Content Type: Working Paper / Political Geography: Europe

201. The Implications of the Third Trilateral Meeting in Brussels

Author:: Emin Mammadov
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD)
Abstract:: In a way towards a productive peace-building process, discussing the situation in South Caucasus and deepening economic cooperation between the EU and both countries, on May 23 President of the European Council Charles Michel hosted the President of Azerbaijan: Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister of Armenia: Nikol Pashinyan. Following the 6 April meeting, which is called by the President Ilham Aliyev as a starting point in the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the content of the recent meeting is once more characterized by its promising and necessary provisions that will serve the interests of Azerbaijan and development of the region more broadly.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe, Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Brussels

202. Azerbaijani Gas Export to Europe: What Advantages Are There?

Author:: CESD Research Team
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD)
Abstract:: Following Russia's decision to restrict natural gas exports to Poland and Bulgaria, energy security has become a priority in the European Union. Although the ancient continent is trying to increase gas imports from alternative sources, Gazprom is still trying to maintain its dominance in Europe for some time. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan continues to increase natural gas production. In the first quarter of this year, Azerbaijan produced 11.8 billion cubic meters of natural gas. 3.5 billion cubic meters of gas were produced from ACG, 6.4 billion cubic meters from Shah Deniz, and 1.9 billion cubic meters from SOCAR. During that period, gas exports amounted to 5.9 billion cubic meters. 2.2 billion cubic meters of gas were exported to Turkey, 2.6 billion cubic meters to Europe, and 1.1 billion cubic meters to Georgia. More than 4 billion cubic meters of gas were transported to Turkey via TANAP during this period.
Topic:: European Union, Gas, Exports, Russia-Ukraine War, and Energy Sector
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Poland, Azerbaijan, and Bulgaria

203. How Will Coal Sanctions Impact on Russian Economy?

Author:: CESD Research Team
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD)
Abstract:: The Western Alliance has approved a new package of sanctions against Russia. The most notable of the sanctions is the suspension of coal exports from Russia. What does this mean for Russia, and how can the European Union compensate for this ban? Yesterday, the European Commission posted a decision on sanctions on its website, which means that the ban will come into force. This means that from today, European companies will not be able to conclude contracts to buy coal from Russia. The contracts signed in the previous period must be completed by August.
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Economy, Exports, Coal, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

204. Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas: Challenges and New Alternatives

Author:: Nigar Islamli
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD)
Abstract:: The Russia-Ukraine war has revealed energy reliance between the European Union and Russia as an issue. In addition to the dependence of the European Union (EU) on Russia, particularly in the sphere of energy, it did not alleviate but rather aggravated, Europe's and Russia's security worries about each other. All happenings raise this question: Can the European Union eliminate its dependence on Russian gas? Is it possible? If possible, for how long can this dependence be eliminated?
Topic:: European Union, Gas, Energy Dependence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

205. Blowback from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Sarah Cliffe, Leah Zamore, and James Traub
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:: While the Ukrainian army and people continue to resist, the costs of Russia's invasion in human terms are mounting. As of March 15, the United Nations (UN) had verified 1,900 civilian casualties, including 726 deaths (fifty of them children), as Russia intensifies its assault on civilian targets, seizes the Zaporizhzhia nuclear site, lays siege to Mariupol which is without food, energy, or water in freezing temperatures, continues to threaten Kyiv, begins a push on Odesa and assaults Kharkiv with heavy and indiscriminate shelling.
Topic:: Security, War Crimes, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

206. Recent UN Votes on Ukraine: What Needs to be Done to Maintain International Unity (Part I)

Author:: Sarah Cliffe, Faiza Shaheen, Leah Zamore, Karina Gerlach, and Nendirmwa Noel
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:: Horrific images of the loss of life and humanitarian suffering in Ukraine continue to come to light, including significant evidence of large-scale human rights abuses. As the war in Ukraine looks likely to enter a period of rearming, redeployment and renewed attacks in the East, maintaining international pressure for a negotiated peace agreement that maintains territorial integrity and upholds international law will be crucial.
Topic:: International Law, Multilateralism, Humanitarian Crisis, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

207. The importance of cybersecurity for Bosnia and Herzegovina Policy recommendations to support BiH’s cyber capabilities and international aspirations

Author:: Nicolo Miotto
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Centre for Security Studies
Abstract:: Cybersecurity is a fundamental domain for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as it impacts the country‘s national security, its economic growth and its international commitments and goals. Despite the importance of cyberspace for the country, BiH lacks a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity, having instead a jeopardised approach which hinders its cybersecurity efforts. The country‘s cybersecurity capabilities are underdeveloped, exposing governmental bodies, private companies and citizens to potential cyber threats and risks. Limited cybersecurity capabilities can undermine BiH‘s efforts to access the EU and NATO as these international organisations require states to respect and adopt specific cybersecurity standards and legislation. Hence, BiH needs to improve its cybersecurity architecture to achieve its international goals. In addition, the country must enhance its cybersecurity to accomplish international obligations deriving from the country‘s membership of international organisations and its ratification of the Budapest Convention. Although the country presents embryonic cybersecurity capabilities, BiH public institutions are improving their cybersecurity awareness by providing public employees with workshops, seminars, and training courses on cybersecurity. As of this, international and domestic cooperation represents a pivotal opportunity for BiH to build and enhance its cyber capabilities; intergovernmental organisations, research centres and partner counties are providing BiH public institutions with funds and training opportunities in the field of cybersecurity.
Topic:: NATO, Crime, European Union, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: Europe, Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

208. Policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina During the COVID-19 Pandemic (2020–2021)

Author:: Stiven Tremaria
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Centre for Security Studies
Abstract:: This paper provides an account of the developments of policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the course of the COVID-19 pandemic from 2020 to 2021 to shed light on elements of continuity and changes from previous trends observable since the 2010s. It is contended that the COVID-19 has made manifest the extent to which the factual management capacity of the Bosnian state administration and the police forces has consolidated in the entities and cantons. By contrast, central state police agencies suffer from chronic stagnation, institutional dysfunctionality, and a lack of factual management capacity to face unexpected challenges and emergencies. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has fostered certain conditions for advancing the rollback of the democratically oriented police reform observable at the entity and cantonal levels since the last decade, which manifests through politicisation, militarisation and slight informalisation of policing. In particular, such police counter-reform has been more acute in the Republika Srpska under the SNSD rule, in contrast to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose police forces are affected by severe degrees of institutional fragmentation, dysfunctional working and clientelism.
Topic:: Law Enforcement, Institutions, Police, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe, Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

209. Book Talk. "Orbánland" by Lasse Skytt

Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: From Europe to America, political landscapes have shifted in recent years in a way summed up in microcosm no better than by the trajectory of one small country, Hungary—whose leader, Viktor Orbán, has gained outsized international notoriety as the bad boy of the European Union for his steadfast alternative to the liberal democracy that has dominated the Western world since 1989. Orbánland is the fascinating story of a Danish journalist who moves to Hungary to gain an insight into the political complexities of this divisive European country. Along the way, he encounters people from all walks of life, and he learns as much about the Hungarians as about himself. In a narrative as absorbing and as it is vital for the lessons it carries as America prepares for its 2020 presidential elections, he asks: Can we get along with those on the other side of the fence? Is it worth even trying? His answers are surprising. By guiding us through a polarized landscape of differing opinions, Lasse Skytt delivers a broader perspective on Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, one that suggests possibilities for the future of Europe and America. His journey will leave us questioning our own truths, and, ultimately, which side we are on.
Topic:: Politics, Authoritarianism, Liberal Order, and Far Right
Political Geography:: Europe and Hungary

210. Things Washed Ashore

Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: One could not physically leave totalitarian autarchic Albania, but one could always escape it. Ardian Vehbiu, who has extensively written on totalitarian language and semiotics, will talk about the out-sized effects of found western objects, casual merchandise, media and images in the Albanian popular imagination. Looking at this “flotsam” that washed ashore, we will explore the relationship between these objects and images and how they shaped the imagination and experiences of Europe and of ourselves. How did these objects, images and messages reach an otherwise impervious Albania? How did they circulate once in Albania and what life and meanings did they take on? Did this relationship with the “beyond”, cherished and suffered by the citizens-inmates of a country otherwise closed to the world, lead to an inadvertent “colonization” of minds by these ethereal images built by and for Western media? Or, did these highly censored or scarcely available objects and images allow Albanians to clandestinely escape across the porous borders of the imagination?
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Media, Totalitarianism, and Identity
Political Geography:: Europe and Albania

211. Radioactive Consequences of a War in Ukraine

Author:: Rico Chandra
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:: A war in Ukraine could lead to thousands of radioactive sources getting lost, or worse, getting stolen and repurposed for political destabilization. So what is a radioactive “source”? It is a material that is specifically manufactured for the purpose of emitting radiation. For example, some forms of cancer are treated using radiotherapy whereby intense gamma radiation, emitted from a pencil-sized lump of radioactive metal, is directed at the tumor. This lump of highly radioactive metal is a radioactive “source”.
Topic:: Health, Military Strategy, Radiological Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

212. Present Danger: Nuclear Power Plants in War

Author:: Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: After Russia’s unprecedented seizure of Ukraine’s nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhya, the United States needs to adjust its military planning and policies to cope with hostile military forces’ targeting, seizure, and garrisoning of armed forces at large operating nuclear plants and clarify its policies regarding possible US targeting of such plants. This article is the first to analyze these concerns. It compares Russia’s assaults with previous strikes against research reactors and nonoperating nuclear plants in the Middle East and clarifies what new military measures and policies will be needed to cope with military operations against large, operating nuclear plants. US Army and Pentagon officials, as well as military and civilian staff, will discover ways to mitigate and reduce future military harm to civilians in war zones and understand the operational implications of military assaults on and seizures of civilian nuclear facilities.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

213. Arresting Nuclear Adventurism: China, Article VI, and the NPT

Author:: Henry Sokolski and Andrea Beck
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: Given the current crisis in Ukraine, it’s tempting to consider focusing on Chinese compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to be an academic indulgence. Giving into this inclination, however, would be a mistake. As dangerous as Russia currently is, China will be more threatening in the long run. As we are learning with Russia’s violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, enforcing binding understandings is critical lest violators run roughshod over law and good order. This is true with Russia’s behavior in Ukraine. It is no less so with China’s nuclear weapons buildup and its repeated refusal to join in good faith negotiations to limit its nuclear weapons activities, which is required by Article VI of the NPT. This buildup and refusal clearly flies in the face of China’s legal NPT obligations. The question is what might bring Beijing back into compliance. To get the answers, NPEC held a battery of workshops last fall, followed by a week-long diplomatic simulation. The game participants included U.S., Japanese, and Australian former and current officials and staff as well as outside experts. The group concluded that Beijing is unlikely to comply willingly with the NPT anytime soon, but that U.S. and international security would still be best served by spotlighting Beijing’s nuclear adventurism and suggesting diplomatic off-ramps to arrest its nuclear buildup.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Peace, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

214. Pari Passu Lost and Found: The Origins of Sovereign Bankruptcy 1798-1873

Author:: Marc Flandreau
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: Verdicts returned by modern courts of justice in the context of sovereign debt lawsuits have upheld a ratable (proportional) interpretation of so-called “pari passu” clauses in debt contracts which, literally, promise creditors they will be dealt with equitably. Such verdicts have given individual creditors the right to interfere with payments to others, in situation where the sovereign had failed to make proportional payments. Contract originalists argue that this interpretation of pari passu clauses has no historical foundation. Historically, they claim, pari passu clauses never granted individual creditors a unilateral right to block payments to other bondholders assenting to a government debt restructuring proposal. This article shows this claim is incorrect. Drawing on novel archival research, it argues that pari passu clauses find one potent historical origin in the operation of a now forgotten sovereign bankruptcy tribunal, the London stock exchange. Under the law of the stock exchange, departure from ratable payments did create a unilateral right for individual creditors to interfere with sovereign debt discharges. In fact, ratable distributions provided the touchstone for the stock exchange sanctioned sovereign debt discharge system. What is more, sophisticated contract drafters availed themselves of the logic. The result was a weaponization of pari passu clauses, and their inscription into sovereign debt covenants in the 19th century. The article concludes that the modern debate on the role of clauses in sovereign debt contracts cannot be held without thorough reconsideration of the history of sovereign bankruptcy.
Topic:: Finance, Banking, Stock Markets, and Sovereign Debt
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, and England

215. Separating electricity from gas prices through Green Power Pools: Design options and evolution

Author:: Michael Grubb and Drummond Pike
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: This paper develops a detailed proposal for an efficient way to channel the value of large-scale renewables, which have become much cheaper than gas-driven wholesale electricity prices, to consumers at ‘cost-plus’ prices. This would reduce the fiscal pressure on governments for market- wide subsidies and offer more stable support for consumers most in need. We detail how this ‘green power pool’ approach could interact with the wholesale market to ensure firm power, also bringing transparency to the cost of balancing the variable renewables output, and maintaining incentives for efficient supply and demand responses. We illustrate the approach with reference to the cost and volume trajectories of UK renewables backed by government CfDs, targeted initially to particular consumer groups, as a first step in a wider transition towards direct consumer access to cheap renewables.
Topic:: Climate Change, Energy Policy, Green Technology, Renewable Energy, and Energy Crisis
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

216. The EU Green Deal. A new momentum for democratic governance in the MENA region?

Author:: Dina Fakoussa
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:: Dysfunctional governance and repression lie at the heart of social, economic and political challenges and crises in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The nature of governance, whether autocratic, corrupt, crony capitalist, highly centralised, patriarchal and/or merely incompetent, led to alarming socioeconomic and political grievances. These grievances accumulated over decades sparking region- wide protests in 2010, 2011 and subsequent years. Without major improvements in the quality of democratic governance,1 further crises are inevitable, and sustainable stability will remain unattainable, with major negative repercussions for the European Union (EU) itself. Naturally, climate change is augmenting these challenges and increasing the pressure on government performance. The EU Green Deal addresses this uniquely urgent matter in need of assertiveness, namely climate change with its worldwide palpable repercussions and impact for all. The deal has serious implications for economies and hence societies in MENA countries. At the same time, it could and must serve as a vehicle for improved democratic governance in the region. This is also in the interests of the EU’s green ambitions, as lasting environmentally sound and socially just policies in countries beyond the EU will hardly materialise without improvements in the area of democratic governance. The two subject areas are mutually dependent; hence, the durable success of climate policies is unlikely without being buttressed by democratic components. This understanding needs to be mirrored in all EU policies and programmes targeting the region by interweaving climate policies with democratic governance.
Topic:: Climate Change, Governance, European Union, Democracy, Repression, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Middle East, North Africa, and MENA

217. Youth unemployment in the South of the Mediterranean: A chronic challenge to development and stability

Author:: Hussein Suleiman
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:: Unemployment among youth, aged 15 to 24 years old according to the International Labour Organization (ILO)’s definition, is the highest in the south of the Mediterranean, and in the larger Middle East and North Africa (MENA), compared to other regions in the world. This problem is exacerbated by very low labour force participation rates for this age group in the region, also compared to other regions. Furthermore, this issue of high youth unemployment is not a recent development but has been chronic in the region for at least the last three decades, as shown in detail further on. Youth unemployment south of the Mediterranean is a major challenge, and a symptom of deeply-rooted problems in the region’s labour markets. Unemployment is largely a youth unemployment issue. The problem is mainly one of new entrants’ transition from school age to work (Assaad & Krafft, 2016) but with consequences that could easily shape the entire life trajectories of individuals in the region and also have widespread impacts on their societies and even neighbouring countries. Such worrying and chronic challenges in the region’s labour markets have been largely shaped by structural deeply-rooted issues, reflected in the rise of work informality as a result of falling public employment, and a slow growth of formal private employment in the region throughout the last few decades, which will be discussed in detail in the paper. This paper aims to provide policy recommendations to address such chronic problems in the region, focusing mainly on Southern Mediterranean countries in North Africa, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, excluding Libya because of the exceptional impact of the civil war on its labour market during the last decade. The paper first explores some prominent implications of low employment among the youth, for their own lives and their societies. It then proceeds to examine the magnitude of the problem in the selected countries and its development across the last three decades, relying mostly on ILO estimates, which, unlike national estimates, have a few missing entries in that extended period, and also allow for disaggregation by age groups and gender that might not always be available for national estimates. Next, the paper highlights the now-established explanation of the youth employment problem in the region and how it developed, before finally moving to the recommended policy measures, both domestic and through regional cooperation, to address this chronic problem that has played a major role in the radical political and social shocks in the region in the last decade.
Topic:: Labor Issues, Employment, Youth, and Unemployment
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Middle East, and Mediterranean

218. Developing EU Trade Incentives: A Support Tool for Refugee Self-Reliance and Host Community Resilience in Turkey

Author:: Basak Kale
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:: The European Union (EU) is developing innovative mechanisms to investigate the root causes of migration in order to offer better socioeconomic opportunities both to migrants and host communities. These mechanisms and actions require multi-country bilateral and regional assistance tools to support different partner countries. Innovative and out-of-the-box ideas include multiple countries and various stakeholders. They are developed to provide cooperation solutions in different regions to have a wider impact on the causes and implications of migration. Despite these efforts, political, social, economic and environmental causes continue to generate human mobility around and beyond the immediate neighbourhood of the EU. The Arab Spring and the civil war in Syria have been creating human mobility in the EU neighbourhood. The war made approximately 7 million Syrians flee to neighbouring countries. Turkey is hosting around 3.7 million Syrians and another half a million asylum seekers and refugees from other regions (DGMM, 2021; UNHCR, 2021). The presence of Syrians in Turkey, together with other refugees benefitting from international protection, has become protracted. The efforts to create durable solutions in the form of “voluntary return, resettlement or local integration” have not yet successfully provided sustainable solutions. Turkey does not pursue an official state integration policy to integrate asylum seekers, refugees and the Syrians under temporary protection (STP). However, STPs, asylum seekers and refugees are becoming increasingly integrated into their host communities through informal and local integration mechanisms (Kale & Erdoğan, 2019). The delay in the access to formal employment and challenges in receiving formal employment permits aggregate the difficulties in the inclusion of refugees into formal employment schemes. Summer 2015 has shown that when there is a lack of economic and employment opportunities for asylum seekers, refugees and persons under temporary protection the incentive to have onward movement to other countries persists and the possibilities of integration in host communities stay low. It is clear that resilience-building and livelihood support through formal work is essential for vulnerable populations to have dignified living conditions in host countries. The EU-Turkey Statement in 2016 triggered the development of changes in the legal framework of international protection and migration policy. The Statement paved the way for the preparation of regulations on work permits for persons under temporary and international protection (Official Gazette, 2016). Legal developments targeted the acceleration of the economic integration of refugees into the Turkish labour market through formal employment. However, the difficulties in getting formal work permits resulted in only 132,000 issued until 2019. This indicates that approximately 4% of the STP working population has formal employment (UN Turkey, 2020). This percentage more or less matches the International Labor Organization (ILO) estimations (ILO, 2020). As a result, the majority of the refugee population is working informally, underpaid (Balkan & Tümen, 2016), without formal social and health security mechanisms, in unskilled jobs that are not wanted by Turkish citizens (Sunata, 2017). Informal employment has been a key element contributing to the lack of durable solutions and a protracted process. In Turkey, informal employment is widespread even among the host community members. It is estimated that there is about 30% of labour in host community among all sectors working unregistered. Informal employment is higher in sectors such as agriculture but significantly lower in the industrial sector. The COVID- 19 pandemic has also aggravated the increasingly poor state of the Turkish economy (Akay Ertürk, 2020). Previously, there were continuous efforts through FRIT (Facility for Refugees in Turkey) and 3RP (Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan) projects with programmes focusing on improving the employability of refugees in the Turkish labour market as well as support for the entrepreneurship capacities of the refugees in accessing the formal labour market. However, under the current economic conditions these projects are failing to generate a significant long-term impact on employment for refugees (Özçürümez & İçduygu, 2020). These projects provide short-term trainings or restricted employment possibilities while including a very limited number of participants. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic conditions have shown that these livelihood support arrangements when they are not based on rights-based approaches overtime can transform back into humanitarian aid services (Kale & Yavçan, 2020). Long-term policy planning needs to include other incentive mechanisms that will cover multi-country and multi-region solutions. In the long run, if vulnerable populations in the host societies turn into the most vulnerable requiring humanitarian and emergency aid, the incentive for secondary movements to third countries can be high.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and International Community
Political Geography:: Europe and Turkey

219. Could the EU’s New Agenda for the Mediterranean Turn Climate Change from a “Threat Multiplier” into an “Opportunities Multiplier”?

Author:: Desirée A.L Quagliarotti
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:: The Mediterranean countries are characterised by evident gaps in terms of demographic growth, socioeconomic conditions and natural resources availability, which undermine the process of Euro-Mediterranean cohesion and create a situation of structural weakness that makes them extremely vulnerable to destabilising events. In just over a decade, the Mediterranean region has been affected by major changes that, at first glance, do not seem to be related to each other. The wave of pro-democracy protests called the “Arab Spring” that has plagued the regimes of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since 2010 has shown how climate-driven crop failures in major food exporting countries may contribute to driving up international food prices and to amplifying social and political destabilisation, especially in food-import dependent countries (Werrell & Femia, 2013). The “Arab unhappiness” that spurred the popular uprisings has not faded over the years, giving rise to what has been referred to as the “Arab Spring 2.0”. This new round of turmoil, in which protesters demand a better quality of life, has been exacerbated by 2020s COVID-19 pandemic, clearly demonstrating, once again, the close interconnection between human well-being and planetary health.[1] In the same time frame, in the Northern Mediterranean Countries (NMCs), the migrant-refugee crisis, characterised by new migration waves triggered by traditional as well as unconventional push factors linked to the effects of climate and environmental changes, is becoming one of the most important and divisive issues in recent European politics, adding a new layer of instability to the already shaky European Union (EU) (Pawel & Roland, 2018).
Topic:: Climate Change, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: Europe and Mediterranean

220. From a Fragmented Cooperation to an Integrated Approach – The Emergence of the Maghreb and Sahel Region and its Consequences for the European Union

Author:: Erzsébet N. Rózsa and Viktor Marsai
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:: The history of the European Union (EU)’s foreign and security policy has been characterised by a continuous develop- ment and a process of adaptation to the realities on the ground and the experi- ences gained. This was manifest in the gradual change from bilateral relations to regional/multilateral structures, from trade through three-basket/three-pillar structured relations to the integrated ap- proach as introduced by the 2016 EU Global Strategy, and the institutionalisa- tion thereof. “Internal and external secu- rity are ever more intertwined: our secu- rity at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surround- ing regions. It implies a broader interest in preventing conflict, promoting human security, addressing the root causes of instability and working towards a safer world” (EEAS, 2016). The present pa- per argues that, in order to be able to halt the increasingly complex threats fac- ing the EU and maintain its global actor status, the EU should introduce further – sectorial and regional – flexibility, in- cluding, among others, definitions of the widening geographical scope underlying its strategic vision. Therefore, this paper first asks how the EU and its member states should recon- sider their regional approach. How can the EU implement the existing frame- works and/or develop a more effective and adaptive strategy towards its south- ern neighbourhood fitting the new reali- ties on the ground better?
Topic:: Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, and Sahel

221. The EU as a Soft Power Superpower: Why a Green Marshall Plan for the Sahel Is Imperative

Author:: Friso Stevens and Dortih Kool
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: This research paper argues that the European Union should roll out a European Green Marshall Plan for ecosystem restoration and local governance in the Sahel region, located between the Sahara to the north and the Sudanian savanna to the south. Ecological degradation and related climate change put mounting pressure on the region. In combination with cyclical resource-related conflicts and the presence of terrorist and insurgent groups, this has created an increasingly volatile situation. European security and stability are indirectly at stake. The EU’s ‘Old War’ footing and support for illegitimate, corrupt, and autocratic governments to ‘mow the lawn’ of terrorists and insurgents fails to address and often undermines fundamental human security needs in the region. The authors propose a remodelling of EU foreign and security policy to shift focus from current securitization efforts towards facilitating a green, bottom-up transition that empowers local communities’ ecological stewardship by using their existing knowledge, skills, and dynamics, and Farmer-Managed Natural Regeneration (FMNR). Failure to make these changes toward a human security-centred approach means the EU’s current security and climate-related policies risk further undermining rather than contributing to regional security.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe

222. The Russian Soldiers’ Question Revisited

Author:: Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The Russian authorities apply an “algorithm of lies”, the Russian armed forces have become a sealed organization, and tactical information about Russia’s war in Ukraine is fragmented and unreliable. Hence, definite conclusions concerning the Russian soldier cannot be drawn.
Topic:: Security, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

223. Mobilizing Against Russia? Some Reflections on the Security Deadlock Called Ukraine

Author:: Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: No event exists beyond the media. This is also the case with the current Russian-Ukraine war. Daily, we are flooded with analyses and opinions about Putin’s military threat in the East. These narratives – mostly polemical and shrill – are both the result of and the catalyst for the crisis. As such, the debate itself – consciously or unconsciously – becomes part of the Western-Russian standoff driven by the strategy of hybrid and decision-centric warfare. This essay deliberately distances itself from the issues of the day and the hyper-polarized debate that currently takes place. Instead, a more detached exercise is made in which the polyphonic nature of the past and the intricacy of history is deliberately sought out. It shows the complexity of the process we have gone through, leading to the current deadlock. As such, we have to face the changes and continuities with which we have been confronted, or as Jeffrey Frank recently wrote in The New Yorker, “If a lot has changed since the end of the Cold War, there’s much that hasn’t.”
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

224. Western financial warfare and Russia’s de-dollarization strategy: How sanctions on Russia might reshape the global financial system

Author:: Maria Shagina
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Since 2014, Russia’s de-dollarization plan has been guided by security and geopolitical considerations. By dumping the US dollar from its foreign currency reserves, Russia diverted from the traditional approach where liquidity and the credibility of the issuer determine the choice of currency. In 2022, Russia has doubled down on its efforts to de-dollarize the economy. What started as de-dollarization in 2014, transformed into full-blown rouble-ization in 2022. Following the dynamic of an emerging multipolar world order, the global financial system is also gravitating towards fragmentation and currency multipolarity. The overuse of sanctions could strengthen revisionist countries’ desire to increasingly conduct their trade in non-dollar currencies in an attempt to avoid US oversight. If current trends continue, the de-dollarization effort could gain ground and undermine the primacy of the US dollar.
Topic:: Monetary Policy, Sanctions, Finance, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Global Focus

225. A Roundtable on Heather Dichter, Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games: International Sport’s Cold War Battle with NATO

Author:: Jenifer Parks, Anne M. Blaschke, Kevin B. Witherspoon, John Soares, and Richard Kimball
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)
Abstract:: When Heather Dichter embarked on writing Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games, she could not have anticipated how prescient her study would be upon publication. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has found a renewed unity and sense of purpose, and sport has again become a key arena for diplomatic policy. In the 1960s, the focus was on Germany which lay at the heart of a divided Europe, and NATO, the Soviet bloc, and the international sporting community struggled to solve the “German question” of how to handle the existence of two separate German states. Dichter’s book takes the reader through the many intricacies of that question, demonstrating not only how the politics of the Cold War influenced sport, but how international sports in turn influenced Cold War international relations. The “German problem” came to a head when the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany) adopted a new flag and anthem and constructed the Berlin Wall. The erection of the wall, effectively cut off East German athletes from the West, and in response, NATO enacted what amounted to a ban on East German athletes traveling to international competitions in NATO countries. International sports organizations responded by downgrading competitions where East German athletes were excluded or moving competitions from NATO countries to neutral or Warsaw Pact countries, depriving host nations of the soft- power benefits of hosting major sports competitions. Meanwhile, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) deliberated whether to recognize a separate East German Olympic Committee or continue to insist on a unified German team. Once the IOC demanded a guarantee that any city hosting the Olympic Games would allow the free travel of East German athletes to the Games, NATO countries with cities bidding for 1968 Winter and Summer Games, namely the USA, Canada, France, and Norway, pressured the alliance to alter its policies on East German travel. East German officials’ attempts to use sport to legitimize their regime ultimately succeeded, and international sports precipitated the official recognition of a separate German Democratic Republic, which would go on to compete in the 1972 Summer Games in Munich under their own flag and anthem as a fully-fledged member of the Olympic Movement. How this unfolded makes for a fascinating read and a compelling discussion.
Topic:: NATO, Cold War, Diplomacy, and Sports
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

226. The Last Word: Zelensky Wags the Dog, But Slowly

Author:: Zachary Jonathan Jacobson
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)
Abstract:: Too often agency (and blame) for the war in Ukraine has been presumed to lie predominantly with the greater powers. Liberals like Anne Applebaum point to President Vladimir Putin’s autocratic and expansionist mission to restore a greater Russia as the precipitating reagent for the crisis, while realists like John Mearsheimer hold the Americans and Europeans responsible for encouraging Ukraine to challenge Russia by seeking membership in NATO.2 In both cases (and both have a case), what has been underplayed is the agency of Ukraine. Taken for granted have been President Volodymyr Zelensky’s artful strategic manipulations to pull a wide community of actors into the regional conflict. His calls for military assistance have resembled what the political scientist Joseph Nye Jr. termed the “soft powers” of persuasion.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Governance, Leadership, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

227. The Digitalization of EU Public Diplomacy: the pandemic crisis and beyond

Author:: Christos A. Frangonikolopoulos and Eleftheria Spiliotakopoulou
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: This paper explores the digitalization of diplomacy and attempts to shed light on the adaptation level of the European Union by presenting the European External Action Service’s activity on social media and selected Public Diplomacy initiatives during the covid-19 pandemic. The main research questions posed in the study are: a) in what ways has the European Union used digital tools to respond to the coronavirus crisis; and b) what are the (recurring) challenges facing the European Union in its efforts to improve its image in a changing world and enhance its role as a leading global actor? The paper concludes that while the European Union is highly competent in terms of digitalization, it does face challenges, which are partly inherent in the sui generis nature of the European Union as an International Organization. These include the need for deeper integration, better coordination between member states, and further dialogue with the Union’s citizens, and must be met if the EU is to enhance trust and build solidarity, as well as a clearer and more solid European identity.
Topic:: Diplomacy, European Union, Regional Integration, COVID-19, Digitalization, and Adaptation
Political Geography:: Europe

228. The return of inflation: Can we protect real incomes?

Author:: Manos Matsaganis and Sotiria Theodoropoulou
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: High inflation, virtually unknown in advanced economies since the 1980s, has made a comeback. In this policy paper, we first explain where inflation comes from, and describe how the policy context for dealing with it was shaped after Keynesian demand management proved unable to defeat stagflation. We then critically examine the various policy options. Generally speaking, policy makers may attempt to (i) contain inflation by raising interest rates or, more directly, by controlling prices, (ii) alleviate the impact of inflation on household budgets through price subsidies or income transfers, and (iii) protect workers’ real incomes via wage indexation and social pacts. We conclude by assessing the merits, costs, and distributional implications of each option in turn.
Topic:: Economy, Inflation, and Income
Political Geography:: Europe and Global Focus

229. Fuel of the Future: A Blueprint for a Mediterranean Market for Emission-Free Hydrogen

Author:: Jorgo Chatzimarkakis
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The Mediterranean Green Hydrogen Partnership (MGHP) should be developed from the outset into a supranational governing structure for the intercontinental hydrogen market around the Mediterranean Basin. The supranational model will ensure optimal ownership for all members while delivering compelling and binding decisions on the production, certification, transportation and distribution of clean hydrogen. It will also serve as a stepping stone to the application of supranational decision-making to future global hydrogen governance on the basis of rules and regulations enacted by the world’s leading hydrogen producing region. Maximising the clean hydrogen potential of all the states encompassed by the MGHP will make the organisation the global leader in a transparent and democratic market for a key future global energy source.
Topic:: Partnerships, Carbon Emissions, Hydrogen, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe and Mediterranean

230. Cooperation against the odds: Getting small firms to work together in unfavourable circumstances

Author:: Kira Gartzou-Katsouyanni
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: How can we get small firms to work together in order to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes, despite adverse circumstances? This policy paper provides an answer to this question that could be useful both to policymakers and to local stakeholders seeking to undertake innovative, cooperative economic activities in their area. Based on evidence from eight case studies within the Greek agri-food and tourism sectors, I argue that a small group of local actors, whom I call ‘institutional entrepreneurs’, usually play a key role in catalysing the emergence of cooperation at the local level. Their strategies and experiences carry valuable insights. I also outline the characteristics that macro-level institutional frameworks need to have if they are to facilitate local cooperation. These characteristics can inform the design of institutions at both the domestic and the EU level. The paper’s findings could be relevant to people interested in local development, but also to those concerned with boosting the productivity and export orientation of the Greek economy as a whole. After all, cooperation can improve the performance of small firms, and it is thus an important ingredient for inclusive growth in countries with a lot of small firms, such as Greece.
Topic:: Development, Economy, Business, and Production
Political Geography:: Europe and Greece

231. The European Union’s uneasy journey through the energy crisis

Author:: Alekos Kritikos
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The European Union revealed rapid reflexes when it came to imposing sanctions on Russia and supporting Ukraine, but has been extremely slow when it comes to taking measures to relieve its own citizens and businesses. At three fruitless summits in the first two months of the crisis, numerous member states’ repeated requests for a joint fiscal response mirroring that adopted vis-à-vis the pandemic were not even informally tabled. In May, the Commission presented the REPowerEU programme, which aims to transition to clean energy and end the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels. The two European Councils in May and June agreed on new sanctions against Russia, further assistance for Ukraine, and joint EU supplies of defence equipment. However, no decision was made to impose a cap on the price of natural gas and the issue of a joint fiscal response to the crisis was not even discussed. Despite repeated requests, the Commission continued to not submit proposals to this effect. But pressure was mounting for decisions to be made. Fifteen countries signed a joint letter in September 2022 calling for a cap on gas prices. In a joint article, Commissioners Thierry Breton and Paolo Gentiloni have also called for a joint fiscal response. The two Councils of Energy ministers in September 2022 resolved on a series of measures, but these are national responses rather than a joint European initiative. The price cap was absent once again from the decisions made. The informal Prague summit did not reach any conclusions either, though it did table all the outstanding issues in question. Europe’s successes in dealing with the pandemic came with “collateral damages”, institutional and otherwise, and the bloc has continued to sustain further collateral damages during the current energy crisis.
Topic:: European Union, Crisis Management, Fossil Fuels, Energy Crisis, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

232. Using RRF resources to kick-start a job-rich recovery in Greece

Author:: Manos Matsaganis and Georgios Manalis
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is a golden opportunity for those member states that were most badly hit first by the debt crisis then by the pandemic. Greece, one of the largest beneficiaries in per capita terms, is due to receive very significant resources that can help arrest the decline of the 2010s. Can these resources be spent wisely and efficiently enough to kickstart the process of inclusive and sustainable growth? This paper briefly reviews the Greek National Recovery and Resilience Plan (Greece 2.0), assessing its potential contribution to upgrading the economy’s growth model, enhancing skills, and boosting employment. In 2007-19, total investment in Greece shrank by a stunning 70% in real terms. Over the same period, public investment fell by 62%, business investment by 44%, and household investment (on housing, mostly) by 89%. Under-investment constrains growth and undermines the future prospects of the Greek economy. The Recovery and Resilience Facility offers Greece a unique opportunity to bridge the investment gap, giving a boost to the sustainable recovery of the Greek economy. Technically, Greece 2.0, the country’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan is competently drafted, as its favourable reception by the European Commission indicates. Still, critical issues abound. In this sense, Greece 2.0 embodies the contradictions of the current juncture. On the one hand, there is a consensus that the Greek economy should rebalance, by pursuing a growth strategy that relies much more on exports than in the recent past, and much less on domestic consumer demand fuelled by debt. On the other hand, the legacy of the past weighs heavily on social and political actors, limiting their room for manoeuvre. The list is daunting. It remains to be seen how the above will play out over the next few years.
Topic:: Debt, Economy, Crisis Management, Resilience, and Economic Recovery
Political Geography:: Europe and Greece

233. Georgian-Greek Relations: Building a Strategic Dimension

Author:: Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Mariam Gugulashvili
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The cordial bilateral relations between Greece and Georgia are mostly centered on the culture and education domains, with less progress achieved in the areas of the economy, foreign policy, and security. Greece can emerge as Georgia’s key supporter in its EU membership aspirations, with Greek experts and diplomatic circles contributing their experience to the country’s EU integration process. This support can be realized at both high and low levels, through EU Twinning projects and results-oriented memoranda between state institutions to import best practices, so Georgia can successfully carry out the required democratization reforms and implement the EU Association Agreement effectively. As the international system becomes more multipolar and the strategic significance of the Black Sea and Caucasus regions increases, Greece and Georgia should work to deepen their ties and build interest-oriented synergies in order to forge a strategic alliance. The promotion of Western and European interests can be significantly aided by a democratic Georgia on the road to European integration and a resurgent Greece with a stronger regional presence in the Black Sea and Caucasus.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:: Europe, Greece, and Georgia

234. EU-Georgia Relations at a Critical Juncture: A Case for European Strategic Autonomy

Author:: Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Mariam Gugulashvili
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Despite the substantial progress that Georgia has made in implementing the EU Association Agreement and related reforms, it has been experiencing democratic backsliding since 2018. The divergence of Georgia’s ruling party from a pro-European trajectory, as well as the political polarization that has been dominant in recent years, have contributed to the deterioration of ties between Georgia and the EU. Unlike Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia, which was once seen as a “reform pioneer,” was not given candidate status in June 2022. Georgian public opinion has always supported membership of Euro-Atlantic institutions, with more than 80% of Georgians today being Euro-enthusiasts and overwhelmingly in favour of joining the EU. The EU is Georgia’s largest donor and trading partner. Georgia’s key strategic option boils down to Russia vs. the West. Georgia should foster closer relations with certain EU member states that could provide key support for its EU membership aspirations.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, European Union, Trade, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Europe and Georgia

235. Threats, Instability and Disruption in Europe’s South

Author:: Marc Pierini
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Russia’s intervention in Syria in September 2016 turned out to have much broader objectives. The development of air and naval bases provided Moscow with platforms for operations in the Mediterranean and in Sub-Saharan Africa. The delivery of S-400 missile systems to Turkey added another major strategic gain. The European Union is faced by broad challenges on its South, with a sharp decline in rule of law, political instability, and a surge in authoritarianism. Wider phenomena such as climate change, demographic trends, and criminal activities of human trafficking networks add to the challenges. ISIL is still a threat too. Turkey’s choice of disruptive policies has perplexed EU and NATO leaders in the recent past. Tensions with the EU have risen due to challenges to maritime boundaries and sovereignty of Cyprus and Greece. Although largely a consequence of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union’s major foreign policy initiatives in 2022 have marked a watershed moment and constitute a useful precedent for the Union’s policies with third countries. In the near future, the EU will have to invent a new format, distinct from accession, for its relationship with the countries of ‘Wider Europe’ and to use its now diversified ‘foreign policy toolbox’ in a coherent and effective fashion.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Sovereignty, European Union, and Instability
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Southern Europe

236. Explaining immigration restrictions using a sequential path dependency model

Author:: Emmanuel Comte
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: This paper, by Emmanuel Comte, Senior Research Fellow, Ariane Condellis European Programme, analyses immigration restrictions by discussing major recent debates of historical political economy and proposing a new explanatory model. The conclusions in recent research on the subject of immigration restrictions converge in highlighting the natives’ fear of economic costs as a potent factor in immigration restrictions, despite evidence proving that actual costs are small and circumscribed, while the aggregate impact of immigration is generally positive. This paper develops existing scholarship to explain the magnitude of current immigration restrictions in Europe and North America by proposing a sequential path dependency model based on both historical insights and the insights of institutionalist theories of path dependence. In this model, the fears of adverse economic effects held by specific segments of the national workforce interact with a power structure dominated by the state and with the agency of union leaders and policymakers initiating a series of policy cycles that lead to complete restrictions on low-skilled immigration.
Topic:: Political Economy, Immigration, and Border Control
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

237. Local community views on Marine Protected Areas on Greek islands

Author:: Lydia Avrami, Nicolas Demertzis, Antonis Armenakis, and Dmitra Syrou
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are usually designated in areas with intense human activity. An MPA is therefore a complex socioeconomic system whose success and/or failure, and ability to deliver environmental, social and economic benefits, depend on local communities and their sensitivities. This paper examines how recently designated MPAs on three islands in the Cyclades group (Kythnos, Milos and Santorini), with differently structured local economies and levels of touristic development, are perceived by their local communities. Data are drawn from a phone survey of local residents, and the results show that the awareness, attitudes and perceptions of the local groups differ significantly depending on the area and their stake in the MPA. How much local communities know about the MPA regulatory framework and its location, past experiences and socioeconomic factors are deemed good predictors for the local communities’ behaviors towards the MPAs. The positive interplay between the operation of an MPA and the development of scuba diving is also acknowledged, although the perceived trade-off between marine protection and fishers’ revenue remains the main challenge facing MPA implementation. The paper’s findings highlight the urgent need to deal with the information and knowledge deficit, and to bridge the gap between the perceptions and expectations of local communities and the MPAs’ actual output. Applying a participatory approach to MPA decision-making and operation would build capacity for effective implementation. Thus, the delimitation of the protection zones within the MPAs, and the provision of specific constraints, should be based on both ecological and socioeconomic criteria.
Topic:: Environment, Natural Resources, Public Opinion, Regulation, and Ecology
Political Geography:: Europe and Greece

238. The Second Phase of the EU Southern Gas Corridor: Which role for Azerbaijan?

Author:: Marika Karagianni
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The operation of the Southern Gas Corridor marks the first attempt of the EU to diversify its pipeline gas supplies and routes beyond Russia. The 2nd Phase of the Corridor, which involves the operation of several gas interconnectors in South Eastern Europe, is being promoted, while the EU is looking for additional supply sources, namely LNG. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, coupled with the intense energy crisis in Europe, has reinforced these trends. Field development in Azerbaijan and future prospects for LNG exports, primarily from the US, are discussed in this article as realistic options for alternative supply sources for Europe.
Topic:: Development, European Union, Gas, Exports, and Pipeline
Political Geography:: Europe, Central Asia, and Azerbaijan

239. Parti Socialiste: the end of the cycle – The collapse of the French Socialists and the future prospects of the Left in France

Author:: Nikolas I. Tzimos
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The French Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste – PS), once the main government party of the Left, has been in rapid decline since 2014; since 2017, it has been struggling for its life. Its electorate shrank due to President François Hollande’s poor management and growing political unreliability during his term in office. Signs of internal crisis were evident from the early 21st century. The Socialist Party has been losing traditional social bastions and organizational resources since the 2014 municipal elections. The 2022 presidential elections already appear lost for the Socialist Party. Anne Hidalgo, the mayor of Paris and the Socialist candidate for the presidency, is from the PS’s vast pool of local authority cadres. She was reelected as mayor in harsh times, back in 2020. A predominantly cosmopolitan candidate, Hidalgo has failed to rally the PS’s forces. She is shedding votes towards the Center and the radical Left. The PS is currently experiencing the inversion of the phenomenon of 21 April 2002. To avoid two undesirable candidates in the second round, potential PS voters are “forced” to vote tactically (vote utile) for candidates that are better equipped to get beyond the first round. Can the PS survive if it puts in a good performance in the upcoming parliamentary elections? The French two-round electoral system requires cooperation to secure seats. A new Épinay is necessary, but is it possible?
Topic:: Domestic Politics, History, Political Parties, and Socialism
Political Geography:: Europe and France

240. Europe after Putin’s War: EU Foreign and Defence Policy in the new European security architecture

Author:: George Pagoulatos and Spyros Blavoukos
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a game changer for Europe and the global system and a call for the EU to emerge as a coherent security actor. Any EU discussion about an autonomous EU military capacity becomes irrelevant in the face of a systemic global security challenge, such as Russia, which cannot be dealt with through the existing or envisaged EU military instruments. Faced with a security challenge on a global scale, NATO remains the only game in town. The EU ambition of developing its strategic autonomy becomes practically meaningful only within the transatlantic alliance. EU member-states should take advantage of the existing clauses that enable significant steps to be taken towards foreign and security integration. The existing Treaty framework provides legal space for significant advances in the field of foreign and security integration, even though all relevant Treaty Articles contain strong ‘brakes’ which enable member-states to retain control of the process. Enhanced cooperation in EU foreign and security policy remains an important way forward, even though there are significant safety clauses. The ‘mutual defence’ or ‘mutual assistance’ clause (Article 42(7) of TEU) and the ‘solidarity clause’ (Article 222 of TFEU) are the closest things the EU has to security guarantees. Adding teeth to 42(7) should be an EU priority. Supporting EU ‘coalitions of the willing’ (Article 44 of TEU) also provides the opportunity for swifter military action under the EU aegis. The modality of cooperation between such coalitions and the EU rapid deployment capacity, which is also envisaged in the Strategic Compass and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), has still to be worked out. Transition to qualified majority voting (QMV) in EU foreign policy decision-making presents both advantages and disadvantages, both from the standpoint of the EU and of the dissenting member states. The EU cannot become a credible global power if it cannot reach collective decisions on EU foreign and security policy. Moving towards QMV would address structural weaknesses and serve the objective of European sovereignty. However, smaller member-states need a strong and explicit reassurance that they can always use the existing emergency brakes when they consider an issue which is to be decided on by QMV to be a matter of national security. Transition to QMV should be the result of the gradual forging of a common foreign policy understanding on the major security challenges facing the EU. Human rights issues and sanctions are a good place to start when building momentum towards QMV. In the meanwhile, the current reform effort should be focused on investing in the institutional framework of EU foreign and security policy and making good use of existing instruments.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

241. Achieving qualitative superiority: Greek conscription and the Turkish threat

Author:: Antonis Kamaras and Nikos Stournaras
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: This policy paper argues that, by emulating its peer countries, wealthy, small to medium sized democracies facing national security threats, in Northern Europe and the Middle East (namely Finland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Israel), Greece can modernize its conscript component and thus attain qualitative superiority over the Turkish Army. Turkey’s conscript model is riven by deep-seated class, geographical and ethnic cleavages, giving to Greek political and military leaders the opportunity to gain a qualitative military edge through judicious modernization of the Greek conscript model. Such a modernization is eminently feasible today as Greece’s economic crisis has created the political space to overcome resistance to the reform of conscription. By contrast, Greece’s main national security threat, Turkey, belongs to that group of authoritarian or illiberal countries which have suboptimal conscription models, featuring evasion of conscript service by the well-educated, inefficient training and harsh, counterproductive treatment of those conscripts who do serve. Greece, also due to its post WWII illiberalism or authoritarianism, and not unlike Taiwan which has a similar legacy, has not infused its conscript component with demanding training and operational standards, roles and missions. The time is ripe, due to the resurgence of the Turkish threat and Greece’s economic crisis, which has removed many of the country’s outdated shibboleths, to modernise Greek conscription, as its peer countries have done, and thus acquire an Army qualitatively superior to that of Turkey. By doing so, Greek policy-makers will decisively strengthen Greece’s deterrence and produce positive externalities for the consripts themselves . Indeed, the more effective conscription becomes in operational terms for the Greek Armed Forces, the greater the benefits to be reaped in civilian life.
Topic:: Security, National Security, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Conscription
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Greece

242. Household Wealth Inequalities in the wake of the Greek Debt Crisis

Author:: Apostolos Fasianos
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Despite the renowned interest in wealth disparities, the distribution of wealth in Greece is largely understudied. This study maps the levels, dynamics, and composition of household wealth using data from the three waves of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey for Greece for the period after the debt crisis of 2009-10 till 2017. The evidence suggests that the richest 1% of the population holds roughly as much wealth as the poorest 50%, while the richest 10% holds about four times the wealth of the poorest 50%. Most inequality indicators employed indicate increasing trends in wealth disparities between 2009 and 2017. During this period, average and median wealth holdings decreased by about one third, and the share of financially fragile households increased by about 20%. Estimates from factor inequality decompositions suggest that, although relatively evenly distributed, housing asset holdings explain much of the increase in overall wealth inequality in Greece, followed by self-employment business equity; financial assets play a negligible role. Financial wealth inequality is much more pronounced than housing wealth inequality in Greece. The findings of the paper carry important implications for the design of appropriate policies aiming at reducing wealth inequalities and strengthening financial resilience.
Topic:: Debt, Income Inequality, Economic Crisis, and Wealth
Political Geography:: Europe and Greece

243. EU-Africa relations ahead of the EU-AU Summit: Taking stock, looking forward

Author:: Pavlos Petidis
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The European Union’s (EU) development policy is a broad field of activity that has undergone multiple significant modifications in both its definitions and its goals. The external relations of the European Union have long included development policy, resulting in an asymmetrical relationship with Africa. Since the turn of the century, the scope of the EU-Africa relationship has expanded to cover new challenges including climate change, terrorism, trade liberalization, and migration. EU development policies reveal a long-term shift in EU development priorities away from fundamental development goals and toward a wider array of ambitions, actors, and methodologies. Identifying and prioritizing the International Organizations on which it and its member states should best focus their diplomatic and political capital is a challenge. Given the political clout and relevance of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) for the continent’s economic development, the EU can concentrate its efforts on encouraging its implementation by deepening its Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Working together to strengthen multilateralism and support the implementation of the European Green Deal and the AfCFTA form the axis of a new articulated African agency.
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, Diplomacy, Migration, Terrorism, European Union, Partnerships, and African Union
Political Geography:: Africa and Europe

244. Who are the populists and how to respond to them: Evidence from mainstream European Parliament parties

Author:: Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The main research questions of this paper are how mainstream European Parliament parties conceptualize populism, and how they respond to the rise of populism. The paper, which has come out of the Horizon 2020 project “Demos”, is based on semi-structured interviews with top officials of non-populist parties in the European Parliament (“Europarties”), such as the ALDE, EPP, the Party of European Socialists and the European Greens. The research technique of the paper is thematic analysis, performed on the responses obtained from the aforementioned interviews. Europarty officials identified populist parties by associating them with core themes such as anti-migration, Euroscepticism, and the tendency to make undeliverable policy promises. As for the effectiveness of anti-populist strategies, the interviewees converged on the idea that the problems posed by populists cannot be ignored and that clear and concrete policy solutions are what mainstream parties need, if they are to defend themselves against the evasive political discourse of populist parties. Non-populist parties in the European Parliament may use three strategies to prevent the rise of populists, namely clashing with, marginalizing, or co-opting the populists. Non-populist parties may prefer to incorporate selected questions raised by the populists into their political agendas, and provide non-populist replies to them. Mainstream parties seem aware that while populists may not win arguments over concrete policy measures, they might win voters’ hearts.
Topic:: Politics, European Union, Populism, Domestic Politics, and European Parliament
Political Geography:: Europe

245. Turkey’s “anti-colonial” pivot to Mali: French-Turkish competition and the role of the European Union in the Sahel

Author:: Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Dawid A. Fusiek
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Turkey’s rising foreign policy ambitions have been best reflected in its pivot to Africa. One of the tropes used by the Erdoğan administration to advance its cause are references to the colonial heritage of the European Union (EU) and its member states. The AKP and its officials have employed this discourse to challenge the French influence in Mali since the 2020 coup d’état. As this paper shows, Turkey uses anti-colonial discourse to exploit postcolonial sentiments with a view to challenging the political and economic power of Western actors, to portraying Turkey as a legitimate and “anti-colonial” ally and partner and, in the long run, to establishing a robust Turkish presence in Mali, the Sahel and beyond. In order to counter Turkish influence, the EU needs to promote fair cooperation with Mali and West Africa, to assist with political and economic development in the region, and to mobilise Member States which are unencumbered with a colonial past.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Anti-Colonialism, and Competition
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, France, Mali, and Sahel

246. Transparency policy in Greece: From citizen empowerment to anticorruption and open data

Author:: Calliope Spanou and Manto Lampropoulou
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: This paper aims to provide an overview of the transparency policy in Greece with a focus on public administration. To this end, we explore and critically analyse the origins and the state of play of transparency policy in line with the key components of the current policy agenda, namely: open government, access to documents and digital information, internal audit, and lobbying activities. The goal is to identify (i) the way by which transparency policy has been embedded in the domestic agenda of state reform and evolved over time and (ii) the processes and mechanisms through which transparency policy is currently formulated, implemented and evaluated. The findings of the analysis show that the focus of the transparency policy has shifted over time and has included a wide range of both symbolic and pragmatic initiatives, such as citizen empowerment and participation (1980s), control of public administration (1990s-2000s), open/ digital governance and open data (2000s), anti-corruption (2010s) and public sector digitalization (2020s). In this respect, the term “transparency” seems to have embraced a wide variety of concerns, objectives, procedures, and institutions. Like other policy domains, the fragmentation of the legislative framework and competent institutions has been a constant feature of the domestic transparency policies, which has hampered policy coherence and co-ordination over time. Accordingly, the formulation, implementation and monitoring of the transparency policy implicates multiple actors across central government together with the growing influence of external experts during the past years. Τhe role of civil society and citizen participation in transparency policy remain weak. Recently, an effort has been put forth to centralize control mechanisms and interconnect existing platforms in order to alleviate the observed weaknesses. Yet, beyond the institutional and technical improvements, the role of transparency for democracy and accountability remains in question and needs to be brought back into the debate.
Topic:: Corruption, Citizenship, and Transparency
Political Geography:: Europe and Greece

247. Rethinking EU economic governance: The foundation for an inclusive, green and digital transition

Author:: Francesco De Angelis, Laura Rayner, and Frederico Mollet
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: The European Union is undertaking a comprehensive review of its economic governance framework, to address longstanding criticisms, respond to the impact of COVID-19, and prepare for the challenges posed by the twin green and digital transitions. This Discussion Paper represents the final instalment of an EPC Task Force series that examined the current approach and proposes 10 concrete policy recommendations to make EU economic governance stronger, greener and fairer: Establish a central investment capacity for green and digital investments (including associated social investments) or, alternatively, a golden rule modelled on the governance of the Recovery and Resilience Facility. Introduce a single net expenditure rule with a country-specific debt target based on nationally designed expenditure and debt plans to enhance political ownership. Shift to a multiannual supervision and assessment framework and introduce fixed medium-term budgetary plans, with a control account tracking deviations. Reform the sanctions regime to increase proportionality, perceived fairness and political enforceability. Differentiate country-specific supervision based on a clear risk threshold. Introduce ‘National Reform and Investment Plans’ modelled on the National Recovery and Resilience Plans, using a commitments-based approach to operationalise social, fiscal, macroeconomic and structural country-specific recommendations. The plans’ components with strong links to fiscal sustainability should govern the use of Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) flexibilities. Reform the Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCPs) to focus more on the investment composition of national fiscal plans and their link to broader policy objectives. Introduce an opinion on the individual and joint impact of the SCPs on imbalances into the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure to strengthen its link with the SGP. Introduce new processes into the European Semester to assess non-macroeconomic structural risks, such as climate and environmental risks. Build on the success of the temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) programme to create insurance-based mechanisms to support national fiscal policy during downturns.
Topic:: Economics, Governance, European Union, and Digital Transition
Political Geography:: Europe

248. The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement after Ukraine’s EU membership application: Still fit for purpose

Author:: Guillaume Van der Loo and Peter Van Elsuwege
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: In an extraordinary session of the European Parliament on 1 March 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky requested from a bunker in Kyiv, while Russian missiles bombarded Ukraine, the EU to give the war-ravaged country a clear path towards EU membership. The day before, Ukraine had submitted its official application to the EU, followed shortly by Georgia and Moldova. The European Parliament already supported Ukraine’s membership application and called on the EU institutions to work towards granting Ukraine EU candidate status, in line with Article 49 TEU. Offering such a status would be a historic token of support for Ukraine in its self-defence against Russian military aggression. The Versailles declaration, adopted by the heads of state or government of the EU member states on 10 and 11 March, acknowledges that Ukraine belongs to the ‘European family’ without explicitly mentioning the country’s candidate status. Nevertheless, the Council already invited the European Commission to submit its opinion in accordance with Article 49 TEU. Despite this support for – and recognition of – Ukraine’s application, the road to EU membership remains a long one. Several member states have concerns about Ukraine’s readiness and eligibility for the pre-accession process, the EU’s absorption capacity, and the geopolitical consequences of the Union’s further eastward enlargement. Moreover, the economic consequences of the war will also complicate Ukraine’s concrete progress in its accession process. With Russian tanks and missiles still on Ukrainian soil, discussing actual membership is arguably premature. This may create unrealistic expectations and lead to frustrations in the applicant countries. It will therefore be important to remain clear and transparent about the EU accession procedure and offer concrete and credible incentives for reform and gradual integration in the Union throughout the long and winding pre-accession procedure. Paired with an unprecedented assistance package and new forms of sectoral integration in key EU policies (e.g. the twin green and digital transitions), the current EU–Ukraine Association Agreement remains the most appropriate instrument to develop this bilateral relationship further. The dynamic nature of the agreement, combined with its open-ended accession perspective, implies that both the EU and Ukraine can reorient it to new and more ambitious forms of political association and economic integration and accommodate it to a pre-accession context on the basis of a staged approach.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

249. War has returned to Europe: Three reasons why the EU did not see it coming

Author:: Corina Stratulat
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: Before 24 February, Europe decidedly defined itself as 'post-war'. But since Putin's full-scale, cold-blooded invasion of Ukraine, war again defines the Union's reality. Damage control is the main priority now — but knee-jerk reactions and moral outrage do not amount to a strategy, argues Corina Stratulat. To create a future that stops perpetuating the past, the Union and its member states must also start to critically contemplate how they got into the current predicament and change course. Three lessons stand out: First, since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, overconfidence in its own allure and model has skewed the EU's perspective of itself and the rest of the world. While freedom, pluralism and liberal democracy remain attractive, liberal expectations that the Union would be able to convert even its immediate neighbourhood – let alone the world – to its image have proven illusory. Despite almost two decades of European integration, democratic performance has still not acquired a positive dynamic in the Balkans. And yet the membership card has now been confidently and imprudently put on the table for Ukraine and other eastern countries, posing as a solution to the current crisis. Without practising humility, the EU stands to persevere in its confirmation biases and continue to evade learning. Second, the EU's unrealistic aspirations to global hegemony have long been concealing a policy of double standards both at 'home' and abroad, piling up accusations of hypocrisy. While the EU was pretending to be a shining example of liberal democracy, several member states have taken full pages from Putin's autocratic playbook or put their own interests ahead of the Union's 'sacred' democratic values — faults easily exploited by illiberal actors, like Putin. Dressing up the EU's foreign policy ambitions as efforts to revive global democracy will remain a hypocrisy trap, including in Ukraine now. Third, a misplaced acceptance of the status quo has prevented the EU from getting to the bottom of the many crises it has been grappling with for decades. But the Union cannot wish away systemic risks or escape the fact that dealing with today's enormous challenges will require deep and brave reforms across the board. The stresses of cumulative crises, crowned now by the ongoing war, give the Union a chance to plan the future. The choices that the EU will make in the coming years will determine what the Union truly values and whether it will be able to preserve its own way of life. If the EU is keen to maintain the normative power of its liberal values in an increasingly illiberal environment, it should obsessively focus on making liberalism its sign of distinction from the outside world, not a model to transform others. The Union has to learn to live by example and will have to work hard to become exemplary.
Topic:: European Union, Norms, Russia-Ukraine War, and Illiberalism
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

250. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: Unity is good, but ambition is better

Author:: Sophie Pornschlegel and Ilke Toygür
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: In view of the volatile geopolitical environment, EU leaders no longer have the luxury of waiting for all 27 member states to find a consensus. In order to lead the way to a Union that is apt for future challenges, the EU should become more ambitious and embrace alternatives, such as differentiated integration, in the coming months and years. Rather than returning to the status quo ante, the EU should use this momentum to progress in five policy fields: economic governance, with a new recovery package and a reform of the fiscal rules; security and defence, with improved EU–NATO cooperation and a stronger ‘European pillar’; energy policy, by quickly steering member states away from dependence on Russian fossil fuels while simultaneously ensuring admissible energy prices for consumers and respecting the climate targets; enlargement and neighbourhood policy, by rethinking its aims and creating options for countries that are unlikely to become EU members in the foreseeable future; and the rule of law, to safeguard the Union’s values ‘at home’. Both the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion revealed that the EU institutions and leaders are capable of managing crises swiftly and decisively. This reality certainly increases its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens as well as its allies. The European Union could use this moment of change to increase its ambition for reforms and for moving European integration forward. This should encourage leaders to think about all the options for designing the Union’s future. This is not a time for black and white thinking – Treaty change or nothing –, but rather a time to explore all the shades of grey for securing necessary reforms. If like-minded countries could lead the way, others may also follow. The changing and evolving positions in the EU could help secure more inclusive alliances for moving forward. The political momentum to do so is finally here.
Topic:: Security, Energy Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, Rule of Law, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

251. The von der Leyen European Commission at midterm: Same priorities, different reality

Author:: Corina Stratulat, Annika Hedberg, Stefan Sipka, Janis Emmanouilidis, and Johannas Greubel
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: At the halfway point of the von der Leyen Commission’s term, and amid a tumultuous context, the EPC has conducted a thorough and broad analysis of its successes and failures so far. How have the pandemic and the war affected President von der Leyen’s initial promises? What are the key imperatives ahead? How can von der Leyen make the most of the remainder of her mandate to help the EU advance in this new era (Zeitenwende)? EPC analysts from across all programmes compare and contrast the initial 6 policy priorities against their actual delivery and provide recommendations for the second half of the Commission’s term.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Migration, European Union, Democracy, Digital Policy, Green Deal, and European Commission
Political Geography:: Europe

252. Post-Brexit EU–UK cooperation on migration and asylum: How to live apart, together

Author:: Alberto-Horst Neidhardt
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: The UK’s withdrawal from the EU has created a policy, legal and operational vacuum in migration and asylum matters which undermines the interests of both sides. There is no more binding framework which defines responsibility for asylum seekers and facilitates transfers between the EU and the UK. Brexit also made it harder to devise and implement effective anti-smuggling strategies with European partners. Despite these gaps, a post-Brexit cooperation agreement is not on the horizon, with structural reforms pursued by each side reflecting conflicting priorities and a growing political disconnect. Following the 2020 proposals of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, EU member states are still negotiating a mandatory responsibility-sharing mechanism. Meanwhile, in April 2022, the UK overhauled its asylum and immigration law, undercutting safeguards for asylum seekers reaching the country irregularly. The same month, the UK government signed a deal with Rwanda to deport all asylum seekers arriving via the Channel – a move even the European Commission has criticised. Recent post-Brexit tensions over other policy areas, most prominently the Northern Ireland Protocol, have reduced mutual trust to a historic minimum. This makes an ambitious and comprehensive agreement over asylum and migration matters an unlikely prospect for the time being. Yet, as neighbours, the EU and the UK will continue to depend on each other to pursue their respective policy objectives in migration and asylum. So, despite living separately and facing numerous unresolved tensions, the EU and the UK can and should pursue a post-Brexit cooperation framework in these matters. Otherwise, they will both be worse off. As a first step, the two sides should focus on rebuilding trust. This can be achieved by pursuing less contentious goals within immediate reach, such as enhanced anti-smuggling efforts, while also diffusing political tensions across the board. Once an atmosphere of sincere cooperation is restored, as a second step, the EU and the UK should define a broader and more ambitious partnership. Safe and legal channels from the EU to the UK should be re-established. At the same time, equitable solutions for facilitating the return of third-country nationals from the UK to the EU, in full respect of procedural safeguards, should also be found. Although reciprocity would have to be at the heart of this new arrangement, the EU and the UK should go beyond a transactional approach, particularly by strengthening protection pathways and burden-sharing solutions, including with third countries, in line with their international commitments. The European Commission should take the lead in the negotiation of a post-Brexit EU–UK cooperation framework. This would allow the EU to speak with one voice and pursue clear and coherent objectives across the different policy areas concerned. The newly established EU–UK Parliamentary Partnership Assembly should also be involved in the negotiations, helping to democratise the process and achieve a more balanced relationship in the interests of both sides.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Migration, European Union, Brexit, and Asylum
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

253. Europe’s moment of truth: United by adversity?

Author:: Fabian Zuleeg and Janis Emmanouilidis
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: Inaction is not an option for the Union. It must demonstrate both unity and ambition along a concrete reform path, specifically across 10 strategic areas. The EU27 must decide whether the integration project can once again become a success story – this time in reaction to the watershed moment we are experiencing. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a major transgression against, and tragedy for, a sovereign country and its people wanting to determine their own future. There is no justification for this war of aggression and the war crimes that Russian troops have already carried out – all driven by revisionist ideology and the neo-imperial ambitions of President Putin and his supporters.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Regional Integration, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

254. Achieving the full potential of sustainable finance: The role of national, European and international initiatives

Author:: Eva De Francesco
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: When signing the 2016 Paris Agreement, a legally binding international treaty on climate change, world leaders agreed to pursue the ambitious goals of achieving climate neutrality and mitigating the effects of climate change. Almost every country around the globe recognised that business-as-usual is not an option if we are to save the planet and human existence. As a result of this realisation and commitment, different green measures are being taken globally, regionally, locally; at all levels of societies; and in the public and private sectors. Redirecting capital flows toward a green economy is an important part of measures to take, so it is no surprise that there is a growing interest in using environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) factors as guidance points for both public and private investors. However, there is still much to be done to ensure not just sufficient investment volumes but also that investments labelled as ‘sustainable’ do, in fact, contribute to climate action objectives. In order to realise ESG markets’ full potential in supporting the global transition towards a climate-neutral economy, further effort is especially needed in the following three areas: Policymakers at all levels must urgently address greenwashing and the lack of transparent and comparable ESG data. In the context of sustainability reporting, double materiality approaches are better suited to address the urgency of climate change. Policymakers at all levels must ensure the interoperability and alignment of the rapidly evolving sustainability reporting initiatives.
Topic:: Climate Change, Finance, Sustainability, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: Europe

255. Managing the energy and food crises: Exceptional times call for exceptional measures

Author:: Annika Hedberg
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: The Russian war on Ukraine is an unprecedented test for the EU and its leaders. On top of the security, humanitarian and refugee crises, they must manage its impact on our economy and energy and food systems. With prices soaring and supply chains disrupted, they must respond to the cost-of-living crisis. Exceptional times call for exceptional measures, including in how we produce and consume energy and food. This Discussion Paper identifies priorities for action to prevent the energy and food crises from spiralling out of control and to enhance European resilience, sustainability and prosperity.
Topic:: European Union, Crisis Management, Energy Crisis, Food Crisis, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

256. The beginning of the European Political Community

Author:: Corina Stratulat
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: The European Political Community (EPoC) idea was floated by President Macron back in May to encourage dialogue and cooperation among like-minded EU and non-EU countries on matters of common interest. It will be formally launched in the margins of the upcoming informal European Council summit in Prague, organised by the Czech EU Presidency. With the meeting just days away, the EU is under growing pressure to give some substance to Macron’s bold initiative. For the EPoC to set in motion a positive dynamic for the Union in the unfolding Zeitenwende, participating governments and leaders must take their preparations for the summit seriously. This Discussion Paper lays out short, but concrete checklists for all the essential players: Prague should organise bilateral consultations with the different invitees and collect ideas ahead of the summit. The agenda of this initial EPoC meeting should only include a limited number of substantive issues that reflect common concerns in the new geopolitical context transformed by Russia’s war in Ukraine. The organisers should also ensure that participants reserve time to discuss how the new format will run its affairs in the future. The details of the EPoC’s operational and governing structure will depend on the level of ambition that the initial participants will choose for the initiative. Establishing a community for dialogue and coordination among partners who might have diverging views and interests but also share security and economic concerns is in itself a valuable rationale for the initiative. And yet the EPoC should aspire to become more than ‘just’ a geopolitical forum for high-level dialogue. Current and potential new members in the future should aim to work in small or broad formations to align their positions in response to challenges that demand joint international action, like the energy crisis, the looming global recession and growing inequality, climate change, shifting demographics, and destabilising technological trends. EU leaders should be careful not to turn geography or democratic credentials into exclusion criteria for participants. A more legitimate and effective approach would be for the EU to rhetorically decouple its efforts to contain authoritarian Russia and rethink Europe’s role in the new global order from its desire to defend democracy and serve justice – or risk looking hypocritical in the process. Nor should EU leaders use the initiative as an excuse not to deal with internal EU reform or deliver on enlargement. Mustering the courage to embark on a European Convention that might lead to Treaty change would not only help the cause of EU hopefuls – especially if it deals with the Union’s absorption capacity, unanimity principle and lack of democratic acquis – it would also strengthen the credibility of the EU’s efforts to encourage political coordination beyond its borders. That being said, nothing stops the Balkan countries, together with Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, from using their leverage in the EPoC format to negotiate in the margins of this and future EPoC meetings their progress in the accession process.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Politics, European Union, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: Europe

257. EU responses to Ukrainian arrivals – not (yet) a blueprint

Author:: Marie De Somer and Alberto-Horst Neidhardt
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: In her recent State of the Union speech, European Commission President von der Leyen stressed that the EU’s welcome responses to Ukrainians fleeing war should not be the exception but rather be used as a “blueprint” for the future. Applying lessons from this response to Ukrainian arrivals to inform decision-making around other groups of refugees would undoubtedly benefit EU decision-making processes in this area and, more importantly, strengthen the protection standards provided. But how much scope is there for doing so? And what is politically realistic? This paper argues that overly optimistic projections are, for the time being, misdirected. We review the discussions surrounding the activation of the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) and highlight how, despite the generally positive response, previous political sticking points have re-emerged in the process. We also consider the bigger-picture, long-term implications of activating the TPD. In this context, we consider several potentially positive impacts, including increased trust and a sense of reinvigoration around migration files. Even there, however, initial discussions within the EU institutions would suggest that longstanding national positions, particularly around secondary movements, remain entrenched.
Topic:: European Union, Refugees, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

258. Keeping a cool head: How to improve the EU migration crisis response

Author:: Helena Hahn
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: One of the critical lessons learned from the 2015/16 migration crisis was that the EU’s crisis response suffered from lacking coordination. Instead of seeming prepared, it appeared to be ‘muddling through’, which resulted in ad hoc and reactive measures. Now, six years later, Europe has seen a rapid succession of migration and humanitarian crises in Afghanistan, Belarus, and Ukraine, evoking memories of the challenges the EU and its member states faced in responding to the events of 2015/16. This Discussion Paper explores whether any lessons have been learned in terms of crisis coordination since that time – and if so, which ones. Crucially, it also engages with questions around how much flexibility versus consolidation of crisis structures and processes will be needed to strengthen EU crisis responses in the future. There has been some cause for optimism in the past year. Between successful coordination efforts within the Solidarity Platform, established in response to arrivals from Ukraine, as well as increased international engagement and alliance-building, notably with the United States and Canada, there are several good practices to draw on. Even so, these sorts of flexible and targeted coordination efforts should be complemented with further consolidation. Given that each migration crisis differs from the next, there will never be one single coordinating mechanism or entity. Yet, the EU should consider pooling and streamlining information around (potential) displacement crises at a designated ‘crisis hub’. Importantly, more meaningful and constructive collaboration between the EU, member states, international organizations, partner countries, and affected countries is also needed. For this, the EU should consider replicating or continuing successful coordination mechanisms beyond the crisis moment, such as the Solidarity Platform, while ensuring a more proactive deactivation of purely crisis mechanisms. Internationally, the EU should continue building its engagement around migration and asylum issues. This would serve not only to foster longer-term exchange and crisis learning across boundaries (e.g., transatlantic exchanges on lessons learned and the way forward). It would also strengthen the EU’s global convening power and leadership at a time when migration crises are becoming increasingly complex and overlapping and therefore in need of joint efforts.
Topic:: Migration, European Union, Refugees, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Europe

259. A new generation of European Citizens’ Panels – Making citizens’ voices a regular part of policymaking

Author:: Johannas Greubel
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: As a first concrete follow-up to the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE), beginning as of next year, the European Commission plans to make European Citizens' Panels (ECPs) a regular form of consultation ahead of key legislative proposals. Von der Leyen’s initiative to involve citizens in policy development is a substantial and positive innovation for EU law making and democracy. It not only answers citizens’ calls expressed in the CoFoE exercise. The measure will also give a boost to EU democracy and has the potential to mitigate shortcomings in the existing institutional consultation process. Yet, to make a difference, these Panels should be integrated into the current policymaking cycle by becoming part of the Commission's better regulation toolbox. This paper makes concrete recommendations on how this could be done by answering these three questions: When in the process and to what end? First, to make a difference, the Panels need to take place as early as possible in the development of a policy. Second, they must be consulted in a way that keeps the process as streamlined and effective as possible. The ideal way to reach these goals is to establish the ECPs as an additional consultation tool that the Commission can activate in addition to the public consultation carried out. The Panels would become an integral part of the institution's stakeholder consultation toolbox. When is a proposal ‘key’? First, the proposal must be a flagship proposal that is essential for one of the central priorities anchored in the Commission’s political guidelines. Second, as the Panel is supposed to complement the existing public consultation procedure, the proposal must be a legislative initiative with an Impact Assessment – thus also involving a public consultation – in which citizens are a crucial stakeholder group, primarily and directly affected by the policy. What is the follow-up? Citizens’ recommendations should directly feed into the Commission’s Impact Assessment of the respective measure and be annexed to it so that the co-legislators can take citizens’ recommendations into account at a later stage. If lawmakers follow these, the new generation of ECPs could improve the quality of legislative proposals from the Commission. Conversely, they risk becoming a fig leaf exercise, without any impact on the legislative initiative it accompanies. In this context, the Commission should use the upcoming ECP on food waste as a pilot Panel, as a steppingstone towards embedding ECPs fully in the EU’s decision-making.
Topic:: Public Opinion, European Union, Citizenship, European Commission, and Policymaking
Political Geography:: Europe

260. Strengthening the impact of EU sanctions against Russian aggression in Ukraine

Author:: Svitlana Taran
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: As Russia’s largest trade and economic partner, the European Union (EU) has significant leverage to expand the current sanctions regime. Yet, EU countries continue to rely heavily on Russia for their energy, raw materials, and agricultural fertilisers. This dependency reduces the EU’s economic resilience and exposes it to supply chain disruptions. Much more should be done to turn the tide on this dependency. The EU has so far adopted eight sanction packages against Russia, which already impacted the country’s economy. However, these restrictions will have an even greater impact when all sanctions are in full effect, and Western supply chains reduce their reliance on Russian products. This Discussion Paper identifies five measures the EU can take to increase the impact of sanctions against Russia and end the war as soon as possible. Extending the scope of sanctions on Russian export revenues: A large part of Russian trade flow remains unsanctioned. Russia is receiving record revenues from energy exports due to rising prices. Even though Russia’s exports are likely to drop significantly after the implementation of the EU oil embargo, the impact of sanctions can be further increased. By expanding their scope to other sectors, such as the diamond industry, and placing embargoes on all iron and steel supplies, the EU can significantly impact Russia’s economy. Expanding and aligning export restrictions among the coalition countries: Many exports from the EU to Russia are not restricted. Sanctions should first target products that Moscow would find difficult to replace. EU and coalition partners (such as G7 members and other allies) should align their sanctions regimes to make it harder for Russia to redirect its trade to other markets and substitute its critical imports. Encouraging more company-level self-sanctions: Voluntary restrictions by companies can have a greater impact on Russian trade and investment flows than compulsory country-level sanctions. Self-sanctions by international companies should be encouraged in sectors unaffected by country-level sanctions, with public pressure serving as an effective catalyst for their trade and investment withdrawal from Russia. Preventing sanctions circumvention: Loopholes in the current sanction regime should be addressed. Sanctioning countries should take stronger enforcement actions, among others, against countries and foreign companies that facilitate sanctions evasion. The EU must work more closely with its allies to monitor and enforce the imposed sanctions. Prolonging renewal periods for economic sanctions: The current six-month period for renewing sanctions against Russia could lead to calls for lifting them, threatening EU unity. To avoid this and increase the sanctions’ impact, the EU should consider prolonging their renewal period until Russian troops leave the Ukrainian territory. Russia’s war of aggression has caused disastrous economic effects and devastating infrastructure damage to Ukraine. EU and Western sanctions against Russia should reflect the extent and consequences of these actions. Closing loopholes and widening the scope of sanctions must be a priority for the EU and its allies to strengthen their impact and curtail Russia’s capacity to continue its war. At the same time, existing possibilities for replacing Russian products with Ukrainian ones should be exploited. While maintaining EU unity over sanctions is a challenge, staying united will be crucial for sustaining the credibility of EU policies, accelerating the end of the war, and securing long-term peace in Europe.
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Economy, Exports, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

261. Overcoming the ambition-unity dilemma

Author:: Fabian Zuleeg and Janis Emmanouilidis
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has triggered a watershed moment for the European Union. To deal with the challenges in this new era, the EU must adapt its decision-making processes to the new circumstances, in particular regarding the unanimity requirement in key policy areas profoundly affected by the Zeitenwende, including foreign and security policy, the EU budget, as well as enlargement. While unity among member states is politically important, it makes it harder to take ambitious decisions quickly. This Discussion Paper by Fabian Zuleeg and Janis A. Emmanouilidis provides two concrete proposals to address this ambition-unity dilemma and improve the EU’s decision-making capacity in times of crisis. The EU should introduce a super-qualified majority in the (European) Council. If that is not possible, it should consider recourse to action outside the EU treaty framework via an ´intergovernmental avantgarde´. Unless the Union finds ways to upgrade its decision-making processes, ambition will suffer, and the EU will not be able to defend its values and protect its interests in Europe and beyond.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

262. What should the EU do about Hungary’s illiberal turn?

Author:: Perle Petit
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: Since 2010, Hungary’s government has followed a clear and deliberate trajectory away from EU democratic principles, turning the country into the first illiberal state in the Union. Before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Hungary’s illiberal turn remained relatively self-contained at the national level. Since the start of the war, however, this illiberalism has spread to the international arena, dramatically impeding EU institutional decision-making processes. Despite the urgency of the matter, the EU’s failure to address the country’s democratic decline has been evident. The EU institutions need to address the national and international impact of Hungary's flouting of democratic norms by proposing both short- and long-term solutions. To do so, the institutions should take the following actions: The EU Commission should stand fully behind the triggering of the rule of law conditionality mechanism against Hungary and insist that the country implements all proposed remedial measures in a legislatively binding way. A periodic review system must be put in place to avoid any reversal of these measures or manipulation of independent public bodies in the coming years. The rule of law conditionality mechanism should be triggered against other infringing countries, to demonstrate a zero-tolerance approach to democratic backsliding. The suspension of EU funds should be harmonised across different funding schemes. In this way, the Commission can avoid becoming compromised by disconnected conditionality mechanisms. Increased capabilities and powers should be conferred to independent EU organisations, such as the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. These should review the strength of democratic institutions in backsliding countries and provide recommendations for reform. The institutions should look into the regional disbursement of EU budgets, bypassing central governments to allocate funds on a regional basis. The Council should consider replacing the unanimity rule with qualified majority voting to render EU decision-making processes more effective and to prevent single member states from holding EU decisions ‘hostage’. As Hungary’s leadership shows no signs of changing course, the EU should change tactics to actively preserve and protect democracy within its borders. The EU institutions should use the full toolbox at their disposal to halt Hungary’s illiberal turn, restore the independence of democratic institutions, and take long-term steps to prevent any further backsliding within the Union.
Topic:: European Union, Rule of Law, European Commission, Illiberalism, and Viktor Orbán
Political Geography:: Europe and Hungary

263. Bringing child immigration detention to an end: The case of EU return procedures

Author:: Anastasia Karatzas
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: The harmful consequences of child immigration detention are, by now, increasingly well-documented. Evidence attests to the long-lasting and negative impact of the practice on children’s health, well-being and development, and has given rise to an international consensus firmly against its continued use. However, the European Union’s policies fail to reflect any such agreement, which is evident not least in the context of the Return Directive and member states’ continued use of the practice. As it stands, the detention of minors is permitted by the Directive and remains a plausible option both according to the European Commission’s proposal to recast it and the Council of the EU’s position on the matter. Furthermore, although the Directive mandates member states to explore all plausible alternatives and use child immigration detention only as a measure of last resort, evidence suggests that detention is prolific and other measures underused. In the recast proposal, little looks set to change on this front either, with the use of alternatives having fallen mostly by the wayside. In this context, this paper argues that, with negotiations on the file ongoing, the time for the EU to shift gears, ban the practice, and mandate member states to implement alternatives is now opportune.
Topic:: Immigration, Children, European Union, and Detention
Political Geography:: Europe

264. Applying an intergenerational mindset to European technology investments

Author:: Fabian Zuleeg
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and the upcoming winter of discontent have accelerated the permacrisis, with serious consequences, not just in the short term, but also for Europe’s future. If the EU proves unable to work together and address today’s strategic challenges, member states risk leaving future generations with a Europe that is economically, politically, and socially fragmented and constrained. But this is not the moment for defeatism. Rather, the EU should adopt an intergenerational approach across all policy areas, asking: how will our reactions to today’s severe challenges affect future generations? This should include a common investment strategy: to counter our common societal challenges and crises, the EU should invest in technology and education, increasing Europe’s human and intellectual capital. However, despite technology’s prominence in the EU political agenda, the Union still struggles to make decisive steps to achieve global leadership in many areas. This Discussion Paper argues that the EU should have access to and control over new technologies to guarantee that these “public goods” are, at least in part, in common ownership. Taking equity stakes in technology should be at the heart of the European Sovereignty Fund, announced by Ursula von der Leyen in her 2022 State of the Union speech. Additionally, member states should work together to create a better environment for future private investment by harnessing the power of the Single Market and completing the Capital Markets Union. By adopting this intergenerational mindset, the EU can start the process of building technological wealth which will be accessible to everyone and help tackle Europe’s fundamental challenges. This new investment strategy will offer hope and ensure that the EU can provide peace, prosperity, and sustainability for the current and, more importantly, future generations.
Topic:: Education, Science and Technology, European Union, Investment, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

265. Parliamentary oversight of the police and the EU accession process – a missing link in the fundamentals-first approach

Author:: Marija Ignjatijevic
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: BCSP Researcher Marija Ignjatijević analyses parliamentary oversight of the police in Serbia through the lens of the European integration process and offers recommendations on how to connect it to the negotiating Chapter 24 – Justice, Freedom and Security. Parliamentary oversight of police work represents a critical measure in strengthening the integrity and operational independence of the police. At the same time, these features of the police work are crucial in attaining benchmarks for negotiating Chapter 24 in Serbia’s EU accession process. Along with judiciary, functional and democratically governed police is a prerequisite for the rule of law and other fundamental principles of the EU accession process. Chapter 24 occupies an even more important position within the revised methodology for accession negotiations, since benchmarks in the Cluster 1 (Fundamentals) are a precondition for advancements in all the other clusters. In the Justice, Freedom, and Security field (Chapter 24), the National Assembly plays an important role, foremost by passing and amending the laws through which domestic legislation harmonizes with the regulations of the European Union. The action plan for the Chapter 24 recognizes the role of the National Assembly in achieving benchmarks in this area, most often precisely through changes in the normative framework, i.e. adoption of new or changes to old legal regulations and confirmation of international agreements. However, the role of the National Assembly should be more significant in practice, although this cannot be precisely expressed through technical measures and activities. Defining obligations in the Action Plan might even produce a counter effect and further boost the “tick the box” approach, with the National Assembly captured by the ruling party proficient in simulating its democratic features. The primarily technical action plan cannot bind the National Assembly to effectively oversee the police since the problem is political – there is a lack of political will to control the security sector, the level of democratic culture is low, and the National Assembly is captured by the ruling party. It is, therefore, necessary to explore mechanisms which could make a clear bond between the political criteria which are part of the Fundamentals cluster, such as the functioning democratic institutions, and concrete measures from the action plans, like the ones aimed at strengthening police integrity. Parliamentary oversight of the police is one such connector since it is a vital democratic feature which can boost police integrity and reforms, essential Chapter 24 criteria and prerequisite for other elements of the Fundamentals cluster.
Topic:: Security, Regional Cooperation, Governance, European Union, and Police
Political Geography:: Europe and Serbia

266. Geopolitics is Local – Ramifications of Chinese Projects for Human Security in Serbia

Author:: Maja Bjelos and Vuk Vuksanovic
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: This report examines the Chinese presence in Serbia through a human security lens, in terms of how it impacts the quality of life and the security of local communities. China’s “no-strings attached” financing of infrastructure has become attractive for Serbia’s ruling elite after the global financial crisis of 2008. However, it took Chinese companies almost a decade to take over two state-owned giants – the Smederevo Steel Mill and the RTB Copper Smelter – and invest in the construction of a new tyre factory. To maintain social peace, employment and legitimise themselves among the constituents, the ruling elite invested a lot of effort in facilitating the arrival of Chinese capital. This effort included drafting laws that suited PRC investors, donating arable land and providing subsidies, circumventing environmental and construction standards, turning a blind eye to labour and human rights violations, and making many other concessions at the expense of citizens and the local communities. Lack of transparency and public scrutiny is common to all PRC investments. In a short period of time, the profit-oriented exploitation of natural resources by PRC investors has led to various environmental hazards that have endangered public health and human existence, causing environmental (anti-government) protests and resentment towards the Chinese. But combating environmental threats and rule of law violations associated with the Chinese projects is difficult, especially since the Serbian government is willing to quell criticism and provide such projects with full political backing. The research was conducted in three Serbian cities with large PRC investments – Smederevo, Bor and Zrenjanin – to establish the impact of these projects on local communities and how they affect human security, understood in terms of human rights and human dignity. Several forms of human security endangerment were observed in the course of the research project: environmental hazards, public health, socio-economic and human rights, rule of law, cross-cultural issues and surveillance.
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, and Local
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Serbia

267. Leaving Stabilocracy Behind – Rethinking the French Approach to the Western Balkans

Author:: Luka Steric
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: In this paper, BCSP researcher Luka Steric calls for the U-turn in the French and EU approach to the Western Balkans, calling for the end of support for stabilocracy. The spring elections have resulted in regime continuity in both France and Serbia. President Macron has secured the second term with a convincing victory in the second round against the archrival Marine Le Pen. Simultaneously, President Vucic has stroke another landslide victory in the first round of the elections, with his Progressive Party holding on to power although losing absolute majority in the Parliament for the first time since 2014. However, the political landscape has changed radically since their previous victories five years ago. The war in Ukraine has shifted the focus of the European Union toward geopolitics, pushing the Western Balkans, seemingly forgotten, back on the European agenda. The threats of instability and the rising influence of third powers in the region have rung the alarm in the new global context, opening the floor for the discussion on how to revamp the European strategy which has been largely inadequate for the past decade. In contrast to previous periods in which France had a more passive approach and appeared mostly indifferent to the developments in the Western Balkans, during the first term of Macron’s presidency the official Paris has retaken a major role on the regional stage. As part of his ambition to become the political leader of Europe, Macron has launched several initiatives attempting to modify the European enlargement policy. Based on the consequences of these initiatives, we can conclude that the goal was to stop the enlargement process for a foreseeable future, substituting it with an economic and political presence that would ensure the stability of the region within the European sphere of influence. For this purpose, Macron was more than ready to collaborate with autocratic regimes such as the one in Serbia which he believed to be crucial for keeping the Western Balkans relatively stable. This strategy has contributed to the region steadily becoming both less secure and less democratic, eroding the once unquestionable European credibility and influence. The tectonic shifts we are witnessing on the European continent should be a wake-up call to critically evaluate and rethink the French policy in the Western Balkans, including a U-turn in the relationship with the current regime in Belgrade.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Democracy
Political Geography:: Europe, France, and Balkans

268. Covidocracy in the Election Process – An Analysis of the Pandemic Narrative Serving the State Capture

Author:: Srdan Hercigonja
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: In this analysis, the predominant narratives of the pandemic shall be explored, as well as the ways they have impacted the state capturing process in the period from the second half of 2021 till 3 April 2022, when the general and presidential elections took place in Serbia. The crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic denuded the authoritarian tendencies in Serbia, both in the state and in the society, making visible the size and scope of state capturing. To what extent this process has set in may be best visible by the way the institutions and authorities have made decisions during the pandemic management, as well as by the decision they have taken. It has been 26 months since the first infection case was registered in Serbia and since the two-month long state of emergency was introduced. Ever since, decisions have been taken towards reducing the virus spread, but also disregarding the opinions of experts in this field (epidemiologists, virologists and immunologists). The decisions were made depending on the ruling elite’s political interests. For the first year and a half after the outbreak, the mainstream discourse imposed by the authorities was that the state and the society were at war. All the elements of war discourse were noticeable in the statements of public officials, even experts – there is an enemy out there whom we must beat (the virus), emergency measures like curfew were introduced, the story of doctors like frontline warriors was imposed, and allies were also chosen for this war. The narrative of war like predominant discourse of fighting the pandemic provided legitimacy for the highest officials to take the crucial decisions in countering the pandemic – precisely this enabled the President of the Republic or the Prime Minister to take and communicate the most important decisions regarding this “war”, while experts were placed at the margins of decision-making. Finally, the top officials are competent for declaring victory at war, and the ruling party declared the victory over the pandemic twice, both times on the eve of elections – first time in May 2020, and second in March 2022. However, during the autumn 2021, the narrative of war as the prevalent one during the pandemic was replaced by quiet and silence, the story of the pandemic was pushed to the margins, which was particularly evident in the April 2022 pre-election period.
Topic:: Elections, Democracy, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe and Serbia

269. Pandemic Management – Lessons Learned for a Safer Future

Author:: Milja Dimitrijevic and Rade Panic
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: How the pandemic was managed in Serbia and what are the recommendations for better coping in similar situations in the future, read in the analysis made by BCSP in cooperation with the Union of Doctors and Pharmacists of Serbia. The political and social context in which the pandemic management in Serbia is analysed is marked by a drastic decline in the level of democracy in the country, as well as the strengthening of authoritarian tendencies in the state and society within the process of “capturing the state” by the ruling elite. Unfortunately, Serbia cannot boast of successful results, especially if we take into account the number of deceased citizens, as well as the low level of vaccination compared to European Union countries. The number of deceased citizens in 2021 is as much as 18 percent higher than in the same period in 2020. Statistical data show that in 2021, most people died in Serbia within one year since the end of World War II. These data speak volumes about the results of the crisis management caused by the COVID-19 epidemic in Serbia. In this analysis, the focus is on two aspects of pandemic management – the legal aspects of crisis management and the health system’s readiness to deal with the crisis. The analysis was created within the framework of informal cooperation between the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy and the Union of Doctors and Pharmacists of Serbia. The author of the paper on the legal aspects of pandemic management is a lawyer from the Union of Doctors and Pharmacists Milja Dimitrijević, while the part about the capacities of the health system was written by Dr. Rade Panić, the President of the Union of Doctors and Pharmacists. The analysis was created within the survey that was conducted from October 2021 to March 2022. Precisely because of that, some data in the analysis were presented during the writing of the analysis itself, which were relevant during the research and writing the analysis (for example, when writing about the number of infected citizens, or the number of deceased doctors). Finally, the analysis concludes with certain recommendations necessary to improve the management of the COVID-19 pandemic, but possibly some other pandemics in the future.
Topic:: Governance, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe and Serbia

270. (Absence of) Trust and Security in the Second Year of the Pandemic – Serbian Citizens’ Opinions about the COVID-19 Pandemic

Author:: Maja Bjelos and Srdan Hercigonja
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: What do Serbian citizens think about the COVID-19 pandemic? What are their opinions about vaccination? Do they trust the institutions that were managing the pandemic? We present you an analysis of citizens' attitudes on these topics. The public opinion poll on the management of the COVID-19 pandemic, the process of immunisation of the population and the impact of the pandemic on the work of institutions and the status of democracy was conducted during the relatively calm epidemiological period, just before the big wave in late 2021 and early 2022, when Serbia had a record number of registered citizens newly infected with the Coronavirus. At the same time, the survey was conducted in the period when all adult citizens were offered the so-called booster or the third dose of the vaccine against COVID-19. The observed period was marked by the political and security crisis in Kosovo, so the pandemic was not in the focus of public and political discussion. In the meantime, the gradual calming of the situation regarding the pandemic itself, and primarily the reduction of the number of newly infected and dead, created space for the analysis and assessment of the way the pandemic had been managed.
Topic:: Public Opinion, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe and Serbia

271. Rethinking the Dutch position towards the Western Balkans in the new security environment in Europe

Author:: Arlinda Rrustemi, Luka Steric, and Marko Drajic
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: The main goal of this paper is to present lessons learned, and present policy recommendations regarding the EU integration policy in Western Balkans given the recent events in 2022. In addition, a deeper understanding of the Dutch foreign and security policy is also provided, since the Netherlands has rejected plans for the EU’s further expansion. The year 2022 brought many political, legal, and security changes to Europe. Most importantly, events which had been considered unthinkable for decades have occurred. On February 24th, Russia commenced a fullscale military invasion of Ukraine, conducting attacks that have caused 7,061civilian deaths, while some sources report up 21,000 deaths only in Mariupol, indiscriminate attacks in violation of the laws of war that may amount to war crimes, and more than five million refugees. The European response was unified and timely. A clear willingness to stand by the side of Ukraine has been shown and sanctions are enforced against Russia by all EU member states (MS), while providing aid in various forms. An uptick in polarization, populism and far right sentiment can be observed in Victor Orban’s success in the Hungarian April Elections and in Marine le Pen’s persisting into the second round of the French Presidential election. Not only the right political spectrum is gaining traction but also the left. The Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Janša has been defeated by a left wing party, the Freedom Movement, founded a year ago. In addition, European governments that are key to stability and peace of the Western Balkans region are experiencing drastic political changes. The new German government that succeeded Angela Merkel’s cabinet after one and a half decade is posing new foreign and security policy questions. Macron suggested an end to the enlargement agenda as we know it, proposing the political European community as an alternative. Tensions in terms of hate and acts of violence have been reported in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, raising further questions about the future of the Western Balkans in Europe. War in the continent posed a threat to the credibility and legitimacy of the European project. It questions European values and is an existential threat to the integration process, and European security. Ursula von der Leyen offered a speedy response to Ukraine’s bid to join the European Union, for which Ukraine applied in times of conflict. This is the first time in history that a nation during conflict applies for EU membership. The Ukrainian application and the war have resulted in many uncertainties for Europe. This raises questions surrounding the accession processes of other countries in the Western Balkans region, such as Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. An analysis of the EU integration policy in the Western Balkans region is therefore crucial given the recent events. Progress towards EU integration has varied among countries in the Western Balkans region. The closest to the EU integration are Montenegro and Serbia with many chapters open. North Macedonia and Albania are waiting to start formal negotiations. Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina are farthest removed due to their internally and externally driven fragilities. The main goal of the report is to question the current approach while providing a fresh perspective on the EU’s integration policy, given the recent security and political events. In addition, a deeper understanding of the Dutch foreign and security policy is also provided, since the Netherlands has rejected plans for the EU’s further expansion. The following sections outline Dutch foreign policy, followed by recent political, security and legal developments in the Western Balkans region. The final section outlines lessons learned, and present policy recommendations regarding the EU integration policy in Western Balkans given the recent events in 2022.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Integration
Political Geography:: Europe

272. Resilience to Violent Extremism in Serbia: The Case of Sanjak

Author:: Predrag Petrovic and Marija Ignjatijevic
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: This paper presents the factors enabling the environment for extremism and the resilience factors to violent extremism in the case of Sanjak. Many experts had gloomy forecasts about violent Islamist extremism and terrorism in Serbia. Sanjak – the southwest region in Serbia populated by Muslim majority – was even dubbed Jihadist hotbed, as it was the center for further spreading ultra-conservative Salafism from the neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina into Serbia, and a region where the recruitment of Syrian foreign fighters took place. Among the most influential militant Salafi leaders in Vienna who maintained contacts with ISIS there were individuals from Sanjak. However, despite these forecasts and the presence of both push and pull factors of violent extremism, Sanjak has proved to be very resilient to violent Islamist extremism. Compared to other countries in the Western Balkans, a relatively small number of people from Serbia (49 of them including women and children) joined militant Islamist groups in Syria. Only a few incidents involving militant Salafis and failed terrorist plots happened. People in Sanjak showed both resilience to violent extremism and to the spread of the ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam. In this paper, we first identify the cases of violent extremism and then map and analyze factors that make Sanjak enabling environment for extremism. The second part of the paper is dedicated to understanding key resilience factors to violent extremism showcased in Sanjak. Ethno-nationalism and far-right extremism are only analyzed as possible drivers of Islamist radicalization. This report is based on extensive field research in Belgrade, Novi Pazar, Sjenica, and Tutin between July and September 2021, during which a total of 25 interviews were conducted.
Topic:: Security, Violent Extremism, Violence, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Europe and Serbia

273. Post-Brexit imports, supply chains, and the effect on consumer prices

Author:: Jan David Bakker, Nikhil Datta, Josh de Lyon, Luisa Opitz, and Dilan Yang
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:: This report documents the decrease in imports and shows how the patterns of imports vary across sectors following the UK’s departure from the Single Market and Customs Unit at the end of 2020. The authors, Jan David Bakker, Nikhil Datta, Josh De Lyon, Luisa Opitz, and Dilan Yang, focus on comparisons between imports from the EU and imports from non-EU countries. Some products, such as fats, oils, and waxes, experienced a sizeable decrease in trade volumes with EU countries compared to those of non-EU countries in January 2021. Other products, such as minerals, experienced minimal deviation in imports from the EU versus non-EU. We also document that the timing of import changes varies across products: in some cases, the deviation occurs pre-TCA, and there is some evidence of stockpiling; in other cases, the changes only occur post-TCA, and can be either short term or persistent. The fall in imports from the EU will affect the UK economy through its impact on supply chains. Two-thirds of international trade is in products used as inputs to production. We show that imports from the EU fell for products that are used as inputs to production in many industries in the UK. For some sectors such as agriculture, fishing, and car manufacturing, there is evidence that imported inputs began to be sourced from non-EU countries pre-TCA. For others, including vegetable oil, animal fats, prepared animal feeds, and pharmaceuticals, the adjustments occurred post-TCA. Evidence suggests that increased access to intermediate inputs can boost productivity, so a reversal is likely to cause a fall in productivity. Imports also provide cheaper goods to consumers, as well as a wider variety of choice. Focussing on food products, we show that the drop in imports after Brexit caused an increase in prices. Products that were more heavily reliant on imports from the EU increased in price following the election of Boris Johnson in 2019, pre-TCA and then increased further post-TCA. This report therefore shows that changes in imports of goods from the EU have affected UK firms’ supply chains. Part of this change is driven by the adjustment costs incurred as part of the new trading relationship and is likely to be short term, but another part is likely to reflect a long-term increase in the cost of inputs from the EU, which make up a sizable contribution of total imports. This could have a knock-on effect for consumers who will face higher prices, and for workers whose jobs will be affected by adjustments in the supply chain.
Topic:: European Union, Brexit, Trade, Imports, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

274. Understanding the Cost-Effectiveness of COVID-19 Vaccination in Nigeria

Author:: Helen Dempster, Jennifer Dew, Samuel Huckstep, Martina Castigliono, and Cassandra Zimmer
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Global Development
Abstract:: The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM) calls on countries of destination to both expand regular migration pathways and take steps to increase the development impact of these pathways. Migration can have a positive impact on the economic development of migrants themselves, their families, their countries of origin, and their country of destination, if aspects such as integration, remittances, and skill transfers are prioritized. This paper, produced by the Center for Global Development (CGD) and the UK office of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), outlines lessons for the UK Government to implement if they are to increase the development potential of both their existing and new immigration pathways, particularly in the agriculture, nursing, and green technology sectors
Topic:: Development, Migration, Immigration, and Reform
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

275. Toward a New Youth Brain-drain Paradigm in the Western Balkans

Author:: Marjan Icoski
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Youth brain drain is one of the most worrisome problems for the Western Balkan Six countries (WB6)—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia. The pace and intensity of youth brain drain, rank the WB6 among the top brain drain leaders in the world, with estimations to lose a quarter to half of its skilled and educated young citizens in the forthcoming decades. A situation that cast serious doubts on the democratic and economic progress of WB6, and their prospective membership into the EU. Youth brain drain is a historically rooted topic in the culture and tradition of the WB6, provoking huge sentiments and heated public debates. Due to its sensitivity, it is prone to politicization and misuse by the political parties that did not manage to find a compromise for its full acknowledgment as a separate policy field. Therefore, to date, the policy approach to youth brain drain is declarative and inconsistent, tackled as part of bigger policy areas such as youth employment, education, and diaspora engagement. Although formally, all WB6 countries have policies and institutional mechanisms in place, youth emigration and the desire to leave are constantly on the rise, underlining their limited scope and impact to keep youth home. This paper analyzes the conceptual shortcomings of the current policy approach. In line with the latest trends and tendencies of youth brain drain, it offers fresh policy options for utilization of the potential of the regional youth diaspora as the new WB6 development doctrine. The paper sees the youth diaspora not only as a source of remittances but also as a source of investments, know-how, skills, and connections as per the examples of several EU member states. The paper further announces the necessary paradigm change grounded in the shift of the public narrative and redesign of return and circulation policies through deepening regional cooperation and establishing a new migration deal with the EU under the framework of the WB6 accession processes.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Migration, Brain Drain, and Youth
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and Central Europe

276. How Its War on Ukraine Killed Russia’s Hydrogen Ambitions

Author:: Aliaksei Patonia
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Hydrogen looks like the fuel that can facilitate global decarbonization because it can be used in diverse applications—such as heat and power generation, transport, and manufacturing—without any carbon emissions. But, while many countries (including in Europe) view renewables-based, zero-carbon hydrogen as the ultimate goal in transitioning to a hydrogen economy, today most hydrogen is produced from natural gas. Thus, it is unlikely that the hydrogen transition will happen without relying on this fossil fuel. Russia is the country with the world’s largest natural gas deposits, and it has been exploring ways to adjust its energy sector to the needs of the emerging global hydrogen one. In 2021, it announced the goal of capturing up to 20 percent of the world’s hydrogen market by 2030. This came after all the major importers of Russia’s energy products had developed their hydrogen strategies, and its key energy companies started to explore new opportunities. Having signed memoranda of understanding with some of the world’s major energy companies to jointly develop Russia’s hydrogen export potential, they focused on Europe as the key destination. Some of Asia’s hydrogen pioneers and most promising future importers, such as Japan and South Korea, were also included among Russia’s potential partners. These steps could have resulted in long-lasting and fruitful collaborations generating large profits for Russia, but its ambitions have been jeopardized by its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This has led to Russia losing key political and economic partners in Europe and also in Asia, which—in combination with being the target the toughest sanctions in its history—is likely to cripple its nascent hydrogen sector. Having planned to convert its natural-gas pipelines to transport hydrogen to future buyers in Europe, Russia is unlikely to be able to use this infrastructure for this purpose anymore. The EU will be an unlikely buyer of Russian hydrogen for the foreseeable future. Turning to Japan and South Korea would not be a success either, since they have joined the sanctions regime against Russia and, like the EU, have been officially labeled as unfriendly by Moscow. This will make the transfer of the technologies critical for the production of low- and zero-carbon hydrogen from the world leaders to a technologically backward Russia very problematic. Europe will also feel long-lasting repercussions of Russia’s war in Ukraine in the energy and hydrogen sectors. With no steady supplies of cheap Russian gas or hydrogen, Europe’s decarbonization efforts and building up its hydrogen industry will be inhibited and require a lot more effort and money. Russia will have to seek alternative markets for its energy commodities and it will seek deals with China, the only country whose energy consumption can rival that of Europe. But, as one of the world’s largest producers of electrolysers and of conventionally manufactured hydrogen, China probably will not need to import Russia’s hydrogen to build up its own hydrogen sector. Possessing critical technologies of its own, it will instead increase imports of Russian primary energy sources (such as natural gas) that it can use for producing hydrogen. The influx of huge volumes of cheap Russian feedstock will speed up China’s transformation from a country with a nascent hydrogen sector into a dominant player on the global hydrogen market. If the EU or the United States—the only two actors comparable to China in economic, technological, and geopolitical strength—do not develop similarly strong hydrogen sectors, Beijing could end up dominating the global energy landscape. To avoid the geopolitical consequences of this and for global balance to be maintained, further cooperation between the EU and the United States will be needed to speed up the creation of strong hydrogen sectors for both.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Business, Trade, Hydrogen, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

277. How the EU Can Defend Media Freedom and Pluralism in Hungary and Poland

Author:: Anna Wójcik
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: In recent years, the European Union has suffered from the erosion of media freedom and pluralism, particularly in Hungary and Poland, where this has been part of a broader decline in democratic standards that has reversed gains made from the transitioning from communism. The main problems include the lack of independence of media regulators; public media being turned into propaganda outlets for the government, characterized by reporting bias and vilifying the opposition; private media capture; the state disproportionately funding government-supporting private media, including through state-controlled companies’ advertising; and creating obstacles for private media independent of government, including through revoking licenses and threatening new taxes. In Poland, the number of strategic lawsuits against public participation against certain media that criticize the government have also greatly increased. The EU has been in the prepared to tackle the issue of breaches of media freedom and pluralism chiefly through a combination of political instruments and new legislation, which may eventually embolden the EU institutions to take legal action. However, it is important to ensure any new legislative initiative will have added value. The EU already has avenues for legal actions to protect media freedom and pluralism in member states.
Topic:: European Union, Media, Freedom of Press, and Pluralism
Political Geography:: Europe, Poland, and Hungary

278. Designing Sanctions: Lessons from EU Restrictive Measures against Belarus

Author:: Yuliya Miadzvetskaya
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The effectiveness and impact of sanctions are predetermined by how they are designed. This paper looks at the different elements in the design of European Union sanctions on Belarus in its different stages, their main pitfalls, and their potential effects on the country and its citizens. Several key elements are important for the design of sanctions: the triggering situation, the type of sanctions, the clarity of objectives and targets, the evidence for listings, and the conditions for review. They are crucial for explaining the mismatch between the objectives of EU sanctions and their limited impact. The gravity of the situation that triggers the introduction of sanctions is closely linked to the type of restrictive measures that will be chosen by the EU. Threats to EU and regional security as well as to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of its neighbors result in more complex measures, including sectoral economic sanctions, export restrictions, and flight bans. In the case of Belarus, broader economic measures were enacted in response to growing security threats to the EU and its partners. An analysis of EU sanctions on Belarus, including their cyclical nature, suggests that they have been most effective when their objective is limited and achievable. The release of political prisoners, cosmetic reforms to the Electoral Code, and the partial solution of the migration crisis are the most obvious examples of concessions that were made by the Belarusian authorities following the imposition of sanctions. Overly ambitious sanctions objectives limit the EU’s room for maneuver and bargaining. Bringing to justice those responsible for forced disappearances and human-rights violations or holding new free and fair elections are inacceptable demands for the Belarusian regime because they endanger its survival as it relies on the law-enforcement institutions. The effects of sanctions also depend on whom can be added on sanctions lists. Listing or designation criteria define conditions under which someone can be targeted. Those for Belarus were significantly updated in 2021 and now target those responsible for violations of human rights and election falsification, entities and persons benefitting from the regime, and those responsible for the forced landing of a Ryanair plane, the instrumentalization of the migration crisis, and Belarus’s involvement in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The broadening of the listing criteria increases the sanctioning power of the EU and paves the way for the extension of sanctions listings. The EU enacts sanctions by providing a statement of reasons that must come under the listing criteria and be substantiated with sufficient evidence for each listing. Based on EU sanctions-related case law, sanctions are designed in a way that takes into consideration the due-process rights of targeted individuals and entities. The EU Council has deployed a degree of legal gymnastics in crafting its sanctions on Belarus to increase their traction, notably by using the broad concepts of “support” for and “benefit” from the regime’s actions. Conditions for the review of sanctions are construed as requirements addressed to the targeted state. The fulfillment of these or some variation in the behavior of the target could trigger the partial suspension or the lifting of restrictive measures. Those conditions in EU sanctions against Belarus are sometimes included in EU legal acts and sometimes in other political statements. Clear-cut conditions for reviewing sanctions would help in improving their effects. The paper concludes with suggestions regarding the EU sanctions policy toward Belarus, notably with respect to national bias and to the need for a proper prior impact assessment, realistic objectives, clear communication, and more leverage for the EU.
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Domestic Politics, and Society
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, and Belarus

279. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: Matching Ambition with Reality

Author:: Jonny Hall and Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: This Strategic Update is based on a discussion hosted by LSE IDEAS in July 2022 on NATO’s 2030 Strategic Concept. Participants in the discussion included: General Sir James Everard, Gordon Barrass, General Sir Richard Barrons, Lt Gen Giles Hill, ProfessorChristopher Coker, Dr Luca Tardelli, Marissa Kemp, Tom McKane, and Peter Watkins. This Strategic Update reflects points made during the discussion, but no participant is in any way committed to its specific content, and the views expressed here are attributable solely to the authors. The Strategic Concept is the first since 2010 and was redrafted throughout a fundamentally different geopolitical and security context—following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This Update addresses the Concept’s recognition of necessary strategic realignment, with NATO’s widening in both its defence commitments and geographic focus on China, as well as its ambiguity in regards to practical military strategy, deterrence, and endpoint of the war in Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

280. NATO’s Resilience: The first and last line of defence

Author:: Johnny Hall and Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: Ahead of NATO’s Madrid Summit in June 2022, Hugh Sandeman and Jonny Hall confront the political challenges posed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the alliance’s 2021 Strengthened Resilience Commitment, especially in creating collective standards when resilience remains the responsibility of individual member states. The authors find that resilience is a psychological mindset as well as a material factor, and NATO’s ‘whole-of-society’ approach should be framed within the concept of ‘deterrence by denial’ to potential threats. This Strategic Update is based on a discussion hosted by LSE IDEAS in January 2022 on ‘How can NATO define and develop practical objectives for enhancing the resilience of member states?’ Participants in the discussion were: General Sir James Everard, Dr Tomas Ries, Susan Scholefield, Peter Watkins, Professor Gordon Barrass, General Sir Richard Barrons, Professor Christopher Coker, and Tom McKane. This Strategic Update reflects points made during the discussion, but no participant is in any way committed to its specific content, and the views expressed here are attributable solely to the authors.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

281. The Long Shadow of the Soviet Union: Demystifying Putin’s Rhetoric Towards Ukraine

Author:: Björn Alexander Düben
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: As tensions between Russia and Ukraine reach an almost-tipping point, Björn Alexander Düben analyses the historical and geopolitical rhetoric Putin and his government have deployed against the post-Maidan Ukraine since 2014. Asking, can this be seen as another Russian assertion of dominance in the post-Soviet region, could there be reasons closer to home, or why tensions across the border seem to once again be at a breaking point? From global oil prices to regime consolidation, an analysis into the words of Russia’s elites could unveil what future Europe is steering towards.
Topic:: Geopolitics, History, Conflict, Soviet Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

282. Can Chancellor Scholz Save the West? The New German Government and Global Geopolitics

Author:: Maximilian Terhalle
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: In the wake of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s departure from the German Chancellorship, her successor, Olaf Scholz, inherits a Germany which has been lacking in strategic vision and an acute foreign policy for a considerable amount of time. Maximilian Terhalle asks, can Chancellor Scholz provide this vision for his country, and imbue NATO and the EU with a coherent and unified foreign policy in the face of threats from China, Russia, and a divided ‘West’?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, Olaf Scholz, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Germany

283. On the Design of Effective Sanctions: The Case of Bans on Exports to Russia

Author:: Ricardo Hausmann, Ulrich Schetter, and Muhammad A. Yildirim
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:: We analyze the effects of bans on exports at the level of 5’000 products and show how our results can inform economic sanctions against Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. We begin with characterizing export restrictions imposed by the EU and the US until mid May 2022. We then propose a theoretically-grounded criterion for targeting export bans at the 6-digit HS level. Our results show that the cost to Russia are highly convex in the market share of the sanctioning parties, i.e., there are large benefits from coordinating export bans among a broad coalition of countries. Applying our results to Russia, we find that sanctions imposed by the EU and the US are not systematically related to our arguments once we condition on Russia’s total imports of a product from participating countries. Quantitative evaluations of the export bans show (i) that they are very effective with the welfare loss typically ∼100 times larger for Russia than for the sanctioners. (ii) Improved coordination of the sanctions and targeting sanctions based on our criterion allows to increase the costs to Russia by about 60% with little to no extra cost to the sanctioners. (iii) There is scope for increasing the cost to Russia further by expanding the set of sanctioned products.
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Exports, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

284. Global Supply Chain Pressures, International Trade, and Inflation

Author:: Julian di Giovanni, Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan, Alvaro Silva, and Muhammad A. Yildirim
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:: We study the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on Euro Area inflation and how it compares to the experiences of other countries, such as the United States, over the two-year period 2020-21. Our model-based calibration exercises deliver four key results: 1) Compositional effects – the switch from services to goods consumption – are amplified through global input-output linkages, affecting both trade and inflation. 2) Inflation can be higher under sector-specific labor shortages relative to a scenario with no such supply shocks. 3) Foreign shocks and global supply chain bottlenecks played an outsized role relative to domestic aggregate demand shocks in explaining Euro Area inflation over 2020-21. 4) International trade did not respond to changes in GDP as strongly as it did during the 2008-09 crisis despite strong demand for goods. These lower trade elasticities in part reflect supply chain bottlenecks. These four results imply that policies aimed at stimulating aggregate demand would not have produced as high an inflation as the one observed in the data without the negative sectoral supply shocks.
Topic:: Economy, Inflation, COVID-19, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

285. Cutting Putin’s Energy Rent: ‘Smart Sanctioning’ Russian Oil and Gas

Author:: Ricardo Hausmann, Agata Łoskot-Strachota, Axel Ockenfels, Ulrich Schetter, Simone Tagliapietra, Guntram Wolff, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:: Following the Russian aggression against Ukraine, major sanctions have been imposed by Western countries, most notably with the aim of limiting Russia’s access to hard international currency. However, Russia remains the world’s first exporter of oil and gas, and at current energy prices this provides large hard currency revenues. As the war continues, European governments are under increased pressure to scale-up their energy sanctions, following measures taken by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. This piece argues that given the inelasticity of Russia’s oil and gas supply, for Europe the most efficient way to sanction Russian energy would not be an embargo, but the introduction of an import tariff that can be used flexibly to control the degree of economic pressure on Russia.
Topic:: Economics, Oil, Sanctions, Exports, Currency, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and North America

286. Trade Liberalization, Collective Bargaining and Workers: Wages and Working Conditions

Author:: Bastien Alvarez, Gianluca Orefice, and Farid Toubal
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: Using large scale data on Eastern European workers, we show significant and sizable deteriorations of their wages and working conditions in regions that faced large tariff liberalization and strong erosion of collective bargaining over the process of accession to the European Union. Import tariffs liberalization reduces workers' wages. The deterioration of working conditions is mostly driven by increased labor demand due to the improvement of Eastern countries' international market access. The erosion of collective bargaining worsens wages and working conditions.
Topic:: Labor Issues, Tariffs, Collective Bargaining, and Wages
Political Geography:: Europe and Eastern Europe

287. EU in Search of a WTO-Compatible Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism

Author:: Cecilia Bellora and Lionel Fontagné
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: To meet the targets of the EU’s ”Fit for 55” package, the European Commission proposes to implement a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). The CBAM is firstly intended to avoid carbon leakages, but it also deals with the thorny issue of the compliance by European producers in carbon-intensive industries. In addition, its design, as voted by the European Council on March 15, 2022, questions the compatibility of the CBAM with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. The CBAM puts a price on carbon contained in imported products whose production-related emissions have not been taxed (or not at the same level as in the European Union) by the exporter country, in order to offset the difference in carbon prices at the border. This paper aims to quantify the economic and environmental impacts of different CBAM design choices with the aim of complying with WTO rules. Different from the previous literature, we evaluate the various options with a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring imperfect competition, global value chains, green-house gas emissions and endogenous price of emission quotas. We show that CBAM is effective in reducing carbon leakages. But its design leads to an increase in the price of carbon quotas in the European Emission Trading System (ETS) market. Losses in competitiveness on export markets are expected, also for downstream sectors not covered by the EU ETS nor the CBAM. Eventually, offsetting the difference in carbon prices at the border comes at a cost to the enforcing jurisdiction, suggesting that the CBAM was not designed as a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.
Topic:: Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Carbon Emissions, WTO, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: Europe

288. Second-generation immigrants and native attitudes toward immigrants in Europe

Author:: Oscar Barrera, Isabelle Bensidoun, and Anthony Edo
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: This paper investigates the role played by immigrants and their children in shaping native attitudes toward immigrants in the European Union. By exploiting the 2017 Special Eurobarometer on immigrant integration, we show that countries with a relatively high share of immigrants are more likely to believe that immigrants are a burden on the welfare system and worsen crime. In contrast, native opinions on the impact of immigration on culture and the labor market are unrelated to the presence of immigrants. We also find that the effects of second-generation immigrants on pro-immigrant attitudes toward security and fiscal concerns are positive (as opposed to first-generation immigrants). Finally, we find no impact of the immigrant share on the attitudes of natives supporting far-left or left political parties, while it is the most negative among respondents affiliated with far-right parties.
Topic:: Children, European Union, Immigrants, Ideology, Welfare, and Nativism
Political Geography:: Europe

289. Regional Diffusion of Foreign Demand Shocks Through Trade and Ownership Networks

Author:: Lionel Fontagné and Gianluca Santoni
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: International demand shocks are transmitted within the trade and ownership firms' networks and impact directly or indirectly domestic firm productivity and labor misallocation. Considering manufacturing firms for Italy, Spain and France over the period 2009-2017, we quantify these transmission channels from the global economy to the domestic firms, and within the domestic economy across locations, sectors and firms. We compute in a shift share fashion international demand shock at the district-sector-year level as plausibly exogenous to individual firms. Our results confirm that global shocks are transmitted through trade networks and that this transmission is largely mediated by firms' ownership networks both across and within the borders of the three countries.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Demand, and Productivity
Political Geography:: Europe, France, Spain, and Italy

290. The Heterogenous Effects of Employers’ Concentration on Wages: Better Sorting or Uneven Rent Extracting?

Author:: Axelle Arquie and Julia Bertin
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: We show empirically for France that labor market concentration decreases wages heterogeneously, with the lowest earners being the most vulnerable, and increases local wage inequality within occupations. If concentration allows employers to improve worker selection, both inequality and efficiency gains could materialize. However, based on a simple formalization, we interpret the findings that employer concentration increases within-firm inequality and decreases between-firm inequality as evidence against such a sorting mechanism. We also find evidence that employer concentration does not increase positive assortative matching. The results therefore suggest that concentration increases inequality through the relatively reduced bargaining position of the lowest earners.
Topic:: Labor Issues, Inequality, Labor Market, and Wages
Political Geography:: Europe and France

291. The Usual Suspects: Offender Origin, Media Reporting and Natives’ Attitudes Towards Immigration

Author:: Sekou Keita, Thomas Renault, and Jerome Valette
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: This paper analyses whether the systematic disclosure of criminals’ origins in the press affects natives’ attitudes towards immigration. It takes advantage of the unilateral change in reporting policy announced by the German newspaper Sächsische Zeitung in July, 2016. Combining individual-level panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel from 2014 to 2018 with 402,819 crime-related articles in German newspapers and those newspapers’ market shares, we find that systematically mentioning the origins of criminals increases the relative salience of natives’ criminality and reduces natives’ concerns about immigration, breaking the implicit link between immigration and crime.
Topic:: Media, Immigrants, Discrimination, and Nativism
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

292. Skilled Immigration, Task Allocation and the Innovation of Firms

Author:: Anna Maria Mayda, Gianluca Orefice, and Gianluca Santoni
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: This paper analyses the impact of skilled migrants on the innovation (patenting) activity of French firms between 1995 and 2010, and investigates the underlying mechanism. We present district-level and firm-level estimates and address endogeneity using a modified version of the shift-share instrument. Skilled migrants increase the number of patents at both the district and firm level. Large, high-productivity and capital-intensive firms benefit the most, in terms of innovation activity, from skilled immigrant workers. Importantly, we provide evidence that one channel through which the effect works is task specialization (as in Peri and Sparber, 2009). The arrival of skilled immigrants drives French skilled workers towards language-intensive, managerial tasks while foreign skilled workers specialize in technical, research-oriented tasks. This mechanism manifests itself in the estimated increase in the share of foreign inventors in patenting teams as a consequence of skilled migration. Through this channel, greater innovation is the result of productivity gains from specialization.
Topic:: Business, Immigrants, Innovation, and Skilled Labor
Political Geography:: Europe and France

293. Current Account Balances’ Divergence in the Euro Area: an Appraisal of the Underlying Forces

Author:: Emmanuelle Faure, Carl Grekou, and Valérie Mignon
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: This paper revisits the crucial issue of current account imbalances and focuses on the determinants of their gaps between eurozone Member States. We conduct robust estimations of the current account balances for a panel of ten founding euro area economies and construct a measure that allows us to diagnose why some countries have started to diverge from the eurozone mean in the last two decades. Our findings show evidence of remaining differences in countries’ economic development, meaning that real macroeconomic convergence has failed in the zone. Price and cost competitiveness, as well as fiscal balances, have also participated in this growing macroeconomic divergence. Overall, while the European authorities cannot influence the part of the current account gaps due to demographic factors, the role of fiscal redistribution and investment at the euro area level could help achieve macroeconomic convergence and thus reduce current accounts’ divergence in the zone.
Topic:: Economics, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Eurozone, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: Europe

294. Everything Counts: Building a Control Regime for Nonstrategic Nuclear Warheads in Europe

Author:: Miles A. Pomper, William Alberque, Marshall L. Brown Jr., William M. Moon, and Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:: Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration insisted in arms control talks with Russia that a follow-on agreement to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) should cover all nuclear weapons and that such an agreement should focus on the nuclear warheads themselves. This would represent a significant change from previous agreements, which focused on delivery vehicles, such as missiles. The United States has been particularly interested in potential limits on nonstrategic nuclear warheads (NSNW). Such weapons have never been subject to an arms control agreement. Because Russia possesses an advantage in the number of such weapons, the US Senate has insisted that negotiators include them in a future agreement, making their inclusion necessary if such an accord is to win Senate approval and ultimately be ratified by Washington. In the wake of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine conflict, such demands can only be expected to grow if and when US and Russian negotiators return to the negotiating table.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

295. Russian-Turkish Relations and Implications for U.S. Strategy and Operations

Author:: Hanna Notte and Chen Kane
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:: Russia and Turkey’s complex relationship has significant implications for U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategic interests. The two states cooperate, deconflict, and compete in multiple theatres within Turkey’s extended neighborhood, which straddles United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), and United States European Command (USEUCOM) areas of responsibility (AORs). 1 Their bilateral strategic trade has created mutual dependencies and vulnerabilities across multiple sectors, such as natural gas, nuclear energy, and tourism. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has many implications for the Russia-Turkey relationship. While engaging actively with Russia and stoking fears that its commercial ties with Moscow could serve Russia’s evasion of Western sanctions, Turkey has also provided TB2 Bayraktar drones to Ukraine, invoked the Montreux Convention, and offered itself as a mediator on various operational issues in the Russia-Ukraine war. As a result of these steps, Turkey’s leverage over both Russia and NATO allies has increased since February 2022. From a U.S. perspective, the implications have been mixed as Turkey has translated its increased leverage into foreign policy steps that threaten to undermine U.S. interests and NATO cohesion. Turkey remains of significant importance to the United States in enabling its interests in the three aforementioned AORs, preventing third actors like China and Iran from operating in the “seams,” and generating an enhanced, unified, and credible NATO capability and capacity in response to Russian aggression. It follows that Turkey’s interplay with Russia in its extended neighborhood has far-reaching implications for the United States and NATO. This study aims to shed light on this relationship, its likely trajectory over the coming decade, its implications for U.S. strategic interests, and how the United States and NATO might shape the Russia- Turkey interplay to their advantage.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, North America, and United States of America

296. The African-France Summit and an Overview of its Recommendations Since 1973

Author:: Fabien Sundjo
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:: France’s earliest profit-making involvement in Africa in the business of buying and transporting slaves started in the 17th century when the local Indian population proved unable to work in plantations in America compared to black Africans. France’s interest in Africa reached its zenith in the 19th and early 20th centuries when France acquired a gigantic African empire. Though several reasons could explain the scramble for Africa by France, we present herein the three most important. First, the defeat of France in the 1870 Prussian war in which she lost influence and a reduction in her international ego. Second, the anxiety to implement Colbert’s mercantilist philosophy emphasized that any rising industrial power required to have both the source of raw materials and market extension under her control. Third and finally, as Europeans scrambled for Africa, France feared their traditional enemies could annex a remarkable share of the territory. Hence, from the outset, it was not the financial gains that many thoughts motivated France’s involvement in Africa but politics and national ego. It will only be later that France saw Africa as a cheap source of military manpower that could help balance demographic stagnation in France. This perception will later be reinforced by her experience in the two World wars. In this light, Iliffe (2007) holds that French colonial policy was characterized by the exploitation of rich resources from Africa. In the midst of all these benefits from colonization in Africa, Charles de Gaulle‘s decision to retain influence in Africa after decolonization in 1960 was driven by the need to persist with these benefits under neo-colonization. According to Abdurrahim (2014), in Africa, France uses a realist foreign policy in which states shape their foreign policies based on their national interests. To facilitate the implementation of this realist foreign policy, France will design the Franco-African summit that will cement France’s influence in her former colonies to date. Were France’s policies put in place through the Franco-African summits shaped to benefit France solely? This paper aims to present the Franco-African Summit and carry out a stocktake of France’s commitments through recommendations from the Franco-African Summit.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, and France

297. Taking the road away from Europe – how far could Georgia go (and can it be reversed)?

Author:: Ghia Nodia
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: Earlier this year, as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moldova and Ukraine were granted official EU candidate status… but not Georgia. Instead, Georgia has been left behind on the waiting list, with its application due to be reevaluated by the EU sometime in 2023. Yet Georgia has an extremely pro-European society highly in favour of their country continuing its journey towards closer integration with the EU. So what happened? This CEPS Explainer argues that the ruling Georgian Dream party’s anti-Western rhetoric and democratic backsliding has actually diverted Georgia down a road away from its key Western allies. Until this is rectified, Georgia may be stuck on the waiting list for some time yet. But all hope is not lost – regardless of the government’s current actions and contradictory statements, Georgia’s highly active and pro-European civil society may hold the key in getting their country back on track towards its European future.
Topic:: European Union, Regional Politics, Democratic Backsliding, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Eurasia, and Georgia

298. Understanding Russia’s perception of international agency in the context of the war against Ukraine

Author:: Andrey Makarychev
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has dominated international politics in 2022 and this looks likely to continue for the foreseeable future. But how did we get to this point in the first place? The core argument presented here is that Russian foreign policy agency – the intention and the ability to act as transgressor and challenger to the liberal international order, defined as the space for norms-based multilateralism – played the key role in the full-fledged restart of the war in Ukraine in February 2022. Taking a critical look at the five pillars of Russian agency, this inaugural CEPS Explainer concludes that the current model of Russia’s international agency is a precarious and vulnerable construct that is unlikely to survive the regime currently sat in the Kremlin.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Multilateralism, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

299. Europe’s Area of Maritime Interest in Northeast Asia

Author:: Philip Shetler-Jones
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Participation in the monitoring of UN sanctions on North Korea is Europe’s most prominent operational contribution to Indo-Pacific security, but is also characterised by a fragmented, bilateral approach that contradicts the trajectory of recent European policies that strive for a more meaningful and coordinated investment in this area. A coordinated European presence in the region built around the sanctions monitoring task is within reach, and steps taken to achieve it would dramatically enhance the policy coherence and impact of European action on Northeast Asian security.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, European Union, and Maritime
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, and North Korea

300. Putin vs Monnet: European Resilience, Energy and the Ukraine War

Author:: Nathalie Tocci
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: As the Ukraine war escalates with no end in sight, Europe’s resilience is put to test. Nowhere is this clearer than in the energy sphere, where the crisis first created the perfect timing for Russia’s invasion and then became weaponised against Europe in the broader confrontation with the West. In this confrontation, two interpretations of resilience come to the fore: Vladimir Putin and Jean Monnet’s, with the former emphasising pain endurance and the latter transformation through crisis. The jury is out on whether Putin or Monnet will win the day, and whether and how the European Union will prove and strengthen its resilience. But at the height of this crisis, my bet today is squarely on Jean Monnet.
Topic:: Climate Change, Politics, European Union, Institutions, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

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