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2. Integrating Cyber Into Warfighting: Some Early Takeaways From the Ukraine Conflict
- Author:
- Ariel Levite
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- It is too early to draw definitive conclusions about cyber warfare in the lead-up to and the execution of the Ukraine war. Data are lacking, and the outcome of the conflict remains uncertain. Yet through monitoring and analysis of a single year in the first major war into which cyber has been extensively woven, we do know enough to be able to generate some tentative, high-level, generic propositions on the nature of cyber conflict. These propositions draw on wide-ranging press reporting and extrapolate from several superb pieces recently published by my colleagues Jon Bateman, Nick Beecroft, and Gavin Wilde, as well as Microsoft’s recent report on the cyber dynamics of the conflict.1 However, we must still tread cautiously. Our propositions draw on highly imperfect empirical knowledge of a single historical case that is still unfolding.2 Current and future antagonists are also constantly learning from their own and others’ analyses and enhancing their performance, which can render current assessments obsolete.3 For this and other reasons it is quite possible that some of the cyber dynamics unfolding in and around Ukraine may play out differently later in Ukraine as well as in other, future confrontations. As we have observed over millennia, the balance between offense and defense can shift over time; this dynamic may well play out in cyberspace as well. It is also important to note at the outset that widespread assessments disparaging the utility and expediency of Russian cyber operations in the Ukrainian conflict (and projections regarding future conflicts) are presently limited by far more than a lack of comprehensive and reliable empirical data. We also lack insights into the metrics and criteria that each of the protagonists uses to assess the success and failure of cyber’s overall performance in the conflict, and we have only fragmentary evidence of the role each party expected cyber operations to perform. Moreover, even if we had such information, Ukraine-specific answers might not apply elsewhere because the expectations for cyber and the metrics for assessing its performance may vary not only over time and between protagonists but also from one conflict to another. In this context it is important to underscore that some specific factors that possibly helped diminish the efficacy of Russia’s offensive cyber operations in Ukraine may not apply elsewhere. Three in particular deserve to be noted here: Russia’s unique approach toward cyber warfare; the level of external support that Ukraine received before and during the war from some leading national and multinational cyber powers; and the sophistication and battle-tested experience of Ukraine’s cyber warriors.4 Nevertheless, even if some of the cyber characteristics of the Ukraine conflict ultimately turn out to be sui generis, they are instructive given the novelty of the field and the involvement of major powers in the conflict. Hence, there is considerable value in advancing these propositions to focus attention on certain questions and facets of cyber conflict, facilitating their review and reassessment as more comprehensive and reliable information becomes available and developments on the battlefield evolve. But the reader should consider the interim observations and propositions offered here as hypotheses employed as a heuristic to encourage debate and invite feedback. All the propositions offered below pertain to our core conception of what cyber warfare is about. Some of the propositions we advance are novel; others reaffirm or refine tentative assertions made before the war. Taken together they suggest a more subdued view of the utility and impact of cyber warfare than was generally found in prewar speculations. More importantly, the Ukraine war reveals that nations diverge significantly in the role and aims they assign to offensive cyber operations as well as the institutional setup and operational modalities they use for conducting them. Most glaringly, the U.S. perspective and approach (emulated in whole or in part by several other Western nations) differs deeply from that of Russia, which makes it reasonable to expect similar divergence across similar regimes. We group our propositions under three temporal headings: the prewar period (starting in 2014);5 the war itself (beginning on February 24, 2022); and finally, the postwar period, after kinetic hostilities eventually die down. Obviously, we cannot know when this last phase will begin; nevertheless, analysis of trends that were manifest in the two earlier phases of the conflict provides a tentative basis for predictions as to what might be expected down the road. This broad scope is driven by two considerations. First, it is designed to underscore the considerable relevance of cyber operations across various phases and types of conflicts. And second, it highlights continuity as well as change between cyber action in peacetime, in wartime, and in grey area situations, as well as during the transitions between these states of confrontation.
- Topic:
- Cybersecurity, Conflict, Non-Traditional Threats, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America
3. Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin employs information operations to erode global confidence in Ukraine
- Author:
- Roman Osadchuk and Andy Carvin
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- In the lead-up to Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin and its proxies perpetrated information operations to justify military action against Ukraine, mask its operational planning, and deny any responsibility for the war. DOWNLOAD PDF Once the war began in earnest, Russia expanded its strategy with an additional emphasis on undermining Ukraine’s ability to resist in hopes of forcing the country to surrender or enter negotiations on Russia’s terms. This strategic expansion included efforts to maintain control of information and support for the war effort at home, undercut Ukrainian resistance, derail support for Ukrainian resistance among allies and partners, especially in the immediate region, and engage in aggressive information operations internationally to shape public opinion about Russia’s war of aggression, including in Africa and Latin America. Building upon daily monitoring by the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), this report synthesizes Kremlin attempts to undermine Ukraine by targeting local, regional, and global audiences over the course of 2022 since the start of the war on February 24 of that year.
- Topic:
- Media, News Analysis, Conflict, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
4. Putin’s war in Ukraine: How to get out of it?
- Author:
- Loïc Simonet
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- The largest armed conflict in Europe since World War II has entered its 300th day without a clear outcome. “Moscow cannot afford to lose in Ukraine, and it will use every means available to avoid defeat” (Mearsheimer, 2022). I believe that Russia’s hasty withdrawal from northeastern Ukraine and its humiliating defeat in Kherson are by no means signaling the last stretch of the war. As I write these lines, missiles and drones target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, destructing half of Ukraine’s power grid and depriving millions of civilians of electricity, water and heat. So where is this war going?
- Topic:
- War, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
5. What the First Week of Fighting in Ukraine Tells Us About a Potential Insurgency
- Author:
- Alec Worsnop
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
- Abstract:
- While the Russian advance in Ukraine has been slower than expected, its overwhelming conventional superiority gives it the upper hand. Despite the valiant resistance of many Ukrainians, Russia will probably conquer all or a portion of the country. However, the first week of the conflict has provided some useful information about the prospects for an insurgent campaign in the wake of a Russian occupation.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
6. Policy Paper: Considerations of condemnation and balance of Palestine’s position on the war in Ukraine
- Author:
- Palthink
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- In classic wars, we waited for the military result, and then we formed a political response. In new wars, there is not a final resolution; there is only the stronger party imposing its conditions. Additionally, there is also geographical control, regime projection, or behavior modification goals. Russia is seeking to maintain its national security and enhance its regional and international position. It has a deep fear that NATO will expand, bringing weapons to its border with Ukraine. Now that the first shock of the war has receded, the world realizes that the war will not exceed Ukraine’s borders. Russia has given indications that it will limit itself to the minimum that preserves its national security by preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. Global concern about the consequences of war is high. People are wondering if it will continue or stop. Additionally, sanctions have been announced. In this context, developing and poor countries are affected by conflict because they depend on foreign aid. Their positions on the war will determine where they are positioned, and how the political, economic and security consequences will affect them. Trying to show a neutral position would not endear them to the great powers. On the face of it, it may seem to be a war fought on Ukrainian lands only, but it is a world war of influence. The survival of developing nations depends on the strength of the international community and the extent to which it supports these nations in the light of political realism, not because of their strength and resources. Many places cannot survive without traditional international support.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Palestine
7. The EU is Reluctantly Getting Tougher with Putin
- Author:
- Emmanuel Navon
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Europeans surely remember what happens when you let an autocrat get away with grabbing territories hoping that the last bite will be the last one
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Military Strategy, European Union, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
8. Israel’s Ukraine policy: ‘Right side of history’ vs national interest
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- History has no right side and it does not evolve according to moral imperatives.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Intervention
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel
9. The Ukraine War: Preparing for the Longer-Term Outcome
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- It is far too early to predict the ultimate outcome of the Ukraine War, but it is all too clear that no peace settlement or ceasefire is likely to eliminate a long period of military tension between the U.S. – including NATO and its allies – and anything approaching President Putin’s future version of Russia, nor will any resolution of the current conflict negate the risk of new forms of war. It is equally clear that the U.S. and NATO need to act as quickly as possible to prepare for an intense period of military competition and must create a more secure deterrent and improve their capability to defend against Russia. In practice, NATO will need to make up for years of underfunding by each member country and for the cuts in force levels, readiness, and modernization that years of a U.S.-driven focus on burden-sharing – rather than funding NATO’s real military priorities – did little or nothing to address. NATO will need to find new ways to counter the massive problems in interoperability and differences in comparative warfighting that still exist between NATO’s 30 nations. This will need to be accomplished at a time when emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are constantly changing the nature of deterrence and warfighting, when Russia is actively pursuing nuclear modernization rather than arms control, and when NATO’s more advanced forces are struggling to create new approaches to joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) – and all while doing so at a time when most member countries have limited capabilities to support their existing force structure. At best, developing and sustaining any coherent effort to deal with these issues will take at least five years to implement. It then will require constant updating on an annual basis as new types of technology, tactics, and command and control continue to reshape military needs and force plans. This, in turn, requires sustained political and popular support in the face of inflation and civil needs during a time when the momentum for military change created by the current fighting in Ukraine may have faded. In some ways, the only thing harder than crisis management is the lack of crisis management.
- Topic:
- War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
10. From Kosovo to Ukraine: lessons from the humanitarian response to conflict and displacement in Europe
- Author:
- Margie Buchanan-Smith and Peter Wiles
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
- Abstract:
- While there are many differences between the conflicts in Kosovo and Ukraine, the international humanitarian response to both bears many similarities. For example, both crises triggered record levels of funding and most international humanitarian agencies on the receiving end had limited or no presence and experience in the countries affected. Protection is the dominant need amongst affected communities in both crises as well. This paper – written by Margie Buchanan-Smith and Peter Wiles – highlights key lessons from the international humanitarian response to the Kosovo crisis that could have relevance to the response in Ukraine. The lessons are drawn from the three-volume ‘Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds’ and ALNAP’s meta-evaluation of the Kosovo response, from our 2001 Annual Review.
- Topic:
- International Organization, Conflict, Crisis Management, and Humanitarian Response
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Kosovo
11. The War in Ukraine: More Western Aid and Fear of Escalation
- Author:
- Eldad Shavit and Shimon Stein
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- The United States and other NATO countries have thus far not deviated from their policy regarding the war in Eastern Europe – military and economic assistance, with no boots on the ground. Yet the more the war continues, and while there is a chance of significant escalation, does this policy stand to change?
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Conflict, Escalation, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
12. The Russia-Ukraine War: Where Do We Go from Here?
- Author:
- Zvi Magen and Sophie Kobzantsev
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Two months after the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the goal of a short campaign has clearly not been achieved. Russia now seeks to achieve gains while suspending the negotiations with Kyiv – both to improve its position in advance of future negotiations, and to deliver the message to the West that “you cannot stop us.”
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
13. Investigation of Russia's Crimes in Ukraine: A Turning Point for the International Criminal Court?
- Author:
- Ori Beeri and Pnina Sharvit Baruch
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- The Chief Prosecutor at The Hague has already begun to investigate actions taken by Russia in the Ukrainian arena, while accelerating judicial proceedings and bureaucracy. This reflects a change of approach, which includes the prioritization of recent events, as part of an effort to strengthen the status of the Court. How will this affect the investigation of the war in Eastern Europe – and the investigation concerning Israel?
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Conflict, International Crime, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Global Focus
14. Walking a Fine Line: Turkey’s Mediation between Russia and Ukraine, and Relations with the West
- Author:
- Remi Daniel and Gallia Lindenstrauss
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Turkey’s reaction to the Russian aggression in Ukraine was among the more moderate responses heard from NATO members. With an eye to the post-war situation, Ankara is trying to walk a tightrope and not overly provoke either side. What lies behind this Turkish policy, and is it viable?
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Conflict, and Mediation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Turkey, and Ukraine
15. The Ukrainian Civil Front – An Interim Assessment
- Author:
- Meir Elran, Uri Bar-Yosef, and Zvi Magen
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Most of Ukraine’s civilian population demonstrates a high degree of steadfastness during the war, rallying around the flag – and around the president. Nonetheless, the challenge to Ukrainian national resilience remains high, given the huge waves of migration, the losses in the hinterland, and the severe damage to national infrastructure and the local economy – which could have decisive effects on Ukraine’s ability to recover from the war
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
16. The War in Ukraine: The Challenge of Shaping an Endgame
- Author:
- Udi Dekel
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Although nearly three weeks have passed since Putin invaded Ukraine, there is no framework for an endgame on the horizon. While the United States and the West would like to bring Putin to his knees as he sinks deeper in the Ukrainian mud, Washington must recognize that the longer the war continues, the chances increase for escalation to new levels that neither side wants. Therefore, before the situation is completely out of control, there must be a dialogue with Russia that can lead to an end to the war.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
17. Germany and the Ukraine Crisis: End of the Age of Illusions
- Author:
- Shimon Stein
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has sent shockwaves through Germany’s political-security approach of the last decades, and recent speeches in the Bundestag reflect the government’s intention to make system-wide changes in security orientation. Germany must also understand how it missed warning signs from Russia over the years, and formulate a clear policy that addresses the emerging worrisome trends
- Topic:
- Security, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, and Germany
18. The Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Legal Aspects
- Author:
- Pnina Sharvit Baruch and Ori Beeri
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Since Russia invaded Ukraine, it has been the object of significant legal pressure. While the various legal measures have no power to stop the bloody war, they deliver a powerful, unequivocal message: any state that flagrantly violates international world and undermines the world order will suffer isolation, condemnation, sanction, and criminal investigations. Israel, which has seemed to lean to sitting on the fence, must join the international efforts against Russia, Otherwise it is liable to find itself on the wrong side of history
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Law, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
19. The Ukraine Crisis: An Interim Analysis
- Author:
- Eldad Shavit, Zvi Magen, and Shimon Stein
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began only days ago, it is already clear that with this belligerence Putin has upset the world order that has existed since the Second World War. The Western bloc has already begun to realign and is presenting a unified and forceful stance vis-à-vis Moscow. Israel can no longer avoid taking a clear stand and siding fully with the countries opposing Russia
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
20. Mobilizing Against Russia? Some Reflections on the Security Deadlock Called Ukraine
- Author:
- Joris Van Bladel
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- No event exists beyond the media. This is also the case with the current Russian-Ukraine war. Daily, we are flooded with analyses and opinions about Putin’s military threat in the East. These narratives – mostly polemical and shrill – are both the result of and the catalyst for the crisis. As such, the debate itself – consciously or unconsciously – becomes part of the Western-Russian standoff driven by the strategy of hybrid and decision-centric warfare. This essay deliberately distances itself from the issues of the day and the hyper-polarized debate that currently takes place. Instead, a more detached exercise is made in which the polyphonic nature of the past and the intricacy of history is deliberately sought out. It shows the complexity of the process we have gone through, leading to the current deadlock. As such, we have to face the changes and continuities with which we have been confronted, or as Jeffrey Frank recently wrote in The New Yorker, “If a lot has changed since the end of the Cold War, there’s much that hasn’t.”
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine