Search

Begin New Search Topic Geopolitics Content Type Working Paper Publication Year within 3 Years Publication Year within 25 Years

1. A battle against time – and against Putin’s Russia

Author:
Erwan Fouéré
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
With Putin’s war against Ukraine about to enter its third year, the EU’s enlargement policy remains at the top of its foreign policy priorities, with the focus being on both Ukraine and Moldova. This is following the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with both countries. But where does this leave the countries of the Western Balkans and their very long journey towards the EU which began over 20 years ago? Will these countries’ hopes for much needed political momentum in their accession prospects be fulfilled during 2024, despite the repeated delays and the EU’s failure to respect its commitments to the region over the past few years? With elections taking place across Europe offering fertile ground for Russia to deploy its arsenal of disinformation tactics, time is not on the EU’s side. To counter Russian attempts to influence developments in the region, as well as to reverse the dangerous trend of backsliding in democratic and rule of law reforms, the EU will need to adopt a more robust, consistent and determined approach towards the Western Balkans. Without any further delay, it needs to set out a much needed geopolitical and security direction for its enlargement policies in the Western Balkans.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Rule of Law, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Balkans

2. Taiwan Strait Crises: Island Seizure Contingencies

Author:
Andrew Chubb
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Conflict across the Taiwan Strait could disrupt East Asia’s extensive trade links, sever global production chains, generate serious shocks to regional economies, upend Asia’s security architecture, and, potentially, escalate into a catastrophic superpower war. Many regional states — including U.S. allies — are beginning to seriously consider how they would respond to a potential use of force by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). But analytic attention has focused overwhelmingly on the worst-case scenario of a PRC invasion, largely ignoring more likely contingencies calculated to stay below the threshold of lethal force. It is in this “gray zone” that the PRC has made strategic advances in the East and South China Seas in recent years. This paper argues that, compared with an invasion or blockade of Taiwan’s main island, an operation to capture one or more offshore islands currently controlled by the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) would offer Beijing considerable advantages. In an immediate tactical sense, it would offer Beijing greater flexibility and escalation control, lower risk of civilian casualties, and less likelihood of sparking a strong Taiwanese response or U.S. intervention. Strategically, such an operation could open up an array of options for further probes, faits accomplis, information gathering, and coercive pressure on ROC forces—and, in the case of the Penghu (Pescadores) Islands, substantial opportunities for enhanced surveillance, reconnaissance, and logistical support for a future invasion of the main island. Domestically, in contrast with a bloody and potentially catastrophic all-out invasion or a blockade that would risk conflict with the United States, outlying island seizure could offer Beijing a low-risk yet highly symbolic rallying point in a period of likely economic struggles and rising social dissatisfaction. Policymakers and strategists on all sides of politics in Taiwan, the United States and elsewhere need to carefully consider how they would respond to such contingencies, in order to enable an effective international response.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

3. Understanding Alignment Decisions in Southeast Asia: A Review of U.S.-China Competition in the Philippines

Author:
William Piekos
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The United States and China are engaged in an ongoing struggle for the alignment commitments of Southeast Asian governments, employing a variety of measures to entice, cajole, and threaten states to alter their policy behavior. Caught between this competition, countries in Southeast Asia weigh their alignment options in search of the strategy viewed by the ruling regime as most likely to ameliorate risk and increase its prospects for survival. While nonalignment through hedging is a sought-after option, most often smaller states align with the major power that offers inducements (over coercion), as the material and diplomatic benefits bolster regimes’ claim to performance-based legitimacy and its domestic stability and security. A review of the Philippines’ geopolitical positioning during the Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016) and Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022) administrations reveals that inducements and coercion have played a significant role in the country’s alignment decisions. During the Aquino administration, coercive measures taken by China in the South China Sea and continued security and diplomatic inducements from the United States underscore the respective approaches of Beijing and Washington. The candidacy and election of Duterte, however, switched this dynamic, and the new president courted and received promises of Chinese economic assistance to support his domestic growth strategy and downplayed U.S. ties in pursuit of a more independent foreign policy. In the end, continued Chinese provocations in the South China Sea and domestic security challenges led Duterte to call upon U.S. assistance once again, and Duterte was unable to initiate a full reconsideration of Manila’s position. Still, his strategic flirtation with China underscores the importance of performance-based legitimacy and the impact of inducements and coercion in shaping the foreign policy choices of smaller states. The findings of this study suggest that Washington’s focus on great power competition and sanctions handicaps U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia and beyond. The Philippines’ leaders focused on securing their domestic political prospects and legitimacy; criticism and coercive measures were largely ineffective for the United States or China in gaining influence over policy decisions. Washington should more often consider the promise and provision of inducements—while remaining sensitive to human rights concerns, governance issues, and liberal norms—to support the needs of Southeast Asian states, incentivize more transparent behavior, and increase the likelihood that these states will support U.S. interests in the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Philippines, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

4. US strategy and force posture for an era of nuclear tripolarity

Author:
Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The term “nuclear tripolarity” describes a world in which China has joined the United States and Russia as a leading nuclear power. As China modernizes its existing nuclear forces and deploys new weapons, it is on track to roughly double its deployed nuclear arsenal in the next few years—from approximately 350 to 700 deliverable warheads. The US Department of Defense projects that China will go further, expanding its arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035.1 At those force levels, China’s arsenal would be comparable to US and Russian deployed nuclear forces, currently capped at 1,550 by the New START Treaty.2 What are the consequences of emerging tripolarity for US nuclear strategy and force posture? If the United States retains its current approach to nuclear force planning, the growth of China’s arsenal (and the ongoing modernization of Russia’s nuclear weapons) will likely compel the United States to significantly increase its own arsenal. The easiest way to do so would be to upload one to two thousand additional warheads from US reserves onto existing delivery systems when the New START treaty expires in 2026. Unfortunately, a major increase in US forces would likely mark just another step in an intensifying arms competition among the three leading nuclear powers, since China and Russia would then feel pressure to respond.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

5. Global trends in countries‘ perceptions of the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Drawing on global media reports, we conduct a sentiment analysis of the image of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the evolution of its image over time. Our main finding is that perceptions of the initiative deteriorated significantly in many geographies from 2017 to 2022. The notable exception is in sub-Saharan Africa where the BRI’s image remains positive, even if slightly less so than in the past. This is notwithstanding increases in debt levels with China, much of which now face potential restructuring. Furthermore, we find significant inter- and intra-regional differences in the average sentiment towards China’s landmark project, as well as a much worse image of the initiative in countries which, until today, are not part of the BRI. Finally, we focus on the European Union, Africa and China’s immediate neighbourhood to better understand the complexities behind the perceived benefits and challenges associated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

6. Hydrodiplomacy and the Food, Water and Energy Nexus: A holistic approach for transboundary cooperation and peace

Author:
Fadi Comair
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
The rapid social and economic development in the world is leading to increased levels of water stress that point to potential water crises. As the most vital and strategic of natural resources, water can serve as an instrument of domination or of cooperation. Given the presence of key geopolitical concerns in the Near East, regional hydro-diplomatic cooperation is necessary to ensure fair sharing of the resource and to avoid additional tensions and conflict. Nine of the seventeen EMME countries are below the absolute water scarcity threshold of 500 m3/year per capita, including all six countries in the Gulf region, Jordan and Palestine. Those countries that share major transboundary basins in the EMME region such as the Nile, Jordan and Tigris-Euphrates basins are subject to multiple challenges which include unilateral water resources management, water scarcity, and environmental degradation leading to food insecurity. Hydrodiplomacy is a tool for applying integrated water resource management at a national and transboundary level in accordance with a cooperative model seeking peace among riparian countries. Multiple UN agencies contribute to bringing riparian countries together with a view to fostering dialogue and the sharing of information on water management and transboundary cooperation.
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Water, Food, Geopolitics, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and Middle East

7. The Greek Defence Sector: Turning the Page?

Author:
Antonis Kamaras
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
From the 1980s to the 2000s, Greece’s defence industry was mismanaged and failed to utilize Greece’s high defence expenditures to become innovative. The impact of Greece’s fiscal crisis and the subsequent expansion of the Turkish threat mean that both economics and geopolitics now favour an invigorated Greek defence sector. The first major weapons procurement programme since the end of Greece’s fiscal crisis has not meaningfully involved the Greek defence sector. Yet the sector’s future prospects have improved, assured by the need for the sector to be financially viable and internationally competitive and by the broader awareness of the defence sector as a building block in national defence. The EU’s growing role in Europe’s collective defence, driven by continent-wide geopolitical developments and industrial imperatives, will also boost the prospects of the Greek defence sector. Mutually reinforcing obstacles still hamper the Greek defence sector’s progress: (a) a polity which privileges distribution over capital investments in its fiscal choices, and (b) an officer corps which lacks the degree of autonomy to co-create novel defence solutions together with the Greek defence sector. Despite these obstacles, the ongoing Turkish threat engenders national insecurity within Greece to such an extent that it can drive the sustainable growth of the Greek defence sector.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Innovation, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Greece

8. The European Union and the war in Ukraine: the liberal power and its limits

Author:
Maxime Lefebvre
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The European Union has been deeply affected by the war in Ukraine. There was talk of a "paradigm shift" in France, of a "Zeitenwende" ("change of era") in Germany, of an "end to naivety". Across Europe, a surge of sympathy and solidarity for Ukraine and its suffering has gripped public opinion, right down to the blue and yellow colours of the EU and Ukrainian flags being ostensibly displayed by Ursula von der Leyen. The European Union has given massive economic aid to Ukraine (€20 billion already paid out, €20 billion planned for 2023) and has taken in 4 million Ukrainian refugees. At the June European Council, it accepted Ukraine's membership application, as well as that of Moldova, and a prospect of accession for Georgia. By adopting sanctions against Russia that were unprecedented since those taken against Serbia at the beginning of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, it has also demonstrated its capacity for "hard power". In the wake of its common defence policy, it delivered arms to Ukraine for the first time through its €3 billion "peace facility". By almost completely depriving itself of Russian fossil fuels, it is accelerating its energy transition. This shows the enormous change that the war in Ukraine represents for the European project, which is undergoing a new existential crisis after the repeated shocks of the last few years (eurozone crisis, migration crisis, Brexit, Covid-19 pandemic), which again seems to confirm Jean Monnet's prophecy that Europe would be built through crises and would be the sum of the solutions brought to these challenges. By defending its values against Russia, the European Union is asserting itself as a "liberal power". But it remains no less fragile beyond its response.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Liberalism, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

9. What Should India Do Before the Next Taiwan Strait Crisis?

Author:
Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In the next two decades, the Taiwan question is likely to assume increasing importance for the Indo-Pacific region. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is becoming more assertive about unifying Taiwan with the mainland, and it is also making progress toward establishing the military capability toward this end. For a rising PRC seeking to establish itself as the dominant global power, it is untenable that a part of its territory remains outside its control. Possible endeavors toward establishing this control could lead to a response by the United States, which would have broader ramifications for the region and the world. For the United States, any endeavors by the PRC to this end would undermine the very core of the idea that the United States is the defender of freedom and democracy across the world, thus undermining its credibility. It might also deal a devastating blow to the United States’ global power. In this context, and given the significance of Taiwan to both countries, it is an issue that can rapidly escalate, making it a matter of concern in the Indo-Pacific. Further, a conflict over Taiwan would dwarf the global economic fallout that began when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Short of conflict, Chinese coercion of Taiwan could disrupt the freedom of navigation and sea lanes of communication through the Taiwan Strait and will have severe consequences for Asian geopolitics and geoeconomics. Given India’s substantial geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in the region and its long history of exchanges with East and Southeast Asia, India should pay constant and careful attention to this issue. Further, a policy to respond to various contingencies must be thought through and put into place. This paper tries to look at the possible policy that India might adopt ahead of a major crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The paper proceeds in three parts. The first part analyzes the geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences of another Taiwan Strait crisis for India. While it is difficult to estimate the actual damage that would be dealt to the Indian economy, it is clear that all segments of the economy would be affected, with the impact possibly substantial enough to set India back several years. A crisis would also impact India’s geopolitical interests and national security, given that China is increasing its assertiveness both along the Line of Actual Control as well as in the Indian Ocean. The second part argues against a commonplace view that India played no role in crisis management during earlier periods of high tension in the Taiwan Strait—the 1954–55 and 1958 Taiwan Strait Crises, also known as the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, respectively. By using archival material in the United States, the United Kingdom, and India, it seeks to dispel the above notion and that Taiwan ceased to be a matter of interest for India after it had recognized PRC’s claim over Taiwan in 1950. Further, it looks at the lessons for policymaking from India’s handling of the crises. The third part of the paper briefly traces the history of India-Taiwan relations following India’s transfer of its diplomatic recognition to the PRC till the present day. It provides an overview of India’s Taiwan policy. Given that a war in the Taiwan Strait is not beyond reasonable doubt, it then discusses the scenarios India might find itself in and the possible policies to respond to these scenarios. It recommends a close following of the U.S.-ChinaTaiwan strategic triangle, a whole-of-government assessment around impacts of a Taiwan Strait contingency, and an assessment of policy options. It also recommends mapping the expectations that China and the United States would have of India, along with undertaking consultations with key partners on the Taiwan question.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Crisis Management, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

10. Will the Invasion of Ukraine Change Russia-Africa Relations?

Author:
Ronak Gopaldas
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
With ties forged under Soviet rule, Russia has historically enjoyed warm relations with many African countries, as their economic and ideological ambitions often align and their ties are bolstered by a mutual mistrust of the West. The spread of Africa’s votes on United Nations (UN) resolutions to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, indicates three key themes. Firstly, many African countries are pulled in competing directions by broader global geopolitics—for many, abstaining was the rational choice. Secondly, Russia’s support on the continent may be overstated and is not unconditional. Finally, Russian influence is often limited by the extent to which it can influence the political elite of a country and in some cases co-opt that elite into patronage networks. The split in the way African countries voted to condemn Russia’s actions is an important departure point for an exploration of the changing nature of Africa’s ties to Russia. There have been myriad interpretations of the votes, most of which have focused on the failure of several African countries to denounce the invasion. Few have questioned whether the nonaligned stances of these countries were tacit refusals to be used as supporting actors in public displays of condemnation by the United States and European Union (EU), to distract from the inability to offer meaningful practical or military support. Fewer still have explored whether the nonaligned stances signal weakening Russian influence on a continent it has typically relied on for support. This paper examines political relations between Russia and Africa, delving into the legacy of independence, military support, diplomatic and foreign policy stances, aid, foreign direct investment, and trade. It will also unpack whether Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a catalyst for what appears to be Russia’s diminishing influence or whether the former Soviet Union’s waning global standing and economic relevance precipitated a loosening of ties. The fluidity of geopolitics has left many African states between a rock and a hard place. What does this mean for Africa, not only in terms of its relationship to Russia but also more broadly on the geopolitical stage? Further, how would Africa be positioned on the global stage should Russia prevail, should the war drag on, or, more interestingly, should Ukraine emerge victorious?
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

11. China’s smart cities and the future of geopolitics

Author:
Valentin Weber
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In this latest Strategic Update, Valentin Weber explores Chinese scientific research and industry application of smart cities, with ‘city brains’. The geostrategic implications for these complex Chinese smart city construction projects outside of China – particularly surrounding surveillance and artificial intelligence – and a potential future ‘world digital brain’ must be considered by policymakers, even if we are far away from an eventual bifurcation of the global internet.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Surveillance, Artificial Intelligence, and Smart Cities
Political Geography:
China and Asia

12. Assessing the groundwork: Surveying the impacts of climate change in China

Author:
Stephan Robin
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The immediate and unprecedented impacts of climate change are becoming increasingly apparent across China, as they are for many parts of the world. Since June 2022, China has been battered by record-breaking heatwaves, torrential downpours, flooding disasters, severe drought and intense forest fires. In isolation, each of those climate hazards is a reminder of the vulnerability of human systems to environmental changes, but together they are a stark reminder that climate change presents a real and existential threat to prosperity and well-being of billions of people. Sea-level rise will undermine access to freshwater for China’s coastal cities and increase the likelihood of flooding in China’s highly urbanised delta regions. Droughts are projected to become more frequent, more extreme and longer lasting, juxtaposed with growingly intense downpours that will inundate non-coastal regions. Wildfires are also projected to increase in frequency and severity, especially in eastern China. China’s rivers, which have historically been critical to the county’s economic and political development, will experience multiple, overlapping climate (and non-climate) impacts. In addition to these direct climate hazards, there will also be major disruptions to the various human systems that underpin China, such as China’s food and energy systems as are discussed in this report. These impacts deserve greater attention from policy analysts, particularly given that they’ll increasingly shape China’s economic, foreign and security policy choices in coming decades. This report is an initial attempt to survey the literature on the impact that climate change will have on China. It concludes that relatively little attention has been paid to this important topic. This is a worrying conclusion, given China’s key role in international climate-change debates, immense importance in the global economy and major geostrategic relevance. As the severity of climate change impacts continue to amplify over the coming decades, the significance of this gap will only grow more concerning.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, National Security, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China and Asia-Pacific

13. Coronavirus and the Widening Global North-South Gap

Author:
Rosa Balfour, Lizza Bomassi, and Marta Martinelli
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The European Union (EU) has a growing interest in investing in the Global South as the bloc seeks to fill a niche amid the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China, find new allies in support of multilateralism, and diversify its international relations in pursuit of its norms and interests. But the union’s policies and ambitions are underinformed by empirical research on how the Global South views the EU and Europe as a whole. This paper presents the initial results of an eighteen-month-long project conducted by Carnegie Europe and the Open Society European Policy Institute (OSEPI) that explored perspectives on Europe’s international role through the eyes of the Global South.1 The project was launched in 2020 and, by necessity, the coronavirus pandemic and the world’s responses to it became the backdrop for identifying and deconstructing the key issues and dilemmas in the relationship between the EU and the Global South. What followed were some sobering lessons that offer new ways of thinking about future engagement. After two years of battling the coronavirus, and as domestic restrictions ease in much of the Global North, what has emerged is a widening gap between North and South. Without the resources and policy innovations the West used to shield itself from the worst of the pandemic’s economic effects, developing countries, already economically vulnerable, were hit hard by the crisis. In some countries, this has reversed decades of progress on poverty, healthcare, and education. The pandemic could have been a watershed moment: an opportunity for the EU to reframe donor-recipient relations, build on ongoing efforts to eliminate global poverty, and demonstrate the value of multilateralism. Yet, rather than capitalizing on the chance to strengthen the Global South’s resilience, the EU was perceived as pursuing more insular strategies, from hoarding COVID-19 vaccinations to opposing vaccine waivers. While outwardly espousing the benefits of international solidarity, the EU was unable to enact extensive policies to address the structural economic and political imbalances in its relationship with the Global South. This shortsightedness led to several missed opportunities for the EU to play a leading role in helping the Global South navigate what will be a long and painful recovery from the pandemic. At the same time, geopolitical games among the United States, Europe, China, and Russia tarnished the West’s image, leading to further resentment and frustration. The EU’s efforts to deweaponize access to healthcare by exporting half the vaccines it produced and supporting the establishment of the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) initiative in the early days of the pandemic were admirable; but a series of missteps—by accident or design—seriously dented the EU’s credibility in the eyes of many of its partners. Much of this harm can be attributed to a strategy that tried to balance competing and contradictory aims with a values-based external policy that boasted the principles of solidarity at its core. China and Russia exploited this weakness to position themselves as more reliable partners than their Western counterparts. However, there are still opportunities for the EU to regain what it has lost. Both Africa and Asia have turned to multilateralism to effectively combat the coronavirus. The Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (ACDC) has played a leading role in coordinating African responses to the pandemic, while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has announced the creation of the Center for Public Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases. The EU can support these organizations in a bid to deepen partnerships with the Global South. Lizza Bomassi Lizza Bomassi is the deputy director of Carnegie Europe, where she is responsible for harmonizing Carnegie Europe’s strategic and operational priorities and managing relations with Carnegie’s global centers and programs as well as partner organizations in Europe. The coming year is rife with opportunities to enact course correction: patent waivers will be discussed in the World Trade Organization (WTO), while Indonesia’s 2022 presidency of the Group of Twenty (G20) and the EU’s Global Gateway initiative are chances for Europe to recharacterize its relationship with the Global South. The EU must embrace ambitious and creative forms of cooperation to build lasting alliances that will, in turn, address global inequality in a manner that aligns with the union’s declared intention to create more equal partnerships in the global community.
Topic:
European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Multilateralism, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global South and Global North

14. U.S. Strategy and Economic Statecraft: Understanding the Tradeoffs

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis and Ethan Kapstein
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Few would dispute that U.S. economic policy has enormous consequences for America’s national security and role in the world. But economic policy is too often made without a clear picture of the strategic tradeoffs it entails. The purpose of this paper is to help clarify some of these tradeoffs by considering three alternative models of U.S. economic statecraft. The first model examined here, America First, has several national security and economic disadvantages. It would not only antagonize some of Washington’s key military allies but probably also undermine U.S. international competitiveness. It might even induce countries to turn their economic attention toward China, reducing the United States’ global influence accordingly. A better approach would be a blend of two other models, namely alliance economics and globalization 2.0. Together these approaches could help orient the United States for the geopolitical challenges of the next decade. By emphasizing commercial relations with U.S. military allies, such a blend would recall Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which calls for international economic cooperation among NATO member states. And by leading a reformed multilateral system, the United States would again put itself at the center of the rules-based global economic order that brought prosperity to millions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Geopolitics, Economy, Economic Cooperation, and Strategy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

15. Green energy depends on critical minerals. Who controls the supply chains?

Author:
Luc Leruth, Adnan Mazarei, Pierre Régibeau, and Luc Renneboog
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
In light of the transition away from fossil fuel–based energy, this paper highlights the importance of understanding who controls vital parts of the global supply chains of critical minerals and rare earth elements (REEs). Analysis of direct ownership does not reveal the real sources of control over the decisions of the company. To identify those sources, the authors use an index that measures the degree to which important shareholders can affect voting decisions. This analysis is not straightforward, because companies along the supply chain are not necessarily incorporated in the countries in which mining and production activities take place, and shareholders can exert influence through multiple layers of subsidiaries. The analysis reveals that China’s control over the global value chains involving critical minerals and REEs extends beyond what is commonly assumed. It also sheds light on environmental, social, and governance issues in the countries in which mining and/or production take place. The paper advocates increasing transparency regarding the sources of control to better assess and manage economic and geopolitical risks; enhancing recycling, to reduce dependency on foreign supply; avoiding protectionist and trade-reducing reactions; and encouraging research and development in order to speed up the adoption of technologies of substitution.
Topic:
Economics, Geopolitics, Supply Chains, Minerals, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

16. Will economic statecraft threaten western currency dominance? Sanctions, geopolitics, and the global monetary order

Author:
Carla Norrlof
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The return of great power rivalry is stoking renewed fears of weakening Western currency dominance. Financial sanctions are becoming the preferred economic tool for accomplishing geopolitical goals. These instruments are especially popular with the United States and Europe. In response, rival great powers, notably China and Russia, are diversifying away from Western currencies and developing counterstrategies to maintain economic and foreign policy autonomy. As other countries are hit by increasingly punishing Western sanctions, the incentive to join Russia and China’s alternative international monetary order increases. New analysis, published in this report, shows early signs that some countries may be trying to diversify away from the dollar. A growing circle of countries attempting to evade the Western-centric financial and currency order may over time erode the dollar and the euro’s sizeable lead, though will likely fall well short of ending their global dominance. This report analyzes these trends and quantifies the extent of reserve diversification following Russia’s 2022 war on Ukraine. It also assesses the polarity of the international currency order since the onset of the euro in 2002. Reserve diversification out of the dollar, and into the euro, has been modest, though Chinese renminbi reserves grew after Russia’s February offensive in Ukraine. Dollar unipolarity declined acutely in 2017 as the number of countries sanctioned by the United States increased and the US President Donald J. Trump threatened to revoke alliance commitments. Using economic statecraft while retaining global economic influence will require the United States to keep its economic house in order and allies close, if the current unipolar currency order is to survive.
Topic:
Economics, Monetary Policy, Sanctions, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

17. India Emerges as a Key Power and Important Partner for the EU in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Patryk Kugiel
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
India’s commissioning of its second aircraft carrier, the INS Vikrant, in September this year reaffirms the country’s aim to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific. The country’s importance in the region will depend mainly on the course of the India-China rivalry, an increase in its economic potential, and the support provided to it by foreign partners. The convergence of goals in the Indo-Pacific strengthens India’s partnership with the U.S. and opens up opportunities for intensifying cooperation with the EU, especially in terms of connectivity, climate change, and the development of capacity in maritime domain awareness.
Topic:
International Cooperation, European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:
Europe, South Asia, India, and Indo-Pacific

18. China Tightens Policy towards Taiwan

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
China treated the visit of Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan at the beginning of August as an expression of U.S. efforts to change the status quo in the region. The reaction of the Chinese authorities was calculated as a controlled escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait, but without the risk of direct military confrontation. Harsh rhetoric, military exercises around the island, and the limitation of dialogue with the U.S. confirmed the intention of China to take over Taiwan in the coming years. For the EU, this means the need to intensify support for Taiwan, including the development of political and economic contacts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

19. Unequivocal benefits of, and necessity for, stronger Turkic Union

Author:
Emin Mammadov and Kamran Ismayilov
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD)
Abstract:
In recent years, the cooperation and unity of the Turkic countries gain increasing momentum which are being demonstrated by its viability leading to the emergence of a united Turkic World as a new geopolitical reality in the Euroasian region. The cooperation deeply embedded in historical brotherhood ties, common language root, cultural and traditional commonalities has revealed significant political and economic results in the continent.
Topic:
Culture, Geopolitics, Regional Integration, and Turkic People
Political Geography:
Eurasia and Caucasus

20. Reckless Abandon: Why Tunisia Can No Longer Delay a Border Free Trade Zone

Author:
Hamza Meddeb
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In 2012, Tunisia announced the establishment of a free trade and logistics zone (FTZ) in Ben Guerdane, near the Libyan border. The aim is to develop marginalized southeastern border regions and formalize informal economic actors. However, the plan has stalled due to institutional resistance, political divisions, and an incapacity to exploit international geopolitical rivalries. If this persists, the project may become irrelevant because of emerging FTZs in Libya, denying Tunisia revenues its ailing economy needs.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Economy, Borders, and Free Trade
Political Geography:
Libya, North Africa, and Tunisia

21. Russia and India: A New Chapter

Author:
Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russian-Indian relations are undergoing a major change. Throughout the Cold War, the relationship rested on three pillars: Soviet arms sales to India; shared public-sector-heavy economic philosophy and extensive Soviet aid; and the Soviet Union–India vs. United States–Pakistan–China geopolitical alignment. The fall of the Soviet Union, the rise of India and China, the U.S.-China tensions, the deepening of U.S.-India ties, and the Russian-Chinese partnership intensified by Russia’s break with the West and the war against Ukraine have had a profound effect on Russian-Indian relations. Of the three pillars of the Moscow–New Delhi relationship, only one remains: the arms trade. Russia remains a major supplier of weapons to India, and Russian equipment still makes up a vast portion of Indian Armed Forces’ force structure; but Russia is facing competition in the Indian arms market. India’s desire to diversify its supply of weapons and develop its own defense industry has resulted in declining Russian arms deliveries to India in recent years. Russia’s break with the West because of its war against Ukraine has accelerated its pivot toward China. Against the backdrop of U.S.-China and China-India tensions, Russia’s position as China’s junior partner will make it harder for Russia to preserve partnership with India. Moscow’s leverage versus both New Delhi and Beijing is shrinking as they have greater capabilities of their own than they had previously and have new partners that offer more than Russia. Still, the Russian-Indian partnership will continue. For India, Russia remains an important supplier of weapons and, most recently, oil. India has not joined the West’s sanctions on Russia. By doing so, it has demonstrated its independent foreign policy. For Russia, India is an important market for arms and oil. The Indian-U.S. security relationship is relatively new, whereas India-Russia ties have endured for over two generations. India has no reason to forsake the benefits of this relationship. Nor does Russia. It has been said that Moscow plays a weak hand well, but sustaining strong security ties with both China and India will become more difficult for it. The question is how China will react to Russian arms sales to India, and what Russia will do if pressed by China to curtail them. For reasons of geographic proximity, economic ties, and personal relations between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, the odds favor Beijing over New Delhi to have a bigger say in Moscow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, South Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, India, and United States of America

22. Turkey in Afghanistan: more than one reason to stay

Author:
Ekrem Eddy Güzeldere
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Despite a long history of bilateral contacts, Turkey’s most intensive commitment in Afghanistan only started in 2001 with the NATO mission. A first friendship treaty was signed back in 1921; the first official foreign visit to the Republic of Turkey was made in 1928 by King Amanullah of Afghanistan. Turkey’s engagement in South Asia started with Afghanistan but has recently been Pakistan-centred. As the only majority-Muslim NATO country, Turkey was viewed more positively by the Afghan population and the Taliban than other NATO member states. Ankara has been reaching out to the Taliban since summer 2021. However, the Taliban have not met Turkish demands for a more inclusive government, or in relation to girls’ education. Turkey has become a haven for non-Taliban (opposition) Afghans, who are told not to voice their criticism of the Taliban. There are four main motivations for Turkey’s engagement in Afghanistan: 1) improving relations with the US; 2) stabilizing Afghanistan to prevent migrant flows; 3) getting a foothold in the geopolitics of the region; 4) benefitting from the economic potential. Kabul international airport is important both for the Taliban and for Turkey. For the Taliban, it is their window to the world; for Turkey, it is an opportunity to profit economically and to boost its international status. In Afghanistan, Turkey’s soft power approach includes TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), the Maarif schools, and the Yunus Emre Institute. These institutions have remained operational. In 2020, Afghanistan received the third largest amount of Turkish developmental aid, amounting to 36.5 million USD. Even if the world, and Turkey, are currently focused on Ukraine, Afghanistan will continue to occupy an important place in Turkey’s regional foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Taliban, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Turkey, and Middle East

23. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: Unity is good, but ambition is better

Author:
Sophie Pornschlegel and Ilke Toygür
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
In view of the volatile geopolitical environment, EU leaders no longer have the luxury of waiting for all 27 member states to find a consensus. In order to lead the way to a Union that is apt for future challenges, the EU should become more ambitious and embrace alternatives, such as differentiated integration, in the coming months and years. Rather than returning to the status quo ante, the EU should use this momentum to progress in five policy fields: economic governance, with a new recovery package and a reform of the fiscal rules; security and defence, with improved EU–NATO cooperation and a stronger ‘European pillar’; energy policy, by quickly steering member states away from dependence on Russian fossil fuels while simultaneously ensuring admissible energy prices for consumers and respecting the climate targets; enlargement and neighbourhood policy, by rethinking its aims and creating options for countries that are unlikely to become EU members in the foreseeable future; and the rule of law, to safeguard the Union’s values ‘at home’. Both the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion revealed that the EU institutions and leaders are capable of managing crises swiftly and decisively. This reality certainly increases its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens as well as its allies. The European Union could use this moment of change to increase its ambition for reforms and for moving European integration forward. This should encourage leaders to think about all the options for designing the Union’s future. This is not a time for black and white thinking – Treaty change or nothing –, but rather a time to explore all the shades of grey for securing necessary reforms. If like-minded countries could lead the way, others may also follow. The changing and evolving positions in the EU could help secure more inclusive alliances for moving forward. The political momentum to do so is finally here.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, Rule of Law, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

24. China and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: An Economic and Political Perspective

Author:
Zhang Yunling
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This paper studies China’s policies and participation in East Asian economic integration and cooperation. The progress of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is remarkable in the time when global as well as regional economies are facing so many challenges. China as the largest economy in East Asia plays a key role in sustaining regional dynamism. China is active and constructive in initiating the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN+1) free trade agreements (FTAs) and an integrated framework of FTAs in East Asia. As RCEP was initiated by ASEAN and supported strongly by China it is essential to keep East Asian economic dynamism: the conclusion of the RCEP negotiations and the implementation has great effects. China’s gains from RCEP are not just economic, but also political. Whilst this paper focuses on economic gains for China, it also analyses the political gains for China, for example, against ‘decoupling’ and political division, which is harmful to East Asian integration and cooperation. The novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic is still ongoing, so the timely enforcement of RCEP is important as it gives confidence to the region to keep the region open and to work together to make East Asia dynamic in facing the challenges. Some challenges for East Asia are (i) how to rebuild the supply chains that are either weakened or broken by the pandemic; (ii) how to overcome the new barriers created by government policies in the name of ‘national security’ both in trade and investment areas; and (iii) how to overcome the new divisions created by the United States’ policy under its comprehensive strategic competition with China that leads to the exclusive arrangements in East Asia. East Asian economic integration and cooperation are based on two basic principles: openness and inclusiveness. As a region with great diversity, it is crucial to provide opportunities for all parties with difference. China will continue its open policy and actively participate in multilateral and regional arrangements, and as the largest economy in East Asia it serves as a key pillar to be a centre of the global economy. China will take RCEP as an essential framework to enhance its interest and role in East Asia, as well as in the Asia-Pacific against a politically oriented Indo-Pacific initiative.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, Regionalism, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and ASEAN

25. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: Matching Ambition with Reality

Author:
Jonny Hall and Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
This Strategic Update is based on a discussion hosted by LSE IDEAS in July 2022 on NATO’s 2030 Strategic Concept. Participants in the discussion included: General Sir James Everard, Gordon Barrass, General Sir Richard Barrons, Lt Gen Giles Hill, ProfessorChristopher Coker, Dr Luca Tardelli, Marissa Kemp, Tom McKane, and Peter Watkins. This Strategic Update reflects points made during the discussion, but no participant is in any way committed to its specific content, and the views expressed here are attributable solely to the authors. The Strategic Concept is the first since 2010 and was redrafted throughout a fundamentally different geopolitical and security context—following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This Update addresses the Concept’s recognition of necessary strategic realignment, with NATO’s widening in both its defence commitments and geographic focus on China, as well as its ambiguity in regards to practical military strategy, deterrence, and endpoint of the war in Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

26. Turkey’s Involvement in the Libyan Conflict, the Geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean and Drone Warfare

Author:
Buğra Süsler
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
Dr Buğra Süsler’s Strategic Update explains Turkish foreign policy-making around a fragile Libya, highlighting its impact on power dynamics in the North Africa and the Middle East, as well as opening a gateway to sub-Saharan Africa. The paper addresses Turkey’s regional economic and political motives, the AKP’s increasingly hawkish use of hard power – especially the diplomatic and ethical implications of the Turkish military’s specialisation in drone warfare – and Ankara’s desire to maintain mutually beneficial relations with Libyan power-brokers key to post-civil war reconstruction.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Drones, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Turkey, Libya, North Africa, and Mediterranean

27. The ‘Kosovo Precedent’: Russia’s justification of military interventions and territorial revisions in Georgia and Ukraine

Author:
Valur Ingimundarson
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In this latest Strategic Update, Valur Ingimundarson explores Russia’s use of the ‘Kosovo precedent’, in order to instrumentalise its violation of international norms for geopolitical gain in the post-Soviet space. Ever since Kosovo’s 2008 unique and contested independence process, Russia has increasingly relied paradoxically on the Kosovo case to legally justify support for secession within, and now overt military expansionism into, post-Soviet territory: from its invasion of Georgia and support for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, to the incorporation of Crimea into the Federation, its invasion of Ukraine, and current effort to absorb the Donbass region.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Military Intervention, Expansion, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Kosovo, and Georgia

28. The Long Shadow of the Soviet Union: Demystifying Putin’s Rhetoric Towards Ukraine

Author:
Björn Alexander Düben
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
As tensions between Russia and Ukraine reach an almost-tipping point, Björn Alexander Düben analyses the historical and geopolitical rhetoric Putin and his government have deployed against the post-Maidan Ukraine since 2014. Asking, can this be seen as another Russian assertion of dominance in the post-Soviet region, could there be reasons closer to home, or why tensions across the border seem to once again be at a breaking point? From global oil prices to regime consolidation, an analysis into the words of Russia’s elites could unveil what future Europe is steering towards.
Topic:
Geopolitics, History, Conflict, Soviet Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

29. Can Chancellor Scholz Save the West? The New German Government and Global Geopolitics

Author:
Maximilian Terhalle
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In the wake of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s departure from the German Chancellorship, her successor, Olaf Scholz, inherits a Germany which has been lacking in strategic vision and an acute foreign policy for a considerable amount of time. Maximilian Terhalle asks, can Chancellor Scholz provide this vision for his country, and imbue NATO and the EU with a coherent and unified foreign policy in the face of threats from China, Russia, and a divided ‘West’?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, Olaf Scholz, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Germany

30. How New Export Control Will Affect Food Security in Azerbaijan?

Author:
Emin Mammadov
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD)
Abstract:
The ongoing climate change and recent geopolitical tensions could spark a global food crisis with simultaneous disruptions to supply-chain systems that drive up the economic shock waves throughout the world. Following the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the upsurge in the price of agricultural commodities and broken supply chains are undeniably vivid. Both countries are exporters of vital commodities such as wheat, oil, corn, sunflower oil and corn, and disturbances to production affect the import-reliant countries.
Topic:
Climate Change, Food Security, Geopolitics, Exports, Supply Chains, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Azerbaijan

31. Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam. The Law, History, Politics and Geopolitics behind Africa’s Largest Hydropower Project

Author:
Francesca Caruso
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Since 2011, the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has provoked a diplomatic crisis between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan, adding fuel to the already combustible geopolitics of the Horn of Africa. Despite its technical aspects, the GERD dispute has over time become a multi-layered geopolitical crisis where a plethora of actors and dynamics have been influencing the ongoing negotiations. Protagonists are no longer only Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan, and the resolution of the crisis is now dependent on factors beyond technical solutions. Moreover, the crisis seems to have become an instrument that the three countries are using to deal with issues of national legitimacy, territorial disputes and regional balance. However, while instrumentalisation can be politically expedient in the short term, all parties have an interest an equitable and regionally based, inclusive and cooperative agreement. In order to understand how multilateral organisations can contribute to the finding of an equitable and reasonable solution, a multi-layered analysis – on local, national and regional dynamics – needs to identify the main drivers for Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan.
Topic:
Diplomacy, History, Water, Infrastructure, Law, Geopolitics, Dams, Conflict Management, and Hydropower
Political Geography:
Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt

32. Russia’s Climate Action and Geopolitics of Energy Transition: The Uncertain and Unsettling Outlook following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Kamila Godzinska and Maria Pastukhova
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has profoundly altered the outlook for Russia’s energy transition and created uncertainties on the global path towards net zero. In response to global economic shifts, Russia had begun taking steps towards decarbonisation, albeit without plans to depart from its hydrocarbon-based economic model in any substantial way. The new political, trade and financial environment induced by Russia’s act of aggression has damaged its potential to maintain the once-emerging momentum. Russia’s actions and the Western response are also reconfiguring global energy relations, with profound economic and geopolitical consequences that may, unless managed, undermine international cooperation on the energy transition and slow down progress on climate change mitigation.
Topic:
Climate Change, Sanctions, Geopolitics, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Eastern Europe, and Balkans

33. The Geopolitics of Clean Hydrogen – Opportunities and Challenges for Italy

Author:
Marco Giuli
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The emergence of clean hydrogen as an energy carrier promises to shape the future geography of the energy trade. Under growing contestation of interdependence, such a geography should be read through political lenses alongside commercial and technological ones. Generally, hydrogen is likely to reduce the geopolitical sensitivity of energy trade with respect to a fossil-fuel-based energy order by increasing the share of energy produced domestically, shifting geostrategic competition from a focus on grabbing resources to a focus on mastering technology and setting standards, and offering petrostates opportunities for economic diversification. Italy can exploit the opportunities offered by a hydrogen economy for enhancing its energy security and positioning in the regional energy trade. However, it should be careful with monitoring how geopolitical barriers such as regional instability may affect its hydrogen ambitions.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Trade, Hydrogen, Pipeline, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and Italy

34. A Scramble for Gas: Qatari LNG and EU Diversification Plans

Author:
Pier Paolo Raimondi
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Amidst a worsening geopolitical and energy crisis in Europe, the EU is scrambling to increase liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports as one component of its larger objective to reduce its overdependence on Russian gas. In 2021, the EU imported 155 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas from Russia (140 bcm via pipeline and 15 bcm of LNG). Under its REPowerEU initiative, the European Commission aims to increase LNG imports to replace 50 bcm of Russian gas by the end of 2022.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Gas, Diversification, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and Qatar

35. Between Geopolitics and Geoeconomics: The Growing Role of Gulf States in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Adel Abdel Ghafar
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The role played by countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the Eastern Mediterranean is becoming increasingly important. This calls for an assessment of their evolving relationship with countries in the region, as well as their involvement in the Libyan conflict. Increased involvement by Gulf actors may inflame existing regional rivalries and geopolitical tensions. The interests of GCC countries in the Eastern Mediterranean are first analysed in the broader context of regional rivalries. Special attention is then devoted to Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, Greece and Cyprus, while considering the role of other key regional actors such as Turkey and Israel. Recommendations on why and how the new US administration should intervene to decrease regional tensions are provided. Paper prepared in the framework of the IAI-Eni Strategic Partnership, January 2021.
Topic:
Economics, Geopolitics, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Greece, Libya, Lebanon, Egypt, Cyprus, Mediterranean, and Gulf Nations

36. Russia in the Arctic—A Critical Examination

Author:
Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia has big Arctic plans, but how they will be realized is uncertain. For the United States this will likely mean the return to a Cold War–like environment rather than a new chapter in great-power competition in the Arctic. Russia’s Arctic ambitions have attracted increasing attention in the West over the past decade as climate change opens up new opportunities in the region for navigation and exploration of its riches. For its part, Moscow casts a wary eye on what it sees as a challenge from the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to its position and ambitions there. The Kremlin’s rhetoric about Western encroachment has become more strident, in sync with its enhanced military posture and ambitious economic and infrastructure projects.
Topic:
NATO, Cold War, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

37. Adapting the U.S.-South Korea Alliance to an Indo-Pacific Regional Architecture: Challenges and Prospects

Author:
Andrew Yeo
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper addresses the U.S.-South Korea alliance in the context of Asia’s evolving security architecture. At the crux of the issue is the Biden administration’s desire to uphold the rules-based international order by reinforcing the network of inter-Asia alliances and multilateral institutions, on one hand, and the Moon government’s relative reluctance to deepen and expand security ties linked to an Indo-Pacific strategy that counter-balances China, on the other hand. Leveraging the existing alliance relationship, the Biden administration should encourage Seoul to coordinate with other like-minded countries committed to sustaining a rules-based regional order while assisting Seoul in mitigating potential strategic vulnerabilities. Conversely, as a middle power, South Korea must not shy away from the region’s security architecture, but instead actively coordinate with other actors in shaping the region’s strategic environment. By working in concert with other countries in the Indo-Pacific, Seoul can reduce its geopolitical vulnerability while advancing its national and regional interests.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

38. How China and Pakistan Negotiate

Author:
Katharine Adeney and Filippo Boni
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Since being officially launched in April 2015, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been one of the most watched set of projects under the aegis of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Having already injected around $25 billion into Pakistan, the CPEC not only has been dubbed the “flagship project” of the BRI, but it also holds a central role in Beijing’s global ambitions.1 While much has been said about the geopolitical implications of the CPEC, including for both India and the United States, less attention has been devoted to providing in-depth insights into the mechanics of how the BRI is unfolding on the ground in Pakistan. How do China and Pakistan negotiate the terms of CPEC deals? To what extent has Islamabad managed to exert agency in its dealings with Beijing? How does China adapt to the contexts it operates in? By now, the CPEC has been subject to much media, academic, and policy scrutiny, but these questions have not been answered. The power asymmetry between the two partners—coupled with the impression that the BRI represents a unidirectional Chinese endeavor, not just in Pakistan but also globally—has contributed to the erroneous representation that Beijing is merely imposing the CPEC on its all-weather partners in Islamabad. On the contrary, this study highlights China’s adaptive strategies in dealing with a host of Pakistani actors (including political parties, local communities, and the military) against the backdrop of Pakistan’s evolving political landscape and change in leadership following the country’s 2018 elections. In filling this gap, this paper foregrounds the importance of adopting a relational approach to studying how the BRI unfolds on the ground. This entails looking at how Pakistan and China have negotiated the CPEC’s energy, infrastructure, and industrial cooperation projects. The analysis is based on semi-structured elite interviews conducted by the two authors during three rounds of fieldwork in 2015, 2018, and 2020–2021 triangulated with a host of official reports, statements, and newspaper articles. Examining the domestic contours of the CPEC shows that Pakistani actors have wielded agency in important ways throughout the process, while Chinese actors at times have accommodated key Pakistani demands.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

39. Russia in the Mediterranean: Here to Stay

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s strategy in the Mediterranean is an integral part of its strategy for the wider European theater, which has long been the principal arena of its foreign policy triumphs and setbacks. Europe’s dominant position on Russia’s foreign policy agenda is a product of its strategic culture, which is in turn shaped by geography, historical legacy, and an elite worldview that considers the West a threat to the domestic political order. It is impossible to understand Russia’s current posture in the Mediterranean without viewing it within this larger context and against the backdrop of the country’s centuries-old involvement in the region and retreat from it during the quarter century that followed the end of the Cold War. Since Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria, alarms have been sounded about the Kremlin’s ambitions and military capabilities in the Mediterranean. These alarms have been unfounded.; Russian capabilities in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region are modest, and the Kremlin’s ambitions there are constrained by geography and geopolitics, limited resources, a transactional approach to relationships, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) formidable force posture on its southern flank. As much as Russia may aspire to regional domination, it lacks the means to achieve this goal. That said, the Russian military is now a presence to be reckoned with in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has complicated U.S./NATO planning and operations, and Moscow has developed good relationships with important regional powers. Given Russia’s limited means, its re-emergence in the region can be considered a success, but its effects should not be exaggerated. Moscow’s posture in the Mediterranean has been largely designed to protect its gains in Syria and defend against the threat that Russian leaders see from NATO land, air, and naval capabilities to the Russian heartland. The importance of Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) “bubble” over Syria has at times been exaggerated. The systems that make up the bubble are limited in range and in a conflict with NATO would be vulnerable to countermeasures. Contrary to a widespread perception, Moscow’s ambitions in the Mediterranean are more than a matter of its vague pursuit to regain great power status—they are a product of enduring Russian national security requirements. The principal rationale for Russia’s return to the region has been the prospect of a military confrontation in the European theater and concerns about the vulnerability of its southern flank in a conflict with NATO. While Russia has sought, in fact, to regain its old Cold War footing—and has been skillful and opportunistic in exploiting openings to expand its footprint—it has acted with caution, avoiding undue risks and, most of all, an outright confrontation with the United States. The Kremlin may aspire to dominate the Mediterranean one day, but for now its aim is to deny this option to NATO. Russia is in the Mediterranean to stay, and its push for a greater naval, air, and land presence and increased political influence will continue as long as it remains locked in a tense standoff with NATO in Europe. This warrants heightened vigilance but not, as has often been the case, fears that Russia has replaced the United States/NATO as the key power broker in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Syria, and Mediterranean

40. A Difficult Balancing Act: Russia’s Role in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Paul Stronski
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean is part of its broader strategy for undermining the cohesion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) and thus complicating the Western alliance’s ability to operate, plan, and formulate policy. The Kremlin’s interests are geared toward enhancing dependencies on Russian gas and financial flows, cultivating governing elites, and stymieing the ability of NATO and, to a lesser extent, the EU to expand. While Moscow’s efforts in the region after its 2015 intervention in Syria are often described as a means to reassert Russia’s great power status, the Russian leadership more likely sees its actions there as part of a broader standoff with the West that stretches from the Atlantic to the Black Sea and from North Africa to the Arctic. This is certainly the case in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus—three of the most vulnerable countries to Russian influence operations in the region due to a mix of relative geographic proximity to Russia, common cultural and historic legacies, and elites that have looked to Moscow and beyond to balance their countries’ foreign policies or gain leverage with transatlantic partners. While Europe today is generally thought of as more or less “unified,” this region is anything but. Economic turmoil, border and territorial disputes, migration flows, and a growing disenchantment with the EU and the United States have created numerous fissures within and between these three states, transforming them into receptive targets for Russia. They are also highly dependent on Russian hydrocarbons and keen to attract Russian investment and tourists. Russia uses a narrative of shared cultural and religious heritage, along with existing anti-American or Euroskeptic sentiment to cultivate the region’s populations, albeit not always successfully. Yet, its influence operations over the past decade have led to Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus being labeled as weak links in NATO or the EU, especially on key issues of concern to Moscow: expansion of Western political and security organizations, EU sanctions, and the promotion of democracy and good governance. However, while the behavior of some of these countries at times has proved troubling to Washington and Brussels, the Kremlin’s engagement there has not led any of them to formally break with their Western partners, although tensions between the latter and Turkey continue to grow. Russia has been skillful and successful in seeking opportunities to engage the region, cultivating rising political, economic, religious, or cultural decisionmakers in all three countries. It now has a clear presence in the Eastern Mediterranean that cannot be ignored. Russia has been able to compartmentalize its differences with Turkey to develop a working, albeit often unhappy, accommodation in Syria and the South Caucasus, even as the two countries operate largely as competitors in Libya and Ukraine. Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system exacerbated frictions with Washington, throwing NATO into an internal crisis and leading to Turkey’s expulsion the F-35 and Patriot missile programs. For Russia, the sale was not only a symbolic win for its arms industry; it succeeded in stoking fissures in the Western alliance and complicating its weapons development programs. Nonetheless, while the Russo-Turkish relationship might appear robust, it is neither deep nor wide, and it is largely dependent on the two countries’ authoritarian leaders. Russia’s engagement with Greece has been less successful. Once described as Moscow’s Trojan horse in Europe,1 Athens pivoted back sharply toward its European and NATO partners after the 2018 exposure of Russian attempts to interfere in Greek politics and to upend its rapprochement with North Macedonia. Despite its promises of financial assistance, Moscow lacks the economic clout to help address Greece’s decade-long financial crisis. President Vladimir Putin’s successful cultivation of his Turkish counterpart also unnerves many Greeks. Greece is a clear case of Russian overreach, but Moscow still has tools—hydrocarbons and cultural links—that it can use in the country should future opportunities arise. Like Greece, Cyprus remains wary of Russia’s enhanced security relationship with Turkey, which has opened the door to greater military cooperation with the United States, France, and other Western allies. Nicosia hoped that Moscow could come to the rescue during its 2012–2013 banking crisis, but the latter lacked the financial clout to do so and was not a viable alternative to a harsh EU bailout. As an offshore financial center, Cyprus is dependent on Russian financial flows, not all of them legal, to help prop up its economy, giving Moscow leverage that has paved the way for limited security cooperation, particularly in the form of naval port calls. Russia has increased its cultural outreach to the country, but much of this is geared toward the growing Russian-speaking expatriate community. In sum, Russia’s capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean are modest, based largely on symbolic diplomacy, energy, financial promises, and the ability to cultivate elites, some of which are quite eager to engage with Moscow for personal or political gain. That approach, however, does not resonate widely beyond the narrow Russia-friendly constituencies in each country. Furthermore, there is not much ballast to these relationships, all of which have proven to be volatile, as the 2015 freeze in Russo-Turkish relations over Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter or the post-2018 plummet in Greek-Russian relations illustrate. But, if Russia’s main goals are to stoke fissures within the West, to shore up vulnerabilities to NATO on its southern flank, and to be seen as a regional player, it has had success, especially considering its limited economic potential and the challenges it faces in balancing the competing interest of Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. Russia also wants a seat at the table as a mediator in regional disputes, but that is mainly to preserve its own interests rather than to bring sustainable solutions. Moscow in fact is far more likely to take advantage of those challenges for economic or geopolitical gain than to try to remedy them. To manage Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO and the EU should shift away from trying to combat every instance of Russian activity there, not all of which is malign. Instead, they should work to enhance local resilience and to stabilize countries in the wider Mediterranean such as Lebanon, Libya, and Syria. They should also help Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus address their economic, governance, political, and security challenges.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

41. Grand Illusions: The Impact of Misperceptions About Russia on U.S. Policy

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A critical examination of U.S. policy misfires in dealing with Russia and its intentions and capabilities over the past several decades is long overdue. Three factors largely account for this problem. All of them continue to affect contemporary policymakers’ approach to a deeply troubled relationship with Moscow. By unpacking the analytical assumptions that underlie these misconceptions, President Joe Biden’s administration and other important policy players will be better equipped to ensure that U.S. policy going forward is grounded in the most realistic understanding of the challenge that Russia poses and the right kinds of tools that the United States should use to contend with it. The first factor is the lingering euphoria of the post–Cold War period. For many Western observers, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the implosion of Russian power demonstrated the permanent superiority of the United States. The perception that Russia’s decline was so deep and irreversible that it would no longer be able to resist Western initiatives made it difficult to accept Moscow’s pushback against Western policies. This was a particular problem when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) pursued several rounds of enlargement in the 1990s and early 2000s under U.S. leadership. U.S. leaders ignored Russia’s objections and underestimated the lengths to which Russian counterparts were prepared to go to secure the homeland against perceived threats. Second, American policymakers and experts have long paid too little attention to the drivers of Russia’s external behavior. Russian threat perceptions are part of an inheritance heavily shaped by geography and a history of troubled relations with other major European powers. They are compounded by the trauma of the loss of its empire, the lingering ideology of greatness, and a sense of entitlement based on its sacrifice in World War II. President Vladimir Putin stokes all of them for domestic political gain. Third, U.S. policymakers have not fully internalized the lessons of the two biggest crises of the Cold War—the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s. In both cases, the Soviet Union went to great lengths to counter what its leaders perceived was a unilateral U.S. threat to the Soviet homeland that could not be tolerated. In 1962 they almost triggered a nuclear war. In 1987, they agreed to eliminate an entire class of intermediate-range nuclear weapons to secure the homeland from U.S. missiles. In both situations, U.S. missiles deployed in Europe would deny the Kremlin the advantage of strategic depth and decision time in a crisis. The lessons of those crises were ignored as anachronisms when NATO embarked on its eastward expansion on the assumption that it would no longer need to worry about, let alone maintain the necessary capabilities for the territorial defense mission. After all, Russia was permanently weakened. When Russia proved otherwise, the alliance was caught by surprise. In another surprise for the United States and its allies, Russian foreign policy has become increasingly assertive, adversarial, and ambitious over the past decade. In the post-Soviet space, the Middle East, Latin America, and parts of Africa, Russia has deployed a diverse tool kit rich in hard, soft, and gray zone power instruments to assert itself as a global power. Russian foreign policy agility and even daring have repeatedly caught the West by surprise and sparked fears of its return as a major threat to Western interests. In reality, Russian gains and tools used to accomplish Moscow’s objectives have not been all that impressive. But Russia has made up for it by capitalizing on mistakes made by the United States and its allies or moving into power vacuums left by them. Still, Russian muscle-flexing and agility in deploying its tool kit, certain to be enriched as new and even more disruptive technologies become available, will remain a top-tier challenge for the president and his senior national security aides. Russia will also remain a serious national security concern for the United States because of its nuclear arsenal and conventional and cyber capabilities—and because of the U.S. commitment to NATO, which is locked in a tense standoff with Russia, in close proximity to its heartland, for the foreseeable future. Getting Russia right—assessing its capabilities and intentions, the long-term drivers of its policy and threat perceptions, as well as its accomplishments—is essential because the alternative of misreading them is a recipe for wasted resources, distorted national priorities, and increased risk of confrontation. In responding to this challenge, it is important to set priorities and differentiate between primary and secondary interests. Europe is the principal theater of the East-West confrontation where Russian actions threaten Western security. Beyond Europe, Russia’s gains have been considerably less than often portrayed and pose a less serious challenge to U.S. interests. The continued tendency to dismiss Russia as a “has been” or declining power whose bark will always be worse than its bite can lead to the United States overextending itself, making unrealistic commitments, and risking a dangerous escalation with the one country that is still its nuclear peer competitor. The push to expand NATO without taking into account the possibility of Russia reemerging as a major military power was an example of such thinking, which is to be avoided in the future. At the same time, the scope and scale of the threat that Russia’s global activism poses to U.S. interests will depend largely on how Washington defines those interests in regions where Russia has expanded its footprint over the past decade. Absent a sober assessment of Russia’s gains and tools for power projection, the United States will position itself to needlessly chase after the specter of Russian expansionism in distant corners of the world where major U.S. interests are not at stake.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Post Cold War, and Expansion
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

42. Less Than a Full Deck: Russia’s Economic Influence in the Mediterranean

Author:
Joanna Pritchett
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015, and then subsequently in Libya, marked its return as a major actor in the Mediterranean. Much has been made of Russia’s use of all elements of statecraft, including diplomatic, ideological, military, and economic instruments, to advance its interests in this region, a vital shipping and transit corridor. A closer look at Russia’s economic tool kit in this region, however, suggests concerns about Russian economic capabilities are likely overstated. Russia’s most important economic tools in the Mediterranean are its energy resources, arms exports, and ability to launder money through corrupt networks. These tools have complemented Russia’s diplomatic and military activities, particularly in areas where economic systems and rule of law have been weaker. Where Russia has been successful, it has increased a country’s dependence on Russian money, oil and gas, and/or arms, giving it a say in a country’s policymaking, particularly on matters of importance to Russia, and a way to undermine U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) influence in the region. In particular, Russia’s unique economic tools have helped it manage its otherwise difficult relationship with Turkey, which depends on Russian oil and gas and is a new customer for Russian nuclear power and weapons systems. Turkey is a unique example in the Mediterranean where Russia already had a substantial trade and investment relationship beyond hydrocarbons, and then used these newer, more subversive tools to build its influence. These same tools have allowed Russia to gain more influence in Egypt, Algeria, and to some degree Cyprus over the last decade. These tools have proved of limited utility elsewhere, however, as they have not been backed by the traditional instruments of economic statecraft: trade in non-energy goods and services, foreign direct investment, and development assistance. Russia has trailed the United States and Europe, and in some cases China, in deploying these fundamental economic elements of foreign policy in the Mediterranean region. Based on economic data available, Russia’s bilateral trade with individual Mediterranean countries is low, its investment levels in most Mediterranean countries are insubstantial, and it is not giving large quantities of development assistance to the poorer countries along the Mediterranean’s eastern and southern rims. The lack of these traditional economic ties is surprising, given Russia’s military and diplomatic efforts to increase its influence in the region. Without them, Russia’s economic diplomacy in the region is highly based on symbolism and the relationships lack sustainability over the long term, which undercuts its geopolitical ambitions in the Mediterranean. If Russia’s ambitions in the Mediterranean region are limited to maintaining access, currying favor with key decisionmakers, and remaining a nuisance to NATO, then its current level of economic ties is likely sufficient. If Russia aims to grow its influence and clout with more countries in the region, however, its current economic tool kit does not appear to be large or sophisticated enough to achieve this. Economic statecraft is an important tool in any country’s foreign policy. Trade and investment deals link countries together in vital ways to improve living standards in each country. They also build relationships between people—politicians, business leaders, students, tourists—that promote mutual understanding and respect for each other’s cultures. The United States and the European Union (EU) have generally excelled in building these types of economic ties in the post–World War II era, and economic data show they continue to be the dominant economic powers in the Mediterranean. Continuing this leadership in the economy will likely ensure that Russian influence in the Mediterranean remains a manageable, if persistent, problem for the West.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, Trade, Regional Power, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

43. Reassessing Russian Capabilities in the Levant and North Africa

Author:
Frederic M. Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia may be back in the Middle East, but is it a truly strategic player? The picture is decidedly mixed. After abandoning most of its presence in the Levant and North Africa during the late 1980s, the Kremlin has alarmed Western policymakers in recent years by filling power vacuums and exploiting the missteps of the United States and the European states. Moscow panders to the insecurities and ambitions of local regimes, trying to enrich itself along the way. While Russian activism is part of a broader push for great power status, most of its policies are rooted more in opportunism than grand strategy. Yet Russian influence is formidable in many respects. In war-wracked states like Syria and Libya, Moscow has adroitly deployed military forces and engaged with actors that are off-limits to Westerners, thus positioning itself as a significant power broker. In Egypt and Algeria, it has pursued arms deals that are unencumbered by human rights conditions. Russia’s economic footprint is expanding in fields ranging from infrastructure to tourism to energy, contributing, in some instances, to the region’s cronyism and corruption. At the same time, a closer look at Russian activism reveals that its ability to shape events in the Middle East is far more modest than is commonly assumed. Russia has neither the tools nor the willingness to tackle the region’s deep-seated socioeconomic and governance problems. In Syria, the limits of the Kremlin’s military commitment have been exposed amid clashes with other powerful, outside players and a hardening stalemate on the ground. For now, Moscow is simply not in a position to achieve its desired military or political outcomes absent a significant investment of new resources. Russian economic penetration is driven mainly by short-term objectives and a search for outsized financial rewards that sometimes fail to materialize or to make Moscow an attractive partner. Russian inroads are further limited by regional factors like fractured politics and capricious local actors, who, despite being plied with Russian attention and support, do not behave as docile proxies. In many instances, Middle Eastern rulers exert far more power in shaping the extent of Russian influence than conventional narratives suggest. Successive leaders of Egypt, for instance, have perfected the game of soliciting Russia’s attention to gain leverage over other patrons, namely the United States. For their part, Israeli leaders have worked hard to ensure that Russia does not throw major obstacles in the way of Israel’s ongoing campaign against Iranian military encroachment in Syria—yet they surely take note when Moscow does the bare minimum in raising concerns about the situation in Gaza. The limits of Russian influence are similarly noticeable in the heartbreaking economic crisis in Lebanon, where Moscow is little more than a bystander. With these limitations in mind, Washington should avoid viewing the region through a zero-sum, Cold War lens that sees every development as a net gain or loss for Moscow or minimizes the agency of local actors. In the context of multiple policy challenges across the globe and at home, U.S. decisionmakers need to prioritize the areas of Russian influence that necessitate a response. In so doing, they should avoid playing the arms sales game on Moscow’s terms or letting themselves be instrumentalized by autocratic Middle Eastern rulers who point to Russian overtures to seek leniency and support from Washington. U.S. and European policymakers have ample tools at their disposal that can frustrate or slow the more malign forms of Moscow’s inroads. Yet the net impact of such pushback on Russian resolve should not be overstated. Instead, Washington should focus its energies on its biggest comparative advantage vis-à-vis Moscow in the region: namely, its abundant sources of influence and leverage in the economic and security spheres, its still-potent soft power, and its leadership of multilateral diplomacy and the rules-based global order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Economy, and Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, North America, and Levant

44. India’s Fog of Misunderstanding Surrounding Nepal–China Relations

Author:
Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
India’s postindependence ties with Nepal were predicated on the intimate cultural and historical links between the two countries. As India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, noted, “though Nepal was an independent country, it was very closely allied to India in culture and tradition and we did not look upon it as a foreign country.” New Delhi also regarded China as an “interloper” in Nepal in 1950 who threatened India’s security and interests in the region, ignoring at least a century of Sino-Nepali history centering around Tibet. This paper argues that New Delhi’s close relationship with Nepal, bound in history and culture, and the misperception about China’s relations with Nepal before 1950 have contributed to a skewed understanding of Sino-Nepali relations. The Working Paper looks at the impact that New Delhi’s misperceptions of Sino-Nepali relations, termed the “fog of misunderstanding,” has had in the context of the triangular relations between China, India, and Nepal. The paper is divided into four sections arranged chronologically. The first section looks at the historical Sino-Nepali relationship from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. It establishes that this early relationship was centered on Tibet. While the Gorkha kings of Nepal sought to preserve their trade privileges in the region, the Chinese were concerned about the security of their southwestern frontier. Notably though, Beijing’s concern with security does not appear to have extended into any desire to conquer Nepal. This section also touches upon British India’s policy toward Nepal in the nineteenth century, and the subsequent approach that the government of independent India took in the first few years, without an adequate appreciation of Kathmandu’s history with China. As a consequence, India developed a suspicious attitude toward Beijing’s desire to re-establish ties with Kathmandu after the Chinese Civil War, and shaped its policy toward Nepal with this factor in mind. The second section delves into Indian and Chinese policies toward Nepal in the period from 1955 until the end of the monarchy in 2008. It showcases how, during this long period, the three kings of Nepal sought to leverage their ties with China in order to maintain some semblance of balance and how China, in turn, followed a limited but strategic approach that was centered on the kings. The fog of misunderstanding continued to shroud India’s attitude to Nepal-China relations during this period and, consequently, India’s Nepal policy lacked a working template to manage relations with a smaller neighbor sandwiched between India and China in a way that would preserve New Delhi’s influence in a positive way. In contrast to China’s political approach, New Delhi fluctuated between the monarchy and an assortment of democratic political parties, suggestive of a provincial approach in New Delhi’s dealing with Kathmandu. As a result, China’s approach ensured that its main objective in Nepal, namely the security of its southwestern frontier, was secured with a relatively low-risk and low-cost strategy. The third section deals with the aftermath of the fall of the Nepali monarchy, 2008 to 2016. During this important period, New Delhi had a fresh opportunity to reset ties by providing the support to democratic forces in Nepal, that could have resulted in a transformation of the Indo-Nepali ties. However, India appeared to hew to its traditional policy. China, on the other hand, quickly built new ties with the post-monarchical dispensation. India’s perceived actions as a result of the adoption of the new constitution of Nepal plunged Indo-Nepali ties to a nadir. It seems to have pushed Kathmandu to strengthen its relationship with China. This section of the paper also outlines the changing nature of China’s policy and objectives in Nepal, especially in the second decade of the twenty-first century, and its possible implications on the future course of the triangular relationship, as well as for India-Nepal relations. It postulates that under President Xi Jinping, China’s policy toward Nepal has shifted from protecting its periphery to a broader goal of bringing Nepal under its strategic control. This section highlights the political and economic levers that Beijing is using to build a preeminent position in Nepal. The paper concludes with an assessment of options available to all three countries going forward, and India’s options in Nepal in the face of China’s new policy in the region. It suggests that a decisive reset in policy toward Nepal is required to restore healthy relations that are based on mutual respect and mutual sensitivity. New Delhi may need to re-orient its thinking toward Nepal in the context of triangular relations, including on the boundary issue and the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship that have been long-standing irritants in the India-Nepal relationship. Nepal, for its part, should also reflect carefully on whether its leveraging of China might become counterproductive in the light of changing strategic balance in its vicinity, and the implications of giving up the policy of balance for one that tilts decisively toward Beijing. The paper concludes that there is sufficient scope and opportunity for course correction by India, and that through sustained efforts India may be able to preserve its influence and security in Nepal and counter China’s expanding footprint.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, Asia, and Nepal

45. Taiwan’s Opportunities in Emerging Industry Supply Chains

Author:
Evan A. Feigenbaum and Michael R. Nelson
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
To some, the acute supply chain crisis that has followed in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic is a sign of poor planning, lack of resilience and surge capacity, and industry rigidity. Inflation is also having a major impact and will inevitably lead to some supply chain reconfiguration. But structural shifts matter too, including rising costs in mainland China—the world’s manufacturing’s powerhouse—and the overconcentration of freight in just ten companies that control 85 percent of global container capacity. Globalization has bequeathed a system that seemed efficient until it was tested by the multidimensional crises of the last two years. In industry after industry, C-suites are planning for a world of disruption. At a minimum, companies aim to build resilience and redundancy into their supply chains. But there is another factor—political risk—that is complicating planning, especially in technology-intensive industries. Specifically, the emergence of multidimensional strategic competition between Beijing and Washington has interrupted the flow of goods, capital, people, technology, and data. And these geopolitical disruptions look set to become a long-term structural trend. This is a sea change that will invariably bleed into many industries and rejigger supply chains. But amid the disruption, some economies will have fresh opportunities to attract investment, build out new industries, and diversify their growth drivers. Taiwan is one such economy that may stand to benefit from the supply chain rethink. This paper explores some ways that it could do so. But to seize opportunities in this dynamic environment, Taiwan needs policy changes and technology investments to better position its ecosystem of government, business, academia, research institutions, and labor to attract new supply chain opportunities, especially for the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the emerging economy of the twenty-first century. Two prior Carnegie Endowment studies of Taiwan’s economic competitiveness included specific recommendations that could comprise the foundation of an ecosystem that serves the public interest by bolstering Taiwan’s profile and role in more and more global supply chains. Most notably, these were Carnegie’s recommendations to position Taiwan’s economy as a trusted hub, trusted vendor, trusted tester, and trusted conduit for technology-intensive R&D and production. Taiwan’s public interest would benefit if such opportunities became a counterpoint to mainland China’s scale advantages. But Taiwan faces intense competition from other economies in Asia and Europe that also seek to capitalize on supply chain shifts, reaping the harvest from their investments while carving out specialized niches amid rising suspicion of mainland China-origin technology products and services. This study aims to help to refine competitive choices for Taiwan while highlighting unique comparative advantages that would make it an especially attractive place for new global investments. The paper digs deeply into two opportunities for Taiwan. The first involves dynamic changes in one of the high-tech industries that Taipei has made into a strategic priority—the life sciences, including biotechnology and precision medicine. Despite twenty years of concerted effort and some signal successes, especially with drug development and diagnostics, Taiwan has not captured a role or market share analogous to its multidecade build-out in semiconductors. For Taiwan, trust will be the crucial variable and competitive advantage. Taiwan could, for example, leverage its advantages with high-quality medical data to become a locus for clinical trials, while also leveraging other advantages for global supply chains in the drug discovery, advanced diagnostics, and personalized medicine markets. But to do so, it will need to make policy and regulatory changes and make some new strategic investments. The second chapter turns to whether Taiwan’s economy could be positioned as a leader in testing, validating, and deploying software, which would give Taiwan-based firms a larger role in the information technology services business where mainland China, India, and others have a larger profile. Elements of Taiwan’s ecosystem could potentially be positioned to use software engineering to ensure that business software and services produced by local companies and their international partners are more tested and more trusted than competing products on the market.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Investment, Industry, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Taiwan and Asia

46. The Scramble for the Eastern Mediterranean: Energy and Geopolitics

Author:
Valeria Talbot
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
Over the past few years, the Eastern Mediterranean has become a major hotspot for both natural gas and geopolitical competition. Natural gas discoveries in the last decade have attracted growing interest from regional countries and beyond. However, recent escalations in tensions and outright confrontations suggest that competition goes beyond the scramble for energy. Indeed, natural gas is just one of the factors that contribute to shaping security and geopolitical dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean, which has emerged as a crucial strategic area in the broader Mediterranean and the Middle East. Moving from the analysis of these interconnected factors, this Report examines the strategy and the plethora of interests of regional and international players, as well as the interplay between cooperative and competitive dynamics in the region. What are the geopolitical, security, and energy interests of the countries involved? What are the implications on the regional security context of the moves and policies of regional and international powers?
Topic:
Natural Resources, Geopolitics, Gas, Strategic Competition, and Energy
Political Geography:
Middle East and Mediterranean

47. Winds of change in the Eastern Mediterranean: Between hydrocarbons and renewable energy geopolitics

Author:
Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Constantine Levoyannis
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Once a cradle of empires, civilizations and religions, the Mediterranean region that once dominated world trade today stands among the world regions with the lowest interconnectivity, trade and investment flows. Under these rather unpromising circumstances, the discovery of sizeable natural gas reserves under the seabed of the Eastern Mediterranean in the 2000s and early 2010s appeared as a golden opportunity for the emergence of the Mediterranean in the EU and global energy map, as well as for regional economic cooperation. Yet various missed opportunities and with gas consumption set to decline sharply post 2030 within the European Union, the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas reserves are no longer likely to emerge as gamechanger in EU energy geopolitics. There is another field where the Eastern Mediterranean can play a leading role in the transformation of European energy policy, giving a new dimension to Eastern Mediterranean energy geopolitics. A new, more dynamic and forward-looking energy and climate strategy is needed and with it, a need to evolve from the traditional definition of energy security. The European Green Deal has transformed the discussion on the monetization of natural resources with a negative climate footprint. While the European Union pledges to turn climate neutral by 2050, carbon dioxide emissions must be decisively cut, affecting the use of hydrocarbons including natural gas. This development brings forward a major opportunity for economic cooperation in the Mediterranean, focusing on the development of infrastructure for the production, storage and transport of renewable energy towards Europe. A robust political response is necessary to address climate change to keep our planet viable. The European Green Deal emerges as a new historic cooperation opportunity for a region with lots of regional conflicts as well as with a lot of unrealized potential.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, Renewable Energy, and Hydrocarbons
Political Geography:
Mediterranean

48. Greece’s Rise as a Trans-Mediterranean Power: Greece’s Eastern Mediterranean strategic shift to Europe-to-Africa and Europe-to-Middle East connectivity

Author:
Michaël Tanchum
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Greece stands at the threshold of a strategic shift that could see the Hellenic Republic become Europe’s geopolitical gatekeeper of the emerging East Africa-to-Europe and Middle East-to-Europe commercial corridors. Whether Greece becomes a European leader in trans-Mediterranean connectivity depends on Athens’ ability to develop its own position in East Africa-to-Europe and Middle East-to-Europe manufacturing value chains. Greece’s advancing green energy, innovation economy offers promising avenues to engage Egypt, Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia in joint ventures that will transform Greece into a cutting-edge trans-Mediterranean actor. Greece’s new trans-Mediterranean profile is a strategic shift that will require the EU system to adjust its perception of Greece and incentivize closer coordination between Greece and other member states to facilitate joint venture investments in the two corridors. In the absence of such coordination, Athens will continue to deepen its relations with Egypt, Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia while engaging with select EU member states. The extent to which Greece succeeds at industrial value chain integration will determine its role in the emerging trans-regional commercial architecture, and with it, Greece’s strategic standing within the European Union and the MENA region.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, and Value Chains
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Middle East, Greece, and Mediterranean

49. Coordination Failure: Risks of US-China competition in space

Author:
Gidon Gautel
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
The 2020s will see a flurry of space activity, with both national and commercial programs picking up pace. Both the United States and China hold strong ambitions in telecommunications, lunar exploration, and beyond. However, currently fraught relations between the superpowers are unlikely to improve and may yet deteriorate further. On the one hand, competition between both countries may drive space activities and foster technological innovation. On the other, as both superpowers expand their activities in space, geopolitical tensions may increase the risk of harmful dynamics that could endanger the sustainable rollout of future programs. In this Strategic Update, Gidon Gautel seeks to outline and call attention to two high-risk flash points arising from the development of the US and China’s national space programmes and industries.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Space, Innovation, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

50. Strategic Report

Author:
Zaid Eyadat and Moh'd Khair Eiedat
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)
Abstract:
This is not a historical nor chronological report. It is rather “a working paper”. The purpose of this rather brief report is to reflect on three major issues: first, what are the characteristics of the world we live in? How stable and predictable is it? Are those in power know what are they doing? Or is it the blind leading the blind? Is our sense of uncertainty and thus unpredictability a product of mental crisis related to one in a lifetime pandemic experience? or is it more structural with long historical span? The second question is how dangerous and out of control is the Middle east region? Or is it? The Abraham Accords promise a new dawn for the region? Paradise is just around the corner or the calm preceding the storm? The third question, where does Jordan fit in these wider circles of activities both global and regional? Deliberately we left out of the report any serious considerations of the economic aspect challenge facing Jordan which is both self-evident and widely recognized. Moreover, the emphasis is on the geostrategic aspects of security related to the global level, the regional level and that of Jordan. Let us first look at the world.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Jordan

51. The “Four Plus One”: The Changing Power Politics of the Middle East

Author:
Joshua Krasna and George Meladze
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In this inaugural MDC Occasional Paper, Josh Krasna and George Meladze analyze the structure of power in the Middle East during the past decade, mapping the main regional players and the interrelationships between them, and assessing the potential for future change in the politics of the region.
Topic:
Politics, Regional Cooperation, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

52. Engagement of External Powers in Africa: Takeaways for India

Author:
Rajiv Bhatia
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
As multiple foreign powers compete in Africa, there is a need to understand the geopolitical landscape, and analyse the various policies, strategies and motivations of each country. Where lies India in this great strategic game? India has a unique relationship with the continent, with respect for equality, mutual benefit, and need-based assistance. By deepening India-Africa cooperation, bolstering economic relations and leveraging new digital, space and medical technologies, the relationship between India and the African nations can be better cemented, despite the global competition at play.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Engagement, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, South Asia, and India

53. Inserting India into U.S.-Israel Defence Technology Cooperation

Author:
Gateway House
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
Over the last decade and a half, Israel and the U.S. have become India’s top arms suppliers, and a robust defence partnership is underway. Beyond pure defence trade, Israeli and U.S. defence companies have participated in the ‘Make in India’ initiative, focusing on technology transfers and the co-development and co-production of technologies. This is the moment for India to capitalise on these two critical, bilateral defence partners, and particularly the start-up innovation hubs of Silicon Valley and Tel Aviv. How can India insert itself into the U.S.-Israel defence technology cooperation corridor, and participate in the development of emerging technologies like quantum computing and artificial intelligence in defence? What benefit will the U.S. and Israel gain from a partnership with India? This paper studies the U.S.-Israel defence technology corridor, and suggests potential collaborations for India. It will necessitate the three innovation hubs of Silicon Valley, Tel Aviv and Bengaluru coming together to capitalise on their respective strengths and declared national technology priorities. Bringing a like-minded, tech-savvy democracy like India into the arc of the U.S.-Israel partnership will offer a trinity of benefits: a robust and tested edge in emerging technologies to the three militaries over their adversaries, develop interoperability, and reinforce their access to the Indian market. The greatest benefit will be for India, which has been set back by lengthy defence acquisition procedures, and will do better with a modern defence base at home. India will have to overcome the geopolitical hurdles of its defence relationship with Russia, and of Israel’s reported defence ties with China and Pakistan, to build a sturdy trilateral cooperation.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Arms Trade, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, India, Israel, and United States of America