Search

Begin New Search Topic Foreign Policy Political Geography Syria Content Type Working Paper

1. The Syrian Civil War Twelve Years On: Can There Be a Constructive Role for Greece?

Author:
Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Loukas I. Papavasileiou
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Continual and ever-growing foreign involvement led to the internationalization of the armed conflict and turned Syria into a battleground for the strategic competition of several powers. The Kremlin has long viewed Hafez and Bashar al-Assad as indispensable partners in the Middle East and has repeatedly offered its diplomatic and military support in an attempt to achieve its own strategic objectives. Given the destabilizing effects the unending Syrian crisis has had on Middle Eastern and Eastern Mediterranean security, Greece maintains a profound interest in the resolution of the conflict. Greece appointed a Special Envoy for Syria in May 2020 with a view to reinvigorating its policy vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis. Greece’s successful re-engagement with key Arab countries and improved relations with other regional actors could pave the way for a more prominent Greek role in Syria. This could entail reinforcing its diplomatic cooperation with the EU Delegation to Syria, leading the EU humanitarian relief effort following the devastating earthquakes that hit Syria on 6 February 2023, and formulating a realistic and forward-looking strategy for the future of the Syrian people, including provisions for the voluntary repatriation of refugees and the protection of minority rights.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Refugees, Political stability, Syrian War, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Greece, and Syria

2. The Kurdish Question Dominates Turkish Policy in the Wake of the Istanbul Bombing

Author:
Aleksandra Maria Spancerska
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
On 13 November, a bomb exploded in Istanbul. In retaliation, Türkiye carried out air strikes against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its affiliates in Iraq and Syria. The public’s sense of a renewed internal threat resulted in a drop in support for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Possible Turkish ground operations in northern Syria may complicate the continuing fight against ISIS.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Islamic State, Domestic Politics, Kurds, and Bombing
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

3. Iran in Syria: From Expansion to Entrenchment

Author:
Ido Yahel
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
Iranian involvement in the Syrian civil war has often made headlines in Israel. Particularly in the context of the Israel Defense Force (IDF)’s so-called campaign between the wars (the Hebrew acronym is Mabam), which has included attempts to prevent Iran from establishing military bases in Syria, keeping Iranian forces away from the Syrian-Israeli border, and thwarting the transfer of precision weapons to Hizballah. But Iranian involvement in Syria goes far beyond the confines of the Israeli-Iranian conflict. As a result of the "Arab Spring" uprising and the Syrian civil war, Iran has succeeded in establishing itself in areas far from the Israeli-Syrian border and extended its influence in Syria beyond the military sphere.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Syria

4. Strategic Incoherence Continued: US Policy Towards Syria Under Biden

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
US determination to draw down in the Middle East, which characterized the Obama, Trump and now Biden administrations, appears likely to prevent the development of any coherent strategy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Leadership, Strategic Interests, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

5. Ten Years of the Syrian Conflict: Time for the EU to Reconsider Its Strategy?

Author:
Amer Al-Hussein
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Syrian conflict entered its eleventh year on 15 March 2021, bringing this “living nightmare” back to our minds.[1] This ominous anniversary should remind the world of the importance of addressing the bleak reality inside Syria. While the new US administration provides a glimmer of hope for a return to diplomacy, multilateralism and an end to the mercantilism of the past years, Europe would be wrong to simply wait for the US lead on Syria.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, European Union, Institutions, and Coronavirus
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, United States of America, and Mediterranean

6. Turkey and Iran: Parallel Islam imperialist ambitions for the Middle East

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Neither Ankara nor Tehran want a strong Iraq, or a strong Syria. On the contrary, the fragmentation of these countries suits both.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Imperialism, Regional Cooperation, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

7. Russia in the Mediterranean: Here to Stay

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s strategy in the Mediterranean is an integral part of its strategy for the wider European theater, which has long been the principal arena of its foreign policy triumphs and setbacks. Europe’s dominant position on Russia’s foreign policy agenda is a product of its strategic culture, which is in turn shaped by geography, historical legacy, and an elite worldview that considers the West a threat to the domestic political order. It is impossible to understand Russia’s current posture in the Mediterranean without viewing it within this larger context and against the backdrop of the country’s centuries-old involvement in the region and retreat from it during the quarter century that followed the end of the Cold War. Since Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria, alarms have been sounded about the Kremlin’s ambitions and military capabilities in the Mediterranean. These alarms have been unfounded.; Russian capabilities in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region are modest, and the Kremlin’s ambitions there are constrained by geography and geopolitics, limited resources, a transactional approach to relationships, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) formidable force posture on its southern flank. As much as Russia may aspire to regional domination, it lacks the means to achieve this goal. That said, the Russian military is now a presence to be reckoned with in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has complicated U.S./NATO planning and operations, and Moscow has developed good relationships with important regional powers. Given Russia’s limited means, its re-emergence in the region can be considered a success, but its effects should not be exaggerated. Moscow’s posture in the Mediterranean has been largely designed to protect its gains in Syria and defend against the threat that Russian leaders see from NATO land, air, and naval capabilities to the Russian heartland. The importance of Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) “bubble” over Syria has at times been exaggerated. The systems that make up the bubble are limited in range and in a conflict with NATO would be vulnerable to countermeasures. Contrary to a widespread perception, Moscow’s ambitions in the Mediterranean are more than a matter of its vague pursuit to regain great power status—they are a product of enduring Russian national security requirements. The principal rationale for Russia’s return to the region has been the prospect of a military confrontation in the European theater and concerns about the vulnerability of its southern flank in a conflict with NATO. While Russia has sought, in fact, to regain its old Cold War footing—and has been skillful and opportunistic in exploiting openings to expand its footprint—it has acted with caution, avoiding undue risks and, most of all, an outright confrontation with the United States. The Kremlin may aspire to dominate the Mediterranean one day, but for now its aim is to deny this option to NATO. Russia is in the Mediterranean to stay, and its push for a greater naval, air, and land presence and increased political influence will continue as long as it remains locked in a tense standoff with NATO in Europe. This warrants heightened vigilance but not, as has often been the case, fears that Russia has replaced the United States/NATO as the key power broker in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Syria, and Mediterranean

8. How Syria Changed Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Francesco Siccardi
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Between August 2016 and the present, Turkey has launched four military operations in northern Syria. Each operation has served specific objectives and was designed to respond to rapidly changing scenarios on the ground. It is possible to identify the key priorities that have informed Turkey’s Syria policy over the years. Boiled down to its core, the Turkish government’s activism in Syria has been driven by domestic politics and has helped Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) preserve power. Domestically, Ankara has used the Syrian conflict as a pretext to suppress the rights of the Kurds living in Turkey and limit their parliamentary representation to secure a landmark constitutional reform in 2017. In the following years, successive military operations in Syria have helped Erdoğan connect with increasingly nationalistic constituencies and drum up support around key electoral dates. Finally, after the failed coup in July 2016, the Turkish government’s Syria policy played a major role in rebuilding the credibility of the Turkish Armed Forces while redrawing the balance between civilian and military power. In foreign policy terms, Turkey’s military operations in Syria have resulted in increasingly tense relations with the United States. Washington’s support for the Syrian Kurds has alienated Ankara to an extent that U.S. policymakers failed to anticipate. The thorniest topic of the day in the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relation—Ankara’s decision to deploy the Russian S-400 missile system—is also deeply related to the Syrian crisis. This decision was made in the context of a strategic realignment between Turkey and Russia that has helped both countries pursue their respective objectives in Syria: the survival of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s regime for Moscow and the weakening of the Syrian Kurds for Ankara. Finally, Ankara’s involvement in Syria has also given Turkey new leverage over the EU when it comes to the management of refugee flows. Solving the question of Syrian refugees in Turkey has been a priority of the Turkish government since the early stages of the Syrian civil war—and a main driver of Ankara’s policies toward both Syria and the EU. Overall, Ankara’s involvement in Syria has not only been a source of conflict—or rapprochement—with its traditional partners and neighbors across the region. It has also equipped Turkey with new tools for conducting a more aggressive, nationalistic foreign policy. The strategies Turkey has employed in Syria have boosted the country’s image and international role. These operations have secured a seat for Turkey at the negotiating table with Russia and the United States. Ankara has used these tools, these lessons learned, and its new capabilities to inform its revisionist foreign policy posture. Going forward, and with an eye on the country’s 2023 presidential election, Turkey will continue to use these tools to reinforce its position in the international arena.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Syrian War, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

9. Russia's Foreign and Security Policy in the Middle East: Entering the 2020s

Author:
Ekaterina Stepanova
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
As Russia has become a major external player in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region due to its military engagement in Syria since 2015, it has acted as a balancer and mediator in several regional controversies and has continued to serve as a security guarantor for the Syrian state. This course has brought Moscow some practical dividends, such as growing economic and military-technical cooperation with select MENA countries, and has spurred its broader international profile. However, entering the 2020s, the risks of more active engagement in the Middle East have also mounted, making Russia’s balancing act more difficult. In three cases where Russia’s involvement has been visible (Syria, Libya and the Israeli-Palestinian problem), evolving developments challenge Moscow’s acquired influence and multi-vector approach, but also create new opportunities for its engagement and mediation. Above all, the 2020 US–Iran crisis catalysed the urgent need for structured regional dialogue, especially across the Persian Gulf. While this requires direct interaction between the region’s main antagonists, the initial impulse to unlock the trans-Gulf impasse might need to come from the outside. A process-oriented blueprint for inclusive multilateral security in the Gulf proposed by Russia in 2019 is a step in the right direction, but to be activated it may need to come as part of some broader international initiative.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Israel, Libya, Palestine, North Africa, and Syria

10. To Shoot or to Defect? Military Responses to the Arab Uprisings

Author:
Nael Shama
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS), Georgetown University in Qatar
Abstract:
By examining the events of the Arab uprisings, this paper looks into the nature and dynamics of armies’ responses to popular uprisings. It argues that the outcome of the massive, regime-threatening Arab revolts in 2011 can be assessed by how a military responded to protests: did the army shoot protesters, did it stay idle, or did it largely defect? In light of the rich literature available on the historical experience of the “Arab Spring,” this paper shows that an army’s response to end popular uprisings in authoritarian regimes is determined by several key factors: the military’s level of institutionalization; its relationship to the regime; the degree of the regime’s legitimacy; the amount of international aid it receives; the prospects of foreign intervention; and, finally, the strength of the army’s bond with society and its perception of its own role within society. Additionally, there is a factor often overlooked by scholars; namely, how the military assesses a regime’s capacity to solve the crisis in order to triumph. The paper draws on evidence from the six cases of the 2011 Arab Spring—Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia—to illustrate the dynamics of troop loyalty or defection.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Social Movement, Arab Spring, and Protests
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Bahrain, and Tunisia