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1. Iraq After ISIS: The Other Half of Victory Dealing with the Civil Dimension

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The United States, its allies, and international organizations are just beginning to come to grips with the civil dimensions of "failed state" wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, the Sudans, Syria, and Yemen. In each case, it is clear that the civil dimension of the war will ultimately be as important as the military one. Any meaningful form of "victory" requires far more than defeating the current extremist threat in military terms, and reaching some temporary compromise between the major factions that divide the country. The current insurgent and other security threats exist largely because of the deep divisions within the state, the past and current failures of the government to deal with such internal divisions, and the chronic failure to meet the economic, security, and social needs of much of the nation's population. In practical terms, these failures make a given host government, other contending factions, and competing outside powers as much of a threat to each nation’s stability and future as Islamic extremists and other hostile forces. Regardless of the scale of any defeat of extremists, the other internal tensions and divisions with each country also threaten to make any such “victory” a prelude to new forms of civil war, and/or an enduring failure to cope with security, stability, recovery, and development. Any real form of victory requires a different approach to stability operations and civil-military affairs. In each case, the country the U.S. is seeking to aid failed to make the necessary economic progress and reforms to meet the needs of its people – and sharply growing population – long before the fighting began. The growth of these problems over a period of decades helped trigger the sectarian, ethnic, and other divisions that made such states vulnerable to extremism and civil conflict, and made it impossible for the government to respond effectively to crises and wars.
Topic:
Security, War, Fragile/Failed State, ISIS, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Africa, United States, Iraq, Middle East, Yemen, Syria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sundan

2. Distributed Defense New Operational Concepts for Integrated Air and Missile Defense

Author:
Tom Karako and Wes Rumbaugh
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Despite the rising salience of missile threats, current air and missile defense forces are far too susceptible to suppression. Today’s U.S. air and missile defense (AMD) force lacks the depth, capacity, and operational flexibility to simultaneously perform both missions. Discussions about improving AMD usually revolve around improvements to the capability and capacity of interceptors or sensors. Rather than simply doing more of the same, the joint integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) efforts might be well served by new or reinvigorated operational concepts, here discussed collectively as “Distributed Defense.” By leveraging networked integration, Distributed Defense envisions a more flexible and more dispersible air and missile defense force capable of imposing costs and dilemmas on an adversary, complicating the suppression of U.S. air and missile defenses. Although capability and capacity improvements remain essential to the high-end threats, the Distributed Defense concept focuses on creating a new architecture for today’s fielded or soon-to-be fielded IAMD force to boost flexibility and resilience.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
United States

3. The Return of Political Warfare

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy outline a U.S. shift from counterterrorism to inter-state competition with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. However, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for much of this competition to occur at the unconventional level, since the costs of conventional and nuclear war would likely be catastrophic. U.S. strategy is evolving from a post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism against groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State to competition between state adversaries. As the National Defense Strategy notes, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”1 This shift has significant implications for the U.S. military, since it indicates a need to improve U.S. capabilities to fight—and win—possible wars against China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea if deterrence fails. Though it is prudent to prepare for conventional—and even nuclear—war, the risks of conflict are likely to be staggering. Numerous war games and analyses of U.S. conflicts with Russia in the Baltics, China in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, and North Korea on the Korean peninsula suggest the possibility of at least tens of thousands of dead and billions of dollars in economic damages. In addition, these conflicts could escalate to nuclear war, which might raise the number of dead to hundreds of thousands or even millions. According to one analysis, for example, a U.S. war with China could reduce China’s gross domestic product (GDP) by between 25 and 35 percent and the United States’ GDP by between 5 and 10 percent. The study also assessed that both countries could suffer substantial military losses to bases, air forces, surface naval forces, and submarines; significant political upheaval at home and abroad; and huge numbers of civilian deaths.2 These costs and risks will likely give Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and even Pyongyang pause, raising several questions. Will these high costs deter the possibility of conventional and nuclear war? If so, what are the implications for the United States as it plans for a rise in inter-state competition? The Cold War offers a useful historical lens. NATO planners prepared for a possible Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. The U.S. military, for example, deployed forces to the Fulda Gap, roughly 60 miles outside of Frankfurt, Germany, as one of several possible invasion routes by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces. NATO also planned for nuclear war. The United States built up its nuclear arsenal and adopted strategies like mutually assured destruction (MAD). The concept of MAD assumed that a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two or more opposing sides would cause the annihilation of both the attacker and the defender. The threat of such heavy costs deterred conflict, despite some close calls. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the two superpowers nearly went to war after a U.S. U-2 aircraft took pictures of Soviet medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba. But Washington and Moscow ultimately assessed that direct conflict was too costly. Deterrence held. Instead, the United States and Soviet Union engaged in intense security competition at the unconventional level across Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. Both countries backed substate groups and states to expand their power and influence. Under the Reagan Doctrine, for example, the United States provided overt and covert assistance to anticommunist governments and resistance movements to roll back communist supporters. The Soviets did the same and supported states and substate actors across the globe. In addition, the Soviets adopted an aggressive, unconventional approach best captured in the phrase “active measures” or aktivnyye meropriatia. As used by the KGB, active measures included a wide range of activities designed to influence populations across the globe. The KGB established front groups, covertly broadcast radio and other programs, orchestrated disinformation campaigns, and conducted targeted assassinations. The Soviets used active measures as an offensive instrument of Soviet foreign policy to extend Moscow’s influence and power throughout the world, including in Europe. Unlike the Cold War, the United States confronts multiple state adversaries today—not one. As the National Defense Strategy argues, the United States is situated in “a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory” where “the central challenges to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers.” But based on the likely costs and risks of conventional and nuclear war with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, much of the competition will likely be unconventional—and include what former U.S. State Department diplomat George Kennan referred to as “political warfare.” The term political warfare refers to the employment of military, intelligence, diplomatic, financial, and other means—short of conventional war—to achieve national objectives. It can include overt operations like public broadcasting and covert operations like psychological warfare and support to underground resistance groups.3 The United States’ adversaries today are already engaged in political warfare. Russia, for instance, utilizes a range of means to pursue its interests, such as technologically sophisticated offensive cyber programs, covert action, and psychological operations. Moscow has conducted overt operations like the use of RT and Sputnik, as well as semitransparent and covert efforts. It has also become increasingly active in supporting state and substate actors in countries like Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan, and Libya to expand its influence in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and even North Africa. Finally, Russia is attempting to exploit European and transatlantic fissures and support populist movements to undermine European Union and NATO cohesion, thwart economic sanctions, justify or obscure Russian actions, and weaken the attraction of Western institutions for countries on Russia’s periphery. Iran is using political warfare tools like propaganda, cyber attacks, and aid to substate proxies to support its security priorities, influence events and foreign perceptions, and counter threats. Tehran is also assisting state and substate actors in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and Afghanistan. Iran supports Shia militia groups in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, and Houthi rebels in Yemen. In the South China Sea, China is pouring millions of tons of sand and concrete onto reefs, creating artificial islands. It is also conducting a sophisticated propaganda campaign, utilizing economic coercion, and using fleets of fishing vessels to solidify its assertion of territorial and resource rights throughout the Pacific. Finally, Beijing is targeting the U.S. government, its allies, and U.S. companies as part of a cyber-espionage campaign. With political warfare already alive and well with the United States’ state adversaries, there are several implications for U.S. defense strategy. First, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for significant inter-state competition to occur at the unconventional level, since the costs and risks of conventional and nuclear war may be prohibitively high. This should involve thinking through trade-offs regarding force posture, procurement, acquisition, and modernization. A U.S. military that predominantly focuses on preparing for conventional or nuclear war with state competitors—by modernizing the nuclear triad, building more resilient space capabilities, acquiring more effective counter-space systems, equipping U.S. forces with high-technology weapons, and emphasizing professional military education (PME) to fight conventional wars—may undermine U.S. unconventional readiness and capabilities. Second, even organizations that already engage in some types of political warfare—such as U.S. Special Operations Command and the U.S. intelligence community—will need to continue shifting some of their focus from counterterrorism to political warfare against state adversaries. This might include, for example, providing more aid to the Baltic States to conduct an effective resistance campaign against unconventional action by Moscow. Or it might involve aiding proxies in countries like Syria and Yemen to counter Iranian-backed organizations. It could also include improving the border security capabilities and effectiveness of Ukrainian military and police units against Russian-backed rebels. Third, the United States should invest in resources and capabilities that allow the military and other U.S. government agencies to more effectively engage in political warfare—and to provide agencies with sufficient authorities to conduct political warfare. One example is improving capabilities to conduct aggressive, offensive cyber operations. Other examples might include advanced electronic attack capabilities, psychological warfare units, security force assistance brigades, and precision munitions. Recognizing that other powers routinely conduct political warfare, George Kennan encouraged U.S. leaders to disabuse themselves of the “handicap” of the “concept of a basic difference between peace and war” and to wake up to “the realities of international relations—the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of war.” Kennan’s advice may be even more relevant today in such a competitive world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

4. Enhanced Deterrence in the North A 21st Century European Engagement Strategy

Author:
Heather A Conley
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Twenty-five years of relative calm and predictability in relations between Russia and the West enabled European governments largely to neglect their military capabilities for territorial defense and dramatically redraw Northern Europe’s multilateral, regional, and bilateral boundaries, stimulating new institutional and cooperative developments and arrangements. These cooperative patterns of behavior occurred amid a benign security environment, a situation that no longer obtains. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, its military incursion into eastern Ukraine, its substantial military modernization efforts, heightened undersea activity in the North Atlantic and Baltic Sea, and its repeated air violations, the region’s security environment has dramatically worsened. The Baltic Sea and North Atlantic region have returned as a geostrategic focal point. It is vital, therefore, that the United States rethink its security approach to the region—what the authors describe as Enhanced Deterrence in the North.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Modernization
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, North Atlantic, Northern Europe, Crimea, and Baltic Sea

5. Oversight and Accountability in U.S. Security Sector Assistance

Author:
Melissa Dalton and Hijab Shah
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
With the range of security challenges confronting the United States in the 21st century, characterized by competition by both state and nonstate actors, the importance of working with allies and partners to address common challenges is paramount. Deeper examination of the relative effectiveness of U.S. security sector assistance and how it must nest in a broader foreign policy strategy, including good governance, human rights, and rule of law principles, is required. Improving oversight and accountability in U.S. security sector assistance with partners are at the core of ongoing security assistance reform efforts to ensure that U.S. foreign policy objectives are met and in accordance with U.S. interests and values. This report examines key areas in security sector programming and oversight where the U.S. Departments of Defense and State employ accountability mechanisms, with the goal of identifying ways to sharpen and knit together mechanisms for improving accountability and professionalism into a coherent approach for partner countries.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and Human Rights
Political Geography:
United States and North America

6. Trump’s 2019 Missile Defense Budget: Choosing Capacity over Capability

Author:
Tom Karako and Wes Rumbaugh
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
President Trump’s 2019 budget request includes $12.9 billion for missile defense programs, including $9.9 billion for the Missile Defense Agency and about $3 billion in modernization in the military services, building upon the acceleration initiated in the $323 million FY 2017 Above Threshold Reprogramming and the FY 2018 Budget Amendment of $2.0 billion. The proposed budget continues the recent trend of procurement consuming a greater portion of overall missile defense spending, reflecting a choice for prioritizing near-term capacity over longer-term capability. With the exception of two new Pacific radars and a modest effort for tracking hypersonic threats, the request includes strikingly few changes to the program of record. The submission fails to address past shortfalls for more research and development of new missile defense technologies and capabilities, most significantly with its lack of real movement toward a space-based sensor layer for tracking and discrimination, as opposed to merely missile warning. Pursuit of more advanced capabilities will require substantial programmatic changes in the 2020 budget, or with a budget amendment later this year, if such capabilities are recommended by the forthcoming Missile Defense Review. On February 12, the Department of Defense (DoD) released its budget request for FY 2019, which included a total of $12.9 billion for missile defense-related activities. The proposed topline for the Missile Defense Agency comes in at $9.9 billion, comprising $2.4 billion for procurement, $6.8 billion for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), $500 million for operations and maintenance (O&M), and $206 million for military construction (MILCON). The $9.9 billion request is a 26 percent increase from the FY 2018 budget request of $7.9 billion. Funding for ballistic missile defense within the services includes about $3 billion, largely for the procurement of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3 MSE) and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) interceptors. Overall, the budget reflects a near-term focus on capacity of existing programs, even at the expense of capability improvements. In its current form, the request boosts funding for all four families of interceptors. For homeland missile defense, this includes the continued improvements to the capacity and reliability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system by continuing to deploy an additional 20 interceptors, several testing spares, and a new missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska. The request also deepens the magazines for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Aegis, and Patriot interceptors, continuing a procurement-heavy trend from last year.1 The focus on capacity does not answer the question, however, how missile defense efforts will be adapted to the new reality of great power competition described by the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy.2 One of the few new muscle movements in the entire budget is the addition of two radars in the Pacific for discriminating long-range missile threats to the homeland. The idea of a discrimination radar for Hawaii had been publicly floated over the past two years, and had previously been part of the yet-unpassed appropriations marks from the House and Senate appropriations committees. The Hawaii radar is scheduled for a 2023 deployment, with an additional radar deployed by 2024 at a yet-undisclosed location. The two radars will cost approximately $2.5 billion over the course of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The inadequacy of the request lies not with the top line, but rather with the capabilities and strategy that the top line fails to prioritize. Although these radars would be useful to close the near-term Pacific midcourse gap against limited ballistic missile threats to the homeland, such funds must be weighed against the opportunity cost for larger improvements in capability provided by a space-based sensor layer that could provide substantially more capable birth-to-death tracking and discrimination on a more global scale and against a wider diversity of threats. The choice for capacity over capability reflects a near-term time horizon, but further delay in more advanced technologies will carry costs at a later time. In sum, the administration’s budget request for FY 2019 prioritizes near-term readiness against limited but growing ballistic missile threats from sources such as North Korea. This choice, however, falls short of connecting missile defense efforts to the reality of renewed great power competition as articulated in the National Defense Strategy. The inadequacy of the request lies not with the top line, but rather with the capabilities and strategy that the top line fails to prioritize. The 2019 request’s modesty of ambition is manifested by low funding for more advanced programs, such as boost-phase intercept, space-based sensors, and volume kill. Should the forthcoming Missile Defense Review address some of these issues and recommend programmatic changes, their implementation may have to wait until the 2020 budget, unless a budget amendment of some kind prioritizes them for the coming fiscal year.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Budget, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Asia, and North America

7. The Other Side of the North Korean Threat: Looking Beyond Its Nuclear Weapons and ICBMs

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The United States, South Korea, Japan—and every other state affected by the stability and security of Northeast Asia—has a strong incentive to find a way to end North Korea's nuclear threat and its development and deployment of ICBMs. At the same time, no one can afford to forget that North Korea poses a much wider range of threats from its conventional forces and shorter-range missiles—particularly as it develops ballistic and cruise missiles with precision strike capabilities. U.S. diplomacy and strategy cannot afford to focus solely on nuclear weapons, particularly when North Korea has the option of developing biological weapons with the same lethality as nuclear weapons. The U.S. cannot afford to ignore the conventional threat that North Korea poses to South Korea—a threat that could inflict massive casualties on South Korean civilians as well as create a level of conventional war that could devastate the South Korean economy.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Political stability, and Biological Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Asia-Pacific

8. Pakistan’s Gwadar Port: A New Naval Base in China’s String of Pearls in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Gurmeet Kanwai
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Issue The development of Gwadar Port is a key element of the greater China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It speaks to both the strength of the China-Pakistan relationship and the reach of China’s grand strategy. With Pakistan’s two other major ports operating near capacity with no room for expansion, projects in Gwadar promise to eventually handle one million tons of cargo annually, while also providing significant industrial, oil, and transportation infrastructure. Though a “monument of Pakistan-China friendship,” there are misgivings on both sides about CPEC, including the safety of Chinese workers, the resentment of Baloch nationalists, and the growing debt trap created by the project. The prospect of the PLA Navy in Gwadar poses greater security questions, as it forms another link in China’s efforts to expand its maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific region. The members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or “Quad,” comprised of India, Japan, Australia, and the United States, should counter China’s strategic outreach by networking with other like-minded countries on cooperative security frameworks to ensure a free, open, prosperous, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:
Security, Oil, Regional Cooperation, Global Political Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, Japan, China, Middle East, India, Asia, and Australia

9. Rebooting U.S.-China Trade Ties: “Enter Ye Through the Narrow Gate”

Author:
Christopher K Johnson
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Nearly two weeks after the U.S. “Trade Avengers” unleashed during their visit to Beijing what one reasonably could call “trade shock and awe” with a very aggressive—if thoroughly researched and well-crafted—set of demands targeting the yawning U.S. trade deficit with China and the core of that country’s throaty industrial policy, China this week is taking its turn with the visit of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo member and Vice Premier Liu He, President Xi Jinping’s economic point man who is almost universally described as a thoughtful, pragmatic, and mild-mannered policy academic. In the interim, voices from a wide swath of official Washington have sounded the alarm about the dangers of Chinese influence operations and the presence of alleged subversives, while President Trump himself seemed to cast aside these growing concerns by suggesting via Twitter that he would ask the Commerce Department to overturn its action against the Chinese telecommunications firm ZTE—long a focus of the U.S. security community for suspected cyber espionage activity and irrefutable violations of U.S. law—in response to protests that reportedly emanated directly from President Xi. With such frenetically sustained action in such a short period of time, the fog of war seems particularly thick at the moment. As such, it seems like a good time to slow down and have a think about how we got here, what actually is going on, and, with a little bit of luck, perhaps think about some ways to craft a viable way forward. Just like milestone birthdays in one’s personal life, important political anniversaries also can incline the mind toward reflection. Next year, of course, marks the fortieth anniversary of the reestablishment of diplomatic ties between the United States and China. As such, much breath and a lot of ink have been devoted to analyzing the course of the bilateral relationship over that nearly half-century. Although certainly not a universal opinion, it seems fair, if perhaps overly reductionist, to suggest that the general conclusion among a substantial number of U.S. officials, policy analysts, and journalists has been that the consistent U.S. policy emphasis on engagement with China during those forty years was, at the end of the day, a sham. In this rendering, naïve groups of senior policymakers in succeeding U.S. administrations and in most of the U.S. China-watching community were hoodwinked by wily CCP leaders who talked the talk of integrating into the so-called U.S.-led rules-based international order, but all the while they had a secret master plan to instead subvert that order and challenge U.S. primacy throughout the globe. In a slightly less menacing (if no less absurd) version of this narrative, China was, indeed, headed generally toward this hoped for integration under the stewardship of deceased paramount leader Deng Xiaoping and his handpicked successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao until Xi Jinping arrived and, through a ruthless consolidation of power, decided instead to change course in what now regularly is referred to in shorthand as Xi’s “authoritarian turn.” But this conclusion seems utterly wrongheaded when examined in the light of hard facts. On the Chinese side of the equation, for example, Deng Xiaoping may have appeared warm and cuddly when donning his cowboy hat during his famous 1979 visit to the United States, but he could be just as ruthless and grasping as any other authoritarian leader. Deng’s exceptionally courageous and dogged pursuit of the policies of reform and opening certainly are worthy of praise, but they cannot, and therefore should not, be separated from the fact that he was content to sit idly by as Chairman Mao’s loyal lieutenant as Mao decimated his political rivals during the Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957-59) and the Great Leap Forward (1958-62). Nor should we forget that Deng used every ounce of his massive personal prestige with the People’s Liberation Army to, with steely determination, rally his many reluctant commanders to execute the brutal Tiananmen crackdown of June 4, 1989. Similarly, Xi Jinping is no Jack-in-the-Box-like figure who has pulled a fast one with a sharp directional turn in the last couple of years made all the more stark after his sweeping consolidation of power at last fall’s 19th Party Congress. In fact, it is this author’s contention, as supported by a large body of written work and public commentary, that everything Xi has done over the last five years was abundantly clear, whether explicitly or in embryonic form—from the moment he was introduced to the world as China’s new top leader in the fall of 2012, as encapsulated in his call for his country to pursue the “China Dream” set on a foundation of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” This by no means suggests the United States should express support for, or even acquiescence in, Xi’s policies, but only that it should not be reacting with the borderline hysteria that now seems to be gripping Washington.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Global Political Economy, and Trade Wars
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America

10. Australia and the United States An Alliance for the Twenty-first Century

Author:
Amy Searight and Michael J. Green
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
On August 21–22, 2017, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) organized a conference in Sydney, Australia—Australia and the United States: An Alliance for the 21st Century—in cooperation with the United States Studies Centre (USSC) at the University of Sydney and the Perth USAsia Centre at the University of Western Australia. The conference was generously supported by a grant from the U.S. Department of State. This conference gathered together key thinkers from both countries at an important time for the Australia-U.S. alliance. The scope of cooperation between Australia and the United States has never been greater—extending well beyond traditional defense, intelligence, and diplomatic engagement—and the alliance enjoys healthy support among policymakers and the wider public in both countries. Bilateral economic, social, and cultural ties are broad and deep. The two countries are working closely together to defeat the threat posed by ISIL and other terrorist networks in the Middle East and globally, and to ensure the Asia-Pacific region remains stable and prosperous. Yet the Australia-U.S. alliance faces growing external and internal challenges. The United States, Australia, and other allies confront rising threats in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, and globally from terrorism, financial instability, pandemic diseases, and other transnational challenges. Revisionist powers are seeking to reshape regional security dynamics and carve out spheres of influence, jeopardizing the liberal rules-based order that has supported American and Australian security and prosperity for more than half a century. The risks of miscalculation and conflict are growing, as is the prospect of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, allied resources available to meet these problems are constrained by slow economic growth across the developed world and the cost of supporting aging populations. Now, economic dislocation and stagnant wages are generating a wave of populist and protectionist sentiment in many parts of the world that risks undermining governance and a return to zero-sum, mercantilist economic policies—while U.S. political divisions and some policy choices are exacerbating allies’ concerns about the future of American global leadership. Many of these issues are playing out in the contemporary Australian debate, with a range of senior political figures and commentators calling for Australia to distance itself from the United States and recent opinion polls suggesting doubts about U.S. staying power as well as growing affinity for China. This is broadly consistent with polling from the region that suggests that China’s growing economic clout and military capabilities are driving expectations that China will supplant the United States as the predominant power in the Asia Pacific. These trends raise new questions about the future of the alliance in domestic, bilateral, and international contexts that we must address. They also highlight: the increasingly complex challenges facing U.S. and Australian alliance managers; the importance of not taking the alliance for granted; a requirement for fresh ideas about the alliance; and the need to engage a broader range of stakeholders, including a new generation of strategic thinkers in Australia and the United States. The Sydney conference brought together a group of about 40 participants—including 10 young next-generation leaders from Australia—for a two-day discussion on the opportunities and challenges facing the Australia-U.S. alliance across geopolitical, security, and economic issues. It focused on identifying key takeaways and formulating practical recommendations to improve the Australia-U.S. alliance’s capacity to adapt to changing dynamics, both globally and in the Indo-Pacific region, and to ensure support for the alliance well into the twenty-first century. Participation was by invitation and the discussions were off the record.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Counter-terrorism, and Global Political Economy
Political Geography:
United States, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

11. Back from the Brink: A Threatened Nuclear Energy Industry Compromises National Security

Author:
Michael Wallace, Amy Roma, and Sachin Desai
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The U.S. commercial nuclear energy industry helps the U.S. government meet several key national security objectives. But the industry is struggling to survive. We are not the first to say this and we will not be the last. We are also not the first to call for U.S. government support for this struggling industry—but this call to action is different. We are urging U.S. government action—not with the focus of protecting the commercial sector, but with a focus to protect U.S. government interests impacted by the decline in the commercial nuclear energy sector. This is a key distinction and warrants attention at the highest level of government. This paper is not intended for those in the nuclear energy industry. They know the issues. It is intended for the U.S. government and the U.S. public—to explain the reasons why U.S. government action is critical at this moment, and to explain how we can move forward in a manner that best protects our country’s national security. But what are these national security objectives and how are U.S. government and national security interests undermined by a decline in the commercial nuclear energy sector? In this paper we explain the critical importance of the U.S. commercial nuclear energy industry in support of U.S. defense, research, economics, geopolitics, and international nonproliferation. We walk through how the U.S. commercial nuclear energy industry arose out of and with the support of the U.S. government—and how President Eisenhower’s reasons for bringing nuclear energy to the world in the 1950s are the very same reasons that the United States needs to continue to do so today. We unravel the web of interconnections between the commercial nuclear energy industry and achieving U.S. government and national security goals. And we explain the impact that a declining commercial nuclear energy sector has on achieving those crucial goals. Moreover, we set forth a recommended path forward to come “back from the brink” and preserve critical commercial nuclear energy sector assets—including technology, knowhow, people, and influence—before they are lost forever, and U.S. national security is damaged as a result. This industry must survive—and it can if the U.S. government and private industry work together, recognizing the government and civilian integrated nuclear infrastructure moving forward. Notably, the response must be U.S. government led to take the approach that is best for the country, rather than any particular company or technology. We recommend five core U.S.-government-led actions to move forward that focus.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, National Security, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States and North America

12. Institutional Foundations of Federated Defense

Author:
Stephanie Sanok Kostro and Rhys McCormick
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
While the united states has long acknowledged the value of working with partner nations to address shared security concerns, drawdowns in defense spending have underscored the importance of bilateral and multilateral cooperation to leverage capabilities and investments. the Center for strategic and International studies' multiyear Federated Defense Project aims to inform policymakers about global and regional security architectures and defense capabilities that support the achievement of common security goals, as well as ways to improve defense cooperation among nations to address those goals together. This report on institutional foundations of federated defense recognizes that successful cooperation in a budget-constrained environment often rests on the u.s. ability and willing-ness to provide assistance and/or equipment to partner nations. CSIS project staff drew on a literature review, workshops, and a public event (“the Future of the security Cooperation Enterprise”) to identify key findings in five areas: Priorities/Strategic Guidance: Proponents of federated defense should better articulate priorities. A proactive, interagency component that includes, at a minimum, officials from the Defense Department, State Department, and White House is necessary to effect a cultural shift and combat potential backsliding into unilateral approaches. Foreign Military Sales: In a federated approach, officials should identify capabilities that could most effectively support partner nations' contributions to federated defense. Toward that end, officials should also emphasize the establishment and maintenance of high-demand capabilities over time. other key issues related to potential difficulties in foreign sales include surcharges, overhead costs, and transparency in offsets. Export Controls: study participants noted that recent export control reform efforts have not yet resulted in significant change and have inadequately addressed industry concerns. Moreover, there appears to be a lack of appetite for these reforms in Congress. Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure: Improvements are needed to coordinate and speed technology transfer and foreign disclosure decisions. transparency across stovepipes within the executive branch is critical to create a common vision and objectives for federated defense, which is especially important when working with industry and foreign government partners. Acquisition and Requirements Processes: Within the Department of Defense, there is insufficient consideration of the export value and challenges of systems in early stages of the acquisition and requirements processes. Modifications during late stages of development are often far more expensive than building in exportability earlier. Having examined these key areas, the study team identified and analyzed three over-arching institutional challenges to and opportunities for federated defense. First, study participants remarked upon the lack of sufficient advocacy for federated defense among senior U.S. government officials. A second challenge was the cultural resistance to federated defense; experts noted that significant cultural change, such as that brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Pub.L. 99-433), may require top-down direction, years to implement, and decades to be accepted. A third challenge was the need for a perceived or actual budget crisis to drive change. The study team's recommendations resulting from this examination were five-fold. First, U.S. national strategies should address the grand strategy questions that could imperil implementation of a federated approach. Implementation of the u.s. National security strategy could impel a new effort to focus on partner capabilities and areas for sharing the common global security burden, as well as to prioritize interests and activities related to U.S. security cooperation, export controls, and technology security/foreign disclosure. Second, proactive U.S. leaders should articulate a vision, objectives, and priorities for a federated approach to defense. third, the Administration and Congress should work together to ensure completion of legal and regulatory reforms already under way (e.g., on export controls). Fourth, executive and legislative officials—perhaps through an interagency task force that works with committee staffs—should identify additional reforms to streamline or create authorities and to eliminate unhelpful directed spending on capabilities and systems that do not contribute to federated defense. Finally, the Department of Defense should start with incremental steps to create a culture that values federated defense; for example, the Defense Acquisition University and Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management could update coursework to institutionalize knowledge regarding federated approaches. This study made it clear that enduring changes in these five areas—from strategy to culture—are necessary to ensure the success of a federated approach to defense.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, and Budget
Political Geography:
United States

13. Cybersecurity and Stability in the Gulf

Author:
James Andrew Lewis
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Gulf has become a flashpoint for cyber conflict. Cyberspace has become an arena for covert struggle, with the United States, Israel and other nations on one side, and Iran and Russia on the other. Iran has far outpaced the GCC states in developing its cyber capabilities, both for monitoring internal dissent and deploying hackers to disrupt or attack foreign targets. Several such attacks over the past two years were likely either directed or permitted by Iranian state authorities. Even if Iran holds back from offensive actions as nuclear talks progress, the growth in Iranian capabilities remains a potential security threat for other Gulf states. The GCC countries have begun to develop their defensive capabilities, but they will need to expand their defenses and collaborate more effectively to deter future threats.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Defense Policy, Development, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Arabia

14. Governing Uranium in the United States

Author:
Sharon Squassoni, Robert Kim, Stephanie Cooke, and Jacob Greenberg
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Proliferation Prevention Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) participated in a global project on uranium governance led by the Danish Institute for International Studies that looks at uranium accountability and control in 17 uranium- producing countries. The project seeks to identify governance gaps and provide policy recommendations for improving front- end transparency, security, and regulation. The impetus for the project is the concern that monitoring activities at the front end—uranium mining, milling, and conversion—could be strengthened.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, International Security, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States

15. Improving the US-GCC Security Partnership: Planning for the Future

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Over the years since the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Southern Gulf states and the US have developed a de facto strategic partnership based on a common need to deter and defend against any threat from Iran, deal with regional instability in countries like Iraq and Yemen, counter the threat of terrorism and extremism, and deal with the other threats to the flow of Gulf petroleum exports.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Defense Policy, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Yemen, Arabia, and North America

16. Afghanistan after the Drawdown

Author:
Gerald F. Hyman
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
In his 2013 State of the Union speech, President Barack Obama announced that by the end of 2014 "our war in Afghanistan will be over" and, a month earlier, that "by the end of next year, 2014, the transition will be complete—Afghans will have full responsibility for their security, and this war will come to a responsible end." The military transition, successful or not, is in full swing. Of course the war will not come to an end in 2014, responsible or otherwise. Even if the military drawdown goes as planned, "America's commitment to a unified and sovereign Afghanistan will endure, but the nature of our commitment will change," the president said. On the military side, our enduring commitment will focus on training, equipping, and funding the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and "some counterterrorism efforts that allow us to pursue remnants of al Qaeda and their affiliates," presumably the Taliban. As the United States draws down, so too will the remaining coalition countries of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command.
Topic:
Security, Development, Economics, and Governance
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and South Asia

17. Opportunities in the Development of Pakistan's Private Sector

Author:
Sadika Hameed
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Relations between the United States and Pakistan have begun to improve after several years of heightened tensions. Yet many challenges remain. Among them is how to improve Pakistan's economy. Its economic crisis is one of the main sources of its internal tensions, but multiple opportunities exist to improve its economic performance. The policy debate in the United States, however, is still dominated by a focus on terrorism and extremism. While Pakistan's stability is a natural concern for the United States, focusing primarily on security issues limits the options for improving stability.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Economics
Political Geography:
Pakistan and United States

18. Security Transition in Afghanistan

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Creating an effective transition for the ANSF is only one of the major challenges that Afghanistan, the US, and Afghanistan's other allies face during 2014-2015 and beyond.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Middle East

19. A Key Update: Afghan Forces on the Edge of Transition: Sharply Contradictory Data on Levels of Violence

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman, Michael Peacock, and Aaron Lin
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Data on Afghan Surge show had little or no lasting impact. NATO/ISAF stopped all meaningful reporting on security trends after EIA fiasco. No maps or assessments of insurgent control or influence versus limited dataf 10 worst areas of tactical encounters. No maps or assessments of areas of effective government control and support and areas where government is not present or lacks support. Shift from direct clashes to high profile and political attacks makes it impossible to assess situation using past metrics, but HPAs sharply up. UN casualty data and State Department START data on terrorism highly negative. No reason for insurgents to engage NATO/ISAF or ANSF on unfavorable terms before combat NATO/ISAF forces are gone.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

20. Federated Defense in Asia

Author:
Michael J. Green, Kathleen H. Hicks, and Zack Cooper
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The United States has long emphasized the desirability of working with allies and partners to meet pressing security challenges. Indeed, many of our most vexing security concerns—from terrorism to cyber attacks—are best met with concerted multilateral responses. At a time when the United States and many of its allies and partners are reluctant to increase defense and security spending, working together is paramount. This is perhaps most evident in Asia, where present and potential future threats to security and prosperity are high and shared interests are substantial.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Disaster Relief, Humanitarian Aid, and Intelligence
Political Geography:
United States and Asia

21. The Civil-Military Challenge to National Security Spending

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Perhaps the worst part of the debate that has led to the shut down of the federal government is its almost total irrelevance. It threaten both the US economy and US national security, but it does even begin to touch upon the forces that shape the rise in entitlements spending or their underlying causes.The Congressional debate does not address the forces that have led to a form of sequestration that focuses on defense as if it were the key cause of the deficit and pressures on the debt ceiling. It does not address the irony that much of defense spending has direct benefits to the US economy and that the spending on foreign wars–the so-called OCO account–dropped from $158.8 billion in FY2011 to some $88.5 billion in FY2013, and is projected to drop to around $37 billion in FY2015. Much of the debate focuses on the Affordable Care Act or "Obama Care"–a program whose balance between federal expenditures and revenues is sufficiently uncertain so the Congressional Budget office can only make limited forecasts, but whose net impact cannot come close to the cost pressures that an aging America and rising national medical costs have put on Federal entitlements in the worst case NDS May actually have a positive impact in the best case.The following briefing provides a range of estimates that addresses the real issues that are shaping the overall pressures that poverty, an aging America, and rising medical costs are putting on the US economy and federal spending. It draws on a range of sources to show how different estimates affect key trends, but focuses on data provide by a neutral arm of the same Congress that has paralyzed the US government and whose action threaten the funding on a viable national security strategy.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Economics, and Governance
Political Geography:
United States and America

22. Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman, Nicholas S. Yarosh, and Ashley Hess
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) face a critical need to improve their understanding of how each is developing its military power and how to avoid forms of military competition that could lead to rising tension or conflict between the two states. This report utilizes the unclassified data available in the West on the trends in Chinese military forces. It relies heavily on the data in the US Department of Defense (DoD) Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, particularly the 2013 edition.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
United States and China

23. Iran's Present Day Military Capabilities and Military Aspirations in the Middle East

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Far too much of the analysis of Iran's search for nuclear weapons treats it in terms of arms control or focuses on the potential threat to Israel. In reality, Iran's mix of asymmetric warfare, conventional warfare, and conventionally armed missile forces have critical weaknesses that make Iran anything but the hegemon of the Gulf. Iran's public focus on Israel also disguises the reality that its primary strategic focus is to deter and intimidate its Gulf neighbors and the United States – not Israel. It has made major progress in creating naval forces for asymmetric warfare and developing naval missiles, but it has very limited air-sea and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (IS) capabilities. It lacks modern conventional land, air, air defense and sea power, has fallen far behind the Arab Gulf states in modern aircraft and ships, and its land forces are filled with obsolete and mediocre weapons that lack maneuver capability and sustainability outside Iran. Iran needs nuclear weapons to offset these facts.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Arabia

24. Offensive Cyber Capabilities at the Operational Level

Author:
Maren Leed
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
At present, the defense policy landscape is replete with arguments, many of which are ultimately based in the lack of a common vision among both elites and within the broader population about the role of the U.S. military in the future. Cyber operations are one element of these debates, although much of the discussion has centered around how best to defend against a growing cyber threat, the role of the Defense Department in that defense, and tensions between civil liberties and security interests. Occasionally, greater attention is paid to questions about the U.S. use of cyber offensively, which brings with it questions of precedent, deterrence, international norms, and a host of other challenges. But it is also apparent that U.S. leaders have already approved the use of offensive cyber capabilities, though under tight restrictions. While not ignoring this larger context, the specific question this report examines is whether the Defense Department should make a more deliberate effort to explore the potential of offensive cyber tools at levels below that of a combatant command.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Intelligence, Science and Technology, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States

25. Yemen and U.S. Security

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman, Robert M. Shelala II, and Omar Mohamed
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Yemen is the most troubled state in the Arabian Peninsula. It remains in a low - level state of civil war, and is deeply divided on a sectarian, tribal, and regional level. A largely Shi'ite Houthi rebellion still affects much of the northwest border area and has serious influence in the capital of Sana and along parts of the Red Sea coast. Al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) poses a threat in central Yemen, along with other elements of violent Sunni extremism, there are serious tensions between the northern and southern parts of Yemen, and power struggles continue between key elements of the military ruling elite in the capital and outside it.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Foreign Policy, Islam, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Yemen, and Arabia

26. Innovative Immigration and Border Control Reform

Author:
Stephanie Sanok Kostro and Scott F. Mann
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Over the last 10 years, the United States placed great emphasis on securing its borders and improving its immigration process. Concerns about terrorism in the shadow of the September 11, 2001, attacks led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a means for streamlining and improving the government's ability to protect the United States, its citizens, and its infrastructure inside the nation's borders. From intelligence gathering and sharing to interdiction and apprehension, the goal was to bring all of the essential homeland security agencies in to one federal department and reduce the characteristically disparate and disconnected nature of previous homeland security agencies and responsibilities. Despite attempts to improve efficiency and efficacy, regulating the U.S. border and enforcing U.S. immigration policies remain significant challenges. The complexity of operations required to achieve the stated policy goals of the U.S. government, combined with the sheer volume of border traffic (licit and illicit, human and trade), hampered past attempts at effective border control, and cloud the potential for success of future operational undertakings.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Migration, Terrorism, Immigration, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:
United States

27. U.S.-India Homeland Security Cooperation: Building a Lasting Partnership via Transportation Sector Security

Author:
Rick "Ozzie" Nelson, Ally Pregulman, Rob Wise, Briana Fitch, and Melissa Hersh
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Given India's rapid development, the nation has become an increasingly vital world actor. India has the 11th largest economy in the world, and with its annual economic growth rate averaging 7 percent per year since 1997, it could surpass the United States and China to become the world's largest economy by 2050. This economic capacity facilitated billions of dollars in investments since 2006 to expand and upgrade India's defense and security capabilities, including the launch of its first nuclear- powered submarine and the ongoing acquisition of a fleet of aircraft carriers. The growth of India's economic and military sectors increases its strategic importance to the United States and other partners interested in ensuring stability and security in Asia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Terrorism, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, China, South Asia, and India

28. U.S. Department of Defense Contract Spending and the Supporting Industrial Base, 2000-2012

Author:
David J. Berteau, Gregory Sanders, Jesse Ellman, and Rhys McCormick
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Over the past decade, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has been analyzing and reporting on contract spending for national security and across the federal government. This report analyzes contracting for products, services, and research and development (R) by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and its key components. It provides an in-depth look at the trends currently driving nearly 70 percent of all federal contract dollars throughout the growth and subsequent inflection of defense spending of the 2000–2012 study period. This third edition of the DoD report updates reports from previous years and provides greater depth of analysis. Rather than primarily reporting the changes across dozens of graphs, the analysis lists key factors behind growth or decline. However, the ability to dive deeply into raw data is as important to many CSIS readers. To meet that need, CSIS has significantly upgraded the project website (http://www.csis.org/NSPIR/DoD ) to include the graphs and table contained within this report as well as variants by defense component and by product/service area. This web site will be a living repository. Throughout the year, the study team will publish and update the data underlying shorter publications on key issues relevant to the defense- industrial base.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
United States

29. The US and Iran: Sanctions, Energy, Arms Control, and Regime Change

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman, Bryan Gold, and Chloe Coughlin-Schulte
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
US and Iranian strategic competition is heavily drive by four key factors–the success or failure of sanctions, the im0pact of that competition on the flow of Gulf energy exports, the success or failure of efforts to limit Iran's nuclear options and the broader prospect for arms control, and the prospects for accommodation of regime change. In recent years, the key variable has been ways in which sanctions on Iran have changed US and Iranian competition since the fall of 2011, and helped lead to a tentative set of Iranian agreements with the UN's P5+1--the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, namely United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, and France, plus Germany--in November 2013.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Economics, Oil, Regime Change, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, United Kingdom, Iran, Middle East, France, and Germany

30. Shaping Iraq's Security Forces US-Iranian Competition Series

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman, Sam Khazai, and Daniel Dewit
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The last active US combat forces left Iraq in August 2010, marking the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the beginning of Operation New Dawn. Some 49,000 advisory troops, four advisor assistance brigades, and a limited number of special operations forces (SOF) remained to train, advise, and assist Iraq's security forces after that date, including the military, intelligence, and police. Until the end, these US troops continued to serve a number of other important security functions: carrying out kinetic operations against Iranian-backed and other militant groups; providing training to the ISF; taking part in joint patrols along the borders of the Kurdish provinces and helping integrate ISF and Kurdish forces; and acting as a deterrent to Iraq's neighbors–in particular Iran.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Counterinsurgency, and Fragile/Failed State
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Arabia

31. The Gulf Military Balance Volume II: The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Bryan Gold
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
No single aspect of US and Iranian military competition is potentially more dangerous than the missile and nuclear dimensions, and the possibility Iran will deploy long-range, nuclear-armed missiles.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Middle East

32. Combating Global Poverty: Investing in the Governance and Growth Nexus

Author:
Conor M. Savoy
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Foreign aid donors face a changed development landscape that necessitates a new approach to programming resources. In the last 20 years, countries across the developing world demo cratized, began to improve their governance, and experienced substantial economic growth. Yet, significant challenges remain that must be tackled, many of which fall within the governance and growth nexus. These issues—government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory policies related to the business and investment climate, and barriers to entry to the formal economy—are the preeminent challenges to expanding broad- based economic growth and continuing to reduce global poverty. The United States needs to shift its focus away from meeting basic human needs toward broader institutional development if it is to increase support for the governance and growth nexus. U.S. foreign aid is overwhelmingly directed toward global health and the delivery of other public goods. This must change.
Topic:
Security, Development, Education, Emerging Markets, Health, Poverty, and Foreign Aid
Political Geography:
United States and United Kingdom

33. The Myth or Reality of US Energy Independence

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
US “independence” from energy imports has been a key source of political dispute ever since the October War in 1973 and the Arab oil embargo that followed. Much of this debate has ignored or misstated the nature of the data available on what the US options are, as well as the uncertainties involved in making any long range projections.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, and Oil
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and Arabia

34. THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE Volume III: The Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Robert M. Shelala II
Publication Date:
05-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The US faces major challenges in dealing with Iran, the threat of terrorism, and the tide of political instability in the Arabian Peninsula. The presence of some of the world's largest reserves of oil and natural gas, vital shipping lanes, and Shia populations throughout the region have made the peninsula the focal point of US and Iranian strategic competition. Moreover, large youth populations, high unemployment rates, and political systems with highly centralized power bases have posed other economic, political, and security challenges that the GCC states must address, and which the US must take into consideration when forming strategy and policy. An updated study by the CSIS Burke Chair explores US and Iranian interests in the region, Gulf state and GCC policies toward both the US and Iran, and potential flash-points and vulnerabilities in the Gulf to enhanced competition with Iran. This study examines the growing US security partnership with Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE – established as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It analyzes the steady growth in this partnership that has led to over $64 billion in new US arms transfer agreements during 2008-2011. It also examines the strengths and weaknesses of the security cooperation between the southern Gulf states, and their relative level of political, social, and economic stability. The study focuses on the need for enhanced unity and security cooperation between the individual Gulf states. It finds that such progress is critical if they are to provide effective deterrence and defense against Iran, improve their counterterrorism capabilities, and enhance other aspects of their internal security.
Topic:
Security, Islam, Oil, Terrorism, Natural Resources, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and Arabia

35. The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia

Author:
Joseph S. Nye and Richard L. Armitage
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This report on the U.S.-Japan alliance comes at a time of drift in the relationship. As leaders in both the United States and Japan face a myriad of other challenges, the health and welfare of one of the world's most important alliances is endangered. Although the arduous efforts of Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and his colleagues in both governments have largely kept the alliance stable, today's challenges and opportunities in the region and beyond demand more. Together, we face the re-rise of China and its attendant uncertainties, North Korea with its nuclear capabilities and hostile intentions, and the promise of Asia's dynamism. Elsewhere, there are the many challenges of a globalized world and an increasingly complex security environment. A stronger and more equal alliance is required to adequately address these and other great issues of the day.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Israel, Asia, and North Korea

36. Moving towards Unity: Expanding the Role of the GCC in Gulf Security

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
12-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Riyadh Declaration, which was issued at the end of the GCC meeting in December 2011, calls for efforts to explore creating a “single unity” that could deal with the many challenges facing the Arab Gulf states.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and Arabia

37. Updating U.S. Federal Cybersecurity Policy and Guidance

Author:
Franklin S. Reeder, Daniel Chenok, Karen S. Evans, James Andrew Lewis, and Alan Paller
Publication Date:
10-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
As the threat to the cyber infrastructure on which the federal government and the nation relies grows, the urgency of investing wisely in protection against, detecting, mitigating, and recovering from cyber events takes on increasing urgency. Our adversaries are well equipped and agile. Our defenses must be equal to the threat, and they are not.
Topic:
Security, Crime, Government, Science and Technology, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:
United States

38. Iran and the Gulf Military Balance - I: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The most threatening form of US and Iranian competition takes place in the military and security arena. The areas where this competition now gets primary attention are the nuclear and missile arena, and Iranian threats to “close the Gulf.” US and Iranian tensions over Iran's nuclear program have grown steadily over the years. They now threaten to reach the crisis point as Iran produces highly enriched uranium and develops all of the technology necessary to produce nuclear weapons, and as US, European, and UN sanctions become steadily stronger.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Oil, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and United Nations

39. Noda Marches on; Both Sides Distracted?

Author:
Michael J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Prime Minister Noda advanced a legislative package on tax and social security reform but faced stiff political headwinds in the form of a frustrated public and a jaded opposition steeling for an election. Japanese concerns over the safety of the MV-22 Osprey aircraft scheduled for deployment in Okinawa dominated the bilateral agenda – at least in the media – and tested the mettle of Japan's widely-respected new defense minister. The two governments agreed to continue consultations on Japan's interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) but political paralysis in Japan and presidential politics in the United States could complicate efforts to make progress in the near term. Two reports issued over the summer addressing US force posture strategy in the Asia-Pacific and the agenda for US-Japan alliance, respectively, focused on the future trajectory for the bilateral relationship.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, and Reform
Political Geography:
United States and Japan

40. The Afghan War: Creating the Economic Conditions and Civil-Military Aid Efforts Needed For Transition

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman, Sean T. Mann, and Bryan Gold
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
In a little over two years the US and its allies plan to hand over security and other responsibilities to the Afghan government as part of a process labeled “Transition.” Afghanistan is still at war and will probably be at war long after 2014. The political, governance, and economic dimensions of this Transition, however, will be as important as any developments in the fighting.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, and Economics
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Asia

41. The FY2013 Defense Budget, Deficits, Cost-Escalation, and Sequestration

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Robert Shelala II
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The US may not face peer threats in the near to mid term, but it faces a wide variety of lesser threats that make maintaining effective military forces, foreign aid, and other national security programs a vital national security interest. The US does need to reshape its national security planning and strategy to do a far better job of allocating resources to meet these threats. It needs to abandon theoretical and conceptual exercises in strategy that do not focus on detailed force plans, manpower plans, procurement plans, and budgets; and use its resources more wisely. The US still dominates world military spending, but it must recognize that maintaining the US economy is a vital national security interest in a world where the growth and development of other nations and regions means that the relative share the US has in the global economy will decline steadily over time, even under the best circumstances. At the same time, US dependence on the security and stability of the global economy will continue to grow indefinitely in the future. Talk of any form of “independence,” including freedom from energy imports, is a dangerous myth. The US cannot maintain and grow its economy without strong military forces and effective diplomatic and aid efforts. US military and national security spending already places a far lower burden on the US economy than during the peaceful periods of the Cold War, and existing spending plans will lower that burden in the future. National security spending is now averaging between 4% and 5% of the GDP – in spite of the fact the US has been fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – versus 6-7% during the Cold War.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Economics
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and Asia

42. Integrating Approaches to Food, Water, Energy, and the Environment

Author:
Katherine E. Bliss and Katryn F. Bowe
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
On October 27, 2010, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the federal Subcommittee on Water Availability and Quality (SWAQ) cohosted a participatory workshop on domestic and international water issues entitled “Bridging Knowledge Gaps in Water Management.” The event convened federal agency experts and influential thinkers from academia, nonprofit organizations, and local communities to share insights across sectors and develop practical, actionable recommendations regarding the management of and access to food, water, and energy both domestically and abroad. A keynote address, two expert panels, and a break-out session structured the day's discussion. David Zetland, senior water economist at Wageningen University in the Netherlands, delivered the keynote address. In his remarks, Zetland critiqued the political process through which water and other resources are managed in the United States. His speech set the stage for a rigorous assessment of the challenges in conserving and using water resources efficiently. The first panel focused on identifying research and education gaps that pertain to water, as it relates to food, energy, and the environment. Allan Hoffman of the U.S. Department of Energy moderated the session, which featured speakers Piet Klop of World Resources Institute (WRI), David Reed of World Wildlife Fund (WWF), and Ed Link of the University of Maryland. On the second panel, representatives of the energy industry, academia, and think tanks shared their perspectives on bridging the knowledge gaps identified during the first session. Katherine Bliss of CSIS moderated the second panel, which included Reagan Waskom of Colorado State University, Kirsten Thorne of Chevron, and Paul Faeth of CNA.
Topic:
Security, Agriculture, Energy Policy, Environment, Natural Resources, and Food
Political Geography:
United States, Netherlands, and Colorado

43. US-Southeast Asia Relations: Dismay at Thai-Cambodian Skirmishes

Author:
Sheldon W. Simon
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Both the US and ASEAN expressed dismay at border skirmishes between Thailand and Cambodia around the Preah Vihear temple and two other ancient temples about 160 km to the west. Artillery exchanges and small arms fire call into question the two countries' commitment to the ASEAN rule of the peaceful settlement of disputes among its members. Washington has promised to aid Philippine maritime capabilities to patrol both its South China and Sulu Seas' territorial waters as part of a larger US goal of keeping Asian sea lanes open. New ships and radar installations as well as navy and coast guard training are being provided by the US. In Indonesia, the US embassy inaugurated a new public diplomacy program, @america, an interactive information technology site designed to demonstrate the breadth of American life to Indonesia's tech-savvy young people. Wikileaks releases of US embassy cables published in the Australian press critical of President Yudhoyono caused some tension between Jakarta and Washington. As the current ASEAN chair, Indonesia seemed to follow Secretary of State Clinton's call for an ASEAN role in resolving the South China Sea islands dispute. US relations with Vietnam and Cambodia continue to be strained over human rights concerns. While ASEAN has called for the lifting of economic sanctions on Burma since its recent national election and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, Washington seems in no hurry to follow suit, labeling the election as fatally flawed and noting that political prisoners remain in jail. Finally, the US promised high-level participation in ASEAN-led regional organizations, including the ARF, the ADMM+, APEC, and the EAS.
Topic:
Security and Human Rights
Political Geography:
United States, Washington, Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines, Cambodia, Thailand, and South China

44. China-Korea Relations: Can Inter-Korean Dialogue Revive Six-Party Talks?

Author:
Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
In the aftermath of North Korea's artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island on Nov. 23, 2010, Chinese officials showed great concern about the possibility of escalation, focusing special concern on the possibility that South Korean military exercises might lead to military escalation. The January summit between Presidents Hu and Obama served to reduce tensions to some degree, especially through a call for resumption of inter-Korean talks in the US-China Joint Statement released at the summit. Following the apparent stabilization of inter-Korean relations, China has stepped up calls for "creating conditions" for the resumption of Six-Party Talks, engaging in diplomatic exchanges with both Koreas, including meetings between Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs Wu Dawei and ROK nuclear envoy Wi Sung-lac on Feb. 10-11 in Beijing and again on April 26 in Seoul, and through DPRK Vice Minister Kim Kye Gwan's meetings in Beijing with Wu Dawei, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, and Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun respectively in mid-April in China. Although South Korea in April agreed to China's proposed "three-step" process toward restarting Six Party Talks – (1) Inter-Korean, (2) US-DPRK, and (3) Six-Party Talks – this plan makes the resumption of multilateral talks depend most critically on reaching consensus on the preconditions for inter-Korean talks, which remain stalled since a preparatory meeting for inter-Korean defense ministers' talks broke down in February.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
United States, China, South Korea, and North Korea

45. Afghanistan Win or Lose: Transition and the Coming Resource Crisis

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The US confronts a wide range of challenges if it is to win the Afghan conflict in any meaningful sense, and leave a stable Afghanistan and Pakistan: Decide on US strategic objectives in conducting and terminating the war. These objectives not only include the defeat of Al Qaeda, but deciding on what kind of transition the US wishes to make in Afghanistan, what goals the US can achieve in creating a stable Afghanistan, US goals in Pakistan, and the broader strategic goals the US will seek in Central and South Asia. Defeat the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but also by eliminating its control and influence over the population and ability exploit sanctuaries in Pakistan and win a war of political transition. Create a more effective and integrated, operational civil and civil-military transition effort by NATO/ISAF, UN, member countries, NGO, and international community efforts through 2014 and for 5-10 years after the withdrawal of combat forces. Build up a much larger, and more effective, mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Give the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy (and lasting stability) at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels by 2014. Dealing with Pakistan in reducing the Taliban-Haqqani network in the NWFP and Baluchistan, and dealing with the broader risk Pakistan will become a failed nuclear weapons state. Shape a balance of post-transition relations with India, Iran, "Stans," Russia, and China that will help sustain posttransition stability. Make effective trade-offs in terms of resources relative to the priorities set by other US domestic and security interests.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States

46. The Future of the U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership

Author:
Haim Malka
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Profound demographic, social, and political transformations are reshaping the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Changes under way in both the United States and Israel have eroded traditional pillars of the relationship, brought new elements to the fore, and contributed to debates in each country about how to defend that country's interests in a rapidly changing strategic environment. Uncertainty is growing about how the United States and Israel can and should cooperate to secure their interests and confront common challenges in a region undergoing dramatic shifts. Even more profoundly, Americans and Israelis increasingly see each other's policy choices as undermining their interests. The trend deepens U.S. doubts of Israel's strategic value and reinforces Israeli fears about U.S. commitments and guarantees to its security.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and Israel

47. u.s. and iranian strategic competition: Competition in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Pakistan

Author:
Erin Fitzgerald and Varun Vira
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The US has many hard decisions to make in shaping its policies toward Central and South Asia – driven primarily by the war in Afghanistan, the growing instability in Pakistan, and whether the US should actively pursue strategic interest in Central Asia in the face of Russian and Chinese pressures and advantages, than by strategic competition with Iran.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Central Asia

48. An Arms Control Process for the Middle East

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan
Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Arms transfer to the Middle East are not the sole cause of the regional problems. In fact the acquisition of arms has been the product of the unresolved political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as other conflicts in the region. Over the past five decades there have been a number of arms control proposals and attempts for the Middle east. One main weakness of these proposals was that they were not integrated into a political process. The continued Arab-Israeli conflict made it practically impossible to formulate and implement formal arms control agreements, resulting in a failure from the beginning. Therefore, in any move towards arms control and regional security in the region, the linkage between both conventional and non-conventional weapons and the ongoing peace process must be made. A peaceful solution to the Arab –Israeli conflict should proceed alongside any arms control negotiations, specially in the establishment of a Weapons of Mass destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the region. It is quite evident that peace cannot be achieved while still being threatened by a weapons of mass destruction capability of a neighboring country, nor can a WMDFZ be achieved without the context of a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement. This has been recognized by the Obama administration as being a “vital national security interest of the United States”. The position of many countries in the region is that they find it difficult to enter serious arms control negotiations until some form of regional peace is fully established. This stems from their perception that nations in the region still consider military force as the only viable source to achieve their policy objectives. The danger from this underlying reasoning, if perceived as the only alternative to preserving a regional security balance, is that it could give rise to an uncontrollable arms race and to a parallel proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Any massive rearmament will surely create an unrestricted arms race in the Middle East which will automatically be accompanied by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The fear is that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction could give rise to states announcing a so-called “in-kind” deterrence or “the right to retaliate in kind”. Unless controlled this arms race will give rise to another military conflict with catastrophic human and environmental consequences.
Topic:
Security and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, Middle East, Israel, and Arabia

49. National Security and the Commercial Space Sector: Initial Analysis and Evaluation of Options for Improving Commercial Access to Space

Author:
Guy Ben-Ari, Brian Green, Joshua Hartman, Gary Powell, and Stephanie Sanok
Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Over the past decade, CSIS has consistently reported on concerns about the state of the space industry. During that same period, the United States has experienced an ever-increasing reliance on space in the daily lives of its citizens and, significantly, in national security. This report assesses the interrelationship between the commercial space sector and national security. Understanding the current state of the commercial space sector is integral to identifying and evaluating national security concerns and to developing options for improvement.
Topic:
Security and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
United States

50. The OSCE and the 2010 Crisis in Kyrgyzstan

Author:
Richard Weitz
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
When Kazakhstan president Nursultan Nazarbayev met with U.S. president Barack Obama on several occasions during the former's April 11–14, 2010, visit to Washington, one of the issues the two leaders discussed was the volatile political situation in Kyrgyzstan. They were also joined on at least one occasion by Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, who was in Washington for the April 12–13 Nuclear Security Summit. The three governments were eager to share assessments about developments in Kyrgyzstan after the April 6–7 civil strife there killed about 80 people and wounded over 1,000. The ensuing chaos led Kazakhstan and other neighboring countries to close their borders with Kyrgyzstan and begin intensive consultations on an appropriate response.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Kyrgyzstan

51. US-Southeast Asia Relations

Author:
Sheldon W. Simon
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
High-level US efforts to convince Burma's military government to open its political system to the democratic opposition and release political prisoners prior to scheduled 2010 elections accelerated this quarter. President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton, and Assistant Secretary of State Campbell all weighed in during meetings in Burma and at the first ASEAN-US summit in Singapore after the annual APEC leaders meeting. The ASEAN states welcomed the first US summit with all 10 members. Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan noted that President Obama's praise for ASEAN's key role in Asian international organizations debunked claims by some that ASEAN is no longer the centerpiece of the region's architecture. Singapore's prime minister insisted that the US continues to be Asia's “indispensable” player despite the rise of China and India. In the Philippines, the Visiting Forces Agreement continues to be a political football in domestic Philippine politics as President Arroyo's political opponents claim that the US military violates the Philippine constitution by engaging in combat – an allegation denied by both the US embassy and the Philippine government. On a tip from the US, Thai authorities detained a cargo aircraft coming from North Korea with a load of sophisticated weapons in violation of a UN Security Council Resolution.
Topic:
Security and Government
Political Geography:
United States, North Korea, Philippines, and Southeast Asia

52. US-Japan Relations

Author:
Michael J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio moved to implement his domestic policy agenda with an eye toward the Upper House elections this summer but watched his approval rating fall as he and members of his ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) were beset by political fundraising scandals. The impasse over the relocation of Marine Air Station Futenma continued to dominate the bilateral agenda and alternative proposals put forth by the Hatoyama government failed to advance the discussion. Concerns about barriers to US exports and the restructuring of Japan Post emerged in commentary by the Obama administration and congressional leaders but a joint statement highlighting cooperation on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) reinforced the economic pillar of the relationship. The Toyota hearings in Congress were covered extensively by media in both countries but did not have an immediate impact on US-Japan relations. However, the recall issue and other developments point to potentially negative perceptions that could cloud official efforts to build a comprehensive framework for the alliance over the course of the year, the 50th anniversary of the 1960 US-Japan Security Treaty.
Topic:
Security and Economics
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, and Asia

53. US-Korea Relations

Author:
Victor D. Cha and Ellen Kim
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The sinking of the Cheonan remained the predominant issue in the US-ROK relationship as both countries spent the quarter coordinating and undertaking punitive measures against North Korea for its alleged attack on the ship. The UN Security Council adopted a Presidential Statement condemning the attack but did not directly blame North Korea. The US and the ROK held their first “Two-plus-Two” meeting in Seoul where Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates met Foreign Minster Yu Myung-hwan and Minister of National Defense Kim Tae-young. While countries reopened their dialogue channels in the hope of resuming the Six-Party Talks, there remain many challenges and uncertainties that make the future direction of the Talks unclear. Several issues remain to be resolved on the KORUS FTA while negotiators are expected to hold a ministerial meeting soon to strike a deal. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs released a report on US attitudes toward South Korea that highlighted public support for trade agreements, including the KORUS FTA, is lukewarm. Among those who viewed fair trade as critical for US interests, support for KORUS was much stronger.
Topic:
Security and United Nations
Political Geography:
United States and Korea

54. U.S. National Security and Global Health: An Analysis of Global Health Engagement by the U.S. Department of Defense

Author:
Eugene V. Bonventre, Kathleen H. Hicks, and Stacy M. Okutani
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Despite a broadening consensus that global health care efforts have an impact on national and global security, the U.S. national security community's efforts to address global health are weak and uncoordinated. The 2006 National Security Strategy states that “development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies.” While the U.S. government struggles to find the right balance among the “three Ds” of defense, diplomacy, and development, the U.S. military has increased its involvement in global health where it perceives the diplomacy and development to be under resourced—or to achieve its own specific objectives. As efforts to renew the capabilities of civilian agencies proceed, it is an appropriate time to step back and consider the role that the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) currently plays in glob al health, the impact of its health activities on national and regional security, and the role it could play to support a newly balanced U.S. foreign policy.
Topic:
Security and Health
Political Geography:
United States

55. U.S.-Southeast Asia Relations

Author:
Sheldon W. Simon
Publication Date:
01-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Political conflict in Thailand between the ruling, rural-based pro-Thaksin People Power Party (PPP) and an urban elite coalition calling itself the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) – though actually opposing democratic elections – turned violent in November and shut down Bangkok and the capital's airports for several days. The PPP government was forced to postpone the ASEAN summit scheduled for early December because of the violence and rescheduled the meeting for February 2009 to the dismay of other ASEAN leaders. Nevertheless, the new ASEAN Charter, which provides the Association with a legal personality for the first time, was activated at a special meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Jakarta on Dec. 15. Southeast Asian leaders welcomed Illinois Sen. Barack Obama's election as the next U.S. president although some commentators noted that the Democratic Party has sometimes followed a trade protectionist policy when the U.S. economy is in difficulty. The Democrats have also taken a tougher position on human rights. In general, though, no significant change is foreseen in U.S. policy for Southeast Asia under President-elect Obama.
Topic:
Security and Development
Political Geography:
United States, Thailand, and Southeast Asia

56. Regional Overview

Author:
Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's choice of Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, and China for her first official trip overseas helped shine a spotlight on Asia as a high priority region this quarter, as did North Korean Dear Leader Kim Jong-il's announcement that he intended to conduct a satellite launch in early April. The drama surrounding the anticipated launch provided an unfortunate back drop for otherwise very positive pronouncements about intended Obama administration policies in East Asia, even if the quarter closed with only a handful of those eventually to be tasked with implementing these policies at their desks. ASEAN leaders finally held their postponed summit and celebrated the entry into force of their much-maligned Charter. Meanwhile, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd visited Washington to underscore that the U.S. and Australia are still “mates,” even as his reluctance to send more combat forces to Afghanistan foreshadowed the difficulty President Obama faces in getting allies to sign up for his “surge” there. Finally, economic forecasts kept being adjusted downward as Asian leaders prepared for the G20 summit in London in hopes that this would bring a turnaround.
Topic:
Security, Government, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Japan, China, Indonesia, Asia, South Korea, London, and Australia

57. U.S.-Southeast Asia Relations

Author:
Sheldon W. Simon
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit to Indonesia, part of her initial overseas journey to Asia, was enthusiastically received in the world's most populous Muslim country. The secretary praised Indonesia's thriving democracy as evidence of the compatibility of Islam and political pluralism. Noting Southeast Asia's importance to the U.S., Clinton announced that the State Department would begin consideration of a process to sign ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a prerequisite for membership in the East Asia Summit. She also acknowledged that Washington's harsh sanctions against Burma's military junta had not changed that regime's draconian rule but also pointed out that ASEAN's engagement strategy was equally impotent. Nevertheless, she stated that the U.S. would consult with ASEAN in the process of reviewing its Burma policy. Meanwhile, ASEAN held its 14th summit in Thailand at the end of February. While the global economic crisis dominated the agenda, the future of a human rights commission mandated by ASEAN's new Charter proved the most contentious, with the more authoritarian ASEAN members insisting that noninterference in domestic affairs should remain the underlying principle of any human rights body.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Government
Political Geography:
United States, Washington, Indonesia, East Asia, Burma, and Southeast Asia

58. U.S.-Japan Relations

Author:
Nicholas Szechenyi and Michael J. Green
Publication Date:
10-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Hatoyama Yukio led the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) to a landslide victory in the Aug. 30 Lower House election and was elected prime minister after a spirited campaign for change both in the form and substance of policymaking. Exit polls showed that the public had grown weary of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) but had not necessarily embraced the agenda of the coalition government Hatoyama would subsequently form with an eye toward consolidating power in an Upper House election next summer. Though the election centered primarily on domestic policy, Hatoyama began his tenure by outlining foreign policy priorities during visits to the UN in New York and the G20 summit in Pittsburgh less than a week after he took office.
Topic:
Security and United Nations
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, and New York

59. U.S.-Korea Relations

Author:
Victor D. Cha
Publication Date:
10-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The quarter saw a good deal of U.S.-Korea activity, largely the result of several trips by high-level U.S. officials to the region. While extended deterrence was a major topic of conversation between the allies, Washington and Seoul also coordinated policy on North Korea with some indication that groundwork for reengagement in nuclear negotiations may be in the offing. Former President Bill Clinton's surprise visit to the North was successful in achieving the return of detained U.S. journalists Laura Ling and Euna Lee.
Topic:
Security, NATO, and Cold War
Political Geography:
United States, North Korea, and Korea

60. U.S.-Southeast Asia Relations

Author:
Sheldon W. Simon
Publication Date:
10-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Despite the renewed incarceration of Burma's Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi after a July “show trial” as well as renewed economic sanctions against the military junta, in late September Washington announced a change in its Burma policy, agreeing to reengage members of the regime. The opening to Burma is an acknowledgement that the decades-long isolation policy has failed to change Burma's politics and that China's influence has increased significantly. Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced an extension of the deployment of U.S. Special Forces in Mindanao to continue assisting the Philippine armed forces' suppression of the radical Islamist Abu Sayyaf. Gates also announced an expansion of U.S. aid in Mindanao for humanitarian and disaster response, climate change, drug trafficking, and maritime security. While expressing shock and offering condolences to Indonesia in the wake of the July terrorist bombings of two hotels in Jakarta, Washington praised the Indonesian police in mid-September for tracking down and killing the perpetrator of the attacks, notorious Jemmah Islamiyah leader, Mohammad Noordin Top. USAID is organizing a new program to assist civic social organizations in the troubled Thai south to promote governance and human rights. All of these activities indicate that, as Secretary of State Clinton exclaimed in Bangkok: “The United States is back!”
Topic:
Security and Human Rights
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Southeast Asia

61. China-Southeast Asia Relations

Author:
Robert Sutter
Publication Date:
10-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Myanmar's military offensive against armed militias of minority groups along the border with China disrupted the status quo that had prevailed along the frontier for the past two decades and complicated the extensive Chinese interests that have developed in the border region during this period. Frictions over territorial claims, fishing, and surveillance among China, Southeast Asian countries, and the U.S. over the South China Sea were less prominent than in recent quarters. China signed an investment agreement with ASEAN members marking the completion of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, which is to go into effect on Jan. 1, 2010. Chinese commentary joined other regional media in highlighting, with some reservations, the prominence of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the more activist U.S. regional agenda at the ASEAN Regional Forum Foreign Ministers' Meeting.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Southeast Asia

62. U.S.-China Relations

Author:
Bonnie Glaser
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Beijing Olympic Games were conducted without a hitch to the great relief of the Chinese leadership and the 1.3 billion Chinese people who had long anticipated the momentous event. Abroad, the reviews were mixed. Most agreed that the opening ceremony was spectacular and that China had successfully ensured the safety of the athletic competitions, but many argued that these goals had been achieved at a significant cost that highlighted the undemocratic nature of China's regime. President Bush's attendance further consolidated an already close and cooperative U.S.-Chinese relationship, even though Bush seized on several opportunities to criticize China's human rights practices. The U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) marked its 25th anniversary with agreements on food security, loans for medical equipment purchase, promotion of digital TV, and cooperation in agriculture and on trade statistics. The U.S. presidential campaign heated up, but China received little attention.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Beijing

63. The Paths Ahead: Missile Defense in Asia

Author:
Jeremiah Gertler
Publication Date:
03-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
In early 2005, Kurt M. Campbell, Director of CSIS' International Security Program, accompanied Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on a trip to Asia. Enroute, the Secretary and several of his close aides expressed an interest in learning more about the future of missile defenses in East Asia and the Subcontinent. Although familiar with the missile defense policies of countries in the region, they were concerned about how those policies were being implemented, whether the various national efforts were complementary or counterproductive, and how those efforts might affect the US approach to missile defense architecture.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States and Asia

64. Mexico Alert: Mexico's Southern Flank: A Crime-ridden "Third U.S. Border"

Author:
George W. Grayson
Publication Date:
12-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Mexico's southern flank constitutes a porous, crime-ridden third border of the United States. The problem is that both President Vicente Fox and Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge concentrate on the U.S.-Mexican frontier, while neglecting the Mexican-Guatemalan interface that provides an open sesame for narcotraffickers, illegal aliens, prostitutes, smugglers, and terrorists.
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
United States, Latin America, and North America

65. Canada Alert: The Smart Border Process at Two: Losing Momentum?

Author:
Andre Belelieu
Publication Date:
11-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
On December 12, 2001, Canada and the United States signed the Smart Border Declaration, which gave birth to the 30-point Smart Border Action Plan. This bilateral agreement instantly became the de facto framework for ensuring the world's longest undefended border remained secure, while facilitating the flow of people, goods, and services, and was a key component in the larger homeland security goal of creating a zone of confidence against terrorist activity, while causing minimal damage to the world's largest trading relationship. Two years later, the Canadian and U.S. governments can point to progress on all 30 points contained in the Action Plan. Through cooperation and an understanding that a smart border works in the interest of both countries, Canada and the United States can claim to be closer than ever to ensuring that the Canada-U.S. border remains “open to trade and closed to terrorists.”
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
United States, Latin America, and North America

66. Cuba, Itamaraty, and Brazil: Same Old Song?

Author:
William Barr
Publication Date:
05-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The New York Times was by no means the lone voice in criticizing Brazil's abstentions on the Cuba-related motions before the UN Human Rights Commission. Much tougher criticism has come from a wide range of Brazilians, including a substantial segment of academics, journalists, and even politicians who have long praised Cuba's independence from the U.S. orbit and criticized the United States' economic blockade.
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
United States, New York, Brazil, Cuba, United Nations, and Latin America

67. Chile Uses Institutional Strength-To Counter Corruption Scandals

Author:
Luis Pinto
Publication Date:
04-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Since Augusto Pinochet stepped down as president in 1989, Chile has been one of the most politically, socially, and economically successful countries in the region. The country has been able to move forward because of its aggressive promotion of exports, strength of its institutions, and the trust it has built with the international community. Recently however, Chile has found itself opposing the United States, a long time champion and supporter; it was also embroiled in several domestic corruption scandals. Chile has turned to the strength of its institutions and its international credibility to get back on track.
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
United States, South America, Latin America, and Chile

68. Mexico Alert: Economic Competitiveness in Mexico: Recent Evolution, Prospects, and Repercussions for the United States

Author:
Mariano Ruiz-Funes
Publication Date:
04-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
A country's economic competitiveness can be analyzed on two closely interrelated levels: microeconomic com-petitiveness and competitiveness in attracting investment. The first level (microeconomic competitiveness) relates to goods and services offered in the country and refers to competition arising from goods and services that are produced in another country. That competition takes place in international markets (export competitiveness) as well as in the domestic market (with imports).
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
United States, Latin America, North America, and Mexico

69. Mexico Alert: The Impact of the War in Iraq on Mexico

Author:
Armand Peschard-Sverdrup
Publication Date:
04-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
When looking at the ramifications of the war in Iraq on the Western Hemisphere, it is clear that the conflict will have the greatest impact on the two nations with which the United States shares borders—Mexico and Canada. From a national security standpoint, these nations' immediate proximity to the United States automatically heightens the threat to their own national security, particularly because we seem to have entered an era in which the use of weapons of mass destruction—be they nuclear, chemical, or biological—poses a viable threat. From a U.S. homeland security standpoint, the shared border transforms both of our friendly neighbors into possible platforms from which rogue elements could stage attacks or enter the United States to threaten our homeland.
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Canada, Latin America, North America, and Mexico

70. Radical Groups in Mexico Today

Author:
Gustavo Hirales Morán
Publication Date:
09-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Since January 1, 1994, the day when the armed uprising of the Zapatista Army for National Liberation (EZLN) was announced, it has been evident that Mexico is facing a second generation of radical organizations. The first generation, dating back to the 1970s, consisted of armed groups made up mainly of students, rural classroom teachers, and campesinos (i.e., subsistence farmers and agricultural workers along with their families). This generation's choice to pursue armed struggle revealed a trio of influences: Cuba's experience, socialist ideology, and the outrage and indignation produced by the repression and crackdown on nonviolent avenues of political opposition unleashed under the governments of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964–1970) and Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970–1976).
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
United States, Latin America, North America, and Mexico

71. Remarks by Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson on the Launch of the US-VISIT Program

Author:
Asa Hutchinson
Publication Date:
05-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
At the Department of Homeland Security-my responsibility centers on the borders of the United States. What we do at our borders impacts our security, our economy and our relationship with the international community.
Topic:
Security and Migration
Political Geography:
United States and North America

72. Cyber Attacks: Missing in Action

Author:
James A. Lewis
Publication Date:
04-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The first warnings of an “electronic Pearl Harbor” appeared in 1995. 1 They have appeared regularly since then. Before the conflict with Iraq that began in March 2003, there was speculation that the U.S. would experience cyber attacks in retaliation. Since the onset of the war, however, there have been no reported attacks that damaged U.S. infrastructure or affected U.S. military operations in Iraq. Nor have there been any reports of cyber attacks that damaged U.S. infrastructure or affected U.S. military operations since 1996.
Topic:
Security, Government, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
United States and Iraq

73. An Attack on Iraq: The Military, Political, and Economic Consequences: Scenario Briefing

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
03-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
There are major uncertainties about the military outcomes and political ramifications of an attack on Iraq. Really three sequential sets of scenarios: The prelude to war and the different ways in which war can occur. The actual process of conflict. The post-conflict occupation of Iraq and the way in which an independent Iraqi regime emerges.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East

74. Saudi Military Forces Enter the 21st Century: The Saudi Air Force

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
04-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This draft analysis is be circulated for comment as part of the CSIS “Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century Project.” It will be extensively revised before final publication.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States and Middle East

75. Saudi Military Forces Enter the 21 st Century: VI. Saudi Force Plans, Military Personnel, Military Expenditures, and Arms Transfers

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
04-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This draft analysis is be circulated for comment as part of the CSIS “Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century Project.” It will be extensively revised before final publication.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States and Middle East

76. The New American Approach to Defense: The FY2003 Program Notes on Homeland Defense, Counterterrorism, Asymmetric Warfare, and Force Transformation

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
02-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The US is Redefining Security: Three major areas in which the US is redefining defense: Home land defense, Force Transformation, Nuclear Posture Review.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States

77. Saudi Military Forces Enter the 21st Century: IX. The Saudi Air Force

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This draft analysis is be circulated for comment as part of the CSIS “Saudi Arabia Enters the 21 st Century Project.” It will be extensively revised before final publication.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and Arabia

78. Proliferation in the "Axis of Evil": North Korea, Iran, and Iraq

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Despite the June 2000 summit meeting and meetings between high level U.S. and North Korean officials on the one hand, and economic turmoil and continued food shortages on the other, we believe North Korea remains committed to maintaining strong military forces. These forces continue to be deployed close to the border with South Korea in an offensively oriented posture, and North Korea's NBC and missile programs likely remain key components of its overall security strategy. The most likely large- scale regional war scenario over the near term, which would involve the United States, would be on the Korean peninsula. In recent years, North Korea has continued to pose a complex security challenge to the United States and its allies. Prior to the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea is believed to have produced and diverted sufficient plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons. In addition, although North Korea froze the production of plutonium in 1994, there are concerns that North Korea is continuing with some elements of a nuclear weapons program. North Korea also possesses stockpiles of chemical weapons, which could be used in the event of renewed hostilities on the peninsula. Research and development into biological agents and toxins suggest North Korea may have a biological weapons capability. North Korea has hundreds of ballistic missiles available for use against targets on the peninsula, some of which are capable of reaching tar-gets in Japan. Its missile capabilities are increasing at a steady pace, and it has progressed to producing medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). North Korea also has continued development of even longer-range missiles that would be able to threaten areas well beyond the region, including portions of the continental United States. As a result of U.S. diplomatic efforts, however, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has maintained a moratorium on launches of long-range missiles for over one year.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, and Korea

80. The Military Balance in the Gulf: 2001-2002 Part III Weapons of Mass Destruction

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
As is the case with North Korea, experts differ over the seriousness of the Iranian threat. Most experts believe that Iran continues to pursue the development of long-range missiles, and of nuclear and biological warheads. Much will depend heavily on whether President Khatami and the more moderate elements in Iran's leadership can consolidate power and rein in Iran's hardline extremists, as well as on Iran's perception of the threat the US poses once it is ready to deploy and the cost of that deployment. This creates an extremely uncertain political climate.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and North Korea

81. If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and The Conventional Military Balance

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Despite the Gulf War, and the loss of some 40% of its army and air force order of battle, Iraq remains the most effective military power in the Gulf. It still has an army of around 375,000 men, and an inventory of some 2,200 main battle tanks, 3,700 other armored vehicles, and 2,400 major artillery weapons. It also has over 300 combat aircraft with potential operational status. At the same time, Iraq has lacked the funds, spare parts, and production capabilities to sustain the quality of its consolidated forces. Iraq has not been able to restructure its overall force structure to compensate as effectively as possible for its prior dependence on an average of $3 billion a year in arms deliveries. It has not been able to recapitalize any aspect of its force structure, and about two-thirds of its remaining inventory of armor and aircraft is obsolescent by Western standards. Iraq has not been able to fund and/or import any major new conventional warfare technology to react to the lessons of the Gulf War, or to produce any major equipment -- with the possible exception of limited numbers of Magic “dogfight” air-to-air missiles. In contrast, Saudi Arabia has taken delivery on over $66 billion worth of new arms since 1991, Kuwait has received $7.6 billion, Iran $4.3 billion, Bahrain $700 million, Oman $1.4 billion, Qatar $1.7 billion, and the UAE $7.9 billion, Equally important, the US has made major upgrades in virtually every aspect of its fighter avionics, attack munitions, cruise missile capabilities, and intelligence, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities. Iraq's inability to recapitalize and modernize its forces means that much of its large order of battle is no obsolescent or obsolete, has uncertain combat readiness, and will be difficult to sustain in combat. It also raises serious questions about the ability of its forces to conduct long-range movements or maneuvers and then sustain coherent operations. Iraq has demonstrated that it can still carry out significant ground force exercises and fly relatively high sortie rates. It has not, however, demonstrated training patterns that show its army has consistent levels of training, can make effective use of combined arms above the level of some individual brigades, or has much capability for joint land-air operations. It has not demonstrated that it can use surface-to-air missiles in a well-organized way as a maneuvering force to cover its deployed land forces. Iran remains a major threat to Iraq. Iran lost 40-60% of its major land force equipment during the climactic battles of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. It has, however, largely recovered from its defeat by Iraq and now has comparatively large forces. Iran now has an army of around 450,000 men – including roughly 125,000 Revolutionary Guards, and an inventory of some 1,600 main battle tanks, 1,500 other armored vehicles, and 3,200 major artillery weapons. It also has over 280 combat aircraft with potential operational status. Iran has been able to make major improvements in its ability to threaten maritime traffic through the Gulf, and to conduct unconventional warfare. Iran has also begun to acquire modern Soviet combat aircraft and has significant numbers of the export version of the T-72 and BMP. Iran has not, however, been able to offset the obsolescence and wear of its overall inventory of armor, ships, and aircraft. Iran has not been able to modernize key aspects of its military capabilities such as airborne sensors and C4I/BM, electronic warfare, land-based air defense integration, beyond-visual-range air-to-air combat, night warfare capabilities, stand-off attack capability, armored sensors and fire control systems, artillery mobility and battle management, combat ship systems integration, etc. In contrast, no Southern Gulf state has built up significant ground forces since the Gulf War, and only Saudi Arabia has built up a significant air force. Only two Southern Gulf forces – those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – have a significant defense capability against Iraq. Saudi Arabia has made real progress in improving its 75,000 man National Guard. Its army, however, lacks effective leadership, training, and organization. It now has an army of around 75,000 men –, and an inventory of some 1,055 main battle tanks, 4,800 other armored vehicles, and 500 major artillery weapons. It also has around 350 combat aircraft with potential operational status. The army has made little overall progress in training since the Gulf War, can probably only fight about half of its equipment holdings in the Iraqi border area (and it would take 4-6 weeks to deploy and prepare this strength), and has declined in combined arms capability since the Gulf War. It has little capability for joint land-air operations. Its individual pilots and aircraft have experienced a growing readiness crisis since the mid-1990s. It has lacked cohesive leadership as a fighting force since that time and cannot fight as a coherent force without US support and battle management.. Kuwait now has an army of only around 11,000 men, and an active inventory of some 293 main battle tanks, 466 other armored vehicles, and 17 major artillery weapons. Only its 218 M-1A2s are really operational and only a portion of these are in combat effective forces. It has only 82 combat aircraft and 20 armed helicopters with potential operational status, and only 40 are modern F-18s. It is making progress in training, but has not shown it can make effective use of combined arms above the battalion level, and has little capability for joint land-air operations. Its individual pilots and aircraft have moderate readiness, but cannot fight as a coherent force without US support and battle management. There has been little progress in standardization and interoperability; advances in some areas like ammunition have been offset by the failure to integrate increasingly advanced weapons systems. Showpiece exercises and purchases disguise an essentially static approach to force improvement which is heavily weapons oriented, and usually shows little real-world appreciation of the lessons of the Gulf War, the “revolution in military affairs,” and the need for sustainability. Current arms deliveries are making only token progress in correcting the qualitative defects in Southern Gulf forces, and no meaningful progress in being made towards integrating the Southern Gulf countries under the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia

82. Defending America: Redefining the Conceptual Borders of Homeland Defense

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
02-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
From a public policy viewpoint, these uncertainties mean the US must prepare for a wide variety of low probability attacks on the US, rather than to emphasize any given form of attack or group of attackers. The US must plan its Homeland defense policies and programs for a future in which there is no way to predict the weapon that will be used or the method chosen to deliver a weapon which can range from a small suicide attack by an American citizen to the covert delivery of a nuclear weapon by a foreign state. There is no reason the US should assume that some convenient Gaussian curve or standard deviation, will make small or medium level attacks a higher priority over time than more lethal forms.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States and America

83. Iraq's Military Capabilities: Fighting A Wounded, But Dangerous, Poisonous Snake

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
12-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
If we go to war with Iraq, we will go to war with forces that are the military equivalent of a wounded poisonous snake. They are weakened, but still dangerous, and they may lash out in ways that are truly dangerous. In broad terms, Iraq's forces have been in steadily decline ever since the beginning of the fighting in the Gulf War. They have been weakened by military defeat, by the impact of UN inspections, by wars of underfunding and by a decade without significant arms imports. At the same time, they are still the most powerful conventional forces in the Gulf, and Iraq may have some very unconventional weapons.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States and Middle East

84. Biological War and the "Buffy Paradigm"

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
09-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The most important single message that anyone can communicate in regard to biological weapons is that we face a very uncertain mix of existing threats politics, commercial development, and technology will change constantly as far into the future as we can look. The issue is not what we know, but how little we know and how little we can predict.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States

85. Islamic Extremism in Saudi Arabia and the Attack on Al Khobar

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
06-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This draft analysis is be circulated for comment as part of the CSIS “Saudi Arabia Enters the 21 st Century Project.” It will be extensively revised before final publication.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Arabia, and Saudi Arabia

86. Defending America: Redefining the Conceptual Borders of Homeland Defense

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
02-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Chemical weapons have not been used effectively in attacks on the American homeland. Reports that the bombers of the World Trade Center considered trying to add a chemical weapon like sodium cyanide to their explosives seem to be untrue, and led to an unsubstantiated assertion by the trial judge. There have, however, been a number of attempts to use chemical weapons by domestic extremists and individuals. For example, in 1997, members of the KKK plotted to place an improvised explosive device on a hydrogen sulfide tank at a refinery near Dallas, Texas. There is a well-established, low-level risk that such weapons will be used in the future, although there is no way to predict the frequency of such attacks, their scale, potential success, or lethality.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States and America

87. Defending America: Redefining the Conceptual Borders of Homeland Defense

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
09-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
There is a wide spectrum of potential threats to the American homeland that do not involve the threat of overt attacks by states using long-range missiles or conventional military forces. Such threats include covert attacks by state actors, state use of proxies, independent terrorist and extremist attacks by foreign groups or individuals, and independent terrorist and extremist attacks by residents of the US. These threats are currently limited in scope and frequency. No pattern of actual attacks on US territory has yet emerged that provides a clear basis for predicting how serious any given form of attack will be in the future, what means of attack will be used, or how lethal new forms of attack will be if they are successful.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States and America

88. Managing the Global Nuclear Materials Threat: Policy Recommendations

Author:
Sam Nunn and Robert E. Ebel
Publication Date:
01-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Despite the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons continue to pose the most devastating security threat to Americans. Although the risk of a nuclear war destroying civilization has virtually disappeared, the risk that a single nuclear weapon might be used to destroy a major city has increased, particularly given the erosion of control over nuclear material with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nothing could be more central to international security than ensuring that the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons do not fall into the hands of terrorists or proliferant states. Effective controls over nuclear warheads and the nuclear materials needed to make them are essential to the future of the entire global effort to reduce nuclear arms and stem their spread. At the same time, ensuring protection of public health and the environment in the management of all nuclear materials—from nuclear weapons to nuclear wastes—remains a critical priority. Appropriate management of both safety and security worldwide will be essential to maintaining nuclear fission as an expandable option for supplying the world's greenhouse-constrained energy needs in the twenty-first century.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
United States and Soviet Union

89. Disposing of Weapons-Grade Plutonium

Author:
Robert E. Ebel and John Taylor
Publication Date:
03-1998
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This panel report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies considers an issue of critical importance to U.S. national security interests: Is the United States now pursuing a well-conceived and effective program of working with Russia to dispose of the vast amounts of separated plutonium that have become excess to the nuclear weapons needs of the two countries?
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Russia and United States