Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Global Focus Publishing Institution Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Publication Year within 10 Years

1. Why Does the Global Spyware Industry Continue to Thrive? Trends, Explanations, and Responses

Author:
Steven Feldstein and Brian (Chun Hey) Kot
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The global spyware and digital forensics industry continues to grow despite public backlash following an array of surveillance scandals, many linked to NSO Group’s Pegasus program. This paper explores the resilience of the commercial spyware market and offers ideas about how to limit the spread of invasive cyber surveillance tools. It highlights several factors driving the industry, including elevated demand for intrusion technology from government clients and private customers, as well as inconsistent political will from democratic governments to crack down on these technologies.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Democracy, Surveillance, Industry, Forensic Science, and Autocracy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Phase-based Tactical Analysis of Online Operations

Author:
Ben Nimmo and Eric Hutchins
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The online threatscape in 2023 is characterized by an unprecedented variety of actors, types of operation, and threat response teams. Threat actors range from intelligence agencies and troll farms to child-abuse networks. Abuses range from hacking to scams, election interference to harassment. Responders include platform trust-and-safety teams, government agencies, open-source researchers, and others. As yet, these responding entities lack a shared model to analyze, describe, compare, and disrupt the tactics of malicious online operations. Yet the nature of online activity—assuming the targets are human—is such that there are significant commonalities between these abuse types: widely different actors may follow the same chain of steps. By conducting a phase-based analysis of different violations, it is possible to isolate the links in the chain within a unified model, where breaking any single link can disrupt at least part of the operation, and breaking many links—“completing the kill chain”—can disrupt it comprehensively. Using this model will allow investigators to analyze individual operations and identify the earliest moments at which they can be detected and disrupted. It will also enable them to compare multiple operations across a far wider range of threats than has been possible so far, to identify common patterns and weaknesses in the operation. Finally, it will allow different investigative teams across industry, civil society, and government to share and compare their insights into operations and threat actors according to a common taxonomy, giving each a better understanding of each threat and a better chance of detecting and disrupting it.
Topic:
Security, Internet, and Non-Traditional Threats
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. To Prevent the Collapse of Biodiversity, the World Needs a New Planetary Politics

Author:
Stewart Patrick
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The planet is in the midst of an environmental emergency, and the world is only tinkering at the margins. Humanity’s addiction to fossil fuels and voracious appetite for natural resources are accelerating climate change and degrading ecosystems on land and sea, threatening the integrity of the biosphere and thus the survival of our own species. Given these risks, it is shocking that the multilateral system has failed to respond more forcefully. Belatedly, the United States, the EU, the UK, and some other advanced market democracies have adopted more aggressive greenhouse gas reduction targets, but their ability to deliver is suspect, while critical emerging economies like China and India have resisted accelerating their own decarbonization.1 Even more concerning, existing multilateral commitments, including on climate change, fail to address the other half of the planet’s ecological crisis: collapsing biodiversity, which the leaders of the Group of 7 nations rightly call an “equally important existential threat.”
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Politics, Multilateralism, and Biodiversity
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. Reducing Pernicious Polarization: A Comparative Historical Analysis of Depolarization

Author:
Jennifer McCoy, Benjamin Press, Murat Somer, and Ozlem Tuncel
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The global rise of political polarization has fueled concerns about its detrimental impact on politics and society. From an increase in political violence to a decrease in the quality of democracy and governance, the threats posed by pernicious polarization—the division of society into two mutually antagonistic political camps—are diverse and acute. Determining how to reduce these tensions is therefore an urgent challenge. Using data on political polarization from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data set, this working paper assesses various instances of depolarization around the globe since 1900 and analyzes their long-term sustainability. Polarization is increasing worldwide. When broken down by region, V-Dem data suggest that every region except Oceania has seen polarization levels rise since 2005. Africa has had the smallest increase during this period, although it has long had high levels of polarization. Rising polarization in Europe is being driven by deepening political divisions in Eastern and Central Europe, Southern Europe, and the Balkans. In the Western Hemisphere, the largest democracies—Brazil, Mexico, and the United States—are all experiencing extreme levels of polarization. East Asia’s polarization levels have traditionally been low, though increasing political tensions in places like South Korea and Taiwan are driving up the region’s score. And in South Asia, India’s polarization has skyrocketed since 2014. Jennifer McCoy Jennifer McCoy is a nonresident scholar in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program, where she focuses on political polarization and democratic resilience in the U.S. and around the world. To better understand the various paths by which polarized societies might overcome or reduce their political divisions, this working paper examines perniciously polarized countries that have successfully depolarized, at least for a time. Through a quantitative analysis of the V-Dem data set, this study identifies 105 episodes from 1900 to 2020 where countries were able to reduce polarization from pernicious levels for at least five years. These 105 episodes represent roughly half of the total episodes of pernicious polarization during the time period, thus indicating a fairly robust capacity of countries to depolarize. If considered in terms of country experiences rather than episodes (because many countries have experienced multiple episodes in a cycle of polarization and depolarization), then the data indicate that two-thirds of the 178 countries for which V-Dem provides polarization data have experienced one or more episodes of pernicious polarization, but only thirty-five countries (20 percent) have failed to experience any depolarization to below-pernicious levels. Given this apparent capacity among the majority of the world’s countries to depolarize from pernicious levels at least some of the time, this analysis seeks to identify the contexts and sustainability of those experiences and to encourage further research into their causal mechanisms and outcomes for democracies. The analysis offers a preliminary discussion of the potential meaning and normative implications of depolarization as a concept and policy goal. It then uses qualitative analysis to identify patterns in the contexts of various depolarization cases and gauge the sustainability of these trends. Most of these depolarization episodes were associated with dramatic changes in a country’s political life. An analysis of contextual factors showed that almost three-quarters of the cases came after major systemic shocks: a foreign intervention, independence struggle, violent conflict, or regime change (primarily in a democratizing direction). In the remainder of cases, countries depolarized within a given regime structure, whether democratic or autocratic. Tellingly, the authors identified no cases of depolarization from pernicious levels among liberal democracies. This is because very few countries classified as full liberal democracies have ever reached pernicious levels; the United States stands out today as the only wealthy Western democracy with persistent levels of pernicious polarization. Just under half of all depolarizing cases were able to sustain depolarization for a decade or longer. In a second sizeable group of cases, countries managed polarization to some degree, either living with chronic near-pernicious levels after depolarizing, or else repolarizing to near-pernicious levels within ten years. Finally, 15 percent of the cases returned to pernicious levels within the first decade. Troublingly, when the authors analyzed the entire time period from 1900 to 2020, nearly half of the countries that had sustained depolarization or managed polarization for at least a decade later returned to pernicious levels of polarization. These outcomes illustrate the difficulty of sustaining low levels of polarization, and they indicate that a cyclical pattern of polarization, depolarization, and repolarization may be a characteristic feature of political life in many places. Only a fraction (14 percent) of cases resulted in sustained depolarization over the long term.The mechanisms and strategies that enable such sustained depolarization in democracies will be the subject of future research. But given the small number of democracies (eleven) able to accomplish this feat amid the larger pattern of cyclical polarization and depolarization, it will be crucial to also understand strategies of managing polarization at moderately high levels while avoiding democratic erosion, government dysfunction, or returns to pernicious polarization and potential violence.
Topic:
Politics, History, Polarization, and Society
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. Governance for Resilience: How Can States Prepare for the Next Crisis?

Author:
Frances Brown
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The pandemic has presented policymakers with daunting, interlinked, and often unprecedented challenges. From health emergencies that also upend economies to trade disruptions that also pose new multilateral diplomatic dilemmas, the pandemic has generated challenges that seem exceptional in both scale and degree of interconnection. Although the coronavirus pandemic has generated a dizzying series of harsh social, political, and economic firsts, such dilemmas will not be the last. Trend lines around a series of domestic and multinational governance issues, including climate change, migration, rising geopolitical tensions, and citizen alienation from governing institutions, suggest that complex, interlinked crises will be features of the future. While national and multilateral policymakers should work to alleviate the drivers of such crises, they must also strive to prepare their countries to adapt and recover from complex shocks. In short, they must try to build resilience. The need for resilience will be especially acute in developing and fragile states. These countries will need to respond to compounding shocks across multiple domains, without the head start that their developed-world counterparts enjoy. Equally, donors and policymakers from the Global North must also elevate resilience and adaptation as key components of their approaches to supporting fragile states. This call to bolster countries’ resilience is hardly new. Even before the pandemic, the policy arena featured increasing calls for resilience; now, the chorus has become almost deafening. Recent seminal policy and analytic documents—including the U.S. National Intelligence Council’s flagship report,1 the UK’s Integrated Review,2 and the U.S. Interim National Security Strategy3—have underscored that states’ resilience and capacity for adaptation will be key to their future success in the geopolitical arena. In donors’ peacebuilding and development policies, high-level emphasis on resilience has also swelled over the past few years, including in official communications from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,4 the United States government,5 and the European Union.6 In some development practitioner and civil society circles, the need for resilience is so frequently invoked that it sometimes borders on cliché.7 The increasingly ubiquitous recommendation to “bolster resilience” is valuable for at least two related reasons. First, it offers a more specific strategic objective than conversations around “state fragility” writ large, which have often been too broad to generate concrete policy responses. Second, recent, failed international statebuilding projects have underscored that state fragility is not to be “fixed”—instead, it is to be managed and mitigated.8 The emphasis on resilience thus marks a helpful shift away from maximalist policy framing and toward a more attainable one. But concrete insights on how developing or fragile countries actually achieve resilience are less clear and less common. Given the broad consensus that state fragility is deeply linked to governance, for many policymakers, good governance is central. To be sure, many other factors beyond governance—including demographic, geographic, military, and economic ones—affect a state’s resilience. But a country’s governance and political institutions generally undergird all other dynamics in determining how effectively that state can bounce back from setbacks. What exactly does the concept of “good governance for resilience” entail in practice? This paper surveys the evidence. Below, it reviews the governance-related characteristics and capabilities that affect a country’s resilience. For the purposes of this paper, resilience at the national level can be understood as a country’s capacity to respond to, adapt to, and grow from stresses and shocks.9 Resilience focuses on bolstering the overall performance of a system in the face of unpredictable and often interconnected hazards, making it different from risk management, which relates to specific hazards.10 A country’s resilience depends on the internal characteristics that allow for states and their institutions to navigate a variety of disruptions.11 An overarching insight from the evidence is that governance for resilience is complex and often multidirectional. Several characteristics, such as decentralization, have an ambiguous effect on resilience: they enable a country to withstand some setbacks but leave it more vulnerable in other ways. Still other characteristics—including whether a country is a democracy or an authoritarian political system—do not appear have a clear-cut effect on resilience. In contrast, a few governance “super-factors”—such as control of corruption, societal trust, and high quality political leadership—are exceptionally powerful in enabling a country to augment its resilience through multiple pathways. Finally, this paper considers the broader implications of governance for resilience as a policy agenda. The framing of bolstering countries’ resilience is a valuable one, but it also raises several vexing trade-offs and dilemmas. In particular, it prompts the question of whose resilience, in specific, it refers to, since resilience of state institutions does not always mean resilience of all parts of the population. Looking ahead, the policy refrain of “building resilience” in fragile and developing states, appealing though it is, should be refined to encompass these thorny realities.
Topic:
Governance, Crisis Management, Resilience, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

6. Understanding and Responding to Global Democratic Backsliding

Author:
Thomas Carothers and Benjamin Press
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Over the past two decades, democratic backsliding has become a defining trend in global politics. However, despite the extensive attention paid to the phenomenon, there is surprisingly little consensus about what is driving it. The most common explanations offered by analysts—ranging from the role of Russia and China and disruptive technologies to the rise of populism, the spread of political polarization, and democracies’ failure to deliver—fall short when tested across a wide range of cases. A more persuasive account of backsliding focuses on the central role of leader-driven antidemocratic political projects and the variety of mechanisms and motivations they entail. This paper identifies and analyzes three distinct types of backsliding efforts: grievance-fueled illiberalism, opportunistic authoritarianism, and entrenched-interest revanchism. In cases of grievance-fueled illiberalism, a political figure mobilizes a grievance, claims that the grievance is being perpetuated by the existing political system, and argues that it is necessary to dismantle democratic norms and institutions to redress the underlying wrongs. Opportunistic authoritarians, by contrast, come to power via conventional political appeals but later turn against democracy for the sake of personal political survival. In still other backsliding cases, entrenched interest groups—generally the military—that were displaced by a democratic transition use undemocratic means to reassert their claims to power. Although motivations and methods differ across backsliding efforts, a key commonality among them is their relentless focus on undermining countervailing governmental and nongovernmental institutions that are designed to keep them in check. As international democracy supporters continue to refine their strategies of responding to democratic backsliding, they must better differentiate between facilitating factors and core drivers. Such an approach will point to the need for a stronger focus on the nature of leader-driven antidemocratic projects, identifying ways to create significant disincentives for backsliding leaders, and bolstering crucial countervailing institutions. Moreover, they should deepen their differentiation of strategies to take account of the diverse motivations and methods among the three main patterns of backsliding. Only in this way will they build the needed analytic and practical capacity to meet the formidable challenge that democratic backsliding presents.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Populism, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
Global Focus

7. A CERN Model for Studying the Information Environment

Author:
Alicia Wanless and Jacob N. Shapiro
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
After the Second World War, European science was suffering. Scientists were leaving Europe in pursuit of safety and work opportunities, among other reasons. To stem the exodus and unite the community around a vision of science for peace, in 1949, a transatlantic group of scholars proposed the creation of a world-class physics research facility in Europe.1 The grand vision was for this center to unlock the mysteries of the universe. Their white paper laid the foundation for the European Center for Nuclear Research (CERN), which today supports fundamental research in physics across an international community of more than 10,000 scientists from twenty-three member states and more than seventy other nations.2 Together, researchers at CERN built cutting-edge instruments to observe dozens of subatomic particles for the first time. And along the way they invented the World Wide Web, which was originally conceived as a tool to empower CERN’s distributed teams. Such large-scale collaboration is once again needed to connect scholars, policymakers, and practitioners internationally and to accelerate research, this time to unlock the mysteries of the information environment. Democracies around the world are grappling with how to safeguard democratic values against online abuse, the proliferation of illiberal and xenophobic narratives, malign interference, and a host of other challenges related to a rapidly evolving information environment. What are the conditions within the information environment that can foster democratic societies and encourage active citizen participation? Sadly, the evidence needed to guide policymaking and social action in this domain is sorely lacking. Researchers, governments, and civil society must come together to help. This paper explores how CERN can serve as a model for developing the Institute for Research on the Information Environment (IRIE).3 By connecting disciplines and providing shared engineering resources and capacity-building across the world’s democracies, IRIE will scale up applied research to enable evidence-based policymaking and implementation. Where CERN “exists to understand the mystery of nature for the benefit of humankind,” IRIE will exist to understand the mystery of the information environment for the benefit of democracies and their citizens.4 While the laws of physics change slowly, the conditions within the information environment are little understood and changing rapidly through the addition of new technology. Additionally, studying the information environment will require analysis of personal and at times sensitive data of internet users, increasing the need for international collaboration. As CERN did by inventing new collaboration tools, IRIE will leverage those same technologies to unlock the collective genius of researchers and practitioners from a variety of fields to strengthen democracy, alongside interested citizens who contribute their own data and expertise. While there are obvious differences between the field of physics and those emerging to study the information environment, aspects of CERN’s development can guide the creation of IRIE, an institution that can uniquely address the growing needs of researchers.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Research, Collaboration, Information, and CERN
Political Geography:
Global Focus

8. Government Internet Shutdowns Are Changing. How Should Citizens and Democracies Respond?

Author:
Steven Feldstein
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Governments worldwide continue to deploy internet shutdowns and network disruptions to quell mass protests, forestall election losses, reinforce military coups, or cut off conflict areas from the outside world. Data from the past few years show that incidences of global shutdowns have remained steadily high: 196 documented incidents in 2018, 213 incidents in 2019, and 155 in 2020. The first five months of 2021 recorded fifty shutdown incidents.1 Government-instigated internet shutdowns largely took place in relation to five event types: mass demonstrations, military operations and coups, elections, communal violence and religious holidays, and school exams. As Clément Voule, the United Nations special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, pointedly observes: “Shutdowns are lasting longer, becoming harder to detect and targeting particular social media and messaging applications and specific localities and communities.”2 Events in Russia have put a finer point on internet shutdown trends. On March 4, 2022, Roskomnadzor, the Russian internet regulator, announced that it would block Facebook and Twitter and would ban new uploads to TikTok.3 On March 14, it added Instagram to the banned list.4 Russian authorities have also restricted access to a slew of news websites, including the BBC, Deutsche Welle, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Voice of America. Roskomnadzor claimed these measures were enacted in response to new limits imposed by platforms on Russian propaganda outlets—accusing Facebook of “discrimination.”5 The Kremlin’s crackdown is an ominous signal about where the shutdown struggle is headed in authoritarian countries. Despite these bleak trends, there is a growing international consensus—at least among liberal democracies—that protecting internet access is integrally linked to freedoms of expression and association and forms a crucial part of the global democracy and human rights agenda. This paper picks up on this emerging norm and probes several key questions: What can citizens do to evade authoritarian controls and regain internet access? How can democratic governments support these efforts and push back against governments that shut down and block the internet? The short answer is that there is a multitude of responses available to democracies and civil society organizations to push back against internet blackouts and network disruptions. Democracies can exert meaningful pressure against repressive governments to ease internet blocks, and citizens are able to exercise creative options to circumvent internet controls. The paper walks through different tools available to citizens to evade internet controls. It examines where internet shutdown trends are headed and incentives for particular regimes to adopt new modes of censorship. It then presents a multifaceted strategy for democracies, civil society organizations, and technology developers and companies to counter internet shutdowns.
Topic:
Government, Science and Technology, Democracy, and Internet
Political Geography:
Russia and Global Focus

9. What Is So Foreign About Foreign Influence Operations?

Author:
Hedvig Ördén and James Pamment
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Influence operations are increasingly seen as a threat to democratic societies because they can corrupt the integrity of political deliberation. As individuals engage in debate on social media, political deliberation becomes vulnerable to potentially destructive forms of interference. Many debates on what to do about influence operations emphasize that these operations constitute what is deemed to be a foreign threat. But does the notion of foreignness, viewed in isolation, constitute a helpful lens for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate influence operations? Ultimately, the lens of foreignness is only helpful when applied to a narrow set of cases. One sensible way of reviewing when the concept of foreignness can be useful in distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate influence operations is to consider three separate conceptions of how to determine what counts as foreign: foreign states, foreign citizens, and foreign interests. In the first case, influence operations are seen as threatening acts directed at a targeted state by foreign states, using behaviors seen as analogous to acts of war. In the second instance, influence operations are considered threatening acts conducted by foreign citizens that undermine domestic democratic systems in a targeted state. In cases of the third sort, influence operations are viewed as acts aimed at advancing foreign interests through the illegitimate employment of soft power. Given these various models, the notion of foreignness constitutes a useful lens for discussions of influence operations in cases when there is overwhelming evidence of state-based, hybrid, and irregular warfare. An argument can also be made for employing the distinction in relation to the protection of democratic institutions, such as elections. However, when influence operations are regarded as a more generalized threat to political deliberation, foreignness is not a helpful category for determining the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such campaigns. In such cases, rather than focusing on the (domestic or foreign) identity of the malicious actors themselves, it is more fruitful to conceive of illegitimacy in terms of specific manipulative communication techniques. Suitable countermeasures could include, for instance, creating greater transparency surrounding, or even restricting, the use of artificial techniques to inflate the level of perceived engagement a piece of online content generates.
Topic:
Democracy, Soft Power, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Global Focus

10. How Middle-Power Democracies Can Help Renovate Global Democracy Support

Author:
Rachel Kleinfeld, Thomas Carothers, Steven Feldstein, and Richard Youngs
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Middle-power democracies—countries which regardless of their geopolitical weight have made democracy support a sustained component of their foreign policy—will be crucial to reimagining democracy support strategies and policies to better meet the moment. Some of these states have crafted new initiatives and wielded diplomatic tools to deepen their impact in recent years. However, these states have on the whole punched below their collective weight. This paper suggests that middle-power democracies can maximize their impact on global democracy in the following ways: Enhancing solidarity: when a country acts courageously in defense of democracy, it needs to know that others will stand alongside it. Sharpening their focus: middle-power democracies should target policy areas aligned with democratic values on issues both at the top of the geopolitical agenda and at the top-of-mind for citizens around the world—for example, economic recovery, injustice and discrimination, corruption, digital repression, and climate change. Improving diplomatic cooperation: pursuing flexible and focused multilateral partnerships allows for collaboration on key policy interests and amplifies middle-power actions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Democracy, Solidarity, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America