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181. National Integrity System Assessment – Israel, 2013

Author:
Ran Lachman
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Transparency International
Abstract:
The national integrity system of Israel was found to have uneven or "oscillating" levels of integrity: some of the central pillars received a fairly high score, placing them in the top fifth of the evaluation scale, some medium-high scores, whereas some pillars, central to the system, received scores barely above mid-scale. The pillars with the highest integrity, in terms of over-all integrity ranking, can be regarded as pillars that safeguard the democracy in Israel: chief among them is the Central Elections Committee (91), followed by the Judicial Branch (83) and the State Comptroller (81). On the other hand, the analyses indicate that the principle weakness of the Israeli national integrity system lies with the pillars of The Public Sector ±i.e., the Civil Service (52), the Executive Branch (58), and the political parties (60).Conspicuous in its low integrity score was The Executive Branch, i.e., the government, where the indicators of Governance and the Role in the integrity system were particularly low.
Topic:
Government
Political Geography:
Israel

182. Anti-Corruption Kit: 15 ideas for young activists

Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Transparency International
Abstract:
Citizens rely on governments for essential goods and services. But what's more is they pay for those services through taxation. If a government, or people within a government, feel like nobody is watching, then the temptation to steal becomes much more seductive. Accountability to the public begins when people – like you! – track government spending and detect corruption by watching how and where the money flows.
Topic:
Government

183. An Economical Business-Cycle Model

Author:
Pascal Michaillat and Emmanuel Saez
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
In recent decades, advanced economies have experienced low and stable inflation and long periods of liquidity trap. We construct an alternative business-cycle model capturing these two features by adding two assumptions to a money-in-the-utility-function model: the labor market is subject to matching frictions, and real wealth enters the utility function. These assumptions modify the two core equations of the standard New Keynesian model. With matching frictions, we can analyze equilibria in which inflation is fixed and not determined by a forward-looking Phillips curve. With wealth in the utility, the Euler equation is modified and we can obtain steady-state equilibria with a liquidity trap, positive inflation, and labor market slack. The model is simple enough to inspect the mechanisms behind cyclical fluctuations and to study the effects of conventional and unconventional monetary and fiscal policies. As a byproduct, the model provides microfoundations for the classical IS-LM model. Finally, we show how directed search can be combined with costly price adjustments to generate a forward-looking Phillips curve and recover some insights from the New Keynesian model.
Topic:
Government, Politics, History, Finance, Business, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:
Global Focus

184. Air pollution in urban Beijing: the role of government-controlled information

Author:
Chiara Ravetti, Yana Popp Jin, Mu Quan, Zhang Shiqiu, and Tim Swanson
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Environmental Studies, The Graduate Institute (IHEID)
Abstract:
This paper looks at the problem of information control behind the unsustainable levels of air pollution in China. In particular, it focuses on a large urban area, Beijing, and it examines the role of the public, government-controlled information and the adaptation choices of households in response to signals about high pollution. Our analysis is based on a simple theoretical framework in which people migrate from rural areas to polluted cities, receiving a signal from the government about urban pollution; hence, they decide whether to adapt to pollution or not. We find that the government has no incentive to ensure sustainable air quality, as it can distort pollution information in order to attract cheap labour. We then analyse empirically two different air pollution indexes from different sources and agents’ behaviour in an original household survey collected in Beijing. We find that the official air pollution values are systematically distorted, creating perverse incentives for households to react to bad air quality, especially for people who rely on government-controlled sources of information.
Topic:
Government, Sustainability, Air Pollution, and Information
Political Geography:
China and Asia