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  • Author: Klaus Becher
  • Publication Date: 07-1999
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
  • Abstract: The nations of the European Union represent not only one of the two most important economic actors in the world, but also include some countries of world-wide political importance. Half of the G-8 membership is from the EU, as are two permanent members of the UN Security Council. The responsibilities and obligations that, historically, European powers accumulated in all continents still have many remnants. The two big European wars of the 20th century were also fought in Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia. Europe, while enjoying the benefits of a large, expanding internal market, depends for its prosperity on a secure and functioning global order.
  • Topic: Security, Defense Policy, NATO
  • Political Geography: Europe, Middle East, Lebanon, Iceland, Nagasaki, Taipei
  • Author: Shahram Chubin
  • Publication Date: 07-1999
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
  • Abstract: In the past fifty years five US President's from Truman to Clinton have directly or indirectly, affirmed US interests in the Middle East. The 'doctrines' in the case of Carter (1979) and Reagan (1981) specifically addressed the security of the Persian Gulf. The same period has seen the withdrawal of imperial powers. Three decades ago Britain managed the security of the Persian Gulf. Two decades ago France had the largest naval force in the Indian Ocean. The contraction of these commitments was encouraged by the US, which was unwilling to be associated with colonialism and its evils. Yet since Britain's withdrawal from the Gulf which occasioned the Nixon doctrine, the US has been grappling with how best to assure security. Reliance on regional states ("twin pillars") was upset by the Iranian revolution. In the 1980's the long Iran-Iraq war underscored the need for a Western role, but neither its shape nor its duration were clear. Local forces were reluctant to envisage any thing beyond an "over the horizon presence."
  • Topic: Security, Defense Policy, NATO
  • Political Geography: Britain, United States, Iraq, Europe, Iran, Middle East, France
  • Author: Francois Heisbourg
  • Publication Date: 07-1999
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
  • Abstract: The Kosovo air war was an eye-opener for many Europeans, particularly for those who normally follow defence issues at a distance. There was no escaping the realisation that close to three-quarters of the aircraft and more than four-fifths of the ordnance released against Serbian targets were American. America's massive dominance in C31 was similarly spectacular, with media commentators using the over-simplified but effective equation: "Fifty U.S. military satellites, a single European satellite". Under such circumstances U.S. influence on all strategic and operational aspects of the war could only be overwhelming, for better or for worse, a situation summarised by the syllogism "no capability-no responsibility". Despite deep strategic flaws, questionable tactics and occasional rank incompetence (the Apache episode, the China Embassy bombing), the U.S. edge is so great that it can afford even serious blunders.
  • Topic: Security, Defense Policy, NATO
  • Political Geography: America, Europe, Middle East
  • Author: Stuart Johnson
  • Publication Date: 07-1999
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
  • Abstract: The United States and its NATO allies have engaged in two high intensity conflicts in this decade, Desert Storm in the Gulf and Operation Allied Force in Yugoslavia. Both campaigns were characterized by a strong, and successful, effort to maintain broad coalition participation and cohesion. But the story is more complex than the press releases from NATO Headquarters, Washington, and other NATO capitals would have us believe. Both operations revealed differences in US and European allies' capabilities and styles of prosecuting warfare. These forced the commanders to adopt an ad-hoc, inefficient division of labor in what, to the public, was presented as a seamless coalition operation.
  • Topic: Security, Defense Policy, NATO
  • Political Geography: United States, Europe, Middle East
  • Author: Philip Epstein
  • Publication Date: 01-1999
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Abstract: Economic convergence has emerged as one of the key debates in the theoretical and historical literature over the last decade. Galor identified three forms of long run per capita income convergence: absolute convergence, whereby convergence occurs independently of the initial conditions facing each economy; conditional convergence, whereby convergence occurs among economies which have identical structural characteristics, independently of their initial conditions; and club convergence, whereby convergence occurs only if the structural characteristics are identical and initial conditions are also similar. Of these, the absolute convergence hypothesis has been discredited whereas there is empirical support for both the conditional convergence and club convergence hypotheses. The club convergence hypothesis, in particular, has much to offer to economic historians. It stresses the importance of both the initial conditions facing each economy and the structural and institutional features of the economy (e.g. preferences, technologies, rates of population growth, government policies, etc.).
  • Topic: Economics, Industrial Policy, Regional Cooperation
  • Political Geography: Middle East
  • Author: Christodoulakim Olga
  • Publication Date: 01-1999
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Abstract: Although industrial production and growth in Greece during the interwar period has attracted considerable attention, there has not been any serious challenge either in qualitative or quantitative terms to the orthodoxy established in the period itself. The literature usually sees the 1920s as a landmark in the industrialisation of the country and a time when Greek manufacturing achieved an "unprecedented prominence". The momentum given to industrial expansion in the 1920s was encouraged by institutional changes brought about by government policy aimed at reducing social tensions stemming from unemployed refugees gathered in urban areas, by the depreciation of the drachma and heavy tariffs. The swift demographic changes that happened in the country following the Asia Minor debacle, however, have played a pivotal role in the literature in explaining industrial growth in the 1920s. According to conventional belief, the arrival of the refugees created the preconditions for an industrial expansion in the 1920s. The sudden increase in the population of the country has been linked to industrial growth in three ways: firstly, the abundance of cheap labour gathered in urban centres exerted downward pressures on wages; secondly, the refugees it is argued, brought with them entrepreneurial skills, their skilled labour, in short contributing to an improvement of the human capital in Greece, and took initiatives that promoted industrial development; finally, the sudden expansion of the domestic market because of the increase in the population boosted demand which consequently stimulated industrial production. The carpet industry, an industry that emerge in the 1920s and was mainly run by refugees, is usually mentioned as a representative example of the impact that refugees had in promoting new industries and entrepreneurial skills in the country.
  • Topic: Economics, Industrial Policy
  • Political Geography: Middle East, Greece, Asia
  • Author: William G. O'Neill
  • Publication Date: 01-1999
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University
  • Abstract: The term “human rights” evokes a wide variety of reactions. Many of those working in international development, commercial lending, and diplomatic institutions regard human rights as highly political and confrontational intrusions on their activities. Many in the international assistance community and the military view human rights as a threat to “neutrality” that may undermine access to populations needing assistance or the success of peacekeeping operations. Some governments in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa dismiss the concept of human rights as a western creation that fails to respect local culture and traditions and undermines state sovereignty. Perhaps the most favorable views of human rights are held by the international public, which is appalled by flagrant onslaughts against fundamental human decency and dignity represented by such practices as genocide, ethnic cleansing, and the use of starvation of civilian populations as a weapon of war.
  • Topic: Human Rights, War
  • Political Geography: Africa, Middle East, Asia
  • Publication Date: 01-1998
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Council on Foreign Relations
  • Abstract: The Persian Gulf is one of the few regions whose importance to the United States is obvious. The flow of Gulf oil will continue to be crucial to the economic well–being of the industrialized world for the foreseeable future; developments in the Gulf will have a critical impact on issues ranging from Arab–Israeli relations and religious extremism to terrorism and nuclear nonproliferation. Every president since Richard Nixon has recognized that ensuring Persian Gulf security and stability is a vital U.S. interest.
  • Topic: Security, Foreign Policy
  • Political Geography: United States, Iraq, Iran, Middle East
  • Author: Barnett Rubin
  • Publication Date: 10-1998
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Council on Foreign Relations
  • Abstract: On August 8, 1998, the Taliban (Islamic student) movement of Afghanistan took control of Mazar-i Sharif, the last city remaining outside their control. 2 In their campaign in northern Afghanistan, the Taliban succeeded in gaining control of nearly all the parts of the country's territory that had remained outside their power since they marched into Kabul on September 26, 1996. Just as the Taliban prepared to campaign for international diplomatic recognition, however, the United States on August 20, 1998, launched a cruise missile attack against camps in Afghanistan that it charged contained the terrorist infrastructure of a movement led by Osama bin Laden, the wealthy Saudi exile. The United States claimed to have strong evidence implicating bin Laden and his network of exiled Islamists in the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7. The United States also raided a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sudan, said to be manufacturing precursors of chemical weapons substances. The Taliban's continued defense of bin Laden and their denunciation of the U.S. raid ruled out any dialogue between the Taliban and the United States that perhaps would lead to U.S. diplomatic recognition and construction of oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia through Afghanistan. The Taliban's behavior complicated their relations with regional states as well. Saudi Arabia, one of only three states that recognized the Taliban's government, expelled their diplomatic representative on September 22 in reprisal for the Taliban's continued harboring of Osama bin Laden. Most dramatically, the Taliban's killing of nine Iranian diplomats during their takeover of Mazar-i Sharif has led to an extended confrontation with Tehran. War, or at least military action, cannot be ruled out. During the more than 20 years since the “Sawr Revolution” of April 27, 1978, brought a communist party to power, Afghanistan had moved from one stage to another of civil war and political disintegration, without seeming to get any closer toward peace, political order, or sustainable development. The combination of an inimical regional environment, characterized by unstable strategic and economic competition, with the destruction of much of the country's elites, institutions, and infrastructure, has assured the continuation of war among forces based in different regions of the divided country. The victory of the Taliban may put an end to open warfare, but it is likely to result in continued guerrilla or commando activities. The emergence of an assertive Islamic traditionalism in the form of the Taliban has also placed new obstacles in the way of international humanitarian and peacemaking programs. 3 The division of control over the country had remained relatively stable since the summer of 1997. The Taliban movement, originally based in the southern city of Qandahar, the heartland of Pashtun traditionalism and the homeland of Afghanistan's old royal clan, had conquered the Persian-speaking city of Herat, near the Iranian border, in September 1995. A year later, in September 1996, the Taliban swept into the eastern Pashtun city of Jalalabad and Afghanistan's capital city, Kabul, driving out the Tajik-dominated government of the “Islamic State of Afghanistan” that was led by President Burhanuddin Rabbani and Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud. At the end of May 1997, the Taliban took advantage of divisions within the mainly Uzbek National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (NIMA) to take temporary control of Mazar-i Sharif. This northern city on the border of Uzbekistan was the only major urban center still not controlled by them. The Shia in the city, however, mostly from the Hazara ethnic group, resisted the Taliban attempt to disarm them and drove the conquerors out in bloody battles that killed thousands and may also have led to the subsequent massacre of prisoners. A Taliban attempt to recapture Mazar-i Sharif in September 1997 also failed, largely because of a major resupply effort mounted by Iran. While the Taliban failed in their first two attempts to control the entire North from this urban center, they managed to establish a long-term presence in the area. They gained the support of many of the ethnic Pashtuns who had been settled in the North by the Afghan monarchy and established a political and military base in Kunduz, which was supplied by air from Kabul and, according to some reports, Pakistan. Despite intermittent activity on several front lines (north of Kabul, around Kunduz, northeast of Herat, on the borders of Hazarajat), the lines of control remained relatively stable until the Taliban's new offensive in July 1998. 4 The Taliban have constituted a governmental structure that they call the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Da Afghanistano Islami Amarat). Before the summer 1998 offensive, they controlled the entire Pashtun belt, from Jalalabad in the East, through Qandahar in the South, and on through the Southwest. They also controlled the ethnically mixed, primarily Persian-speaking cities of Herat and Kabul, which border on the Pashtun areas. Finally, they controlled a pocket of territory in the North centered around Kunduz. They thus controlled the highways connecting Afghanistan to Pakistan, Iran, and Turkmenistan, nearly all the Pakistani border, the entire Iranian border, and about half of the border with Turkmenistan. They also appeared to control part of the border with Tajikistan, including the port of Sher Khan Bandar. These areas included all the country's major customs posts except for Hairatan, north of Mazar-i Sharif, which the Taliban briefly held in May 1997. They also controlled the areas estimated to produce 90 percent of Afghanistan's opium poppies, the country's most profitable crop. Taxes on this crop are an important source of revenue for the Taliban, though they strictly prohibit its consumption. The United Nations estimates that Afghanistan and the surrounding region produce slightly more than half the world's supply of this drug. 5 The opposition to the Taliban, known generically as the “United Front,” consisted of several groups controlling different portions of the remaining parts of the country, which are largely inhabited by Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. After the main Taliban offensive, elements of these groups controlled only a few mountainous areas home to ethnic minorities: Badakhshan and the Panjsher Valley, inhabited by Tajiks, and the Hazarajat, home to the Shia Muslim Hazara ethnic group. Before the Taliban's July-August offensive, the opposition groups had controlled most of the northern tier of provinces from Faryab to Badakhshan (except for Kunduz) as well as the Hazarajat. They controlled the main highway leading to Uzbekistan and the railhead at Hairatan that connects to the former Soviet rail system with links to Asia and Europe. Hairatan is the only major customs post in their region. These territories included about half of Afghanistan's border with Turkmenistan, the short but logistically and economically important border with Uzbekistan, nearly the entire border with Tajikistan, and a remote, mountainous, and largely inaccessible part of the border with Pakistan (including Pakistan-controlled Kashmir). Even before the offensive, the Taliban appeared to control at least two-thirds of Afghanistan's territory; their own estimates ranged as high as 85 percent. Much of that territory, however, was uninhabited desert, especially in the Southwest. The areas under Taliban control at that time included probably slightly more than half the country's population, which is currently estimated at nearly 24 million. 6 The two largest population centers then under Taliban rule, Herat and Kabul, were largely hostile to them, and the requirements of controlling these areas probably make them more of a drain on Taliban personnel than a source of recruits. These market centers provided significant income, however. The Taliban's main advantage was that they controlled the territory and population in the regions they ruled through a unitary structure, while the opposition remained split and riven by feuds. The opposition was divided into several groups, and each group was further divided into feuding factions. Furthermore, both sides depended to a great extent (though precise data are lacking) on foreign military, technical, and financial assistance. The Taliban are supported and were to some extent organized by Pakistan, with financial support from both official and unofficial sources in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states, while the northern groups have received aid from Iran, Russia, and, to a lesser extent, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The Taliban thus controlled the borders and highways leading not only to their own main supporter, Pakistan, but also to the opposition's main supporter, Iran. Supplying the Taliban was thus easier and less expensive than supplying the northern groups. By late August, the Taliban had control of virtually all the country's airfields except for two in Hazarajat. This effectively stopped aid to any other region. The regional competition results from the reconfiguration of the region after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Iran, Pakistan, and Russia are competing for control over the routes by which Central Asia's oil and gas resources will reach outside markets, which in turn will largely determine what power becomes predominant in the area. 7 The decision by India, followed by Pakistan, to test nuclear weapons has raised the stakes in the region and complicated peacemaking efforts. The independence of ethno-national states in Central Asia has given new prominence to ethnic identities, affecting co-ethnics across borders. And the increasing politicization of Islamic identity has increased the salience of Sunni/Shia sectarian differences. Perhaps the best-known fact about the Taliban is the restrictions they have imposed on women. These restrictions require that women be fully veiled, forbid them most education and employment, and impose strict limitations on their access to public services, including health care. The Taliban have also required men to grow full, untrimmed beards, cut their hair short, and attend mosque. They forbid any social mingling or communication among men and women outside the family. These rules (and others) have led to a series of confrontations with the representatives of the international community, largely the U.N. agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) present in Afghanistan. 8 Despite these rules, until the summer of 1998 these international organizations continued to work in Taliban areas; they did not work in most areas controlled by the northern groups. All agencies withdrew from Mazar-i Sharif after their offices, property, and storehouses (including food intended for destitute or famine-stricken areas) were thoroughly looted for the second time in September 1997 (they had been looted previously in May). The United Nations continued to work in Hazarajat, however. Western NGOs left Kabul in July 1998 when the Taliban refused to withdraw a requirement that all the NGOs move to the Polytechnic, a ruined Soviet-built campus in northern Kabul. More Westerners left in response to U.S. warnings about dangers to non-Muslim foreigners during the preparation for the August 20 raids. The Taliban resent the fact that although they have provided security for U.N. and NGO staff and property, the opposition, which has failed to do so, continues to be recognized as the government of Afghanistan by most countries and to occupy Afghanistan's U.N. seat. Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates recognize the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Opposition to the Taliban's gender policies accounts for much of the resistance to either recognizing them or vacating Afghanistan's U.N. seat. Indeed, a significant movement has developed in Europe and North America in opposition to the Taliban's gender policies, and this movement, as much as the interest in gas and oil pipelines, has placed Afghanistan back on the international radar screen. The Taliban's harboring of bin Laden and his network provides yet another even more prominent reason.
  • Topic: Security, Foreign Policy
  • Political Geography: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, United States, Iran, Middle East, Taliban, Saudi Arabia
  • Author: Barnett Rubin
  • Publication Date: 10-1998
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Council on Foreign Relations
  • Abstract: Mr. Chairman, thank you for this invitation, and thank you for your continuing work to focus attention on Afghanistan. I have brought a written submission for the record providing background information on recent events in Afghanistan. In my statement I will concentrate on policy challenges posed by Afghanistan to the United States and the international community.
  • Topic: Security, Foreign Policy
  • Political Geography: Afghanistan, United States, Middle East
  • Author: Bjørn Moller
  • Publication Date: 03-1998
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Danish Institute for International Studies
  • Abstract: The paper is introduced by an analysis of the concept of region, followed by an application of this analytical framework to the Persian Gulf region. Several problems in this region are identified, including a seemingly open-ended arms race and a significant risk of war. As a possible remedy to these problems, the author proposes a policy of Common Security, intended to satisfy the legitimate security problems of all states in the region. As a consequence, he recommends efforts to ensure the strictly defensive nature of the military postures of regional states, to be implemented unilaterally as well as by means of arms control negotiations and regulations of the international arms trade. The paper concludes with a Postscript on the Iraqi crisis of 1997/98.
  • Topic: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Peace Studies
  • Political Geography: Iraq, Middle East, Persia
  • Author: Thomas Risse, Sarah Mendelson, Neil Fligstein, Jan Kubik, Jeffrey T. Checkel, Consuelo Cruz, Kathleen McNamara, Sheri Berman, Frank Dobbin, Mark Blyth, Ken Pollack, George Steinmetz, Daniel Philpott, Gideon Rose, Martha Finnemore, Kathryn Skikkink, Marie Gottschalk, John Kurt Jacobsen, Anna Seleny
  • Publication Date: 05-1998
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Social Science Research Council
  • Abstract: The last decade or so has witnessed a resurgence in scholarship employing ideational and cultural factors in the analysis of political life. This scholarship has addressed political phenomena across a variety of national and international settings, with studies of European politics being particularly well represented. For example, the work of scholars like Peter Hall (1993), Peter Katzenstein (1996), Ronald Inglehart (1997), Robert Putnam (1994) and Daniel Jonah Goldhagen (1995) has improved our understandings of European polities, societies and economies. Yet despite a recent rise in interest, ideational and cultural explanations still meet with skepticism in many quarters of the discipline. Some scholars doubt whether non-material factors like ideas or culture have independent causal effects, and others, who accept that such factors might matter, despair of devising viable ways of analyzing their impact on political life.
  • Topic: Conflict Resolution, International Relations, Security, Democratization, Economics, Government, Human Rights, International Cooperation, Nationalism, Politics
  • Political Geography: United States, Middle East, France, Latin America
  • Author: Gerald M. Steinberg
  • Publication Date: 07-1998
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
  • Abstract: Since the beginning of the atomic age in 1945, the possession and deployment of nuclear weapons has become the dominant factor in the international system. Those countries that acquired nuclear weapons have become (or maintained their status as) primary world powers, but as the number of such countries grew, the potential for the use of nuclear weapons also increased. In the early 1960s, President Kennedy warned that unless immediate and significant action was taken, within a decade there would be as many as 20 nuclear powers. The process of proliferation was seen as one of the most dangerous and destabilizing aspects of the nuclear era.
  • Topic: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons
  • Political Geography: Pakistan, South Asia, Middle East, India
  • Publication Date: 12-1997
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: U.S. Government
  • Abstract: In fall 1996, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) held a series of conferences at National Defense University to identify key global trends and their impact on major regions and countries of the globe. The exercise was designed to help describe and assess major features of the political world as they will appear in the year 2010.
  • Topic: International Relations
  • Political Geography: Africa, United States, Europe, Middle East, Asia, South America
  • Author: Greg Gause
  • Publication Date: 02-1997
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The Mershon Center
  • Abstract: Steve: My impression is that your group has identified the variables that might affect the way the peace process goes. In fact, you probably have too many to factor into any one scenario. One way to proceed might be to divide the variables into First Order and Second Order variables: First Order variables would be those in which a change would have direct and immediate consequences on the peace process; Second Order would be those in which change would have an indirect and/or longer-term effect. You rightly have problematized the question of just what direction your vectors might take. This distinction would add intensity as a second element of the vector.
  • Political Geography: Middle East
  • Author: Rick Hermann
  • Publication Date: 02-1997
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The Mershon Center
  • Abstract: My first cut at the hierarchy of driving forces ranks Israeli-Palestinian bilateral factors as the most important and regional and global factors as secondary. Competition between global powers (USA, Russia, China) is currently not intense. None of them see the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian conflict as instrumentally critical to their broader strategic competition with each other. None see their security as centrally tied to this conflict, and, consequently, while interested not even the United States will commit enough resources at this point to overturn the forces driving the bilateral bargain. Competition among regional states is substantial, but the conflicts that do not involve Israel do not involve states powerful enough to project their competition into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For example, Iranian v. Turkish, or Iranian v. Saudi Arabian, or Syrian v. Iraq, or India v. Pakistan might tangentially connect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, mostly in the realm of rhetoric and symbol manipulation. None of these states, however, are strong enough to see the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an instrumental regional manifestation of their broader strategic conflict. The primary determinants of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation process in the short-term are the conflicting ambitions and calculations made by Israelis and Palestinians. Forces at the global and regional level will affect these bargaining calculations, (affecting both relative coercive leverage and positive reassurance) but they will not impose additional sources of conflict. My examination of global and regional forces, will follow my construction of the primary bilateral dynamic. I do not think global and regional factors will upset the short-term prediction I will make for the bilateral Palestinian-Israeli relationship. They may play a big role in shaping longer-term predictions.
  • Political Geography: Russia, China, Iraq, Middle East, Israel, Syria
  • Author: Bruce Jentleson
  • Publication Date: 02-1997
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The Mershon Center
  • Abstract: There are two issues I want to raise regarding our basic approach of focusing on driving forces to trace scenarios and predict outcomes. First is the question of the time frame of the outcomes to which we are driving. I ask this with particular reference to the "violent collapse" outcome. There are numerous permutations here that we need to differentiate. I'm not adept enough to graph it on the computer, but here are the permutations: Two versions of violent collapse: violent collapse as some sort of end state for whatever our timeframe is, or violent collapse as an intermediate outcome which then comes back together and leads to "two state" or "autonomy"; If violent collapse as an intermediate stage, then what conditions make an ensuing path to Palestinian state more likely, and what conditions for autonomy? Or what 's the story line for getting to either of these without going through violent collapse? And what are the parameters and criteria for what we mean by "violent" (Singer and Small had their figures for how many deaths equal a war; how many equal "violent") and by "collapse", as distinct from pause or suspension of talks?
  • Political Geography: Middle East
  • Author: David E. Spiro
  • Publication Date: 02-1997
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The Mershon Center
  • Abstract: Several interesting observations came out of our first conference. We realized that the mainstream academic view on the Middle East peace process has changed dramatically—from a belief that there would never be a peace to confidence that the peace process would not be derailed. In trying to make predictions that are not driven by newspaper headlines, we used a fairly uncontroversial laundry list of systemic variables, but we could not agree on which way they would effect the outcome. My aim in this memorandum is to review my past views on the Middle East peace process as an exercise in exploring what changed—both in the Middle East, and in my own implicit assumptions. I will amend my conclusions about the past by examining what has happened since the Oslo Accords. Finally, I will suggest, by way of conclusion, what driving forces will affect the future.
  • Political Geography: Middle East
  • Author: Janice Stein
  • Publication Date: 02-1997
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The Mershon Center
  • Abstract: The two-state solution includes continuing but declining violence over time against Israeli and Palestinian civilians as the Palestinian state becomes entrenched and its legitimacy and authority grows, Palestinian leaders develop a commitment to the status quo, and the opposition in Israel reluctantly accepts the permanence of a Palestinian state. If the Palestinian state is poorly institutionalized, violence against Palestinian and Israeli citizens may well increase over time.
  • Topic: Development, Government
  • Political Geography: Middle East, Israel, Palestine
  • Author: Don Sylvan
  • Publication Date: 02-1997
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: The Mershon Center
  • Abstract: Steve asked each of us to do the following: "Each participant will return to the next meeting with arguments on these seven driving forces. These arguments will include: Logic: what is the causal logic by which the driving force impacts on the intervening and dependent variables. Probability: what is the probability estimate of the effect. Hierarchy: is there an identifiable hierarchy among these driving forces.
  • Topic: Government
  • Political Geography: Middle East