint, these nations' immediate proximity to the United States automatically heightens the threat to their own national security, particularly because we seem to have entered an era in which the use of weapons of mass destruction—be they nuclear, chemical, or biological—poses a viable threat. From a U.S. homeland security standpoint, the shared border transforms both of our friendly neighbors into possible platforms from which rogue elements could stage attacks or enter the United States to threaten our homeland.
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Canada, Latin America, North America, and Mexico

186. Argentina Alert: Polls Apart

Author:
Carlos M. Regúnaga
Publication Date:
04-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The race for the Argentine presidency is now in the next to last lap. The first ballot will be cast April 27, but for the first time in history it looks as if a second ballot will be required. If it is, it will take place on May 18. At this juncture, public opinion and pundits' predictions are poles apart. But before analyzing them, it might be useful to remember the electoral system now in effect.
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
Argentina, South America, and Latin America

187. Mexico Alert: The Vote That Wasn't

Author:
Luis Rubio
Publication Date:
03-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Mexico's President Vicente Fox chose a rather awkward time to take a stand supporting a multilateralist approach in foreign policy. Even though a multilateral approach matches neatly—almost naturally—with the country's history, taking such a visible stand after the events of September 11 entailed huge risks that nobody in Fox's cabinet could ignore, even if, in retrospect, few truly understood what the actual risks were. Yet, oblivious to that fact, the government pushed ahead. Even after President George W. Bush had decided not to pursue a vote in the UN Security Council on a follow-up resolution that would have de facto authorized the use of force in Iraq, the Mexican government found it necessary to state that it would have voted “no.” The critical question is less whether this constitutes an approach to foreign policy that is new for Mexico than whether the administration truly understands the implications of its newfound ways.
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
Latin America, North America, and Mexico

188. Mexico Alert: NAFTA And Mexico's Agriculture

Author:
Sergio Sarmiento
Publication Date:
03-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
For a long time, it seemed impossible for any issue to forge an alliance between the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)—the party that ruled Mexico from 1929 to 2000—and the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). This issue, however, has clearly emerged now with the attempt to force President Vicente Fox, a member of the conservative National Action Party (PAN), to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in order to offer special protection to Mexico's agriculture.
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
Latin America and North America

189. Mexico Alert: Mexico State Election

Author:
Armand Peschard-Sverdrup and George W. Grayson
Publication Date:
03-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
On March 9, 2003, the citizens of Mexico state (Edomex) will elect 124 municipal government officials and 75 members of the state legislature. Although local contests, these elections have attracted national attention for several reasons. First, with 13 million inhabitants Edomex is the most populous of Mexico 31 states–with approximately 4.5 million more citizens than Mexico City. Second, Mexico state also boasts more than 8 million voters, the most of any state and 12.55 percent of the nationwide total. Third, Mexico state is a microcosm of the country–with (1) a vibrant manufacturing sector, (2) one-third of its income arising from agriculture, (3) a small indigenous population, (4) a plethora of middle-class residents who work for the government, own small businesses, or practice professions such as medicine, dentistry, accounting, and teaching, and (5) poor people who eke out a living in Chalco, Texcoco, and other sprawling slums contiguous to Mexico City. Fourth, Edomex is an arena of intense political activism, involving the country's three major parties: the once-hegemonic Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the center-right National Action Party (PAN), and the nationalist-left Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). In addition, the Mexican Green Ecological Party (PVEM) boasts its largest support base in the state, while several new or small parties will also compete in the upcoming election. These include the centrist Convergencia, the leftist Workers' Party (PT), the right-wing Social Alliance (PAS), the conservative Party of the Nationalist Society (PSN), the reform-oriented México Posible (MP), the Mexican Liberal Party (PLM), Citizens' Force (FC), and the Citizens' Parliament (PC). Fifth, the importance of the state means that any major Edomex politician who distinguishes himself will wind up on the short list of contenders for the presidency in 2006. Finally, the outcome of the Mexico state balloting will provide an insight into the relative strength of contending parties as they prepare for the July 6 election of 500 members of the Chamber of Deputies and six governors (Campeche, Colima, Nuevo León, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, and Sonora).
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
Latin America, North America, and Mexico

190. Radical Groups in Mexico Today

Author:
Gustavo Hirales Morán
Publication Date:
09-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Since January 1, 1994, the day when the armed uprising of the Zapatista Army for National Liberation (EZLN) was announced, it has been evident that Mexico is facing a second generation of radical organizations. The first generation, dating back to the 1970s, consisted of armed groups made up mainly of students, rural classroom teachers, and campesinos (i.e., subsistence farmers and agricultural workers along with their families). This generation's choice to pursue armed struggle revealed a trio of influences: Cuba's experience, socialist ideology, and the outrage and indignation produced by the repression and crackdown on nonviolent avenues of political opposition unleashed under the governments of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964–1970) and Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970–1976).
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
United States, Latin America, North America, and Mexico

191. Remarks by Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson on the Launch of the US-VISIT Program

Author:
Asa Hutchinson
Publication Date:
05-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
At the Department of Homeland Security-my responsibility centers on the borders of the United States. What we do at our borders impacts our security, our economy and our relationship with the international community.
Topic:
Security and Migration
Political Geography:
United States and North America

192. Authentication Report

Author:
James A. Lewis
Publication Date:
05-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
How does a machine know you are who you say you are and what you are allowed to do? A car 'knows' you are authorized to drive it when you insert a metal key. An automatic teller knows who you are and how much is in your account when you insert a magnetic card and enter a Personal Identification Number. The machine isn't actually confirming your identity; it is accepting a token issued to you by someone else, who may have taken steps to confirm at the time of issuance that you are who you say you are.
Topic:
Security, Government, and Science and Technology

193. Cyber Attacks: Missing in Action

Author:
James A. Lewis
Publication Date:
04-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The first warnings of an “electronic Pearl Harbor” appeared in 1995. 1 They have appeared regularly since then. Before the conflict with Iraq that began in March 2003, there was speculation that the U.S. would experience cyber attacks in retaliation. Since the onset of the war, however, there have been no reported attacks that damaged U.S. infrastructure or affected U.S. military operations in Iraq. Nor have there been any reports of cyber attacks that damaged U.S. infrastructure or affected U.S. military operations since 1996.
Topic:
Security, Government, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
United States and Iraq

194. An Attack on Iraq: The Military, Political, and Economic Consequences: Scenario Briefing

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
03-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
There are major uncertainties about the military outcomes and political ramifications of an attack on Iraq. Really three sequential sets of scenarios: The prelude to war and the different ways in which war can occur. The actual process of conflict. The post-conflict occupation of Iraq and the way in which an independent Iraqi regime emerges.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East

195. Weapons of Mass Destruction in India and Pakistan

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
India continues its nuclear weapons development program, for which its underground nuclear tests in May 1998 were a significant milestone. The acquisition of foreign equipment will benefit New Delhi in its efforts to develop and produce more sophisticated nuclear weapons. During this reporting period, India continued to obtain foreign assistance for its civilian nuclear power program, primarily from Russia.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, South Asia, India, and Asia

196. Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Reasons for proliferating outweigh disincentives,and motivation is growing. Arms control regimes harass proliferators without stopping stem and fail to offer non-proliferators security. War fighting concepts are likely to lack clear structure and be highly volatile in terms of enemy, targets, and crisis behavior. Only a few leadership and military elites -- such as Egypt and Israel -- have shown a concern with highly structured strategic planning in the past. Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars have demonstrated missiles and weapons of mass destruction will be used. Israeli actions in 1967 and attack on Osirak, Egyptian and Syrian attack on Israel in 1973, demonstrate regional focus on surprise and preemption. Iraq has already demonstrated regional concern with launch on warning, launch under attack options. Syria probably has some option of this kind. Concentration of population and leadership in single or a few urban areas makes existential attacks possible.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Syria, and Egypt

197. The Arab-Israeli Military Balance in 2002 Part Four: Trends in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Reasons for proliferating outweigh disincentives, and motivation is growing. Arms control regimes harass proliferators without stopping stem and fail to offer nonproliferators security. War fighting concepts are likely to lack clear structure and be highly volatile in terms of enemy, targets, and crisis behavior. Only a few leadership and military elites -- such as Egypt and Israel -- have shown a concern with highly structured strategic planning in the past. Iran - Iraq and Gulf Wars have demonstrated missiles and weapons of mass destruction will be used. Israeli actions in 1967 and attack on Osirak, Egyptian and Syrian attack on Israel in 1973, demonstrate regional focus on surprise and preemption. Iraq has already demonstrated regional concern with launch on warning, launch under attack options. Syria probably has some option of this kind. Concentration of population and leadership in single or a few urban areas makes existential attacks possible.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Arabia, and Egypt

199. The Military Balance in the Gulf: 2001-2002 Part III Weapons of Mass Destruction

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
As is the case with North Korea, experts differ over the seriousness of the Iranian threat. Most experts believe that Iran continues to pursue the development of long-range missiles, and of nuclear and biological warheads. Much will depend heavily on whether President Khatami and the more moderate elements in Iran's leadership can consolidate power and rein in Iran's hardline extremists, as well as on Iran's perception of the threat the US poses once it is ready to deploy and the cost of that deployment. This creates an extremely uncertain political climate.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and North Korea

200. If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and The Conventional Military Balance

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Despite the Gulf War, and the loss of some 40% of its army and air force order of battle, Iraq remains the most effective military power in the Gulf. It still has an army of around 375,000 men, and an inventory of some 2,200 main battle tanks, 3,700 other armored vehicles, and 2,400 major artillery weapons. It also has over 300 combat aircraft with potential operational status. At the same time, Iraq has lacked the funds, spare parts, and production capabilities to sustain the quality of its consolidated forces. Iraq has not been able to restructure its overall force structure to compensate as effectively as possible for its prior dependence on an average of $3 billion a year in arms deliveries. It has not been able to recapitalize any aspect of its force structure, and about two-thirds of its remaining inventory of armor and aircraft is obsolescent by Western standards. Iraq has not been able to fund and/or import any major new conventional warfare technology to react to the lessons of the Gulf War, or to produce any major equipment -- with the possible exception of limited numbers of Magic “dogfight” air-to-air missiles. In contrast, Saudi Arabia has taken delivery on over $66 billion worth of new arms since 1991, Kuwait has received $7.6 billion, Iran $4.3 billion, Bahrain $700 million, Oman $1.4 billion, Qatar $1.7 billion, and the UAE $7.9 billion, Equally important, the US has made major upgrades in virtually every aspect of its fighter avionics, attack munitions, cruise missile capabilities, and intelligence, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities. Iraq's inability to recapitalize and modernize its forces means that much of its large order of battle is no obsolescent or obsolete, has uncertain combat readiness, and will be difficult to sustain in combat. It also raises serious questions about the ability of its forces to conduct long-range movements or maneuvers and then sustain coherent operations. Iraq has demonstrated that it can still carry out significant ground force exercises and fly relatively high sortie rates. It has not, however, demonstrated training patterns that show its army has consistent levels of training, can make effective use of combined arms above the level of some individual brigades, or has much capability for joint land-air operations. It has not demonstrated that it can use surface-to-air missiles in a well-organized way as a maneuvering force to cover its deployed land forces. Iran remains a major threat to Iraq. Iran lost 40-60% of its major land force equipment during the climactic battles of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. It has, however, largely recovered from its defeat by Iraq and now has comparatively large forces. Iran now has an army of around 450,000 men – including roughly 125,000 Revolutionary Guards, and an inventory of some 1,600 main battle tanks, 1,500 other armored vehicles, and 3,200 major artillery weapons. It also has over 280 combat aircraft with potential operational status. Iran has been able to make major improvements in its ability to threaten maritime traffic through the Gulf, and to conduct unconventional warfare. Iran has also begun to acquire modern Soviet combat aircraft and has significant numbers of the export version of the T-72 and BMP. Iran has not, however, been able to offset the obsolescence and wear of its overall inventory of armor, ships, and aircraft. Iran has not been able to modernize key aspects of its military capabilities such as airborne sensors and C4I/BM, electronic warfare, land-based air defense integration, beyond-visual-range air-to-air combat, night warfare capabilities, stand-off attack capability, armored sensors and fire control systems, artillery mobility and battle management, combat ship systems integration, etc. In contrast, no Southern Gulf state has built up significant ground forces since the Gulf War, and only Saudi Arabia has built up a significant air force. Only two Southern Gulf forces – those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – have a significant defense capability against Iraq. Saudi Arabia has made real progress in improving its 75,000 man National Guard. Its army, however, lacks effective leadership, training, and organization. It now has an army of around 75,000 men –, and an inventory of some 1,055 main battle tanks, 4,800 other armored vehicles, and 500 major artillery weapons. It also has around 350 combat aircraft with potential operational status. The army has made little overall progress in training since the Gulf War, can probably only fight about half of its equipment holdings in the Iraqi border area (and it would take 4-6 weeks to deploy and prepare this strength), and has declined in combined arms capability since the Gulf War. It has little capability for joint land-air operations. Its individual pilots and aircraft have experienced a growing readiness crisis since the mid-1990s. It has lacked cohesive leadership as a fighting force since that time and cannot fight as a coherent force without US support and battle management.. Kuwait now has an army of only around 11,000 men, and an active inventory of some 293 main battle tanks, 466 other armored vehicles, and 17 major artillery weapons. Only its 218 M-1A2s are really operational and only a portion of these are in combat effective forces. It has only 82 combat aircraft and 20 armed helicopters with potential operational status, and only 40 are modern F-18s. It is making progress in training, but has not shown it can make effective use of combined arms above the battalion level, and has little capability for joint land-air operations. Its individual pilots and aircraft have moderate readiness, but cannot fight as a coherent force without US support and battle management. There has been little progress in standardization and interoperability; advances in some areas like ammunition have been offset by the failure to integrate increasingly advanced weapons systems. Showpiece exercises and purchases disguise an essentially static approach to force improvement which is heavily weapons oriented, and usually shows little real-world appreciation of the lessons of the Gulf War, the “revolution in military affairs,” and the need for sustainability. Current arms deliveries are making only token progress in correcting the qualitative defects in Southern Gulf forces, and no meaningful progress in being made towards integrating the Southern Gulf countries under the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia