Publishing Institution: Center for Strategic and International Studies / Political Geography: North Korea / Publication Year: within 25 Years / Journal:

1. North Korea’s Covid-19 Lockdown: Current Status and Road Ahead

Author:: Victor D. Cha, Katrin Fraser Katz, and J. Stephen Morrison
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: CSIS hosted a panel of experts for a discussion of the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on North Korea. The group discussed what is known about the current situation, the primary and secondary effects of the border lockdown, and the broader impact on North Korean society and markets. The group also examined North Korea’s path going forward, the possibility of an easing of restrictions, and the feasibility of humanitarian aid policies to North Korea. The meeting took place under Chatham House Rule on a not-for- attribution basis.
Topic:: Public Health, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Quarantine
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

2. More Is Possible Now to Address North Korea’s Health and Humanitarian Needs

Author:: J. Stephen Morrison
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: As President Trump and Kim Jong-un meet for their second summit in Hanoi, will there be serious consideration given to what concrete actions can be taken to protect and advance a health and humanitarian agenda that can directly benefit North Korea’s impoverished majority and reduce the threat of a runaway tuberculosis (TB) outbreak? Perhaps. Certainly, let’s hope so. There is much that can be done.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Health, Poverty, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

3. Korea, the JCPOA, and the Shifting Military Balance in the Gulf

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The analysis concludes that the sudden breakdown in the latest round of U.S.-Korean nuclear arms control talks in Vietnam should scarcely come as a surprise to anyone. Both sides sought too much too soon and did so despite a long history of previous failures. Heads of state engaged before their staffs had reached a clear compromise and did so seeking goals the other leader could not accept. It is not clear that an agreement was reachable at this point in time, but each side's search for its "best" ensured that the two sides could not compromise on the "good." This failure sent yet another warning that agreements like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear arms agreement with Iran that offers major progress in limiting a nation's nuclear weapons efforts can be far better than no agreement, and of the danger in letting the perfect become the enemy of the good. The failed U.S. negotiations with Korea sends a warning that any set of compromises that preserves Iran's compliance with the JCPOA, and creates a structure where negotiation can continue, will be better than provoking a crisis with Iran that can end in no agreement at all and alienate America's European allies in the process.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Denuclearization, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

4. The Return of Political Warfare

Author:: Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:: 02-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy outline a U.S. shift from counterterrorism to inter-state competition with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. However, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for much of this competition to occur at the unconventional level, since the costs of conventional and nuclear war would likely be catastrophic. U.S. strategy is evolving from a post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism against groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State to competition between state adversaries. As the National Defense Strategy notes, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”1 This shift has significant implications for the U.S. military, since it indicates a need to improve U.S. capabilities to fight—and win—possible wars against China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea if deterrence fails. Though it is prudent to prepare for conventional—and even nuclear—war, the risks of conflict are likely to be staggering. Numerous war games and analyses of U.S. conflicts with Russia in the Baltics, China in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, and North Korea on the Korean peninsula suggest the possibility of at least tens of thousands of dead and billions of dollars in economic damages. In addition, these conflicts could escalate to nuclear war, which might raise the number of dead to hundreds of thousands or even millions. According to one analysis, for example, a U.S. war with China could reduce China’s gross domestic product (GDP) by between 25 and 35 percent and the United States’ GDP by between 5 and 10 percent. The study also assessed that both countries could suffer substantial military losses to bases, air forces, surface naval forces, and submarines; significant political upheaval at home and abroad; and huge numbers of civilian deaths.2 These costs and risks will likely give Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and even Pyongyang pause, raising several questions. Will these high costs deter the possibility of conventional and nuclear war? If so, what are the implications for the United States as it plans for a rise in inter-state competition? The Cold War offers a useful historical lens. NATO planners prepared for a possible Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. The U.S. military, for example, deployed forces to the Fulda Gap, roughly 60 miles outside of Frankfurt, Germany, as one of several possible invasion routes by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces. NATO also planned for nuclear war. The United States built up its nuclear arsenal and adopted strategies like mutually assured destruction (MAD). The concept of MAD assumed that a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two or more opposing sides would cause the annihilation of both the attacker and the defender. The threat of such heavy costs deterred conflict, despite some close calls. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the two superpowers nearly went to war after a U.S. U-2 aircraft took pictures of Soviet medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba. But Washington and Moscow ultimately assessed that direct conflict was too costly. Deterrence held. Instead, the United States and Soviet Union engaged in intense security competition at the unconventional level across Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. Both countries backed substate groups and states to expand their power and influence. Under the Reagan Doctrine, for example, the United States provided overt and covert assistance to anticommunist governments and resistance movements to roll back communist supporters. The Soviets did the same and supported states and substate actors across the globe. In addition, the Soviets adopted an aggressive, unconventional approach best captured in the phrase “active measures” or aktivnyye meropriatia. As used by the KGB, active measures included a wide range of activities designed to influence populations across the globe. The KGB established front groups, covertly broadcast radio and other programs, orchestrated disinformation campaigns, and conducted targeted assassinations. The Soviets used active measures as an offensive instrument of Soviet foreign policy to extend Moscow’s influence and power throughout the world, including in Europe. Unlike the Cold War, the United States confronts multiple state adversaries today—not one. As the National Defense Strategy argues, the United States is situated in “a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory” where “the central challenges to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers.” But based on the likely costs and risks of conventional and nuclear war with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, much of the competition will likely be unconventional—and include what former U.S. State Department diplomat George Kennan referred to as “political warfare.” The term political warfare refers to the employment of military, intelligence, diplomatic, financial, and other means—short of conventional war—to achieve national objectives. It can include overt operations like public broadcasting and covert operations like psychological warfare and support to underground resistance groups.3 The United States’ adversaries today are already engaged in political warfare. Russia, for instance, utilizes a range of means to pursue its interests, such as technologically sophisticated offensive cyber programs, covert action, and psychological operations. Moscow has conducted overt operations like the use of RT and Sputnik, as well as semitransparent and covert efforts. It has also become increasingly active in supporting state and substate actors in countries like Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan, and Libya to expand its influence in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and even North Africa. Finally, Russia is attempting to exploit European and transatlantic fissures and support populist movements to undermine European Union and NATO cohesion, thwart economic sanctions, justify or obscure Russian actions, and weaken the attraction of Western institutions for countries on Russia’s periphery. Iran is using political warfare tools like propaganda, cyber attacks, and aid to substate proxies to support its security priorities, influence events and foreign perceptions, and counter threats. Tehran is also assisting state and substate actors in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and Afghanistan. Iran supports Shia militia groups in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, and Houthi rebels in Yemen. In the South China Sea, China is pouring millions of tons of sand and concrete onto reefs, creating artificial islands. It is also conducting a sophisticated propaganda campaign, utilizing economic coercion, and using fleets of fishing vessels to solidify its assertion of territorial and resource rights throughout the Pacific. Finally, Beijing is targeting the U.S. government, its allies, and U.S. companies as part of a cyber-espionage campaign. With political warfare already alive and well with the United States’ state adversaries, there are several implications for U.S. defense strategy. First, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for significant inter-state competition to occur at the unconventional level, since the costs and risks of conventional and nuclear war may be prohibitively high. This should involve thinking through trade-offs regarding force posture, procurement, acquisition, and modernization. A U.S. military that predominantly focuses on preparing for conventional or nuclear war with state competitors—by modernizing the nuclear triad, building more resilient space capabilities, acquiring more effective counter-space systems, equipping U.S. forces with high-technology weapons, and emphasizing professional military education (PME) to fight conventional wars—may undermine U.S. unconventional readiness and capabilities. Second, even organizations that already engage in some types of political warfare—such as U.S. Special Operations Command and the U.S. intelligence community—will need to continue shifting some of their focus from counterterrorism to political warfare against state adversaries. This might include, for example, providing more aid to the Baltic States to conduct an effective resistance campaign against unconventional action by Moscow. Or it might involve aiding proxies in countries like Syria and Yemen to counter Iranian-backed organizations. It could also include improving the border security capabilities and effectiveness of Ukrainian military and police units against Russian-backed rebels. Third, the United States should invest in resources and capabilities that allow the military and other U.S. government agencies to more effectively engage in political warfare—and to provide agencies with sufficient authorities to conduct political warfare. One example is improving capabilities to conduct aggressive, offensive cyber operations. Other examples might include advanced electronic attack capabilities, psychological warfare units, security force assistance brigades, and precision munitions. Recognizing that other powers routinely conduct political warfare, George Kennan encouraged U.S. leaders to disabuse themselves of the “handicap” of the “concept of a basic difference between peace and war” and to wake up to “the realities of international relations—the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of war.” Kennan’s advice may be even more relevant today in such a competitive world.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

5. The Other Side of the North Korean Threat: Looking Beyond Its Nuclear Weapons and ICBMs

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 03-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The United States, South Korea, Japan—and every other state affected by the stability and security of Northeast Asia—has a strong incentive to find a way to end North Korea's nuclear threat and its development and deployment of ICBMs. At the same time, no one can afford to forget that North Korea poses a much wider range of threats from its conventional forces and shorter-range missiles—particularly as it develops ballistic and cruise missiles with precision strike capabilities. U.S. diplomacy and strategy cannot afford to focus solely on nuclear weapons, particularly when North Korea has the option of developing biological weapons with the same lethality as nuclear weapons. The U.S. cannot afford to ignore the conventional threat that North Korea poses to South Korea—a threat that could inflict massive casualties on South Korean civilians as well as create a level of conventional war that could devastate the South Korean economy.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Political stability, and Biological Weapons
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Asia-Pacific

6. Shield of the Pacific: Japan as a Giant Aegis Destroyer

Author:: Tom Karako
Publication Date:: 05-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Several decades ago, former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone once described his country as a “big aircraft carrier” from which to defend against Soviet aircraft.1 Although such an analogy fails to capture the richness and depth of the U.S-Japan alliance, it did say something important about Japan’s unique geographic and strategic position. Today’s air and missile threats in the Asia-Pacific region are different, as is the joint U.S.-Japanese defense posture to meet them. Given a handful of changes underway, however, one might instead say that Japan is shaping up to be a giant Aegis destroyer group of sorts. A vision of much more robust air and missile defense capability in the Asia-Pacific region hinges upon the forthcoming acquisition of Aegis Ashore sites in Japan. Japan’s intent to acquire two such sites was announced in December 2017, a decision supported by 66 percent of the Japanese population, according to one recent poll.2 But the potential significance of Japanese Aegis Ashore deployments has not yet been widely understood. Combined with military forces in other domains, these sites will be the foundation of more robust air and missile defenses against North Korea and form a base upon which to adapt to more sophisticated future threats, including China. Assuming the approval process for the foreign military sales comes along well, this development has broad implications for the United States and America’s allies.3 The road to more layered missile defense goes in part through Aegis Ashore, and the road to innovative Aegis Ashore deployments probably goes through Tokyo. The U.S. Navy’s Aegis Combat System has evolved considerably since the first Aegis ship deployed in 1984. Some 90 Aegis ships are currently operated by the United States, and five other countries have Aegis ships as well: Australia, Norway, South Korea, Spain, and Japan. The word “Aegis” refers to the shield of the ancient god Zeus, and Aegis ships have long provided fleet air defense, strike, and antisubmarine warfare. Over the past decade, 35 American and 4 Japanese Aegis ships have also acquired a ballistic missile defense mission. The most recent configurations are capable of executing the integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) mission, with simultaneous air defense and ballistic missile defense operations.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Asia-Pacific

7. The Korean Civil-Military Balance

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 05-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: President Trump's cancellation of the summit with North Korea is a warning as to just how difficult it is to bring any kind of stability to the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. It is also a warning that the U.S. cannot focus on the nuclear issue and ICBM, rather than the overall military balance in the Koreas and the impact that any kind of war fighting can have on the civil population of South Korea and the other states in Northeast Asia. The nuclear balance is an all too critical aspect of regional security, but it is only part of the story and military capability do not address the potential impact and cost of any given form of conflict.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

8. Everyone Pivots to the Asia-Pacific

Author:: Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 02-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: A trifecta of international gatherings – the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders Meeting in Beijing, the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Nay Pyi Taw, and the G-20 gathering in Brisbane – had heads of state from around the globe, including US President Barack Obama, flocking to the Asia-Pacific as 2014 was winding to a close. North Korea was not included in these confabs but its leaders (although not the paramount one) were taking their charm offensive almost everywhere else in an (unsuccessful) attempt to block a UN General Assembly resolution condemning Pyongyang's human rights record. More successful was Pyongyang's (alleged) attempt to undermine and embarrass Sony Studios to block the release of a Hollywood film featuring the assassination of Kim Jong Un.
Topic:: Economics
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

9. Theories on Why North Korea Rejects the World

Author:: Victor Cha
Publication Date:: 07-2015
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: North Korea last week rejected South Korea’s invitation to attend the Seoul Defense Dialogue in September, denigrating the talks as “puerile.” In the same breath, it also rejected a proposal by National Assembly speaker Chung Ui-hwa for a meeting with his northern counterpart to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the liberation of the Korean Peninsula on Aug. 15. If you ask an Obama administration official about America’s “strategic patience” policy of non-dialogue with North Korea, he or she will tell you that the problem is not an unwillingness on the part of the United States to have dialogue. On the contrary, the Obama administration has tried every channel possible, from six-party talks to personal communications to secret trips, to jump-start a dialogue. But the regime in Pyongyang has rejected all of these.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Defense Policy, and International Security
Political Geography:: United States, South Korea, and North Korea

10. Theories on Why North Korea Rejects the World

Author:: Victor D. Cha
Publication Date:: 07-2015
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: North Korea last week rejected South Korea’s invitation to attend the Seoul Defense Dialogue in September, denigrating the talks as “puerile.” In the same breath, it also rejected a proposal by National Assembly speaker Chung Ui-hwa for a meeting with his northern counterpart to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the liberation of the Korean Peninsula on Aug. 15. If you ask an Obama administration official about America’s “strategic patience” policy of non-dialogue with North Korea, he or she will tell you that the problem is not an unwillingness on the part of the United States to have dialogue. On the contrary, the Obama administration has tried every channel possible, from six-party talks to personal communications to secret trips, to jump-start a dialogue. But the regime in Pyongyang has rejected all of these.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention and Diplomacy
Political Geography:: South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula

11. Respond and Restrain: Deterrence and Reassurance in Northeast Asia

Author:: Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 12-2014
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The US extended deterrent in Northeast Asia is strong. US alliances with Japan and South Korea are each arguably in the best shape in years, with alliance modernization efforts proceeding in tandem with domestic adjustments to security policy that strengthen the foundation for cooperative action. Policy toward North Korea, historically a wedge between Washington and allied governments in the region, is largely aligned, and serving as a glue rather than a source of discord. This otherwise sunny outlook is darkened by the difficulties in the Seoul-Tokyo relationship. The (from a US perspective) obvious convergence of interests among the three governments is overshadowed by a lengthy and depressingly well-rehearsed list of problems. The second US-ROK-Japan Trilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue, hosted by Pacific Forum CSIS and the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, with indirect support from the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), explored ways to overcome those obstacles to enhanced cooperation. In an attempt to push the envelope, the 43 senior participants from the three countries joined 17 Pacific Forum Young Leaders (all attending in their private capacities) in discussions and a tabletop exercise that was designed to explore reactions to a nuclear contingency on the Korean Peninsula. The results were sobering and underscored the need for increased coordination and planning among the three governments to prepare for such a crisis in Northeast Asia.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

12. Korean Unification in a New Era

Author:: Victor D. Cha
Publication Date:: 12-2014
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: As a result of a speech delivered by Republic of Korea (ROK) president Park Geun- hye in Dresden, Germany, on March 28, 2014, the topic of unification of the Korean peninsula has been on the minds of many. This is, of course, not the first time that unification has been in the news. During the Cold War era, unification was defined as the absolute military victory of one side over the other. In Korean, this was known as “songgong t'ongil” or “p'ukch'in t'ongil” (“march north” or “unification by force”). In political science literature influenced by the European experience, it was defined as the perfect integration of the two countries. After the reunification of Germany on October 3, 1990, unification was seen as the economic and political absorption of one side by the other. And yet at other times, it was defined, by both North and South Korea, as the imperfect operation of one country, two systems. For a decade during the period of “sunshine” policy, 1997–2007, unification was defined as something to be avoided for generations. It was framed as an outcome that was too difficult to contemplate, too dangerous to suggest, and too expensive to afford.
Topic:: Security, Economics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: South Korea, North Korea, and Germany

13. North Korea Heading for the Abyss

Author:: Bruce Klingner
Publication Date:: 09-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: For some Asian experts, Kim Jong-un's December 2013 purge of his uncle and éminence grise, Jang Song-taek, changed everything. Hopes that the young, Western-educated North Korean leader would initiate long-predicted reform were dashed, replaced by rising fears of instability in the nuclear-armed nation. For other analysts, the purge merely affirmed everything that had seemed so obvious since the coronation of Kim petit-fils, namely that he would maintain the policies of his predecessors, though in a more erratic and riskier manner. Regardless of who was right, what are the policy implications going forward?
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

14. The United States and South Korea: Who Does What if the North Fails?

Author:: Kent Harrington and Bennett Ramberg
Publication Date:: 09-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: After several years of uncertainty about Kim Jong-un and his grip on power, analysis of North Korea has settled back into well-worn patterns. In Washington, Seoul, and elsewhere, mainstream commentary seems to have shelved concerns about the North's stability, returning instead to questions that represent hearty perennials for Pyongyang watchers: Is Kim prepared to open the North's moribund economy to Chinese-style reform, or is the latest dynastic offspring simply intent on the survival of his draconian family regime? Do the North's rhetoric and intermittent provocations threaten conflict, or are they simply more of the same theatrics out of an isolated elite? Notwithstanding its long history of broken pledges, is a nuclear deal possible—or are the North's weapons permanently in its arsenal? Add to all this the focus on North Korea's recent offer to Tokyo to investigate the fate of scores of Japanese citizens kidnapped by its agents since the 1960s, as well as the warming relations with Moscow as President Putin reaches out to burnish Russia's Asian role, and attention to Pyongyang's new normalcy appears to have supplanted anxiety about the regime's potential to fall.
Political Geography:: Washington, North Korea, and Tokyo

15. The Key to the North Korean Targeted Sanctions Puzzle

Author:: John S. Park
Publication Date:: 09-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: At no point in the history of U.S. nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy have financial sanctions been so central to U.S. efforts to prevent or rollback the acquisition of nuclear weapons in countries such as North Korea and Iran. Despite this crucial role, financial sanctions have been examined almost solely from the sender's perspective, that is, the country imposing the sanctions. Few focused policy analyses have measured the effects of these instruments from the target's perspective.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:: United States, Iran, and North Korea

16. Breaking the North Korean Nuclear Deadlock: a Global Action Plan

Author:: Duk-min Yun and Wooseon Choi
Publication Date:: 09-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The North Korean nuclear problem has entered a new stage as Pyongyang has developed more robust nuclear capabilities with the successful launch of a long - range missile in December 2012, a third nuclear test in 2013, and further missile tests in June 2014. The United States is now beginning to face the real risk that North Korea could soon develop the capability to directly strike the U.S. homeland. This situation has also raised concern among South Koreans about the credibility of extended deterrence provided by the United States. At the same time, the chances of a North Korean provocation have increased as conventional deterrence becomes less important.
Political Geography:: United States, South Korea, and North Korea

17. Regional Overview: Rebalance Continues Despite Distractions

Author:: Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 10-2013
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: It was a rough four months for the US as Washington struggled to convince Asian audiences that the “rebalance” is sustainable given renewed attention to the Middle East, even before the Syrian crises. US engagement in Asia was multidimensional with participation at several ministeriallevel meetings, a visit by Vice President Biden, continued pursuit of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and a show of military capability in Korea. But, it isn't clear North Korea got the message. Kim Jong Un seems to have adopted his father's play book: first create a crisis, make lots of threats, and follow up with a “smile diplomacy” campaign. So far, Washington has stuck to its game plan, insisting on a sign of genuine sincerity before opening a dialogue with Pyongyang. Finally, the US image in the region was damaged by revelations about classified NSA intelligence collection efforts.
Topic:: Government
Political Geography:: China, Washington, Asia, and North Korea

18. US-Korea Relations: A Good Start

Author:: Ellen Kim and Victor D. Cha
Publication Date:: 10-2013
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The highlight of US-ROK relations was the first summit between Barack Obama and Park Geunhye in Washington where the two presidents celebrated the 60th birthday of the alliance. Obama announced his support for Park's “trustpolitik” initiative, demonstrating bilateral agreement on policies toward North Korea. The US also voiced support for the thaw in inter-Korean relations reflected in resumption of dialogue over the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Meanwhile, South Korea and the US agreed to an extension of the US-ROK civil nuclear agreement, began negotiations on a Special Measures Agreement (host nation support for US forces), and restarted discussions on a possible delay of OPCON transfer.
Topic:: War
Political Geography:: Washington and North Korea

19. South Korea-North Korea Relations: Second Chance for Trustpolitik?

Author:: Aidan Foster-Carter
Publication Date:: 10-2013
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: So far this year, ups and downs on the Korean Peninsula have coincided conveniently with Comparative Connections' deadlines. Had this journal still been published quarterly, as it used to, our first report of 2013 would have come out in the middle of what we can now look back on as North Korea's spring saber-rattling. Most of that was rhetoric, albeit extreme even by DPRK standards. The main actual event, the suspension of the joint venture Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), broke just as we would have been going to press. But as it was, Comparative Connections' now thrice-yearly schedule enabled us to cover this lengthy hissy-fit in its entirety. This time the date fit is not quite so neat, but as of early September it is a relief to report that inter-Korean relations are on the up again; they could hardly have gone lower. This has been an interesting four months. Pyongyang abruptly changed its tune, demanding the immediate reopening of the KIC no less peremptorily than it had earlier closed it. Both attitudes were exasperating and hard to explain, but at least the North's new “peace offensive” offers some hope of a more constructive approach. At the same time this challenged the South, forcing it to put flesh on the bones of President Park Geun-Hye's “trustpolitik” and make hard decisions on two levels: what principles to adopt in dealing with a now partly more pliant North and – on that basis – how precisely to respond on a whole range of immediate concrete issues. This was a steep learning curve, which the new ROK administration mostly handled with a skillful mix of firmness and flexibility – except for one mistaken and avoidable row over protocol, discussed below, which delayed the rapprochement by a month or so.
Political Geography:: South Korea and North Korea

20. A North Korean Spring?

Author:: Nicholas D. Anderson and Victor D. Cha
Publication Date:: 12-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Is revolution similar to the Arab Spring possible in North Korea? The answer from most scholars and intelligence analysts has been “no”—that the Pyongyang regime's stability in the aftermath of the events in the Middle East and North Africa is an “old question” that was answered in the 1990s when the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea) faced the most critical test of its life, and survived. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the drastic cuts in patron aid from China, and the onset of famine that killed hundreds of thousands all constituted the ultimate test of DPRK stability, and the regime staggered on through it all. Thus, the assumption is that the Arab Spring has little relevance to the DPRK. The scholarly literature tends to support this assessment. Scholars like Georgetown University's Daniel Byman have argued that Kim Jong-il has effectively “coup-proofed” himself through an elaborate system of patronage, bribery, and draconian rule.
Topic:: International Relations and Arab Spring
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, and Asia-Pacific

21. The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia

Author:: Joseph S. Nye and Richard L. Armitage
Publication Date:: 08-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: This report on the U.S.-Japan alliance comes at a time of drift in the relationship. As leaders in both the United States and Japan face a myriad of other challenges, the health and welfare of one of the world's most important alliances is endangered. Although the arduous efforts of Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and his colleagues in both governments have largely kept the alliance stable, today's challenges and opportunities in the region and beyond demand more. Together, we face the re-rise of China and its attendant uncertainties, North Korea with its nuclear capabilities and hostile intentions, and the promise of Asia's dynamism. Elsewhere, there are the many challenges of a globalized world and an increasingly complex security environment. A stronger and more equal alliance is required to adequately address these and other great issues of the day.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Israel, Asia, and North Korea

22. At a Time of Uncertainty, Count on North Korea

Author:: Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 05-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: There was a brief period during the past four months –16 days to be precise – when it looked like a breakthrough was possible in the longstanding nuclear stalemate with North Korea; then Pyongyang reverted to form. Shortly after pledging to freeze all nuclear and missile tests, Pyongyang announced a satellite launch, pulling the rug out from under Washington (and itself) and business as usual (or unusual) returned to the Peninsula. The announcement also cast a shadow over the second Nuclear Security Summit hosted by Seoul while providing additional rationale for Washington's “pivot” toward Asia.
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Washington, Taiwan, Beijing, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, Korea, and Pyongyang

23. Xi Visit Steadies Ties; Dissident Creates Tension

Author:: Bonnie Glaser and Brittany Billingsley
Publication Date:: 05-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: China's next leader, Xi Jinping, traveled to the US for a visit that went smoothly and laid a foundation for a strong bilateral relationship after the 18th Party Congress this fall. Senior US and Chinese officials delivered speeches to mark the 40th anniversary of Nixon's 1972 visit to China, highlighting the progress made and the importance of the bilateral relationship while recognizing the deep mutual strategic mistrust. The third Asia-Pacific Consultation was held to manage suspicious and enhancement cooperation. President Obama met Hu Jintao on the sidelines of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit and coordinated planned responses to North Korea's satellite launch. Friction increased with the filing of a complaint with the WTO that charged China with manipulating prices of rare earth elements. Beijing angered the Obama administration at the UN Security Council by vetoing a resolution that called for Syria's president to step down. But as the violence worsened, the Council passed a resolution that authorized observers to monitor the ceasefire. China rebuffed US entreaties to reduce tis oil imports from Iran and the US imposed sanctions on a Chinese company for selling refined oil to Iran. A Chinese dissident sought assistance by entering the US Embassy, creating potential new challenges for the relationship.
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Asia, and North Korea

24. North Korea's Rocket Launch

Author:: Victor D. Cha and Ellen Kim
Publication Date:: 05-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The most significant news in early 2012 centered on North Korea's rocket launch. In a slightly different twist to the pattern, this latest provocation came just two weeks after reaching what seemed to be a new deal with the US to freeze its missile and nuclear programs in exchange for food assistance. After Pyongyang went ahead with the launch in defiance of its international agreements and its so-called “Leap Day” deal with the US, it felt like Groundhog Day. The question soon became how soon a nuclear test might be in the offing. Meanwhile, the KORUS FTA finally took effect after seven years of deliberation, and US sanctions on Iran and US beef imports to the ROK also reemerged as issues for the relationship.
Political Geography:: United States and North Korea

25. Plumbing the Depths

Author:: Aidan Foster-Carter
Publication Date:: 05-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Covering inter-Korean relations for Comparative Connections has been a roller-coaster ride, given the peninsula's changeable political weather. Even so, the current state of affairs is unprecedented. Pyongyang has spent the whole of 2012 hurling ever ruder and angrier jibes at ROK President Lee; plumbing the depths even by North Korean standards. In April, KCNA published and trumpeted a set of vicious cartoons that depict Lee as a rat being gorily done to death. From the viewpoint of inter-Korean relations, the past four months essentially saw almost no interaction except this one-sided name-calling. Unsurprisingly Seoul did have a few words to say in response, which only served to rile Pyongyang more. Wading through filth is no fun, but duty must be done as we describe and try to interpret North Korea's slander campaign, which showed ominous signs of escalating from words to deeds. In some obscure way, one intended function may be to boost the callow Kim Jong Un, so we also briefly report his formal accession to the DPRK's top leadership posts.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: North Korea and Pyongyang

26. China's Post-Kim Jong Il Debate

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 05-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: China and South Korea have designated 2012 as a year of friendship to mark 20 years of diplomatic relations. The anniversary may provide a pretext for more active diplomacy to meet a growing list of potential disputes in the relationship, including China's handling of North Korean refugees, illegal fishing in Korean territorial waters, territorial claims, and mutual suspicions regarding approaches toward North Korea. All of this is occurring in a period of political transition in both countries, as South Korea prepares for December elections while China works out a complex leadership transition later this year. Presidents Hu Jintao and Lee Myung-bak have held two summits this year, in Beijing in January and in Seoul on March 26 on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit. On his state visit to China from Jan. 9-11, Lee also met Premier Wen Jiabao and top legislator Wu Bangguo. Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met President Lee and ROK counterpart Kim Sung-hwan on March 2 during his visit to Seoul for annual inter¬ministerial consultations. The two foreign ministers also met in Ningbo, China, on April 8 for the sixth China-ROK-Japan Foreign Ministers Meeting. Sino-South Korean diplomatic exchanges have sharpened attention on the prospects for the bilateral partnership in the aftermath of Kim Jong Il's death
Political Geography:: Japan, South Korea, and North Korea

27. Sisyphus

Author:: David C. Kang and Jiun Bang
Publication Date:: 05-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The most dramatic events affecting relations in early 2012 concerned North Korea. The power transition appears to be proceeding smoothly, although mixed signals give signs that a clear foreign policy has not yet been worked out by the leadership in Pyongyang. Meanwhile, relations between South Korea and Japan continued on their seemingly disconnected tracks. In economic relations and day-to-day issues, they continue to move closer together on issues from dealing with tax evasion to joint disaster relief planning. Yet, territorial claims or claims about history are a constant irritant that threaten to derail relations at any time. Both sides seemingly wanted relations to worsen by picking fights over Dokdo/Takshima and making claims about history. One could dismiss the squabbling as peripheral to the main relationship, but these disputes hinder coordination and planning over important issues, divert diplomatic attention, and remain salient for domestic politics of both sides.
Topic:: Foreign Policy
Political Geography:: South Korea, North Korea, and Pyongyang

28. US Rebalances as Others Squabble

Author:: Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 09-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The only good news to report when it comes to Korean Peninsula denuclearization is the absence of any new really bad news over the past four months. North Korea's widely predicted (including by us) third nuclear test or follow-on missile launch did not occur. No one anticipated any serious movement toward resumption of the stalled Six-Party Talks, and those expectations were met. The biggest multilateral surprise came from ASEAN, which for the first time in its 45-year history, concluded its annual ministerial meeting without issuing a chairman's statement or communiqué. The ministers at the follow-on ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) did produce a summary, which once again highlighted the need for broader multilateral cooperation throughout the region, including the South China Sea. Economic ministers were equally productive in meetings in August, when among things they launched the first East Asian Summit Economic Ministers Meeting and the inaugural ASEAN-US Business Summit.
Topic:: Disaster Relief
Political Geography:: China, East Asia, and North Korea

29. Waiting for Better

Author:: Aidan Foster-Carter
Publication Date:: 09-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: There is very little to be said about relations between the two Koreas in the middle four months of 2012. And under a sensible new dispensation granted by this esteemed journal's editors, I need not pretend otherwise. Usually guilty of over-writing (probably in more senses than one) when there was much to report and comment on, for once this time we shall be brief.
Political Geography:: South Korea and North Korea

30. Managing Relations amidst Power Transitions

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 09-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Senior-level dialogue between China and North Korea resumed this summer when head of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) International Department Wang Jiarui became the first senior foreign visitor to meet Kim Jong Un. Previously, there had been a great deal of speculation regarding the absence of leadership exchanges since Kim Jong Il's death. Several other high- level exchanges followed. Discussions focused on reconciling priorities and Chinese support for Kim Jung Un's consolidation of power. Although more subdued, there were also several high- level exchanges between China and South Korea as they celebrated the 20th anniversary of diplomatic ties, initiated talks on establishing a bilateral free trade agreement, held the second round of strategic defense talks, and sparred over South Korean concerns about human rights.
Topic:: Human Rights
Political Geography:: China, South Korea, and North Korea

31. Grappling on a Hillside

Author:: David C. Kang and Jiun Bang
Publication Date:: 09-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Diplomatic disputes between Korea and Japan over historical issues and territory flared yet again this summer, being by far the most serious row since the mid - 2000s. With both sides focused far more on proving the others' misdeeds than on finding some stable equilibrium, the disputes threatened to spill over and affect economic relations as well as distract leaders from focusing on a number of pressing domestic and foreign issues. We try to avoid overreactions in this forum, hence the title. Korea - Japan relations are nowhere near falling off a cliff, but without stabilizing relations, there are potential deleterious bilateral and regional effects that could result from the current disputes. There were three underlying themes that characterized and reinforced the general lack of rapport: first, the reverberations from these bilateral disputes onto third parties (US, China, and North Korea); second, the domestic sources of foreign policy (known as the “ second - image ” in international relations theory); and third , deliberate moves toward negative issue - linkage in stymieing diplomatic relations in the region.
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, North Korea, and Korea

32. Regional Overview: Shaking the Foundations

Author:: Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 04-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The biggest headlines during the first four months of 2011 were generated by the triple tragedy in Japan, which left Tokyo (and much of the rest of the world) shaking, especially over nuclear safety. On the Korean Peninsula, Chinese concerns about the ROK/US “enough is enough” (over?)reaction to North Korean aggressiveness resulted in Beijing's acknowledgment that the road to a solution must run through Seoul, providing a new foundation for a resumption of Six-Party Talks. Meanwhile, elections among the Tibetan diaspora began a long-anticipated political transition, shaking Chinese policy toward the province. More fighting between Thailand and Cambodia over disputed borders has rattled ASEAN as it challenges the most important of its guiding principles – the peaceful resolution of disputes. Economic developments all highlighted growing doubts about the global economic order and the US leadership role. It's easy to predict the biggest headline of the next four month period: "Bin Laden is Dead!" Implications for Asia will be examined in the next issue; initial reactions were predictable.
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Asia, North Korea, Cambodia, Tokyo, and Thailand

33. US-Korea Relations: Under the Shadow of 2010

Author:: Victor D. Cha and Ellen Kim
Publication Date:: 04-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The US and South Korea continued strong solidarity and close policy coordination on North Korea in early 2011. The US made repeated calls for North Korea to improve its relations with South Korea and show sincerity about denuclearization. The Hu Jintao visit to the US in January paved the way for the first inter-Korean talks since the Yeonpyeong shelling, although they collapsed as the two Koreas could not resolve their dispute over the sinking of the Cheonan. Meanwhile, the US and South Korea agreed to pursue a UNSC Presidential Statement that would denounce North Korea's uranium enrichment program. Possible resumption of US food aid and Jimmy Carter's Pyongyang visit were new variables, although neither brought any change. The KORUS FTA looks near its long-awaited passage in the Congress. With both the Obama and Lee administrations making final efforts to clear all political barriers , it appears that the measure will be passed in both countries in the coming months.
Topic:: National Security
Political Geography:: United States, South Korea, and North Korea

34. China-Korea Relations: Can Inter-Korean Dialogue Revive Six-Party Talks?

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 04-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: In the aftermath of North Korea's artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island on Nov. 23, 2010, Chinese officials showed great concern about the possibility of escalation, focusing special concern on the possibility that South Korean military exercises might lead to military escalation. The January summit between Presidents Hu and Obama served to reduce tensions to some degree, especially through a call for resumption of inter-Korean talks in the US-China Joint Statement released at the summit. Following the apparent stabilization of inter-Korean relations, China has stepped up calls for "creating conditions" for the resumption of Six-Party Talks, engaging in diplomatic exchanges with both Koreas, including meetings between Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs Wu Dawei and ROK nuclear envoy Wi Sung-lac on Feb. 10-11 in Beijing and again on April 26 in Seoul, and through DPRK Vice Minister Kim Kye Gwan's meetings in Beijing with Wu Dawei, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, and Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun respectively in mid-April in China. Although South Korea in April agreed to China's proposed "three-step" process toward restarting Six Party Talks – (1) Inter-Korean, (2) US-DPRK, and (3) Six-Party Talks – this plan makes the resumption of multilateral talks depend most critically on reaching consensus on the preconditions for inter-Korean talks, which remain stalled since a preparatory meeting for inter-Korean defense ministers' talks broke down in February.
Topic:: Security
Political Geography:: United States, China, South Korea, and North Korea

35. A Return to Dialogue

Author:: Victor D. Cha and Ellen Kim
Publication Date:: 09-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The summer months saw a potentially new cycle of US-DPRK dialogue. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's invitation to DPRK Vice-Minister Kim Kye Gwan to visit New York for two days of official talks raised the specter that the North may be ready for re-engagement. Meanwhile, South Korea named a new unification minister, which some perceive to be the harbinger of a shift in its North Korea policy. But reliable sources say that President Lee Myung-bak will not cave so easily on his principles. Elsewhere, the Korea-US free trade agreement remains in limbo as it remains caught in partisan strife within the legislatures of both countries and the US received another lesson in Korea's preferred terminology for Asian geography.
Political Geography:: United States, New York, South Korea, and North Korea

36. A Fragile China-ROK Strategic Partnership

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 09-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: High-level exchanges between China and South Korea's foreign and defense ministries appeared to recover momentum as the two countries marked their 19th anniversary of diplomatic relations on Aug. 24. The first China-ROK “strategic defense dialogue” was held in Seoul on July 27 following talks between Defense Ministers Liang Guanglie and Kim Kwan-jin in Beijing on July 15 and in Singapore on June 4 on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue. Foreign Ministers Yang Jiechi and Kim Sung-hwan met June 6 ahead of the Asia-Europe Foreign Ministers Meeting in Budapest and held another round of talks July 21 in Bali on the sidelines of ASEAN regional meetings. But efforts to consolidate the China-ROK strategic partnership have exposed policy differences over North Korea and the ROK alliance relationship with the US.
Topic:: Fragile/Failed State
Political Geography:: United States, China, South Korea, and North Korea

37. Reality or Symbolism in the Relationship

Author:: David C. Kang and Jiun Bang
Publication Date:: 09-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: South Korea and Japan are neighbors that are advanced, technologically sophisticated capitalist economies with capable and well-educated populations, and are fully consolidated liberal democracies. They share an alliance with the US, and generally view themselves as stalwart regional allies. As has been the case for many years, relations between them during the past four months were relatively stable, with increasingly deep economic relations, voluminous cultural flows, and general agreement on a strategy of isolation toward North Korea. They also share a tendency to provoke each other over their shared history and the ownership of several islets that sit between them. When this happens, the media goes into a frenzy, breathlessly reporting the latest incident. But which is reality? Do the historical disputes meaningfully affect their bilateral relations? On the one hand, yes: they could cooperate more closely on issues such as military coordination and a free-trade agreement. On the other hand, no: it's not at all clear that historical issues are holding up cooperation and relations are deeper across a range of issues.
Topic:: Economics
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea

38. Regional Overview:More of the Same, Times Three

Author:: Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 01-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Last quarter we noted that the US profile in Asia was on the rise and China‟s image was falling, while questioning if North Korea was changing, as Beijing, among others, seemed to insist. This quarter has been marked by more of the same, on all three fronts.
Political Geography:: United States, China, Asia, and North Korea

39. US-Japan Relations: Tempering Expectations

Author:: Michael J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi
Publication Date:: 01-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Prime Minister Kan Naoto opened the quarter with a speech promising a government that would deliver on domestic and foreign policy, but public opinion polls indicated he was failing on both fronts, damaging his own approval rating and that of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The US and Japanese governments continued a pattern of coordination at senior levels and North Korea‟s bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island on Nov. 23 furthered trilateral diplomacy with South Korea and exchanges among the three militaries. President Obama met with Kan on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leader‟s Meeting in Yokohama to take stock of the relationship, though a once-anticipated joint declaration on the alliance did not materialize and the optics of the meeting appeared designed to lower expectations as the Futenma relocation issue remained unresolved. A bilateral public opinion survey on US-Japan relations released at the end of the quarter captured the current dynamic accurately with Futenma contributing to less sanguine views but convergence in threat perception and an appreciation for the role of the alliance in maintaining regional security as encouraging signs for the future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, North Korea, and Asia-Pacific

40. US-Korea Relations: A Tumultuous Ending of Year 2010

Author:: Victor D. Cha and Ellen Kim
Publication Date:: 01-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: US -Korea relations in the last quarter of 2010 centered around two major events. On the economic front, even though Presidents Barack Obama and Lee Myung-bak failed to seal a deal on the KORUS Free Trade Agreement (FTA) during their meeting on the margins of the G20 in Seoul, the two countries reached final agreement a few weeks later, potentially opening a new era in bilateral relations pending approval in the two legislatures. Meanwhile, North Korea‟ s revelation of its uranium enrichment facility and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island raised a real possibility of war on the peninsula. South Korea and the US once again demonstrated their strong security alliance and solidarity even at the risk of a military conflict. North Korea‟ s artillery attack quelled ongoing diplomatic efforts to resume the Six-Party Talks, as the prospect for early resumption vanished.
Political Geography:: United States, North Korea, and Korea

41. Chronology of US-Korea Relations:October – December 2010

Publication Date:: 01-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Oct. 2, 2010: US Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Leon Panetta makes a surprise visit to Seoul to discuss North Korean succession with President Lee Myung-bak. Oct. 6, 2010: US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell visits Tokyo to discuss strategies to deal with North Korea. Oct. 7, 2010: Secretary Campbell visits Seoul for talks on a wide range of issues. Oct. 8, 2010: South Korean Defense Minister Kim Tae-young meets Defense Secretary Robert Gates in Washington for an annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM). Oct. 10, 2010: North Korean defector Hwang Jang-yop dies at his home in Seoul of an apparent heart attack at the age of 87.
Topic:: Intelligence
Political Geography:: East Asia and North Korea

42. China-Korea Relations:DPRK Provocations Test China‟s Regional Role

Author:: Scott Snyder
Publication Date:: 01-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: North Korea"s artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island on Nov. 23 placed the Korean North Korea‟s artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island on Nov. 23 placed the Korean Peninsula at the center of regional attention and intensified diplomatic pressures on China as an indispensable player. Beijing mobilized a remarkably swift diplomatic effort in response, sending State Councilor Dai Bingguo to Seoul to meet President Lee Myung-bak and Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan, and to Pyongyang to meet Kim Jong Il and Vice Premier Kang Sok Ju. Chinese calls for regional dialogue intensified with South Korean efforts to deter North Korea through joint naval exercises with the US in the Yellow Sea and live-fire artillery drills. Despite urgent Chinese entreaties to convene “emergency consultations” among senior envoys, North Korean provocations appeared to undermine already limited prospects for Six-Party Talks. Beijing‟s persistent calls for both Koreas to return to dialogue and Seoul‟s apparent support for inter-Korean dialogue and Six-Party Talks, may open the way for a return to negotiations, but South Korea‟s position remains conditional upon North Korea acknowledging its responsibility for provocations and taking concrete steps to show its commitment to denuclearization.
Political Geography:: China and North Korea

43. Chronology of Japan-Korea Relations:October - December 2010

Author:: Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 01-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Oct. 4, 2010: Japanese Prime Minister Kan Naoto and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak meet on the sidelines of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEAM) and discuss bilateral relations. Oct. 22, 2010: A group of Japanese and South Korean scholars release a study commissioned by the two governments in which they conclude that Japan"s annexation of Korea was coerced in the face of opposition from Koreans. Oct. 29, 2010: Prime Minister Kan, President Lee, and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao meet on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Vietnam. Nov. 11-12, 2010: South Korea hosts G20 Summit. Nov. 13-14, 2010: Japan hosts APEC Leaders Meeting.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and Vietnam

44. Chronology of North Korea-South Korea Relations:October – December 2010

Author:: Brad Glosserman and Carl Baker
Publication Date:: 01-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Sept. 30, 2010: The Koreas hold their first direct military talks (at colonel level) in two years, at Panmunjom. They founder on the wreck of the Cheonan. The South insists on an apology, while the North still demands to send its own inspectors to examine the wreckage. [Ed. Note: Our apologies for incorrectly reporting them as occurring on Oct. 1 in our last issue.] Oct. 1, 2010: At a meeting of their Red Crosses, the two Koreas agree to hold family reunions at the North"s Mt. Kumgang resort Oct. 30-Nov. 5. Oct. 1, 2010: ROK National Assembly confirms Kim Hwang-sik as premier two months after an earlier nominee withdrew. Oct. 2, 2010: North Korea proposes working-level talks on Oct. 15 to discuss ways to restart regular tourism to Mt. Kumgang. Oct. 3, 2010: An unnamed ROK official tells the daily JoongAng Ilbo that in 2007 a senior DPRK diplomat, Ri Gun, inadvertently admitted North Korea"s responsibility for the 1987 bombing of KAL 858, with 115 deaths. Oct. 4, 2010: In Germany for the 20th anniversary of reunifcation, ROK Unification Minister Hyun In-taek says North Korea must change its stance on the Cheonan if it wants the South to consider resuming cross-border tourism.
Political Geography:: South Korea and North Korea

45. US-Korea Relations: Death of Kim Jong Il

Author:: Ellen Kim and Victor D. Cha
Publication Date:: 09-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's state visit to the US was a big event that attested to the strength of the two countries' relationship and the personal ties between Presidents Obama and Lee. The timely passage of the KORUS FTA in the US was the big deliverable for the summit. Final ratification of the FTA in both countries clears one longstanding issue and lays the foundation for greater economic integration and a stronger alliance. Meanwhile, the most shocking news for the final third of the year was the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in late December. His death disrupted US-DPRK bilateral talks as North Korea observed a mourning period for its late leader. The US and South Korea spent the last two weeks of December quietly watching developments in North Korea as the reclusive country accelerated its succession process to swiftly transfer power to the anointed successor, Kim Jong Un.
Topic:: International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and International Affairs
Political Geography:: United States, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

46. North Korea-South Korea Relations: A New Era?

Author:: Aidan Foster-Carter
Publication Date:: 09-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: No reader of Comparative Connections needs telling that Kim Jong Il, North Korea's leader since 1994, died of a heart attack on Dec. 17. (The wider public is something else. The young woman who looks after this writer's baby had never heard of Korea, much less North Korea, or that anything had happened there. We specialists should never assume too much.)
Political Geography:: South Korea, North Korea, and Chicago

47. China-Korea Relations: New Challenges in the Post-Kim Jong Il Era

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 09-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Beijing underscored maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula following Kim Jong Il's death. DPRK leadership succession raises questions about the future direction of China's Korea policy, which was most recently reaffirmed during an October visit to the two Koreas by Vice Premier Li Keqiang, the presumed successor of Premier Wen Jiabao. Prior to Kim's death, China and North Korea maintained regular contacts with senior national, party, and military officials. There have also been mutual efforts to stabilize Sino-South Korean relations despite many differences that have risen in the aftermath of North Korea's 2010 provocations. The fourth China-ROK high-level strategic dialogue was held on Dec. 27 in Seoul.
Political Geography:: China, Beijing, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

48. Japan-Korea Relations: North Korean Leadership Change Overshadows All

Author:: David C. Kang and Jiun Bang
Publication Date:: 09-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The last four months of 2011 were dominated by two leadership changes – the mid-December death of Kim Jong Il and the election of Noda Yoshihiko in September. Kim's death is a watershed event that could mean changes in DPRK policies with repercussions around the region. South Korea and Japan reacted cautiously to the news of Kim's death and the rise of his son, Kim Jong Un, as the new leader of North Korea. Beyond this event, however, Korea-Japan relations showed little change. Economic relations between South Korea and Japan continue to move slowly forward, even as they remain firmly stuck arguing the same issues that have aggravated diplomatic relations for decades. North Korea-Japan relations also showed little change as both sides repeated the usual accusations, but neither showed any inclination to change. Meanwhile, there were three main trends in relations. First, external forces drove state behavior as evidenced by the almost domino-like efforts at free trade agreements. Second, there was growing recognition of the high domestic political costs associated with non-pliable issues such as the comfort women/sex slaves. Third, there was a realization that change could mean opportunity as Seoul and Tokyo contemplate the post-Kim Jong Il landscape in North Korea.
Political Geography:: Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Tokyo, and Korea

49. China-Russia Relations: Between Geo-Economic and Geo-Politics

Author:: Yu Bin
Publication Date:: 09-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The last four months of 2011 were both ordinary and extraordinary for Beijing and Moscow. There was certainly business as usual as top leaders and bureaucrats frequented each other's countries for scheduled meetings. The world around them, however, was riddled with crises and conflicts. Some (Libya and Syria) had seriously undermined their respective interests; others (Iran and North Korea) were potentially more volatile, and even dangerous, for the region and the world. Regardless, 2011 was a year full of anniversaries with symbolic and substantive implications for not only China and Russia, but also much of the rest of the world.
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Beijing, North Korea, Libya, Moscow, and Syria

50. US-Southeast Asia Relations

Author:: Sheldon W. Simon
Publication Date:: 01-2010
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: High-level US efforts to convince Burma's military government to open its political system to the democratic opposition and release political prisoners prior to scheduled 2010 elections accelerated this quarter. President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton, and Assistant Secretary of State Campbell all weighed in during meetings in Burma and at the first ASEAN-US summit in Singapore after the annual APEC leaders meeting. The ASEAN states welcomed the first US summit with all 10 members. Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan noted that President Obama's praise for ASEAN's key role in Asian international organizations debunked claims by some that ASEAN is no longer the centerpiece of the region's architecture. Singapore's prime minister insisted that the US continues to be Asia's “indispensable” player despite the rise of China and India. In the Philippines, the Visiting Forces Agreement continues to be a political football in domestic Philippine politics as President Arroyo's political opponents claim that the US military violates the Philippine constitution by engaging in combat – an allegation denied by both the US embassy and the Philippine government. On a tip from the US, Thai authorities detained a cargo aircraft coming from North Korea with a load of sophisticated weapons in violation of a UN Security Council Resolution.
Topic:: Security and Government
Political Geography:: United States, North Korea, Philippines, and Southeast Asia

51. North Korea-South Korea Relations

Author:: Aidan Foster-Carter
Publication Date:: 01-2010
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: During the last quarter of 2009 relations between the two Koreas maintained the slight improvement seen since late August, when two senior Northern figures visited Seoul and met the hitherto excoriated President Lee Myung-bak. This easing is a relief compared to the first year and a half of Lee's presidency, during which North-South ties went from bad to worse. Yet it is premature to suggest any substantial improvement – much less a return to the engagement of the “Sunshine” decade (1998-2007), which must now be consigned to history. Rather, what we see is mixed signals from Pyongyang, and to some extent also from Seoul. Having got past initial hostilities, the two governments are now testing and sounding each other out. This is not happening in a vacuum, but in the context of two wider imponderables: whether Kim Jong-il will return to nuclear dialogue in any shape or form, plus the opaque and delicate process of installing his third son Kim Jong-eun as his anointed successor. A surprise currency redenomination in early December, rendering most North Koreans' savings worthless and reportedly provoking protests, is a reminder that the North's internal stability cannot be taken for granted – and a blow to those who still aver that the DPRK is at some level trying to change for the better.
Topic:: Government and History
Political Geography:: North Korea and Korea

52. Japan-Korea Relations

Author:: Ji-Young Lee and David C. Kang
Publication Date:: 01-2010
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Relations between Japan and the two Koreas were relatively uneventful in the final quarter of 2009. The new Hatoyama government quickly began to show more attention to its relations with its East Asian neighbors and hinted at a small change in priorities with respect to North Korea. South Korea and Japan said mostly all the right things, even while substantively it seemed fairly clear that they continued to have very different opinions about territorial and historical disputes. However, no real movement or dramatic changes came about during the quarter, setting the stage for 2010 – the 100th “anniversary” of Japan's annexation of Korea.
Topic:: Government
Political Geography:: Japan, East Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

53. US-Korea Relations

Author:: Victor D. Cha and Ross Matzkin-Bridger
Publication Date:: 03-2010
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The first quarter of 2010 set the stage for what should be a busy year in US-Korea relations. The Six-Party Talks remain stalled, although dire conditions in the North may force Kim Jong-il back to negotiations soon. While North Korea continues to demand concessions before a return to talks, the US shows no sign of caving in. In South Korea, there was a flurry of mixed signals on whether the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) to Seoul scheduled to be completed in 2012 would go ahead as planned. Prospects for the US-ROK free trade agreement got a boost from President Obama and his administration, however, it remains uncertain when the deal will move to Congress for ratification. Finally, the issue of spent nuclear fuel reprocessing in South Korea has made its way to the forefront of US-Korea relations, where it will likely remain for some years.
Political Geography:: United States, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

54. South Korea-North Korea Relations

Author:: Aidan Foster-Carter
Publication Date:: 03-2010
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: 2010 is a year of anniversaries on the Korean Peninsula, many of them miserable. It is the centenary of Japan's occupation of Korea in 1910, an event unlikely to be much marked on either side of the Sea of No Agreed Name, given how bitter Korean memories remain. This June marks 60 years since a by-then partitioned peninsula erupted into a civil war which technically is not over, since the 1953 Armistice Agreement was never followed by a peace treaty. For South Koreans, April 1960 celebrates the ouster of their authoritarian first leader, Syngman Rhee, in an all too brief democratic interlude before soldiers seized power in Seoul. Twenty years later, May 1980 marks the bloody suppression of a rising against military dictatorship in Gwangju in the southwestern Jeolla region, still the heartland of political opposition in South Korea. Seven years later the generals were forced back to barracks for good – a rare achievement in Asia – and a sometimes fractious democracy has since grown strong roots.
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, Korea, and Korean Peninsula

55. China-Korea Relations

Author:: Scott Snyder
Publication Date:: 03-2010
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: China and North Korea sustained high-level contacts during the quarter, but there seems to be little to show for it. Wang Jiarui, head of the International Department of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, met Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang and delivered a letter from President Hu Jintao, reportedly extending an invitation to Kim to visit China. Following the visit, the Chinese Foreign Ministry confirmed Pyongyang's “persistent stance” toward denuclearization while Hu affirmed that friendly ties is China's “consistent policy” toward Pyongyang. Two weeks later Kim Yong-il, director of the International Affairs Department of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee, visited Beijing, where he met President Hu. North Korea's major push to attract foreign investment appears to involve potential economic deals that Beijing has claimed do not violate UN resolutions toward the North. Meanwhile, Chinese leaders presented a positive outlook for the resumption of Six-Party Talks on the sidelines of the annual session of the National People's Congress (NPC) and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in March. Having received the title of representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs, China's lead representative to the Six-Party Talks Wu Dawei stated that talks might resume before July this year in light of favorable diplomatic contacts with Pyongyang. Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi expressed support for improved inter-Korean and US-DPRK ties. China and South Korea officially launched Visit China Year 2010, pledging to strengthen their strategic cooperative partnership through intensified diplomatic, cultural, and economic exchanges. ROK Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan held talks with Premier Wen Jiabao and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi in Beijing.
Political Geography:: China, Beijing, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

56. Regional Overview

Author:: Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 07-2010
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Hopes for a resumption of Six-Party Talks this past quarter were torpedoed when an international investigation team concluded that the ROK Navy ship Cheonan was deliberately attacked by a North Korean submarine. The Chinese, while scuttling plans for UNSC censure of Pyongyang, fired a warning shot of their own, denying Defense Secretary Gates' request for a China visit after the Shangri-La Dialogue in June in a sign of continued displeasure over US arms sales to Taiwan. Also once again torpedoed, this time by an oil spill, was President Obama's twice-delayed “homecoming” visit to Indonesia.
Political Geography:: United States, China, Indonesia, Taiwan, and North Korea

57. US-Korea Relations

Author:: Victor D. Cha and Ellen Kim
Publication Date:: 07-2010
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The second quarter saw a series of major events in US-ROK relations. With the sinking of the Cheonan in late March, the quarter saw the possible return to armed conflict in Korea. The North Korean torpedo attack on the South Korean warship caused the two Koreas to break ties, intensified the tension along the border, and blasted hopes for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. Meanwhile, the US-ROK alliance was at its zenith as the US showed solidarity with South Korea on its response to the provocation and put pressure on China to support a strong UN Security Council measure identifying North Korea as being responsible for the attack. The two presidents announced a delay in transfer of wartime operational control and President Obama, in a surprise announcement on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Toronto, called for ratification of the KORUS FTA. Though these two developments were not a direct result of the Cheonan sinking, they were influenced by a desire by both allies to show strong, deep partnership in the face of North Korean threats, and perhaps more important, by a personal chemistry between the two leaders that is unique in the history of the alliance.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: United States, China, South Korea, North Korea, Korea, and Toronto

58. US-Southeast Asia Relations

Author:: Sheldon W. Simon
Publication Date:: 07-2010
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: In mid-May, long-simmering political tension in Thailand between the Bangkok elite establishment and urban lower classes as well as those in northern Thailand who feel ignored by the center erupted in the worst political violence in decades. Tentative US efforts to mediate were rejected by the Thai government, though the opposition appeared to welcome a US role. A tense calm has been restored, but the prospect for renewed violence is palpable. While the Indonesian government expressed understanding for President Obama's second postponement of a visit to his childhood home because of the disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, opposition Muslim politicians claimed the real reason for the postponement was the Israeli attack on a Turkish flotilla running Israel's Gaza blockade. A number of Muslim leaders stated that Obama wished to avoid encountering Indonesian ire for his country's pro-Israeli stand. The election of Benigno Aquino III as the Philippines' 15th president was greeted by international observers as a generally fair and transparent process. The president-elect has stated he plans to review the country's Visiting Forces Agreement with the US to modify its pro-US bias. Washington continues to criticize Burma's preparations for elections scheduled for October as marginalizing the political opposition. The US is also concerned that Burma may be clandestinely importing materials from North Korea for a nascent nuclear weapons program.
Political Geography:: United States, Indonesia, Israel, North Korea, Philippines, Burma, Mexico, Thailand, Southeast Asia, and Bangkok

59. South Korea-North Korea Relations

Author:: Aidan Foster-Carter
Publication Date:: 07-2010
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: To state what in my country we call the bleedin' obvious, this was the worst quarter in inter-Korean relations of the near-decade (starting in 2001) that Comparative Connections has been covering this relationship. On the rare occasions when the peninsula makes global headlines, or even more rarely moves markets, it tends not to be good news. Thus it was on May 24-25, when for the first time in many years the world seriously wondered whether the two Koreas might go to war again – almost 60 years after they fatefully did so the first time. Fortunately both backed away from the brink. On closer inspection there was both more and less to this than at first met the eye. But it was a perilous moment; and though it now seems to have passed, it leaves North-South relations in a pit from which no easy exit is apparent. The cause, of course, is the sinking of the ROK corvette Cheonan on March 26. Yet this did not erupt as a crisis until late May. The course of those two months is fascinating in its own right, and has been under-examined in the welter of comment and controversy. It reveals, we suggest, an odd mix of tactical skill and strategic flailing by Seoul. As of early July, with ROK President Lee Myung-bak still smarting from an unexpected rebuff in local elections a month ago, one must conclude that North Korea's torpedo scored a bulls-eye. Despite delivering a remarkable economic recovery and chairing the G20, “bulldozer” Lee is now on the back foot: just as Kim Jong-il intended. It was nasty and negative, but it worked. In Pyongyang's eyes, this counts as a win – even though from any sensible perspective it is a loss for both Koreas, and their relations.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: South Korea, North Korea, and Sinai Peninsula

60. China-Korea Relations

Author:: Scott Snyder
Publication Date:: 07-2010
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The March 26 sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan in the West Sea that killed 46 soldiers served as the backdrop for a series of high-level exchanges between China and the two Koreas as China came under international pressure to provide a tough response to the incident. Kim Jong-il paid an “unofficial” visit to China on May 3-7 and met President Hu Jintao in Beijing, days after ROK President Lee Myung-bak's summit with Hu. Kim's delegation included senior officials from the Foreign Ministry, Worker's Party of Korea, and the DPRK Cabinet. Lee attended the April 30 opening ceremony of the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai, where President Hu also met the DPRK's top legislator Kim Yong Nam. Lee and Hu held another round of bilateral talks on the sidelines of the G20 Summit on June 26 in Toronto, where they pledged to strengthen the China-ROK strategic cooperative partnership despite unresolved tensions over North Korea. Premier Wen Jiabao paid a three-day visit to South Korea on May 28-30 and met President Lee in Seoul prior to the third China-ROK-Japan trilateral meeting in Jeju. Foreign Ministers Yu Myung-hwan and Yang Jiechi also held talks on the sidelines of the fourth trilateral foreign ministers meeting with Japan on May 15-16 in Gyeongju.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, North Korea, and Korea

61. Japan-Korea Relations

Author:: Ji-Young Lee and David C. Kang
Publication Date:: 07-2010
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The sinking of the South Korean warship on March 26 turned the second quarter into a tumultuous time for Northeast Asian diplomacy. A multinational team of investigators concluded that North Korea was responsible, bringing Seoul and Tokyo closer together in a united stand against Pyongyang, while Japan's relations with North Korea relations declined even more than usual as they continued their “sanctioning and blaming”: Tokyo placed more sanctions on Pyongyang, and Pyongyang blamed Tokyo for being used as a US “servant.” For its part, the Democratic Party of Japan found a face-saving solution to the problem of the Futenma relocation issue, putting the matter on hold due to the threat from North Korea. At the 60th anniversary of the Korean War, the region appears largely the same as it did in 1950. Both Koreas view each other as the main enemy, US alliances are the cornerstone of Japan and South Korean foreign policies, and China (and to a lesser extent, Russia) is sympathetic to North Korea and faces strong criticism from the US and South Korea.
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, North Korea, and Korea

62. South Korea-North Korea Relations

Author:: Aidan Foster-Carter
Publication Date:: 09-2010
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The past quarter in inter-Korean relations might be called the morning after the night before. Tensions over the sunken ROK corvette Cheonan by no means disappeared; the less so since North Korea still denied responsibility, while the South smarted at its failure to convince key powers – China and Russia above all – of Pyongyang‟s culpability. The Cheonan incident remains a crime and an obstacle. Yet hopeful signs are emerging that both sides realize they will have to get past this eventually and that they might as well start now. Among various small initiatives, including flood aid, the quarter ended on a hopeful note with an agreement to hold a fresh round of reunions of separated families in late October.
Topic:: International Relations, Development, and Government
Political Geography:: Russia, China, South Korea, and North Korea

63. Japan-Korea Relations

Author:: David C. Kang
Publication Date:: 09-2010
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The two highlights in Japan-Korea relations during this quarter are Prime Minister Kan Naoto‟s apology to South Korea for Japan‟s colonial rule, and the appointment of Kim Jong-un, as vice chairman of the Workers‟ Party Central Military Commission and military general in the Korean People‟s Army. While these developments hold the promise to potentially change the security landscape of Northeast Asia, Prime Minister Kan‟s first full quarter in office reveals that Japan‟s North Korea policy is likely to continue along the lines of previous Japanese administrations, at least for now: an unfavorable attitude coupled with hostility and inaction. Pyongyang‟s attitude toward Tokyo, too, changed little and remained more or less predictable – it denounced Prime Minister Kan for apologizing only to South Korea, criticized Japan for “shamelessly” wanting a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, and demanded compensation for all of Japan‟s past wrongdoings. Japan-South Korea relations appear to be moving closer, although whether Kan‟s apology will truly change anything remains to be seen. Japan keeping a watchful eye on North Korea‟s succession At the quarter‟s end, the Japanese government remained noncommittal but is apparently paying close attention to the North Korea‟s power transition dynamics for signs of whether there is any possible impact on the North‟s stance on either the abduction issue or its nuclear and missile programs. The Japanese media closely followed news about Kim Jong-un‟s appointment as a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission in the Workers‟ Party, which took place a day before the party‟s conference selecting “supreme leadership body.” With no prior military title, little is known about Kim Jong-un, but his new position means that he is responsible for directing North Korea‟s army and for formulating the party‟s military policies. Along with Kim Jong-il‟s sister Kim Kyong-hui‟s promotion to a Central Committee‟s Political Bureau member and her husband Jang Song-taek‟s nomination to the number two position on the National Defense Commission, it appears that a hereditary power transfer may be underway in Pyongyang. The Japanese government made no immediate official comment, but Prime Minister Kan said on Sept. 28 that Japan will “carefully monitor the situation inside North Korea.”
Topic:: Security and Government
Political Geography:: Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Tokyo, Korea, and Pyongyang

64. What Do They Really Want?: Obama's North Korea

Author:: Victor D. Cha
Publication Date:: 10-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Negotiating with North Korea is all about contradictions. What can be important one day can become unimportant the next. A position they hold stubbornly for weeks and months can suddenly disappear. But these contradictions tell us a lot about core goals that may lie beneath Pyongyang's rhetoric and the provocative actions which culminated in a second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. Understanding these core goals, moreover, offers insights into how spectacularly unsuccessful North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has been as he prepares to step down. What do the North Koreans ultimately want with their recent spate of provocative behavior? What is often stated through the mouths of their foreign ministry officials is only a part of the Pyongyang leadership's broader goals. The judgments that follow are also informed by the experiences and ‘‘gut instincts’’ of those who have negotiated with the regime over the past sixteen years.
Topic:: International Relations and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: United States, Washington, and North Korea

65. Playing the Same Game: North Korea's Coercive Attempt at U.S. Reconciliation

Author:: Narushige Michishita
Publication Date:: 10-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The nuclear and missile capabilities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are certainly improving, but that does not mean its strategy has changed. Those who argue that Pyongyang has abandoned diplomacy and chosen a military path risk missing the point: nuclear weapons and missiles are the means, not the ends. North Korea is actually taking necessary steps to prepare for future talks with the United States. In other words, North Korea is playing the same game again.
Topic:: Diplomacy
Political Geography:: United States and North Korea

66. Cooperative Denuclearization toward North Korea

Author:: Dingli Shen
Publication Date:: 10-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Why has the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) been so defiant against the international community? What could be its external and internal motivations to carry out new missile tests, and even a new nuclear test, in spring 2009 when its economy is in shambles and a large portion of its population is starving? Why has President Barack Obama's ''smart power'' diplomacy, which stresses dialogue with countries with which the United States has long had difficulties, not worked well with Pyongyang so far? Why does North Korea seem to be ignoring its key ally, China, and its concerns? Beijing is now in an awkward position as North Korea looks uninterested in bestowing any credibility on China's efforts to sustain the Six-Party Talks that are aimed at denuclearizing the Korean peninsula.
Topic:: Diplomacy
Political Geography:: China and North Korea

67. U.S.-Japan Relations

Author:: Michael J. Green
Publication Date:: 01-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The U.S. decision to rescind the designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism tested the bilateral relationship this quarter as the Bush administration was perceived in Japan as having softened its commitment to the abductee issue in favor of a breakthrough on denuclearization in the Six-Party Talks, which ultimately proved elusive. The Aso government managed to extend the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) refueling mission in the Indian Ocean for one year, though bilateral discussions on defense issues continued to center on whether Japan could move beyond a symbolic commitment to coalition operations in Afghanistan. Japanese domestic politics remained tumultuous as the opposition led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) thwarted the Aso legislative agenda to increase pressure for a snap election. Prime Minister Aso's approval rating plummeted over the course of the quarter due mostly to frustration with the response to the financial crisis, prompting him to postpone the widely anticipated Lower House election in an attempt to shore up support for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Public opinion polls revealed increased interest in offering the DPJ a chance at the helm with most observers predicting an election sometime next spring. Other polls at the end of the quarter showed the Japanese public less sanguine about the U.S.-Japan alliance, a sobering development as President-elect Obama prepared to take office.
Topic:: Development, Terrorism, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, and North Korea

68. North Korea-South Korea Relations

Author:: Aidan Foster-Career
Publication Date:: 01-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The final three months of 2008 saw relations between the two Koreas continue to worsen, as they had since South Korean voters in December 2007 elected the conservative Lee Myung-bak as their next president, ending a decade of rule by liberals. Official ties remained frozen as Pyongyang media continued to heap childish insults on Lee. Upping the ante from words to deeds, but also shooting itself in the foot, from December the North placed restrictions on cross-border traffic and expelled most Southerners from the joint Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), just north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). But the end of the year brought a possible way forward, with hints from both sides that they are considering a deal where the South would pay for the release of abductees and prisoners of war held by the North. It remains to be seen whether this will fly or how soon the two Koreas can tone down the enmity stoked over the past year. Meanwhile, nongovernmental interaction continues, albeit on a far smaller scale than during the former “Sunshine” policy.
Topic:: Government and Communications
Political Geography:: South Korea and North Korea

69. Japan-Korea Relations

Author:: David C. Kang
Publication Date:: 01-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The year ended fairly quietly in Japan-Korea relations with no major events marking the last few months of 2008. Japan-North Korea relations remained stagnant and Japan-South Korea relations essentially ignored the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, instead focusing on dealing with the widening global economic crisis. The biggest diplomatic event was the successful trilateral summit in December among China, Korea, and Japan, which may set the stage for further diplomatic movement. Whether 2009 will bring dramatic progress on these issues remains to be seen, but with new leaders in Japan and South Korea entering their first full years of rule, the continued concerns about the health of North Korea's leader, and a new U.S. president, the new year holds the possibility for progress on at least some of these issues.
Topic:: International Relations and Economics
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, North Korea, and Korea

70. U.S.-Japan Relations

Author:: Michael J. Green
Publication Date:: 04-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: A new calendar year did little to change the tenor of Japanese domestic politics as the public became increasingly frustrated with parliamentary gridlock and the leadership of Prime Minister Aso Taro, whose approval rating plummeted amid a deepening recession. Opposition leader Ozawa Ichiro continued pressure tactics against the government and became the favorite to succeed Aso until the arrest of a close aide damaged his reputation and stunted momentum for a snap election. Aso demonstrated the art of political survival, touting the urgency of economic stimulus over a poll he could easily lose and which need not take place until the fall. In an effort to prevent political turmoil from weakening Japan's global leadership role, the government dispatched two Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) destroyers to participate in antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.
Topic:: International Relations, Economics, and Government
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, and North Korea

71. U.S.-Korea Relations

Author:: Victor D. Cha
Publication Date:: 04-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The quarter ended with the question of whether President Obama's first late-night crisis phone call – the metric for leadership bandied about during the campaign – would be over a ballistic missile test by North Korea. The suspenseful end to the quarter contrasted with its quiet start where the focus of U.S.-ROK bilateral relations was on initial contacts between the Lee and Obama administration teams and policy coordination over the global financial crisis, while the North Korea missile launch issue slowly but steadily moved from a simmer to a slow boil. However events unfold, the launch itself gives the new administration its first taste of North Korean bad behavior and confronts it with the problem of finding the right balance between under- and over-reaction that is needed to move denuclearization negotiations forward.
Topic:: International Relations and Government
Political Geography:: United States, Washington, North Korea, and Korea

72. North Korea-South Korea Relations

Author:: Aidan Foster-Carter
Publication Date:: 04-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Looking back, it was a hostage to fortune to title our last quarterly review: “Things can only get better?” Even with that equivocating final question mark, this was too optimistic a take on relations between the two Koreas – which, as it turned out, not only failed to improve but deteriorated further in the first months of 2009. Nor was that an isolated trend. This was a quarter when a single event – or more exactly, the expectation of an event – dominated the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia more widely. Suspected since January, announced in February and awaited throughout March, despite all efforts to dissuade it North Korea's long-anticipated Taepodong launched on April 5. This too evoked a broader context, and a seeming shift in Pyongyang. Even by the DPRK's unfathomable logic, firing a big rocket – satellite or no – seemed a rude and perverse way to greet a new U.S. president avowedly committed to engagement with Washington's foes. Yet, no fewer than four separate senior private U.S. delegations, visiting Pyongyang in unusually swift succession during the past quarter, heard the same uncompromising message. Even veteran visitors who fancied they had good contacts found the usual access denied and their hosts tough-minded: apparently just not interested in an opportunity for a fresh start offered by a radically different incumbent of the White House.
Topic:: International Relations, Development, and Government
Political Geography:: United States, South Korea, North Korea, and Pyongyang

73. China-Korea Relations

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 04-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Top-level diplomacy between Beijing and Pyongyang intensified this quarter in honor of China-DPRK Friendship Year and the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations. Prior to the Lunar New Year holiday in mid-January, Kim Jong-il held his first public meeting since his reported illness with Chinese Communist Party International Liaison Department Head Wang Jiarui. In March, DPRK Prime Minister Kim Yong-il paid a return visit to Beijing. The Chinese have accompanied these commemorative meetings with active diplomatic interaction with the U.S., South Korea, and Japan focused on how to respond to North Korea's launch of a multi-stage rocket. Thus, China finds itself under pressure to dissuade Pyongyang from destabilizing activity and ease regional tensions while retaining its 60-year friendship with the North. Meanwhile, South Korean concerns about China's rise are no longer confined to issues of economic competitiveness; the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis has produced its first public assessment of the implications of China's rising economic capabilities for South Korea's long-term security policies. The response to North Korea's rocket launch also highlights differences in the respective near-term positions of Seoul and Beijing. Following years of expanding bilateral trade and investment ties, the global financial crisis provides new challenges for Sino-ROK economic relations: how to manage the fallout from a potential decline in bilateral trade and the possibility that domestic burdens will spill over and create new strains in the relationship.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Beijing, South Korea, North Korea, Korea, and Pyongyang

74. Japan-Korea Relations

Author:: Ji-Young Lee and David C. Kang
Publication Date:: 04-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The first three months of 2009 saw Japan-North Korea relations go from stalemate to hostility, as North Korea's “satellite” launch on April 5 heightened tensions throughout Northeast Asia. As Pyongyang tried to goad its partners in the Six-Party Talks (the new Obama administration in particular) to induce more favorable terms, Tokyo took steps that may have more far-reaching implications for regional security than merely a plan to deal with the current North Korean missile crisis. Meanwhile, Tokyo and Seoul continued to focus on a practical partnership for economic cooperation and stayed on good terms. The highlight of the quarter was Prime Minister Aso's successful two-day visit to South Korea in mid-January for a summit with President Lee Myung-bak. Although historical issues lingered as a potential factor that might challenge and disrupt this mood of détente, Japan-South Korea relations improved due in no small part to the Lee administration's tough policy toward Pyongyang.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Japan, North Korea, Tokyo, Korea, and Pyongyang

75. U.S.-China Relations

Author:: Bonnie Glaser
Publication Date:: 07-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: After the completion of the first round of “get-acquainted” meetings aimed at laying the foundation for cooperation on a broad range of issues, both the U.S. and China agree that the bilateral relationship has gotten off to a good start. While there is acute awareness on both sides of the challenges, there is a shared sense that their futures are inextricably linked and that cooperation is essential to global economic prosperity and security. The quarter opened with the first face-to-face meeting between Presidents Hu and Obama on the sidelines of the G20 financial summit in London. On separate visits to Beijing, Todd Stern, the U.S. special envoy for climate change, and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi underscored the importance of combating the effects of global warming. U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner traveled to China to prepare for the first round of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Washington sought China's cooperation on pressing regional security issues, including North Korea and Afghanistan-Pakistan. After an 18 month hiatus, the Defense Consultative Talks were held in Beijing, giving a desperately needed boost to the bilateral military relationship.
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, China, Washington, Beijing, North Korea, and London

76. U.S.-Korea Relations

Author:: Victor D. Cha
Publication Date:: 07-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The quarter saw a plethora of provocations by North Korea, ranging from ballistic missiles tests to the country's second (and more successful) nuclear test. The United Nations Security Council responded with Resolution 1874 that called for financial sanctions and the institutionalization of a counter proliferation regime that would have made John Bolton proud. The U.S. and ROK presidents held their first summit amidst all this noise and sent clear signals of alliance solidarity. Washington exhibited the closeness of the alliance, being the only country to send a presidential delegation to the funeral of former President Roh Moo-hyun. These rhetorical demonstrations of the alliance's strength, however, cannot drown out the potential substantive setback to the alliance as the KORUS Free Trade Agreement continues to languish.
Topic:: United Nations
Political Geography:: United States, Washington, North Korea, and Korea

77. North Korea-South Korea Relations

Author:: Aidan Foster-Carter
Publication Date:: 07-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The second quarter of 2009 saw North Korea make headlines around the world, as it likes to do. (On their leisurely train journey across Siberia toward Moscow in the summer of 2001, Kim Jong-il told his Russian host, Konstantin Pulikovsky: “'I am the object of criticism around the world. But I think that since I am being discussed, then I am on the right track.”) The quarter was neatly, perhaps deliberately, bookended by missile launches. On April 5 after a two month build-up, while the world watched the preparations via spy satellites, the DPRK finally fired its long-awaited Taepodong-2 long-range missile. Ostensibly this was to put a satellite in orbit – although neither the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) nor anyone else has managed to observe any new object soaring across the heavens. Meanwhile, relations between the South and North continued to deteriorate as interaction became more caustic and the stakes higher. By the end of the quarter, the rest of the world watched again as the North launched more missiles.
Political Geography:: South Korea, North Korea, and Moscow

78. China-Korea Relations

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 07-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: North Korea's missile launch on April 5 and nuclear test on May 25 posed a test to the international community following two UN Security Council resolutions in 2006 condemning North Korea's actions. For China, the tests again highlighted the tensions between its emerging role as a global actor with increasing international responsibilities and prestige and a commitment to North Korea as an ally with whom China shares longstanding historical and ideological ties. On June 12, China voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 1874 condemning North Korea's nuclear test, banning sales of nuclear and missile-related technology and heavy weapons to North Korea, authorizing financial sanctions against companies involved with North Korea's missile and nuclear programs, and authorizing the implementation of an inspections regime for suspect shipments into and out of North Korea. China now must decide whether it will actively implement the resolution. As a result of North Korea's declining trade with South Korea and the international community, China's economic leverage with North Korea has grown. But it is unclear whether China will utilize such leverage given strategic concerns about regional stability and the impact on the political succession process now underway in Pyongyang.
Political Geography:: China, South Korea, North Korea, Korea, and Pyongyang

79. Japan-Korea Relations

Author:: Ji-Young Lee and David C. Kang
Publication Date:: 07-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The second quarter of 2009 saw a rapid increase in tensions between North Korea and all its neighbors, and this tension dominated relations during the quarter. In rapid succession, North Korea tested a long-range intercontinental ballistic missile (which failed), a nuclear device (successfully), dared anyone to start a war with it, and then dispatched a ship suspected of carrying small arms on a route most believed destined for Myanmar. Japan led the way in responding to North Korea, introducing harsher sanctions and calling for wider international moves to punish Pyongyang. Seoul-Tokyo relations moved closer as leaders in both capitals agreed on how to react to North Korea and both leaders welcomed the Obama administration's moves for UN sanctions.
Topic:: United Nations
Political Geography:: Japan, North Korea, Tokyo, Korea, Myanmar, and Pyongyang

80. U.S.-Korea Relations

Author:: Victor D. Cha
Publication Date:: 10-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The quarter saw a good deal of U.S.-Korea activity, largely the result of several trips by high-level U.S. officials to the region. While extended deterrence was a major topic of conversation between the allies, Washington and Seoul also coordinated policy on North Korea with some indication that groundwork for reengagement in nuclear negotiations may be in the offing. Former President Bill Clinton's surprise visit to the North was successful in achieving the return of detained U.S. journalists Laura Ling and Euna Lee.
Topic:: Security, NATO, and Cold War
Political Geography:: United States, North Korea, and Korea

81. North Korea-South Korea Relations

Author:: Aidan Foster-Carter
Publication Date:: 10-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Dealing with North Korea resembles the board game Snakes Ladders (known in the U.S. as Chutes Ladders). The first half of this year was an especially long snake/chute. Pyongyang's missile and nuclear tests, and its general bellicosity, not only undid last year's slight gains in the Six-Party Talks (6PT), but were a strange way to greet an incoming U.S. president avowedly committed to exploring engagement with Washington's traditional foes. But what goes down must, eventually, come up, even if each time some may fear it is a case of – to change the spatial metaphor – one step forward, two steps back. As of autumn, things on the peninsula are looking up somewhat – at least relatively, if not in any absolute sense.
Topic:: International Relations and Diplomacy
Political Geography:: United States, South Korea, and North Korea

82. China-Korea Relations

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 10-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: North Korea's missile tests in early July marked an apparent peak in its provocative behavior as Pyongyang shifted to a “charm offensive” strategy toward the international community from August. Pyongyang's turn toward diplomacy has shifted attention to a series of meetings between North Korea and the international community, including Kim Jong-il's talks with former U.S. President Bill Clinton and Hyundai Chairperson Hyun Jung-Eun in August, China's State Councilor Dai Bingguo in September, and finally Premier Wen Jiabao in early October. Kim Jong-il's encouraging statement regarding prospects for renewed multilateral and bilateral dialogue during Dai's visit and his further statement during Wen's visit that “the DPRK is willing to attend multilateral talks, including the Six-Party Talks, based on the progress in the DPRK-U.S. talks” has set the stage for new engagement with North Korea by the U.S. and the international community. It remains to be seen if this engagement will lead to tangible North Korean actions in the direction of denuclearization.
Topic:: Environment
Political Geography:: China, North Korea, and Pyongyang

83. Regional Overview: Tentative Multilateralism and Democracy in Action

Author:: Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 01-2008
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The quarter began with high hopes, following the year's second Six-Party Talks “breakthrough,” but it was all down hill after that. On Oct. 3, Beijing announced a “second phase” implementation plan that laid out a series of specific Korean Peninsula denuclearization actions to be accomplished by Dec. 31. Unfortunately, the new year tolled with the most critical of these promised actions – a mutually acceptable “complete and correct declaration” of all North Korean nuclear programs, facilities, and activities – nowhere to be found. The much-anticipated ASEAN Charter was also signed this quarter but hopes that Myanmar would somehow be penalized for its brutal suppression of peaceful protests earlier in the fall were dashed as the other members took an ostrich-like approach to the problem. The third East Asia Summit took place as scheduled, with outside observers still not fully clear about the group's objectives or its place in the greater multilateral mix. The largest multilateral gathering of the quarter took place in Bali, where those worried about global warming expelled a lot of hot air in producing a potentially useful but currently not very specific “Bali Roadmap” on climate change. The democratic process remained alive and well with new governments being elected in Australia, South Korea, and Thailand, even as China was ruling that Hong Kong would not be ready for a more representative government until at least 2017. On the economic front, 2007 proved to be a good year for Asia, with growth consistent with pre-year projections; most forecasters see only a modest slowdown in 2008, despite lingering concerns about over the fallout from the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis.
Political Geography:: United States, China, East Asia, South Korea, North Korea, Australia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Myanmar, and Bali

84. U.S.-Japan: Distracted Governments Make some Positive Progress

Author:: Nicholas Szechenyi and Michael J. Green
Publication Date:: 01-2008
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo outlined his foreign policy agenda in an address to the Diet, highlighting – as did his predecessors Abe Shinzo and Koizumi Junichiro – the U.S.-Japan alliance and international cooperation as the foundations of Japanese diplomacy. But legislation authorizing Japan's naval refueling mission in the Indian Ocean became a political football in a divided legislature and expired on Nov. 1, forcing Fukuda to draft a new bill and extend the Diet session twice in an attempt to continue Japan's support for the war on terror. Fukuda noted the importance of the bill during a November summit with President Bush in Washington that also covered other issues including the Six-Party Talks and concerns in Japan about a perceived shift in the U.S. position on Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea. Other developments such as a new agreement on host nation support for U.S. forces in Japan and a successful sea-based missile defense test demonstrated forward trajectory for alliance cooperation. Yet the quarter ended with other issues unresolved, namely Japan's suspension of Indian Ocean refueling operations and Pyongyang's failure to come clean on its nuclear programs.
Topic:: International Relations
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, Washington, India, North Korea, and Pyongyang

85. U.S. - Korea: North Disables Facilities, But Resists Declaration

Author:: Donald G. Gross and Hannah Oh
Publication Date:: 01-2008
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: North Korea followed through on its Oct. 3 commitment to disable its nuclear facilities this quarter, but resisted giving an “complete and correct” declaration of its nuclear programs. While the disabling actions – which would prevent North Korea from producing nuclear material for at least a year – encouraged U.S. officials, Pyongyang's unwillingness to declare its uranium enrichment program, in particular, created a potentially major obstacle in the Six-Party Talks. At the end of the quarter, the U.S. faced a diplomatic dilemma: how to incentivize Pyongyang to continue the disabling process, while pressuring North Korea to come clean on its past nuclear activities. Pyongyang insisted it had engaged in “sufficient consultation” with the U.S. on the declaration and threatened to slow down the disabling process until it received more compensation.
Political Geography:: United States, North Korea, and Pyongyang

86. China - Korea: Underhanded Tactics and Stolen Secrets

Author:: Scott Snyder
Publication Date:: 01-2008
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The Oct. 3 Six-Party Talks agreement on next steps in North Korea's denuclearization and the Oct. 4 inter-Korean summit declaration shaped developments in China-Korean relations in the last quarter of 2007, as China reaffirmed its peacemaking role on the Korean Peninsula. Chinese Communist Party official Liu Yunshan visited Pyongyang in late October with a message from Hu Jintao, resuming party-to-party high-level contacts with Pyongyang after a year's break. Similarly, Six-Party Talks lead negotiator Wu Dawei visited Pyongyang in mid-December to encourage North Korean counterparts to follow through on obligations to disable and declare nuclear facilities by the end of the year in accordance with the Feb. 13 and Oct. 3 agreements. South Korean telecommunications companies worked hard to gain an advantage over global competitors in the Chinese market, while Korean automobile and steel manufacturers faced new challenges as industrial espionage involving proprietary technology drew an even higher profile in both sectors. China's search for financing has not bypassed the Korean equity market, as Korea's China-focused equity funds gained while the Korean Stock Exchange attempts to attract Chinese firms to list directly on the Korean exchange.
Political Geography:: China, South Korea, North Korea, Korea, Sinai Peninsula, and Pyongyang

87. Japan - Korea: Lost in the Six-Party Talks

Author:: Ji-Young Lee and David C. Kang
Publication Date:: 01-2008
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The final quarter of 2007 was eventful and left observers in both Japan and South Korea cautiously optimistic about bilateral relations. Both Japan and South Korea chose new chief executives this fall, and both of them promised to search for more collaboration and to begin repairing relations between the two countries. Halting progress on North Korean denuclearization through the Six-Party Talks led to hope that momentum could be sustained, although Japan for the time being has chosen to be supportive but skeptical of North Korea's promise to denuclearize, and continued its sanctions against the DPRK. Indeed, North Korea's missed deadline for declaring its nuclear programs was a reminder that progress in relations with North Korea is never straightforward or easy. Although no country has decided to forego the process, it is unclear how relations between North Korea and other states in the region will evolve in 2008.
Topic:: International Security and International Affairs
Political Geography:: Japan, South Korea, and North Korea

88. Regional Overview: (Waiting for) The Dawn of a New Era

Author:: Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 04-2008
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: “It is always darkest just before the dawn of a new day” goes the old saying. Well, it looks pretty dark when it comes to U.S.-DPRK relations and the prospects for the Six-Party Talks, with no significant progress reported this quarter in the quest for a “complete and correct declaration” of North Korea's nuclear programs and activities. Hope springs eternal, however, as both sides continued to work toward a much needed “third breakthrough” in the next quarter.
Political Geography:: North Korea

89. U.S. - Korea: A New Day

Author:: Victor D. Cha
Publication Date:: 04-2008
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The major event of the first quarter of 2008 was the inauguration of a new government in South Korea. The Lee Myung-bak government offered some initial signals of the types of policies it intends to pursue both on and off the peninsula. While there is much that was accomplished under the Roh Moo-hyun government in U.S.-ROK relations, most experts agree that the overall tone between the new Lee government and the Bush administration will improve considerably. Meanwhile, U.S.-DPRK relations in the context of the Six-Party Talks remain stuck on completing the second phase of the denuclearization agreement, despite some audibles by the U.S. team in conjunction with the Chinese. While we may be in the first quarter of the year, it may be the last quarter for the six-party process absent any progress.
Topic:: International Relations
Political Geography:: United States, South Korea, and North Korea

90. China - Korea: Lee Myung-bak Era: Mixed Picture for China Relations

Author:: Scott Snyder
Publication Date:: 04-2008
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The South Korean political transition to a new administration under President Lee Myung-bak catalyzed diplomatic contacts designed to size up the new leader and to establish the foundations for a new era in the Sino-South Korean relationship. Accompanying this transition, Beijing redoubled efforts to manage relations with Pyongyang through high-level party-to-party exchanges with Kim Jong-il. Chinese food assistance to North Korea and the North Korean commitments in the Six-Party Talks framework to declare nuclear-related programs dominated conversations with the Dear Leader. The rise in “fly-by-night” departures of South Korean small investors from China resulting from rising Chinese labor costs and changing incentives for investments in China requires diplomatic management between Beijing and Seoul. Finally, “yellow dust,” Tibet, Taiwan, and quality controls on food exports to Korea are nagging issues that cloud the relationship.
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Beijing, South Korea, North Korea, Korea, and Pyongyang

91. Japan - Korea: Inaction for Inaction

Author:: Ji-Young Lee and David C. Kang
Publication Date:: 04-2008
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Despite the change in Japanese leadership from hard-liner Abe Shintaro to the more dialogue-oriented Fukuda Yasuo, this quarter's Japan-North Korea relations were largely uneventful and produced little progress. Tokyo criticized Pyongyang for missing the year-end deadline for declaring all its nuclear programs and facilities, urging North Korea to make a “political decision” to fulfill its commitment under the Six-Party Talks agreement. Pyongyang reiterated that Japan should be excluded from the talks, and blamed Japan for the U.S. failure to remove Pyongyang from its list of state sponsors of terror. North Korea asserted that there would be no improvement in their bilateral relations as long as Japan continues to press resolution of the abduction issue on Pyongyang. By mid-March, Tokyo had decided to extend economic sanctions against Pyongyang for another six months after they expire April 13, if the current situation continues with no breakthroughs. Meanwhile, with the change in South Korean leadership from a liberal-minded Roh Moo-hyun to the more conservative Lee Myung-bak, Tokyo exerted diplomatic efforts to bring South Korea closer to Japan by trying to form a united front between Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. against North Korea.
Topic:: International Relations
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Tokyo, and Pyongyang

92. Regional Overview

Author:: Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 10-2008
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Hopes of progress in Six-Party Talks negotiations evident in the closing days of the previous quarter were quickly dashed as anticipated disagreements over verification of North Korea's nuclear declaration created a stalemate still in evidence at quarter's end. The only movement was backward, as “action for action” was replaced by inaction and worse. Last year, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made news by not showing up at the annual ASEAN Regional Forum ministerial. This year she went and hardly anyone noticed. The democratic process made for interesting watching this quarter, not only in Thailand and Malaysia, but in East Asia's most established democracy, as Japan saw its third leader in the 24 months since Prime Minister Koizumi departed the scene. The once presumably left for dead U.S.-India nuclear deal was reincarnated by the Indian Parliament this quarter with the U.S. Congress following suit at quarter's end and President Bush's signature in early October. Finally, the U.S. sneezed this quarter and the rest of the world did catch cold, even as Wall Street struggles with a serious bout of pneumonia. Economic policy also dominated the “foreign policy debate” between Senators Obama and McCain, with no questions and only sparse references to Asia throughout.
Topic:: Economics
Political Geography:: India, East Asia, Asia, and North Korea

93. U.S.-Japan Relations

Author:: Michael J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi
Publication Date:: 10-2008
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Development
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, and North Korea

94. U.S.-Korea Relations

Author:: Victor D. Cha
Publication Date:: 10-2008
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The big news in the penultimate quarter of 2008 centered on leadership ills (literally) in North Korea and Pyongyang's rolling back of the six-party denuclearization agreement. On the U.S.-ROK front, President George W. Bush made his last trip to Asia of his presidency, stopping for a brief visit in South Korea on his way to the Beijing Olympics. While the free trade agreement (FTA) remains mired in U.S. domestic politics, important low-key agreements were reached to help bolster the people-to-people aspects of the alliance. As the quarter ended, the Bush administration was making preparations to make what some described as a last ditch effort to salvage the aid-for-denuclearization deal with North Korea by sending Six-Party Talks negotiator Christopher Hill to Pyongyang for a third time.
Topic:: Government
Political Geography:: United States, Beijing, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

95. China-Southeast Asia Relations

Author:: Robert Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
Publication Date:: 10-2008
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Chinese relations with Southeast Asia were overshadowed for most of the quarter by Chinese leadership preoccupations with the 2008 Olympic Games and various crises involving toxic Chinese milk supplies, turmoil in U.S. and international financial markets, leadership uncertainty in North Korea, and the Russia-Georgia war. Although official Chinese media highlighted President Hu Jintao's meetings with Southeast Asian and other world leaders at the Beijing Olympics, he and other top leaders did not travel to Southeast Asia except for the foreign minister's attendance at the ASEAN meetings in Singapore in July. New troubles emerged with Vietnam, notably over oil exploration in the South China Sea. The recent pattern of Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean leaders meeting independent of ASEAN, despite their continued avowals of ASEAN's “leadership” in East Asian regional matters, paused when Japanese officials announced the postponement of a planned summit among the three northeast Asian powers in September on account of the resignation of Japan's prime minister.
Topic:: Development and Economics
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Beijing, North Korea, and Southeast Asia

96. North Korea-South Korea Relations

Author:: Aidan Foster-Career
Publication Date:: 10-2008
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Relations between the two Koreas, having already worsened from April when North Korea took umbrage with South Korea's new president, Lee Myung-bak, deteriorated further during the third quarter. This may have been inevitable. In a break from the “sunshine” policy pursued over the past decade by his two liberal predecessors, Kim Dae-jung (1988-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-08), Lee had signaled that henceforth expanded inter-Korean cooperation would depend on progress in denuclearization under the Six-Party Talks (6PT). Not only did this linkage displease Pyongyang in principle, but the current 6PT stalemate and North Korea's proclaimed restoration of facilities at its Yongbyon nuclear site, have made inter-Korean progress difficult given the Lee administration's conditionalities. And yet, and yet. By early July, his popularity plunging barely four months into his five-year term (after the U.S. beef import protests and a series of gaffes), the president formerly known as “bulldozer” was ready to try a different tack. On July 11 he told the new National Assembly – elected in April, but only now convening due to inter-party wrangles – that “full dialogue between the two Koreas must resume.” He also renewed his offer of humanitarian aid.
Topic:: Human Rights
Political Geography:: United States, South Korea, and North Korea

97. Japan-Korea Relations

Author:: Ji-Young Lee and David C. Kang
Publication Date:: 10-2008
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Although there was little movement in Japan's relations with North Korea, this quarter was dominated by the news leaking out of North Korea in early September that Kim Jong-il was potentially very sick. Questions about Kim's health, the status of his leadership in North Korea, and the future of North Korea's leadership quickly dominated discussion. Coupled with Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda's surprise resignation and the quick choice of Aso Taro as prime minister, Japanese foreign policy was on a brief hiatus while the new leader set his own agenda. Known as a conservative, it is expected that Aso will take a harder line toward the North – and the region more generally – than did Fukuda. But his official appointment, coming on Sept. 24, was so recent that it is too early to see how Aso plans to proceed. Thus, there was actually little substantive change in Japan's relations with North Korea, and the quarter ended basically where it began.
Topic:: Government and Politics
Political Geography:: Japan, North Korea, and Korea

98. Action for Action, with Mixed Reaction

Author:: Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 07-2008
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: After eight months of inaction, there was a flurry of six-party action at quarter's end. As Pyongyang produced its long-awaited declaration of its nuclear activities, President Bush announced his intention to remove North Korea from the U.S. listing of state sponsors of terrorism and Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) restrictions. Pyongyang responded with a made-for-TV demolition of the cooling tower at its Yongbyon nuclear facility. Elsewhere, respective reactions to natural disasters showed how far China has come and Myanmar/Burma still has to go in dealing with the outside world. There was a generally positive reaction to Secretary Gates' Shangri-La statements on U.S. East Asia policy and toward the two U.S. presidential candidates (or their surrogates) early pronouncements about Asia as well. In contrast, there has been almost no reaction at all to Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's call for a more inclusive Asia-Pacific community.
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, Burma, Myanmar, and Pyongyang

99. Chock-full of Dialogue: SED, Human Rights, and Security

Author:: Bonnie Glaser
Publication Date:: 07-2008
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Major developments in Sino-U.S. relations took place on the economic, military, and political fronts this quarter. The fourth U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue was held in Annapolis, Maryland, June 17-18, yielding a 10-year energy and environment cooperation framework. A telephone link was installed between the U.S. Department of Defense and China's Ministry of Defense and talks were launched on nuclear policy and strategy. The U.S. and China held a round of their bilateral dialogue on human rights after a hiatus of six years and vice-foreign minister level talks on security issues were held for the first time in four years. The U.S. provided assistance to China to ensure the security of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. A massive 7.9 magnitude earthquake rocked China's southwestern Sichuan Province and the U.S., along with the rest of the international community, provided aid. Secretary of State Rice visited the quake-hit area and held talks in Beijing focused on North Korea.
Political Geography:: China, Beijing, North Korea, and Maryland

100. Lee Outflanked

Author:: Aidan Foster-Carter
Publication Date:: 07-2008
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Rarely does the political weather change so abruptly with the calendar as it has in Korea during the past quarter. As we reported in our last issue, North Korea chose April 1 – April Fools' day – to finally break its long silence on the South's new leader Lee Myung-bak, who was elected president last December 19 and took office on February 25. With rare restraint, Pyongyang had kept its counsel for several months since Lee – a former mayor of Seoul, ex-Hyundai CEO and self-described pragmatic conservative – was elected president by a large majority on a platform of mending fences with the U.S. and curbing Seoul's “sunshine” policy of the past decade. Though ready to expand inter-Korean dealings on his own terms – as in his Vision 3000 program, which offered to triple North Korean national income to US$3,000 per head – Lee insisted on linking any increased cooperation to progress on the North's nuclear disarmament.
Political Geography:: North Korea, Korea, and Pyongyang

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS