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1. Factsheet: Alp Services

Author:
Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:
Alp Services is a private global public affairs and intelligence firm based in Geneva, Switzerland. In 2023, it was revealed that Alp Services worked for the United Arab Emirates, and carried out the largest disinformation campaign against Muslims in Europe, linking successful business people, organizations, and individuals to the Muslim Brotherhood in an effort to smear and blackmail them. The campaign relied on Islamophobic tropes as it framed Muslim individuals and organizations of being tied to an alleged “Islamist movement.”
Topic:
Intelligence, Islamophobia, Disinformation, and Public Affairs
Political Geography:
Europe, Switzerland, and United Arab Emirates

2. Member States Seek to Unmask Russian Espionage in the EU

Author:
Elzbieta Kaca
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russian intelligence services are actively developing their networks of spies in the EU. While Member States are trying to counteract this and are undertaking coordinated action, many of them have limited operational capacities. Their cooperation at the EU level is hampered by differences in threat perceptions and a lack of mutual trust. With the aim of developing common competences, EU diplomacy can inform Member State societies about the growing scale of espionage threats by publishing regular reports on this subject.
Topic:
Intelligence, European Union, Espionage, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. Intelligence and the War in Ukraine: The Limited Power of Public Disclosure

Author:
Ofek Reimer
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Months before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the West began to disclose intelligence material on Putin’s plans – thereby using a policy tool that brings with it both advantages and risks. What did the intelligence disclosures achieve, and what might Israel learn from this experience?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Intelligence, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. Guidelines for Intelligence Oversight for Parliamentary Committees in the Assembly of the Republic of North Maced

Author:
Teodora Fuior
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
The Guidelines for Intelligence Oversight reviews the Macedonian legislative framework and oversight system, and it provides information on international principles and good practices in intelligence oversight. It is designed to inform and support parliamentary committees in fulfilling their oversight mandate, especially in conceptualizing and planning oversight activities which need to contribute to an uncontested improvement of parliamentary performance in intelligence and security oversight. This revised version of the Guidelines shall respond to the expectations and needs of the new members of the Assembly, continuing to serve as a useful and informative tool for their work.
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Governance, and Oversight
Political Geography:
Europe and North Macedonia

5. North Korea’s Nuclear Program: The Early Days, 1984–2002

Author:
Torrey Froscher
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
The North Korean nuclear program has been a major intelligence and policy challenge for more than 30 years. Former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry described the problem as “perhaps the most unsuccessful exercise of diplomacy in our country’s history.”1 Donald Gregg, who was CIA station chief in Seoul as well as US ambassador to South Korea, called North Korea the “longest running intelligence failure in the history of American espionage.”2 To be fair, Gregg was referring specifically to a lack of success in recruiting human sources—not necessarily errors in specific or overall assessments. Nonetheless, his comment underscores the difficulty of figuring out what North Korea is up to. In 2005, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), which was convened to investigate the failed 2002 national intelligence estimate on Iraqi WMD capabilities, indicated that we know “disturbingly little about the weapons programs and even less about the intentions of many of our most dangerous adversaries,”3 presumably including North Korea. Today we know a lot more about North Korea’s nuclear program— but mostly it is what they want us to know. Pyongyang has conducted six nuclear tests. We know that North Korea has nuclear weapons, a significant fissile material production capacity, and an ambitious nuclear and missile development effort. These programs are completely unconstrained. The United States has tried many approaches to deal with the problem over the years, and intelligence has played a key role in support. Are there lessons to be learned from this experience? Obviously, it’s a very big question and I will sketch out just a few thoughts, mostly from an intelligence perspective: What we knew and when and how we thought about the problem. North Korea was one of many issues I worked on as an analyst and manager in CIA until my retirement in 2006. The views that follow are my own, of course, and the specific information is drawn from the extensive public literature on the issue, as well as declassified intelligence documents.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, and History
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

6. Egyptian Plague or Spring of Youth? The Israeli Discourse regarding the Arab Spring

Author:
Lior Lehrs
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
From the outset of the protest events in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya and other countries, many people in the world began using the term “Arab spring” to describe the sequence of events in the various locations. The term was based on the term “theSpring of Nations,” that refers to a wave of national revolutions in Europe in the mid-19th century. It seemed to take a little longer for the term to penetrate the Israeli discourse on the subject and even when it did many hesitated to accept it and had reservations about its positive and optimistic connotations. For instance, Minister of Strategic Affairs Moshe (Bogie) Yaalon stated that “the event is dramatic and historic and will be given a name, but not the Arab spring.” Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan also opined it was a mistake to use the term “Arab spring” and explained that “whoever coined the phrase drew it from events that occurred in Europe in 1848, when liberal ideas proliferated in the world. The truth is there is no liberal message.” Former head of military intelligence Amos Yadlin said “we understand today that the pair of words ‘Arab spring’ did not describe correctly the phenomenon that rocked the Middle East in 2011.” The Israel Defense Forces’ intelligence branch discussed the issue and decided that the term “Arab spring” was unsuitable and decided to use the term “upheaval” as the official term describing the events.4 Many other people in Israel, as shall be described below, began using the terms “Arab winter” or “Islamic winter” as terms to challenge the original term and express a negative reading of the events. This article wishes to present an analysis of the Israeli discourse following the Arab Spring events as articulated by different parties in diverse forums of conversation. The article analyzes the public and media conversation in Israel and includes an analysis of statements, articles and public opinion surveys and refers to different players (politicians, public figures, journalists and military commanders) and different issues and questions that have arisen as part of the conversation on the subject.
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Arab Spring, History, and Protests
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Arab Countries

7. Reviewing Bill C-59, An Act Respecting National Security Matters 2017: What’s new, what’s out, and what’s different from Bill C-51, A National Security Act 2015?

Author:
Michael Nesbitt
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
In 2015, Canada’s national security law landscape received some long-overdue attention in the form of Bill C-51, the Anti-Terrorism Act. It was the culmination of a series of smaller initiatives that had brought attention to national security law in Canada, but also a direct response to two terrorist attacks that left two Canadians dead in October 2014. Bill C-51 did indeed reinvigorate discussions around national security law in Canada, but it became a lightning rod for criticism. Bill C-59, An Act Respecting National Security Matters 2017 was not passed until June 2019, but it was nevertheless a direct response to Bill C-51 and the criticisms it faced. Yet for the most part, Bill C-59 amended but did not repeal the important new powers, or even the most controversial ones, found in Bill C-51. Instead, Bill C-59 can be seen, in part, as a technical-legal bill that largely entrenched the powers first conceived of in Bill C-51 by putting them on firmer constitutional footing. But Bill C-59 was also much more than a series of legal/constitutional improvements: its legislative scope went much further afield from the Bill C-51 regime, amending the authorities of agencies – such as the Communications Security Establishment – that had been untouched by Bill C-51, while also greatly expanding national security oversight and review through the creation of important new bodies. The purpose of this paper is to compare these two important pieces of national security legislation with a view to explaining what these legislation reforms did, why the reforms were undertaken, and to identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of the most controversial of the reforms under each bill. The idea is to explain where Canada stands today, in the wake of this massive legislative overhaul. By identifying what has already been addressed, we can identify next steps and, in particular, where the focus of future legislative reforms in national security should be. Three recommendations flow from this conclusion. First, national security legislation must be reformed with greater consistency than in the past. Second, as an immediate priority, Canada must address its “intelligence-to-evidence” problem; that is, the system by which it converts – or fails to convert – raw intelligence into the sort of evidence usable by courts of law. Third, enforcement of Canada’s national security laws must now take priority, in particular by prosecuting returning foreign fighters and far-right extremists where their activities meet the threshold of a terrorism offence, as well as terrorist financing, to a greater degree than Canada has seen to date.
Topic:
Intelligence, National Security, Terrorism, and Legislation
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

8. Turbulence in arms control: Open Skies Treaty became a victim of the great power competition

Author:
Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Non-compliance and disputes between Russia and the US resulted in the US exiting the Open Skies Treaty. If Russia withdraws in response, European countries will lose an important source of intelligence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Intelligence, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

9. State Violence and Public Monitoring – Britain’s use of torture in Mandatory Palestine

Author:
James Hopkins
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, St. Andrews University, Scotland
Abstract:
In his influential work Torture and Democracy, Darius Rejali argues that when democracies use torture, they tend to resort to the use of stealthy torture techniques in order to avoid detection. Using primary archival sources, this paper examines Rejali’s hypothesis by looking at torture in the British Mandate in Palestine up to 1945. First, looking specifically at torture it will show that the case study fits the hypothesis, as torture was generally stealthy, but also systemic and at times officially sanctioned. It locates the reason for the use of torture in the failure of intelligence gathering, before examining the pressures public monitoring put on the British. The historical literature tends to emphasise the concerns British authorities had over propaganda in both the foreign and local press: however, this paper also highlights the threat of pan-Arabic and Muslim agitation across the Middle East and India. After noting that torture is merely one form of violence in the state’s repertoire, and therefore cannot be fully understood in isolation, the paper aims to put the use of torture in its wider context. In Palestine, torture took place alongside a brutal counterinsurgency campaign, in which British servicemen systemically carried out casual brutality against the local population, which, in contrast to the use of torture, was highly visible and unconcerned with public monitoring. It is argued that the reasons for this casual brutality were the poor conditions of service, the make- up of the force, and the racism endemic in it. Despite this seeming contradiction of the monitoring hypothesis, the paper concludes by arguing that the hypothesis can explain the disparity between stealthy torture and visible casual brutality. In doing so, it draws attention to the importance of perception in public monitoring as well as the shifts in the factors affecting the Mandate.
Topic:
Intelligence, Terrorism, Torture, State Violence, and Surveillance
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Middle East, and Palestine

10. Insights and Lessons Learned From Croatia's Intelligence Reforms

Author:
Dragan Lozancic
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
This paper provides insights into intelligence reform efforts in Croatia, including lessons learned by the author during his tenure as director of Croatia’s Security and Intelligence Agency and recommendations for reform efforts in countries in transition. More specifically, the paper provides insights into the main challenges faced during the reform processes, starting from the adjustments of the legal frameworks, to the implementation of the reform agenda. As a starting point, the agency’s self-assessment helped to identify intelligence requirements and priorities and pointed to the need of investing in the development of new and effective intelligence capabilities within the service. Maybe one of the most important insights was the acknowledgement that effective oversight helped earning public trust and respect. Modernization and transformation processes had to address decentralization of authority, the balancing of privacy rights and the initiation of a public dialogue on the role and future of intelligence.
Topic:
Intelligence, Governance, Reform, Privacy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe, Balkans, and Croatia