Publishing Institution: / Political Geography: Europe

251. Potential efficiency gains from the introduction of an emissions trading system for the buildings and road transport sectors in the European Union

Author:: Wilfried Rickels, Christian Rischer, Felix Schenuit, and Sonja Peterson
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: In the European Union (EU), a second emissions trading system (EU ETS2) covering buildings, road transport and small energy and industrial installations is expected to be introduced from 2027. Until 2030, however, EU ETS2 will not be a separate pillar of EU climate policy, but will support Member States in meeting their national targets under the Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR). If there are net regional shifts in emission reductions within the EU ETS2, for example, if companies in one member state buy in aggregated terms net allowances, this must be compensated for at the national level. We study the EU ETS2 for the year 2030 using the general equilibrium model DART. In our analysis, the introduction of an EU ETS2 generates about a quarter of the efficiency gains of a comprehensive emissions trading system, assuming that nation states use the flexibility mechanisms of the ESR and compensate for regional abatement leakage through interstate emissions trading. However, this is only true if there is no extensive price stabilization in the EU ETS2. Our analysis suggests an EU ETS2 allowance price of around EUR 300/tCO2. Stabilizing the EU ETS2 price at the envisaged intervention price of 45 EUR/tCO2 would require about 415 million additional allowances and thus imply additional emissions of the same amount in 2030 alone.
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Economy, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: Europe

252. The path of economics research production: Insights into the seesaw between theory and empirics

Author:: João Ricardo Faria, Rajeev K. Goel, and Neela D. Manage
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper provides insights into the apparent seesaw between the generation of theoretical versus empirical economics research over time. A dynamic model considers the incentives of researchers to focus on empirical versus theoretical papers. It yields the main characteristics of the path-changing of economics research, from theoretical-intensive to empirical-focused. The model has two equilibria, one with a higher proportion of theoretical papers and another with a higher proportion of empirical papers. Curiously, the equilibrium with greater theoretical papers is stable, while the one with more empirical papers is a saddle point. This suggests that the current trend of increasing empirical research is unlikely to last.
Topic:: Economics, Research, and Innovation
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

253. Technology will save the climate! Attitudes towards Norway’s climate policy in four social groups

Author:: Åsta Dyrnes Nordø
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: The risk of opposition from the population increasingly plays a role in choosing the climate policy measures to achieve the objective to substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In Norway, there is a long-standing cross-party consensus that the development of new technologies will be crucial for solving climate challenges. Comparing public opinion surveys, Norwegians are significantly more convinced that new technology will solve problems induced by climate change, compared people in other European countries. A concrete example of such a technology is carbon capture and storage (CCS). Despite discussions about the costs of establishing the technology, there is a cross-party consensus in Norway that CCS is a good and suitable measure for reaching climate policy goals. In this article, we review the historical background that has led to this broad support in Nor-way. Furthermore, we look at how this has been expressed in the political parties’ attitudes towards CCS. There has been a long standing consensus among all major parties that CCS should be developed and deployed. We argue that this lay the foundation for the societal support for CCS. We analyze data from the Norwegian Coordinated Online panels for research on DEMocracy and governance (KODEM) to examine the attitudes toward CCS among citizens and three functional elites, namely elected representatives, bureaucrats, and journalists. We find that CCS receives strong support in all four groups, but that citizens and elected representative are more skeptical compared to bureaucrats and journalists. However, when looking at the factors that influence the perception of CCS, the pattern is the same for all four groups. The more technology optimistic a person is, the more positively they tend to perceive CCS as a method to fight climate change. We also find that those who think the political efforts to reduce greenhouse gases are too great are less positive about CCS com-pared to those who think the efforts are appropriate or too small. Overall, the analysis indicates that all four societal groups are technology optimistic and characterized by the same attitudes toward climate change. We discuss the role of technology optimism in Norway’s climate policy and the reasons for the high degree of political consensus across groups with different societal functions.
Topic:: Climate Change, Science and Technology, Carbon Emissions, Elites, and Attitudes
Political Geography:: Europe and Norway

254. The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?

Author:: Christoph Trebesch, Ariana Antezza, Katelyn Bushnell, Andre Frank, and Pascal Frank
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper presents the Ukraine Support Tracker, which lists and quantifies military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. Since the third update we track support by 41 countries, specifically the EU member states, other members of the G7, as well as Australia, South Korea, Turkey, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, China, Taiwan, India and Iceland. The database is intended to support a facts-based discussion about support by other countries to Ukraine. Private donations and aid through non-governmental organizations are not included due to a lack of systematic data. To value in-kind support like military equipment or weapons, we rely on government statements as well as own calculations using market prices. We find significant differences in the scale of support across countries, both in absolute terms and as percent of donor country GDP.
Topic:: Economics, War, Foreign Aid, Military Aid, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Germany, and United States of America

255. Exposure to War and Its Labor Market Consequences over the Life Cycle

Author:: Sebastian T. Braun and Jan Stuhler
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: With 70 million dead, World War II remains the most devastating conflict in history. Of the survivors, millions were displaced, returned maimed from the battlefield, or spent years in captivity. We examine the impact of such wartime experiences on labor market careers and show that they often become apparent only at certain life stages. While war injuries reduced employment in old age, former prisoners of war postponed their retirement. Many displaced workers, particularly women, never returned to employment. These responses are in line with standard life‐cycle theory and thus likely extend to other conflicts.
Topic:: History, Displacement, World War II, Welfare, Prisoners of War, and Labor Market
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

256. NATO in the North: The emerging division of labour in Northern European security

Author:: Matti Pesu
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Russian war of aggression has rendered Northern Europe an increasingly significant region for Euro-Atlantic security. A stable and secure Northern Europe is a critical precondition for a safe and stable Euro-Atlantic region. The alliance should treat Northern Europe as a strategic whole although the different subareas of Northern Europe have their distinctive security dynamics and concerns. NATO is currently improving its deterrence and defence posture. It is simultaneously shifting its military strategy from a model of deterrence by reinforcement to one of deterrence by denial. NATO’s evolving posture and strategy in Northern Europe should be underpinned by a more explicit division of labour. The regional allies and stakeholders can be divided into four categories in terms of their role in regional security: frontline nations, hubs, security providers and the ultimate security guarantor. The regional frontline nations include the Baltic states, Finland and Poland, which can also play a role as hubs and even security providers along with the United Kingdom and Germany. Denmark, Sweden and Norway are first and foremost hubs. The United States remains the ultimate security guarantor of the area.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe, Nordic Nations, Arctic, and Baltic Sea

257. US-EU climate change industrial policy: Pulling in different directions for cooperation, competition, and compromise

Author:: Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The United States and the European Union agree on prioritizing policies to address climate change, which includes securing supply chains for components essential to low-carbon technology. Despite this agreement, their policies to address climate change and low-carbon technology could foster competition. The US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) reflects the competitive advantage of the US to draw in the best talents, capabilities, and resources from outside sources. This leads to a disconnect between the industrial policy benefits of the IRA within the US and the potential competitive impact the IRA has on US relationships with allies. The EU’s policies are shaped by the bloc’s desire to respond to external actors—including China and Russia—while protecting the common market and building up its internal capability to ensure security of supply. This is complicated by individual member-state objectives. The 2024 US presidential election could bring change: A Republican administration might not share the EU’s outlook on climate change, the need for government intervention, or even the close transatlantic relationship seen during the Biden administration.
Topic:: Climate Change, Governance, European Union, Economic Policy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Europe, Finland, and United States of America

258. The geoeconomics of the hydrogen era: Towards a new global energy architecture

Author:: Timo Behr
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Clean hydrogen is crucial for ensuring the transition to a carbon-neutral economy, and large quantities of it will be needed in the future. The transition from a hydrocarbon to a hydrogen economy will have significant geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences. Due to its unique properties, hydrogen will not become the “new oil”. While oil and gas have encouraged a concentration of power – in the hands of producer countries, major oil companies, and around strategic choke points – hydrogen will favour a dispersion of power. The transition to a hydrogen economy will see strong competition over technologies, raw materials, and regulatory standards. Hydrogen has the potential to make the world energy trading system more balanced, more democratic, and less prone to price fluctuations, but it could equally lead to fragmentation, inadvertently contributing to current geopolitical divisions. For the EU and Finland, the transition towards a hydrogen economy presents both challenges and opportunities. Concerted action and active diplomacy will be needed to prevent Europe from being overtaken by others and slipping into new dependencies.
Topic:: Climate Change, Governance, Hydrogen, Energy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Europe and Finland

259. The role of space technologies in power politics: Mitigating strategic dependencies through space resilience

Author:: Markus Holmgren
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Space activity is experiencing a boom with the scope and importance of space technologies and services fuelling rapid growth upon growth. While the space boom is catalysing transferral of the ownership of previously public infrastructure and capabilities to corporate control, many space technologies have critically important military and civilian applications. As the importance of space sectors grows, both public and private cyberoperations targeting space infrastructure proliferate. This makes it more difficult to attribute the perpetrators of cyber operations. The United States’ lead in the space sector is increasing. Starlink, a satellite internet constellation operated by the US-based company SpaceX, will serve to bind many nations to one more US-controlled communication architecture. As a result of the implications of space technologies for comprehensive security, building space resilience is becoming paramount. States must diversify their supply of space-related services and tighten cooperation with like-minded states.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economic Policy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Europe and Finland

260. Outlining EU-Turkey relations: The impacts of the Ukraine war and Turkey’s crucial elections

Author:: Toni Alaranta
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Turkey-EU relations are affected by Russia’s war on Ukraine and its consequences for the EU’s place in the world. Another major factor is Turkey’s presidential and parliamentary elections held in May, which are defining the prospects for the country’s democratic future and its foreign policy. The second round of the presidential election took place on 28 May. The re-election of President Erdoğan indicates that the unilateral foreign policy and strained relationship with the West is likely to continue, although there is a chance of a short-term burst of cooperation due to Turkey’s economic troubles. There are increasingly divergent views about Turkey in the West, and the EU’s future relationship with Turkey needs to accommodate these different conceptualizations of the country as a state actor. The EU needs to be flexible in the coming months and to find ways to engage with Turkey in a more fruitful manner, irrespective of the election results.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Elections, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Turkey

261. EU reform is back on the agenda: The many drivers of the new debate on treaty change

Author:: Steffen Müller
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Institutional reform is back on the European Union’s agenda, with the European Parliament, the Commission and large member states like Germany and France all supporting changes to the way the EU operates. While opening the EU treaties is not without political risk and there is still no consensus on doing so among member states, this momentum for reform is unlikely to wane in the near future. There are several reasons for the new reform drive. In particular, reforms are intended to strengthen the EU’s democratic credibility, to prevent institutional erosion in a time of permanent crisis, to make the EU more resilient to blockades by individual governments, and to lay the groundwork for the accession of new member states. While some of the proposed changes could be achieved without treaty change, the number and variety of issues at stake entails the risk of getting bogged down in parallel debates and missing opportunities for package deals. The most efficient way to deal with the EU’s reform needs would therefore be the launch of a treaty convention.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Reform, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe

262. Europe’s policies for a green transition: The European Commission’s geopolitical turn and its pitfalls

Author:: Marco Siddi
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The European Commission has published numerous policy documents concerning the European Green Deal and the energy transition since 2019. Several have an important foreign policy component. Following the Covid-19 crisis and especially Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the discourse and policy objectives of these documents have taken a ‘geopolitical turn’, meaning that the EU’s security, interests and cooperation with Western allies have become more prominent than before. The REPowerEU plan, the new External Energy Strategy and the Green Deal Industrial Plan exemplify this shift by combining green and geopolitical objectives. The EU’s geopolitical turn in external energy politics involves several risks. Third countries could perceive some policies as ‘green protectionism’ or ‘green colonialism’. Domestically, some business actors dislike restrictions on imports of critical raw materials and green technology from abroad, whereas additional mining in the EU may not be compatible with biodiversity and environmental protection. At the same time, ‘offshoring’ mining outside the EU may transfer the ecological consequences to contexts with laxer regulation.
Topic:: Geopolitics, European Commission, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: Europe

263. The changing dynamics of the G7, G20 and BRICS: Informal multilateral cooperation is increasingly important in an era of strategic competition

Author:: Juha Jokela and Alana Saul
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Increasing strategic competition among major powers has had a negative effect on the efficacy of formal multilateral cooperation. This has also been reflected in informal forums such as the G7, G20 and BRICS. Yet some new dynamics have emerged. Since Russia was excluded from the G8 in 2014, the G7 has become a key forum for Western cooperation. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has further geared the group towards a stronghold of Western economies and democracies. The BRICS group has continued to meet at leaders’ level, and has consolidated its position. Despite variation in its members’ interests, the group aims to balance the G7, and its importance for China and Russia has been elevated. Currently, the G20 constitutes a forum in which strategic competition can potentially be managed. Along with the G7 and BRICS countries, other powers play an increasingly notable role. The dynamics of the group also displays an increasing “Southernization” of informal multilateral cooperation.
Topic:: European Union, Democracy, Multilateralism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

264. Russian aggression and the European Arctic: Avoiding the trap of Arctic exceptionalism

Author:: Harri Mikkola, Samu Paukkunen, and Pekka Toveri
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In its efforts to limit the Western defence posture in the Arctic, Russia has successfully exploited the “High North, low tension” mantra and the notion of the Arctic as an exceptional region of peace and cooperation. At the same time, Russia has managed to build its position of relative strength in the Arctic through systematically developing its military capabilities. To create a threat of escalation, Russia has also used offensive military exercises and disruptive hybrid operations against the Western Arctic states in the region. Arctic economic resources and military assets continue to play an essential role for Russia in pursuing its strategic goals, and for its ability to carry out acts of aggression. Through regional cooperative practices, the West has unintentionally facilitated this capacity. The West has limited its military activity in the Arctic to mitigate tensions. This has been a one-sided effort. The Western Arctic states should thus focus on building comprehensive deterrence in the region.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Arctic

265. The war-induced exodus from Russia: A security problem or a convenient political bogey?

Author:: Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Since 24 February 2022, around 800,000 Russians have left Russia in reaction to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The largest proportion of new migrants was accepted by Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkey, and Armenia. War-induced migration should be handled like any other migration, whether it involves asylum-seekers, economic migrants, or repatriates. Excessive politicization and fearmongering around migration, including political refugees and political oppositionists, is counterproductive, as it feeds into Kremlin propaganda and belligerent narratives. While there may be concerns about espionage or saboteurs, the primary focus should be on the socio-economic impact of Russian immigration. For the receiving states, especially in the post-Soviet space, the Russian migrants pose a socio-economic challenge rather than a political one. With an increasing probability of cross-border repression – persecution or intimidation of political migrants abroad – it is essential that the EU adopts a consistent response towards political migrants, including those from Russia.
Topic:: Security, Refugees, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

266. Russia’s regime transformation and the invasion of Ukraine: From a failed blitzkrieg to war as the new normal

Author:: Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Russia’s increasingly dictatorial and Soviet-nostalgic political leadership sees the invasion of Ukraine not only as a necessity when it comes to prevailing in the conflict with the West, but also as a chance to break free from Western influences. Vladimir Putin is acting as a referee in the elite’s hidden competition, which has been transformed into open rivalry in the context of the war. The competition over who is the most loyal to Putin’s war policy radicalizes the political discourse throughout. The Kremlin’s key challenge is to maintain the balance between citizens’ political apathy and the mobilization of society required in times of war. Civic passivity is central to the regime’s security, while justifying the continuation of the poorly progressing war requires an increasing militarization of society. The Russian public’s approval of the war has gradually diminished, and efforts to mobilize society in revenge for perceived losses have not changed the trend. Hence, Russia’s poor military success is thus far the fastest way to vitiate the legitimacy of Putin’s war regime.
Topic:: Security, Authoritarianism, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

267. Centre-right parties in Germany and Sweden: Challenges and strategies in a changing political landscape

Author:: Sanna Salo and Tuomas Iso-Markku
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Centre-right parties have played a central role in stabilising European party politics and advancing European integration, but the increased fragmentation of party systems and the rise of the radical right present serious challenges to them. The way that centre-right parties respond has important implications for domestic and EU politics alike. Many European centre-right parties have become divided on their political profile and programme, debating between leaning towards the progressive-liberal or the conservative-authoritarian end of the political spectrum. In Germany, the rise of the radical-right AfD has fuelled disagreements within the CDU/CSU and generated demands to sharpen its profile. However, this has thus far not led to major changes to the CDU/CSU’s platform, as it is also challenged from the political centre by the SPD and the Greens. In Sweden, the Moderates have clearly reshaped their political agenda in the last decade, focusing on immigration and law-and-order issues, as well as adopting positions and rhetoric reminiscent of the SD. This shift culminated in the formation of a Moderate-led coalition government supported by the SD in late 2022.
Topic:: Politics, European Union, and Political Parties
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, and Sweden

268. Mexico’s domestic decay: Implications for the United States and Europe

Author:: Lauri Tahtinen
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) has challenged Mexico’s democratic institutions, including the electoral commission INE, and relies on the military to run sectors of the economy and to provide internal security. Recognizing the continuing strategic importance of its southern neighbor, the United States is attempting to “friend-shore” American industry to Mexico despite trade disputes. Mexico’s economic convergence with the US is giving way to ideological divergence. In the past year, Mexico has called NATO’s stance on Ukraine “immoral” and openly aligned with the leftist, anti-US dictators of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Mexico’s internal development and shifting external stance could spark a return to a United States focused on the protection of its 19th-century borders instead of its 20th-century global footprint. European attention to the future of Mexico can help diversify the country’s trade and other partnerships, as well as shine a light on its democratic decay.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Democracy, Europe, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:: Europe, Latin America, North America, Mexico, and United States of America

269. Allies Help Those Who Help Themselves: How Estonia and Japan Approach Deterrence

Author:: Yoko Iwama, Tetsuo Kotani, Sugio Takahashi, Tony Lawrence, and Henrik Praks
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Up until the blatant act of Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2022, the West had been gradually shifting its attention towards East Asia, with China seen as the primary challenge of the first half of the 21st century. The new context requires a thorough reassessment of international security architecture by all national stakeholders. This, in turn, offers Estonia and Japan the opportunity to enrich their security perspectives on common strategic threats, as well as on broader geopolitical shifts caused by Russia and China. This report introduces several aspects of these revolutionary developments, their background, and their potential implications, some of which have already been reflected in the updated strategic documents unveiled by US and Japanese defence communities. Taken together, these documents make a case for an enhanced partnership between Japan, the US, and Europe that would prepare like-minded allies to respond to any security crisis. In the eventuality of a crisis resulting in an actual military confrontation, the report compares China’s missile supremacy and Japan’s long-range standoff maritime firepower strategies by grounding this analysis in the theory of victory. Charting a more favourable course forward, the report assesses the current state of deterrence in the Baltics by detailing the key developments in regional defence posture and planning, with a clear shift towards forward defence. Centring on emerging cross-border risks posed by hybrid warfare and using Estonia as a case study for vulnerabilities, the report proposes ways to mitigate these risks by advancing the role of deterrence. The report’s recommendations are as follows: To establish a cooperative format between NATO and Indo-Pacific nations along the lines of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and Cooperation Council and open NATO’s liaison office in Japan. To create the Baltic-Japan security and defence 1.5 Track dialogue forum. To develop ties between the defence intelligence services of Estonia and Japan in order to better understand the threats posed by Russia and China. To facilitate networking in the fields of concept development, capability planning, doctrine, and military education to address the challenges of multi-domain operations. To explore possibilities for closer defence industrial cooperation and technology sharing between Estonia and Japan in cyber security, artificial intelligence, sensorics, robotics, and electronic warfare. To engage Estonia’s knowledge and experience when adopting NATO’s standards and practices in Japan’s future capability development in pursuit of interoperability. To hold joint exercises in integrated air and missile defence, coastal defence, critical undersea infrastructure protection, etc. As Japan seeks to forge closer defence relations with Europe and European nations and enhance their defence ties with the democracies in the Indo-Pacific area, the need to understand better how cooperation between Estonia and Japan contributes to the emerging Euro-Pacific deterrence agenda will persist.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and Estonia

270. Europe’s Broken Order and the Prospect of a New Cold War

Author:: Kristi Raik and Eero Kristjan Sild
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The Russian and western visions of European security have profoundly different ideational roots: balance of power embedded in realist geopolitics versus liberal rules-based order. Russia is a revisionist power aiming to re-establish a European security order based on the balance of power, including a recognition of its empire and sphere of influence. Russia’s aggressive pursuit of this vision has forced the West to defend the rules-based liberal order in Europe and beyond. This report analyses the main sources and implications of Russia’s discontent with the post-Cold War European security order, which eventually led to the invasion of Ukraine. The disagreements are likely to endure beyond the war in Ukraine, leading to a new Cold War. The paper identifies three scenarios for the future of the European security order, the most likely one being a dual order, with the liberal rules-based order further strengthened and enlarged among western countries including Ukraine, while Russia will hold on to its imperialist ambitions but being forced to accept a much more limited sphere of influence than the former Soviet or tsarist empires. As long as the worldview that underlies Russia’s foreign policy does not change, any new balance of power will be temporary and under threat of renewed aggression once Russia has regained strength. In order to make it more sustainable, the West will need to eliminate grey zones, ensure credible deterrence and defence, and consistently weaken Russia’s ability to rebuild its military might.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Cold War, Authoritarianism, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

271. New Frontiers: Estonia’s Foreign Policy in Africa

Author:: Kristin Adeoti
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Estonia’s renewed foreign policy engagement in Africa holds a historical foundation proving that the country’s approach to diplomacy is a gradual development and a work in progress. In recent years, Estonia has taken several strategic steps to enhance its ties with African nations across the realms of diplomacy, security, economic relations, business partnerships, development cooperation, and humanitarian aid – and has already had some success stories. This drive reflects both an ambition and a commitment to building stronger bonds between Estonia and Africa. To strengthen ties with African states, Estonia must commit to continuous engagement on the levels of government, businesses, and people-to-people cooperation, while acknowledging the current challenges and limitations. Such a comprehensive approach – albeit a demanding endeavour involving multiple stakeholders – would foster mutual trust, forming the basis for genuine partnerships and sustainable progress. Today, it is of essence to recognise the immense potential that this relationship promises. Demographic growth, rapid economic development, and expanding IT markets on the continent boost its global influence. As Africa gains more weight in international affairs, Estonia can engage in a mutually beneficial exchange. Africa’s prospective influence and Estonia’s existing expertise lay the foundation for a partnership that will fuel innovation and drive progress.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economics
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, and Estonia

272. In a State of Denial: The Air War in Ukraine

Author:: Francesca Verville and Catarina Buchatskiy
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Ukraine’s ability to repel one of the world’s leading military powers has surprised the world. Since the full-scale invasion in February 2022, neither Russia — despite its superiority in numbers and capabilities — nor Ukraine has been able to establish air superiority. With fewer and less capable air domain assets, Ukraine has instead been obliged to adopt the less costly and inherently defensive strategy of ‘air denial.’ However, for it to remain successful will require Ukraine to sustain continuous air defence operations and the West to commit to a steady supply of military assistance. Mutual air denial is essentially an attritional form of warfare from which Russia is likely to draw greater benefits and a strategy which forces Ukraine to make difficult choices regarding the targets it wants to deny. The F-16, albeit not a silver bullet, offers the prospect of enabling Ukraine’s air forces to more effectively exploit openings in Russia’s defences and to strike Russian forces and their logistics. However, unlike previous provisions of Western military assistance, the decision to give Ukraine F-16s moves past the more short-term view of helping it meet the immediate needs of the war. The effort spent training Ukrainian pilots, ground crews, and logisticians will have long-term value in supporting Ukraine’s air defence needs and deterring any renewed Russian aggression.
Topic:: Air Force, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

273. War and Energy Security: Lessons for The Future

Author:: Tomas Jermalavicius, Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen, Andrian Prokip, Christian Egenhofer, and Edoardo Righetti
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia’s war against Ukraine has produced multiple shifts in the geopolitical landscape of Europe. Various EU member states and EU institutions broke through entire decades of dogmatic principles and established practices in security and defence policies to respond to Russia’s aggression and protect the continent. The energy domain is at the forefront of this confrontation, as Russia used its dominant market position in European energy supply in the run-up to – as well as during – the war to weaken Europe’s responses, divide the EU, and deter it from increasing its support to Ukraine. The multifaceted and far-reaching impact of the war offers an opportunity for a deeper reflection on the lessons learned for energy security at the national, regional, and EU levels. It allows for an assessment of the prospects in the geopolitical landscape where Russia is comprehensively isolated; new energy and technology players grow in importance; a new global energy order emerges; and the effects of the climate crisis become more severe and evident. It is also a rare opportunity to assess how complex energy systems retain their resilience or degrade under the conditions of a high-intensity conventional war, which has collective defence implications to the ability of the frontline states, such as Estonia, to fulfil NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience and thus Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The report seeks to provide analysis concerning these aspects of the war’s short-, medium-, and long-term impact on energy security in Europe, the Baltic region, and Estonia. Conclusions of the report stress the importance of regulatory, policy, and technological flexibility, as well as innovation, in responding to various forms of strategic coercion through the energy sector – especially when such coercion is applied against targets under the duress of a major war, in which economic disruption, market uncertainty, geopolitical turmoil, and societal anxieties are abundant. The conclusions caution though that the appetite for resilience-enhancing investments and transformative solutions might diminish in the cost-conscious economic environment of the future or that the EU and US will start a vicious cycle of protectionist measures in green energy development, which will undercut transatlantic cooperation in energy security.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Gas, Crisis Management, Renewable Energy, Hybrid Threats, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Sweden, and United States of America

274. The Future of Arms Control: Ready to (Dis)Agree?

Author:: Tõnis Idarand, Kalev Stoicescu, and Ian Anthony
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Having been crumbling already for years, international arms control architecture is now in a perilous state. Existing arrangements have either been losing their effectiveness or outright failing due to Russia’s non-compliance, whilst Russia’s aggression against Ukraine might have delivered the final blow to this system. Even after the war in Ukraine has ended, it will take years to re-establish the level of trust necessary to, again, engage with Russia on arms control. The return to the pre-war ‘business as usual’, where the dialogue will resume as if never interrupted, is unlikely. Arms control dialogue with Russia ‘at any cost’ cannot produce an acceptable result. Arms control as we have known it, with its legally binding and verifiable agreements, may have come to an end. The trends emerging from the expert discussions are more focused on a different set of instruments, such as political commitments, risk reduction, or transparency and confidence building measures. Development of new technologies, proliferation of new weapon systems, the rise of China as a global player, and increasing role of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Russian and Chinese military doctrines will all have an impact on global arms control. The fate of the New START Treaty will have a decisive effect on the future of arms control and the prospects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime already under immense pressure. This report attempts to summarise the developments in arms control architecture over the last decades and accentuate the trends that might be consequential when designing the arms control system of the future. The year 2023 has already demonstrated that arms control is less relevant in Russia’s security thinking. Moscow exploits the existing arrangements mainly as leverage to influence the US and NATO’s policy towards Ukraine or obtain concessions regarding its proposals on the new European security arrangements. The role of arms control in European security might be in decline, but the key elements of European security architecture are still in place, and most states continue to implement them. NATO allies – when discussing and designing arms control or confidence-building measures – shall consider how these instruments advance the security of allies. Under the current circumstances, the priority is to strengthen defence and deterrence of the Alliance. This is the only way to lay the groundwork for a constructive arms control dialogue with Russia.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, Nonproliferation, Trade, and Military
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

275. The EU’s Magnitsky Act Obsolete in the Face of Russia’s Crimes in Ukraine?

Author:: Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Despite the mounting evidence of the most serious of human rights violations being conducted by Russian forces on Ukrainian soil, the EU has chosen not to use its new Magnitsky Act to blacklist the perpetrators and their commanders. Instead, the EU has preferred to respond to Russia’s ‘dumb’ bombs with increasingly ‘dumb’ sanctions. This Brief explains why, after decades of work to smarten up its restrictive measures, the politicisation of human rights sanctions and the high threshold of evidentiary standards make it very hard for the Council to rely on evidence gathered from transition countries where the justice sector is still vulnerable to widespread corruption and political cronyism.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Law, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

276. Is There Life in the Desert? Russian Civil Society After the Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: By the end of 2021, all leading independent NGOs and individual human rights activists had been completely suppressed, and all issues deemed inconvenient for the Kremlin had been removed from the agenda of those still operating. This report focuses on the state of Russian civil society at the outset of Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, as well as on how it was affected by the war and what are the prospects for its development in the future. Since Vladimir Putin came to power, Russia has been moving along the path of creating a fully state-controlled civil society in which the political potential of independent civil activism would be completely undermined. To achieve this goal, the Kremlin pro-actively advanced its network of government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs) while simultaneously limiting foreign funding for NGOs. Those who did not abide by the Kremlin’s rules were systematically discriminated against and persecuted under the so-called “foreign agent” laws. Meanwhile, local authorities have stopped all formal and informal interaction with “politicised” civil actors. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine added further impetus to these trends and strengthened the Kremlin’s resolve to root out any sources of potential defiance. The independent professional NGOs that remained were in a deep crisis. Since February 2022, they have switched to survival mode. In all likelihood, they will either be co-opted by the state through a centralised system of financial support or cease to exist in the near future. The niches that they have left – including in the field of human rights advocacy – are being quickly filled by GONGOs. With their colossal resources, wider media access, and connections in the government, GONGOs are able to attract more young people to join their ranks. In many regions, even the scanty of organised independent civic activism that existed before the war was neither there nor likely to re-emerge in the coming years. In Russia, the level of involvement in NGOs has always been low and the population at large indifferent to the problems of civil society. Therefore, one should be wary of inflated expectations when contemplating the future of Russian civil activism. Even if Putin’s regime collapses, one can hardly anticipate a quick transition towards a truly independent and vibrant civil society. The study was conducted on the basis of interviews with representatives of independent NGOs from various regions who, as of February 2022, were based in Russia. The geography of this survey was expanded as much as possible to make the study more reliable and better reflect the content of the processes underway in the country. This analysis also shows that representatives from Moscow, large provincial cities, and the North Caucasus differ significantly in their perception of the current situation with civil society, whereas their visions for the future diverge considerably. A profound lack of communication among them only amplifies the divisions and fragmentations in Russia’s civil society. The situation in the North Caucasus is of particular note. Albeit being severely weakened, local independent NGOs and activists are – in contrast with the rest of Russia – more disapproving of the war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine but more optimistic about the future of their home regions. They pin their hopes on the revival of indigenous languages and cultures with the help of diasporas abroad and the emergence of civil society.
Topic:: Civil Society, Human Rights, Politics, War, Governance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

277. British Nuclear Policy

Author:: Peter Watkins
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Nuclear deterrence has been a major pillar of British defence policy since the mid-1950s. The United Kingdom maintains a minimum, credible, independent strategic nuclear deterrent force, assigned to the defence of NATO. Its purpose is purely defensive: to deter the most extreme threats to the security of the UK and to that of her NATO allies. Potential adversaries must thus take into account the UK’s nuclear capabilities when facing UK conventional forces deployed as part of NATO’s forward deterrence and defence posture, not least the UK-led battlegroup in Estonia. The UK does not see a contradiction between cooperation with allies and having an “independent” deterrent – its nuclear force is operationally independent and only the UK Prime Minister can authorise the use of the UK’s nuclear weapons, even as part of a wider NATO response. Today, the Soviet Union is gone – yet a weaker but more dangerous Russia as well as an increasingly powerful China create a potential “two peer” nuclear challenge. The UK is currently renewing its nuclear deterrent as the existing capability is aging – but continues to seek opportunities for multilateral nuclear disarmament as the strategic circumstances allow. In light of the international security environment, the 2021 change to the warhead ceiling reflected that. But the UK needs to ask itself whether bigger changes will be needed for the future.
Topic:: NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, and Estonia

278. British Power in Baltic Weather: The UK’s Role in Nordic-Baltic Security and UK-Estonia Defence Cooperation

Author:: Tomas Jermalavicius and Alice Billon-Galland
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: For many decades, the United Kingdom has been an important player in the Nordic-Baltic region, and today it aims to increase its contribution to security and stability of the region. The UK has long been an attractive partner for countries in the region that seek to maintain strong relations with the geopolitical heavyweight possessing a similar outlook on the security environment, transatlantic relations, utility of military force, and the threat from Russia. Given London’s interest for global engagement and its limited means, ensuring continuous and reliable British involvement in the region is a priority for Nordic-Baltic states. This report analyses the objectives, priorities, and constraints of the UK’s defence policy in the Nordic-Baltic region at a critical juncture for Euro-Atlantic security, as Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine and China grows increasingly assertive in the Indo-Pacific. It provides the political and strategic context of British engagement in the Nordic-Baltic region, with a particular focus on the challenges that British defence strategy and capability plans face as a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It then explores whether other key security players, such as Germany or France, could eventually take a stronger lead in the Nordic-Baltic area and how that would impact the UK’s involvement and leadership. It discusses the arrangements aimed at enhancing the UK’s military footprint in Estonia — in the framework of NATO’s collective defence and deterrence — that were developed in the run-up to and after NATO’s June 2022 Madrid summit. This analysis is put into the context of expectations from the Baltic states and plans of the Alliance for stronger forward defence in the region that are subject to discussions in July 2023 Vilnius summit and may generate additional demand for the UK’s regional military presence. The report also explores how minilateral formats, such as the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), fit into the regional security architecture and how London seeks to leverage them to sustain its leadership role. Finally, it highlights some key aspects of the UK-Estonia bilateral defence cooperation and analyses its opportunities, challenges, and prospects.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, Estonia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

279. NATO and the Indo-Pacific Region

Author:: Iro Särkkä
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Amid Russia’s war in Ukraine, NATO has paid much less attention to global security issues, such as China’s potentially menacing activities in the Indo-Pacific region. But there too, the deteriorating geopolitical environment calls for NATO to take a stronger cooperative and consultative role. This brief explores why NATO is deepening cooperation with the Indo-Pacific partners. It discusses both NATO’s and individual Allies’security concerns in the region and compares them with those of Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand (the AP4).1 It also outlines the development of NATO’s Indo-Pacific partnerships with the AP4 as part of its cooperative security agenda, from the early 2000s to the present day. Finally, it considers how NATO’s cooperative security dialogue is likely to develop in the future and what might be expected at the forthcoming Vilnius Summit.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Strategic Planning, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

280. Military Command and Control

Author:: Gintaras Bagdonas
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: NATO's current military Command and Control (C2) structure was designed for forces engaged in crisis management and expeditionary operations, not territorial defence. It will thus not be suitable for implementing NATO’s new regional defence plans, or for building credible deterrence and defence. A new military C2 structure that clarifies the geographical areas of responsibility of the Joint Force Commands (JFCs) and treats the Baltic Sea region as indivisible is needed. NATO must also improve C2 at the tactical level through the establishment of tactical- (component-) level commands, perhaps building upon the existing corps headquarters. The Baltic states, meanwhile, are establishing divisional structures which will further develop their military capabilities and give them new opportunities to act with Allies under corps command. They may, however, face challenges in implementing these ambitious plans due to a shortage of resources.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Military, and Command and Control
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

281. NATO’s new Defence Plans

Author:: Mārtiņš Vargulis
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: NATO’s Vilnius Summit, the second summit to be held in the Baltic states after the one in Riga in 2006, will be a pivotal event with immense importance for the security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. NATO summits are crucial milestones for the Alliance. Political guidance for operational plans, priorities for strengthening defence capabilities, and policies guiding NATO’s daily business are agreed at the highest level. The Vilnius Summit will play a vital role in reflecting on the progress made since the last summit in Madrid, seeking consensus on various key issues, and providing taskings for further work. These include several items that are critical from the perspective of the three Baltic states.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Europe, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

282. Prospects for Ukraine’s NATO Membership

Author:: Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: At the Vilnius Summit, Allies will focus primarily on their commitments to deter Russian aggression against NATO territory. But NATO seems unable to resolve the bigger strategic issue of how to secure Ukraine. If its own riskaversion prevents it from giving Ukraine a clearer pathway to membership, NATO may leave Ukraine disillusioned. A deterrence and defence partnership that guarantees the strengthening of Ukraine’s military capability for as long as required currently seems to be the most realistic scenario.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

283. Defence Spending

Author:: Margarita Šešelgytė
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia’s war in Ukraine has highlighted Europe’s military weakness. But the changes to threat assessments that followed Russia’s brutal full-scale invasion have also created an opportunity for European Allies to reassess their defence spending. If they are serious about defence, they will need to address the impact of decades of persistent underinvestment, not least because higher defence spending will be key to the credibility of the new defence plans to be agreed at the Vilnius Summit. Allies should thus review and revise their defence investment pledge. If they do not do this now, it will be more difficult once the war in Ukraine ends.
Topic:: NATO, Defense Spending, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

284. Europe’s Indo-Pacific Tilt: Estonian and Japanese Interests

Author:: Frank Jüris, Steven Blockmans, Kazuto Suzuki, Sanshiro Hosaka, and Maret Nukke
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Reshaped by the new great power competition, the international order has been undergoing revolutionary transformations. Revanchist Russia has unleashed a barbarian war against a sovereign European nation, while increasingly militarised and contentious China looms as a not-so-insidious threat in the Indo-Pacific. In response to these shifting dynamics and mounting geopolitical tensions, Europe is now awakening to the new reality and paying greater attention to the far-away region. At first glance, Estonia and Japan may seem like odd partners, yet they share vital commonalities and common interests impossible to ignore. Amidst Russia’s ongoing brutal invasion of Ukraine and China’s territorial claims over Taiwan, Japan’s strong advocacy in the Indo-Pacific region confirms how essential unity, consensus, and solidarity are for tackling global challenges in an environment of limited resources. This report brings together foreign and security policy experts to improve our understanding of each other’s security concerns — be it threats in cyber and information space, ruptures in trade, energy, and food, or authoritarian neighbours — by taking a step closer to a shared threat perception. Acknowledging unprecedented challenges to global security and rules-based order that democracy and democracies are confronted with from East to West, this report critically examines whether the European Union’s regional strategy maximises and realises the union’s full potential in the Indo-Pacific, which will test its actorness and agency and determine the role for the decades — if not centuries — to come. As the long-distance race for technological hegemony between the U.S. and China — of which Japan and Estonia are by far neither neutral nor casual observers — tightens, the report highlights national policies and capabilities needed to stay competitive, as well as to reduce known and potential vulnerabilities, from the perspective of economic security. China’s dramatic rise — as not only an economic but also a military superpower — entails an assertive and oftentimes assailing foreign policy that is felt both in Europe and the Indo-Pacific alike. The authoritarian regime in Beijing cleverly exploits the vacuum of power wherever it finds any. Cautioning against repeating the old mistakes of China-centrism, the report advocates for fostering multifaced cooperation with Japan in the framework of EU-Japan and Estonia-Japan relations. Thus, the report recommends that the EU as a whole and its individual member states should continue building on the positive momentum generated by the Indo-Pacific strategies and modify their approach to incorporate like-minded partners. From freedom of information to information- and cybersecurity, the report reminds us that leadership matters. It explains the changing tides in the Japanese mainstream public opinions that have already washed away the decades of harmful Russia-centrism from media, academia, and corridors of power and thus resulted in a society successfully resisting malign foreign disinformation campaigns. Estonia and Japan should facilitate digital transformation beyond their national borders, promote economic security, and exert geopolitical power through domestically produced sophisticated technology. The report also probes Sino-Russian relations from the perspective of Chinese strategic interests in its own neighbourhood. Able to contain the West by redirecting its focus and resources towards the war in Ukraine, Russia creates additional operation space for China in the Taiwan Strait. With the war raging In Europe, it should be clear that appeasing an aggressor with concessions and seemingly clever compromises only emboldens the latter, making it even more contentious in both territorial claims and bellicose actions. To prevent a conflict from breaking out in the Taiwan Strait, the EU should be building up allied immunity by counterbalancing China in the Indo-Pacific and proactively defending the rules-based world order.
Topic:: Defense Policy, European Union, Cybersecurity, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), ASEAN, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, Estonia, and Indo-Pacific

285. Iran’s Defence Industry: What’s in Stock for Russia?

Author:: Tato Kvamladze
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Albeit heavily sanctioned and exhausted by the Islamic revolution and the war with Iraq, Iran has managed to upbuild a self-sufficient defence industry from the ashes and demonstrate a robust weapon system manufacturing capacity over the last decades. It started with low-tech reverse-engineering of 3rd generation fighters and tanks and ended with indigenously producing high-accuracy and long-range ballistic missiles. Although Tehran has exported $435 million worth of weaponry, its arms trade is not a source of revenue, but a foreign policy tool to bolster its allies and proxies in the region and beyond. Supplying weapons to Russia, however, is a unique case that signals Moscow’s desperation and inability to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine. In 2022, after years of military cooperation with Russia, Teheran finally had an opportunity to provide support to Moscow, when the exhausted and depleted Russian army requested – and immediately received – unmanned combat aerial vehicles that are now used to target critical civilian infrastructure. Further economic cooperation between two rogue states might also extend to (nuclear) technology transfers, which for now remains an Achilles’ heel for Teheran. For as long as the war in Ukraine lasts, the Kremlin will have a reliable partner who can deliver an assortment of weapons needed on short notice.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Arms Trade, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

286. French Nuclear Policy

Author:: Jean-Louis Lozier
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: France’s independent nuclear deterrence has been the main pillar of its defence strategy for sixty years. The French nuclear policy, as well as its European and allied dimensions, however, tends to be misunderstood abroad, including by those who rely on French military involvement in the pursuit of their national security goals. French nuclear deterrence is, first and foremost, strictly conceived as defensive. It is designed to protect the country’s vital interests and ensure its sovereignty and freedom of action, with the fundamental purpose to prevent a major war that would threaten those vital interests. In the wake of the war in Ukraine and Russian nuclear sabre-rattling, the value of French deterrent for European security has been raised once again. Not so long ago, President Emmanuel Macron confirmed that France’s vital interests have a European dimension. Allies must understand that France does not intend to replace the U.S. extended deterrence but rather wishes to enhance and strengthen Europe’s common defence in a more uncertain security environment. Hence, there should be a shared interest to engage in a strategic dialogue on common threats and challenges before they have materialised.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe and France

287. Chinese Military-Civil Fusion: Sino-Italian Research Cooperation

Author:: N. Lill
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The Chinese government exploits foreign academic infrastructure and talent to build a world-class military. Although cooperation with China offers alluring investments, it risks research objectives being mandated by or from China and may result in unintended knowledge transfer in critical areas. Considering the extent of Chinese military-civil fusion, any collaboration—with military and non-military institutions alike—is likely to boost Chinese military capabilities. Utilising academic exchanges to further military ambitions is a coordinated and broad long-term strategy that has benefited from the West’s limited knowledge of Chinese institutions and their links to the military. To repurpose a quote by Nelson Mandela, “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.” And for now, that weapon is handed out without deep consideration or proper regulation.
Topic:: Education, International Cooperation, Research, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

288. How Russia Brings Its Aggression Against Ukraine to The Global South

Author:: Ivan Ulises Klyszcz
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: 2022 was a wake-up call for the West. The response by the Global South to the war in Ukraine highlighted Russia’s enduring strengths in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. This report explores the evolution of Russia’s relations with the countries in the Global South and the ways Russia cultivates these relationships in pursuit of its foreign policy agenda. Moscow’s current interactions in the Global South are driven by the demands of its war of aggression, as well as by its long-term goal: to challenge the international order. The latter dictate several manoeuvres found throughout such engagements: strategic communications, market substitution and sanctions evasion, and regime sheltering. This report presents three case studies meant to illustrate how Russia’s relations with the Global South have evolved since 2022. First, Tunisia exemplifies a superficial partner, with Moscow’s main tool in the country being strategic communication aimed at shaping public opinion in its favour. Second, India is illustrative of a strategic partner whom Moscow tries to engage in order to substitute for lost energy markets and evade sanctions. Third, Myanmar represents a hierarchical relationship, in which the local regime depends on Moscow for diplomatic support and arms deliveries. Notwithstanding varied perspectives on and responses to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, countries in the Global South have generally sought to prioritise their economy and security by attempting to strike a balance between Russia and the West. Aware of such desires, Moscow has been exploiting this situation to maintain its influence internationally. Challenging Russia in the Global South will put pressure on the Kremlin and limit its ability to conduct aggressive foreign policy – and wage war against Ukraine. The report concludes with six recommendations on how to counter Russia in the Global South.
Topic:: Cold War, Markets, Science and Technology, Communications, Arms Trade, Defense Industry, and Military
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, India, Asia, Tunisia, Myanmar, United States of America, and Global South

289. How Russia Went to War: The Kremlin’s Preparations for Its Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:: Kalev Stoicescu, Mykola Nazarov, Keir Giles, and Matthew Johnson
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: This report examines Russia’s preparations for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: domestically, in Ukraine itself, in the global information domain, and in building its relationship with China. For Russia, crushing Ukraine’s quest for democracy was central to meeting its objectives of reshaping the post-Cold War order in Europe and globally, restoring its own status, and reconstituting the Russian empire and Russian world. Its preparations in the political and informational, military, and economic domains for a full-scale war in Ukraine were too extensive and overt to go unnoticed, but they were not acted upon. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the evidence went against the dominant narrative in the West and was simply brushed aside. In the political and informational domains, Russia’s domestic preparations including cementing the regime’s authority, and taking advantage of the population’s Soviet nostalgia and aspirations for the restoration of the Russian world and the empire. Limited economic preparations were intended to safeguard Russia’s economy against current and future Western sanctions, while Russia’s extensive military preparations involved large-scale defence spending and extensive military modernisation efforts. Russia’s preparations beyond its own territory included: a campaign within Ukraine to divide society and discredit the democratically elected leadership; a campaign directed at the rest of the world about Ukraine, discrediting the country and its people as an object of sympathy and support in their resistance against Russia; and a campaign of intimidation designed to instil in western leaders and populations a fear of obstructing, impeding, or offending Russia. Russia also worked to build a relationship with China. China’s support is essential to Putin’s ambitions. But equally, China’s strategy for confronting the United States – which China cannot do alone – depends on Russia remaining at least a quasi-great power.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Development, Sanctions, Military Affairs, European Union, Resilience, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

290. Putin the Green? The Unintended Consequences of Russia’s Energy War on Europe

Author:: Mitchell Orenstein
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Both before and during its re-invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia cut energy supplies to Europe in an effort to force the continent to abandon Ukraine. Instead, Vladimir Putin accelerated Europe’s transition to green energy, decimating a key market for Russian exporters. Over the long term, Europe is well-positioned to win the energy war with Russia.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Markets, Renewable Energy, Energy Crisis, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

291. Russia Is Down, But Not Out, in Central Asia

Author:: Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has weakened its influence in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan. Russia is no longer a regional hegemon, which may increase regional instability. Tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are especially dangerous. Despite Moscow’s diminished influence in Central Asia, regional states cannot afford to completely ignore Russian interests. Western hopes for Central Asian gas resources to be pumped westwards and circumvent Russia remain unlikely to be fulfilled.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Gas, Political stability, Regional Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan

292. The Roots of Russian Military Dysfunction

Author:: Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: An unwillingness to decentralize decision making authority and a failure to communicate accurate information are the most consequential weaknesses at the state level that have contributed to the Russian military’s subpar performance to date in the war with Ukraine. These characteristics are exacerbated by other historic factors found throughout Russian society, which also permeate the military as a reflection of that society. They include an imperialist national identity, endemic corruption, and societal brutality. To these systemic problems must be added the inherent difficulties of what the Russian military was supposed to achieve in its first major peer conflict since World War Two and elements of simple military incompetence. The unwillingness to decentralize decision making authority is symptomatic of over five centuries of Russian autocracy. It is why Russia lacks an effective noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps and has a top-down command-and-control system, which is slow to provide timely direction to forces at the front. This is exacerbated by a failure to communicate accurate information, especially at the strategic level, which results in decision making based on faulty information and reinforces bad decisions due to inaccurate feedback. These two characteristics create a command, control, and communications system unsuited for modern warfare but congruent with a Russian way of war that has been influenced by a culture of imperialism, corruption, and brutality. Imperialism prevented Russian national security elites from seeing agency in other peoples, which led them to underestimate possible Ukrainian resistance and Western resolve. Corruption compounded personnel and supply challenges for the Russian military. A reliance on brutality to control its own soldiers and assert control over occupied populations exacerbated factors in the Russian military that are detrimental to good order, discipline, morale, and unit cohesion and provided additional motivation to Ukrainians to resist Russian aggression. These are not really “weaknesses” of the Russian system but consequences of that system. Furthermore, despite their detrimental impact on military effectiveness, these factors have sometimes “worked” for Russia and provided, counterintuitively, advantages such as the political will to conduct attrition warfare at a cost that no Western society would accept. This is significant because all the above factors are endemic to Russian social and political culture and will continue, barring a major social revolution in Russia of the scale of 1917. This means there will be no permanent solution to the war in Ukraine even if a peace treaty is signed. These cultural factors will eventually drive Russia to regain its military capacity and renew its aggression against Ukraine and hostility to the West. As long as Russia is autocratic with a propensity for self-deception and imperialism, it will try again to assert hegemony over Ukraine and other portions of its former empire. That future war will likely resemble the war in Ukraine, a high-intensity war of attrition where Moscow is willing to make brutal sacrifices to outlast its foes. This is not a case of predicting that history will repeat itself, but that Russia’s basic political nature will. Only if Russia overcomes its history and changes internally, will it ever behave differently externally.
Topic:: Corruption, Autocracy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

293. The Wagner Group’s Expanding Global Footprint

Author:: Raphael Parens, Colin P. Clarke, Christopher Faulkner, and Kendal Wolf
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: 1. The sanctions discussion needs to be expanded, as such designations should aim to shame Wagner’s state partners. 2. Sanctions lists should expand to include actors in third-party countries, such as Broker Expert LLC, a Russian-owned company widely reported to be shipping heavy machinery to support Wagner Group forestry activities in CAR, and First Industrial Company, a business owned by Wagner operator Dimitri Sytyi which concocts cheap “Russian” alcohol in Cameroon and sells it in CAR. 3. Perhaps one of the more important lessons for countering Wagner and other Russian PMCs is the importance of multilateralism. 4. NATO must also continue to consider proactive tools to counter Russian and other PMCs. 5. NATO should work to amplify efforts to push the adoption of the 2008 Montreux Document—an international agreement designed to reaffirm the legal obligations of states where PMCs originate and for those who hire them. 6. The Wagner Group and other Russian PMCs require consideration within a larger great power discussion, particularly as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has firmly aligned Europe and the US against Russia. 7. US senior leaders should demonstrate a greater diplomatic commitment to African allies and put pressure on other African leaders considering, or currently contracting, the Wagner Group and other Russian PMC operations. 8. International bodies such as the African Union, ECOWAS, and the East African Community (EAC) should reevaluate their approaches to peacekeeping and instability. 9. Exploiting the friction between Wagner’s financier and the MoD should also be considered a worthwhile policy option. 10. Last, NATO members must formalize methods of blocking contact with the Wagner Group through their international activities.
Topic:: NATO, Sanctions, Wagner Group, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

294. Russia’s Nuclear Policy After Ukraine

Author:: Stephen Blank
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: The recent mutiny by Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner mercenary force, generated international concern about the control of Russian nuclear weapons and Russia’s future nuclear policy.[1] Therefore we must ask, will Russia change its nuclear policy due to contemporary strategic developments? This question correctly assumes that the war in Ukraine and all its ramifications, despite their undoubted importance, are not the only factors influencing Russian decision-making on nuclear policy. Accordingly, we analyze those factors—including, among others, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine—that will likely influence the direction and nature of Russia’s nuclear policy. Those factors influencing policy, itself the outcome of myriad domestic and foreign pressures, also include Russia’s overall security policies, the global strategic environment, and the lessons Russia learns from recent wars—most prominently its aggression against Ukraine. Russian national security strategy and policy originate in what Carl Schmitt called the presupposition of unceasing conflict.[2] Since the U.S. is Russia’s principal interlocutor, it also is its primary antagonist. Russian security policy is inherently adversarial. It postulates a state of permanent conflict with Washington and its allies where Washington seeks to undermine, if not destroy, the Russian state and prevent it from restoring its empire (i.e., global great power status). As Deputy Foreign Minister Rybakov recently stated, “Russia’s foreign policy interests as a great power have a global projection. Our country plays a stabilizing role in various regions of the world.”[3] Allegedly the U.S. employs nuclear weapons, missile defenses, and advanced conventional weapons that could negate Russia’s nuclear deterrent to frustrate Russia’s policies.[4] Thus it is an article of faith in Moscow that its nuclear weapons are the main guarantees of Russia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, great power status, and the factor that deters the West from intervening against Russia in Ukraine.[5] Moreover, those weapons, when deployed abroad, also deter NATO’s potential, largely maritime, threats to Russia. Therefore, Russia must conduct a global military—i.e., an expeditionary, nuclear, and military policy.[6] Indeed, Putin has recently and revealingly called nuclear weapons, “the key guarantee of Russia’s military security and global stability.”[7] Russian nuclear strategy and behavior also derive from a cognitive universe wholly unlike and unfamiliar to American strategic thought. Identical words often mean entirely different things to Russians and Americans; much Russian rhetoric is politicized, deliberately deceptive, or opaque, and invariably follows state requirements. Yet, despite voluminous and even insightful commentary on war, Russian forces often do not fight as its doctrine stipulates, adding to the difficulties involved in determining what its policy is.[8] Simultaneously, however, Russian strategy and policy are also inherently evolutionary—i.e., they respond to changes in the strategic environment that are then incorporated into doctrine, strategy, official statements, exercises, procurement, and policy. Finally, despite our own difficulties in understanding Russia, either willfully or because it cannot help itself due to the deep-seated paranoia in its political culture, equally misreads the West, wholly misunderstands the West, and habitually ascribes the worst motives to U.S. and Western policies.[9] This misreading of the West repeatedly generates worst-case threat assessments that frequently lead to Russian nuclear threats or procurements. Taking all these factors into account, including Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, it is quite likely if not certain that Russian nuclear strategy and policy will change in the wake of the war in Ukraine, win, lose, or draw. Unfortunately, in most potential outcomes to the war save defeat and collapse of the government, that change points to an enhanced role of nuclear weapons in Russian policy with no letup in hostility toward the West. The war in Ukraine has been instrumental in fostering still more animosity toward the West and an enhanced role for nuclear weapons.[10]
Topic:: National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Wagner Group, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

295. The Frontline States: Conversations and Observations About Russia’s Other War in Europe

Author:: Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: From late June to mid-July 2023, I visited Georgia, Moldova, Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania on a research trip. The analysis and conclusions in this report are based, in part, on conversations with a wide variety of individuals from former government officials, university students, academics, and members of non-governmental organizations to ordinary citizens. The Kremlin desires to reestablish a sphere of influence in former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states between the Black and Baltic Seas. To do so, it is fighting a conventional war in Ukraine and political wars elsewhere to remove Western influence and reestablish hegemony. Russia’s political warfare operations have a major flaw; they only offer people the past and not a future. However, US efforts against them could be more effective and citizens in frontline states facing Russian subversion have constructive criticisms to improve them. Resisting Russian subversion depends as much on the political health of the targeted state as Western countermeasures. Efforts to oppose backsliding on democratic norms are vital, even if they spark tensions with partners and allies. Several countries in the region will hold elections between the fall of 2023 and 2025 that will determine their geopolitical orientation. If the war in Ukraine is a battle of modern weapon systems, these elections will be a war of ideas between East and West. It is important that the United States not cede the narrative for these elections to Moscow and work with allies and partners to counteract anti-Western propaganda.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

296. Why the West Should Stick with Conventional Arms Control in Europe for Now

Author:: Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez and Alexander Graef
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: After Russia’s withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Arms Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) formally enters into force on November 7, 2023, the remaining twenty-nine member states need to decide whether they want to keep the Treaty or dissolve it for good. The CFE Treaty no longer corresponds to the present state of European security, but its transparency and verification regime can still provide limited security advantages for NATO members and strengthen deterrence. A formal dissolution of the Treaty would undermine Western normative commitments to military transparency. In the long run, it could lead to a loss of expertise on how to conduct inspections and information exchange, which might become relevant again in the context of ending Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Topic:: NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

297. Using Taxation to Fund Military Spending

Author:: Nan Tian, Diego Lopes da Silva, and Xiao Liang
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: World military expenditure is on the rise. To fund their increases in military spending, options available to governments include tax, debt or revenue from natural resources. Each form of financing has its consequences, economic, political or social. Tax is the prevalent source of finance for governments. The use of tax, and the choice among different types of tax, can have an impact on income inequality and economic growth, among other things. However, no scholarly attention has yet been paid to the use of taxation to fund military spending. Using statistical analysis combined with in-depth case studies sheds light on this use of taxation. The findings—based on data for 100 countries between 1990 and 2020 and reinforced by detailed case studies on Burundi and Ukraine—show that countries in conflict tend to resort to indirect taxation to fund military expenditure. This is particularly true for low-income countries and for countries with an autocratic regime. This association can be consequential, considering the accumulated evidence on the impacts of indirect taxation on income inequality.
Topic:: Finance, Military Spending, and Tax Systems
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Ukraine, and Burundi

298. Naval Incident Management in Europe, East Asia and South East Asia

Author:: Ian Anthony, Fei Su, and Lora Saalman
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: Unprecedented global turbulence in 2022 has demonstrated the need to pay increased attention to naval operations. Enhanced military capability allows naval power projection far beyond home waters. New threats and challenges are emerging from technological advances and new applications, not least the vulnerability of warships and naval facilities to cyber intrusions and cyberattacks. As states implement the programmes they need to protect and promote their interests at sea, there is also likely to be an increase in the number of close tracking incidents. How effective current risk reduction mechanisms will be at dealing with incidents at sea is unclear. This Insights Paper provides a preliminary assessment of the existing mechanisms and suggests areas for further improvement.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Navy, Crisis Management, and Military
Political Geography:: Europe, East Asia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

299. The Role of Umbrella States in the Global Nuclear Order

Author:: Tytti Erästö
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: This paper focuses on countries under extended nuclear deterrence arrangements, or ‘umbrella’ states. The paper explores the ways in which umbrella states both in the Asia-Pacific region and in Europe have supported prevailing nuclear deterrence practices or distanced themselves from such practices. While there is a tendency for these countries to side with their nuclear-armed patron on matters related to nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament norms, at times they have taken steps away from the allied mainstream position by advocating for anti-nuclear weapon policies. As long as extended deterrence has a nuclear dimension, allies will need to balance between normative pressures to support nuclear disarmament and alliance commitments that require at least passive support for nuclear deterrence practices.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe and Asia-Pacific

300. Russia’s Military Expenditure During Its War Against Ukraine

Author:: Julian Cooper
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: This SIPRI Insights paper is devoted to an analysis of military spending by the Russian Federation during its war against Ukraine, and the sources of funding for that spending. Russia’s total military expenditure has increased since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, but not dramatically. Despite difficulty in accessing information on budget spending, total budgeted military spending in 2023 can be estimated at 6648 billion roubles. This represents 4.4 per cent of forecast Russian gross domestic product. While military spending in early 2023 seemed to accelerate beyond the budgeted amount, the rate of spending can be shown to be similar to that in early 2022 and does not suggest any unusual surge. The Russian government is attempting to restrain spending on the war to minimize the domestic impact and enable the pursuit of policy goals set before the invasion. The Russian economy can afford this level of spending notwithstanding severe sanctions, while leaving open the possibility of increased war-related funding if the government considers it necessary in the future.
Topic:: War, Budget, Military Spending, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

« Previous
Next »
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
…
198
199

Search

Search Constraints

Search Results

Refine your search

Topic

Political Geography

Content Type

Journal

Publishing Institution

Author

Publication Year

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS