Content Type: Working Paper / Publication Year: within 10 Years

6151. Al Shabaab Remains Virulent as ISIS Shifts to Egypt

Author:: Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: A quarterly update of a map tracking militant Islamic group activity in Africa as compiled by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Al Shabaab has been involved in over half of all violent events related to militant Islamist groups in Africa in the first three quarters of 2017 (987 of 1,827 total).
Topic:: Violent Extremism, ISIS, Militant Islam, and Al Shabaab
Political Geography:: Africa, North Africa, West Africa, and East Africa

6152. South Sudan Conflict Drives Massive Population Movement

Author:: Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Mass atrocities, including unlawful killings, rape, torture, and destruction of property, have caused one in three people in South Sudan to flee their homes.
Topic:: Genocide, Human Rights, United Nations, Refugees, and Displacement
Political Geography:: Africa, Sudan, East Africa, South Sudan, and Central Africa

6153. Dynamics of African Economic Migration

Author:: Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 12-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Migration continues to be a major issue affecting African societies. Here are three observations on how Africa’s economic migrants* affect security on the continent:
Topic:: Migration, United Nations, Diaspora, Refugees, and Displacement
Political Geography:: Africa, Libya, Egypt, Mediterranean, and Gulf of Aden

6154. Aftermath of the Terror Attack on Breitscheid Platz Christmas Market: Germany’s Security Architecture and Parliamentary Inquiries

Author:: Sebastian von Münchow
Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:: On December 19th 2016, Anis Amri, a Tunisian citizen, hijacked a truck and crashed into a Christmas market at Breitscheid Platz in Berlin. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack, which resulted in twelve deaths and fifty additional casualties. Amri escaped the crime scene and travelled through Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France to Northern Italy where police officers killed him near Milan three days later. This assault was the first major terrorist event in Germany for decades. Prior to this event, the most recent attacks were the Red Army Faction plots in the 1970s, the Olympics hostage-taking in 1972, and the right-wing motivated attack on Munich’s Oktoberfest in 1980. This attack, in which a vehicle rammed into a crowded Christmas market in the center of Berlin, not only sparked a debate about Berlin’s migration policy at large, but also focused the conversation on specific questions. How could Amri be seeking asylum in Germany despite his criminal record in Italy? How did he operate inside Germany using fourteen different identities? Did he rely on a network of supporters? How did he manage to travel through half of Europe before his life ended? Some political voices called for security-related reforms aimed at improving video surveillance, data exchange, and deportation processes, while others demanded a thorough parliamentary investigation of the plot. This paper will briefly touch upon those parliamentary attempts on state and federal level to explore the plot. It will then revisit federal inquiries into matters related to the security architecture over the past twenty-seven years as well as the coverage of these inquiries in the media. Finally, this study will conclude with some thoughts about whether a federal parliamentary inquiry should have been used to investigate what happened before, during, and after the attack.
Topic:: Migration, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, Italy, Berlin, and Central Europe

6155. Footprints in Paradise: Ecotourism, Local Knowledge, and Nature Therapies in Okinawa

Author:: Andrea E. Murray
Publication Date:: 06-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Berghahn Books
Abstract:: The economic imperative of sustainable tourism development frequently shapes life on small subtropical islands. In Okinawa, ecotourism promises to provide employment for a dwindling population of rural youth while preserving the natural environment and bolstering regional pride. Footprints in Paradise explores the transformation in community and sense of place as Okinawans come to view themselves through the lens of the visiting tourist consumer, and as their language, landscapes, and wildlife are reconstituted as treasured and vulnerable resources. The rediscovery and revaluing of local ecological knowledge strengthens Okinawan or Uchinaa cultural heritage, despite the controversial presence of US military bases amidst a hegemonic Japanese state.
Topic:: Environment, Imperialism, Tourism, and Local
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, Asia, and Okinawa

6156. URBAN CONFLICTS IN NORTHERN AMAZON REGION: DISORDERED GROWTH OF WETLANDS/RESSACAS IN MACAPÁ

Author:: Bianca Moro de Carvalho
Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The New School Graduate Program in International Affairs
Abstract:: Internationally recognized for its immense wealth of natural resources, the Brazilian Amazon Region and its enormous forest are characterized by significant urban conflicts. The growth of illegal settlements in Amazon cities is a sad reality that has transformed the region’s space. The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate part of my doctorate investigation in which I present the squatter-settlement development process (called favelização) of wetlands in the city of Macapá where there is intense occupation of environmental protection areas for precarious housing construction. Also by virtue of such phenomenon, the Federal University of Amapá, via its extension project called “Planning with the Community,” has been seeking to answer some questions relating to informal urbanization processes and their effects on communities living in ressaca areas.
Topic:: Environment, Urbanization, Conflict, and Settlements
Political Geography:: Brazil, South America, and Amazon Basin

6157. KIDNAPPING OF MIGRANTS IN TRANSIT THROUGH MEXICO AND THE TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS FOR THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS: SCOPE AND STRATEGIES

Author:: Monica Salmon Gómez
Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The New School Graduate Program in International Affairs
Abstract:: The human rights crisis in Mexico and particularly the one with migrants in transit through Mexico is not coincidental. The increased securitization of migration has transformed it into a security issue, causing it to be a threat to the national security. The mechanisms and strategies to fight against this crisis has led to terrible consequences to the thousand of migrants that pass through Mexico every year. As stated by David Harvey, the conceptualization of the irregular migration as a threat to the Nation-States has occurred as a consequence of the “global unequal capitalist integration”. This is a structural process that promotes global inequality in a parallel way, creating the undocumented as the others unwanted (Álvarez and Guillot, 2012:24). We then have migration as a phenomenon characterized by the economic globalization and the predominance of the logic of social exclusion, that it reveals itself as a feature for nations and families in their need to seek, among other things, improved living conditions in places that are different from their place of origin
Topic:: Security, Human Rights, Migration, United Nations, and Inequality
Political Geography:: United States, South America, Latin America, North America, and Mexico

6158. DECOLONIZATION IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM: INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND LEGAL PLURALISM, A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN BOLIVIA, COLOMBIA, AND ECUADOR

Author:: Sergio Miranda Hayes
Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The New School Graduate Program in International Affairs
Abstract:: In the academic world, scientific literature comes mainly from the western part of the globe. Ramón Grossfoguel believes that knowledge is determined by power relations in the "post-colonial" era (Grossfoguel, 2002: 16). This means that Western powers dominate the academic world. In constitutional law, this is not the exception. However, while we can accept that it is true that many constitutional provisions, doctrine, jurisprudence and theories of Western constitutional law have influenced Latin American countries, most of these countries have also developed their own constitutional systems that have specific and new features, whose unique identity differentiates them from other systems in the world. In this paper, I will try to study the special features that Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia have in the recognition of indigenous rights and legal pluralism, whose discursive axis entails a “decolonizing” spirit which is the retrieval of their own institutions against the trends of hegemonic governance of the western culture as I will explain later. Latin America has faced numerous problems concerning social differentiation. In the opinion of one of the most cited authors in Latin American constitutional law, Raquel Yrigoyen, the disadvantaged were left behind from the social, economic and political issues through legal measures created by people of a favored minority, in order to maintain privileges (Yrigoyen, 2011: 139). In the case of Latin America, many of the disadvantaged match to be those survivors of the brutal Spanish conquest; the native Indians. I have chosen these three countries since they have a significant indigenous population; more than 36.6 million indigenous people in the region. In Bolivia, the number rises to 4,115,222 natives, in Ecuador 1018176,and in Colombia 1392623. (World Bank, 2014: 24-25) The Constitutions of Colombia (1991), Ecuador (2008) and Bolivia (2009) reflect the new “decolonizing” ideology; Colombia through its jurisprudence, on the one hand, and Bolivia and Ecuador, proclaiming themselves "Plurinational”countries on the other. All made great strides in recognizing indigenous rights and, consequently, in gaining their social inclusion. (Gargarella, 2014: 175) Constitutional systems are a product of history and the struggle of peoples. In these cases, the effort to include indigenous peoples in the economic, political and social spheres resulted in these new constitutional models which can be understood through a comparative study.By understanding this, advantages and disadvantages of each country to improve social inclusion of indigenous peoples in all the mentioned spheres can be found. In the first title, I will talk about the meaning of legal pluralism. In the second, I will discussthe new models of statewhich are conditioned by legal pluralism and indigenous rights. In the third, I will address indigenous autonomies and jurisdictions that are the subject of our study. And in the remaining two titles, I will discuss the most distinctive features, and rights arising from the recognition of this unique legal pluralism. All this with the purpose of exposing the new constitutional spirit of "decolonization" of these countries.
Topic:: Human Rights, Post Colonialism, Legal Theory, Colonialism, Decolonization, and Economic Inequality
Political Geography:: United States, Colombia, South America, Latin America, North America, Ecuador, and Bolivia

6159. PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS TO ENABLE WOMEN TO ACCESS A LIFE FREE FROM VIOLENCE IN MEXICO CITY: AN INTERVENTION PROPOSING TO WORK WITH YOUNG MEN FOR THE PREVENTION OF MASCULINE VIOLENCE

Author:: Isabella Esquivel Ventura
Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The New School Graduate Program in International Affairs
Abstract:: This document is a synthesis of a Master's thesis titled “Public Policy analysis to enable women to access a life free from violence in Mexico City: an intervention proposing to work with young men for the prevention of masculine violence”, developed over the course of 2013-14, as part of the Master's program in Public Policy and Gender offered by the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences based in Mexico, and which was defended in front of an academic panel in August 2014. The investigation is a policy analysis, using the conceptual and argumentative framework of gender theory, and involves the analysis of a social problem of inequality between men and women, with the end to propose recommendations for a solution using public policy. Thusmasculine gender violence against women is the public problem of gender inequality which is the object of this policy analysis, a problem which is present in Mexican society both historically and structurally. Current prevention policies in Mexico City have been analyzed and this document includes public policy recommendations regarding said policies. The investigation is structured as an introduction and four chapters. The first detailed the public problem and the design of this research, and in the following chapters the conceptual and theoretical frameworks, methodology, analysis and recommendations were outlined. What follows here is a summary of this work.
Topic:: Women, Inequality, Gender Based Violence, and Masculinity
Political Geography:: North America, Mexico, and Mexico City

6160. The Trump Factor in Asia and the Into-Pacific

Author:: Juan Manuel López-Nadal
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:: The elected President Donald Trump and his new administration at the White House sewed confusion and alarm in Asian and India-Pacific by broadcasting ambiguous and disconcerting signs about the American new policy towards the region. The later steps taken recently point to a certain return to the traditional parameters of Washington's Asian policy: the alliance with Japan and South Korea, and a firm attitude to China in commitment to dialogue, at the same time confirmation of Asia's strategic importance for the American fundamental interests. Since the campaign trail, Trump had already hinted at abandoning the pivot policy on military, commercial and diplomatic terms. Just three days hereinafter his assumption of power, the ambitious and highly contentious Trans-Pacific Partnership was ditched, which spread great dismay among the Trans-Pacific partner countries. To add, the One-China policy, respected by all the Republicans and Democrats since the historical Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, was threatened due to Trump's phone call to the Taiwanese President, Tsai Ing-wen, during his first days in office. Would Trump presidency actually redraw the geopolitical landscape in Asia?
Topic:: Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

6161. The Tactical Utility and Strategic Effects of the Emerging Asian Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense System

Author:: Jaganath Sankaran
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: The United States and Japan are jointly developing and deploying an integrated advanced regional missile defense system meant to counter threats from North Korea. North Korea possesses a large and diversified arsenal of short- and medium-range missiles that could strike Japanese cities and military bases in the event of a crisis and cause measurable damage. The missile defense system currently in place provides strong kinematic defensive coverage over Japanese territory. However, in general, the offense enjoys a strong cost advantage. It is impractical to deploy as many defensive interceptors as there are offensive missiles, which, in turn, limits the efficiency of missile defenses. It should be understood that regional missile defenses in the Asia-Pacific are neither capable nor expected to provide 100% defense. Rather, their goal is to provide sufficient capability to bolster deterrence and, should deterrence fail, to provide enough defense in the initial stages of a crisis to protect vital military assets. Additionally, U.S. and Japanese forces apparently also need to develop a better command and control architecture to operate the Asia-Pacific regional missile defense system. Finally, while the system is meant to defend only against regional threats, China has argued that the system might in the future be able to intercept Chinese ICBMs, thereby diluting its strategic deterrent against the United States. Maintaining effective defenses against North Korea while reassuring China will be one of the major challenges the U.S. and Japan face in their missile defense endeavor.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

6162. Turkey’s Turbulent Journey with the EPAA and Quest for a National System

Author:: Nilsu Gören
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: This paper provides an overview of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) missile defense debate from a Turkish perspective. While Turkey participates in the EPAA by hosting a U.S. early-warning radar in Kurecik, Malatya, its political and military concerns with NATO guarantees have led to the AKP government's quest for a national long-range air and missile defense system. However, Turkish decision makers' insistence on technology transfer shows that the Turkish debate is not adequately informed by the lessons learned from the EPAA, particularly the technical and financial challenges of missile defense.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: United States, Europe, Turkey, and Asia

6163. Missile Defense, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation in the 21st Century - Collected Papers

Author:: Catherine Kelleher
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: The following papers were commissioned as part of the Missile Defense, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation in the 21st Century project supported by the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC). The papers have two general purposes: 1) to create a body of work that provides an overview of the missile defense developments in major regions of the world; and 2) to provide emerging scholars the opportunity to conduct research, publish, and connect with each other. We believe we have succeeded on both counts. The papers written for this project will be valuable for academics and policymakers alike, and will be published and disseminated by the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. This element of the project has also been successful in further bringing together a new cadre of experts in the field and developing the next generation of academics and public servants who will benefit from their participation in this project.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: United States, Europe, and Global Focus

6164. GCC Missile Defense: Obstacles on the Road to Integration

Author:: Ari Kattan
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: The U.S.-led effort to establish a missile defense architecture for the Persian Gulf has been slower and less successful than the United States had hoped, mainly due to an unwillingness and inability to cooperate among the Gulf Security Council nations whose nations the system is designed to defend. Given, inter alia, Iran’s growing ballistic missile arsenal and unease with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in Gulf Arab capitals, security reassurances to the Gulf monarchies will become simultaneously more important and more difficult to make credible. In this environment, missile defense will be an important, but by no means sufficient, mechanism for assuring the Arab Gulf states. Cooperation on missile defense with the Gulf monarchies should continue, but with a realistic understanding of what is possible given the current chaos and political dynamics of the region.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: United States, Middle East, and Persian Gulf

6165. Seeing Missile Defense as U.S. Hostility, North Korea Aims at More and Better Weapons

Author:: Naoko Aoki
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have spurred Japan and South Korea to develop their own ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems and to regenerate their interest in regional missile defense cooperation with the United States. Has North Korea reacted to such developments, and if so, how? This paper looks at North Korea’s missile capacity development as well as its official proclamations and concludes that while Pyongyang likely does not believe that it is the region’s sole target for U.S. and allied BMD, it feels deeply threatened by its deployment. Existing and potential BMD systems have not discouraged Pyongyang from building its own missiles. Rather, North Korea is accelerating its efforts to improve and expand its missile arsenal to develop a survivable force, likely perceiving BMD systems as part of an overall U.S. strategy that is hostile to Pyongyang.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

6166. Ballistic Missile Defense in South Korea: Separate Systems Against a Common Threat

Author:: Joshua Pollack
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: Some of the most enduring disagreements in the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) concern ballistic missile defenses (BMD). At the same time that South Korea has expanded its conventional offensive missile program, it has declined American proposals for a regionally integrated BMD architecture, insisting on developing its own national system in parallel to the defenses operated by U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). American appeals for interoperability between U.S. and ROK systems have been received cautiously, as were proposals to enhance its own BMD in Korea by introducing the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to the Peninsula for several years. A desire for expanded autonomy in national security appears to underpin Seoul’s attitudes on BMD. Rather than rely passively on American protection against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, South Korea’s military leaders have focused on developing precision-strike capabilities to intimidate Pyongyang, and resisted simply accepting an American BMD umbrella. Even more than they desire greater independence from their American patron-ally, South Koreans are suspicious of entanglements with Japan, their former colonial master, whose own defensive systems are already integrated with the American regional BMD architecture. This outlook encourages the pursuit of independent defense capabilities and discourages institutionalizing trilateral security arrangements.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

6167. Categorizing and Assessing the Severity of Disruptive Cyber Events

Author:: Nancy Gallagher and Charles Harry
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: Faced with a rapidly growing volume and range of cyber attacks, policymakers and organizational leaders have had difficulty setting priorities, allocating resources, and responding effectively without a standard way to categorize cyber events and estimate their consequences. Presidential Policy Directive 41 laid out the Obama administration’s principles for executive branch responses to significant cyber incidents in the public or private sector. But it neither drew important distinctions between different types of cyber incidents, nor gave a standard way to determine where a particular incident falls on its 0-5 point severity scale. This policy brief demonstrates how an analytical framework developed at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland (CISSM) can help address these problems. It first differentiates between low-level incidents and more significant cyber events that result in either exploitation of information and/or disruption of operations. It categorizes five types of disruptive events and analyzes 2,030 cyber events in a dataset developed from media sources, showing that cyber exploitation remains more common than disruption, and that most disruptive activity fits into two categories: message manipulation and external denial of service attacks. Finally, the brief offers a standard method to assess the severity of different categories of disruptive attacks against different kinds of organizations based on the scope, magnitude, and duration of the event. This Cyber Disruption Index (CDI) is then applied to survey data on Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in the private sector to assess severity within a common category of disruptive events. Of 3,900 cases reported, only 5 events (less than 1% of the DDoS cases) had a combined scope, magnitude, and duration severe enough to be a priority for prevention and potentially warrant government involvement.
Topic:: Government, Cybersecurity, and Media
Political Geography:: United States, Washington, and D.C.

6168. Stability at Low Nuclear Numbers

Author:: Catherine Kelleher
Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: What conditions are needed for a stable transition to a new nuclear order, one in which the total number of nuclear weapons would be reduced to very low numbers, perhaps even zero? We have addressed the myriad issues raised by this question with funding from a grant on “Creating Conditions for a Stable Transition to a New Nuclear Order,” co-directed by Catherine Kelleher and Judith Reppy, from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation to the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at Cornell University. Our project had three goals: to take a fresh look at the theoretical underpinnings of the arguments about strategic security and nuclear doctrines; to encourage members of the younger generation (NextGen) scholars working on nuclear security issues to see themselves as part of a network that stretches from scholars in the field to active participants in the policy process; and to disseminate the products of the project to the policy community, in Washington and elsewhere. We convened five workshops—in Berlin (December 2014); Ithaca, NY (November 2015 and November 2016); Monterey, CA (February 2016); and Washington, DC (May 2016)—and held five discussion (“reach-in”) meetings with Washington insiders at the Cosmos Club in Washington, DC. This essay concentrates on our project’s first goal: a re-assessment of the deterrence literature and the conditions for stability during a transition period to low nuclear numbers, perhaps nuclear zero. It is based on the work of the participants in the workshops and on our own reading of the literature, both from the early days of the nuclear age and more recent contributions following the end of the Cold War.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, South Korea, and North Korea

6169. Safeguards-by-Design for Advanced Nuclear Systems

Author:: Lance Kim
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: The emergence of an advanced nuclear industry has renewed the pursuit of small modular and advanced reactor technologies to supply low carbon energy. By the same token, these developments potentially expose gaps in current safeguards practices, particularly for reactor designs utilizing novel coolants and fuel forms–underscoring calls for the early application of Safeguards-by-Design to effectively and efficiently detect diversion and misuse. Other innovations may necessitate additional measures to credibly assure the absence of undeclared activities. This paper discusses three types of advanced nuclear and nuclear-related technologies as illustrations of these challenges: 1) micronuclear reactors, 2) molten salt reactors, and on the balance-of-plant side, 3) thermal energy storage and dry cooling. It then identifies high-level safeguards development needs associated with these on-the-horizon technologies so as to elevate safeguards considerations in the minds of reactor developers and investors.
Topic:: Science and Technology and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Global Focus

6170. The Ramifications of Rouhani's Re-election

Author:: Nancy Gallagher, Ebrahim Mohseni, and Clay Ramsay
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: Summary of Findings 1. Rouhani’s Re-election Seen as Endorsement of His Foreign Policy and JCPOA, Not Revolutionary Change There is no consensus among Iranians about what type of mandate Rouhani was given by the 57 percent of Iranians who voted to give him a second term. Fewer than 12 percent offered the same answer when asked an open-ended question. When presented with alternative interpretations, large majorities agree that Rouhani's re-election means that most Iranian people approve of his foreign policy and the nuclear deal he negotiated with the P5+1 countries. They disagree with the assertion that his re-election means most people disapprove of the ideals of the Islamic Revolution, or that they want religion to play a lesser role in policy making. 2. Approval of Nuclear Deal Increased during Presidential Campaign, Despite Disappointment with its Economic Benefit After steady declines in enthusiasm for the JCPOA prior to the May 2017 presidential election, approval of the agreement rose during the election process. Two in three Iranians approve of the agreement, while about a third oppose it. The agreement divides those who voted for Rouhani from those who did not. While eight in ten Rouhani voters approve of the deal, only four in ten of those who voted for Raisi approve of the agreement. Two years since the signing of the agreement, majorities believe that Iran has not received most of the promised benefits and that there have been no improvements in people’s living conditions as a result of the nuclear deal. A plurality thinks that the agreement for Iran to purchase passenger airplanes from the United States will likely have little impact on Iran’s economy. Still, there is some optimism that the deal will eventually improve people’s living conditions. 3. U.S. Seen as Actively Obstructive, Contrary to Commitment under JCPOA Most Iranians lack confidence that the United States will live up to its obligations under the JCPOA. They believe either that the United States is finding other ways to keep the negative effects of sanctions that were lifted under the deal, or that the United States has not even lifted the sanctions it was supposed to lift. A growing majority also believes that contrary to the terms of the agreement, the United States is trying to prevent other countries from normalizing their trade and economic relations with Iran. While a majority still express some confidence that other P5+1 countries will abide by the agreement, most say Europeans are slow in investing and trading with Iran primarily due to fear of punishment by the United States. 4. Majority Support Retaliation if U.S. Abrogates JCPOA Iranians expect President Donald Trump to be more hostile toward Iran than was former President Barack Obama. Seven in ten Iranians believe it likely that Trump may decide not to abide by the terms of the nuclear agreement. Attitudes about how Iran should respond if the United States violates the JCPOA have hardened: A clear majority now thinks that instead of taking the matter to the UN, Iran should retaliate by restarting the aspects of its nuclear program it has agreed to suspend under the JCPOA, if the United States abrogates the deal. A large majority see the new sanctions that Congress is likely to impose on Iran as being against the spirit of the JCPOA, with half saying it would violate the letter of the agreement as well. 5. No Appetite for Renegotiating the Nuclear Deal with Trump Large majorities say that Iran should refuse to increase the duration of the special nuclear limits it accepted under the JCPOA, or to terminate its nuclear enrichment program, even if offered more sanctions relief in return. 6. Majority Opposes a Halt to Missile Testing, Even in Return for More Sanctions Relief Over three in five say that Iran should continue testing ballistic missiles despite U.S. demands for Iran to halt such tests and find the proposition that Iran reduce testing missiles in return for the lifting of more sanctions unacceptable. Two thirds reject the notion that Rouhani’s re-election means most Iranians oppose testing of missiles by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). 7. Greater Support for Self-Sufficiency An increasing majority think Iran should strive to achieve economic self-sufficiency rather than focusing on increasing its trade with other countries. Six in ten say current changes in the world make it necessary for Iran to have a president who will stand up for Iran’s rights and refuse to compromise. Majorities reject offering various steps in exchange for more sanctions relief—steps such as Iran reducing its missile testing, or recognizing Israel, or ceasing its aid to the Syrian government and Hezbollah. Rejection of these steps is significantly lower, though, among those who think the nuclear deal has improved the living condition of ordinary Iranians. 8. Economy is Seen as Bad, and Reducing Unemployment is Given the Highest Priority Large majorities say Iran’s economic situation is bad, and less than a quarter think the economic condition of their family has improved over the last four years. Half think that the country’s economic situation is getting worse. Eight in ten say reducing unemployment should be a top priority for Rouhani in the next four years. 9. Rouhani Seen as Successful in Foreign Policy, not in Reducing Unemployment Majorities see Rouhani as being successful in improving Iran’s relations with other countries and getting international sanctions on Iran lifted. Majorities also see his re-election to mean that most Iranians approve of his foreign policy and the JCPOA. In fact, the nuclear agreement is regarded as Rouhani’s most important accomplishment during his first four years in office. Rouhani, however, gets low marks on the unemployment situation in Iran. Six in ten say he has been unsuccessful in reducing unemployment and half say he has thus far failed to improve the economy. 10. Rouhani's Reelection was Not Certain until Ghalibaf Left the Race Election polls were quite accurate in predicting the outcome of the election. Pre-election polls suggested that if Tehran mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf had been Rouhani’s main opponent rather than Raisi, the election results would have been much closer. After the second presidential debate, Rouhani was ahead of Ghalibaf by less than 6 percentage points, while his lead over Raisi was more than 20 points. While an overwhelming majority of Raisi supporters said that if Raisi pulled out they would vote for Ghalibaf, less than half of Ghalibaf supporters said they would vote for Raisi if their candidate pulled out. Indeed, when Ghalibaf pulled out of the race nearly half of his supporters switched to Rouhani and helped him pass the 50 percent threshold. 11. Turnout Helps Rouhani About a quarter of those who said they rarely vote in Iranian presidential elections reported that they voted in the May 2017 election, and seven in ten said they voted for Rouhani. Large majorities believe that both the Guardian Council and the Interior Ministry were fair and impartial as they fulfilled their election-related responsibilities. About five percent, however, say that they went to their voting stations but for one reason or another were not ultimately able to cast their ballots. 12. Rouhani and Zarif's Popularity Increase after Re-Election, but General Soleymani is Most Popular Political Figure The Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, is the most popular politician in Iran, with President Rouhani coming in second. Although Rouhani’s popularity increased somewhat during the recent election, it is still substantially lower than the first time he ran for office and after he signed the JCPOA. 13. Post-election Terrorist Attacks: ISIS Seen as Primary Culprit, but Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States Likely Helped A large majority of Iranians thinks that ISIS conducted the June 7 attacks in Tehran. Most Iranians also think that Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States probably provided guidance or support to the perpetrators. 14. Strong Support for Fighting ISIS, but Not for Collaboration with U.S. The June 7 attacks seem to have increased support for Iran playing a more active role in the Middle East. More than eight in ten call increasing Iran’s security a top priority; seven in ten say this about fighting ISIS and increasing Iran’s influence in the region. A growing majority of Iranians support their government helping groups that are fighting ISIS, although the number that favors sending troops has remained roughly constant. Two in three support Iran sending military personnel to Syria to help the Assad government against armed Syrian rebels, including ISIS. Support for Iran and the United States collaborating with one another to help Iraq’s government counter ISIS is at its lowest, with an increasing majority saying they would oppose such cooperation. 15. Views of P5+1 Countries Majorities regard Russia, China, and Germany—half of the P5+1—favorably, and the other half—the U.S., France and Britain—unfavorably. While six in ten believe that most P5+1 countries (but not the United States) will fulfill their obligations under the JCPOA, views toward all the Western powers that took part in the JCPOA negotiations are now less positive. Though a majority believes that Iran’s relations with European countries have improved as a result of the deal, only a quarter say that about the United States. Still, far from showing implacable hostility toward the West, a majority continues to think it is possible for the Islamic world and the West to find common ground.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Elections
Political Geography:: United States, Iran, and Middle East

6171. KEDO: How Multilateral Cooperation Helped an Unprecedented North Korean Project

Author:: Naoko Aoki
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: In 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework, in which Pyongyang promised to abandon its nuclear program in exchange for energy aid and improvement of relations with Washington. An international consortium led by the United States was created to implement the key provisions of the deal, including the delivery of two light water reactor (LWR) units. While multi-national efforts are common in commercial nuclear projects, the case of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was unique. KEDO’s challenges ranged from the lack of diplomatic relations between its main members and North Korea, to the country’s poor infrastructure. This paper examines KEDO’s experience and concludes that cooperation among its member states—Japan, South Korea, the United States and others—helped ensure the project’s financial and political feasibility, even if work did not proceed smoothly. While the construction of the LWRs was never completed due to larger political changes, KEDO’s experience offers lessons for future nuclear projects that face similar hurdles. EXPLORE:
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

6172. International Cybersecurity Information Sharing Agreements

Author:: Nilsu Gören and Theresa Hitchens
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: Cybersecurity transcends national boundaries in many ways: The internet’s technical infrastructure is global in scope; threat actors based in one country can disguise their identities by taking control of computers in other countries; global businesses sell software, hardware, and security services that may introduce or combat vulnerabilities; and the consequences from a disruptive attack can spread far beyond the initial victim. Even the most cyber-savvy country cannot protect itself completely unless it wants to disconnect from the global internet and strictly limit who can use information technology and for what purposes inside its own borders. And this course of action is infeasible because it would result in dire consequences for the national economy, military, and all other systems that depend on advanced information technology. International cooperation to improve cybersecurity is a much more realistic and viable path. Information sharing is the most commonly promoted type of international cooperation, but very little is known about what type of cybersecurity information is currently being shared with whom, for what purposes, and under what conditions. As a first step towards answering this larger question, the International Cybersecurity Information Sharing Project undertook to survey, catalog, and analyze publicly available government-to-government cybersecurity-related sharing agreements to determine what types of information various governments have committed to share, and to identify gaps in information sharing. The ultimate aim of the larger project is to assess how multilateral cybersecurity sharing practices can be encouraged and improved in order to strengthen global cybersecurity. The project team started from the assumption that formal cyber sharing agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoU) are an important part of the foundation for the development of norms on cyber cooperation. Over the past several years, various international fora have reiterated that sharing information about cyber threats and vulnerabilities, national approaches to cyber protection, best practices, incidents of concern, and response mechanisms could increase mutual cybersecurity while reducing risks of misunderstandings and conflict. Different types of information sharing can be used to improve cybersecurity in various ways. By sharing threat perceptions and national policies, states can better understand each other’s concerns and priorities. By conducting multilateral exercises and sharing best practices for protection of networks, critical infrastructure, and software/hardware, states can help each other ensure safe data transfer across borders. Cooperation to build capacity in states with weaker infrastructure for managing the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) can help in identifying threats and responding to crises. This research found that cybersecurity information agreements are more numerous, but less specific than anticipated. The project documented and analyzed 196 agreements involving 116 different countries and 2,349 signatures. Extensive signature of agreements and associated commentary shows widespread accord on the principle that information sharing is necessary. However, it is unclear how much and what type of information sharing occurs in practice. Few agreement texts are public, and those that are often use vague language. And, despite the potential benefits of sharing more cyber-security information, many disincentives and logistical barriers remain. This project collected as much information as possible, not only about what states have agreed to do, but also what they actually do, and why they make those choices. After a brief summary of the approach taken and some limitations encountered, the study provides summary statistics about international cyber information sharing agreements. It then looks in more detail at sharing agreements and behaviors by some of the most active and/or important countries in regional organizations, and in multilateral fora that have focused on this topic. A summary of key findings, conclusions, and next steps is followed by annexes with more methodological information and texts for some of the most important agreements.
Topic:: Science and Technology and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: Global Focus

6173. Contrasting Russian Perspectives on Coercion and Restraint in Russia’s Security Relations with the West

Author:: anya Loukianova fink
Publication Date:: 12-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: This discussion paper analyzes a sample of 2014-2016 Russian-language publications focused on Russia’s security relations with the United States. It characterizes the Russian expert debate at that time as dichotomous in nature, where security policy analysts proposed either coercive or restrained policy approaches in dealing with perceived threats. It assesses similarities and differences of these two perspectives with regard to the nature of Russia’s political-military relationship with the West, as well as past challenges and then-future opportunities in nuclear arms control and strategic stability.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, and Europe

6174. The Hashd al-Shaabi and Iraq: Subnationalism and the State

Author:: Dylan O'Driscoll and Dave Van Zoonen
Publication Date:: 03-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: This report views the Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilisation Forces, PMF) as having played an intrinsic role in the provision of security in Iraq since the dramatic rise of the Islamic State (IS). However, through the lens of nationalism it analyses the negative role the PMF may play once IS is defeated. The report therefore presents suggestions to deal with the perceived threat of the PMF in the short to medium term. The various groups within the PMF essentially represent a number of subnationalisms, which to a different extent act as competition to the state. The leaders of the various militias use their own particular brand of nationalism in their attempts to gain and maintain power and in doing so they dilute any prospect of national unity or loyalty to the state. Through providing security they act as competition to the Iraqi army which directly impacts on the perception of the state and is used by members of the PMF for political gain. The multiple competing subnationalisms in Iraq do little for the fostering of Iraqi unity or the functioning of Iraq as a state, and are likely to result in the continuation of violent conflict. Therefore, dealing with the challenges surrounding the PMF will be one of the most pressing issues in Iraq following the defeat of IS. The ultimate solution to this problem would be the incorporation of these forces through demobilisation and integration into the conventional ISF. Having one inclusive army, police force and border patrol operating under unified command structures and accountable to civil bodies of oversight is not only an important symbol in aiding national reconciliation and promoting cooperation between different communities, it is also a primary prerequisite for the effectiveness of the security sector as a whole. However, the current situation on the ground, in terms of security, reconciliation, and political will, precludes an aggressive, straight-forward pursuit of this objective. This necessitates an initial phase in which significant progress in these areas is made before incorporation of most PMF units can realistically take place. The government of Prime Minister Abadi needs to use its time following IS’ defeat to build a solid political platform based on shared citizenship, unity and reform. This platform has to include serious reforms in the areas of security and national reconciliation. At the same time, an assistance programme will have to be set up for individual militia members wishing to either integrate into the ISF or make the transition from fighter to civilian immediately following IS’ defeat. This joint process will allow for the gradual dissolution of the PMF as the functioning of the Iraqi state improves, cooperation and unity is advanced, and the army grows in strength. During this time the government can stop colluding with the PMF and begin incorporating, containing, and eventually suppressing the various groups within the PMF based on the level of loyalty to the state that the group holds. Only then can a comprehensive demobilisation and reintegration programme based on formal agreements with all militias be launched as an ultimate solution to Iraq’s problem with militias and subnationalisms. It is crucial that this programme is adapted to fit the local context and that the government of Iraq can exert primary control over it. Accordingly, some conventional standards of DDR programming may have to be deviated from in order for this programme to be successful.
Topic:: Security, Nationalism, Military Strategy, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Baghdad

6175. Planning Post-IS Iraq: Competing Visions Within the Shia Block?

Author:: Irene Costantini
Publication Date:: 03-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: On Monday 20 February, Muqtada al-Sadr announced a 29-point roadmap for governing Mosul after the eventual liberation from Islamic State (IS), which appears closer than ever considering the ongoing offensive in the western part of the city. In October last year, Ammar al-Hakim proposed a political reconciliation plan, the “Historical Settlement”, as a template for governing Iraq in view of the defeat of IS. Though both are drawn from the Shia leadership and represent the Shia electorate, the two leaders and their constituencies have noticeable differences. A third pole is represented by the non-reconciliatory vision of Nuri al-Maliki, who has so far obstructed any dialogue in the country. In light of the Sunni’s weak political leadership and the Kurds being distracted by internal discordance as well as talks about independence, the Shia Block is realistically the key determinant for national reconciliation to occur in Iraq. However, its internal divisions make it a problematic and non-unitary interlocutor for national, regional, and international initiatives. This policy brief analyses what the common and competing positions of the plans that have been announced so far within the Block are. The major shortcoming of both al-Sadr’s and al-Hakim’s initiatives is the political heritage that they attach to a national reconciliation plan. Free from such heritage, al-Abadi, the fourth pole in the Shia Block, has yet to reinvigorate his initial push for reconciliation and articulate it in a comprehensive plan, one that may find support among a broader spectrum of domestic and international actors. Competing positions A key difference between al-Hakim’s and al-Sadr’s plans is first of all their political inception. Al-Hakim is the key promoter of the “Historical Settlement”, but the plan is, in theory, the expression of the National Iraqi Alliance, the large but loose Shia Block holding the majority of parliamentary seats. Elected as chairman in September, after years of tensions over the Block’s leadership, al-Hakim will hold the position for a year based on the rotational presidency arrangement struck upon his election. In contrast, al-Sadr’s plan is an expression of his own political will. Al-Sadr’s political block, al-Ahrar, has boycotted NIA since spring 2016 and rejoined in October in what was most probably a political calculation when talks about provincial elections were underway. There is so far no indication that al-Sadr is promoting the plan among Iraqi parties and it has received almost no traction, but the announcement itself can be seen as another sign of competing visions within the Shia Block. A second key difference is their scope. Al-Hakim’s plan (based on leaked versions of it, as no official document was released) is intentionally vague. In all, the plan sets principles, parameters and steps forward, which participating parties must adhere to before a dialogue could start under the auspices of the UN. So far, the UN has repeated that “there is no UN draft or UN initiative. It is still an Iraqi national initiative”, waiting most probably for the document to gain traction among the Iraqi leadership. On the other hand, al-Sadr’s plan calls for a number of initiatives, which include a national dialogue, but extend to measures targeting socio-economic issues and the security apparatus, most of them as vague as the ones in the “Historical Settlement” document. The two plans are also different with relation to a number of specific points. Al-Sadr sets as a condition the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the country. The document is explicit in calling for ending Turkish presence in the country (by diplomatic means, or otherwise) but also for ensuring “the exit of all occupying forces and the “friendly” ones, so to speak, from Iraqi lands”. This is in line with al-Sadr’s past position on opposing foreign presence in Iraq, including through armed struggle. However, the leader allows for UN engagement in settling the dispute with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and eventually supervising the political process in the liberated areas. The engagement of the UN is more pronounced in al-Hakim’s plan, which gives the UN the role of submitting a detailed strategy based on consultation with key representatives, and in collaboration with Jordan, a key country hosting the Sunni opposition to the current Shia-dominated government. Another difference in the documents concerns whether any plan for the future of Iraq should occur within or outside the electoral process. Al-Sadr asserts that a dialogue for national reconciliation, as he sees it, “should not be based on political and electoral grounds but on grounds that guarantee civil and social peace”. In al-Hakim’s document, instead, the “binding recognition of the results of free and fair elections” indicates the opposite attitude. This point is certainly important considering next year’s election and it may reflect the two parties’ electoral weight in the country. Furthermore, in al-Hakim’s document the call for refraining from “the practice of duplication in attitudes towards the legitimacy of the Iraqi political system (a foot in the government and a foot in the opposition), including the cessation of instigation against the legitimacy of the existing political system internally and externally” is something that al-Sadr could take quite personally, given his confrontation with the current government. Converging positions The reaffirmation of Iraq’s unity is shared by both plans. According to al-Hakim’s, “the aim of the initiative is “to maintain and strengthen Iraq as an independent state that enjoys sovereignty, unity, federalism and democracy and that brings all of its people and components together.” The same necessity is recognised in al-Sadr’s roadmap as preserving “the unity, security, and sovereignty of Iraq”. Al-Hakim’s Historical Settlement goes perhaps even further, by affirming as one of the parameters: “faith and commitment in words and deed to the unity of Iraq … and reject its division under any circumstances”. This is a point that is certainly problematic for the KRG’s aspiration for independence. Al-Hakim and al-Sadr therefore present a similar vision on a number of other issues. First, they both envision the involvement of tribal leaders, social elites, religions, sects, minorities, and ethnic groups in the process of settling the ethno-sectarian tensions that have brought the country to the verge of collapse. They both exclude from the process Baathists and terrorists, al-Hakim extending this exclusion to Takfiri groups, defined as groups who label others as apostates. A key difference on this point could, however, emerge in the final draft of the document. Indeed, al-Hakim excludes the “Baath Party”, potentially leaving the door open to some Baathists to be involved in their personal capacity. Al-Sadr, instead, has referred so far to the Baathists as a whole, most probably excluding any form of consultation with them. With regard to the security situation, al-Sadr’s plan expresses the need not to interfere in neighbouring countries, alluding to the involvement of Iraqi elements within the Hashd al-Shaabi in the fight against IS in Syria (such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Saraya al-Khorasani), something al-Sadr is opposed to. The need for non-interference is also explicitly mentioned in al-Hakim’s document. Their position on the domestic role of the Hashd al-Shaabi is, however, less clear, with al-Sadr, for instance, calling for integrating the “disciplined elements with the Hashd in the security forces”. The law regulating the Hashd al-Shaabi (November 2016) has already caused a harsh reaction from Sunni elements strengthening the rejection of al-Hakim’s plan by the National Forces Alliance, the biggest Sunni block in the parliament. Identifying shortcomings and conditions for national reconciliation There are many things lacking in both documents. One of these missing elements is the result of the avoidance of concretely addressing the governing mechanisms in Nineveh in the future, a point which will be key in settling reconciliation within the governorate but also countrywide. Secondly, despite calls for an inclusive process, the “Historical Settlement” as well as al-Sadr’s roadmap appear to be too focused on party politics, and so far there appears to be little engagement with bottom-up initiatives, another fundamental condition for national reconciliation to succeed. Furthermore, in the absence of a clear time framework, any reconciliation initiative runs the risk of becoming trapped in the electoral game in the midst of the next parliamentary and provincial elections which are likely to be scheduled for April 2018. Not only will this not serve the purpose of reconciliation, it will further discredit similar mechanisms in the eyes of the population, making reconciliation even more difficult. Most importantly, al-Hakim and al-Sadr only represent part of the Shia Block, whose cohesion has been undermined over the last years by personal projects; polarisation within the electorate; and more recently the presence of armed groups––the Hashd al-Shaabi––partly a product of existing and perhaps newly forming political parties. The brokers of the two plans are far from being perceived as super partes actors, as both al-Hakim and al-Sadr were active (and problematic) parts in the political makeshift of Iraq after 2003. Beside these two brokers, the third pole, the Dawa Party, is still commanding political power within the Block and in the country. Al-Maliki is certainly not a realistic candidate under whom any reconciliation plan will succeed. He has already labelled the “Historical Settlement” as “treason against the Iraqi people”. Despite the Dawa Party’s nationalistic credentials still being strong, at least among a segment of society, al-Maliki is associated with the dark days of the advancement of IS, something that inevitably weakened his position. Despite coming from the same party, al-Abadi has the credentials of having faced, so far successfully, IS and retaken important swathes of Iraqi territories. Al-Abadi had already come to office with a commitment to pursue a national reconciliation project. The passing of the General Amnesty Law in August 2016 is an indication of this commitment together with the work of the National Reconciliation Committee in the Prime Minister’s Office (NRC). By revitalising his initial push for reconciliation, al-Abadi has the opportunity to build upon common positions in existing plans and reconcile them with other demands coming from the Iraqi society. A comprehensive plan coming from al-Abadi would certainly have a more likely chance of finding support among a broader spectrum of domestic and international actors.
Topic:: Elections, Islamic State, Sunni, and Shia
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, and Mosul

6176. The Referendum in Turkey: A Pyrrhic Victory and Continuous Crisis

Author:: Athanasios Manis
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: There is no doubt that the Turkish referendum of 16 April 2017 marks a sea change for Turkey’s political system. Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) have narrowly won the referendum that turns his de facto hegemonic presidency into de jure. 51.28% of Turkish citizens approved the 18 proposed constitutional amendments, while 48.72% opposed them. However, the provisions of the constitutional amendments and the statements made by the main political protagonists and antagonists give little hope that the referendum result will bring political stability or economic prosperity; or allow Turkey’s leadership to play a constructive role in Syria and Iraq - at least in the short-term. Furthermore, it is unlikely to enhance the level of cooperation with the EU and the US over the war against the Islamic State (IS) and the refugee crisis.
Topic:: Elections, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: United States, Europe, Turkey, and Asia

6177. Assessing the Post-Disaster Needs in Agriculture Sector

Author:: Naresh Singh
Publication Date:: 06-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: The great majority of communities affected by disasters in developing countries are directly or indirectly dependent on agriculture for their livelihood. Climate change has been linked to a significant increase in the frequency and severity of disasters in the recent past, leading to natural hazardous events that have had several negative repercussions on the agriculture sector and sub-sectors (i.e. crops, livestock, fishery and aquaculture) and on the life of the people depending on them. This paper will firstly review the commonly used methods of assessing the damages and losses to the agriculture sector and its sub-sectors, with particular emphasis on the strengths and limitations of the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) methodology. After that, it will consider the financial implications of disasters and discuss the necessity of developing follow-up mechanisms to assess the proportion of disbursed funds required to implement response interventions. This will involve an analysis of the extent to which agriculture assistance is usually prioritized in the formal and informal sector, and the typology of targeted and assisted beneficiaries with an emphasis on the gender dimension. The paper concludes with recommendations aiming at improving the current standardized processes of assessing the impacts and effects of disasters, in order to enhance the effectiveness of needs assessment towards resource mobilization and recovery processes.
Topic:: Agriculture, Climate Change, and Natural Disasters
Political Geography:: Global Focus

6178. Competing Interests in Shingal District: Policy Recommendations for Defusing Tensions

Author:: Tomáš Kaválek
Publication Date:: 06-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: This report concerns the political and security situation in the district of Shingal after the summer of 2014. Specifically, it focuses on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) presence in the area. In August 2014, the Peshmerga forces hastily withdrew from Shingal district due to the IS (Islamic State) advance. The Yazidi population of the district was then exposed to atrocities at the hands of IS. These events damaged trust between the Yazidi population and the KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government). The PKK entered the stage in Shingal district and aided Yazidis at the onset of IS’ advance. It capitalised on its image of being the saviour of Yazidis and promptly began to build governance and armed structures in the district. The area has thus become an arena of competition between the KRG (especially the Kurdistan Democratic Party– KDP) and Baghdad. PKK’s increasing presence challenges the KDP’s strong influence in the district. The ongoing power struggle in Shingal district also takes place against a background of wider regional competition. The report utilises Zachariah Mampilly’s theoretical framework in order to analyse the effectiveness of rebel governance. It is argued that the model used for PKK-linked political and armed structures in Shingal district follows the PKK’s governance model as it is established in PKK’s leader Abdullah Öcalan’s ideological works and is currently in place in Rojava, run by PKK-affiliated actors. Furthermore, building upon Anna Arjona’s typology of rebel governments, it is asserted that the PKK-linked governance in Shingal district has become, since the summer of 2014, increasingly effective and entrenched despite certain shortcomings stemming mainly from lack of resources to satisfy all the needs of the population. Ultimately, the PKK-linked civilian governance structures represented by the Self-Administration Council and the armed structures of the Sinjar Protection Units find fertile ground among the Yazidi population for their project of self-administration and self-defence for Yazidis in Shingal district. The PKK-linked forces’ influence goes beyond a mere military presence and thus poses a new reality in which the PKK-linked forces are indeed actors which must be taken into consideration in future political arrangements in Shingal district. While outlining the competing interests in the district of Shingal, the paper provides a set of recommendations to the PKK, the PKK-linked actors in the district, the KRG, the GoI, Turkey, and the US with an aim of promoting stabilisation and the well-being of the local population. The best case scenario would include at least partial demilitarisation of the situation in the district while shifting the competition for the population between the GoI, the PKK-linked forces and the KRG into a non-violent domain, instead focusing on trying to win the hearts and minds of the population. Competition within the scope of Iraqi law with an aim of generating as much genuine popular support as possible in the upcoming elections in Iraq is the way forward. In the long-term, the PKK-linked forces should engage in democratic electoral competition with the KRG and aim for integration into governance and administrative structures as per Iraqi law. Both sides could then work on improving their standing electorally.
Topic:: Governance, Democracy, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan

6179. Turkmen in Tal Afar: Perceptions of Reconciliation and Conflict

Author:: Khogir Wirya
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: With the military defeat of the Islamic State (IS) in Mosul city, the task to liberate Tel Afar continues to loom large. The fall of Tal Afar to IS on 16 June, 2014 has severely damaged the already strained Sunni/Shia relations in the area, as well as Turkmen relations with other ethno-religious communities. Most of Tal Afar’s Sunni and Shia population were displaced during the crisis. However, some Sunni Turkmen decided not to flee and remained in Tal Afar. Although much is still unclear, it is widely believed that a number of Sunni Turkmen from Tal Afar joined IS and stand accused of having committed war crimes in their name. Reconciling communities and repairing social ties are critical needs in ensuring stability and preventing the onset of renewed cycles of violence in the future. Such processes however, can only be advanced through consultation with local populations regarding their needs and vision for the future. The focus of this report is therefore on Turkmen perceptions of needs, opportunities, and obstacles to reconciliation within their own community as well as with other communities. The report finds that Turkmen from Tal Afar overwhelmingly conceptualise reconciliation as a security objective that is important for enabling the safe return of the displaced. At least in the short term therefore, participants prioritised reconciliation between the Sunni and Shia Turkmens over reconciliation with other communities living elsewhere.Interviews revealed strongly overlapping views on how sectarian violence had emerged and escalated in the past, and how it should be addressed in the future. Because reconciliation in Tal Afar requires communities to reject and actively combat extremist ideologies, the process must encompass mechanisms to enable these communities to resist the influence of radical organisations. According to the majority of both Sunni and Shia participants, the first step in this process is the inclusion of Sunnis in the security sector. Creating an inclusive, formal security sector comprised of all elements of society is seen as the main need for enabling reconciliation in the future. Serious issues of distrust, however, appears to stand in the way. The process of building trust between Sunni and Shia Turkmen faces additional challenges stemming from the fact that both communities continue to perceive each other as serving an exogenous agenda. While Shias suspect Sunnis of alignment with Turkey, Sunnis for their part see the Shias as an extension of Iranian interests in the area. Nonetheless, both communities clearly labelled security sector reform as the first step in stabilising the area after liberation, and expressed the hope that any process would not be thwarted by external actors. In terms including Sunnis in the security sector, Shias expressed concerns about infiltration of government institutions by extremist elements. This obstacle can partly be overcome by recruiting Sunnis in the force tasked with liberating Tal Afar. For the Shias, Sunni participation constitutes a vetting mechanism which can identify those who are committed to peaceful relations and oppose extremist ideologies. Sunni inclusion in the operation to liberate Tal Afar will also increase inter-group contact and cooperation, thus contributing to the formation of shared experiences and long-term objectives. Although intra-community reconciliation is clearly prioritised over reconciliation with other communities, participants also reflected on ways to improve relations with the neighbouring Eyzidi community. The liberation of Tal Afar will present opportunities for doing so. Criminal investigations into the crimes committed by IS as well as other actors should be initiated promptly. Sunni tribal leaders must strongly condemn crimes committed by members of their tribe and cooperate closely with law enforcement to ensure accountability can be imposed. However, it is equally important to publicise positive stories of Turkmen from Tal Afar who have risked their own lives to resist IS and help free some Eyzidi captives. Highlighting these accounts can serve an important role in countering perceptions of collective guilt towards the Sunni Turkmen community in Tal Afar.
Topic:: Islamic State, Ethnicity, Sunni, and Shia
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, and Mosul

6180. The Sabean-Mandaeans: Perceptions of Reconciliation and Conflict

Author:: Khogir Wirya
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: The Sabean-Mandaean community in Iraq is threatened with extinction. As a result of unabated kidnappings, robberies and killings, much of the community has been displaced from Baghdad and areas in the south of Iraq to the Kurdistan Region and Kirkuk. Considering the particular vulnerability of the community,and the continued security threats present in their areas of origin, community members are currently not considering going back. After the defeat of the Islamic State, the Iraqi government should seize the window of opportunity to promote coexistence, religious pluralism and citizenship. In the short term, however, the Kurdistan Regional Government can play an important role in supporting the continued survival of the Sabean-Mandaean community by adopting a long-term vision towards their settlement in the Region and facilitate their integration in Kurdistan society. The international community who are concerned with religious pluralism in Iraq should seek to support the KRG in its approach and improve the community’s connectedness with its diaspora by reducing restrictions on visiting visas for countries hosting a large number of Sabean-Mandaeans.
Topic:: Security, Democracy, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: Iraq, Baghdad, and Kurdistan

6181. Kurdistan: a potential strategic partner the US deserves

Author:: Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: This year is the 25th anniversary of the election of the first Parliament and government of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq(KRI). Thanks to the safe haven that the United States and its European allies created in 1991 to protect the displaced Kurdish population from Baghdad’s brutal attacks, the Kurds turned a crisis into an opportunity to build a forward-looking nation with democratic aspirations. The journey was a tough one, with many successes and failures, but U.S.-KRI relations grew stronger and developed into a mutually rewarding partnership. The United States continued to protect the Iraqi Kurds from Saddam Hussein’s regime in 1990s and ensured that they would have their fair share in the post-Saddam Iraq. The U.S. once again came to the rescue of the KRI in the face of the Islamic State (ISIS) onslaught in 2014 and continued its support to date. The Kurds have reciprocated with unreserved loyalty and solid support for U.S. policies in Iraq. Peshmerga forces became indispensable partners in the U.S.-led global coalition and instrumental in the ultimate military defeat of ISIS in Iraq. Some consider this KRI-U.S. partnership a tactical and temporary one, not only because ISIS is being defeated, but also because the United States will ultimately stop relying on the Kurds due to their inability, like the rest of Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries, to promote the rule of law and good governance, and to control corruption, which runs unacceptably deep. However, the U.S. and the KRI can prove otherwise. For a start, the United States continues to need strategic partners in the ever-changing Middle East, where its vital interests will remain at stake. In a region that is in turmoil and where terrorism is on the rise, the U.S. and Europe face much-reduced space, presence and leverage for driving and shaping events. Regional state and sub-state actors (like the KRI) have grown in influence across borders. A multitude of nonstate actors, legitimized or not, have become increasingly influential in driving events. The KRI, lying in the heart of the Middle East, is just what the United States needs, where it is most needed. The Kurds have proven themselves skillful and dynamic survivors in a conflict zone that is overwhelmed by powerful rivals. They have strong, collaborative, love-hate relations with the Shia political elite of Iraq. They share a long border with the previously ISIS-occupied Sunni Arab territories, where the challenge of stabilization is greatest. They accommodated the majority of the displaced Sunni Arabs and other ethnic and religious minorities during the ISIS war. Internationally, despite the complexity and sensitive nature of the Middle East’s politics, the political parties of the KRI have actively engaged and maintained relatively good neighborly relationships with both Iran and Turkey. Being a Muslim-majority country and having been part of Iraq, the KRI leaders have had unhindered access to most of the Arab countries. On the issue of KRI’s internal governance challenges, the United States can help a great deal via constructive engagement. The KRI, as a small, emerging nation, remains vulnerable in the world’s toughest neighborhood. This gives the U.S. plenty of leverage that it has never used effectively. In fact, the U.S. has the same kind of leverage with all of its allies in the Middle East but was never willing to use it in fear of negative reactions. On the contrary, the previous U.S. administration chose to almost totally disengage with the region, particularly Iraq, and virtually abandoned its obligation to spread the values of liberty and the rule of law in the Middle East. The consequences were disastrous, forcing the U.S. to return and face a war against the most radical of terrorists. It might be rare for politicians to request or accept conditional help, but the KRI leaders do when such requests come from trusted friends. They are, and have been, responsive to terms and conditions that are linked to good governance, designed to help their country become a better, stronger and more prosperous place. KRG leaders viewed these conditions as incentives and opportunities to reform. Many used them to convince their fellow leaders to endorse change. In short, tough love works with the Kurds and the United States should help the KRI become the partner it deserves, and the partner KRI deserves to be.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Sunni, and Shia
Political Geography:: United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan

6182. The Shabaks: Perceptions of Reconciliation and Conflict

Author:: Khogir Wirya
Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: With the complete military defeat of IS in Iraq underway, the process of the return of internally displaced people (IDPs) faces enormous challenges. IS’s swift seizure of control of vast swathes of territories created new fissures and exacerbated old animosities and grievances among the variegated communities of the Nineveh Plain. Members of certain communities joined IS, while others showed sympathy to the group, causing rising social tensions among the communities. The war against IS also prompted certain communities to form their own armed forces, which can now be used to challenge rival communities and impose one-sided solutions by virtue of force. While no rigorous plan for the post-IS situation is available, and with Iraq facing economic and political hardships, the region’s dynamics are likely to continue to be conflictual, and communal relations may worsen further. Understanding how communities perceive reconciliation and conflict is a key element to ensure the return of IDP’s in the future. This report focuses on the Shabak community, an abstruse ethno-religious group living on the Nineveh Plain just east of Mosul, and how they perceive reconciliation and conflict. Various international minority rights organisations recognise Shabaks as one of the five main minority groups most affected by the recent conflict beginning in June 2014. At present, the Shabak community is comprised of both Sunni and Shi’ites, yet the community’s religious identity has significantly evolved over time, moving from a distinctly heterodox to a more orthodox set of beliefs and rituals. This, combined with their geographic location in the disputed territories in close proximity to various other minorities, make their views on conflict and reconciliation particularly relevant for future coexistence in Nineveh. One of the main findings of this report is that the Shabak community suffers from four main conflicts. Two relate to relations with other ethno-religious communities, namely Sunni Arabs and Christians, and the other two concern divisions within the community itself, that is, religious and ethnic identity. The rise of IS has impacted conflict dynamics in two distinct ways. On the one hand, it has led to a proliferation of armed groups, significantly increasing the possibility of a violent escalation. On the other hand, the complete rupture of the pre-2014 status quo has resulted in an intensification of identity discussions, which is linked to the settlement of the administrative status of disputed territories on the Nineveh Plain. The community’s perception of justice and security is also explored in this report. Interviews reveal that the community is fearful of forced displacement and revenge acts after their areas are liberated, while some expressed doubts about the ability of the security forces and the judiciary system in place to deal with the post liberation environment.
Topic:: Religion, Islamic State, Conflict, and Recovery
Political Geography:: United States, Iraq, and Middle East

6183. Universities are rising from ruins of war

Author:: Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: Since the 1960s, successive governments in Baghdad considered the Kurdish-majority areas of Iraq a war zone, and deprived them of investment. So when, in 1992, Kurds elected their first parliament and government, the politicians inherited a half-ruined country, with more than 4,000 destroyed villages and just one small university to serve a traumatised population of more than 4 million. Educationally, the biggest priority for the Kurdistan regional government (KRG) was to rapidly expand school capacity. New universities and technical institutes with diverse programmes were also established de novo. Currently, 14 public and 15 private universities are fully operational, accommodating 165,414 students in 2016, compared with 10,166 in 1992. Investing in quality was the next big challenge. In 2010, the Kurdish government that I was part of introduced a comprehensive system of quality assurance and accreditation, including a performance assessment of all staff and institutions that later became the basis for the annual ranking of KRI universities. Previously, no such system had existed in Iraq, and standards were on the decline – especially after the Iraqi regime change in 2003. Continuing political, security and economic crises, as well as poorly designed policies, corruption and over-politicised administrations were partly to blame. As in other Middle Eastern countries, the Iraqi and KRI governments make all senior university appointments and manage university budgets. This inevitably permits external interference in academic affairs, at the expense of quality and efficiency. There have been serious attempts to move towards making universities totally independent from government, but it has not been easy to accomplish. However, we have succeeded in making the KRI university admissions system electronic and transparent, to ensure equal opportunity. Curricula and teaching methods have been modernised, with greater emphasis on critical thinking, scientific debate, mastering information technology and learning other languages, particularly English and Arabic. The rapid proliferation of educational institutions and the subsequent increase in student populations threatened to outpace the system’s ability to prepare an adequate number of teaching staff. This is where research-intensive universities and other centres of excellence in Europe and America helped. In 2010, it was mandated that all PhD candidates should spend up to 18 months in international centres abroad. And the KRG launched a $400 million programme to send more than 4,500 talented graduates to study for higher degrees at prestigious universities abroad. Meanwhile, existing faculty were given incentives to take sabbatical leave, spend time in prestigious universities abroad and to co-publish with colleagues there. Such arrangements can be mutually beneficial. While the local academics and institutions have great needs in terms of connectivity, sense of direction and research leadership, they can offer scientific material, data and unique insight into their local issues. Academic leaders of post-conflict countries need first-hand exposure to best practice in higher education and research. They need to understand how independent universities work in a democracy. They need help to become research-active and to produce high-impact publications. They need to think globally and act locally, solving their countries’ problems through collaborative research. Countries such as KRI are resource-rich and can sustain the funding of their side of collaborations. In addition to its full-fee paying scholarship and sabbatical programmes, the KRG also pledged in 2010 to match-fund external grants for research projects in the KRI. These have led to numerous joint projects, publications and supervision of research students. Many of the external supervisors have become external examiners and assessors of university performance in the KRI. The current security and economic crises have slowed progress, but this is a transient phase. These investments must be maintained as the situation eases. Without strong higher education, Kurdistan will never stand tall even as it moves towards full nationhood.
Topic:: Development, Education, Political stability, and Higher Education
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan

6184. Is Kurdistan Independence Inevitable?

Author:: Yerevan Saeed
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: On 25 September, residents of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) will cast their votes in a referendum that may trigger an official process of separating Kurdistan from Iraq. International friends and foes alike have opposed the controversial Kurdish move, contending that the referendum will fuel further instability in Iraq, and cause repercussions across the Middle East. The Kurdish bid for independence is not unique, however. Ethnic groups in Asia, Europe, and Africa have in the past pursued their own dreams of statehood — some with success, while others ended in failure. Whatever the outcome, the process is often costly in terms of both its human toll and economically. For that reason, the secession of any region from its parent state has to be justified on strategic, political, and economic terms. For their part, Kurdish leadership asserts that Baghdad’s mentality of power monopoly has not changed and the long-term potential for future violence against Kurds remains high. For them, the only viable, albeit risky, path is to seek complete sovereignty. The stakes are high all round, and the international community could have a constructive role to play. Conversely, international disengagement leaves both Baghdad and Erbil exposed to greater uncertainty in the near future. Iraq and Kurdistan could follow the model of Kosovo, East Timor, or South Sudan, all of which realised their statehood but to varying degrees of stability; or, instead, the catastrophic pathways taken by the Biafra region of Nigeria and Katanga in Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Though South Sudan is still reeling from its civil war and ongoing territorial disputes, international intervention has been key in preventing clashes between Khartoum and the new state. Some important steps included the signing of the North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, and the active participation of the United Nations in the referendum process in 2011. Likewise, international support was a determinant in amicable separation of East Timor from Indonesia in UN-sponsored referendum in 1999, as well as the separation of Kosovo from Serbia in 2008. By the same token, instead of mounting further pressure on Erbil to cancel the poll, it could be more constructive for all stakeholders to assist Baghdad and Erbil to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. This is likely to be beneficial for all sides. A deal would mitigate the chance of violent conflict between Kurdish forces and the Iraqi army, and could save the UN and major powers from investing blood and treasure in case of a potential later conflict. It would also remove Kurdistan from international legal limbo and provide a more viable route for diplomatic recognition. In contrast to these experiences, the anticipated absence of international engagement means a unilateral declaration of independence by Erbil could prove costly for all sides. This is evidenced by the declaration of independence of the Biafra Region in Nigeria in 1967–1970. The Igbo-dominated region of Biafra did not hold a referendum to pursue its dream of statehood. Instead, the 300 members of the joint Consultative Assembly of chiefs and elders voted in favour of secession from Nigeria on 26 May, 1967. The following day, the same Consultative Assembly passed a binding resolution, forcing the head of the Eastern region of Nigeria, Colonel Emeka Ojukwu, to declare independence unilaterally on 30 May, 1967. Despite some international support from African and European countries, the move was met with harsh military and economic warfare against the infant republic by the Nigerian government, leading to a three year conflict. One million people, including many civilians Biafrans civilians died, primarily from starvation. Further evidence of the potential danger can be found in the case of Katanga. When Moise Tshombe declared Katanga province as an independent republic from Congo on 11 July, 1960, the move was initially supported by Belgium, and came just two weeks after the Congo’s independence. Tshombe famously said, “We are seceding from chaos,” referring to the messy state of affairs of postcolonial Congo. However, the republic, located in the mineral heartland of Congo, failed to receive diplomatic recognition — even from Belgium, and faced strong opposition from Congo and the international community. The events descended into political turmoil, and forced the UN to deploy peacekeeping forces. In addition, the competing interests and support for different groups from the US, Soviet Union, Belgium, and other powers further complicated the crisis from 1960–1965. It took three years to defeat Tshombe and reintegrate Katanga into Congo, with a high human and economic toll . Beyond these examples and above all, the right of the Kurds to pursue statehood can be historically and legally justifiable. At the dawn of the last century when the Ottoman Empire crumbled, Kurds were deprived of statehood by the Great Powers. They were subject not just to marginalisation, but to genocide as well. Even so, following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Iraqi Kurdish leaders actively participated in the political processes in Baghdad, helping rebuild the Iraqi state and contributing to the defeat of terrorism. From their point of view, Baghdad has not lived up to its commitments to the 2005 constitution. Furthermore, the Kurds in Iraq believe they have strong grounds legal for a Kurdish state. Under the UN Charter, they have the right to self-determination. Finally, legal scholars argue that the principle of “territorial integrity” — enshrined in the UN Charter — is not unbreakable, should a country oppress a particular ethnic group and refuse to provide equal citizenship. International and regional powers have expressed understanding for the Kurdish aspirations for statehood, but are concerned the result could lead to violence. However, if instability is the concern, they are well-positioned to facilitate an amicable outcome between Erbil and Baghdad. Kurdish leaders have said that they have reached a point of no return with regard to their status quo within Iraq. Yet, they have shown flexibility in a willingness to postpone the referendum, should the international community offer alternatives or agree to officially support a legally binding referendum in the future. Indeed on 14 September, 2017, envoys of the US, UK and UN, in coordination with Baghdad, presented an ‘alternative to the referendum’ to the KRG President. Details of the ‘alternative’ is not known but short of providing political and economic incentives and security assurances, it is hard to see the current momentum for the referendum coming to an end
Topic:: United Nations, Election watch, Conflict, and Independence
Political Geography:: Africa, Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan

6185. The Christians:Perceptions of Reconciliation and Conflict

Author:: Khogir Wirya
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: This report is about perceptions of reconciliation and conflict among the Christians in Iraq. Being a religious minority group in a country that has been fraught with conflicts and instability, this community, like other minorities in Iraq, endured suppression, displacement, and degradation. This, in addition to the weakening rule of law, has had an inverse impact on their communal relations, causing many to migrate. Furthermore, the Islamic State’s (IS) invasion of large swathes of land in the Nineveh Plain, where large numbers of Christians live, was yet another severe blow inflicted upon this community. The findings of this study reveal that the Christian community has had a conflictual relationship with the Shabaks, another minority group, in the Nineveh Plain well before IS’s emergence in 2014. The interviewees claim that the Shabaks encroached on their lands in an attempt to undermine the Sunnis in Mosul, serve external agendas and change the demography of the area. This report also shows that the Christians have disagreements with the Sunni Arabs, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and the Central government of Iraq (CGI). In order to fend off the rising Shia dominance in the Nineveh Plain, Sunnis are partly blamed for increasing the level of violence in the area. Many Christians held grievances against KRG’s policies in the Nineveh Plain before 2013. They argue that in its attempts to shield influence against Baghdad, the KRG caused friction and fragmentation among the Christians. As for the CGI, the interviewees expressed mistrust since it was unable to protect them from IS’s onslaught. In the eyes of Christians, the security situation after liberation does not portend well. The Shia Shabaks are thought to pose a security concern in the Nineveh Plain because of their involvement with Shia armed forces while there are Christian armed groups as well. Baghdad and Erbil have not engaged in debating future control of the security of the Nineveh Plains. Therefore, they see the potential for eruption of violence which may inflict great damage on reconciliation efforts. In short, the dynamics in Nineveh Plain were not stable before June 2014. Inter and intra-communal relations were strained, the political landscape was divisive and the quality of services was poor. The KRG and Baghdad are usually blamed for the overall pre-crisis climate as they were competing for hegemony. The ramifications of that unhealthy competition were manifold. Polarisation, neglect, underdevelopment, and strained relationships are just some. IS’s invasion strained the relations further and a return to the status quo ante means protracted conflicts and further instability. The bigger danger is that more and more Christians would leave the country should the situation remain unchanged.
Topic:: Religion, Islamic State, Christianity, Sunni, and Shia
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

6186. After the Kurdistan Referendum: Iraq’s Road to Reconciliation

Author:: Yasir Kuoti
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: On 25 September 2017, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) held a historic, if contentious, referendum in the three Kurdistan Region’s provinces (Erbil, Duhok, and Sulimanyiah) and disputed territories, including Kirkuk. Notwithstanding the moral grounds for Kurdish self-determination, and despite the Kurds having voted overwhelmingly in favor of independence, the unilateral move was met with strong backlash form varied opponents, for varied reasons. The Iraqi government, parliament and Supreme Court in Baghdad come out against the referendum calling it “illegitimate,” “unconstitutional,” “destabilizing” and “untimely”, as did Turkey, Iran, many western countries and international institutions including the United Nations and European Union. In a retaliatory response, Baghdad moved to impose a host of punitive measures against the KRG. These included the decision by the civil aviation authority of Iraq to halt international flights to and from Erbil and Sulimanyiah airports on September 29, 2017. Now a month into the referendum, Iraqi Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, a perceived moderate Shiite, continues to face a mounting pressure from Iraq’s parliament and political parties to take tougher measures against the KRG. In exact, the issue of disputed territories took a center stage as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), backed by the Popular Mobilization Unit (PMU), moved to reinstitute federal authority in Kurdish-held areas in Kirkuk, Nineveh, Salahddin, and Diyala governorates. The referendum and post-referendum events grew fast over the past few weeks, and it is difficult to undo them for a host of legal and political considerations. Playing the blame game now is not only frustrating, but also impeding to progress. Therefore, it is more constructive that Baghdad and Erbil take steps to calm down emotions and pave the path for meaningful dialogue. Irrespective of what Baghdad leaders think of the referendum or its legality, they cannot take away from the fact that millions of Kurds cast their votes in favor of independence. The Kurds have legitimate fears about the sectarian direction in which the country is heading, a view that is also shared by non-Kurdish Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs and many Shiite Arabs, including Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Such fears need to be acknowledged and dealt with, not dismissed. Baghdad should also take measures to improve communications with the KRG, to mitigate future fears by Kurds. Certainly, a drive behind the timing of the referendum was the fear, real or perceived, by some Kurds that with the defeat of IS, Baghdad will turn focus to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) to deprive it of its gains. Erbil must recognize that Iraq’s constitution of 2005, which Kurdish voters have largely backed, gave a broad autonomy to Kurdistan Region and unequivocally affirmed that federal authorities have the constitutional duty to “preserve the unity [and] integrity…of Iraq and its federal democratic system.” Kurdish leaders, and many Iraqis too, have issues with the constitution and the political process it stipulated, but in the absence of a better framework, it remains the law of the land. Erbil should also take a leading role in mitigating the fallout from the referendum. The KRG leaders should accept that the referendum has backfired where the best outcome, for the short term at least, is negotiations with Baghdad for a democratic and federal Iraq. Therefore, the KRG might choose to publically demand the implementation of Iraqi constitution. This does not take away from the strategic and aspirational value of the referendum, which is expedient for pushing Kurdish demands over disputed areas, broader autonomy, and other issues. Meanwhile, the KRG leadership would benefit form focusing on its internal challenges including the need to address intra-Kurdish rivalries among political parties, empowering institutions, strengthening the rule of law, and initiating economic reforms. Such political and economic reforms will improve KRG’s negotiating positions with Baghdad. The referendum has given rise to unprecedented political and military tensions between the federal government of Iraq and the KRG. With the mobilization of the ISF, backed by the PMUs, to reclaim federal control over disputed territories, the situation risks igniting an armed confrontation between the two sides in one disputed area or another, especially if Baghdad decides to swing the pendulum too far. Given these developments, the only sensible way forward is for Baghdad and Erbil to make negotiations a priority. It is essential that talks focus not only on procedural and technical issues such as budget, oil sales, and fair distribution of resources, but, more importantly, on the primary issue that divided Baghdad and Erbil and helped trigger the referendum: corruption and sectarianism in the Iraqi state. Iraq’s political system is increasingly turning into an ethno-sectarian battle, which has been the feature of post-2003 Iraq except that it has become much more abrasive in recent years. Political parties throughout Iraq are structuring themselves to whip up sectarian and ethnic divisions to varying extents of extremism. Under the system, each party has become associated with its identity where there is little to no space to an overarching Iraqi national identity. Parties have become accustomed to not only make their constituents polarized along ethnic and sectarian lines, but also make them fearful of fellow countrymen. This state of affairs calls for an urgent action; else cycles of disputes and violence are likely to resurface. Interestingly, the fallout from the referendum has also provided opportunities for dialogue between the KRG and Baghdad. Indeed, the KRG Cabinet in its meeting of 19 October reemphasized the need for negotiations without pre-conditions and that the KRG is ready for dialogue. If and when reconciliations efforts take place, it is critical they address revising the constitution and structure of government. Negotiations are far better when they are outcome-driven with defined timelines, addressing the need for a non-sectarian and non-divisive arrangement. Prime Minister Abadi must seize on his successes to steer the country’s ship toward a unified vision that can bring about the will to address problems rooted in the political system, which feeds on ethno-sectarian divisions and is the greatest barrier to development. The international community, particularly the United States, has historic opportunities to positively influence the future of Iraq by articulating a peaceful settlement to the crisis and encouraging meaningful negotiations between Baghdad and the KRG. Furthermore, the U.S. should promote dialogue within the major political parties in the KRI while leveraging its influence to redirect attention toward liberating remaining IS strongholds in western Iraq. The U.S is also encouraged to provide Iraq with legal and technical assistance needed to launch reforms and national reconciliations initiatives. The U.S and Iraqi leaders need to work together to dispel fears held by minorities, encouraging them to integrate into a better version of federal and democratic Iraq. Being part of the coalition government in Baghdad, Kurds have a key role to play in making progress toward national reconciliations and reforms.
Topic:: Self Determination, Democracy, Independence, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Baghdad, and Kurdistan

6187. Perceptions of EU Crisis Response in Iraq

Author:: Khogir Wirya, Dlawer Ala'Aldeen, and Kamaran Palani
Publication Date:: 11-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: This policy paper provides a bottom-up analysis of the impact of the European Union’s (EU) crisis response policies in Iraq. It examines how the EU’s engagement in crisis response is received and perceived by different local actors throughout the conflict cycle. The EU’s engagement in Iraq is multifaceted and encapsulates, but is not limited to, the fields of reform; capacity building; rule of law; security sector reform; humanitarian assistance; and development aid. Furthermore, this study seeks to unpack whether the EU’s responses correspond to the needs of target groups, perceived as conflict-sensitive and geared to the needs of vulnerable groups. Although the findings indicate that general attitudes towards the EU are favourable, we suggest the following policy recommendations: The EU should place more emphasis on its image as a contributor in crisis response in Iraq. The data indicate that a significant number of participants were unaware of the EU’s efforts in this perspective. The EU should also increase awareness about its roles in the fields of security sector reform, rule of law and development aid. The results show that these sectors are less known than the others. The EU should do more in the areas of security sector reform, development aid and rule of law. Participants have shown inconclusive satisfaction levels about these sectors. With an increasingly weak rule of law, limited capacities and widespread insecurity, expectations of increased EU engagement in these sectors are evident. The EU should identify the causes behind the partial satisfaction with its assistance scheme in responding to the crisis In Iraq. A sizeable share of the respondents stated that the EU’s support had not improved their status in the crisis. This should warrant an investigation into the effectiveness of the EU’s contributions and programmes in various fields.
Topic:: Security, Humanitarian Aid, European Union, Crisis Management, and Development Aid
Political Geography:: Iraq, Europe, Middle East, and Baghdad

6188. Shifting Gears in Iraq-Saudi Arabia Relations

Author:: Yasir Kuoti
Publication Date:: 11-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: Relations between Iraq and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) have remained largely cold or nonexistent since the 2003 Iraq War, an outcome of the war itself that saw the empowerment in Iraq of Riyadh’s regional archrival, Iran. Since January 2017, however, bilateral relations improved considerably as Saudi officials flocked to Baghdad to meet Iraqi counterparts. Iraqi officials and public figures reciprocated, in speed, with their own visits to the KSA. The surprising rapprochement agenda have thus far resulted in, among other things, restoring Saudi diplomatic representation in Iraq, opening al-Jadidah Arar border-crossing on the Saudi northern borders with Iraq, and inaugurating the Saudi Arabia-Iraq Coordination Council, opening a new era of strategic ties between the two countries. Iraqi media now reports that the Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman will start an official visit to Iraq in November. In the process, he will become the highest-level Saudi official to do so since 1990. What explains the timing of this rapprochement policy?
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

6189. How to Close Guantanamo

Author:: Human Rights First
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Human Rights First
Abstract:: President Obama should provide sustained leadership to increase the momentum to transfer prisoners out of Guantanamo and close the facility.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Prisons/Penal Systems, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: United States, Cuba, North America, Washington, D.C., and Guantanamo

6190. How to Dismantle the Business of Human Trafficking: Blueprint for Congress

Author:: Annick Febrey
Publication Date:: 02-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Human Rights First
Abstract:: Since passage of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000—and its subsequent reauthorizations—the U.S. government has taken steps to build an anti-human trafficking infrastructure. Through annual publication of the Department of State’s (DOS) Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report,[ii] the United States has led the movement to call worldwide attention to this problem. The DOS Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (J/TIP) provides grants to both American and foreign institutions involved in prevention and awareness raising, protection and victim services, law enforcement and efforts to increase prosecutions, research and data collection, and evaluation. J/TIP also facilitates coordination between U.S. agencies, both at home and abroad, including those on the President’s Interagency Task Force (PITF).[iii] Despite these efforts, human trafficking continues to be a massive human rights problem across the globe, one that inflicts suffering on millions and undermines legitimate, law-abiding U.S. businesses and their workers. Victims are forced to work in fields and factories and on fishing boats for little to no pay, while others are held captive in private homes. Forced prostitution rings imprison women, girls, and boys in brothels or make them to work on the streets under threat of abuse. The primary reason for the persistence of slavery is clear: the crime pays. Operating with virtual impunity, traffickers earn an estimated $150 billion annually in illicit profits worldwide.[iv] The 2016 DOS TIP report used law enforcement data to determine that there were only 6,609 human trafficking convictions globally in 2015—a paltry figure considering the millions of victims. The U.S. government reported just 297 convictions in 2015.[v] The United States should flip the financial equation for traffickers: dismantle the business of human trafficking by increasing the risks and decreasing the profits. To that end, the 115th U.S. Congress has an opportunity to prioritize policies that will increase prosecutions through the annual appropriations process and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, which is up for reauthorization this fall. These policies should strengthen partnerships across federal, state and local law enforcement and related agencies, and increase funding to create more effective and sustainable efforts to combat this horrific crime.
Topic:: Labor Issues, Sex Trafficking, Domestic Politics, and Human Trafficking
Political Geography:: United States, Washington, and D.C.

6191. Vienna meeting on Nuclear Energy and Proliferation Risks

Author:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:: There was general agreement that the JCPOA was a very positive solution to a complex issue, providing a constructive and peaceful way forward for the Middle East in particular, and the non-proliferation regime in general. The deal contained in the JCPOA is working as intended. Iran has been determined by the IAEA on multiple [6] occasions to be in full compliance with its obligations, and now has the most comprehensive safeguards and verification regime in history. World powers have followed through with some sanctions relief thereby aiding the Iranian economy. Furthermore, there have been other positive dimensions, including an effective joint commission process, greater transparency among parties, as well as communications and interactions taking place in a more positive atmosphere. At the same time, it was recognized that the deal is unstable: although the terms of the JCPOA were ring-fenced from the wider geopolitical environment of the Middle East, political manoeuvring can threaten its continued implementation. The spill-over of non-nuclear issues, often labelled under “Iranian behaviour”, should not be allowed to derail the process. It was noted in a positive sense that all the main candidates in the Iranian Presidential campaign have signalled their desire to continue with the JCPOA. However, several participants felt that some of Iran’s regional policies could undermine this, risking a negative reaction from the US and other states. Some argued that given Iran’s disputed compliance history with IAEA safeguards agreements (which even two years later remains heated) and, in general, the uneasy relations in the past between Iran and IAEA, it is important that Iran continue to strictly comply to the letter of the JCPOA. The US domestic context provides perhaps the greatest potential risk to the sustainability of the JCPOA. It was noted that President Trump may not, after all, ‘tear up’ the deal. The possibility was raised that, because many in his national security team were seen as hostile to Iran, any minor safeguards violation may be seized upon to terminate the deal. Such a hard-line approach could isolate the US from a global consensus and weaken its hand in other relevant matters. There is further danger that Congress could act alone in enacting a bill (of which many are on the table) that would be in contravention of the JCPOA. This possibility was considered unrealistic by some participants. Some details of Security Council resolution 2231 were seen as problematic in a number of ways: the explicit provisions on ballistic missiles were viewed as an unnecessarily punitive measure unrelated to the main goals of the JCPOA; equally, some of the inquiry and resolution mechanisms were seen by some as unbalanced. The JCPOA should in any case be understood as a temporary solution. Even though continuing to implement it effectively would build more confidence, ultimately trust between Iran and some Western states will likely never be high. However, the deal does hold the potential for transformative progress in Iran-US relations, pending further steps to de-escalate and normalize relations. Many of Iran’s neighbours worry that the remaining latent nuclear capacity has only delayed the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran down the road; at the same time, many regional states are also pursuing nuclear fuel cycle programs. The JCPOA should also offer the international community an opportunity to consider how to extend some measures indefinitely and extend them to other countries. Regional stability and non-proliferation could be enhanced by extending some of the JPCOA provisions to the Middle East and beyond it. As such, Pugwash should make efforts to convene and organize meetings to explore far-reaching initiatives that are in the spirit of the agreement; for example: initiatives to discuss ‘internationalizing’ the nuclear fuel cycle; forward-looking regional agreements, such as a threshold of uranium enrichment, a ban on plutonium reprocessing, or limits on stockpiles of LEU; innovative safeguards measures, such as advanced monitoring technology, enhanced access to centrifuge production facilities, or explicitly set times for snap inspections; further multilateral scientific and technical cooperation, such as the SESAME project.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: United States, Iran, Middle East, and Israel

6192. Sovereignist Populism - a Reaction to the Democratic De�icit of the European Union

Author:: Janko Bekić
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: Populism has been de�ined by Cas Mudde as “a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ʻthe pure peopleʼ and ʻthe corrupt eliteʼ, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté general (general will) of the people”. In the past, populist movements and parties in Europe campaigned against national political elites who, as the narrative goes, lost touch with the common people and pursued their own particular agendas in national capitals. Since the advent of the European Union in 1993 (entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty) their focus has moved to an adversary even more disconnected and physically distant from the national electorates – the unelected, bureaucratic and supranational elite in Brussels. Nevertheless, national heads of state or government remain a secondary target, as they are seen either as powerless (due to the transfer of competences to EU institutions) or in collusion with the Brussels’ “junta”. This new type of populism can be described as sovereignist, because of its advocacy of downgrading the EU back to a confederation of states, or – more radically – of dissolving it altogether. This new type of populism can be described as sovereignist, because of its advocacy of downgrading the EU back to a confederation of states, or – more radically – of dissolving it altogether. The populist objection to the democratic de�icit of the EU is not without substance. Major decisions, such as the introduction of harsh austerity measures in Greece, or the attempted imposition of obligatory migrant quotas on Hungary, have been made in the Quartier européen against the explicit wishes of the affected demoi, made clear in the Greek bailout referendum of July 2015 and the Hungarian migrant quota referendum of October 2016. Therefore, these decisions can be described as legal, according to relevant EU treaties, but not fully legitimate, as they don’t enjoy the support of the concerned populations. Even the renowned German sociologist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas, certainly no admirer of populist parties, acknowledged in The Crisis of the European Union: A Response (2012) that the EU “has been sustained and monopolised only by political elites” and that it is showing signs of moving in the direction of “a kind of post-democratic rule”. While some argue that the creeping transition towards post-democracy is a deliberate choice by European political elites, others view it as a regrettable but unavoidable side effect of the current status of the EU which is a sui generis formation, neither a confederation of states, nor a federal state.
Topic:: Politics, European Union, and Populism
Political Geography:: Europe

6193. Hybrid Warfare

Author:: Sandro Knezović and Nani Klepo
Publication Date:: 02-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: Contemporary international relations are carrying a wide range of challenges that have led to the necessity to rede�ine existing national and international strategies grounded predominantly on conventional state-based threats. Recognising vulnerability to non-conventional challenges, contemporary strategies are increasingly acknowledging the importance of the changing character of warfare. Namely, not only have the non-conventional threats become increasingly perilous, but the overlapping of different classes of threats have dramatically increased the complexity of existing challenges. This leads to a conclusion that future con�licts are very likely to be multidimensional, with blurring and combined forms of combat characterised by expanding dynamics and growing destructiveness, frequently called hybrid. Due to the fact that it includes a wide range of fairly unconsolidated categories, the term itself had received a signi�icant amount of criticism related to an alleged lack of conceptual clarity. Still, while the mainstream transatlantic security policy elites largely operate in traditional terms and only modestly use the contemporary framework of strategic thinking, the challenges and increasingly assertive opponents are following a different path.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, War, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Global Focus

6194. Presidential election in Serbia: A boost or setback for EU accession?

Author:: Krševan Antun Dujmović
Publication Date:: 03-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: As Serbia braces itself for the presidential election on 2nd April 2017, the international community �inds itself puzzled with the prospect of future political orientation of this Balkan country. The biggest republic of ex-Yugoslavia, Serbia still bears the burden of the wars in the nineties, unde�ined relations with Kosovo and NATO bombing of 1999, due to which the country is still somewhat cautious toward Euro-Atlantic integration and the United States. It seems that Serbia seeks to join the European Union (EU), and at the same time to foment its relation with its traditional ally, the Russian Federation. In that respect, the current trends of foreign policy in Serbia are also visible in other Balkan countries, namely Macedonia and Montenegro, which like Serbia have strong links to their big Orthodox patron in the East, while striving to make progress on the path to the EU. This dichotomy between pro-European and pro-Russian forces in Serbia was exacerbated to a new level with Brexit and stalemate in the EU enlargement process, growing Russian in�luence in the region and expectations in Serbia that the newly inaugurated US president Donald Trump will bring a thaw in relations with Russia and allow a regionally more dominant Serbia, while curbing ambitions of Kosovar Albanians. This dichotomy has created a division in the country torn between its Western and Eastern ambitions that is visible in many aspects of Serbian society, candidates bare hallmark, or in Obradović, the leader of the Serbian Movement Dveri (Srpski pokret Dveri) is a clear example of a pro-Russian politician in Serbia, while independent candidate SašaJanković represents the voice of a civil and pro-European Serbia. The rest of the presidential candidates are positioned on a wide spectrum dividing Obradović and Janković, thus contributing to the rather short but at the same time very electri�ied presidential campaign.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Elections, Europe Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Serbia, and Balkans

6195. Quo vadis Europa?

Author:: Doris Pack
Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: There is no doubt that as it marks its 60th birthday, the European Union is in poor shape. There is persistently high unemployment in many EU countries – especially among young people; we are facing the rise of populist political parties, most of them harbor anti-EU or Eurosceptic sentiments. Such factors are complicating the EU’s ability to deal with a multitude of internal and external challenges. Among the most prominent are the June 2016 vote in the UK in favor of leaving the EU, the debt crisis and lingering concerns about the eurozone, ongoing migrant and refugee lows, the spread of authoritarianism, a heightened terrorism threat, shattering conflicts in different parts of the world, climate change and an excessive consumption of natural resources based on an economy that is not corresponding to the principle of sustainability.
Topic:: Climate Change, Terrorism, Natural Resources, European Union, and Refugees
Political Geography:: Europe

6196. Federal election in Germany: Continuation of CDU’s dominance at the helm of Europe’s biggest power?

Author:: Krševan Antun Dujmović
Publication Date:: 06-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: Over the course of past twelve months, Europe was holding its breath in a couple of nerve wrecking moments that were to decide the destiny of the European Union (EU). Indeed, in June last year the British cast their votes for the unimaginable and decided that the United Kingdom (UK) should leave the EU. Shockwaves battered the woozy continent sprawling from over the other side of the English Channel, and it was the President of the European Parliament, incumbent German SPD leader Martin Schulz who exclaimed in the wake of the Brexit vote that the UK should exit the EU as quickly as possible. Just four months later Europe experienced another shockwave, this time propelled from the other side of the Atlantic, as the Americans voted for Donald Trump, who was in support of Brexit during his campaign, advocating overtly against the European integration and even renouncing the fundament of Trans-Atlantic integration - NATO. The beginning of 2017 set a murky atmosphere as the EU started to brace itself for another big test in France. The victory of Emmanuel Macron in May meant that the EU would survive, albeit crippled as the Britons lead by Theresa May continued relentlessly their divorce with Europe by triggering the Article 50 in March. With the British already one foot out, and the French �irmly in the Union, the attention of the European public is shifting more to Germany which will hold the federal election on September 24th this year. After the disappointing break away decision in Britain, some Europeans seem to invoke a renewed Franco-German axis as the power engine of European integration. Since the great economic depression swept Europe like a contagion in 2008, Germany has been the best performing European economy, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel was perceived as the “savior of Europe”. Due to these facts, it is no wonder that all of Europe eagerly expects the outcome of the German federal election which will largely determine the fate of the continent.
Topic:: Elections, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:: Britain, Europe, France, Germany, and Western Europe

6197. Sí o no? Will Catalonia go it alone?

Author:: Janko Bekić
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: The United Kingdom and Spain have many things in common. Both countries are former empires, constitutional monarchies and parliamentarydemocracies;of�iciallytheyare unitary states, however, devolution in the UK and the model of autonomous communities in Spain make them “federations without federalism”. Furthermore, they are both plurinational, in the sense that Britishness and Spanishness serve as overarching identities for the stateless nations of the English, Scots and Welsh within the UK, and the Castilians, Catalans, Basques and others within Spain (although, one could argue that the English and the Castilians are the real “owners” of the two countries). In the past, London as well as Madrid fought minority nationalisms with violence, triggering terrorist attacks by armed separatist and secessionist groups like the IRA and ETA. More recently, the central governments of the UK and Spain have been faced with peaceful and democratic independence movements in Scotland and Catalonia, to which they responded quite differently. While London allowed the Scottish independence referendum of September 2014, and promised to honor its result, Madrid remains adamantly opposed to a similar plebiscite in Catalonia, and vows to disrupt it with all legal means at its disposal (which, ultimately, includes the use of force). The differing approaches of British and Spanish governments to secessionism within their borders are mirrored in their foreign policies: the UK recognized the Serbian breakaway province of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state, while Spain (along with four other EU members) refuses to do so.
Topic:: Federalism, Autonomy, and Independence
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Spain, Catalonia, Scotland, and Western Europe

6198. WHAT ABOUT THE ADRIATIC ?

Author:: Sandro Knezović
Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: Special bond between humans and ‘big waters’ is most probably as old as the mankind itself. Not only that the seas provided inspiration for mythology and even religions, but they also facilitated trade and commerce and connected people with different cultural backgrounds. The development of means of water transport has contributed substantially to that. People began trading with items others did not have or, in some cases, have not seen at all. Apart from cultural exchange, this prompted the economic one as well and small ports started attracting many merchants from distant places, representing cradles of capitalism. The same applies for the Adriatic, where different cultures, religions and even political systems were intertwined. It is no wonder therefore that cities like Dubrovnik and Split were actually more linked with cities like Ancona and Venice than to cities like Skopje or Belgrade, even during the time when they actually belonged to the same state together with last two. The structure and complexity of the terrain in the Balkan Peninsula obviously also contributed to that.
Topic:: Environment, Regional Cooperation, and Water
Political Geography:: Europe, Southern Europe, and Adriatic Sea

6199. The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Russia - US flashpoint

Author:: Brenda Shaffer
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson described the state of current US-Russian relations as at its “lowest point since the Cold War.” This situation has potentially dangerous implications for the US, Russia and Europe, as well as a variety of regional conflicts around the globe. Among the top of this list is the Nagorno-Karabakh in the South Caucasus. In the past three years, the frequency, intensity and technological level of flare ups in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan have intensified. Adding to the propensity for danger is the fact that several regional conflicts are now linked together—Syria, Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh and the policy toward Iran—with actions in one conflict affecting developments in another.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, Europe, and Ukraine

6200. Fears of War on the Korean Peninsula

Author:: Dario Kuntić
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: War is lurking on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has embarked on an accelerated buildup of weapons of mass destruction and modernization of its already large conventional force. It has been consistently testing a series of ballistic and intercontinental missiles, performing nuclear tests, and accelerating toward development of a fully functional nuclear weapon that could strike the United States. The North Korean regime is now estimated to have as many as twenty nuclear warheads and could soon be able to make some to �it on the missiles necessary to deliver them. With time running out, Washington may come to the conclusion that a preventive military strike against North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs is the only way to deprive Pyongyang of capability to launch a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile on the US. On a visit to Seoul in March this year, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson left open the option of a military strike to prevent the development of nuclear weapons program from advancing too far, vowed to defend allies in the region, and ruled out negotiations with Pyongyang. As Washington and Pyongyang escalate their war of words, with both sides hinting it could end with a nuclear con�lict, the prospect of serious con�lict is stronger than ever.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

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