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  • Author: Fred Tanner
  • Publication Date: 08-2000
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
  • Abstract: The disappearance of the overwhelming threat of Cold War confrontation has left the Europeans more sensitive to challenges, risks and threats from their southern periphery. The wars in the Persian Gulf and in the Balkans, the bloody civil war in Algeria, the recurrence of deadly violence between Israelis and Palestinians, the spread of religious extremism and the increasing migratory pressures from the South have obliged Europe and NATO to pay greater attention to their near abroad in the South. Given the region's root causes of conflict such as poverty, economic cleavages and uncontrolled population growth, the North's balancing strategy of the Cold War days was replaced by policies of engagements, politico-economic partnerships and dialogue initiatives. The EU, recalling its Euro-Arab special relations of the 1970s, lobbied to get its share in the post-Gulf War peace process, that brought together for the first time Arab states with Israel and Western "sponsors" in the multilateral setting of Madrid. Short-cut by the Arab-Israeli bilateral tracks under US patronage after Oslo, the EU changed gears in 1995 and founded in Barcelona a Euro-Med partnership with all Mediterranean states, including those of North Africa (with the exception of Libya), the Near East and the Palestinian Authority. This Partnership includes a political, economic and social dimension. The founders of the Partnership hoped that it would turn into the Mediterranean equivalent of NAFTA on the one hand and provide a support structure for the Middle East process on the other. The "Political and Security Chapter" of the Euro-Med Partnership was not only reminiscent of the Helsinki Process of the Cold War period, it also created a political platform of North-South co-operation in the Mediterranean that kept the Americans out and the Israelis in. The exclusion of the US from Barcelona (even as observer) was certainly one of the reasons why NATO enhanced its own security co-operation with some Southern Mediterranean states. Today, the Barcelona process finds itself in more or less direct competition with NATO with regards to soft security projection towards the South. This paper examines future scenarios of Euro-Med relations as well as of Atlantic relations over Mediterranean issues - under the assumption that Europe would become an international security actor. It will suggest that - in the long term - a successful Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) would strengthen the EU security and crisis management capabilities in the Mediterranean region. The CESDP would entitle the EU to enter the domain of security-cooperation in the fields of peacekeeping, defence training and education and the use of military assets for humanitarian operations. But two obstacles will have to be overcome: First, the relations to NATO dialogue programmes in the region will have to be sorted out and second, the Southern partner states need to be assured that the EU headline force projection capabilities will not make Europe more interventionist in the region.
  • Topic: Security, Defense Policy, NATO
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States, Europe, Asia
  • Author: Yuri Nazarkin
  • Publication Date: 08-2000
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
  • Abstract: Historically, Russia was always threatened from three sides: from the West it was threatened and invaded at different periods of its history by Poland, Sweden, France and Germany; from the South, its traditional rival and enemy was the Ottoman empire; from the East, China and Japan. Throughout its history Russia had to be on the alert along all its borders. Though at present there are no direct military threats from any of the three directions, the current Russian security planning takes into account all the three directions. However, the problem of European security is the highest priority in Russian foreign and security policy. There are a number of reasons for this.
  • Topic: Security, Defense Policy, NATO
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States, Europe, Asia
  • Author: André Liebich
  • Publication Date: 08-2000
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
  • Abstract: The above manifesto, entitled "A Horror is Haunting Europe," was published on the front page of one of Europe's premier newspapers in the thick of this year's presidential campaign in Russia. It was signed by some two hundred intellectuals and public figures, the French being the most strongly represented but including signatories from fifteen other European countries and a number of Americans. Among the recognisable names are those of media and cultural personalities such as Costas Gavras, Jean-Luc Godard, John Le Carré, Bernardo Bertolucci, Jane Birkin, Vanessa Redgrave and Barbara Hendricks. Many of the others are widely known academics, such as Umberto Eco and Noam Chomsky, as well as a minor galaxy of familiar Parisian personalities.
  • Topic: Security, Defense Policy, NATO
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States, America, Europe
  • Author: Roland Dannreuther
  • Publication Date: 08-2000
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
  • Abstract: Ever since Catherine the Great pronounced that 'Russia is a European country', Russia has been an inescapable part of the European balance of power. Russia's European credentials are indisputable. The larger majority of the Russian population, and most of the major economic centres, are located in the European part of Russia. Russians are Christian, if of the eastern orthodox faith, and Russian poets, novelists, artists and composers have made an extraordinary contribution to European culture. Russians perceive themselves as part of European civilisation, not least when confronted with other ancient civilisations, such as Iran, India and China. Moreover, other European actors have recognised Russia as an intrinsic part of the European order, even if at times this recognition has been mixed with strong doses of suspicion and fear. But, Russia is not only in Europe. Geographically, the larger part of Russia's territory, however inhospitable and poorly populated, lies in Asia. Culturally, Russia has periodically been hermetically sealed from mainstream developments in Europe. During the medieval period, Russia lay under Tartar rule; during the Soviet period, the borders were, in Stalin's words, under 'lock and key' and Western influences were rigorously excluded. The consequent backwardness of Russia, which has been a consequence of these intermittent linkages with the more developed West, has diluted Russia's European credentials. Russia's Asian destiny was also a deliberate act of state policy with Russia's borders being continually expanded into Asian territory. Russia had a similar experience to the United States with a continental expansion to the Pacific, which was driven, as in America, by entrepreneurial colonists who subsequently decimated the local populations. Towards the South, Russia followed European imperial practice and engaged in a mission civilisatrice to bring European-style rule over purportedly backward peoples. The Russian imperial experience differed from the British and French examples in one critical element: no division was made between the metropolitan centre and empire and thus no clearly demarcated border existed between the Russian state and its imperial appendages. The Tsarist military historian, Mikhail Vernukov, argued that this absence of a separation involved a different imperial practice when compared with 'Englishmen in India who do their utmost to avoid mingling with the natives . . . Our strength lies in the fact that . . . we have assimilated subject races, mingling affably with them'. For these and other reasons, Russia's European credentials have been questioned, not only by other Europeans but by Russians themselves. For west Europeans, the vast geographical expanse, the relative backwardness and large population, the heady mix of despotism and mysticism, has made Russia an alien entity, the 'other' from which the enlightened rational West can be contrasted. The well-known French proverb - 'Grattez le Russe, et vous trouverez le Tartare' - illustrates this European scepticism well. Russians themselves have often been drawn to emphasising the exceptionalism of Russia, not as in America because Russia represents the 'new' rather than the 'old' world, but because Russia's unique position between Europe and Asia makes it belong to neither and the fusion of East and West preserves the benefits of Western civilisation but without its decadent rationalism and materialism. The notion of Moscow as the Third Rome has been a continual source of attraction to the more mystical members of Russian society. This complex set of historical experiences, mutual perceptions and attitudes have contributed to the frequent shifts in Russia's policy towards the rest of Europe. At times, Russia has fully embraced the West so as to 'catch up' and modernise; at other times, Moscow has retreated into its citadels so as to preserve its uniqueness and the universality of its message. In terms of security policy, Russian leaders have been consistent in promoting as fluid and weak a set of alliance structures in Europe as possible. Alexander I, at the Congress of Vienna, was arguably the first to conceive of the notion of collective security and this legacy has been followed in more recent times with Gorbachev's promotion of a 'common European home' and the Soviet and post-Soviet predilection for defining the CSCE/OSCE as the overarching framework for the European security order. These collective security proposals, which have consistently baffled and irritated other Europeans powers, have had a strong realpolitik dimension, alongside the requisite dose of mysticism. Such schemes are designed to exclude a concentration of power in Europe, which might be directed against Russia, and to prevent the type of direct aggression which Russia suffered through the Napoleonic and Nazi invasions. Such flexible arrangements are also the most favourable mechanism for promoting Russian influence in Europe and to securing Russia's consistent desire, even obsession, to be treated as an equal with the other European great powers. It is clear that the West's rejection of the proposed collective security arrangement for the post-Cold War European order, and the corresponding expansion of NATO, has been viewed in Moscow as a humiliating geopolitical defeat. The sense of betrayal, of promises made by the West and then reneged upon, has been profoundly felt. With the perception of a Europe excluding and marginalising Russia, there has been a turn towards the East in the search for alternative avenues for projecting Russia's power and influence. Again, there are historical parallels with the nineteenth century when the concerted European effort to block Russian expansion into the Balkans, with its ultimate pan-Orthodox goal of capturing Constantinople, led to Russian energies being re-directed towards expansion in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In a similar vein, in March 1997, the Russian Presidential Spokesman, Sergei Yastrzhembskii, stated at the Russian-USA Helsinki summit: 'If NATO expansion is going to continue . . . Russia will be confronted with a need to reconsider its foreign-policy priorities. Our relations with China, India . . . and Iran are developing well'. The objective of this paper is to assess the nature, complexities and the relative success and failure of Russia's purported 'turn' to the East. Three areas will be briefly surveyed: recent Russian policy towards the Middle East, to Central Asia and to China.
  • Topic: Security, Defense Policy, NATO
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States, Europe
  • Author: Pami Aalto
  • Publication Date: 04-2000
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: International Studies Association
  • Abstract: It is no secret that research on integration within the European Union (EU) is not any more limited to the traditional dispute between intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. The debate between these two branches of research is now joined by International Relations (IR) constructivism, comparative politics approaches, and approaches treating the EU as “new governance” (Christiansen et al. 1999: 537). The issue of EU enlargement, moreover, enforces us to enlarge the research agenda horizontally, too, in order to make EU integration comprehensible. One of the metaphors depicting this enlarged research agenda is the “Europe of concentric circles”, with Brussels and EU institutions as the centre (Joenniemi 1993: 209- 12). For Ola Tunander (1997: 32), the emerging perception in the EU centre is that it represents a “Cosmos” of order and peace. This “Cosmos” is surrounded by a concentric circle of less integrated EU members, then a circle of relatively stable states eager for joining the EU, an outer circle of states less prepared to do so, and finally, a periphery representing “Chaos”; a final frontier of Europe which is definitely not about to join the EU in the foreseeable future. Ole Wæver (1997), for his part, speaks of a “Europe of three empires”. The EU is the most important empire, but it is accompanied by the “empire of the Tsars” -- Russia and its sphere of interests -- and the “empire of the Ottomans” -- Turkey with its sphere of interests.
  • Topic: Globalization, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance
  • Political Geography: Europe, Israel
  • Author: Timothy Ponce
  • Publication Date: 03-2000
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: International Studies Association
  • Abstract: The continued drive to unify Europe holds numerous implications for the measurement of state strength. The emergence of the European Union as a powerful player in the post-Cold War international system still remains to be seen. This article examines the complications for state strength brought about by European unification. Particularly, I examine the impact of unification on state strength for the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy from 1960 to the current period. Although potentially construed as part of the pains and process of unification, this paper argues that European unification does not seriously erode the strength of these states. My results indicate that these more powerful states are influenced negatively by the processes of globalization but not regional integration.
  • Political Geography: United Kingdom, Europe, France, Germany, Italy
  • Author: Kim Reimann
  • Publication Date: 03-2000
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: International Studies Association
  • Abstract: With comparative cases in North America and Europe as a reference point, this paper examines the recent emergence of international development NGOs (IDNGOs) in Japan and the role of state policies in supporting the growth of international civil society. In contrast to other advanced industrial nations where state-IDNGO cooperation in foreign aid programs developed extensively in the 1960s and 1970s, IDNGOs and NGOs were excluded from Japanese ODA policies until the late 1980s. The paper looks at changes in Japanese state policies vis-à-vis IDNGOs in 1989 and the early 1990s and shows how such changes in turn helped stimulate the creation of new citizen-organized international groups in Japan. To explain this shift in state policy, the paper turns to sociological institutional theories and argues that international norms promoted by international organizations and international actors have played an important role in expanding opportunities for IDNGOs in Japan.
  • Political Geography: Japan, Europe, North America
  • Author: Raimo Väyrynen
  • Publication Date: 02-2000
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame
  • Abstract: To the surprise of most observers, the European Union is moving quickly toward the establishment of its own crisis management capability. In its June 1999 meeting in Cologne the European Council concluded that the Union must have "the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military force, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO." The Council pledged to develop an effective EU-led military crisis management capacity in which all EU members, both NATO and non-allied countries, would participate on an equal footing. The new force will perform the so-called Petersberg tasks: humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping, and the use of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
  • Topic: Security, NATO, International Organization
  • Political Geography: Europe
  • Author: Peter Kramper
  • Publication Date: 10-2000
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Abstract: The “Golden Age” of post-war European economic growth has witnessed extraordinary changes not only in the economic, but also in the social and cultural outlook of Western European societies. Eric Hobsbawm's statement that “[h]istorians of the twentieth century in the third millennium will probably see the century's major impact on history as the one made by and in this astonishing period” is perhaps a little bit too enthusiastic; but it shows that the “Great Boom” has come to be regarded as a key period on the road to the present-day Western world. It has transformed the countries of the West and has at the same time made them more similar to each other. No matter what European societies were in 1950 by 1973, they were all, in Galbraith's famous.
  • Topic: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation
  • Political Geography: Britain, Europe
  • Author: Caspar Fithin
  • Publication Date: 11-2000
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Oxford Analytica
  • Abstract: Congressional criticism of 'Plan Colombia's' military component, and the advent of a new administration in Washington, are likely to lead to a strategic review of US policy. The outcome may be a policy that is less military focused, more regionally oriented, and based on closer cooperation with other aid donors. It has become increasingly clear that Plan Colombia can only be implemented if the EU and its member states are prepared to increase their financial contribution. This will give the Europeans considerable leverage, and they are likely to use it to insist on a less militarised approach. However, even with a change in policy emphasis, the prospects of success will remain poor.
  • Topic: Government, Politics
  • Political Geography: United States, Europe, Washington, Colombia