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Begin New Search Topic Nuclear Weapons Political Geography North Korea Content Type Working Paper Publication Year within 5 Years Publication Year within 10 Years

1. North Korea Continues to Develop Its Nuclear Forces

Author:
Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
North Korea is conducting further missile tests to check new types of weapons and increase the credibility of its nuclear deterrence. The adoption of a new nuclear doctrine that allows pre-emptive nuclear strikes also serves this purpose. North Korea is taking advantage of the period of tension between the U.S., Russia, and China, which prevent the UN Security Council from adopting further sanctions. In this situation, the U.S. and its allies should strengthen defence and deterrence capabilities against North Korea and set achievable goals to reduce the risk of escalation of tensions before possible negotiations.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

2. Preparing for the worst: Was North Korea’s decision to develop nuclear weapons rational?

Author:
Sanghoon Kim
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
North Korea’s foreign policy decision-making procedure is highly centralized to a single leader or, at most, a few political/military elites. While democratic governments are restrained both horizontally and vertically, authoritarian regimes are relatively free of constraints from the public. This paper examines the motivations behind North Korea’s nuclear weapons development in light of the rational deterrence model, then discusses the strategic implications of a rational, or irrational, North Korea. It concludes that North Korea’s decision to develop nuclear weapons was rationally motivated by the deteriorating security environment surrounding the state, but that this will not guarantee deterrence.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Authoritarianism, Deterrence, Denuclearization, and Rationality
Political Geography:
South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula

3. From Critical Engagement to Credible Commitments: A Renewed EU Strategy for the North Korean Proliferation Crisis

Author:
Antoine Bondaz
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile crisis is the most serious proliferation crisis the European Union (EU) and its member states currently face on the world stage. Despite the staging of diplomatic meetings, the threat caused by this crisis to European interests, in terms of proliferation, instability and to prosperity, persists. It is now essential that the EU and its member states move from a strategy of critical engagement to implementing a more proactive strategy of credible commitments in four areas: political engagement, non-proliferation, the implementation of restrictive measures and engagement with the North Korean people. Such a renewed strategy should be highly coordinated, build on the many initiatives already being taken and facilitated by the appointment of an EU Special Representative on North Korea.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, European Union, Disarmament, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and North Korea

4. North Korea’s Nuclear Program: The Early Days, 1984–2002

Author:
Torrey Froscher
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
The North Korean nuclear program has been a major intelligence and policy challenge for more than 30 years. Former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry described the problem as “perhaps the most unsuccessful exercise of diplomacy in our country’s history.”1 Donald Gregg, who was CIA station chief in Seoul as well as US ambassador to South Korea, called North Korea the “longest running intelligence failure in the history of American espionage.”2 To be fair, Gregg was referring specifically to a lack of success in recruiting human sources—not necessarily errors in specific or overall assessments. Nonetheless, his comment underscores the difficulty of figuring out what North Korea is up to. In 2005, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), which was convened to investigate the failed 2002 national intelligence estimate on Iraqi WMD capabilities, indicated that we know “disturbingly little about the weapons programs and even less about the intentions of many of our most dangerous adversaries,”3 presumably including North Korea. Today we know a lot more about North Korea’s nuclear program— but mostly it is what they want us to know. Pyongyang has conducted six nuclear tests. We know that North Korea has nuclear weapons, a significant fissile material production capacity, and an ambitious nuclear and missile development effort. These programs are completely unconstrained. The United States has tried many approaches to deal with the problem over the years, and intelligence has played a key role in support. Are there lessons to be learned from this experience? Obviously, it’s a very big question and I will sketch out just a few thoughts, mostly from an intelligence perspective: What we knew and when and how we thought about the problem. North Korea was one of many issues I worked on as an analyst and manager in CIA until my retirement in 2006. The views that follow are my own, of course, and the specific information is drawn from the extensive public literature on the issue, as well as declassified intelligence documents.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, and History
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

5. The NPT turns 50: Will it get to 60?

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
In the next decade, it is all too likely that the past success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons among the world’s nations will be reversed. Three trends make more proliferation likely. First is the decay of nuclear taboos. Second, and arguably worse, is renewed vertical proliferation—the increase in size and sophistication of nuclear arsenals by states that already have them. Third, the technical information to fuel nuclear breakouts and ramp-ups is more available now than in the past. These trends toward increased proliferation are not yet facts. The author describes three steps the international community could take to save the NPT: making further withdrawals from the NPT unattractive; clamping down on the uneconomical stockpiling and civilian use of nuclear weapons materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium); and giving real meaning to efforts to limit the threats that existing nuclear weapons pose.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, North Korea, Global Focus, and United States of America

6. North Korea’s Shift to Diplomacy in 2018: A Result of U.S. Pressure or North Korean Security Calculus?

Author:
Naoko Aoki
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
After conducting a record number of missile and nuclear tests in 2016 and 2017, North Korea dramatically changed its policy approach and embarked on a diplomatic initiative in 2018. It announced a self-imposed halt on missile and nuclear tests and held summit meetings with the United States, China, and South Korea from spring of that year. Why did North Korea shift its policy approach? This paper evaluates four alternative explanations. The first is that the change was driven by North Korea’s security calculus. In other words, North Korea planned to achieve its security goals first before turning to diplomacy and successfully followed through with this plan. The second is that U.S. military threats forced North Korea to change its course. The third is that U.S.-led sanctions caused North Korea to shift its policy by increasing economic pain on the country. The fourth is that diplomatic initiatives by South Korea and others prompted North Korea to change its position. This paper examines the actions and statements of the United States, North Korea, China, South Korea, and Russia leading up to and during this period to assess these four explanations. It concludes that military threats and economic pain did not dissuade North Korea from obtaining what it considered an adequate level of nuclear deterrence against the United States and that North Korea turned to diplomacy only after achieving its security goals. External pressure may have encouraged North Korea to speed up its efforts to develop the capacity to strike the United States with a nuclear-armed missile, the opposite of its intended effect. Diplomatic and economic pressure may have compelled Kim Jong Un to declare that North Korea had achieved its “state nuclear force” before conducting all the nuclear and ballistic missile tests needed to be fully confident that it could hit targets in the continental United States. These findings suggest that if a pressure campaign against North Korea is to achieve its intended impact, the United States has to more carefully consider how pressure would interact with North Korean policy priorities. Pressure should be applied only to pursue specific achievable goals and should be frequently assessed for its impact.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

7. Converting Maximum Pressure to Maximum Leverage: The Role of Sanctions Relief in Negotiations with North Korea

Author:
Daniel Wertz
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign has led to the imposition of a nearly comprehensive international sanctions regime targeting North Korea and its nuclear weapons program. With negotiations underway, the question of whether to provide North Korea with partial sanctions relief in exchange for limited concessions on its nuclear program has been a major point of dispute between Washington and Pyongyang. This paper looks at sanctions as a form of coercive bargaining and examines the logic and challenges behind a strategy of incrementally exchanging relief from pressure for compliance with the sanctioner’s demands. It argues that taking an “all-or-nothing” approach to sanctions relief risks missing an opportunity to reduce the threat of North Korea’s nuclear program and squandering hard-won negotiating leverage, and outlines a framework for how a step-by-step approach might proceed.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America