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Begin New Search Topic Regional Cooperation Political Geography Europe Content Type Working Paper

1. EU Development Cooperation Policy Shifts from Charity to Self-interest

Author:
Patryk Kugiel
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In recent years, the EU’s development cooperation policy has evolved, moving away from an approach based on poverty eradication and the needs of partner countries to focusing more on its own interests. This change is supported by the majority of EU members. This gives the EU the opportunity to exert strategic influence in the world but risks the loss of its unique identity as an altruistic donor and attractive partner in development cooperation. The change in the Union’s approach is consistent with the position of Poland, which can use it to reform and strengthen its development aid system.
Topic:
Development, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Development Aid
Political Geography:
Europe and Poland

2. Developing EU Trade Incentives: A Support Tool for Refugee Self-Reliance and Host Community Resilience in Turkey

Author:
Basak Kale
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
The European Union (EU) is developing innovative mechanisms to investigate the root causes of migration in order to offer better socioeconomic opportunities both to migrants and host communities. These mechanisms and actions require multi-country bilateral and regional assistance tools to support different partner countries. Innovative and out-of-the-box ideas include multiple countries and various stakeholders. They are developed to provide cooperation solutions in different regions to have a wider impact on the causes and implications of migration. Despite these efforts, political, social, economic and environmental causes continue to generate human mobility around and beyond the immediate neighbourhood of the EU. The Arab Spring and the civil war in Syria have been creating human mobility in the EU neighbourhood. The war made approximately 7 million Syrians flee to neighbouring countries. Turkey is hosting around 3.7 million Syrians and another half a million asylum seekers and refugees from other regions (DGMM, 2021; UNHCR, 2021). The presence of Syrians in Turkey, together with other refugees benefitting from international protection, has become protracted. The efforts to create durable solutions in the form of “voluntary return, resettlement or local integration” have not yet successfully provided sustainable solutions. Turkey does not pursue an official state integration policy to integrate asylum seekers, refugees and the Syrians under temporary protection (STP). However, STPs, asylum seekers and refugees are becoming increasingly integrated into their host communities through informal and local integration mechanisms (Kale & Erdoğan, 2019). The delay in the access to formal employment and challenges in receiving formal employment permits aggregate the difficulties in the inclusion of refugees into formal employment schemes. Summer 2015 has shown that when there is a lack of economic and employment opportunities for asylum seekers, refugees and persons under temporary protection the incentive to have onward movement to other countries persists and the possibilities of integration in host communities stay low. It is clear that resilience-building and livelihood support through formal work is essential for vulnerable populations to have dignified living conditions in host countries. The EU-Turkey Statement in 2016 triggered the development of changes in the legal framework of international protection and migration policy. The Statement paved the way for the preparation of regulations on work permits for persons under temporary and international protection (Official Gazette, 2016). Legal developments targeted the acceleration of the economic integration of refugees into the Turkish labour market through formal employment. However, the difficulties in getting formal work permits resulted in only 132,000 issued until 2019. This indicates that approximately 4% of the STP working population has formal employment (UN Turkey, 2020). This percentage more or less matches the International Labor Organization (ILO) estimations (ILO, 2020). As a result, the majority of the refugee population is working informally, underpaid (Balkan & Tümen, 2016), without formal social and health security mechanisms, in unskilled jobs that are not wanted by Turkish citizens (Sunata, 2017). Informal employment has been a key element contributing to the lack of durable solutions and a protracted process. In Turkey, informal employment is widespread even among the host community members. It is estimated that there is about 30% of labour in host community among all sectors working unregistered. Informal employment is higher in sectors such as agriculture but significantly lower in the industrial sector. The COVID- 19 pandemic has also aggravated the increasingly poor state of the Turkish economy (Akay Ertürk, 2020). Previously, there were continuous efforts through FRIT (Facility for Refugees in Turkey) and 3RP (Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan) projects with programmes focusing on improving the employability of refugees in the Turkish labour market as well as support for the entrepreneurship capacities of the refugees in accessing the formal labour market. However, under the current economic conditions these projects are failing to generate a significant long-term impact on employment for refugees (Özçürümez & İçduygu, 2020). These projects provide short-term trainings or restricted employment possibilities while including a very limited number of participants. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic conditions have shown that these livelihood support arrangements when they are not based on rights-based approaches overtime can transform back into humanitarian aid services (Kale & Yavçan, 2020). Long-term policy planning needs to include other incentive mechanisms that will cover multi-country and multi-region solutions. In the long run, if vulnerable populations in the host societies turn into the most vulnerable requiring humanitarian and emergency aid, the incentive for secondary movements to third countries can be high.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and International Community
Political Geography:
Europe and Turkey

3. Could the EU’s New Agenda for the Mediterranean Turn Climate Change from a “Threat Multiplier” into an “Opportunities Multiplier”?

Author:
Desirée A.L Quagliarotti
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
The Mediterranean countries are char­acterised by evident gaps in terms of demographic growth, socioeconomic conditions and natural resources avail­ability, which undermine the process of Euro-Mediterranean cohesion and cre­ate a situation of structural weakness that makes them extremely vulnerable to destabilising events. In just over a dec­ade, the Mediterranean region has been affected by major changes that, at first glance, do not seem to be related to each other. The wave of pro-democracy pro­tests called the “Arab Spring” that has plagued the regimes of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since 2010 has shown how climate-driven crop failures in major food exporting countries may contribute to driving up international food prices and to amplifying social and polit­ical destabilisation, especially in food-im­port dependent countries (Werrell & Femia, 2013). The “Arab unhappiness” that spurred the popular uprisings has not faded over the years, giving rise to what has been referred to as the “Arab Spring 2.0”. This new round of turmoil, in which protesters demand a better quality of life, has been exacerbated by 2020s COVID-19 pandemic, clearly demon­strating, once again, the close inter­connection between human well-being and planetary health.[1] In the same time frame, in the Northern Mediterranean Countries (NMCs), the migrant-refugee crisis, characterised by new migration waves triggered by traditional as well as unconventional push factors linked to the effects of climate and environmental changes, is becoming one of the most important and divisive issues in recent European politics, adding a new layer of instability to the already shaky European Union (EU) (Pawel & Roland, 2018).
Topic:
Climate Change, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Europe and Mediterranean

4. From a Fragmented Cooperation to an Integrated Approach – The Emergence of the Maghreb and Sahel Region and its Consequences for the European Union

Author:
Erzsébet N. Rózsa and Viktor Marsai
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
The history of the European Union (EU)’s foreign and security policy has been characterised by a continuous develop- ment and a process of adaptation to the realities on the ground and the experi- ences gained. This was manifest in the gradual change from bilateral relations to regional/multilateral structures, from trade through three-basket/three-pillar structured relations to the integrated ap- proach as introduced by the 2016 EU Global Strategy, and the institutionalisa- tion thereof. “Internal and external secu- rity are ever more intertwined: our secu- rity at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surround- ing regions. It implies a broader interest in preventing conflict, promoting human security, addressing the root causes of instability and working towards a safer world” (EEAS, 2016). The present pa- per argues that, in order to be able to halt the increasingly complex threats fac- ing the EU and maintain its global actor status, the EU should introduce further – sectorial and regional – flexibility, in- cluding, among others, definitions of the widening geographical scope underlying its strategic vision. Therefore, this paper first asks how the EU and its member states should recon- sider their regional approach. How can the EU implement the existing frame- works and/or develop a more effective and adaptive strategy towards its south- ern neighbourhood fitting the new reali- ties on the ground better?
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and Sahel

5. Parliamentary oversight of the police and the EU accession process – a missing link in the fundamentals-first approach

Author:
Marija Ignjatijevic
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
BCSP Researcher Marija Ignjatijević analyses parliamentary oversight of the police in Serbia through the lens of the European integration process and offers recommendations on how to connect it to the negotiating Chapter 24 – Justice, Freedom and Security. Parliamentary oversight of police work represents a critical measure in strengthening the integrity and operational independence of the police. At the same time, these features of the police work are crucial in attaining benchmarks for negotiating Chapter 24 in Serbia’s EU accession process. Along with judiciary, functional and democratically governed police is a prerequisite for the rule of law and other fundamental principles of the EU accession process. Chapter 24 occupies an even more important position within the revised methodology for accession negotiations, since benchmarks in the Cluster 1 (Fundamentals) are a precondition for advancements in all the other clusters. In the Justice, Freedom, and Security field (Chapter 24), the National Assembly plays an important role, foremost by passing and amending the laws through which domestic legislation harmonizes with the regulations of the European Union. The action plan for the Chapter 24 recognizes the role of the National Assembly in achieving benchmarks in this area, most often precisely through changes in the normative framework, i.e. adoption of new or changes to old legal regulations and confirmation of international agreements. However, the role of the National Assembly should be more significant in practice, although this cannot be precisely expressed through technical measures and activities. Defining obligations in the Action Plan might even produce a counter effect and further boost the “tick the box” approach, with the National Assembly captured by the ruling party proficient in simulating its democratic features. The primarily technical action plan cannot bind the National Assembly to effectively oversee the police since the problem is political – there is a lack of political will to control the security sector, the level of democratic culture is low, and the National Assembly is captured by the ruling party. It is, therefore, necessary to explore mechanisms which could make a clear bond between the political criteria which are part of the Fundamentals cluster, such as the functioning democratic institutions, and concrete measures from the action plans, like the ones aimed at strengthening police integrity. Parliamentary oversight of the police is one such connector since it is a vital democratic feature which can boost police integrity and reforms, essential Chapter 24 criteria and prerequisite for other elements of the Fundamentals cluster.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Governance, European Union, and Police
Political Geography:
Europe and Serbia

6. Leaving Stabilocracy Behind – Rethinking the French Approach to the Western Balkans

Author:
Luka Steric
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In this paper, BCSP researcher Luka Steric calls for the U-turn in the French and EU approach to the Western Balkans, calling for the end of support for stabilocracy. The spring elections have resulted in regime continuity in both France and Serbia. President Macron has secured the second term with a convincing victory in the second round against the archrival Marine Le Pen. Simultaneously, President Vucic has stroke another landslide victory in the first round of the elections, with his Progressive Party holding on to power although losing absolute majority in the Parliament for the first time since 2014. However, the political landscape has changed radically since their previous victories five years ago. The war in Ukraine has shifted the focus of the European Union toward geopolitics, pushing the Western Balkans, seemingly forgotten, back on the European agenda. The threats of instability and the rising influence of third powers in the region have rung the alarm in the new global context, opening the floor for the discussion on how to revamp the European strategy which has been largely inadequate for the past decade. In contrast to previous periods in which France had a more passive approach and appeared mostly indifferent to the developments in the Western Balkans, during the first term of Macron’s presidency the official Paris has retaken a major role on the regional stage. As part of his ambition to become the political leader of Europe, Macron has launched several initiatives attempting to modify the European enlargement policy. Based on the consequences of these initiatives, we can conclude that the goal was to stop the enlargement process for a foreseeable future, substituting it with an economic and political presence that would ensure the stability of the region within the European sphere of influence. For this purpose, Macron was more than ready to collaborate with autocratic regimes such as the one in Serbia which he believed to be crucial for keeping the Western Balkans relatively stable. This strategy has contributed to the region steadily becoming both less secure and less democratic, eroding the once unquestionable European credibility and influence. The tectonic shifts we are witnessing on the European continent should be a wake-up call to critically evaluate and rethink the French policy in the Western Balkans, including a U-turn in the relationship with the current regime in Belgrade.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Balkans

7. Rethinking the Dutch position towards the Western Balkans in the new security environment in Europe

Author:
Arlinda Rrustemi, Luka Steric, and Marko Drajic
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The main goal of this paper is to present lessons learned, and present policy recommendations regarding the EU integration policy in Western Balkans given the recent events in 2022. In addition, a deeper understanding of the Dutch foreign and security policy is also provided, since the Netherlands has rejected plans for the EU’s further expansion. The year 2022 brought many political, legal, and security changes to Europe. Most importantly, events which had been considered unthinkable for decades have occurred. On February 24th, Russia commenced a fullscale military invasion of Ukraine, conducting attacks that have caused 7,061civilian deaths, while some sources report up 21,000 deaths only in Mariupol, indiscriminate attacks in violation of the laws of war that may amount to war crimes, and more than five million refugees. The European response was unified and timely. A clear willingness to stand by the side of Ukraine has been shown and sanctions are enforced against Russia by all EU member states (MS), while providing aid in various forms. An uptick in polarization, populism and far right sentiment can be observed in Victor Orban’s success in the Hungarian April Elections and in Marine le Pen’s persisting into the second round of the French Presidential election. Not only the right political spectrum is gaining traction but also the left. The Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Janša has been defeated by a left wing party, the Freedom Movement, founded a year ago. In addition, European governments that are key to stability and peace of the Western Balkans region are experiencing drastic political changes. The new German government that succeeded Angela Merkel’s cabinet after one and a half decade is posing new foreign and security policy questions. Macron suggested an end to the enlargement agenda as we know it, proposing the political European community as an alternative. Tensions in terms of hate and acts of violence have been reported in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, raising further questions about the future of the Western Balkans in Europe. War in the continent posed a threat to the credibility and legitimacy of the European project. It questions European values and is an existential threat to the integration process, and European security. Ursula von der Leyen offered a speedy response to Ukraine’s bid to join the European Union, for which Ukraine applied in times of conflict. This is the first time in history that a nation during conflict applies for EU membership. The Ukrainian application and the war have resulted in many uncertainties for Europe. This raises questions surrounding the accession processes of other countries in the Western Balkans region, such as Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. An analysis of the EU integration policy in the Western Balkans region is therefore crucial given the recent events. Progress towards EU integration has varied among countries in the Western Balkans region. The closest to the EU integration are Montenegro and Serbia with many chapters open. North Macedonia and Albania are waiting to start formal negotiations. Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina are farthest removed due to their internally and externally driven fragilities. The main goal of the report is to question the current approach while providing a fresh perspective on the EU’s integration policy, given the recent security and political events. In addition, a deeper understanding of the Dutch foreign and security policy is also provided, since the Netherlands has rejected plans for the EU’s further expansion. The following sections outline Dutch foreign policy, followed by recent political, security and legal developments in the Western Balkans region. The final section outlines lessons learned, and present policy recommendations regarding the EU integration policy in Western Balkans given the recent events in 2022.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Integration
Political Geography:
Europe

8. EU in Search of a WTO-Compatible Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism

Author:
Cecilia Bellora and Lionel Fontagné
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
To meet the targets of the EU’s ”Fit for 55” package, the European Commission proposes to implement a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). The CBAM is firstly intended to avoid carbon leakages, but it also deals with the thorny issue of the compliance by European producers in carbon-intensive industries. In addition, its design, as voted by the European Council on March 15, 2022, questions the compatibility of the CBAM with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. The CBAM puts a price on carbon contained in imported products whose production-related emissions have not been taxed (or not at the same level as in the European Union) by the exporter country, in order to offset the difference in carbon prices at the border. This paper aims to quantify the economic and environmental impacts of different CBAM design choices with the aim of complying with WTO rules. Different from the previous literature, we evaluate the various options with a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring imperfect competition, global value chains, green-house gas emissions and endogenous price of emission quotas. We show that CBAM is effective in reducing carbon leakages. But its design leads to an increase in the price of carbon quotas in the European Emission Trading System (ETS) market. Losses in competitiveness on export markets are expected, also for downstream sectors not covered by the EU ETS nor the CBAM. Eventually, offsetting the difference in carbon prices at the border comes at a cost to the enforcing jurisdiction, suggesting that the CBAM was not designed as a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.
Topic:
Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Carbon Emissions, WTO, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Europe

9. Current Account Balances’ Divergence in the Euro Area: an Appraisal of the Underlying Forces

Author:
Emmanuelle Faure, Carl Grekou, and Valérie Mignon
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
This paper revisits the crucial issue of current account imbalances and focuses on the determinants of their gaps between eurozone Member States. We conduct robust estimations of the current account balances for a panel of ten founding euro area economies and construct a measure that allows us to diagnose why some countries have started to diverge from the eurozone mean in the last two decades. Our findings show evidence of remaining differences in countries’ economic development, meaning that real macroeconomic convergence has failed in the zone. Price and cost competitiveness, as well as fiscal balances, have also participated in this growing macroeconomic divergence. Overall, while the European authorities cannot influence the part of the current account gaps due to demographic factors, the role of fiscal redistribution and investment at the euro area level could help achieve macroeconomic convergence and thus reduce current accounts’ divergence in the zone.
Topic:
Economics, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Eurozone, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Europe

10. The African-France Summit and an Overview of its Recommendations Since 1973

Author:
Fabien Sundjo
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
France’s earliest profit-making involvement in Africa in the business of buying and transporting slaves started in the 17th century when the local Indian population proved unable to work in plantations in America compared to black Africans. France’s interest in Africa reached its zenith in the 19th and early 20th centuries when France acquired a gigantic African empire. Though several reasons could explain the scramble for Africa by France, we present herein the three most important. First, the defeat of France in the 1870 Prussian war in which she lost influence and a reduction in her international ego. Second, the anxiety to implement Colbert’s mercantilist philosophy emphasized that any rising industrial power required to have both the source of raw materials and market extension under her control. Third and finally, as Europeans scrambled for Africa, France feared their traditional enemies could annex a remarkable share of the territory. Hence, from the outset, it was not the financial gains that many thoughts motivated France’s involvement in Africa but politics and national ego. It will only be later that France saw Africa as a cheap source of military manpower that could help balance demographic stagnation in France. This perception will later be reinforced by her experience in the two World wars. In this light, Iliffe (2007) holds that French colonial policy was characterized by the exploitation of rich resources from Africa. In the midst of all these benefits from colonization in Africa, Charles de Gaulle‘s decision to retain influence in Africa after decolonization in 1960 was driven by the need to persist with these benefits under neo-colonization. According to Abdurrahim (2014), in Africa, France uses a realist foreign policy in which states shape their foreign policies based on their national interests. To facilitate the implementation of this realist foreign policy, France will design the Franco-African summit that will cement France’s influence in her former colonies to date. Were France’s policies put in place through the Franco-African summits shaped to benefit France solely? This paper aims to present the Franco-African Summit and carry out a stocktake of France’s commitments through recommendations from the Franco-African Summit.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and France

11. British Pugwash Note on the Absence of Sole Purpose in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
In June 2022 NATO members adopted an updated Strategic Concept (the preceding Concept having been adopted in 2010). There was reason to hope that in the updated Concept NATO members would envisage using nuclear weapons only in response to their first use by a nuclear-armed adversary. That reason lay in remarks made by President Biden when he was Barack Obama’s Vice-President. Notably in January 2017 he said: “Given our non-nuclear capacities and the nature of today´s threats, it is hard to envision a plausible scenario in which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States would be necessary or would make sense; deterring, and, if necessary, retaliating against a nuclear attack should be the sole purpose of the US nuclear arsenal”. The adoption of Sole Purpose would be a useful nuclear risk reduction measure. Leaving open the option of using nuclear weapons in response to a non-nuclear attack on NATO entails the risk of nuclear escalation if the attacker is nuclear armed; and nuclear escalation entails the risk of global nuclear annihilation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

12. Between Erdogan, Mitsotakis, and Biden: The Evolving Ankara-Athens-Washington Triangle

Author:
Gallia Lindenstrauss, Christoph Becker, and Remi Daniel
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
“The Prime Minister of Greece no longer exists for me,” declared Turkey’s President, reflecting a break in the rapprochement seen over the past year between Ankara and Athens. What lies behind this change of approach, and how does this affect Israel’s relations with Eastern Mediterranean states?
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Greece, North America, United States of America, and Mediterranean

13. Exchanging Money for Love? A Regional Analysis of EU Cohesion Policy on Euroscepticism

Author:
Michael Bayerlein and Matthias Diermeier
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
In the past, the European Union seems to have been able to tame Euroscepticism through regional 'convergence' funding. After the Eastern enlargement of the Union, however, this relationship needs to be put to the test. Not only have the new member states become the main recipients of EU funding, Eastern Europe has also changed from once being the most integration-friendly region to displaying the most integration-hostile attitudes in the EU. Motivated by this empirical puzzle, we revisit the relationship between structural 'convergence' funding and Euroscepticism and ask where - if at all - is the EU's convergence spending still able to tame Euroscepticism. Most surprisingly, correlation analyses reveal that between 2006 and 2018 larger regional subsidies go along with increasing opposition to EU integration. We can rebut this counterintuitive finding by a Diff-in-Diff approach that reveals an increasing Euroscepticism in Eastern European regions between 2006 and 2014. Nevertheless, also these more advanced models fail to establish a positive relationship between regional funding eligibility and pro-integrationist attitudes. Finally, fuzzy RDD models exploit the funding assignment rule and corroborate that the EU is no longer able to pacify integration-critical regions by their simply increasing 'convergence' funding. Nevertheless, the EU has won support in Eastern Europe where EU investments are perceived (positively). In designing a strategy to win back support for EU integration, Brussels does not need more fiscal capacity but rather has to design 'convergence' funding that is visible as well as clearly attributable to its donor.
Topic:
Economics, Regional Cooperation, Foreign Aid, European Union, and Eurocentrism
Political Geography:
Europe

14. Commitment to Control Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security

Author:
Anna Nadibaidze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The global debate on weaponised artificial intelligence (AI) often focuses on futuristic “killer robots”, which risks overlooking the fact that these technologies are already part of the security landscape. Diminishing human control over the use of force and the differences in states’ discourse pose a considerable risk for European security and stability. The impact of AI is not inevitable, and states should address this issue through political means, such as a political declaration with a commitment to ensuring human control over the use of force. With its inclusive membership, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) can and should become the platform through which its participating States can take a step forward in the global debate on weaponised AI.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, and OSCE
Political Geography:
Europe

15. Montenegro after the General Elections: A New Chapter in Transition or Preservation of Status Quo?

Author:
Krševan Antun Dujmović
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
The general elections held in Montenegro on 30 August 2020 has once again drawn the attention of the Western Balkans to the smallest, measured by population, among seven nations that emerged after the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This attention is due to a number of factors. Back in May of 2018 Montenegro has opened the last of the thirty-three chapters in the negotiation process with the European Union, making it a harbinger among Western Balkans nations on the path to Euro-Atlantic integrations, especially as the country had joined the North Atlantic Alliance in June 2017. Other countries in the region linger behind Montenegro – Albania and North Macedonia, both NATO members, are still waiting for the opening of the negotiations with the EU. Serbia has no intention to join NATO, and in spite of EU negotiations and ambitions, sees itself in balance between the West on one side, and Russia and China on the other. Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina are far from NATO membership and have merely the status of potential candidates for EU membership. This is why all eyes of the region and of the advocates of continuation of EU enragement policy are on Montenegro. The second factor are strong historical ties of this country on the Adriatic coast with its northern neighbor Serbia. Serbian minority makes up to one third of Montenegro’s population, and the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC- Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva) plays a vital role in Montenegrin society, as this country does not have its own autocephalous Church recognized by other Orthodox Churches in Eastern Christendom. This gives Serbia and the SPC a significant clout within borders of its southern neighbor. The third factor is the involvement of global players in this country. The United Sates has advocated strongly to include Montenegro in NATO in order to stretch the line of NATO’s southern flank in the Northern Mediterranean from the Iberian Peninsula to the west to Greece and Turkey in the east. On the other hand, Montenegro’s authorities accused Russia of meddling in the general elections held in October 2016 when the alleged coup d’état occurred on the election day. Many feared a similar scenario on the eve of 30 August 2020 election, fathoming the outbreak of riots and violence that could ignite the powder keg in the Balkans. Although none of these happened, Montenegro is not ceasing to be the subject of the geopolitical chessboard. Considering these factors, the attention of neighbors to the events in this Balkan country is understandable. The unfolding situation after the elections in which the government of Montenegro is backed by a very thin majority in the Parliament (Skupština Crne Gore) and with no clear vision nor strategy for further political and economic development of the country, is only fueling the wariness of its neighbors and of Brussels about Montenegro as a success story.
Topic:
NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Elections, European Union, and Transition
Political Geography:
Europe, Balkans, and Montenegro

16. Unlocking European Defence. In Search of the Long Overdue Paradigm Shift

Author:
Arnout Molenaar
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The European Union’s range of new EU security and defence initiatives are ground-breaking, but they can only deliver on their potential if member states shift the paradigm towards truly thinking, acting and working together as Europeans, based on a strategic consensus regarding the future of European defence in the changing global context. The new Strategic Compass, to be adopted by the Council in early 2022, provides a framework to develop such a shared vision. It should help to operationalise the EU’s strategic autonomy in concrete terms, in mutual reinforcement and coherence with NATO, while seizing the opportunity to strike a new transatlantic bargain with the Biden Administration. In this context, the Union should agree on concrete steps forward to become a more active security provider abroad, reinforce its resilience and protection at home, enhance its operational readiness for different scenarios, and develop new capabilities through deeper cooperation while stepping up its cooperation with partners.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

17. Israel Should Maintain its Mediterranean Alignment, Despite Signals from Ankara

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
It should be made clear to Israel’s partners in the eastern Mediterranean that any (unlikely) improvement in Israel’s relations with Turkey will not come at their expense. Despite some recent positive signals, Erdogan’s basic orientation as an Islamist is bound to remain hostile.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Alliance, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Israel

18. NATO 2030- The Military Dimension

Author:
Heinrich Brauss and Christian Mölling
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO must “stay strong militarily, be more united politically, and take a broader approach 1 globally”. When launching the reflection pro- cess on NATO’s future role, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg set these three priorities to frame his vision of NATO 2030. At their meeting in London in December 2019, NA- TO’s political leaders mandated a “forward-looking re- flection process” on how NATO should further adapt to ensure it was able to successfully cope with a world of competing great powers due to the rise of China and Russia’s persistently aggressive posture, together with instability along NATO’s southern periphery, new trans- national risks emerging from pandemics, climate change and disruptive technologies. Establishing a unified stra- tegic vision is vital for upholding the Alliance’s cohesion, credibility and effectiveness. Looking forward, what does this mean for NATO’s military dimension?
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

19. Proportionality and Karlsruhe’s Ultra Vires Verdict: Ways Out of Constitutional Pluralism?

Author:
Martin Hopner
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
In May 2020, for the first time in its history, the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) of Germany declared Union acts as being ultra vires. According to the FCC, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) had acted beyond their mandates because they did not apply strong proportionality standards to the ECB’s Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP). The resulting stalemate within constitutional pluralism has revived the discussion about the possible introduction of an Appeal Court with the “final say” over constitutional conflict. As the analysis of the PSPP conflict shows, such a judicial authority would reach its limits the more we move from the surface to the core of the struggles between European and national constitutional law. The different readings of proportionality are difficult to bridge, and the mutually exclusive claims about the nature of the supremacy of European law are not accessible to compromise at all. We should therefore not expect too much from an Appeal Court, if it were introduced.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Law, European Union, Economic Cooperation, European Monetary Union, and Banking
Political Geography:
Europe

20. Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response

Author:
Gabriella Sanchez, Kheira Arrouche, Matteo Capasso, Angeliki Dimitriadi, and Alia Fakhry
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
Countering migrant smuggling and its actors – described as the men behind the facilitation of migrants’ irregular journeys – are important elements of the European Union (EU)’s migration and border control policy. Under the new Pact on Migration and Asylum, the EU has proposed to promote tailor-made and mutually beneficial partnerships with third countries specifically to address migrant smuggling. EU Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson has also promised a predictable and reliable migration management system that includes “stepping up the fight against human traffickers and smugglers”. The EU has certainly taken important steps to counter irregular migration, including making considerable financial commitments to the fight against smugglers and their networks, to whom the journeys of irregular migrants into Europe are almost single-handedly attributed. Smugglers, characterised as inherently violent and exploitative, are also described as relying on a specific business model that generates incalculable earnings. Much has been written about how these profits, if unmonitored, can be funnelled by smugglers into other criminal enterprises like drug trafficking or weapons smuggling, but also into the more nefarious practices of sex trafficking or terrorism. Within this context, smugglers are also said to exploit an ever-growing number of naïve and desperate victims, primarily young men from sub-Saharan Africa who, driven solely by the power of social media and the iconography portraying European soil as a dreamed destination, do not think twice about embarking on dangerous journeys across vast deserts and seas. At high level policy events and academic exchanges, participants often cite examples of young men who, tricked by Facebook and Instagram posts, arrive in Europe after enduring harrowing experiences only to find themselves in even more desperate situations of homelessness and deprivation, having believed the lies and false promises of smugglers, friends and family members posted online. Migrant women, on the other hand, tend to be described as young sex slaves or prostitutes, victims of the depravity of sexually-predatory smugglers who do not hesitate to exploit them for profit in cities across North Africa and Europe. Migrants do face violence and intimidation at the hands of smugglers. These experiences have been documented at length in a vast number of reports targeting European audiences. Kidnapping, extortion, and physical and sexual assault are undeniable and troubling realities on the migration pathway, and migrants do experience them often at the hands of smugglers. Women, girls, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and questioning migrants are also more vulnerable to specific forms of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), which are often compounded by racism and other forms of discrimination – this does not preclude the fact that SGBV against migrant men is also common on the migrant trail. This policy study, developed by a team of migration scholars based in EU research institutions, argues that while these general notions have guided the mainstream, collective understanding of migrant smuggling, they do in fact pose several and serious limitations that, if not considered closely, can lead to faulty conclusions and inadequate policy responses. Echoing other studies, this report shows that irregular migration and counter-smuggling policy are often based on limited empirical data, drawn from similar if not identical stakeholders, and developed by a reduced and identifiable core of researchers (most of them, European and/or Europe-based). While this body of work has to a large extent expanded the understanding of smuggling, it has simultaneously privileged Euro-centric perspectives and law enforcement priorities at the expense of silencing the experiences (other than those involving victimisation and abuse) of the very people who rely on smugglers for their journeys. Chapter one examines how research has shown that while in most law enforcement, policy and academic circles the facilitation of irregular migration for profit is articulated as a crime, for most migrants the people behind their journeys merely facilitate a service of mobility, which may be in some instances illicit but not criminal, rooted in the lack of accessible, affordable, legal and safe paths for migration. These actors, commonly depicted in academic publications and research reports as heinously violent and predatory members of tribes or other ethnic and racialised groups, are quite often valued and well-respected people in communities across North Africa and the Sahel, trusted for the efficiency of their mobility, trade and transportation services. Known or depicted as smugglers in policy reports, these facilitators are quite often ordinary men and women, recognised for their contributions to the local economy, including the provision of mobility solutions for young and adult migrants unable to secure the protections afforded by passports or visas.
Topic:
Migration, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Trafficking
Political Geography:
Europe