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41. Pakistan’s Gwadar Port: A New Naval Base in China’s String of Pearls in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Gurmeet Kanwai
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Issue The development of Gwadar Port is a key element of the greater China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It speaks to both the strength of the China-Pakistan relationship and the reach of China’s grand strategy. With Pakistan’s two other major ports operating near capacity with no room for expansion, projects in Gwadar promise to eventually handle one million tons of cargo annually, while also providing significant industrial, oil, and transportation infrastructure. Though a “monument of Pakistan-China friendship,” there are misgivings on both sides about CPEC, including the safety of Chinese workers, the resentment of Baloch nationalists, and the growing debt trap created by the project. The prospect of the PLA Navy in Gwadar poses greater security questions, as it forms another link in China’s efforts to expand its maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific region. The members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or “Quad,” comprised of India, Japan, Australia, and the United States, should counter China’s strategic outreach by networking with other like-minded countries on cooperative security frameworks to ensure a free, open, prosperous, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:
Security, Oil, Regional Cooperation, Global Political Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, Japan, China, Middle East, India, Asia, and Australia

42. Rebooting U.S.-China Trade Ties: “Enter Ye Through the Narrow Gate”

Author:
Christopher K Johnson
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Nearly two weeks after the U.S. “Trade Avengers” unleashed during their visit to Beijing what one reasonably could call “trade shock and awe” with a very aggressive—if thoroughly researched and well-crafted—set of demands targeting the yawning U.S. trade deficit with China and the core of that country’s throaty industrial policy, China this week is taking its turn with the visit of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo member and Vice Premier Liu He, President Xi Jinping’s economic point man who is almost universally described as a thoughtful, pragmatic, and mild-mannered policy academic. In the interim, voices from a wide swath of official Washington have sounded the alarm about the dangers of Chinese influence operations and the presence of alleged subversives, while President Trump himself seemed to cast aside these growing concerns by suggesting via Twitter that he would ask the Commerce Department to overturn its action against the Chinese telecommunications firm ZTE—long a focus of the U.S. security community for suspected cyber espionage activity and irrefutable violations of U.S. law—in response to protests that reportedly emanated directly from President Xi. With such frenetically sustained action in such a short period of time, the fog of war seems particularly thick at the moment. As such, it seems like a good time to slow down and have a think about how we got here, what actually is going on, and, with a little bit of luck, perhaps think about some ways to craft a viable way forward. Just like milestone birthdays in one’s personal life, important political anniversaries also can incline the mind toward reflection. Next year, of course, marks the fortieth anniversary of the reestablishment of diplomatic ties between the United States and China. As such, much breath and a lot of ink have been devoted to analyzing the course of the bilateral relationship over that nearly half-century. Although certainly not a universal opinion, it seems fair, if perhaps overly reductionist, to suggest that the general conclusion among a substantial number of U.S. officials, policy analysts, and journalists has been that the consistent U.S. policy emphasis on engagement with China during those forty years was, at the end of the day, a sham. In this rendering, naïve groups of senior policymakers in succeeding U.S. administrations and in most of the U.S. China-watching community were hoodwinked by wily CCP leaders who talked the talk of integrating into the so-called U.S.-led rules-based international order, but all the while they had a secret master plan to instead subvert that order and challenge U.S. primacy throughout the globe. In a slightly less menacing (if no less absurd) version of this narrative, China was, indeed, headed generally toward this hoped for integration under the stewardship of deceased paramount leader Deng Xiaoping and his handpicked successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao until Xi Jinping arrived and, through a ruthless consolidation of power, decided instead to change course in what now regularly is referred to in shorthand as Xi’s “authoritarian turn.” But this conclusion seems utterly wrongheaded when examined in the light of hard facts. On the Chinese side of the equation, for example, Deng Xiaoping may have appeared warm and cuddly when donning his cowboy hat during his famous 1979 visit to the United States, but he could be just as ruthless and grasping as any other authoritarian leader. Deng’s exceptionally courageous and dogged pursuit of the policies of reform and opening certainly are worthy of praise, but they cannot, and therefore should not, be separated from the fact that he was content to sit idly by as Chairman Mao’s loyal lieutenant as Mao decimated his political rivals during the Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957-59) and the Great Leap Forward (1958-62). Nor should we forget that Deng used every ounce of his massive personal prestige with the People’s Liberation Army to, with steely determination, rally his many reluctant commanders to execute the brutal Tiananmen crackdown of June 4, 1989. Similarly, Xi Jinping is no Jack-in-the-Box-like figure who has pulled a fast one with a sharp directional turn in the last couple of years made all the more stark after his sweeping consolidation of power at last fall’s 19th Party Congress. In fact, it is this author’s contention, as supported by a large body of written work and public commentary, that everything Xi has done over the last five years was abundantly clear, whether explicitly or in embryonic form—from the moment he was introduced to the world as China’s new top leader in the fall of 2012, as encapsulated in his call for his country to pursue the “China Dream” set on a foundation of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” This by no means suggests the United States should express support for, or even acquiescence in, Xi’s policies, but only that it should not be reacting with the borderline hysteria that now seems to be gripping Washington.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Global Political Economy, and Trade Wars
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America

43. Shield of the Pacific: Japan as a Giant Aegis Destroyer

Author:
Tom Karako
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Several decades ago, former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone once described his country as a “big aircraft carrier” from which to defend against Soviet aircraft.1 Although such an analogy fails to capture the richness and depth of the U.S-Japan alliance, it did say something important about Japan’s unique geographic and strategic position. Today’s air and missile threats in the Asia-Pacific region are different, as is the joint U.S.-Japanese defense posture to meet them. Given a handful of changes underway, however, one might instead say that Japan is shaping up to be a giant Aegis destroyer group of sorts. A vision of much more robust air and missile defense capability in the Asia-Pacific region hinges upon the forthcoming acquisition of Aegis Ashore sites in Japan. Japan’s intent to acquire two such sites was announced in December 2017, a decision supported by 66 percent of the Japanese population, according to one recent poll.2 But the potential significance of Japanese Aegis Ashore deployments has not yet been widely understood. Combined with military forces in other domains, these sites will be the foundation of more robust air and missile defenses against North Korea and form a base upon which to adapt to more sophisticated future threats, including China. Assuming the approval process for the foreign military sales comes along well, this development has broad implications for the United States and America’s allies.3 The road to more layered missile defense goes in part through Aegis Ashore, and the road to innovative Aegis Ashore deployments probably goes through Tokyo. The U.S. Navy’s Aegis Combat System has evolved considerably since the first Aegis ship deployed in 1984. Some 90 Aegis ships are currently operated by the United States, and five other countries have Aegis ships as well: Australia, Norway, South Korea, Spain, and Japan. The word “Aegis” refers to the shield of the ancient god Zeus, and Aegis ships have long provided fleet air defense, strike, and antisubmarine warfare. Over the past decade, 35 American and 4 Japanese Aegis ships have also acquired a ballistic missile defense mission. The most recent configurations are capable of executing the integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) mission, with simultaneous air defense and ballistic missile defense operations.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Asia-Pacific

44. The Korean Civil-Military Balance

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
President Trump's cancellation of the summit with North Korea is a warning as to just how difficult it is to bring any kind of stability to the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. It is also a warning that the U.S. cannot focus on the nuclear issue and ICBM, rather than the overall military balance in the Koreas and the impact that any kind of war fighting can have on the civil population of South Korea and the other states in Northeast Asia. The nuclear balance is an all too critical aspect of regional security, but it is only part of the story and military capability do not address the potential impact and cost of any given form of conflict.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

45. Southeast Asia Financial Integration and Infrastructure Investment: What Role for the United States?

Author:
Murray Hiebert
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Issue Southeast Asia has come a long way since the devastating financial turmoil of 1997 and has set up mechanisms to avoid the next shock. But in case a future crisis hits, it would be useful for the U.S. government to say upfront if it would support International Monetary Fund (IMF) support. Some in the Trump administration have said they oppose IMF bailouts. The newest opportunity—and challenge—to Southeast Asia’s financial system is the bursting onto the scene of fintech firms. These companies are meeting the urgent needs of underserved populations. Yet their activities outstrip the ability of traditional regulators to govern their activities and protect consumers. China’s Belt and Road Initiative could play a mighty role in meeting infrastructure needs in Southeast Asia if it is done right. But so far Beijing has said little about what it envisions the impact of its projects to be. “Will that spending help people who need it most?” asks Jonathan Hillman of CSIS’ Reconnecting Asia Project. “Will it go into viable projects…? Will it help or hurt climate change?” “[I]n countries where public debt is already high, careful management of financing terms [for infrastructure projects] is critical,” IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde said during a conference in Beijing. “This will protect both China and partner governments from entering into agreements that will cause financial difficulties in the future.”
Topic:
Infrastructure, Global Political Economy, Integration, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

46. The Future of Latin America and the Caribbean in the Context of the Rise of China

Author:
Dr. R. Evan Ellis
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
There are numerous analyses about China and its future, as well as about Chinese engagement with Latin America. This report examines, in detail, how the growth of China, with its power and role in the global economy, is likely to transform Latin America and the Caribbean through economic, political, and other forms of engagement with the region. The report considers multiple scenarios regarding the future of China, the resolution of its security challenges, and possible departures from its current trajectory. It focuses primarily on the question of what Latin America and the Caribbean will look like if China succeeds in its ongoing economic and political engagement in the region. Compared to scenario-oriented analyses, this report does not attempt to predict the detailed political ebbs and flows of the region. Instead, it examines economic sectors to understand how the region will be transformed through its intimate economic relationship with China and its part in a global process in which Chinese companies continue to expand their presence in the region. While the report also looks at military issues and the likely evolution of Latin America’s relationship with the United States, it finds equally dramatic implications for China’s willingness to use its soft power in the region. While this report does not claim that China has nefarious objectives to politically dominate the region, or usurp the United States as a superpower, it does find evidence that the logical extension of China’s current expansion plans threatens to relegate the region to a future of limited economic opportunity and personal liberty. This is seen in China’s actions to pursue its development interests, dominate the most lucrative parts of global value chains, and expand China’s power with a questionable level of respect for Western concepts of universal laws, rights, and freedoms. As China continues in the pursuit of these goals, compromised elites serve the transfer of wealth and resources from the Latin American region and other "Belt and Road" region to the new imperial center.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Hegemony, Foreign Interference, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Latin America, Caribbean, and North America

47. Technological Competition and China

Author:
James A. Lewis
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Napoleon’s famous quotation about a sleeping giant moving the world when it awoke seems prescient, but a closer examination presents a more complex story. China’s rise is often accompanied by corresponding predictions of inevitable conflict and U.S. decline. These predictions are simplistic and rest on assumptions of China’s economic and political trajectory that may not be valid. In the near term, competition is unavoidable, and the more important challenge comes from China’s efforts to “return to the center of the world stage” and the means China uses to attain this at a time when the United States is reassessing its global role. The United States and China are in a growing competition, perhaps verging on conflict, but it is not a nineteenth century competition between empires for control of territory and resources. Unlike great power competition in previous centuries, the focal point is not military strength or territorial expansion. This conflict is over control of the modern levers of power—global rules and institutions, standards, trade, and technology. The ability to create new technologies, particularly digital technologies (given their importance for politics, security, and economic growth) have become key factors in the U.S.-China relationship, which is marked by close commercial cooperation and deep governmental distrust. This disparity creates unavoidable tensions. The link between technology, innovation, national security, and international power is now widely recognized. When Vladimir Putin says that the country that leads in artificial intelligence (AI) “will be the ruler of the world,” it is hyperbole, but hyperbole that confirms that political leaders recognize that the ability to innovate is a potent source of national power. In the digital age, national security and national power have different requirements shaped by technological change and cyberspace. Innovation has become a central element of its international influence.1 This is not new—the U.S.-Soviet space race was a contest of the ability of different systems to produce new technologies, but those were unique government programs. Technological competition today is as much between companies as states. A country’s ability to innovate and produce advanced technologies provides economic strength, military power, and an intangible benefit of perceived leadership. Both China and the United States have advantages and disadvantages in this contest, and while it is usual to focus on quantitative aspects—such as the number of engineers or patents and spending on research and development (R&D)—these are not the key determinants of technological competition between states. This competition is a contest of ideas on governance for investment, innovation, and the internet. The internet and global connectivity not only reshape the environment for competition but also create political and market forces that both nations find difficult to control.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Hegemony, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China and Asia

48. The Article II Mandate: Forging a Stronger Economic Alliance between the United States and Japan

Author:
Matthew P. Goodman, Ann Listerud, and Daniel Remler
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The alliance between the United States and Japan has been a force for peace and prosperity around the world for nearly 60 years. Economics has been at the heart of the U.S.–Japan alliance from the outset: Article II of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security mandates that the two allies “seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and … encourage economic collaboration between them.” Nowhere are U.S. and Japanese strategic interests more closely aligned than in the Indo-Pacific region. Both Washington and Tokyo seek to ensure regional security and stability, expand trade and other economic opportunities, and support universal democratic norms. The two countries have worked constructively together for many decades to shape regional economic rules and norms through institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Regionalism, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

49. How should we view China's rise?

Author:
CHRISTOPHER K JOHNSON, Amy Searight, and Victor D. Cha
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
It is evident that China’s rise will continue to dominate the geopolitics of Asia. How do the Chinese view this? Do its neighbors view it as inevitable, benign, or concerning? Where is there greatest convergence of Chinese views with that of its neighbors, and where is the greatest divergence?
Topic:
Globalization, International Political Economy, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
China

50. U.S.-Sino Relations in the Arctic A Roadmap for Future Cooperation

Author:
Heather A. Conley
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The emergence of the Arctic as a region of political and economic opportunity adds a new dimension to U.S.-China relations. Despite divergent priorities in the region, there are opportunities for greater cooperation. Both countries experience the physical challenges of climate change while investing in scientific research to gain a better understanding of a transforming Arctic. They both also seek cooperation through the Arctic Council and the International Maritime Organization to promote governance in the region. For these reasons, among others, the United States and China should create a more purposeful dialogue on a range of Arctic issues. U.S.-Sino Relations in the Arctic: A Roadmap for Future Cooperation is the result of fruitful exchanges between American and Chinese experts who addressed a range of issues: the future of Arctic governance, geopolitical factors shaping the Arctic’s future, international maritime issues in the Central Arctic Ocean, future trends in sustainable Arctic development, and new bilateral scientific research initiatives in the Arctic. Through frank and candid exchanges, this report aims to lay the foundation of strong bilateral cooperation between the United States and China in the Arctic.
Topic:
International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Geopolitics, and Climate Finance
Political Geography:
China, America, and Arctic

51. European Defense Trends: Briefing Update

Author:
David J. Berteau, Gregory Sanders, T.J. Cipoletti, Meaghan Doherty, and Abby Fanlo
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The European defense market, though impacted by lethargic economic growth and painful fiscal austerity measures, continues to be a driver in global defense. Five of the fifteen biggest military spenders worldwide in 2013 were European countries, and Europe remains a major market for international arms production and sales. Surges in military spending by Russia, China, and various Middle Eastern countries in recent years has augmented the defense landscape, especially as European countries in aggregate continue to spend less on defense and the United States embarks on a series of deep-striking budget cuts. This report analyzes overall trends in defense spending, troop numbers, collaboration, and the European defense and security industrial base across 37 countries. To remain consistent with previous reports, this briefing utilizes functional NATO categories (Equipment, Personnel, Operations and Maintenance, Infrastructure, and Research and Development) and reports figures in constant 2013 euros unless otherwise noted. Many of the trends identified within the 2012 CSIS European Defense Trends report continued into 2013, namely reductions in topline defense spending, further cuts to R spending, and steadily declining troop numbers. Though total European defense spending decreased from 2001-2013, with an accelerated decline between 2008 and 2010, select countries increased spending2 between 2011 and 2013. Collaboration among European countries has decreased in the R category; however, it has increased in the equipment category – indicating increased investment in collaborative procurement. Defense expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure has decreased across Europe from 2001-2013 with the exceptions of Albania and Estonia. An updated CSIS European Security, Defense, and Space (ESDS) Index is included within this report and exhibits a shift in geographic revenue origin for leading European defense firms away from North America and Europe and towards other major markets between 2008 and 2013. Finally, a brief analysis of Russian defense spending is included in the final section of this report in order to comprehend more fully the size and scope of the European defense market within the global framework. In 2013, Russia replaced the United Kingdom as the third largest global defense spender, devoting 11.2 percent of total government expenditures to defense. This briefing report concludes with summarized observations concerning trends in European defense from 2001 to 2013. CSIS will continue to follow and evaluate themes in European defense, which will appear in subsequent briefings.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Budget
Political Geography:
Russia, China, United Kingdom, America, and Europe

52. Is the Pivot Doomed? The Resilience of America's Strategic 'Rebalance'

Author:
Scott W. Harold
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
U.S. foreign policy is beset by numerous simultaneous crises. In Syria, the Assad regime continues to commit massive human rights abuses, while Islamic State jihadis are seizing territory in Syria and neighboring Iraq. Russia has annexed Crimea and is threatening its neighbors from Ukraine to the Baltics. In Nigeria, Boko Haram is killing students while they sleep and abducting hundreds of young girls to sell into slavery, while the Ebola virus is killing thousands in neighboring West African states. And as if this wasn't enough, in Asia, China is on the march in the South China Sea, North Korea may test another nuclear device, and U.S. allies Japan and South Korea continue to feud over history issues. In light of these challenges, U.S. foreign policy analysts may understandably question the fate of President Obama's signature foreign policy initiative, the `pivot' or `rebalance' to the Asia–Pacific.
Topic:
Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Japan, China, America, Asia, South Korea, Syria, and Nigeria

53. China: The Post-Responsible Power

Author:
Yong Deng
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Something profound seems to have occurred in Chinese foreign policy since the global financial crisis starting in 2007–08. Many have noted an assertive and nationalist Chinese shift, as most dramatically demonstrated in its high-profile global diplomacy to promote its agenda and maritime disputes with its neighbors to defend its “core” interest. But how to characterize the change remains unclear. Even the “assertive” label, an innocuous term in international relations, is contested. More common is the pessimism regarding China and East Asia, as expressed by strategist Robert Kaplan when he said, “The 21st century map of the Pacific Basin, clogged as it is with warships, is like a map of conflict-prone Europe from previous centuries.” Does this signal the start of a wholesale Chinese reversal of a formerly placid, cooperative strategy? What does the recent turn of events mean for the Sino–U.S. relationship, the East Asian order, and global governance?
Political Geography:
China

54. The Sources of Chinese Conduct: Explaining Beijing's Assertiveness

Author:
Aaron L. Friedberg
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Starting in 2009, an increasing number of foreign observers (and many Chinese as well) began to note a shift towards more forceful or “assertive” behavior on the part of Beijing. Among the most frequently cited indications of this trend were: An internal debate among Chinese elites in which some participants advocated edging away from Deng Xiaoping's “hiding and biding” strategy and replacing it with something bolder and more self-confident; A “newly forceful, `triumphalist,' or brash tone in foreign policy pronouncements,” including the more open acknowledgement—and even celebration—of China's increasing power and influence; Stronger reactions, including the threatened use of sanctions and financial leverage, to recurrent irritations in U.S.–China relations such as arms sales to Taiwan and presidential visits with the Dalai Lama; More open and frequent displays of China's growing military capabilities including larger, long-range air and naval exercises, and demonstrating or deploying new weapons systems; A markedly increased willingness to use threats and displays of force on issues relating to the control of the waters, air space, surface features, and resources off China's coasts. These include ongoing disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam (among others) in the South China Sea, with Japan in the East China Sea, and with the United States regarding its conduct of surveillance and military exercises in areas from the Yellow Sea to the vicinity of Hainan Island.
Political Geography:
United States, China, Taiwan, and Beijing

55. Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay

Author:
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
As Chinese political, economic, and military power continues to grow at impressive rates, the impact of Chinese external behavior on the region has correspondingly increased. Since 2010, it has become commonplace for observers to refer to Chinese foreign policy behavior as abrasive, muscular, or assertive. However, China's heightened willingness to rely on coercive diplomacy—or the simultaneous use of diplomacy and limited use of force to accomplish one's objectives—began much earlier with the Impeccable incident in March 2009. In this case, five Chinese vessels shadowed and aggressively maneuvered in dangerously close proximity to the U.S. Naval Ship Impeccable. In the following months, commentators predicted that China would moderate its behavior in the face of regional backlash. Instead, instances of Chinese platforms maneuvering in a dangerous and unprofessional manner only became more frequent.
Topic:
Diplomacy
Political Geography:
United States and China

56. Projecting Strategy: The Myth of Chinese Counter-intervention

Author:
M. Taylor Fravel and Christopher P. Twomey
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
In analyses of China's military modernization, it has become increasingly common to describe China as pursuing a “counter-intervention” strategy in East Asia. Such a strategy aims to push the United States away from China's littoral, forestalling the United States' ability to intervene in a conflict over Taiwan or in disputes in the East and South China Seas. Moreover, such a military strategy is consistent with a purported broader Chinese goal to displace the United States from its traditional regional role, including Washington's support for global norms such as freedom of navigation in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and partnerships with long-standing treaty allies.
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Washington

57. The Changing Military Balance in the Koreas and Northeast Asia

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Linn
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The tensions between the Koreas – and the potential involvement of the People's Republic of China (China or PRC), Japan, Russia, and the United States of America (US) in a Korean conflict – create a nearly open-ended spectrum of possible conflicts. These conflicts could range from posturing and threats – “wars of intimidation” – to a major conventional conflict on the Korean Peninsula, intervention by outside powers like the US and China, and the extreme of nuclear conflict.
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Japan, China, Korea, and Northeast Asia

58. Grappling with the South China Sea Policy Challenge

Author:
Gregory Poling
Publication Date:
08-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) hosted its fifth annual South China Sea conference on July 21, 2015. The event garnered more interest and a considerably larger audience—both in CSIS’s at-capacity conference room and online—than its four predecessors. Interest in the conference reflected the wider discussion on the South China Sea among policy communities in Washington and around the Asia Pacific—discussions that have risen to the top of the strategic agenda in many capitals. This report seeks to grapple with the dual policy challenges—one immediate and one long-term—of the South China Sea disputes, and offers recommendations to U.S. policymakers.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
China

59. Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization: A Comparative Analysis

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Steven Colley
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
China’s emergence as a global economic superpower and as a major regional military power in Asia and the Pacific, has had a major impact on its relations with the United States and its neighbors. China was the driving factor in the new strategy the United States announced in 2012 that called for the U.S. to “rebalance” its forces to Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, China’s actions on its borders, in the East China Sea, and in the South China Sea have shown that China is steadily expanding its geopolitical role in the Pacific, and having a steadily increasing impact on the strategy and military developments in other Asian powers. As a result, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the United States, and China’s neighbors face a critical need to improve their understanding of how each state in the region is developing its military power, and find ways to avoid the kind of military competition that could lead to rising tension or conflict.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Industrial Policy, International Trade and Finance, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
China and East Asia

60. BALANCING WITHOUT CONTAINMENT: A U.S. STRATEGY FOR CONFRONTING CHINA'S RISE

Author:
Ashley J. Tellis
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
China's rise constitutes the most serious geopolitical challenge facing the United States today. On current trends, China could–many say will–develop a national economy larger than that of the United States as early as the end of this decade, at least when measured in purchasing power parity terms. China's national ambitions too are clear: at the very least, Beijing seeks to recover the centrality it enjoyed in Asian geopolitics until the coming of colonialism. Its economic renaissance since the 1980s has now positioned it to play a major global role that was simply unimaginable some thirty years ago. With its extraordinary military modernization program, Beijing has also made tremendous strides toward holding at risk the United States' forward deployed and forward operating forces in the western Pacific, thereby raising the costs of implementing U.S. security guarantees to its partners in the region. Its unique characteristics–being a continental sized power, possessing a gigantic and technologically improving economy, having a strategically advantageous location, and rapidly acquiring formidable military capabilities-add up quickly to make China a consequential rival to the United States, even if it differs from previous challengers in character, aims, and ambitions.
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Beijing