Search

Begin New Search Publishing Institution Center for Strategic and International Studies Publication Year within 5 Years

91. Battle Networks and the Future Force

Author:
Todd Harrison and Christopher Reid
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This CSIS brief is the third in a series on the future of battle networks and Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). The first brief in the series examined the importance of battle networks to modern military operations and presented a framework of five functional elements that make up a battle network. The second brief used lessons learned from previous attempts to improve battle network integration to explore how the Department of Defense (DoD) can properly scope the problem it is trying to solve and organize itself to effectively and efficiently acquire the systems needed to realize its vision for JADC2. This brief focuses on the importance of integrating allies and partners into future battle networks, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. It explores existing agreements, opportunities for new agreements, and the technical and policy challenges for battle network integration across allied and partner nations. It concludes with an assessment of how combined battle networks with allies and partners can serve as the key enabling technology toward a new offset strategy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Indo-Pacific

92. Beyond 2025: The Future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act

Author:
Daniel F. Runde and Sundar R. Ramanujam
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Over the past two decades, the United States has provided assistance and support for sub-Saharan Africa’s efforts to transform its economic and trade relationships, centered around the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). First enacted into law on May 18, 2000, AGOA was designed to significantly enhance designated sub-Saharan African countries’ market access to the United States by providing duty-free treatment for specific import categories. The legislation’s primary goal was to promote economic growth through good governance and free markets. To qualify and remain eligible for AGOA, countries were expected to demonstrate progress toward market liberalization and to improve the rule of law, human rights protections, and core labor standards. More than 20 years later, AGOA continues to provide preferential treatment to 44 countries in the region, spanning over 6,500 tariff lines. Since May 2000, AGOA has been amended four times, mostly to clarify preferential treatment terms, technical standards, and sunset deadlines. The act was initially designed to be valid for eight years, expiring at the end of September 2007. In July 2004, however, President George W. Bush signed the AGOA Acceleration Act, extending it to 2015. Toward the end of his second term, in June 2015 President Barack Obama extended its validity by signing the Trade Preferences Extension Act, under which AGOA is set to expire in 2025. The global political and economic landscape has changed profoundly since AGOA was enacted in 2000, even before the Covid-19 pandemic created new disruptions and accelerated several ongoing changes. The mobile telephony revolution has created new opportunities for millions to participate in the digital sphere, use mobile banking and payments systems, and receive commercial, educational, and medical services via the internet. Even as the sub-Saharan African region’s middle class continues to grow, it is also set to experience a youth population boom in the next three decades—which, under the right conditions, could pay a demographic dividend and avert a social crisis. Meanwhile, the United States has also entered an era of great-power competition with China. With China’s influence in sub-Saharan Africa rising significantly, this competition is also playing out through the region’s political and economic institutions. Considering these opportunities and challenges, leaders in Washington (and their constituents across the United States) ought to look at Africa as a prospect for deepening commercial partnerships, not as a continent that needs to be “saved” through foreign assistance. Accordingly, the United States can consider one of the three following scenarios in response to AGOA’s current expiration timeline
Topic:
Development, Economics, International Cooperation, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Africa

93. U.S. Military Forces in FY 2022: Peering into the Abyss

Author:
Mark F. Cancian
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
CSIS senior adviser Mark Cancian annually produces a series of white papers on U.S. military forces, including their composition, new initiatives, long-term trends, and challenges. This report is a compilation of these papers. It takes a deep look at each military service, as well as special operations forces, DOD civilians, and contractors in the FY 2022 budget. This report also discusses the debate about legacy equipment, the interaction of the budget and force size, and the decline in force size that the services face with retiring older systems without adequate replacements.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Defense Industry, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

94. Securing Intellectual Property for Innovation and National Security

Author:
Sujai Shivakumar
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The United States is engaged in a global competition for innovation, with critical implications for the nation’s continued technological leadership, competitiveness, and security. To win, the United States will need to leverage its advantages at home, including its robust intellectual property (IP) rights system and the innovative zeal of its entrepreneurs. It should also look abroad—setting the pace for scientific cooperation with allies and strategic partners, as well as developing shared international technical standards through the contributions of experts from around the globe. Most pressingly, the United States should not adopt policies that weaken protection of U.S.-owned patents—which would both disincentivize innovation in the United States and support Chinese efforts to dominate critical standards and other advanced technologies. Yet a recent proposal of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) does just that. Launched as a consultation, its Draft Policy Statement on Licensing Negotiations and Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to F/RAND Commitments is promoted as an effort to encourage good-faith licensing negotiations and to address the scope of remedies available to patent owners who have agreed to license their essential technologies on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (F/RAND) terms. While this draft policy seems like an innocuous administrative change, it has the potential to do significant damage to the United States’ innovation engine and, by extension, to its national security.
Topic:
Security, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Innovation, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

95. Decarbonizing Aluminum: Rolling Out a More Sustainable Sector

Author:
William Alan Reinsch and Emily Benson
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
As the effects of climate change intensify, countries and industries alike are seeking new ways to decarbonize to meet emissions targets, avoid carbon border tariffs, and reduce energy costs. Today, energy use in industry is the number one contributor to global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Therefore, decarbonization of heavy industry would have a direct and immediate impact on reducing GHG emissions and slowing climate change. Aluminum is the second most used metal in the world. Its applications are numerous and fundamental, from electrical transmission to defense and construction. Aluminum is also a key input in other goods that help reduce emissions, such as electric vehicles and energy-efficient buildings, meaning that decarbonizing aluminum can help industries that are playing a critical role in global climate efforts. This paper evaluates global progress on sectoral emissions reductions and assesses policies governments can pursue to accelerate decarbonization of the aluminum sector. The aluminum industry consists of three component segments: upstream aluminum, downstream aluminum, and recycled aluminum. The upstream aluminum sector is responsible for the sourcing of raw material components from mined bauxite that is then refined into alumina and smelted into aluminum. Aluminum production is usually accomplished in two phases. In the first stage, bauxite ore is refined to obtain aluminum oxide through the Bayer process. The Hall-Heroult process of smelting the aluminum oxide to release pure aluminum comprises the second stage. Upstream production of aluminum involves the mining of bauxite and refining it into alumina. The downstream segment refers to the production of semi-fabricated aluminum products and their use in a wide range of sectors, from manufacturing and automobiles to construction and consumer products. Aluminum not only offers durability, but also is lightweight and infinitely recyclable, meaning it has clear environmental benefits compared to other similar inputs, such as steel or plastic. While aluminum does offer some environmental benefits, producing it is carbon intensive. Aluminum production processes have changed very little since the 1800s, and many countries continue to rely on coal to produce the electricity required for aluminum production. Globally, the aluminum sector contributes roughly 2 percent of GHG emissions—equivalent to about 1.1 billion tons of carbon dioxide (CO2). Yet demand for aluminum is expected to increase by 50 to 80 percent by 2050. In 2019, the aluminum industry consumed 6 percent of all global coal-fired electricity, exceeding the total amount of coal-fired electricity generated in Europe. That same year, coal-fired electricity used in aluminum electrolysis produced 636 million tons of C02 emissions, or 58 percent of the sector’s carbon footprint. On average, 72 percent of GHG emissions from primary production of aluminum are from electricity, meaning greater use of renewable energy in aluminum production could significantly decrease the sector’s carbon output. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), global CO2 emissions need to decrease by 45 percent by 2030 in order to keep global warming below the 1.5 degree threshold. By accelerating the deployment of renewables and designing policies that encourage and support the decarbonization of heavy industry, the private and public sectors can play key roles in helping to reduce carbon emissions, while also continuing to grow the global economy.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Renewable Energy, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Global Focus

96. The Kremlin Playbook 3: Keeping the Faith

Author:
Heather A Conley and Donatienne Ruy
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
For six years, the Kremlin Playbook series has studied Russia’s malign influence efforts in Europe, primarily through the economic lens. This research showed the Kremlin has developed a pattern of malign economic influence in Europe through the cultivation of “an opaque network of patronage across the region that it uses to influence and direct decision-making.” The aim is to weaken democratic systems from within, using existing and creating new societal divides. But what if Russia, for its own malign purposes, were to seek to influence religious or traditional views? The Kremlin Playbook 3: Keeping the Faith aims to protect these beliefs by exposing how Russian malign influence works in this particularly challenging and very personal dimension—a new strategic seam—to ensure citizens do not unwittingly become part of an influence operation. The instrumentalization of values, traditions, and religious beliefs is a relatively recent and particularly pernicious front of the Kremlin’s influence efforts in Europe and elsewhere. This study investigates these dynamics in four case study countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, France, Georgia, and Greece. This report explores how the United States and its European allies can protect the religious beliefs and values of their citizens from malign influence at a time when transatlantic societies are grappling with the speed of societal change. Societal anxiety and fear related to these rapid economic, demographic, and generational shifts—and the subsequent politics and political figures that seek to capitalize on them—have fueled societal divisions around the so-called cultural wars in Western societies. Through two main channels, the Orthodox world and the traditional values ecosystem, the Kremlin has taken advantage of these fears to accentuate societal wedges in Europe and Eurasia.
Topic:
Economics, Hegemony, Strategic Interests, and Influence
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

97. Creating Accountability for Global Cyber Norms

Author:
James A. Lewis
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The year 2021 saw all UN member states agree in the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on a framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, based on norms developed in the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) in 2015.1 The OEWG formalized global agreement on the 2015 norms. This consensus agreement means that the framework for responsible state behavior is now politically binding for all member states. Global agreement on the obligations for responsible state behavior is a substantial step forward in building international cybersecurity in a rules-based environment. Unfortunately, international experience since 2015 has shown that agreement on norms, even when politically binding, is by itself not enough to ensure their observation or create stability in cyberspace. This has shifted discussion from what norms are needed to how to build accountability and what to do when norms are ignored. While the norms agreed to by all member states will ultimately reinforce international stability, to make progress, it will be necessary to develop a collective diplomatic strategy to improve the observation of norms and increase accountability when they are ignored. A strategy of sustained engagement and the imposition of consequences is necessary for norms to have effect. Our assumption is that accountability for malicious cyber actions can only be strengthened if there are consequences for a state’s decision not to observe norms. If nothing else, a failure to take action in response to transgressions seems to only encourage opponents. An immediate task is to define the conditions for collective action. There has been an initial and informal agreement among like-minded democratic nations that accountability requires the imposition of consequences for a failure to observe norms, but several issues must be addressed. These include agreement on standards for attribution of the source of a malicious action and agreement on a proportional, lawful, and effective response. A collective approach is essential if efforts to create accountability are to succeed, and any response to a cyber incident will require political heft and sustained engagement.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, United Nations, Cybersecurity, Accountability, Transparency, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

98. Data Protection or Data Utility?

Author:
Alexander Kersten and Issac A. Robinson
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Despite the economic upheaval wrought by the Covid-19 pandemic, the United States is now poised to enter a new period of productivity growth with the widespread deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. And just as past eras’ technologies have been driven entirely by the consumption of resources such as steam, coal, oil, and natural gas, this AI-driven period will rely on data. Yet, while this data-driven economic growth model has proven benefits to both individuals and firms, it also raises serious concerns over individuals’ data privacy. A key challenge in this regard is to ensure that data is handled securely and that the privacy of American citizens is protected. Because of the regard paid to data protection and privacy over the past decade, the proliferation of digitization has made privacy policy a part of innovation policy. However, until now, policymakers have viewed data use and data protection as trade-offs, with some nations adopting strict control of data flows. These measures have not been effective in practice; strict curbs have stifled innovation while doing relatively little to protect privacy. An alternative is to deploy promising cryptographic software solutions that can enhance privacy while still allowing access to data. This solution not only unlocks the commercial potential of data for use by firms, law enforcement, nonprofits, and researchers but also protects individuals’ privacy. Realizing the benefits of this win-win solution will require further development and widespread adoption of emerging cryptographic software solutions.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, Cyberspace, and Encryption
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

99. Russia’s Losing Hand in Ukraine

Author:
Seth G. Jones, Philip G. Wasieleswki, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The United States and its partners and allies should be prepared to conduct a sustained diplomatic, economic, military, and humanitarian campaign that supports Ukraine and raises the financial and military costs for Moscow of meddling in Ukraine—both now and in the future. Russia has several weaknesses that can be exploited, and Ukrainian nationalism and Western resolve could present formidable, long-term problems for Moscow.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

100. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict

Author:
Jeffrey Mankoff
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest threat to peace and security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. On February 21, 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin gave a bizarre and at times unhinged speech laying out a long list of grievances as justification for the “special military operation” announced the following day. While these grievances included the long-simmering dispute over the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the shape of the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe, the speech centered on a much more fundamental issue: the legitimacy of Ukrainian identity and statehood themselves. It reflected a worldview Putin had long expressed, emphasizing the deep-seated unity among the Eastern Slavs—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, who all trace their origins to the medieval Kyivan Rus commonwealth—and suggesting that the modern states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus should share a political destiny both today and in the future. The corollary to that view is the claim that distinct Ukrainian and Belarusian identities are the product of foreign manipulation and that, today, the West is following in the footsteps of Russia’s imperial rivals in using Ukraine (and Belarus) as part of an “anti-Russia project.” Throughout Putin’s time in office, Moscow has pursued a policy toward Ukraine and Belarus predicated on the assumption that their respective national identities are artificial—and therefore fragile. Putin’s arguments about foreign enemies promoting Ukrainian (and, in a more diffuse way, Belarusian) identity as part of a geopolitical struggle against Russia echo the way many of his predecessors refused to accept the agency of ordinary people seeking autonomy from tsarist or Soviet domination. The historically minded Putin often invokes the ideas of thinkers emphasizing the organic unity of the Russian Empire and its people—especially its Slavic, Orthodox core—in a form of what the historian Timothy Snyder calls the “politics of eternity,” the belief in an unchanging historical essence. The salience that Putin and other Russian elites assign to the idea of Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian unity helps explain the origins of the current conflict, notably why Moscow was willing to risk a large-scale war on its borders when neither Ukraine nor NATO posed any military threat. It also suggests that Moscow’s ambitions extend beyond preventing Ukrainian NATO membership and encompass a more thorough aspiration to dominate Ukraine politically, militarily, and economically. It also helps explain Russia’s military strategy. Moscow appeared to calculate that enough Ukrainians, at least in the eastern part of the country, would accept some form of reintegration into a Russian sphere of influence because of shared cultural, linguistic, religious, and other ties with Russia. Despite pre-war polls showing large numbers of Ukrainians willing to take up arms to defend their country against a Russian invasion, Moscow’s wager was not entirely implausible given the recentness of the shift and the persistence of family and other ties across the Russian-Ukrainian border. Nonetheless, Russia’s war has become bogged down in no small part because this calculation about Ukrainian identity has proven dramatically wrong.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine