Publishing Institution: Center for Strategic and International Studies / Political Geography: Afghanistan / Topic:

1. The Lessons of the Afghan War That No One Will Want to Learn

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: At the best of times, the U.S. tends to rush out heavily politicized studies of the lessons of war that are more political ammunition than serious analyses, and while these are followed by long formal studies that are often quite good, they then are often ignored as the flow of events moves on. These are scarcely the best of times. The collapse of the Afghan government and forces has occurred during one of the most partisan periods in American politics, followed by a totally different kind of conflict in Ukraine, all while the U.S. focus on terrorism and regional conflicts that began with 9/11 has been replaced by a focus on competition with nuclear superpowers like Russia and China. The very fact that the war stretched out over two decades has meant that much of the focus on lessons has ignored the first half or more of the war, and the almost inevitable chaos following the U.S. decision to withdraw has led to the focus on the collapse of the Afghan forces and the central government rather than on the actual conduct of the war – and few within the U.S. government now want to rake over the list of past mistakes that turned an initial tactical victory into a massive grand strategic defeat.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

2. Setting the Right Conditions for Aid to Afghanistan—and Other Nations as Well

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: A year of Taliban rule over Afghanistan has shown all too clearly that there are good reasons to debate the future level of aid to Afghanistan. The Emeritus Chair in Strategy at CSIS has prepared a detailed analysis of these issues, drawing on key sources like the UN, OHC, World Bank, CIA, and SIGAR.
Topic:: Human Rights, Humanitarian Aid, International Cooperation, and Equality
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Middle East

3. Tell Me How This Ends: Military Advice, Strategic Goals, and the “Forever War” in Afghanistan

Author:: Mark F. Cancian
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: When the United States invaded Afghanistan after the attacks on September 11, 2001, and then overthrew the Taliban regime, senior military officers were not predicting that the United States would be militarily involved 18 years later. Yet, after expending nearly $800 billion and suffering over 2,400 killed, the United States is still there, having achieved at best a stalemate. This CSIS report concludes that the mission in Afghanistan expanded from a limited focus on counterterrorism to a broad nation-building effort without discussion about the implications for the duration and intensity of the military campaign. This expansion occurred without considering the history of Afghanistan, the Soviet experience, and the decades-long effort required in successful nation-building efforts. The report makes a series of recommendations: improving the dialogue between senior military and civilian officials about desired goals/end states and the implied intensity/duration of a military campaign; continuing the development of military strategists; revising military doctrine publications to include discussion of choices about goals/end states; and taking more seriously the history and experience of others.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

4. Creating a Real Peace in Afghanistan

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: It has been a long, grim war since the first U.S. troops appeared in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. The fighting has now lasted close to 18 years, and the conflict has become one of the worst managed wars in American history. The effort to reinvent Afghan government as a functioning democracy has so far been an unstable nightmare mixing corruption and uncertain central leadership with power brokers, ex-warlords, and divided leadership. Efforts at economic growth and reform have fallen far short of their goals, vast sums have been wasted or lost through corruption, and the current Afghan economy now survives on the basis of outside aid and domestic narcotics exports. Major security efforts have at best produced an uncertain stalemate and one where the Afghan government increasingly seems to be losing control in the countryside in order to maintain its hold on major population centers. Three different Presidents have made major errors in overall strategy. President Bush gave priority to Iraq at the cost of giving the Afghan war proper attention and providing adequate forces to deal with the return of the Taliban. President Obama first authorized a surge — which wasted major resources in Helmand — and then called for a premature U.S. withdrawal based on totally unrealistic goals for Afghan force development. President Trump has adopted a strategy which has no clear political or economic element, and is unclear as to whether the U.S. is willing to keep supporting Afghan government military efforts or is giving priority to peace more as part of an effort to withdraw U.S. forces than to achieve a lasting and meaningful peace settlement. This report addresses the options for staying in Afghanistan, for reaching a cosmetic or real form of peace, and for some form of unilateral withdrawal. It describes the challenges in each area: the current stalemate in conflict and the debate over Afghan Government versus Taliban control, the critical problems in Afghan governance, the weaknesses in the Afghan economy, and the many remaining challenges in creating Afghan forces that can stand on their own. It addresses the challenges in cutting or removing U.S. land and air forces. Finally, it addresses critical problems in assessing and costing the current level of U.S. involvement in the war, and in estimating the future cost of supporting a peace or continuing the fighting.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Public Opinion, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, Asia, Vietnam, North America, and United States of America

5. ‘Peace’ in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: In fairness, peace almost always consists of a pause in the fighting that becomes a prelude to war. Taking modern Europe as an example, the Napoleonic wars were punctuated by failed peace attempts, and then led to the rise of Germany and a whole new series of wars with Austria, Denmark, and France. The repressive peace settlements following Europe’s upheavals in 1848 set the stage for decades of new rounds of conflict and revolution. World War I led to World War II, and then led to the Cold War and now to the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the current U.S. efforts to support peace negotiations in Afghanistan and the Middle East seem remarkably weak even by historical standards. In the case of Afghanistan, “peace” is being negotiated without even the same cosmetic level of local government participation that occurred in Vietnam. It is being negotiated when there is no political stability to build upon, and no apparent prospect that the coming election can bring real unity or effective leadership.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq, Middle East, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Gulf Nations

6. The State of the Fighting in the Afghan War in Mid-2019

Author:: Anthony H Cordesman
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The Afghan War has entered a critical period in which the U.S. is actively seeking a peace settlement with the Taliban, and doing so in spite of the fact that it is negotiating without the full participation of the Afghan government. Peace is a highly uncertain option. There are no official descriptions of the terms of the peace that the Administration is now seeking to negotiate, but media reports indicate that it may be considering a full withdrawal within a year of a ceasefire, and other reports indicate that it is considering a 50% cut in U.S. military personnel even if a peace is not negotiated. As of mid-August 2019, the Taliban has continued to reject any formal peace negotiations with the Afghan government, and has steadily stepped up its military activity and acts of violence while it negotiates with the United States. Terrorist groups like ISIS-K add to the threat, as do the many splits within the Afghani government and political structure. The Taliban has not encouraged further ceasefires, or shown any clear willingness to accept a lasting peace on any terms but its own. It may well see peace negotiations as a means of negotiating a withdrawal of U.S. and other allied forces and a prelude to a peace that it could exploit to win control of Afghanistan. At the same time, major uncertainties also exist regarding continuing support for the war. Some press reports indicate the Administration is seeking a 50% reduction in active U.S. military manpower in country by the end of 2019 or some point in mid-2020 regardless of whether a peace settlement is reached. Some members of Congress have called for major U.S. force cuts and shown only a limited willingness to keep up U.S. support of the Afghan government and forces if peace negotiations do not succeed. Much depends on current trends in the war, and the extent to which the Afghan Government or the Taliban are winning control and influence over the country. Much also depends on the degree to which the Afghan government forces can stand on their own if a peace negotiation leads to the withdrawal of U.S. and Resolute support forces, or if the U.S. makes major further force cuts.
Topic:: Development, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

7. The Civil Challenges to Peace in Afghanistan

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The Afghan War has entered a critical period in which the U.S. is actively seeking a peace settlement with the Taliban, and doing so in spite of the fact that it is negotiating without the full participation of the Afghan government. Its options now consist of finding some form of peace, leaving the country without any form of victory or security, or fighting indefinitely in a country whose central government has no near or mid-term capability to either defeat its opponents or survive without massive military and civil aid. Peace is a highly uncertain option. There are no official descriptions of the terms of the peace that the Administration is now seeking to negotiate, but media reports indicate that it may be considering a full withdrawal of its military support within one to two years of a ceasefire, and other reports indicate that it is considering a 50% cut in U.S. military personnel even if a peace is not negotiated. As of late-August 2019, the Taliban continued to reject any formal peace negotiations with the Afghan government, and its military activity and acts of violence while it negotiated with the United States. Terrorist groups like ISIS-K add to the threat, as do the many splits within the Afghani government and political structure. The Taliban has not encouraged further ceasefires, or shown any clear willingness to accept a lasting peace on any terms but its own. It may well see peace negotiations as a means of negotiating a withdrawal of U.S. and other allied forces and a prelude to a peace that it could exploit to win control of Afghanistan. At the same time, the other options are no better. They either mean leaving without a peace and the near certain collapse of the Afghan government, or continuing the war indefinitely with no clear timeframe for victory or the emergence of an Afghan government that can fight on its own or act as an effective civil government. Much of the analysis of these three options has focused on the possible terms of the peace, the immediate progress in the fighting, and/or the coming Afghan election and Afghanistan’s immediate political problems. These are all important issues, but they do not address the basic problems in Afghan security forces that will limit its military capabilities indefinitely into the future, or the scale of the civil problems in Afghanistan that have given it failed governance and made it the equivalent of a failed state, and that will shape its future in actually implementing any peace or in attempting to continue the war.
Topic:: Civil Society, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Peace
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

8. Finishing Strong: Seeking a Proper Exit from Afghanistan

Author:: Daniel F. Runde and Earl Anthony Wayne
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: A precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan would endanger many of the social, political, economic, and health gains that have been achieved in Afghanistan over nearly 20 years. Afghanistan has a myriad of problems, including corruption, violence, and poverty, but these challenges often overshadow improvements in mortality rates, media and cellular access, tax collection, and women and girls’ education and political freedoms, among others. To prevent these gains from dissipating, the international community should encourage the Afghan government to meet certain governance benchmarks and continue on its path to self-reliance. The United States and its international allies should also consider a gradual withdrawal of troops, funding for the Afghan security forces, and economic assistance, based on a timeline that reflects facts on the ground and progress on peace negotiations.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Military Strategy, State Building, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Middle East

9. Preventing Catastrophe in Afghanistan

Author:: Richard Olson and Daniel F. Runde
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: This brief presents a summary of key historical events in Afghanistan since 1989 and outlines a possible worst-case scenario following a U.S. and allied withdrawal from the country. The United States, Afghanistan, and its allies must work together in search for greater Afghan self-reliance, security, and stability in order to avoid a catastrophic scenario. Only then will Afghanistan be able to free itself of foreign presences and embark on its own journey to prosperity and self-reliance.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Governance, Hegemony, Military Affairs, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

10. Iraq After ISIS: The Other Half of Victory Dealing with the Civil Dimension

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The United States, its allies, and international organizations are just beginning to come to grips with the civil dimensions of "failed state" wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, the Sudans, Syria, and Yemen. In each case, it is clear that the civil dimension of the war will ultimately be as important as the military one. Any meaningful form of "victory" requires far more than defeating the current extremist threat in military terms, and reaching some temporary compromise between the major factions that divide the country. The current insurgent and other security threats exist largely because of the deep divisions within the state, the past and current failures of the government to deal with such internal divisions, and the chronic failure to meet the economic, security, and social needs of much of the nation's population. In practical terms, these failures make a given host government, other contending factions, and competing outside powers as much of a threat to each nation’s stability and future as Islamic extremists and other hostile forces. Regardless of the scale of any defeat of extremists, the other internal tensions and divisions with each country also threaten to make any such “victory” a prelude to new forms of civil war, and/or an enduring failure to cope with security, stability, recovery, and development. Any real form of victory requires a different approach to stability operations and civil-military affairs. In each case, the country the U.S. is seeking to aid failed to make the necessary economic progress and reforms to meet the needs of its people – and sharply growing population – long before the fighting began. The growth of these problems over a period of decades helped trigger the sectarian, ethnic, and other divisions that made such states vulnerable to extremism and civil conflict, and made it impossible for the government to respond effectively to crises and wars.
Topic:: Security, War, Fragile/Failed State, ISIS, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Africa, United States, Iraq, Middle East, Yemen, Syria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sundan

11. Terrorism: U.S. Strategy and the Trends in Its “Wars” on Terrorism

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 08-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The United States has now been at war in Afghanistan for some seventeen years and been fighting another major war in Iraq for fifteen years. It has been active in Somalia far longer and has spread its operations to deal with terrorist or extremist threats in a wide range of conflicts in North and Sub-Saharan in Africa, South Asia, and South East Asia. In case after case, the U.S. has moved far beyond counterterrorism to counterinsurgency, and from the temporary deployment of small anti-terrorism forces to a near "permanent" military presence. The line between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency has become so blurred that there is no significant difference. The national academic consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) has just issued new trend data on terrorism that are updated through the end of 2017. When they are combined with other major sources of data on terrorism, they provide the ability to trace the history of U.S. "wars" against terrorism in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. They show the results of America's "long wars" of attrition where it is increasingly unclear that the United States has a strategy to terminate them, or has the capability to end them in ways that create a stable and peaceful state that can survive if the United State should leave. The resulting graphics and maps are provided in the full text of the report on which this summary is based, and which is available on the CSIS website here. This summary both summarizes how the trends in such data reveal the patterns in terrorism and impact on U.S. strategy. The key conclusions, and an index to these graphics, are provided in this summary.
Topic:: Imperialism, National Security, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, and War on Terror
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Africa, United States, South Asia, Asia, North Africa, Southeast Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa

12. Transition in Afghanistan: Losing the Forgotten War?

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 01-2015
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: On December 29, 2014, the US President and Secretary of Defense announced the formal end to Operation Enduring Freedom, its combat mission in Afghanistan, which had begun in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks. They also stated that the US would begin its follow-on mission, Operation Freedom's Sentinel, at the start of 2015.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Political Violence, Defense Policy, International Security, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: Pakistan and Afghanistan

13. Afghanistan after the Drawdown

Author:: Gerald F. Hyman
Publication Date:: 04-2014
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: In his 2013 State of the Union speech, President Barack Obama announced that by the end of 2014 "our war in Afghanistan will be over" and, a month earlier, that "by the end of next year, 2014, the transition will be complete—Afghans will have full responsibility for their security, and this war will come to a responsible end." The military transition, successful or not, is in full swing. Of course the war will not come to an end in 2014, responsible or otherwise. Even if the military drawdown goes as planned, "America's commitment to a unified and sovereign Afghanistan will endure, but the nature of our commitment will change," the president said. On the military side, our enduring commitment will focus on training, equipping, and funding the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and "some counterterrorism efforts that allow us to pursue remnants of al Qaeda and their affiliates," presumably the Taliban. As the United States draws down, so too will the remaining coalition countries of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command.
Topic:: Security, Development, Economics, and Governance
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and South Asia

14. The Challenges to Transition in Afghanistan: 2014-2015

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 04-2014
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Creating political unity and reasons to be loyal to government. Creating a new structure of governance and balance between factions. Effective revenue collection, budget planning and expenditure, and limits to corruption. Fully replacing NATO/ISAF with the ANSF and "layered defense". Creating a new structure of security forces, advisors, and aid funds, to include addressing the presence of US and other nations' personnel. Acting on the Tokyo Conference: Creating effective flow and use of aid, economic reform, and limits to corruption and waste Stabilizing a market economy driven by military spending and moving towards development: Brain drain and capital flight. Coping with weather and other challenges to agricultural structure and with pressures to increase the narco - economy. Dealing with neighbors: Pakistan, I ran, Central Asian nations, India, China, and Russia.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Military Strategy, and Foreign Aid
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, China, South Asia, India, and North America

15. Pakistan and Afghanistan: International Indicators of Progress

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 08-2014
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: It is unclear that the United States has any current assessments and strategy to deal with either these governance or economic issues. If it does, it has provided no transparency as to what these plans are, and has failed to develop any effective public measures of the effectiveness of its civil aid programs after more than 10 years of effort, and in spite of the fact that the civil dimension of counterinsurgency efforts is at least as important as the military efforts. It is also important to note that World Bank and UN reporting show the same lack of progress in governance, economics, and human development in Pakistan as in Afghanistan.
Topic:: Economics, Politics, and World Bank
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and India

16. Security Transition in Afghanistan

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 09-2014
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Creating an effective transition for the ANSF is only one of the major challenges that Afghanistan, the US, and Afghanistan's other allies face during 2014-2015 and beyond.
Topic:: Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and Middle East

17. The Civil Transition in Afghanistan: 2014-2016

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 09-2014
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Creating an effective transition for the ANSF is only one of the major challenges that Afghanistan, the US, and Afghanistan's other allies face during 2014 2015 and beyond. The five other key challenges include: Going from an uncertain election to effective leadership and political cohesion and unity. Creating an effective and popular structure governance, with suitable reforms, from the local to central government, reducing corruption to acceptable levels, and making suitable progress in planning, budgeting, and budget execution. Coping with the coming major cuts in outside aid and military spending in Afghanistan, adapting to a largely self-financed economy, developing renewal world economic development plans, carrying out the reforms pledged at the Tokyo Conference, and reducing the many barriers to doing business. Establishing relations with Pakistan and other neighbors that will limit outside pressures and threats, and insurgent sanctuaries on Afghanistan's border. Persuading the US, other donors, NGCO, and nations will to provide advisors to furnish the needed aid effort through at least 2018, and probably well beyond.
Topic:: Government, Politics, and Governance
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Middle East

18. Losing the "Forgotten War" The U.S. Strategic Vacuum in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 09-2014
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: President Obama has addressed the need to deal with Ukraine and the Islamic State in speeches and at the NATO Ministerial meeting Afghanistan, however, has become the forgotten war at a time when the Taliban is making steady gains, civilian casualties are rising there is still no effective Afghan government the Afghan economy is in crisis, and there still are no clear plans for any post 2014 aspect of transition.
Topic:: Islam
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Central Asia

19. A Key Update: Afghan Forces on the Edge of Transition: Sharply Contradictory Data on Levels of Violence

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman, Michael Peacock, and Aaron Lin
Publication Date:: 11-2014
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Data on Afghan Surge show had little or no lasting impact. NATO/ISAF stopped all meaningful reporting on security trends after EIA fiasco. No maps or assessments of insurgent control or influence versus limited dataf 10 worst areas of tactical encounters. No maps or assessments of areas of effective government control and support and areas where government is not present or lacks support. Shift from direct clashes to high profile and political attacks makes it impossible to assess situation using past metrics, but HPAs sharply up. UN casualty data and State Department START data on terrorism highly negative. No reason for insurgents to engage NATO/ISAF or ANSF on unfavorable terms before combat NATO/ISAF forces are gone.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Security, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States

20. The Civil Transition in Afghanistan: The Metrics of Crisis?

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 12-2014
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Creating an effective transition for the ANSF is only one of the major challenges that Afghanistan, the US, and Afghanistan's other allies face during 2014-2015 and beyond. The five other key challenges include: Going from an uncertain election to effective leadership and political cohesion and unity. Creating an effective and popular structure governance, with suitable reforms, from the local to central government, reducing corruption to acceptable levels, and making suitable progress in planning, budgeting, and budget execution. Coping with the coming major cuts in outside aid and military spending in Afghanistan, adapting to a largely self-financed economy, developing renewal world economic development plans, carrying out the reforms pledged at the Tokyo Conference, and reducing the many barriers to doing business. Establishing relations with Pakistan and other neighbors that will limit outside pressures and threats, and insurgent sanctuaries on Afghanistan's border. Persuading the US, other donors, NGCO, and nations will to provide advisors to furnish the needed aid effort through at least 2018, and probably well beyond.
Topic:: Corruption, Economics, Governance, and Reform
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Asia

21. Afghan Forces on the Edge of Transition - Volume I Introduction, US Policy, and Cuts in US Forces and Spending

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 12-2014
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Creating an effective transition for the ANSF is only one of the major challenges that Afghanistan, the US, and Afghanistan's other allies face during 2014-2015 and beyond. The five other key challenges include: Going from an uncertain election to effective leadership and political cohesion and unity. Creating an effective and popular structure governance, with suitable reforms, from the local to central government, reducing corruption to acceptable levels, and making suitable progress in planning, budgeting, and budget execution. Coping with the coming major cuts in outside aid and military spending in Afghanistan, adapting to a largely self - financed economy, developing renewal world economic development plans, carrying out the reforms pledged at the Tokyo Conference, and reducing the many barriers to doing business. Establishing relations with Pakistan and other neighbors that will limit outside pressures and threats, and insurgent sanctuaries on Afghanistan's border. Persuading the US, other donors, NGCO, and nations will to provide advisors to furnish the needed aid effort through at least 2018, and probably well beyond.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, Foreign Aid, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and Asia

22. Afghan Forces on the Edge of Transition–IV: Progress in Afghan Force Development

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 12-2014
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: This report reflects major progress in many areas of ANSF development. It also warns, however, just how rapidly the ANSF has expanded, and how poorly that expansion was initially funded and staffed with adequate advisors. It also shows that much of the ANSF is a relatively ineffective and corrupt police force that lacks the support of other key elements of the justice system in many areas. The unclassified reporting also have ceased to provide any meaningful insight into the development of either the Ministry of Defense or Ministry of the Interior, and that the reporting of unclassified readiness data on the ANA and ANP has been reduced in scope over the last six months to the point where it has little or no real meaning.
Topic:: Corruption and Governance
Political Geography:: Afghanistan

23. Afghanistan's Legacy: Emerging Lessons of an Ongoing War

Author:: Stephen Biddle
Publication Date:: 06-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: In an important sense, emerging debates on the war's lessons are premature. The war in Afghanistan is not over; nor is it ending anytime soon. Nevertheless, before conventional wisdom consolidates, two observations on counterinsurgency are worth considering now: whether it can work and how to approach governance reform.
Topic:: Security, War, Governance, and Reform
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and America

24. India's Role in a Changing Afghanistan

Author:: Shashank Joshi
Publication Date:: 06-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: For India, the Western drawdown of forces in Afghanistan will represent the greatest adverse structural shift in its security environment for over a decade. Yet, a fundamental congruity of interests between Washington and New Delhi, and opportunities for cooperation, remain.
Topic:: Security, NATO, and Environment
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Washington, and India

25. India: A Reluctant Partner for Afghanistan

Author:: Sandra Destradi
Publication Date:: 06-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: If the West wants to harness the potential of cooperating with India in Afghanistan, it needs a better appreciation of India's engagement and motivations, as well as of New Delhi's assets and concerns about Afghanistan's future.
Topic:: Security and Government
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, India, and New Delhi

26. Iran's Foreign Policy in Post-Taliban Afghanistan

Author:: Kayhan Barzegar
Publication Date:: 06-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Since 2001, this Iranian scholar argues, Iran has sought to establish security and stability, while advancing regional cooperation in Afghanistan. The only way to manage conflict in the post-exit era is for the West to accept the legitimacy of increased regional cooperation, including Iran's involvement.
Topic:: Foreign Policy and Economics
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iran, and Taliban

27. Iran's Continuing Interests in Afghanistan

Author:: Sumithra Narayanan Kutty
Publication Date:: 06-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: When it comes to Afghanistan's future, the United States ironically has more in common with Iran than it does with Pakistan. As Western troops draw down, a look inside Iran's enduring interests, means to secure them, unique assets, and goals that may or not conflict with other regional actors.
Topic:: Government and War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and Iran

28. Afghanistan: Meeting the Real World Challenges of Transition

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 01-2013
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The more one looks at the current situation in Afghanistan today, the more likely it seems that Transition will at best produce a weak and divided state and at worst a state that either continues its civil war or comes under Taliban and extremist control. More than a decade of Western intervention has not produced a strong and viable central government, an economy that can function without massive outside aid, or effective Afghan forces. There is no sign that insurgents are being pushed towards defeat or will lose their sanctuaries in Pakistan. This has made every aspect of Transition is a high-risk effort.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Civil War, Development, Islam, Terrorism, War, Armed Struggle, Counterinsurgency, and Governance
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Taliban

29. Trends in Militancy across South Asia

Author:: Thomas M. Sanderson, Rick "Ozzie" Nelson, Stephanie Sanok Kostro, Zachary I. Fellman, and Rob Wise
Publication Date:: 04-2013
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The bulk of international counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and related efforts over the last decade have focused on targeting a select few extremist organizations such as al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. Yet looming security transitions, international fiscal strictures, demographic trends, religious and ethnic tensions, popular dissatisfaction, and weak governance are likely having significant and worrying effects on a wide array of militant actors around the world. A narrow focus on those groups perceived to be the most immediate threats has, at times, come at the cost of a broader understanding of militancy and how it may manifest in a given region.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and Taliban

30. US AND IRANIAN STRATEGIC COMPETITION: The Impact of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Central Asia

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman, Sam Khazai, Robert M. Shelala II, Nori Kasting, and Sean Mann
Publication Date:: 06-2013
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Security and stability in Central and South Asia are driven by regional tensions and quarrels, and the internal instability of regional states. Weak governance and corruption are major problems in every state in the region, along with state barriers to economic growth and development and – in most cases – under investment in education, health, and infrastructure. Very young populations face major unemployment and underemployment problems and income distribution is badly unbalanced, and on sharply favors the ruling power elite. Ethic, tribal, and sectarian tensions compound these problems, and in many cases, so do internal and external threats from Islamic extremists and the growing tensions between Sunni and Shi‟ite.
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and India

31. Drone Wars

Author:: Peter Bergen and Jennifer Rowland
Publication Date:: 10-2013
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: At the National Defense University (NDU) on May 23, 2013, President Barack Obama gave a major speech about terrorism-arguing that the time has come to redefine the kind of conflict that the United States has been engaged in since the 9/11 attacks. Obama asserted that ''[w]e must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will define us.'' Thus, the President focused part of his speech on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), which Congress had passed days after 9/11 and which gave President George W. Bush the authority to go to war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies. Few in Congress who voted for this authorization understood that they were voting for what has become the United States' longest war, one that has expanded in recent years to countries such as Pakistan and Yemen.
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Yemen

32. Changing US Security Strategy: The Search for Stability and the "Non-War" against "Non-Terrorism"

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 09-2013
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: More than a decade into the “war on terrorism,” much of the political debate in the US is still fixated on the legacy of 9/11. US politics has a partisan fixation on Benghazi, the Boston Marathon bombing, intelligence intercepts, and Guantanamo. Far too much US attention still focuses on “terrorism” at a time the US faces a much broader range of threats from the instability in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) and Islamic world. Moreover, much of the US debate ignores the fact that the US has not actually fought a “war on terrorism” over the last decade, and the US failures in using military force and civil aid in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US has not fought wars as such, but rather became involved in exercises in armed nation building where stability operations escalated into national building as a result of US occupation and where the failures in stability operations and nation building led to insurgencies that forced the US into major counterinsurgency campaigns that had little to do with counterterrorism. An analysis of the trends in the Iraq and Afghan conflicts shows that the US has not been fighting a war on terrorism since Bin Laden and Al Qaida Central were driven into Pakistan in December 2001. The US invaded Afghanistan and Iraq and then made stability operations and armed nation building its key goals. It was US mishandling of these exercises in armed nation building that led to major counterinsurgency campaigns although – at least in the case of Afghanistan --the US continued to label its military operations as a struggle against “terrorism.” By 2013, the US had committed well over $1.4 trillion to these exercises in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, the US made massive increases in its domestic spending on homeland defense that it rationalized as part of the fight against terrorism but often had little or nothing to do with any aspect of counterterrorism. At the same time, the US failed to develop consistent or useful unclassified statistics on the patterns in terrorism and its counterterrorism activities. The US government has never provided a meaningful break out of federal activities and spending at home or abroad which actually focus on terrorism, or any unclassified measures of effectiveness. The OMB has lumped a wide range of activities that have no relation to terrorism it its reporting on the President's budget request – activities whose total cost now approach $60 billion a year. The Department of Defense has never provided a meaningful estimate of the total cost of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, or a break out of the small portion of total overseas contingency operations (OCO) spending actually spent on counterterrorism versus counter insurgency. The State Department and US intelligence community provide no meaningful unclassified data on the cost of their counterterrorism effort and it is unclear that they have developed any metrics at any level that show the cost-benefits of their activities. The annual US State Department country reports on terrorism come as close to an unclassified report on the status of terrorism as the US government provides. While many portions are useful, the designation of terrorist movements is often political and shows the US designation of terrorist movements conflates terrorism and insurgency. The closest the US has come to developing any metrics on terrorism has been to develop an unclassified database in the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) that never distinguished terrorism from insurgency. This database formed the core of the statistical annex to State Department reporting, but has since been withdrawn without explanation. As this analysis shows in detail, it now has been replaced by a contractor effort that makes all of the previous mistakes made by the NCTC. The end result is a set of official reporting and statistics in the annex to the State Department report where “terrorism” remains remained poorly defined, badly structured, ignored in parts of the world, and conflates terrorism with counterinsurgency, instability, and civil war. A review of the Afghan, Iraq conflicts, and other recent conflicts in the MENA region shows just how serious these problems are in distorting the true nature of the wars the US is fighting and the threats it faces. The same is true of the unclassified reporting the US government provides on terrorism. A detailed review of the most recent State Department report on terrorism provides important insights into key terrorist movements, but the narratives generally ignore their ties to insurgent movements, their statistical data include some major insurgent movements and exclude others, and many of the data seem to include violence that is not truly terroristic in character.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, Middle East, and North Africa

33. Transition in Afghanistan: 2009-2013

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 08-2013
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The US is already at least six months behind in shaping an effective Transition in Afghanistan. It has not laid credible plans for the security, governance, and economic aspects of Transition. It has not made its level of future commitment clear to its allies or the Afghans, and it has failed dismally to convince the Congress and the American people that there is a credible reason to support Transition beyond the end of 2014.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Development, Economics, Islam, War, and Fragile/Failed State
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States

34. Solving the Statebuilders' Dilemma

Author:: Ben Rowswell
Publication Date:: 12-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The international mission to reconstruct Afghanistan may be the most ambitious statebuilding exercise ever undertaken. Since 2009 at least, the country has been the focus of tremendous international political will, extensive development assistance, and overwhelming military power. While the effort has generated real progress in quadrupling GDP, increasing literacy rates, and building up the Afghan National Security Forces, the news coming out of Afghanistan is dominated by stories of corruption, electoral fraud, and the impunity of regional powerbrokers.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan

35. China and Afghanistan: China's Interests, Stances, and Perspectives

Author:: Huasheng Zhao
Publication Date:: 03-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: China holds clear, coherent, but relatively low-profile positions on Afghanistan. While staying largely with the mainstream of the international community on the issue of Afghanistan, China maintains an independent policy that reflects the peculiarities of Chinese interests, concerns, and priorities in Afghanistan. China has multiple interests in Afghanistan; however, domestic concerns about the security and stability of the largely Muslim region of Xinjiang overwhelm all others. China maintains normal and good relations with the Afghan government, takes active part in the country's economic rebuilding, and provides Afghanistan financial aid and other assistance. China supports the international community in its efforts in Afghanistan, but stays away from direct military involvement. China refrains from criticizing America's involvement in the war in Afghan- istan, but it doubts the war's efficacy, and China refuses to join the American Northern Distribu- tion Network (NDN) to Afghanistan. China dislikes the Taliban because of its close relations with the “East Turkistan” organization—a Uyghur separatist group—but China deals with the Taliban cautiously, trying to avoid direct conflict. China favors an Afghanistan governed by Afghans and hopes that the “Kabul process”—the transition to greater Afghan responsibility and ownership in both security and civilian areas—will have a successful end. At the same time, China also prepares for unexpected outcomes.
Topic:: Development and Economics
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, China, and Asia

36. Recalibrating U.S. — Pakistan Relations

Author:: Haider Ali Hussein Mullick
Publication Date:: 07-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Afghanistan is America's longest war. Thousands of U.S. troops and those from nearly 50 other countries have fought in Afghanistan against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, but it was in nuclear-armed Pakistan where Osama bin Laden was killed, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (the mastermind of 9/11) was captured, and Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar as well as the heads of the virulent Haqqani network reside. Pakistan's duplicity is a fact, yet it is often excessively characterized as a function of the India—Pakistan rivalry. Pakistani generals do fear India, but they have also recognized the threat from domestic insurgents. The height of this concern was reached in 2009, when the Pakistani Taliban were 60 miles from the country's capital and jeopardized U.S. as well as Pakistani goals in the region: interdicting al-Qaeda, protecting Pakistani nuclear weapons, and stabilizing (and in Pakistan's case, an anti-India) Afghanistan. At that point, Pakistani troops, unlike past attempts, fought back and prevailed against the insurgents. It can be done.
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, America, and India

37. The FY2013 Defense Budget, Sequestration, and the Growing Strategy-Reality Gap

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 07-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The US may not face peer threats in the near to mid term, but it faces a wide variety of lesser threats that make maintaining effective military forces, foreign aid, and other national security programs a vital national security interest. The US does need to reshape its national security planning and strategy to do a far better job of allocating resources to meet these threats. It needs to abandon theoretical and conceptual exercises in strategy that do not focus on detailed force plans, manpower plans, procurement plans, and budgets; and use its resources more wisely. The US still dominates world military spending, but it must recognize that maintaining the US economy is a vital national security interest in a world where the growth and development of other nations and regions means that the relative share the US has in the global economy will decline steadily over time, even under the best circumstances. At the same time, US dependence on the security and stability of the global economy will continue to grow indefinitely in the future. Talk of any form of “independence,” including freedom from energy imports, is a dangerous myth. The US cannot maintain and grow its economy without strong military forces and effective diplomatic and aid efforts. US military and national security spending already places a far lower burden on the US economy than during the peaceful periods of the Cold War, and existing spending plans will lower that burden in the future. National security spending is now averaging between 4% and 5% of the GDP -- in spite of the fact the US has been fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan -- versus 6 - 7% during the Cold War.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Economics, and Government
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Middle East

38. Religious Movements, Militancy, and Conflict in South Asia: cases from india, pakistan, and afghanistan

Author:: Robert D. Lamb, Liora Danan, Joy Aoun, Sadika Hameed, Kathryn Mixon, and Denise St. Peter
Publication Date:: 07-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The top headlines of the past year have made increasingly clear to U.S. government officials the central—but complicated—roles that religion plays in many of the most strategically important engagements of the United States.
Topic:: Political Violence, Peace Studies, and Religion
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, South Asia, and India

39. Religion and Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan

Author:: Mariam Mufti
Publication Date:: 06-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The importance of studying the rise of Islamic radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot be overemphasized. First, both Afghanistan and Pakistan have experienced serious threats from radical Islamic groups. In Afghanistan, coalition forces led by the United States were successful in overthrowing the Taliban regime after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, but since then there has been a resurgence in violence that is being perpetrated by a combination of the Taliban who have regrouped, the Haqqani Network (HQN) and Hizb-e-Islami (HiG). Foreign groups such as al Qaeda are also implicated in the violence. In Pakistan, most of the militant activity has occurred in the frontier region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, known as the FATA. But other parts of Pakistan, especially Punjab, have also been subject to bomb attacks. These attacks have not only targeted Pakistanis but also foreigners, including U.S. government facilities.
Topic:: Political Violence, Islam, Religion, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Pakistan and Afghanistan

40. Afghanistan from 2012-2014: Is A Successful Transition Possible?

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 06-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The key issue in evaluating the prospects for a successful Transition in Afghanistan is not whether a successful transition in Afghanistan is possible, it is rather whether some form of meaningful transition is probable — a very different thing. The answer is a modest form of strategic success is still possible, but that it is too soon to know whether it is probable and there are many areas where the current level of planning, analysis, and action combined to sharply reduce the chances for success.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Security, Defense Policy, War, Counterinsurgency, and Fragile/Failed State
Political Geography:: Afghanistan

41. The FY2013 Defense Budget, the Threat of Defense Cuts and Sequestration and the Strategy-Reality Gap

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman and Robert M. Shelala II
Publication Date:: 06-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The US may not face peer threats in the near to mid term, but it faces a wide variety of lesser threats that make maintaining effective military forces, foreign aid, and other national security programs a vital national security interest. The US does need to reshape its national security planning and strategy to do a far better job of allocating resources to meet these threats. It needs to abandon theoretical and conceptual exercises in strategy that do not focus on detailed force plans, manpower plans, procurement plans, and budgets; and use its resources more wisely. The US still dominates world military spending, but it must recognize that maintaining the US economy is a vital national security interest in a world where the growth and development of other nations and regions means that the relative share the US has in the global economy will decline steadily over time, even under the best circumstances. At the same time, US dependence on the security and stability of the global economy will continue to grow indefinitely in the future. Talk of any form of "independence," including freedom from energy imports, is a dangerous myth. The US cannot maintain and grow its economy without strong military forces and effective diplomatic and aid efforts. US military and national security spending already places a far lower burden on the US economy than during the peaceful periods of the Cold War, and existing spending plans will lower that burden in the future. National security spending is now averaging between 4% and 5% of the GDP -- in spite of the fact the US has been fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan -- versus 6-7% during the Cold War.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Economics, Government, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq

42. The US Cost of the Afghan War: FY2002-FY2013: Cost in Military Operating Expenditures and Aid, and Prospects for "Transition."

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 05-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: It is surprisingly difficult to get a meaningful estimate of the total cost of the Afghan conflict, total spending on Afghan forces and total spending on various forms of aid. More data are available on US efforts – which have dominated military and aid spending, but even these data present serious problems in reliability, consistency, and definition. Moreover, it is only since FY2012 that the US provided an integrated request for funding for the war as part of its annual budget request. The data for the period before FY2009 are accurate pictures of the Department of Defense request, but there is only a CRS estimate of total spending the previous years.
Topic:: Economics and War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States

43. The Afghan War: Creating the Economic Conditions and Civil-Military Aid Efforts Needed For Transition

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman, Sean T. Mann, and Bryan Gold
Publication Date:: 09-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: In a little over two years the US and its allies plan to hand over security and other responsibilities to the Afghan government as part of a process labeled “Transition.” Afghanistan is still at war and will probably be at war long after 2014. The political, governance, and economic dimensions of this Transition, however, will be as important as any developments in the fighting.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Security, and Economics
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and Asia

44. The FY2013 Defense Budget, Deficits, Cost-Escalation, and Sequestration

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman and Robert Shelala II
Publication Date:: 09-2012
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The US may not face peer threats in the near to mid term, but it faces a wide variety of lesser threats that make maintaining effective military forces, foreign aid, and other national security programs a vital national security interest. The US does need to reshape its national security planning and strategy to do a far better job of allocating resources to meet these threats. It needs to abandon theoretical and conceptual exercises in strategy that do not focus on detailed force plans, manpower plans, procurement plans, and budgets; and use its resources more wisely. The US still dominates world military spending, but it must recognize that maintaining the US economy is a vital national security interest in a world where the growth and development of other nations and regions means that the relative share the US has in the global economy will decline steadily over time, even under the best circumstances. At the same time, US dependence on the security and stability of the global economy will continue to grow indefinitely in the future. Talk of any form of “independence,” including freedom from energy imports, is a dangerous myth. The US cannot maintain and grow its economy without strong military forces and effective diplomatic and aid efforts. US military and national security spending already places a far lower burden on the US economy than during the peaceful periods of the Cold War, and existing spending plans will lower that burden in the future. National security spending is now averaging between 4% and 5% of the GDP – in spite of the fact the US has been fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – versus 6-7% during the Cold War.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Economics
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and Asia

45. Germany as a Geo-economic Power

Author:: Hans Kundnani
Publication Date:: 06-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Berlin's March 2011 abstention on the UN Security Council vote on military intervention in Libya has raised questions about Germany's role in the international system. By abstaining on Security Council Resolution 1973, Germany broke with its Western allies and aligned itself with the four BRIC countries: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Whether or not the decision signals a weakening of what Germans call the Westbindung, it illustrates the strength of Germany's ongoing reluctance to use military force as a foreign-policy tool even in a multilateral context and to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. Over the past few years, as the number of German and civilian casualties has increased in Afghanistan, the German public has become more skeptical about the mission of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in particular and about the deployment of German troops abroad in general. Like Germany, other EU member states such as France and the United Kingdom are cutting their defense budgets, but Germany shares few of their aspirations to project power beyond Europe.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, China, India, Libya, Brazil, Germany, and Berlin

46. The Trust Deficit: Seven Steps Forward for U.S.–Arab Dialogue

Author:: Mina Al-Oraibi and Gerard Russell
Publication Date:: 06-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: “We are in an information war...and we are losing” declared U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, describing U.S. efforts to counter extremists and engage Arab publics during this year's unprecedented and historic change in the Middle East. She is right. In the decade since 9/11, thousands of American lives and more than a trillion dollars have been spent on wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, while millions of dollars have been spent on public diplomacy programs aimed at the Arab world. In 2009, President Barack Obama delivered a landmark speech in Cairo designed to seek “a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world.” Two years on, according to the latest polling data in Egypt, unfavorable views of the United States outnumber favorable ones by nearly four to one. With some exceptions, the United States likewise remains unpopular in most majority-Muslim countries from Morocco to Pakistan. Why? And what can be done about it?
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Middle East, Arabia, and Egypt

47. Afghanistan Win or Lose: Transition and the Coming Resource Crisis

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 09-2011
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The US confronts a wide range of challenges if it is to win the Afghan conflict in any meaningful sense, and leave a stable Afghanistan and Pakistan: Decide on US strategic objectives in conducting and terminating the war. These objectives not only include the defeat of Al Qaeda, but deciding on what kind of transition the US wishes to make in Afghanistan, what goals the US can achieve in creating a stable Afghanistan, US goals in Pakistan, and the broader strategic goals the US will seek in Central and South Asia. Defeat the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but also by eliminating its control and influence over the population and ability exploit sanctuaries in Pakistan and win a war of political transition. Create a more effective and integrated, operational civil and civil-military transition effort by NATO/ISAF, UN, member countries, NGO, and international community efforts through 2014 and for 5-10 years after the withdrawal of combat forces. Build up a much larger, and more effective, mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Give the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy (and lasting stability) at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels by 2014. Dealing with Pakistan in reducing the Taliban-Haqqani network in the NWFP and Baluchistan, and dealing with the broader risk Pakistan will become a failed nuclear weapons state. Shape a balance of post-transition relations with India, Iran, "Stans," Russia, and China that will help sustain posttransition stability. Make effective trade-offs in terms of resources relative to the priorities set by other US domestic and security interests.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States

48. u.s. and iranian strategic competition: Competition in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Pakistan

Author:: Erin Fitzgerald and Varun Vira
Publication Date:: 09-2011
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The US has many hard decisions to make in shaping its policies toward Central and South Asia – driven primarily by the war in Afghanistan, the growing instability in Pakistan, and whether the US should actively pursue strategic interest in Central Asia in the face of Russian and Chinese pressures and advantages, than by strategic competition with Iran.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Terrorism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Central Asia

49. The Missing Endgame for Afghanistan: A Sustainable Post-Bin Laden Strategy

Author:: David M. Abshire and Ryan Browne
Publication Date:: 10-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Within hours of President Obama's announcement of Osama bin Laden's May 2 death, pundits and politicians from both the right and left were calling for a speedier withdrawal from Afghanistan. The discovery and targeted killing of bin Laden in a compound on the outskirts of Abbottabad, Pakistan, located less than a mile from the Pakistan Military Academy, dramatically amplified concerns about elements of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence service (ISI) maintaining links with al-Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations. Many argued that the death of al-Qaeda's leader meant that our post-9/11 mission had been accomplished, and our expensive presence in Afghanistan was no longer needed amidst an era of mounting debt and budget fights.
Topic:: NATO
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States

50. Regional Overview: Rays of Hope?

Author:: Ralph Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 09-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Rays of hope were seen in several areas across the region. Dim rays of light pierced what has been the darkness of the Six-Party Talks since their suspension in December 2008, even though prospects for actual Korean Peninsula denuclearization remain low. US-China relations continued to mend at the Shangri-La Dialogue and the ARF; Vice President Biden's trip to China added to the light. Hopes have also been raised for an end to political turmoil in Japan and Thailand with the election of new prime ministers. Aung San Suu Kyi's release from house arrest provides a ray of hope for progress in moving Burma/Myanmar toward democracy. Meanwhile, the self-inflicted debt crisis in the US has further dimmed hopes for US leadership in Asia and globally. Looking forward, there are flickering hopes that this year's APEC Leaders Meeting in Honolulu will shine a new spotlight on this increasingly overshadowed institution. Finally, the death of Osama bin Laden has raised the hope that this signals the beginning of the end for al Qaeda; others hope it will hasten the US exit from Afghanistan as well.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, Japan, China, Asia, Burma, and Myanmar

51. Plan A-Minus for Afghanistan

Author:: Bruce Riedel and Michael O'Hanlon
Publication Date:: 12-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The strategy in Afghanistan, as outlined by President Obama in his December 2009 West Point speech and earlier March 2009 policy review, still has a good chance to succeed. Described here as ''Plan A,'' it is a relatively comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, albeit one with a geographic focus on about one-third of Afghanistan's districts. Directed at defeating the insurgency or at least substantially weakening it, while building up Afghan institutions, it has reasonable prospects of achieving these goals well enough to hold together the Afghan state and prevent the establishment of major al Qaeda or other extremist sanctuaries on Afghan soil. Nevertheless, the strategy is not guaranteed to succeed, for reasons having little to do with its own flaws and more to do with the inherent challenge of the problem. Critics of the current strategy are right to begin a discussion of what a backup strategy, or a ''Plan B,'' might be. The most popular alternative to date emphasizes targeted counterterrorism operations, rather than comprehensive counterinsurgency—especially in the country's Pashtun south and east where the insurgencies are strongest. The United States should have a debate over Plan B, but the above version is highly problematic. Its proponents are serious people motivated by serious considerations—they worry that the current war is not winnable, or at least that it is not winnable at costs commensurate with the strategic stakes they perceive in Afghanistan. Yet, it would be troubling if the U.S. debate in 2011 was forced to choose effectively between this kind of backup plan and the current robust counterinsurgency approach. There is a better way if a fallback option is needed. Rather than conceding at least one-third of the country to extremists and reducing NATO forces quickly, the United States should tie its force drawdown to the growth and maturation of Afghan security forces. Under this plan, described here as ''Plan A-,'' U.S. and other foreign forces would have to keep fighting hard in Afghanistan for 2-4 more years, even as they gradually passed the baton to Afghan forces, but the United States would not need to stay in Afghanistan indefinitely, and would not tie its downsizing to the stabilization of all key terrain.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States

52. Caught in the Muddle: America's Pakistan Strategy

Author:: Paul Stanilan
Publication Date:: 12-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: President Obama has placed Pakistan at the center of his administration's foreign policy agenda. Islamabad is a pivotal player in Afghanistan and its decisions will have much to do with whether and how U.S. forces can leave that country. Al Qaeda and linked militant groups have used Pakistan as a sanctuary and recruiting ground, with the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas becoming, in President Obama's words, ''the most dangerous place in the world.'' Recurrent tensions between India and Pakistan frustrate and complicate U.S. initiatives in the region, where nuclear proliferation, insurgency, terrorism, and grand strategic goals in Asia intersect.
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, America, and Asia

53. Why America No Longer Gets Asia

Author:: Evan A. Feigenbaum
Publication Date:: 03-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: In the fall of 2006, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central Asia, I wandered through a bazaar in Kara-suu on the Kyrgyz—Uzbek border. The bazaar is one of Central Asia's largest and a crossroads for traders from across the volatile Ferghana Valley Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and many others. But most remarkably, it has become home to nearly a thousand Chinese traders from Fujian, a coastal province some 3,000 miles away, lapped by the waters of the Taiwan Strait.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Taiwan, and Asia

54. A Truly Regional Economic Strategy for Afghanistan

Author:: Andrew C. Kuchins
Publication Date:: 03-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Two events in the past year have shifted the focus of efforts to stabilize Afghanistan as President Obama's July 2011 deadline for beginning a drawdown of U.S. forces approaches. The first was the Kabul Conference, held July 20, 2010, where Afghan President Hamid Karzai announced that Afghanistan would take full responsibility for its sovereignty and security by the end of 2014. The November 2010 NATO conference in Lisbonthe second eventconfirmed this benchmark for full transition to Afghan sovereignty as well as a longer-term commitment to a ''strong partnership'' beyond 2014. While there are certain caveats about ''conditions-based'' decisions regarding these benchmarks, this timeframe should guide the strategic planning of the Afghan government, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and regional partners.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and United States

55. Under the Shrinking U.S. Security Umbrella: India's End Game in Afghanistan?

Author:: C. Christine Fair
Publication Date:: 03-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: On December 24, 1998, five Pakistani terrorists associated with Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) a Pakistani jihadist organization hijacked an Indian Airlines flight in Kathmandu with the goal of exchanging three Pakistani terrorists held in Indian jails for the surviving passengers. Pakistan's external intelligence agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), facilitated the hijacking in Nepal. After a harrowing journey through Amritsar (India), Lahore (Pakistan), and Dubai (United Arab Emirates), the plane landed at Kandahar Air Field in Afghanistan, then under Taliban control. Under public pressure, the Indian government ultimately agreed to the terrorists' demands to deliver the three prisoners jailed in India. Both the hijackers and the terrorists who were released from prison transited to Pakistan with the assistance of the ISI. Masood Azhar, one of the freed militants, appeared in Karachi within weeks of the exchange to announce the formation of a new militant group which he would lead, the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM).
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, India, Nepal, Dubai, Lahore, and Amritsar

56. The Afghan War: A Campaign Overview

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 06-2010
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Defeating the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population. Creating an effective and well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population. Building up a much larger and more effective (and enduring base for transition) mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels. Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts. Dealing with the sixth center of gravity outside Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF's formal mission. with the actions of Pakistan, Iran, and other states will be critical to success in Afghanistan.
Topic:: NATO and War
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Asia

57. The Key To Success in Afghanistan: A Modern Silk Road Strategy

Author:: S. Frederick Starr and Andrew C. Kuchina
Publication Date:: 05-2010
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: One of the most promising ways forward for the U.S. and NATO in Afgha-nistan is to focus on removing the impediments to continental transport and trade across Afghanistan's territory. Many existing international initiatives from the Mediterranean to the Indian sub-continent and Southeast Asia are already bringing parts of this network into being. Absent is the overall priori-tization, coordination, and risk management that will enable Afghanistan to emerge as a natural hub and transit point for roads, railroads, pipelines, and electric lines. America and its coalition partners can provide these missing ingredients.
Topic:: NATO
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, America, and Southeast Asia

58. Surprise is Inevitable; Vulnerability is Not: Improving the Defense Department's Readiness to Address Key Areas of Potential Surprise

Author:: Maren Leed, Hilary Price, and Tara Murphy
Publication Date:: 06-2010
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The Department of Defense's (DoD's) mission to protect the nation necessitates its leaders' concern about the military's readiness for a vast and expanding range of missions. These concerns are heightened in the midst of two ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and within the context of a world that is increasingly complex. To their credit, DoD leaders continue to seek insight from both inside and outside the department about areas of potential vulnerability; this study is one such effort.
Topic:: Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Iraq

59. A Growing Terrorist Threat? Assessing "Homegrown" Extremism in the United States

Author:: Rick "Ozzie" Nelson and Ben Bodurian
Publication Date:: 03-2010
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Five events during the fall of 2009 thrust concerns over “homegrown” terrorism—or extremist violence perpetrated by U.S. legal residents and citizens —into public view: September 19: Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan citizen and U.S. legal resident, was arrested on charges of conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction. Zazi later admitted to traveling to Pakistan to receive explosives and weapons training and to planning an attack in the United States. October 27: Federal authorities charged U.S. citizen David Coleman Headley with planning to attack a Danish newspaper. In December, revelations surfaced that Headley may have conspired with operatives of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani terrorist group, in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. November 5: Major Nidal Malik Hasan, U.S. Army, allegedly killed 13 and wounded 30 at Fort Hood Army Base, outside Killeen, Texas. Early reports revealed that Hasan had previously communicated with a radical Yemeni cleric connected to al Qaeda. November 23: Federal officials unsealed indictments against eight people charged in connection with the alleged recruitment of approximately two dozen Somali Americans to fight with an insurgent group in Somalia. December 9: Five young Northern Virginia men were arrested in Sargodha, Pakistan. U.S. and Pakistani authorities claim that the group traveled there to fight alongside Taliban militants in Afghanistan.
Topic:: Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, America, Somalia, and Virginia

60. Shaping the War in Afghanistan: The Situation in the Spring of 2010

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 04-2010
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The Taliban-led insurgency has the momentum...but additional effective counterinsurgency forces and operations will challenge them in select districts and provinces.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, War, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Taliban

61. US-China Relations

Author:: Bonnie Glases
Publication Date:: 01-2010
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: President Obama's first-ever trip to China was the main attraction of the fourth quarter. In addition to meeting Chinese leaders, Obama held a town hall-style assembly with Chinese students in Shanghai. The two sides signed a joint statement, the first in 12 years, which highlighted the depth and breadth of the relationship and promised greater cooperation. Nevertheless, the US media mostly faulted the president for not making sufficiently concrete progress on a number of problems. The Copenhagen climate talks garnered much attention in December. As the two largest emitters of CO2, negotiations between China and the US not only occupied the meeting's spotlight, but also ultimately decided its outcome. Trade friction continued to intensify with both countries launching new investigations and imposing duties on several products. The bilateral military relationship took a step forward with the visit to the US by Xu Caihou, vice chairman of China's powerful Central Military Commission.
Topic:: Economics
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and China

62. India-US and India-East Asia Relations

Author:: Satu Limaye
Publication Date:: 01-2010
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: India-US relations were characterized by a degree of ennui while India-East Asia relations were overshadowed by public tensions between China and India throughout much of the year. The Obama administration, preoccupied by multiple high-stakes domestic and foreign policy priorities, offered up two high-profile visits for New Delhi with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton going to India in July and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh coming to Washington in November as the first head of state visit. But the newly strengthened Congress-led government, which returned to power after the April-May national elections, remained wary of the Obama administration's priorities and approaches toward a range of issues including its Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak) strategy, nuclear nonproliferation, and climate change, as it felt some nostalgia for the primacy of place and purpose offered to India by the bygone Bush administration. Meanwhile, in India's ties with East Asia, even though New Delhi made diplomatic forays ranging from Mongolia to Papua New Guinea to the Pacific Islands Forum to Australia while sustaining its traditional relationships with Japan and ASEAN, the tense Beijing-New Delhi interaction over the decades-old border dispute was the focus of attention for most observers.
Topic:: Government
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Japan, Washington, India, Beijing, East Asia, New Delhi, and Guinea

63. US-Southeast Asia Relations

Author:: Sheldon W. Simon
Publication Date:: 09-2010
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The United States significantly raised its political profile in Southeast Asia this quarter, inserting itself in South China Sea disputes, announcing its plan to join the East Asia Summit, convening the second US-ASEAN summit, and creating an ambitious agenda for participation in a variety of Southeast Asia programs. On the South China Sea issue, Secretary of State Clinton proposed multilateral discussions under ASEAN auspices – an idea that did not appear, however, in the ASEAN-US summit communiqué in late September. The US inaugurated naval exercises with Vietnam in early August, coinciding with the visit of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington. Washington is considering new financial sanctions against Burma, recognizing that more engagement with the military regime has not yielded the expected results. The presence of US military trainers in the southern Philippines continues to rile leftist and nationalist legislators. As a sign of growing warmth in US-Malaysian relations, Kuala Lumpur is sending a small contingent of medical personnel to Afghanistan. The Indonesian-US Comprehensive Partnership was launched in Washington in September, signifying Jakarta‟s special importance to the US. Washington also restored military-to-military relations with Kopassus, the Indonesian Special Forces unit that has been accused of egregious human rights violations in Timor, Papua, and Aceh.
Topic:: International Relations and Human Rights
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, Washington, Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and Kuala Lumpur

64. The War in Afghanistan: Key Trends in the Fighting and ANSF Development in the DoD 1230 Report and Year-End NTM-A Reporting

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 12-2010
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Recent reporting by the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) and the Department of Defense provides added insight into how the course of the fighting tracks with the development of Afghan security forces. The metrics in this analysis are not a substitute for reading the detailed Department of Defense reporting on Afghan force development available in the publications section of DoD's web site at defenselink.gov, or the new NTM-A report, "Year in Review, November 2009 to November 2010." They do show, however, that there is now a far more credible prospect that Afghan forces will be ready for transition in 2014, and capable of largely assuming responsibility for security operations. The one critical caveat is that these efforts must continue to be properly funded, and that NATO has not yet obtained anything like the quantity and quality of trainers and partners it needs to win. These metrics make it clear that this is a the highest single priority for added military contributions from NATO countries, and that current assets meet less that 40% of the requirement needed by mid-2011.
Topic:: Security, NATO, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Afghanistan

65. Radical Islam in the North Caucasus

Author:: Sergey Markedonov
Publication Date:: 11-2010
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: As Kyrgyzstan plunges into crisis and the threat of a second Afghanistan in Central Asia looms large, the situation in the "Big Caucasus" seems less pressing and thus overshadowed. The worst scenarios predicted by analysts and politicians for the period of the 2008 August war have not been realized. The Russian attempt to "replace the regime" of Mikhail Saakashvili or apply the Georgian pattern in Ukraine, expected by many in the West, has not taken place. Neither have the attempts from the West (the United States, NATO, and others) to "nudge Georgia into a rematch," which were expected in Moscow. Nonetheless, the Caucasus region remains one of the most vulnerable spaces in Eurasia. In the Caucasus, the first precedent of a revision of borders between the former Soviet republics was established. For the first time in Eurasia, and particularly in the Caucasus, partially recognized states have emerged. While their independence is denied by the United Nations, it is recognized by the Russian Federation, a permanent member of the UN Security Council. After the "hot August" of 2008, Moscow demonstrated its willingness to play the role of a revisionist state for the first time since 1991. Russia defines the "Big Caucasus" as the sphere of its vital interests and priorities and consequently pretends to be a key stakeholder for the whole region.
Topic:: NATO, Islam, and Insurgency
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, United States, Central Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Moscow, and United Nations

66. Can Berlin and Washington Agree on Russia?

Author:: Stephen F. Szabo
Publication Date:: 10-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Both Russia and Germany are back on the U.S. agenda. Russia will be a key element of a wide array of policies to the Obama administration, including dealing with Iran and the construction of a broader nonproliferation regime, energy security, nuclear arms reductions, and Afghanistan. Russia policy will also be central to U.S. designs for NATO, including how to deal with Georgia and Ukraine, and the viability of a pan-European security structure.
Topic:: NATO
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Washington, Ukraine, Georgia, and Berlin

67. Dirty Windows and Burning Houses: Setting the Record Straight on Irregular Warfare

Author:: John A. Nagl and Brian M Burton
Publication Date:: 04-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: After a slow start, the U.S. military has made remarkable strides in adapting to irregular warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq, and is beginning to institutionalize those adaptations. Recent Department of Defense (DOD) directives and field manuals have elevated stability operations and counterinsurgency to the same level of importance as conventional military offensive and defensive operations. These changes are the outcome of deep reflection about the nature of current and likely future threats to U.S. national security and the military's role in addressing them. They represent important steps toward transforming a sclerotic organizational culture that long encouraged a ''we don't do windows'' posture on so-called ''military operations other than war,'' even as the nation's leaders called upon the armed forces to perform those types of missions with increasing frequency.
Topic:: National Security and War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq

68. Toward Reconciliation in Afghanistan

Author:: Michael O'Hanlon
Publication Date:: 04-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: How can we make sense of where the United States is in Afghanistan today? A poor country, wracked by 30 years of civil war, finds itself at the mercy of insurgents, terrorists, and narco-traffickers. NATO's economy-of-force operation there has attempted to help build a nation with very few resources. Yet, overall levels of violence remain relatively modest by comparison with other violent lands such as the Congo, Iraq, and even Mexico. Economic growth is significant and certain quality of life indicators are improving, though from a very low base. The United States is committed to Afghanistan and over the course of 2009 will roughly double its troop strength there. The international community is also seriously committed, with a number of key countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom fighting hard and applying solid principles of counterinsurgency.
Topic:: NATO and Economics
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, United Kingdom, Canada, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mexico, and Netherlands

69. Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating Relations with Pakistan

Author:: C. Christine Fair
Publication Date:: 04-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States has sought to help Pakistan transform itself into a stable, prosperous, and democratic state that supports U.S. interests in the region, is capable of undermining Islamist militancy inside and outside its borders, commits to a secure Afghanistan, and actively works to mitigate prospects for further nuclear proliferation. Washington has also hoped that Pakistan, along with India, would continue to sustain the beleaguered peace process to minimize the odds of a future military crisis between them. Between fiscal years 2002 and 2008, the United States has spent more than $11.2 billion, presumably to further these goals. The FY 2009 budget request includes another $1.2 billion.
Topic:: Islam
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Washington, and India

70. How Obama Can Get South Asia Right

Author:: C. Raja Mohan
Publication Date:: 04-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Washington Quarterly
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: One of the major contributions of Barack Obama's presidential campaign during 2007—08 was his political success in shifting the focus of the U.S. foreign policy debate away from Iraq and toward Afghanistan. The reversal of fortunes in the two major wars that President George W. Bush had embarked upon during his tenure (a steady improvement in the military situation in Iraq during the last two years of the Bush administration and the rapidly deteriorating one in Afghanistan) helped Obama to effectively navigate the foreign policy doldrums that normally sink the campaigns of Democratic candidates in U.S. presidential elections. Throughout his campaign, Obama insisted that the war on terror that began in Afghanistan must also end there. He attacked Bush for taking his eyes off the United States' ''war of necessity,'' embarking on a disastrous ''war of choice'' in Iraq, and promised to devote the U.S. military and diplomatic energies to a region that now threatened U.S. interests and lives: the borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Topic:: Foreign Policy and War
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and South Asia

71. Regional Overview

Author:: Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 04-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's choice of Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, and China for her first official trip overseas helped shine a spotlight on Asia as a high priority region this quarter, as did North Korean Dear Leader Kim Jong-il's announcement that he intended to conduct a satellite launch in early April. The drama surrounding the anticipated launch provided an unfortunate back drop for otherwise very positive pronouncements about intended Obama administration policies in East Asia, even if the quarter closed with only a handful of those eventually to be tasked with implementing these policies at their desks. ASEAN leaders finally held their postponed summit and celebrated the entry into force of their much-maligned Charter. Meanwhile, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd visited Washington to underscore that the U.S. and Australia are still “mates,” even as his reluctance to send more combat forces to Afghanistan foreshadowed the difficulty President Obama faces in getting allies to sign up for his “surge” there. Finally, economic forecasts kept being adjusted downward as Asian leaders prepared for the G20 summit in London in hopes that this would bring a turnaround.
Topic:: Security, Government, and United Nations
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, Japan, China, Indonesia, Asia, South Korea, London, and Australia

72. China-Russia Relations

Author:: Yu Bin
Publication Date:: 04-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The year of 2009, which marks the 60th anniversary of diplomatic ties between China and Russia, unfolded with a series of high-profile interactions. The “Year of Russian Language” in China was launched, which is to be reciprocated by Russia's “Year of Chinese language” in 2010. An oil pipeline is finally to be built from Skovorodino to northeast China 15 years after its initial conception. The two militaries were engaged in the first round of talks for joint exercises to be held in July-August. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization held its first special session on Afghanistan as it officially reached out to NATO. Meanwhile, top leaders and senior diplomats were busy coordinating policies regarding the financial crisis and growing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. All of this, however, could hardly conceal a sense of uneasiness, particularly from the Chinese side, about the sinking in mid-February of a Chinese cargo ship by the Russian Coast Guard near Vladivostok. While Beijing requested a thorough and timely investigation, Moscow seemed more interested in a weapons smuggling case allegedly involving top Russian naval officers.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, China, Beijing, Moscow, and Korea

73. U.S.-China Relations

Author:: Bonnie Glaser
Publication Date:: 07-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: After the completion of the first round of “get-acquainted” meetings aimed at laying the foundation for cooperation on a broad range of issues, both the U.S. and China agree that the bilateral relationship has gotten off to a good start. While there is acute awareness on both sides of the challenges, there is a shared sense that their futures are inextricably linked and that cooperation is essential to global economic prosperity and security. The quarter opened with the first face-to-face meeting between Presidents Hu and Obama on the sidelines of the G20 financial summit in London. On separate visits to Beijing, Todd Stern, the U.S. special envoy for climate change, and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi underscored the importance of combating the effects of global warming. U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner traveled to China to prepare for the first round of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Washington sought China's cooperation on pressing regional security issues, including North Korea and Afghanistan-Pakistan. After an 18 month hiatus, the Defense Consultative Talks were held in Beijing, giving a desperately needed boost to the bilateral military relationship.
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, China, Washington, Beijing, North Korea, and London

74. Japan - China: Politics in Command: Part 2

Author:: James J. Przystup
Publication Date:: 01-2008
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Beijing welcomed the new Fukuda government and Japan's new prime minister made clear his commitment to improving Japan's relations with its Asian neighbors and building the strategic relationship with China. However, the new government in Tokyo soon became preoccupied with the passage of a new antiterrorism special measures law to reauthorize Japan's refueling operations in support of UN operations in Afghanistan, Defense Ministry scandals, and the continuing pension fund imbroglio.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Japan, Beijing, Asia, and Tokyo

75. Is It Interests or Values?

Author:: Joseph Ferguson
Publication Date:: 07-2008
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: At the conclusion of the final summit meeting between Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin at the Russian resort of Sochi in early April, relations between Moscow and Washington appeared to have righted themselves. The cordial meeting between the outgoing presidents left a sense of optimism in both Moscow and in the West that U.S.-Russia relations would improve until at least the fall presidential elections in the United States. Things have quieted down between the two nations over the last quarter, as the leadership of both countries has gone about business at home and has lessened (though not ceased) the often-negative rhetoric. But when the summer concludes, Russia will again loom large in U.S. political debates, and the big questions of U.S. foreign policy – whether they revolve around Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Northeast Asia, or even Venezuela – will necessarily include Russia policy. And as President Dmitry Medvedev unveils his own version of “sovereign democracy,” U.S. foreign policymakers will be forced to address the fundamental question of whether U.S. policy toward Moscow is centered on its strategic interests, or on democratic values.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, United States, Iraq, Washington, Moscow, Venezuela, and Northeast Asia

Search

Search Constraints

Search Results

Refine your search

Topic

Political Geography

Content Type

Journal

Publishing Institution

Author

Publication Year

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS