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2. Present Danger: Nuclear Power Plants in War
- Author:
- Henry Sokolski
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- After Russia’s unprecedented seizure of Ukraine’s nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhya, the United States needs to adjust its military planning and policies to cope with hostile military forces’ targeting, seizure, and garrisoning of armed forces at large operating nuclear plants and clarify its policies regarding possible US targeting of such plants. This article is the first to analyze these concerns. It compares Russia’s assaults with previous strikes against research reactors and nonoperating nuclear plants in the Middle East and clarifies what new military measures and policies will be needed to cope with military operations against large, operating nuclear plants. US Army and Pentagon officials, as well as military and civilian staff, will discover ways to mitigate and reduce future military harm to civilians in war zones and understand the operational implications of military assaults on and seizures of civilian nuclear facilities.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
3. Expanding the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology and Climate Change Adaptation: Opportunities and Challenges
- Author:
- Julius Caesar Trajano
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
- Abstract:
- While ongoing debates on the critical role of nuclear power plants in achieving the goals established in the 2015 Paris Agreement remain unsettled, the peaceful applications of nuclear technology in climate change adaptation have been expanding in recent years. The peaceful uses of nuclear technology cannot be excluded from innovative approaches to addressing the world’s most pressing and complex challenge─ climate change. This NTS Insight examines how nuclear technology can be deployed to strengthen climate adaptation measures and presents case studies from several Southeast Asian countries that have nuclear research and scientific programmes. Nuclear technology is being utilised in adopting climate-smart agriculture, modernising water management, enhancing greenhouse gas emissions analysis, and combatting plastic pollution. This Insight offers agendas for action by Southeast Asian countries to address key challenges to expanding the role of nuclear technology in addressing climate change.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Science and Technology, Nuclear Power, and Green Transition
- Political Geography:
- Asia
4. Forging a Path Forward on US Nuclear Waste Management: Options for Policy Makers
- Author:
- Matt Bowen
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- Nuclear power is considered in many countries a critical facet to maintaining reliable access to electricity during a global transition to low-carbon energy sources. One challenge to its potential in the United States, however, is the current standstill regarding a disposal pathway for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from commercial reactors. This impasse has a negative bearing on nuclear energy’s ability to supply more zero-carbon electricity and may cost US taxpayers tens of billions of dollars in government liability for failing to meet contractual obligations to take possession of the waste from utilities. Despite the scientific community assessing that commercial SNF and other high-level radioactive waste (HLW), such as from defense activities, can be safely isolated in deep underground repositories, US efforts to license and operate one have flatlined. The original plan for siting at least two repositories for such waste was abandoned first by DOE and then by Congress. Yucca Mountain in Nevada was designated in law as the nation’s sole potential disposal site by Congress in 1987, fomenting the state’s opposition to the project. As a result of that opposition, Congress has not funded the project since 2010. Still, progress has been made over the last few decades in nuclear waste disposal programs in countries such as Finland, Sweden, and Canada. And the United States has seen the successful opening and operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico to dispose of generally less radioactive but long-lived transuranic nuclear waste from defense activities. Such programs offer insights for how the United States can try to resolve the challenges with commercial nuclear waste disposal and potentially alleviate one obstacle to wider adoption of nuclear energy to decarbonize the US economy. This report, part of wider work on nuclear energy at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, explains how the United States reached its current stalemate over nuclear waste disposal. It then examines productive approaches in other countries and a few domestic ones that could guide US policy makers through options for improving the prospects of SNF and HLW disposal going forward
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, Nuclear Power, and Nuclear Waste
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
5. Can Negotiations and Diplomacy Break the US–Iran Impasse?
- Author:
- Anahita Motazed Rad
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- As the Biden and Rouhani administrations’ position to renew diplomatic efforts on the Iranian nuclear file with European support, they face more challenges than their predecessors did in 2015, when the Iranian nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was originally signed. Today, domestic, regional and international confrontations have increased; hardliners and conservatives in Tehran and Washington, on the one hand, and in Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the other, are now more aligned and coordinated against a diplomatic success than they were in 2015.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Power, and Negotiation
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
6. Strategic Report
- Author:
- Zaid Eyadat and Moh'd Khair Eiedat
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)
- Abstract:
- This is not a historical nor chronological report. It is rather “a working paper”. The purpose of this rather brief report is to reflect on three major issues: first, what are the characteristics of the world we live in? How stable and predictable is it? Are those in power know what are they doing? Or is it the blind leading the blind? Is our sense of uncertainty and thus unpredictability a product of mental crisis related to one in a lifetime pandemic experience? or is it more structural with long historical span? The second question is how dangerous and out of control is the Middle east region? Or is it? The Abraham Accords promise a new dawn for the region? Paradise is just around the corner or the calm preceding the storm? The third question, where does Jordan fit in these wider circles of activities both global and regional? Deliberately we left out of the report any serious considerations of the economic aspect challenge facing Jordan which is both self-evident and widely recognized. Moreover, the emphasis is on the geostrategic aspects of security related to the global level, the regional level and that of Jordan. Let us first look at the world.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Jordan
7. Turkey's Nuclear Future
- Author:
- Assa Ophir
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
- Abstract:
- In our latest issue of Turkeyscope Dr. Assa Ophir discusses the implications of Turkish efforts to potentially become a state with an independent nuclear program.
- Topic:
- NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Turkey and Middle East
8. Reconsidering US Nuclear Cooperation Agreements
- Author:
- Richard Nephew
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- Despite having played a central role in the creation of the international nuclear commercial sector, today the United States is increasingly on the outside looking in when it comes to civil nuclear projects. The United States now accounts for a relatively small number of new reactor builds, both at home and abroad. There are a few rays of sunshine for the US nuclear industry, especially when it comes to new technology. In fact, many of the new reactor builds that are underway do involve US technology and intellectual property, even if others are performing the construction. To take advantage of a similar dynamic, US innovators are looking to both new and forgotten designs as a way of managing the challenges of nuclear fuel manufacture, safety, waste management, security cost, and proliferation. But these new technologies face an uncertain future (and so consequently does the US role), even notwithstanding the advantages nuclear energy would bring to managing climate change and the edge the United States may have in their development. Various factors account for the challenges facing the US nuclear industry, including the complex political, economic, scientific, and popular environment around nuclear technology and civil nuclear energy. Of the various problems potentially plaguing US nuclear energy policy, one remains both difficult to address and controversial: US requirements for nuclear cooperation, and in particular, the demand from many in Congress and the nonproliferation community that the United States insist on binding commitments from its cooperating partners to forswear developing enrichment and reprocessing technology. While this policy is not responsible for the decline of the US nuclear industry, it adds additional hindrance to US nuclear commerce abroad and may even be to the long-term detriment of US nonproliferation policy interests. If so, then the questions that arise are whether this is in the US interest and, if not, how the US ought to respond. If the government believes that having a role in international nuclear commerce is advisable on both economic and strategic grounds, then it needs to decide whether to commit resources to incentivize foreign partners to overlook the problems its nonproliferation policies may cause these partners or seek modifications to those policies. From a pure nonproliferation perspective, it would be preferable for the United States to invest in its nuclear industry to ensure it is competitive globally. But, this does not seem to be a likely course of action for the United States given the myriad political, legal, and budgetary complexities that would be involved. Consequently, this paper recommends several changes to how US nuclear cooperation agreements are negotiated as well as enhancements to overall US nuclear nonproliferation policies. In aggregate, they seek to rebalance and reformulate some aspects of US nuclear nonproliferation policy to make it more effective and efficient, particularly regarding engagement in civil nuclear commerce, but without compromising the core nonproliferation interests the current US diplomatic approach seeks to advance. With respect to nuclear cooperation agreements, the paper recommends the following: Relaxing the current US preference for a legally binding commitment to forswear all enrichment and reprocessing capabilities indefinitely for these agreements, while continuing traditional US policy to discourage these technologies development through various means. Relying on enhanced inspector access and improved verification tools, technology, and practices to provide confidence on the nondiversion of civil nuclear cooperation rather than assurances regarding enrichment and reprocessing that, in any event, are potentially revocable. Adopting a favorable view of “black box” transfers of nuclear power reactors and building this into policy as new, advanced reactor concepts are being explored, developed, and marketed. Creating a new sanctions regime to cover countries that pursue enrichment and reprocessing capabilities after concluding a 123 agreement. With respect to nuclear nonproliferation policy more generally, the paper recommends the following: Developing an annual nonproliferation indicators publication to identify trends in proliferation, including the kinds of goods that proliferators are potentially seeking. This document would also include a list of countries where there are presently enhanced concerns regarding national nuclear programs or concerns about transshipment and export control risk. Its objective would not be to serve as a proxy for future sanctions designations decisions but rather to give a broad perspective of the challenges that exist with particular jurisdictions even—and perhaps especially—if there is no need or justification for sanctions at present. Developing a warning system for sought-after goods. The United States should work with industry to develop a restricted database that identifies sensitive goods that are being sought. This database would be accessible to corporate compliance officers, who would be vetted for access to the information. Within it, the database could also include additional information about the sorts of tactics being employed by proliferators. Making greater use of end use verification as a means of facilitating monitoring of the nonproliferation commitments of countries, particularly regarding dual use technology. This could also be built out to include greater collaboration with partner countries and companies. Amending Executive Order 13382, which provides for sanctions against proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, to add a prong of “willful negligence.”
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, International Cooperation, United Nations, Infrastructure, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- United States
9. Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much?
- Author:
- George Perkovich
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- For decades, policy debates in nuclear-armed states and alliances have centered on the question, “How much is enough?” What size and type of arsenal, and what doctrine, are enough to credibly deter given adversaries? This paper argues that the more urgent question today is, “How much is too much?” What size and type of arsenal, and what doctrine, are too likely to produce humanitarian and environmental catastrophe that would be strategically and legally indefensible? Two international initiatives could help answer this question. One would involve nuclear-armed states, perhaps with others, commissioning suitable scientific experts to conduct new studies on the probable climatic and environmental consequences of nuclear war. Such studies would benefit from recent advances in modeling, data, and computing power. They should explore what changes in numbers, yields, and targets of nuclear weapons would significantly reduce the probability of nuclear winter. If some nuclear arsenals and operational plans are especially likely to threaten the global environment and food supply, nuclear-armed states as well as non-nuclear-weapon states would benefit from actions to physically reduce such risks. The paper suggests possible modalities for international debate on these issues. The second initiative would query all nuclear-armed states whether they plan to adhere to international humanitarian law in deciding if and when to detonate nuclear weapons, and if so, how their arsenals and operational plans affirm their intentions (or not). The United Kingdom and the United States have committed, in the words of the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, to “adhere to the law of armed conflict” in any “initiation and conduct of nuclear operations.” But other nuclear-armed states have been more reticent, and the practical meaning of such declarations needs to be clarified through international discussion. The two proposed initiatives would help states and civil society experts to better reconcile the (perceived) need for nuclear deterrence with the strategic, legal, and physical imperatives of reducing the probability that a war escalates to catastrophic proportions. The concern is not only for the well-being of belligerent populations, but also for those in nations not involved in the posited conflict. Traditional security studies and the policies of some nuclear-armed states have ignored these imperatives. Accountable deterrents—in terms of international law and human survival—would be those that met the security and moral needs of all nations, not just one or two. These purposes may be too modest for states and activists that prefer the immediate prohibition and abolition of nuclear weapons. Conversely, advocates of escalation dominance in the United States and Russia—and perhaps in Pakistan and India—will find the force reductions and doctrinal changes implied by them too demanding. Yet, the positions of both of these polarized groups are unrealistic and/or unacceptable to a plurality of attentive states and experts. To blunt efforts to stifle further analysis and debate of these issues, the appendix of this paper heuristically rebuts leading arguments against accountable deterrents. Middle powers and civil society have successfully put new issues on the global agenda and created political pressure on major powers to change policies. Yet, cooperation from at least one major nuclear power is necessary to achieve the changes in nuclear deterrent postures and policies explored here. In today’s circumstances, China may be the pivotal player. The conclusion suggests ways in which China could extend the traditional restraint in its nuclear force posture and doctrine into a new approach to nuclear arms control and disarmament with the United States and Russia that could win the support of middle powers and international civil society. If the looming breakdown in the global nuclear order is to be averted, and the dangers of nuclear war to be lessened, new ideas and political coalitions need to gain ascendance. The initiatives proposed here intended to stimulate the sort of analysis and debate from which such ideas and coalitions can emerge.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Environment, Nuclear Power, Weapons, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Russia, China, India, Global Focus, and United States of America
10. The NPT turns 50: Will it get to 60?
- Author:
- Henry Sokolski
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- In the next decade, it is all too likely that the past success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons among the world’s nations will be reversed. Three trends make more proliferation likely. First is the decay of nuclear taboos. Second, and arguably worse, is renewed vertical proliferation—the increase in size and sophistication of nuclear arsenals by states that already have them. Third, the technical information to fuel nuclear breakouts and ramp-ups is more available now than in the past. These trends toward increased proliferation are not yet facts. The author describes three steps the international community could take to save the NPT: making further withdrawals from the NPT unattractive; clamping down on the uneconomical stockpiling and civilian use of nuclear weapons materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium); and giving real meaning to efforts to limit the threats that existing nuclear weapons pose.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, North Korea, Global Focus, and United States of America
11. An Effect-Centric Approach to Assessing the Risks of Cyber Attacks Against the Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems at Nuclear Power Plants
- Author:
- Nancy Gallagher, Charles Harry, and Jor-Shan Choi
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
- Abstract:
- Cyberattacks against the digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs) are of grave security concern. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires all NPPs to protect critical digital assets that support safety, security, and emergency preparedness functions against cyberattacks.1 Other standards bodies like the International Society of Automation (ISA) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) have also developed standards that address cybersecurity for industrial control systems (ICS) including DI&C.2 Due to concerns for security, relevant stakeholders such as regulators, plant operators, information technology (IT) and operation technology (OT) staff, and equipment suppliers are sometimes reluctant to reveal in technical detail about vulnerabilities posed by DI&C systems. Yet, because some types of cyberattacks against an NPP may cause core damage or significant release of radioactivity, harming the plant, the public and the industry, the safety implications of potential cyberattacks should be evaluated. This divide between security and safety is a challenge for stakeholders focused in cyber security for NPPs. To bridge this security and safety divide, this study proposes and demonstrates a methodology for assessing and addressing the safety consequences of cyber events that disrupt one or more parts of the DI&C systems at NPPs. The methodology builds on the “effect-centric” cyber risk assessment framework developed by the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). It is used to analyze two historical cyberattacks and one hypothetical attack scenario. As the focus is on plant safety, these assessment, evaluation, and analysis can be candidly and openly discussed with the goal of finding the best defense to thwart the specific cyberattack.
- Topic:
- Security, Governance, Nuclear Power, Cybersecurity, and Regulation
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
12. Increasing Nuclear Threats through Strategic Missile Defense
- Author:
- Greg Thielmann
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
- Abstract:
- Growing concerns about third-country nuclear threats led the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty’s constraints on the size and scope of ballistic missile defense arsenals in 2002. Inaccurate and alarmist projections of “rogue state” ICBM threats were critical in winning support for the decision to withdraw from the treaty and to sustain the multi-billion dollar annual price tag for developing, deploying, and expanding strategic missile defenses. But 18 years after Washington abandoned the treaty, North Korea is the only rogue state that could pose a near-term nuclear threat against the American homeland—and U.S. missile defense interceptors and radars have not even delivered high confidence of being able to protect against this threat. Meanwhile, the absence of limits on U.S. strategic missile defenses and prudent, worst-case concerns in Moscow and Beijing about their future expansion are fueling resistance to additional nuclear arms reductions and stability measures. The end result is that the exponential threats posed by Russia and China are getting worse and the chances of a disastrous nuclear arms race are increasing. This analysis argues that the nuclear threat confronting the United States is multilateral, three-dimensional, and interrelated. Unless the United States acknowledges the role of missile defenses in this complicated reality, it will not be able to realize the full benefits that arms control offers.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Missile Defense
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America
13. Coming out and breaking out: The US, Iran and Europe go nuclear
- Author:
- Erwin van Veen
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- On the eve of the US elections, the nuclear deal (JCPOA) stands on the edge of the precipice. The US strategy of ‘maximum pressure’ has not (yet) achieved its implicit objective of 'regime change' but tanked Iran’s economy, caused its government to dig in and increased regional instability. The geopolitical consequences of US sanctions, EU prevarication and Iran’s deep presence throughout the Middle East have been equally profound. At the global level, they include nudging Iran towards China/Russia, the US alienating its European ‘partners’ and encouraging them to develop greater strategic autonomy. At the regional level, US sanctions risk creating an alternative economic regional order, ensuring Yemen remains a protracted war and making a regional security initiative more necessary, but less likely. It is not yet too late to turn the tide. The focus should now be on reducing regional tensions and especially the stress that sanctions have put on Iran’s population and government. Radical action looks more inviting when one stands against the wall, but the Middle East does not need more conflict than it already has. To do so, the EU should first support Iran with a large-scale Covid-19 humanitarian economy recovery package. As such measures are already sanctions-exempt, they will create few new tensions. An economic initiative should follow that grants preferential access to the EU’s internal market for industrial and agricultural goods from the entire Middle East (for Iran via an upgraded INSTEX). Such interventions will not resolve existing security dilemmas but can show there is an alternative to confrontation.
- Topic:
- Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, Elections, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Yemen, and United States of America
14. Why the United States Should Remain Engaged on Nuclear Power: Climate Change and Air Pollution
- Author:
- Matt Bowen
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- Nuclear energy has shown much promise and faced considerable challenges since its origins in the mid-20th century. While the United States drove the early charge for safe nuclear power around the globe, its leadership has waned in recent decades. US reactors now under construction—following no orders for such plants in the United States for several decades—have gone well over planned budgets and schedules. And while the United States was once the leading international supplier of reactors, other countries have since stepped forward to fill that role. Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, as part of its wider work on nuclear energy, is examining the impact of potential American disengagement from nuclear power’s development and where opportunities exist to step back in and shape its future. The program also will assess the US nuclear waste management program and efforts to collaborate with other countries on advanced reactor development, as well as options for improvement on both fronts. This effort will begin with a two-part commentary on some of the benefits the United States might derive from increasing its engagement on nuclear power. The first in the series, this piece, explores the important role nuclear energy can play in lowering greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the worst potential outcomes of climate change. The second piece will examine the geopolitical and national security implications of the United States and its traditional allies effectively ceding the international nuclear energy marketplace to the Chinese and Russians. The nuclear program’s ultimate goal is to inform readers—policy makers, industry leaders, academics, and others—with objective, research-based analysis. It will strive in the months and years ahead to contribute constructively to a necessary dialogue on the future of nuclear power.
- Topic:
- Environment, Nuclear Power, Pollution, Air Pollution, and Nuclear Energy
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
15. Why the United States Should Remain Engaged on Nuclear Power: Geopolitical and National Security Considerations
- Author:
- Matt Bowen
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- Nuclear energy has shown much promise and faced considerable challenges since its origins in the mid-20th century. While the United States drove the early charge for safe nuclear power around the globe, its leadership has waned in recent decades. US reactors now under construction—following no orders for such plants in the United States for several decades—have gone well over planned budgets and schedules. And while the United States was once the leading international supplier of reactors, other countries have since stepped forward to fill that role. Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, as part of its wider work on nuclear energy, is examining the impact of potential American disengagement from nuclear power’s development and where opportunities exist to step back in and shape its future. The program also will assess the US nuclear waste management program and efforts to collaborate with other countries on advanced reactor development as well as options for improvement on both fronts. This effort includes a two-part commentary on some of the benefits the United States might derive from increasing its engagement on nuclear power. The first in the series explored the important role nuclear energy can play in lowering air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the worst potential outcomes of climate change. The second part of the series, this piece, examines the geopolitical and national security implications of the United States and its traditional allies effectively ceding the international nuclear energy marketplace to the Chinese and Russians. The nuclear program’s ultimate goal is to inform readers—policy makers, industry leaders, academics, and others—with objective, research-based analysis. It will strive in the months and years ahead to contribute constructively to a necessary dialogue on the future of nuclear power.
- Topic:
- Security, Energy Policy, National Security, and Nuclear Power
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
16. China’s evolving nuclear export control regime
- Author:
- Xu Chunyang
- Publication Date:
- 08-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
- Abstract:
- The Chinese nuclear industry is actively pursuing international trade under China’s new “Go Global” policy. This development could strain Chinese nuclear export control systems in the coming decades. This paper investigates the evolution of the Chinese nuclear export control regime from the late 1970s to the present, describes the current state of the Chinese export control system, and investigates recent Chinese efforts to build a more robust system. It finds that although the Chinese strategic export control systems have grown tremendously since they first took shape and the capacity of the government to implement these controls has grown as well, significant improvements in both the legal basis for the controls and the capacity of institutions involved are still needed, including in how current laws define exports, in how government bodies are equipped to investigate violations, and in how violations are prosecuted. The Ministry of the Commerce is preparing a new “Export Control Law” that is expected to come into effect soon and to provide the basis for more robust controls that address many of the deficiencies identified above. The Chinese government’s growing commitment to undertaking its international obligations and safeguarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy provides reason for optimism, but in the near term, the effectiveness of these corrective efforts will depend on the completion, implementation, and enforcement of the new law.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, and Nuclear Power
- Political Geography:
- China, Beijing, and Asia
17. Do as I Say, and as I Do: Chinese Leadership in Nuclear Security
- Author:
- Sara Z. Kutchesfahani
- Publication Date:
- 09-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
- Abstract:
- This paper analyzes China’s words and actions regarding the Nuclear Security Summits to better understand what Chinese leadership on nuclear security could look like in the future. It finds that China accomplished the many things it said it would do during the summit process. The paper also explores how China’s policy and actions in other nuclear arenas could be paired with Chinese nuclear security policy to form a coherent agenda for nuclear risk reduction writ large. Consequently, the paper addresses how China doing as it says and does – per nuclear security – may be used as a way in which to inform its future nuclear security roles and responsibilities. In particular, it assesses China’s opportunities to assume a leadership role within this crucial international security issue area, especially at a time where U.S. leadership has waned.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Nuclear Power
- Political Geography:
- United States, China, Beijing, and Asia
18. Future Scenarios: What To Expect From a Nuclear North Korea
- Author:
- Daniel R. Russel
- Publication Date:
- 04-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- After decades of broken promises and failed diplomatic efforts, North Korea has become a nuclear power. Kim Jong Un’s charm offensive over the past year, as seen in summit meetings with U.S. President Donald Trump and other leaders, has enabled him to shed his pariah status without shedding his nuclear weapons. While Kim has frozen testing, he continues to expand the country’s nuclear arsenal, defy and evade Security Council resolutions, and is now getting support from China in his call for sanctions relief. In the wake of the failed February 2019 Hanoi Summit, North Korea is warning of a return to testing by year’s end. But even if Kim were to reverse course and agree to freeze his entire nuclear and missile program, North Korea’s capacity to threaten the U.S. and its allies with a formidable arsenal would be undiminished. What’s worse, Kim seems to be turning to a powerful new weapon of mass destruction to gain leverage. Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) Vice President for International Security and Diplomacy Daniel Russel asserts in this ASPI issue paper that North Korea’s next weapon of choice is likely to be cyber: a high-impact, low-cost, and low-risk digital-age weapon that North Korea already can and does use to steal money, hack secrets, and terrorize nations. In the 5G era, developed nations such as the United States are particularly vulnerable. North Korean cyber-attacks have already succeeded in crippling critical overseas infrastructure and stealing hundreds of millions of dollars, reducing the efficacy of international sanctions. Future Scenarios: What to Expect from a Nuclear North Korea details the consequences of North Korea’s slow but steady trajectory toward acceptance as a nuclear power. The report highlights the urgency of focusing U.S. national security efforts against the threat from North Korea’s rapidly growing cyber warfare capability. Russel writes that the combined threat from North Korea’s nuclear and cyber programs can only be reduced through “coercive containment” — a multi-pronged strategy of diplomacy, defense, deterrence, and denial that will require substantial cooperation among key international players.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Diplomacy, Nuclear Power, Cybersecurity, Donald Trump, and Kim Jong-un
- Political Geography:
- Asia, North Korea, and United States of America
19. The Rising Crisis between the United States and Iran
- Author:
- Amos Yadlin
- Publication Date:
- 05-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- After a year in which Iran opted for "strategic patience," in the hope that European nations would compensate for the United States sanctions, it now seeks to present a price tag for the US measures against it, and has thus embarked on a response comprising action in three realms: nuclear, military, and oil exports from the Gulf. In the current circumstances, Iran and the United States are demanding conditions that would make a resumption of negotiations difficult, although both sides apparently understand that dialogue may ultimately be the less dangerous option for them. The latest developments embody the potential for escalation and miscalculation that is liable to affect Israel's security, and therefore the security cabinet should convene to craft an appropriate policy for the near, medium, and long terms.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Oil, Military Strategy, and Nuclear Power
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iran, Middle East, and North America
20. Does the New Saudi Reactor Justify Proliferation Fears?
- Author:
- Basel Ammane
- Publication Date:
- 05-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Council on International Policy (CIP)
- Abstract:
- In early April 2019, Saudi Arabia’s progress in constructing its first nuclear reactor with the assistance of Argentine firm INVAP was the subject of considerable media attention that speculated on the dangers of this development. This was made all the more alarming given the reported nuclear technological assistance to the kingdom that the American administration approved. In fact, a cursory review of events surrounding this development reveals that there are at least two indicators that can be seen as cause for concern. First, Saudi leadership rhetoric pertaining to proliferation has not been reassuring, as crown prince Mohammed bin Salman signaled his country’s resolve to pursue the path of nuclear armament in the event that Iran, its regional rival, moves in that direction too. Second, the construction of this reactor is seen as the first step toward acquiring the knowledge and experience necessary for developing a sizeable nuclear power infrastructure that will supply the kingdom’s needs in the future. The kingdom has plans to build two large nuclear reactors to diversify its energy sources and meet its electricity needs, as well as a number of small reactors for desalination purposes. As these plans begin to materialize, the importance of Saudi compliance under a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) will become indispensable and equivocation on the matter unacceptable. Having said this, speculation that is largely focused on a handful of events reported by the media is not good at providing a clear picture. Grounding analysis in an understanding of regional politics and global nonproliferation dynamics is likely to capture a clearer picture of the situation. There are at least two factors should be grounds for concern about potential Saudi nuclear proliferation.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Infrastructure, and Nuclear Power
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Saudi Arabia