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Begin New Search Topic Defense Policy Content Type Working Paper

21. Americans on War Powers, Authorization for Use of Military Force and Arms Sales: A National Survey of Registered Voters

Author:
Steven Kull
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
The question of when the United States should use military force is a profound question. There has been a long-running debate about the role of Congress and the President when it comes to making this decisions. The constitution gives Congress the power to fund the military and declare war, and declares the President as the Commander in Chief of the military. However, there are ambiguities about which branch of government has the power in a number of specific situations related to the use of force and the transfer of arms to another country. Currently there are a number of pieces of Congressional legislation that seek to give Congress greater power. One proposal seeks to give Congress greater influence over the use of military force outside of the framework of a declaration of war or in response to an attack on the US. Current law, grounded in the War Powers Act of 1973, requires that the President withdraw troops after 60 days unless Congress votes in favor of continuing it. However, since its passage, every President has considered this unconstitutional and many have not abided by it, keeping forces in place without Congressional approval. In order to stop such a military operation, Congress must gather a veto-proof majority, or bring the President to court. Neither has ever happened. A proposal that has been put forth in Congress is to ‘flip the script’ on this, and automatically cut off funding to such military operations after 60 days, unless Congress actively votes in favor of continuing the operation. (Based on H.R. 2108, H.R. 5410 and S. 2391) Another proposal deals with the termination of a Congressional authorization to use military force (AUMF). Shortly after the September 11 attacks Congress authorized the President to use military force against those responsible for the attacks, or who have aided those responsible. Since then all presidents have used this AUMF to justify various uses of force that some Members of Congress feel go beyond its original purpose. Currently there is a proposal to terminate this AUMF which requires an act of Congress. (Based on H.R. 255 and S. 2391) The last proposal seeks to give Congress greater authority over arms sales. Currently, all arms sales must be approved by the President, and Congress can only halt an arms sale with a majority vote, or more realistically a veto-proof majority. Members of Congress believe that it should be easier for Congress to halt an arms sale. They have introduced a proposal that would also ‘flip the script’ in this case by requiring that any arms sale over $14 million only proceed if Congress votes in favor. (Based on H.R. 5410 and S. 2391) To bring the American people a voice at the table of the current debate on these various pieces of legislation, the Program for Public Consultation (PPC) has conducted an in-depth on-line survey of 2,702 registered voters with a probability-based sample provided by Nielsen Scarborough.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Public Opinion, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

22. What the First Week of Fighting in Ukraine Tells Us About a Potential Insurgency

Author:
Alec Worsnop
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
While the Russian advance in Ukraine has been slower than expected, its overwhelming conventional superiority gives it the upper hand. Despite the valiant resistance of many Ukrainians, Russia will probably conquer all or a portion of the country. However, the first week of the conflict has provided some useful information about the prospects for an insurgent campaign in the wake of a Russian occupation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

23. The New Wave of Defensive Trade Policy Measures in the European Union: Design, Structure, and Trade Effects

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, Vanika Sharma, and Renata Zilli
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This study undertakes a comprehensive review of proposed and adopted defensive trade policy instruments in the EU, with the purpose of better understanding their design, functioning, and implications. The study covers eight policy instruments at different stages of development. These are: Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), International Procurement Instrument (IPI), Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), Foreign Subsidy Instrument (FSI), Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence (DD), Level Playing Field Provisions in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (LPF), Enforcement Regulation (ER), and the Deforestation Initiative (DI). It is understandable that the EU seeks both redressive and retaliatory measures in its trade policy. However, these measures would have the total effect of Europe producing more for itself and being less dependent on imports. This is a significant policy shift, because in their totality the defensive trade policies make the EU more inward-looking. This can lead to major negative consequences. An extensive distortion of trade and markets would reduce the gains from trade and prompt a reallocation of European resources. Notably, the EU is a larger supplier of goods and services than it is a buyer, and an inward-looking policy that leads to retaliation from EU’s trading partners can harm its exports and trade surplus. There are also potential strategic consequences that could follow, and their importance has increased considerable as a result of the Russian war against Ukraine. Under these measures, the EU could introduce new trade frictions with friends and allies, and with countries that the EU seeks closer cooperation with to provide for a safer geopolitical environment. For each of these defensive measures, the study takes an extensive look at the objectives of the instruments, their legality, proportionality, and subsidiarity, the working of the instruments and the division of labour between institutions, as well as their enforceability in conjunction with existing multilateral and bilateral rules affecting the EU. It also attempts to capture the impact and potential for retaliation for the EU and its partners as a result of the implementation of the instruments. The study highlights the areas where the instruments lack clarity, particularly in the implementation of the instrument, the division of labour between the EU and EU member states, and the compliance of the instruments with WTO rules and bilateral FTA provisions. The instruments share some general characteristics. Many of the instruments have been created as retaliatory measures against coercion and unfair trade practices by partner countries. Very often, the partner countries most affected by the instruments are also the same. The United States, China, Russia, the UK, and Turkey are likely to be on the receiving end of the instruments due to the significant volumes of trade and economic interdependence with the EU, but also because they either do not follow the same trade rules as the EU, or the EU wants to maintain with them the current level of competitiveness. Most instruments also use restrictions to the EU market as the main policy lever. The objective is not just about creating an equal playing field but also ensuring that the rest of the world follows EU rules. Particularly, the EU aims at regulating non-EU companies directly and unilaterally through EU policies, which increases the risk of retaliation against the EU. At the same time, there are also important areas of departure in the specifics of each instrument, as illustrated by the varying objectives, measures, compatibility with international obligation, affected sectors, and whether the measures apply automatically or at the discretion of the EU.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Political Economy, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe

24. Policy Paper: Considerations of condemnation and balance of Palestine’s position on the war in Ukraine

Author:
Palthink
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In classic wars, we waited for the military result, and then we formed a political response. In new wars, there is not a final resolution; there is only the stronger party imposing its conditions. Additionally, there is also geographical control, regime projection, or behavior modification goals. Russia is seeking to maintain its national security and enhance its regional and international position. It has a deep fear that NATO will expand, bringing weapons to its border with Ukraine. Now that the first shock of the war has receded, the world realizes that the war will not exceed Ukraine’s borders. Russia has given indications that it will limit itself to the minimum that preserves its national security by preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. Global concern about the consequences of war is high. People are wondering if it will continue or stop. Additionally, sanctions have been announced. In this context, developing and poor countries are affected by conflict because they depend on foreign aid. Their positions on the war will determine where they are positioned, and how the political, economic and security consequences will affect them. Trying to show a neutral position would not endear them to the great powers. On the face of it, it may seem to be a war fought on Ukrainian lands only, but it is a world war of influence. The survival of developing nations depends on the strength of the international community and the extent to which it supports these nations in the light of political realism, not because of their strength and resources. Many places cannot survive without traditional international support.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Palestine

25. The Implications of the Ukraine War for Israel

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
For Israel, this is evidence that its self-reliance doctrine must be nourished with no illusions about foreign support in times of crisis. Moreover, Turkey probably sees NATO more positively since it borders Russia, pushing Ankara toward the West.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel

26. Vienna: A return to Ben-Gurion’s WW2 Dual Strategy?

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
It is time to revive the spirit of Ben-Gurion’s famous dictum from the days of WWII regarding the stance toward the British: “We will fight the war as if there were no White Paper, and we will fight the White Paper as if there were no war.” This makes sense concerning Israel’s dilemma towards the US in the context of the renewal of the JCPOA.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Israel

27. Ukraine could have Repercussions for Syrian Regime, Israel

Author:
Marta Furlan
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The movement of Syrian fighters to Ukraine will significantly impact Syria’s internal dynamics, and Israel needs to monitor the situation closely.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel

28. Japan and the War in Ukraine

Author:
Eyal Ben-Ari
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Two weeks after the war began, Japan announced that its new National Security Strategy scheduled to be published this year would recategorize Russia from “partner” to “security challenge,” thus placing it alongside China and North Korea.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Europe, and Asia

29. Israel Must Adjust its Ukraine Policy

Author:
Daniel Rakov
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The difficulties of the Russian military on the battlefield increase the possibility that in the coming weeks, Moscow will expand the fighting as part of preparations for a long-term military campaign.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel

30. A New Global Order? Israel’s Relations with China and Russia in Light of the War in Ukraine

Author:
Tuvia Gering and Daniel Rakov
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Despite their mutual support throughout the first hundred days of the war, Russia and China continue to have competing interests. Whereas Israel needs to be more responsive to Washington’s concerns about its two global competitors, it must also be mindful of populist calls to destabilize relations with Moscow and Beijing.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel