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Begin New Search Topic War Political Geography Iraq Content Type Working Paper Publication Year within 25 Years

31. Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line

Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
As sectarian violence in Iraq has ebbed over the past year, a new and potentially just as destructive political conflict has arisen between the federal government and the Kurdistan regional government in Erbil. This conflict has manifested itself in oratory, backroom negotiations and military manoeuvres in disputed territories, raising tensions and setting off alarm bells in Washington just as the Obama administration is taking its first steps to pull back U.S. forces. A lasting solution can only be political – involving a grand bargain on how to divide or share power, resources and territory – but in the interim both sides should take urgent steps to improve communications and security cooperation, run joint military checkpoints and patrols in disputed territories and refrain from unilateral steps along the new, de facto dividing line, the so-called trigger line.
Topic:
Political Violence, Ethnic Conflict, and War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Washington, Middle East, Arabia, and Kurdistan

32. Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict

Author:
Frank G. Hoffman
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
America's ongoing battles in Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted limitations in our understanding of the complexity of modern warfare. Furthermore, our cultural prism has retarded the institutionalization of capabilities needed to prevail in stabilization and counter-insurgency missions.
Topic:
War and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, and America

33. Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and "Other Means"

Author:
Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Iran has a robust program to exert influence in Iraq in order to limit American power-projection capability in the Middle East, ensure the Iraqi government does not pose a threat to Iran, and build a reliable platform for projecting influence further abroad. Iran has two primary modes of influence. First, and most importantly, it projects political influence by leveraging close historical relationships with several Shi'a organizations in Iraq: the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the Badr organization, and the Dawah political party. Second, Iran uses the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Qods Force (QF) to provide aid in the form of paramilitary training, weapons, and equipment to various Iraqi militant groups, including Moqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and the Special Group Criminals (SGCs). Iran also projects influence through economic initiatives and various religious programs. Iranian influence in Iraq is inevitable, and some of it is legal and constructive. Nonetheless, Iranian policy in Iraq is also duplicitous. Iran publicly calls for stability while subverting Iraq's government and illegally sponsoring anti‐government militias.
Topic:
International Political Economy and War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

34. Iraq after the Surge I: The New Sunni Landscape

Publication Date:
04-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Against the odds, the U.S. military surge contributed to a significant reduction in violence. Its achievements should not be understated. But in the absence of the fundamental political changes in Iraq the surge was meant to facilitate, its successes will remain insufficient, fragile and reversible. The ever-more relative lull is an opportunity for the U.S. to focus on two missing ingredients: pressuring the Iraqi government to take long overdue steps toward political compromise and altering the regional climate so that Iraq's neighbours use their leverage to encourage that compromise and make it stick. As shown in these two companion reports, this entails ceasing to provide the Iraqi government with unconditional military support; reaching out to what remains of the insurgency; using its leverage to encourage free and fair provincial elections and progress toward a broad national dialogue and compact; and engaging in real diplomacy with all Iraq's neighbours, Iran and Syria included.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Conflict Prevention, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

35. Iraq after the Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy

Publication Date:
04-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Against the odds, the U.S. military surge contributed to a significant reduction in violence. Its achievements should not be understated. But in the absence of the fundamental political changes in Iraq the surge was meant to facilitate, its successes will remain insufficient, fragile and reversible. The ever-more relative lull is an opportunity for the U.S. to focus on two missing ingredients: pressuring the Iraqi government to take long overdue steps toward political compromise and altering the regional climate so that Iraq's neighbours use their leverage to encourage that compromise and make it stick. As shown in these two companion reports, this entails ceasing to provide the Iraqi government with unconditional military support; reaching out to what remains of the insurgency; using its leverage to encourage free and fair provincial elections and progress toward a broad national dialogue and compact; and engaging in real diplomacy with all Iraq's neighbours, Iran and Syria included.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Conflict Prevention, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

36. Learning the Right Lessons from Iraq

Author:
Benjamin H. Friedman, Harvey Sapolsky, and Christopher Preble
Publication Date:
02-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Foreign policy experts and policy analysts are misreading the lessons of Iraq. The emerging conventional wisdom holds that success could have been achieved in Iraq with more troops, more cooperation among U.S. government agencies, and better counterinsurgency doctrine. To analysts who share these views, Iraq is not an example of what not to do but of how not to do it. Their policy proposals aim to reform the national security bureaucracy so that we will get it right the next time.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East

37. Private Military Companies in the US Stabilization Operation in Iraq

Author:
Marcin Terlikowski
Publication Date:
08-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In the last two decades, the issue of private military companies and the privatization of the sphere of international security, have been addressed by political decision-makers in many countries, military experts, as well by the media and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It seems that the controversies and sometimes very categorical opinions which have emerged concerning these issues have several sources. Firstly, the relatively sudden appearance of a new type of non-public actor in the military sphere, which traditionally was the exclusive activity of the state, was associated with consternation caused by negative connotations with historic, still pre-Westphalian international order where significant roles were played by private armies and other mercenary forces (e.g. condottieres, corsairs). Secondly, the activities of these types of firm have caused a number of problems. For example, to this day, not all the circumstances have been explained regarding the participation by several firms in conflicts in Africa and the Balkans in the 1990s, while the media are still reporting various irregularities and incidents involving such enterprises. Thirdly, this specific business has developed with enormous dynamism, continuously generating profits and extending both the geographical scope of activities and the profile of the services provided.
Topic:
Security and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Arabia

38. Just Deserts in Iraq: American Vengeance for 9/11

Author:
Linda J. Skitka and Peter Liberman
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies
Abstract:
In January 2002 national survey data, we find a strong relationship between Americans' desire to avenge 9/11 and their bellicosity toward Iraq, even after controlling for the perceived terrorist threat, left right ideology, and approval of U.S. political leaders. This effect could have been due to suspicions of Iraqi complicity in 9/11 stemming from prior enemy images of Iraq, or to the effects of anger and desires for revenge on out-group antipathy, displaced blame, and optimistic assessment of war risks. We test the out group antipathy hypothesis and find evidence that anti-Arab and anti-Muslim antipathy partially mediated vengefulness's effect on bellicosity. Vengeance, in turn, was boosted by retributiveness (proxied by rightwing authoritarianism) and patriotism. While perceptions of the Iraqi threat probably assumed greater importance over the course of the following year, additional survey data shows that even as war approached, most supporters acknowledged it would satisfy a desire for revenge.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, America, Middle East, and Arabia

39. What NATO can learn from "the surge" in Iraq

Author:
Christopher M. Schnaubelt
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
What a difference 30,000 additional troops and a new strategy make. A few years ago, Afghanistan was commonly viewed as the model of a successful intervention while many politicians, military analysts, and pundits believed that the war in Iraq was being irretrievably lost. Yet today— although conditions still have a long way to go before normalcy has been achieved—the progress in Iraq following “the surge” directed by President Bush in January 2007 is widely recognized. All the indicators of violence: attacks against Iraqi infrastructure and government organizations; small arms, mortar and rocket attacks, and casualties among Iraqi civilians, Iraqi Security Forces, and Coalition Forces have sharply declined since July 2007. The situation has gone from being generally perceived as on the brink of disaster to being a success story (albeit belated and costly).
Topic:
NATO, Terrorism, War, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq

40. "The Kitsch of War: Misappropriating Sun Tzu for an American Imperial Hypermasculinity

Author:
L.H.M. Ling and Ching-Chane Hwang
Publication Date:
04-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The New School Graduate Program in International Affairs
Abstract:
Sun Tzu seems more popular than ever. The Bush Administration attributes its successful invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq to tactics in The Art of War such as “shock and awe” and “decapitation.” However, neither exists in Sun Tzu's manual. More seriously, this misappropriation reinforces an imperial hypermasculinity in US foreign policy given its neoliberal logic of “conversion or discipline” for Self/Other relations. Rival camps of imperial hypermasculinity arise in reaction, thereby rationalizing the US Self's resort to such in the first place. Locking the world into ceaseless rounds of hostility between opposed enemies, we argue, contradicts Sun Tzu's purpose. The Art of War sought to transform, not annihilate, the enemy as mandated by the cosmo-moral, dialectical world order that governed Sun Tzu's time. In misappropriating Sun Tzu, then, the Bush Administration turns The Art of War into mere kitsch.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, and Political Theory
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq