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4862. The Shadow Sector: North Korea’s Information Technology Networks
- Author:
- Andrea Berger, Cameron Trainer, Shea Cotton, and Catherine Dill
- Publication Date:
- 05-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- Abstract:
- North Korea’s commercial information technology (IT) industry has operated overseas, largely unnoticed, for decades. It sells a range of products and services including website and app development, administrative and business management software, IT security software, and biometric identification software for law enforcement applications. Its global network includes a myriad of front companies, intermediaries, and foreign partnerships. Yet despite the attention currently paid to North Korea’s overseas revenue streams and its offensive activities in cyberspace, the spotlight has yet to illuminate the money-spinning North Korean IT firms whose offerings seem to have found their way into corporate supply chains and potentially even Western-allied law enforcement agencies. Drawing upon extensive open-source investigations by the authors, this paper examines several nodes in North Korea-linked IT networks and considers the implications for current and future policy efforts to stem North Korean revenue and mitigate the cyber-security threats the country poses.
- Topic:
- Cybersecurity, Information Age, Disinformation, and Information Technology
- Political Geography:
- Asia and North Korea
4863. All the World is Staged
- Author:
- Jack O Nassetta and Ethan P. Fecht
- Publication Date:
- 09-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- Abstract:
- Though much of the scrutiny into foreign interference in US political debates focuses on long-term election operations, foreign actors have now turned to social media to conduct short-term tactical operations. These operations aim to affect American attitudes toward specific US foreign and military policy, and ultimately affect the policy itself. In recent years, state actors and loosely affiliated patriotic operators have inorganically inserted themselves into the political discussion surrounding US intervention in Syria following the use of chemical weapons. Through continually evolving techniques, these “synthetic actors” are likely the main driving force behind shaping the character of the counternarrative discussion surrounding the use of chemical weapons in Syria. “All the World is Staged: An Analysis of Social Media Influence Operations against US Counterproliferation Efforts in Syria,” CNS Occasional Paper #37, seeks to analyze the tradecraft, trends, themes, and possible effects of disinformation produced by suspected synthetic actors (i.e., bots, trolls, and cyborgs) on Twitter concerning chemical weapons use in Syria. Although it is highly likely these synthetic actors exist on other social media platforms as well, this analysis focuses exclusively on Twitter, since the open nature of the platform allows for study without special access. Furthermore, we aim to improve public and academic awareness of foreign, inorganic disinformation efforts against our domestic decision-making processes. We hope that this text contributes to the efforts to prevent the erosion of the integrity of the political conversations that matter most. It concludes with salient recommendations for both policy makers and social network companies, focusing on how they can prevent synthetic actors from abusing their platforms for influence operations.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America
4864. Geo4Nonpro 2.0
- Author:
- Melissa Hanham
- Publication Date:
- 10-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- Abstract:
- The most impressive discovery was North Korea’s Kangson uranium-enrichment facility. CNS believes it to be the first time this facility has been identified or analyzed in the open-source literature. It represents the possibility that North Korea has been producing—and can continue to produce—as much, if not more, fissile material for nuclear weapons than it could have using the only previously known enrichment site at Yongbyon. The first section of this report discusses the evolution of the platform: from the conception of Geo4Nonpro 1.0 and the initial training of G4N team members, to the lessons learned during the first phase of the project and how these lessons fed into the platform’s continued development. The second section describes the launch of Geo4Nonpro 2.0, its new features, and highlights news stories that featured Geo4Nonpro and the central role that it played in many of these discoveries. This is followed by an analysis of each campaign. Lastly, the team proposes the next steps and future applications for this innovative platform.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nuclear Power, and Emerging Technology
- Political Geography:
- Asia and North Korea
4865. Safeguards and Verification in Inaccessible Territories
- Author:
- Chen Kane
- Publication Date:
- 10-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- Abstract:
- The paper aims to assist the international community and international organizations (IOs), such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to better prepare for challenges related to verification and safeguards of nuclear materials, chemical weapons, and facilities in inaccessible territories. The paper identifies lessons from past and ongoing cases (Iraq, Libya, Syria, Fukushima/Japan, and Crimea/Ukraine) and presents policy, legal, and technical recommendations to the IAEA, OPCW, and their member states to overcome some of these challenges. The challenges in verifying and safeguarding nuclear materials in inaccessible sites have existed for decades. Past cases include Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Serbia during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the number of cases in which international organizations such as the IAEA and the OPCW had to verify the status of declared materials in territories they could not access increased significantly since 2010. This report discusses three categories of situations from which the IAEA and the OPCW have been barred from accessing sensitive materials or facilities. One category consists of locations that are insecure or unsafe and thus involve high risk to IO staff such as in Libya, Iraq, and Fukushima (Japan). The other two categories involve territory over which the state responsible for securing access does not have de facto control. This occurs when the site is controlled by either nonstate actors, such as some sites in Iraq and Syria, or by another state, as in Crimea, Ukraine. In many of these instances, securing access involves a range of political sensitivities, such as civil war, occupation, or natural disaster, which has broader implications and complexities beyond nuclear or chemical nonproliferation, further complicating an IO’s ability to gain access to the site or use other means to gather required information. Each of these situations poses different political, legal, and technical challenges and limitations, but they also offer potential novel solutions.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, Chemical Weapons, Nuclear Safety, and Disaster Management
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
4866. Monitoring Uranium Mining and Milling in China and North Korea through Remote Sensing Imagery
- Author:
- Melissa Hanham
- Publication Date:
- 10-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- Abstract:
- Although uranium mining and milling constitute the first step in any nuclear-weapons program, nuclear nonproliferation analysts have devoted surprisingly little attention to monitoring these processes. Understanding and monitoring uranium mines and mills can provide deeper insight into fissile-material production. This report focuses on the insights gleaned from remotely sensed images of known Chinese uranium mines and mills to understand the current status of uranium mining and milling in North Korea.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Surveillance, Mining, and Uranium
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and North Korea
4867. Monitoring Uranium Mining and Milling in India and Pakistan through Remote Sensing Imagery
- Author:
- Melissa Hanham, Grace Liu, Joseph Rodgers, and Ben McIntosh
- Publication Date:
- 11-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- Abstract:
- CNS Occasional Paper #41 details existing and potential uranium mines and mills in India and Pakistan as part of an ongoing project to track uranium production in Asian states that possess nuclear weapons. As non-signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, India and Pakistan face challenges procuring fissile material from foreign sources. Both countries have ongoing nuclear-weapon programs, clear and increasing demands to supply their nuclear-energy programs, and domestic production deficits. The continuing and increasing demand for uranium in India and Pakistan indicates that domestic uranium production is likely to grow significantly in the near future. This paper explores remote-sensing techniques that can allow open-source analysts to monitor and track front-end uranium production activity in these countries. India and Pakistan both have plans to expand their nuclear-energy industries, increasing both countries’ demands for uranium. However, without membership in the NPT, both countries face a multitude of challenges to importing uranium. They are not entitled to receive nuclear-related technologies from nuclear-weapon states, nor are they allowed to trade nuclear materials with any NPT states parties. This leaves only non-signatory countries as possible trading partners: Israel, North Korea, and South Sudan. Pakistan has a history of trade with North Korea through the now-defunct A.Q. Khan network. Both India and Pakistan are expanding existing uranium mines and mills and funding exploratory research into new sites for uranium-resource exploitation. Both countries still rely heavily on domestic production of uranium resources, which allows analysts to gain significant insight into their nuclear capabilities by monitoring domestic uranium-production sites. The operational output of a mine or processing plant can be gauged by weighing numerous factors, including the amounts of vehicle traffic, construction on the site, tailings and waste piles, and changes in the surrounding environment.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Surveillance, Mining, and Uranium
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, India, and Asia
4868. he Other Fissile Material: Strengthening National and International Plutonium Management Approaches
- Author:
- John Carlson, Leonard Spector, and Miles A. Pomper
- Publication Date:
- 12-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- Abstract:
- CNS Occasional Paper #42 discusses issues relating to separated, or unirradiated, plutonium in civilian nuclear programs, that is, plutonium that has been chemically separated from spent nuclear reactor fuel by reprocessing but has not been reintroduced into a nuclear reactor after separation and subjected to further irradiation. Efforts to limit the spread of reprocessing in the civilian sector crystalized in the mid-1970s. Two developments triggered the intensified attention to this issue: (1) India’s 1974 test of a nuclear explosive device, which used as its core plutonium produced in an ostensibly peaceful nuclear-research program, and (2) attempts on the part of several states that had not renounced nuclear weapons to obtain reprocessing plants for their civil nuclear power programs. In the intervening forty-four years, in those states that proceeded with civilian reprocessing programs, stocks of separated civilian plutonium have continued to grow in the aggregate. Taken together today, they are substantially greater than worldwide military plutonium stocks. Multiple approaches to limiting the separation of civil plutonium have been implemented, and still others have been given serious study, but stocks have increased regardless, while options for working down these stocks appear to be diminishing. Meanwhile, concern has deepened over the possible theft or diversion of this material, which could bring weapon-sufficient quantities of plutonium into the hands of violent extremists. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards are valuable, but they do not fully address the risks of breakout from nonproliferation or disarmament commitments. Safeguards are intended to provide timely warning of diversion, so as to provide an opportunity for intervention. However, even if diversion of plutonium is detected immediately, the plutonium could be weaponized too quickly for effective preventive measures. Nor are safeguards designed to address nuclear-material security issues. Accordingly, there is a need for institutional and technical measures to mitigate risks from separated plutonium. This report recommends steps to address the risks posed by existing reprocessing programs and stocks as well as ways to discourage potential new programs.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Governance, Nuclear Power, and Mining
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
4869. North Korea’s International Scientific Collaborations: Their Scope, Scale, and Potential Dual-Use and Military Significance
- Author:
- Joshua Pollack and Scott LaFoy
- Publication Date:
- 12-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- Abstract:
- North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has described research and development as crucial to his regime’s efforts to overcome the international sanctions regime. By developing key technologies indigenously, North Korea seeks to reduce its need to import sensitive goods that might otherwise be denied to it through export controls, sanctions enforcement, or lack of funds. Direct collaboration between North Korean and foreign scientists is playing an expanding role in the regime’s pursuit of technological advancement. To assess the extent of this activity, and to identify collaborative research involving dual-use technologies and other technologies of potential military significance, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey developed a new dataset capturing publications coauthored by North Korean scientists and foreign scientists between 1958 and April 2018.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Nuclear Power
- Political Geography:
- Asia and North Korea
4870. Is the IDF Ready for Our Next War?
- Author:
- David M. Weinberg
- Publication Date:
- 01-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- The IDF is building an impressive capacity to crush Hezbollah, Hamas and Iranian assets in future fighting. But it must not neglect defense of the periphery or go soft on its ethos and fighting spirit.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Israel