Content Type: Working Paper / Political Geography: Europe / Topic:

201. Parliamentary oversight of the police and the EU accession process – a missing link in the fundamentals-first approach

Author:: Marija Ignjatijevic
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: BCSP Researcher Marija Ignjatijević analyses parliamentary oversight of the police in Serbia through the lens of the European integration process and offers recommendations on how to connect it to the negotiating Chapter 24 – Justice, Freedom and Security. Parliamentary oversight of police work represents a critical measure in strengthening the integrity and operational independence of the police. At the same time, these features of the police work are crucial in attaining benchmarks for negotiating Chapter 24 in Serbia’s EU accession process. Along with judiciary, functional and democratically governed police is a prerequisite for the rule of law and other fundamental principles of the EU accession process. Chapter 24 occupies an even more important position within the revised methodology for accession negotiations, since benchmarks in the Cluster 1 (Fundamentals) are a precondition for advancements in all the other clusters. In the Justice, Freedom, and Security field (Chapter 24), the National Assembly plays an important role, foremost by passing and amending the laws through which domestic legislation harmonizes with the regulations of the European Union. The action plan for the Chapter 24 recognizes the role of the National Assembly in achieving benchmarks in this area, most often precisely through changes in the normative framework, i.e. adoption of new or changes to old legal regulations and confirmation of international agreements. However, the role of the National Assembly should be more significant in practice, although this cannot be precisely expressed through technical measures and activities. Defining obligations in the Action Plan might even produce a counter effect and further boost the “tick the box” approach, with the National Assembly captured by the ruling party proficient in simulating its democratic features. The primarily technical action plan cannot bind the National Assembly to effectively oversee the police since the problem is political – there is a lack of political will to control the security sector, the level of democratic culture is low, and the National Assembly is captured by the ruling party. It is, therefore, necessary to explore mechanisms which could make a clear bond between the political criteria which are part of the Fundamentals cluster, such as the functioning democratic institutions, and concrete measures from the action plans, like the ones aimed at strengthening police integrity. Parliamentary oversight of the police is one such connector since it is a vital democratic feature which can boost police integrity and reforms, essential Chapter 24 criteria and prerequisite for other elements of the Fundamentals cluster.
Topic:: Security, Regional Cooperation, Governance, European Union, and Police
Political Geography:: Europe and Serbia

202. Geopolitics is Local – Ramifications of Chinese Projects for Human Security in Serbia

Author:: Maja Bjelos and Vuk Vuksanovic
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: This report examines the Chinese presence in Serbia through a human security lens, in terms of how it impacts the quality of life and the security of local communities. China’s “no-strings attached” financing of infrastructure has become attractive for Serbia’s ruling elite after the global financial crisis of 2008. However, it took Chinese companies almost a decade to take over two state-owned giants – the Smederevo Steel Mill and the RTB Copper Smelter – and invest in the construction of a new tyre factory. To maintain social peace, employment and legitimise themselves among the constituents, the ruling elite invested a lot of effort in facilitating the arrival of Chinese capital. This effort included drafting laws that suited PRC investors, donating arable land and providing subsidies, circumventing environmental and construction standards, turning a blind eye to labour and human rights violations, and making many other concessions at the expense of citizens and the local communities. Lack of transparency and public scrutiny is common to all PRC investments. In a short period of time, the profit-oriented exploitation of natural resources by PRC investors has led to various environmental hazards that have endangered public health and human existence, causing environmental (anti-government) protests and resentment towards the Chinese. But combating environmental threats and rule of law violations associated with the Chinese projects is difficult, especially since the Serbian government is willing to quell criticism and provide such projects with full political backing. The research was conducted in three Serbian cities with large PRC investments – Smederevo, Bor and Zrenjanin – to establish the impact of these projects on local communities and how they affect human security, understood in terms of human rights and human dignity. Several forms of human security endangerment were observed in the course of the research project: environmental hazards, public health, socio-economic and human rights, rule of law, cross-cultural issues and surveillance.
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, and Local
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Serbia

203. Leaving Stabilocracy Behind – Rethinking the French Approach to the Western Balkans

Author:: Luka Steric
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: In this paper, BCSP researcher Luka Steric calls for the U-turn in the French and EU approach to the Western Balkans, calling for the end of support for stabilocracy. The spring elections have resulted in regime continuity in both France and Serbia. President Macron has secured the second term with a convincing victory in the second round against the archrival Marine Le Pen. Simultaneously, President Vucic has stroke another landslide victory in the first round of the elections, with his Progressive Party holding on to power although losing absolute majority in the Parliament for the first time since 2014. However, the political landscape has changed radically since their previous victories five years ago. The war in Ukraine has shifted the focus of the European Union toward geopolitics, pushing the Western Balkans, seemingly forgotten, back on the European agenda. The threats of instability and the rising influence of third powers in the region have rung the alarm in the new global context, opening the floor for the discussion on how to revamp the European strategy which has been largely inadequate for the past decade. In contrast to previous periods in which France had a more passive approach and appeared mostly indifferent to the developments in the Western Balkans, during the first term of Macron’s presidency the official Paris has retaken a major role on the regional stage. As part of his ambition to become the political leader of Europe, Macron has launched several initiatives attempting to modify the European enlargement policy. Based on the consequences of these initiatives, we can conclude that the goal was to stop the enlargement process for a foreseeable future, substituting it with an economic and political presence that would ensure the stability of the region within the European sphere of influence. For this purpose, Macron was more than ready to collaborate with autocratic regimes such as the one in Serbia which he believed to be crucial for keeping the Western Balkans relatively stable. This strategy has contributed to the region steadily becoming both less secure and less democratic, eroding the once unquestionable European credibility and influence. The tectonic shifts we are witnessing on the European continent should be a wake-up call to critically evaluate and rethink the French policy in the Western Balkans, including a U-turn in the relationship with the current regime in Belgrade.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Democracy
Political Geography:: Europe, France, and Balkans

204. Covidocracy in the Election Process – An Analysis of the Pandemic Narrative Serving the State Capture

Author:: Srdan Hercigonja
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: In this analysis, the predominant narratives of the pandemic shall be explored, as well as the ways they have impacted the state capturing process in the period from the second half of 2021 till 3 April 2022, when the general and presidential elections took place in Serbia. The crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic denuded the authoritarian tendencies in Serbia, both in the state and in the society, making visible the size and scope of state capturing. To what extent this process has set in may be best visible by the way the institutions and authorities have made decisions during the pandemic management, as well as by the decision they have taken. It has been 26 months since the first infection case was registered in Serbia and since the two-month long state of emergency was introduced. Ever since, decisions have been taken towards reducing the virus spread, but also disregarding the opinions of experts in this field (epidemiologists, virologists and immunologists). The decisions were made depending on the ruling elite’s political interests. For the first year and a half after the outbreak, the mainstream discourse imposed by the authorities was that the state and the society were at war. All the elements of war discourse were noticeable in the statements of public officials, even experts – there is an enemy out there whom we must beat (the virus), emergency measures like curfew were introduced, the story of doctors like frontline warriors was imposed, and allies were also chosen for this war. The narrative of war like predominant discourse of fighting the pandemic provided legitimacy for the highest officials to take the crucial decisions in countering the pandemic – precisely this enabled the President of the Republic or the Prime Minister to take and communicate the most important decisions regarding this “war”, while experts were placed at the margins of decision-making. Finally, the top officials are competent for declaring victory at war, and the ruling party declared the victory over the pandemic twice, both times on the eve of elections – first time in May 2020, and second in March 2022. However, during the autumn 2021, the narrative of war as the prevalent one during the pandemic was replaced by quiet and silence, the story of the pandemic was pushed to the margins, which was particularly evident in the April 2022 pre-election period.
Topic:: Elections, Democracy, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe and Serbia

205. Pandemic Management – Lessons Learned for a Safer Future

Author:: Milja Dimitrijevic and Rade Panic
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: How the pandemic was managed in Serbia and what are the recommendations for better coping in similar situations in the future, read in the analysis made by BCSP in cooperation with the Union of Doctors and Pharmacists of Serbia. The political and social context in which the pandemic management in Serbia is analysed is marked by a drastic decline in the level of democracy in the country, as well as the strengthening of authoritarian tendencies in the state and society within the process of “capturing the state” by the ruling elite. Unfortunately, Serbia cannot boast of successful results, especially if we take into account the number of deceased citizens, as well as the low level of vaccination compared to European Union countries. The number of deceased citizens in 2021 is as much as 18 percent higher than in the same period in 2020. Statistical data show that in 2021, most people died in Serbia within one year since the end of World War II. These data speak volumes about the results of the crisis management caused by the COVID-19 epidemic in Serbia. In this analysis, the focus is on two aspects of pandemic management – the legal aspects of crisis management and the health system’s readiness to deal with the crisis. The analysis was created within the framework of informal cooperation between the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy and the Union of Doctors and Pharmacists of Serbia. The author of the paper on the legal aspects of pandemic management is a lawyer from the Union of Doctors and Pharmacists Milja Dimitrijević, while the part about the capacities of the health system was written by Dr. Rade Panić, the President of the Union of Doctors and Pharmacists. The analysis was created within the survey that was conducted from October 2021 to March 2022. Precisely because of that, some data in the analysis were presented during the writing of the analysis itself, which were relevant during the research and writing the analysis (for example, when writing about the number of infected citizens, or the number of deceased doctors). Finally, the analysis concludes with certain recommendations necessary to improve the management of the COVID-19 pandemic, but possibly some other pandemics in the future.
Topic:: Governance, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe and Serbia

206. (Absence of) Trust and Security in the Second Year of the Pandemic – Serbian Citizens’ Opinions about the COVID-19 Pandemic

Author:: Maja Bjelos and Srdan Hercigonja
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: What do Serbian citizens think about the COVID-19 pandemic? What are their opinions about vaccination? Do they trust the institutions that were managing the pandemic? We present you an analysis of citizens' attitudes on these topics. The public opinion poll on the management of the COVID-19 pandemic, the process of immunisation of the population and the impact of the pandemic on the work of institutions and the status of democracy was conducted during the relatively calm epidemiological period, just before the big wave in late 2021 and early 2022, when Serbia had a record number of registered citizens newly infected with the Coronavirus. At the same time, the survey was conducted in the period when all adult citizens were offered the so-called booster or the third dose of the vaccine against COVID-19. The observed period was marked by the political and security crisis in Kosovo, so the pandemic was not in the focus of public and political discussion. In the meantime, the gradual calming of the situation regarding the pandemic itself, and primarily the reduction of the number of newly infected and dead, created space for the analysis and assessment of the way the pandemic had been managed.
Topic:: Public Opinion, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe and Serbia

207. Rethinking the Dutch position towards the Western Balkans in the new security environment in Europe

Author:: Arlinda Rrustemi, Luka Steric, and Marko Drajic
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: The main goal of this paper is to present lessons learned, and present policy recommendations regarding the EU integration policy in Western Balkans given the recent events in 2022. In addition, a deeper understanding of the Dutch foreign and security policy is also provided, since the Netherlands has rejected plans for the EU’s further expansion. The year 2022 brought many political, legal, and security changes to Europe. Most importantly, events which had been considered unthinkable for decades have occurred. On February 24th, Russia commenced a fullscale military invasion of Ukraine, conducting attacks that have caused 7,061civilian deaths, while some sources report up 21,000 deaths only in Mariupol, indiscriminate attacks in violation of the laws of war that may amount to war crimes, and more than five million refugees. The European response was unified and timely. A clear willingness to stand by the side of Ukraine has been shown and sanctions are enforced against Russia by all EU member states (MS), while providing aid in various forms. An uptick in polarization, populism and far right sentiment can be observed in Victor Orban’s success in the Hungarian April Elections and in Marine le Pen’s persisting into the second round of the French Presidential election. Not only the right political spectrum is gaining traction but also the left. The Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Janša has been defeated by a left wing party, the Freedom Movement, founded a year ago. In addition, European governments that are key to stability and peace of the Western Balkans region are experiencing drastic political changes. The new German government that succeeded Angela Merkel’s cabinet after one and a half decade is posing new foreign and security policy questions. Macron suggested an end to the enlargement agenda as we know it, proposing the political European community as an alternative. Tensions in terms of hate and acts of violence have been reported in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, raising further questions about the future of the Western Balkans in Europe. War in the continent posed a threat to the credibility and legitimacy of the European project. It questions European values and is an existential threat to the integration process, and European security. Ursula von der Leyen offered a speedy response to Ukraine’s bid to join the European Union, for which Ukraine applied in times of conflict. This is the first time in history that a nation during conflict applies for EU membership. The Ukrainian application and the war have resulted in many uncertainties for Europe. This raises questions surrounding the accession processes of other countries in the Western Balkans region, such as Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. An analysis of the EU integration policy in the Western Balkans region is therefore crucial given the recent events. Progress towards EU integration has varied among countries in the Western Balkans region. The closest to the EU integration are Montenegro and Serbia with many chapters open. North Macedonia and Albania are waiting to start formal negotiations. Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina are farthest removed due to their internally and externally driven fragilities. The main goal of the report is to question the current approach while providing a fresh perspective on the EU’s integration policy, given the recent security and political events. In addition, a deeper understanding of the Dutch foreign and security policy is also provided, since the Netherlands has rejected plans for the EU’s further expansion. The following sections outline Dutch foreign policy, followed by recent political, security and legal developments in the Western Balkans region. The final section outlines lessons learned, and present policy recommendations regarding the EU integration policy in Western Balkans given the recent events in 2022.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Integration
Political Geography:: Europe

208. Resilience to Violent Extremism in Serbia: The Case of Sanjak

Author:: Predrag Petrovic and Marija Ignjatijevic
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: This paper presents the factors enabling the environment for extremism and the resilience factors to violent extremism in the case of Sanjak. Many experts had gloomy forecasts about violent Islamist extremism and terrorism in Serbia. Sanjak – the southwest region in Serbia populated by Muslim majority – was even dubbed Jihadist hotbed, as it was the center for further spreading ultra-conservative Salafism from the neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina into Serbia, and a region where the recruitment of Syrian foreign fighters took place. Among the most influential militant Salafi leaders in Vienna who maintained contacts with ISIS there were individuals from Sanjak. However, despite these forecasts and the presence of both push and pull factors of violent extremism, Sanjak has proved to be very resilient to violent Islamist extremism. Compared to other countries in the Western Balkans, a relatively small number of people from Serbia (49 of them including women and children) joined militant Islamist groups in Syria. Only a few incidents involving militant Salafis and failed terrorist plots happened. People in Sanjak showed both resilience to violent extremism and to the spread of the ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam. In this paper, we first identify the cases of violent extremism and then map and analyze factors that make Sanjak enabling environment for extremism. The second part of the paper is dedicated to understanding key resilience factors to violent extremism showcased in Sanjak. Ethno-nationalism and far-right extremism are only analyzed as possible drivers of Islamist radicalization. This report is based on extensive field research in Belgrade, Novi Pazar, Sjenica, and Tutin between July and September 2021, during which a total of 25 interviews were conducted.
Topic:: Security, Violent Extremism, Violence, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Europe and Serbia

209. Post-Brexit imports, supply chains, and the effect on consumer prices

Author:: Jan David Bakker, Nikhil Datta, Josh de Lyon, Luisa Opitz, and Dilan Yang
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:: This report documents the decrease in imports and shows how the patterns of imports vary across sectors following the UK’s departure from the Single Market and Customs Unit at the end of 2020. The authors, Jan David Bakker, Nikhil Datta, Josh De Lyon, Luisa Opitz, and Dilan Yang, focus on comparisons between imports from the EU and imports from non-EU countries. Some products, such as fats, oils, and waxes, experienced a sizeable decrease in trade volumes with EU countries compared to those of non-EU countries in January 2021. Other products, such as minerals, experienced minimal deviation in imports from the EU versus non-EU. We also document that the timing of import changes varies across products: in some cases, the deviation occurs pre-TCA, and there is some evidence of stockpiling; in other cases, the changes only occur post-TCA, and can be either short term or persistent. The fall in imports from the EU will affect the UK economy through its impact on supply chains. Two-thirds of international trade is in products used as inputs to production. We show that imports from the EU fell for products that are used as inputs to production in many industries in the UK. For some sectors such as agriculture, fishing, and car manufacturing, there is evidence that imported inputs began to be sourced from non-EU countries pre-TCA. For others, including vegetable oil, animal fats, prepared animal feeds, and pharmaceuticals, the adjustments occurred post-TCA. Evidence suggests that increased access to intermediate inputs can boost productivity, so a reversal is likely to cause a fall in productivity. Imports also provide cheaper goods to consumers, as well as a wider variety of choice. Focussing on food products, we show that the drop in imports after Brexit caused an increase in prices. Products that were more heavily reliant on imports from the EU increased in price following the election of Boris Johnson in 2019, pre-TCA and then increased further post-TCA. This report therefore shows that changes in imports of goods from the EU have affected UK firms’ supply chains. Part of this change is driven by the adjustment costs incurred as part of the new trading relationship and is likely to be short term, but another part is likely to reflect a long-term increase in the cost of inputs from the EU, which make up a sizable contribution of total imports. This could have a knock-on effect for consumers who will face higher prices, and for workers whose jobs will be affected by adjustments in the supply chain.
Topic:: European Union, Brexit, Trade, Imports, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

210. Understanding the Cost-Effectiveness of COVID-19 Vaccination in Nigeria

Author:: Helen Dempster, Jennifer Dew, Samuel Huckstep, Martina Castigliono, and Cassandra Zimmer
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Global Development
Abstract:: The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM) calls on countries of destination to both expand regular migration pathways and take steps to increase the development impact of these pathways. Migration can have a positive impact on the economic development of migrants themselves, their families, their countries of origin, and their country of destination, if aspects such as integration, remittances, and skill transfers are prioritized. This paper, produced by the Center for Global Development (CGD) and the UK office of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), outlines lessons for the UK Government to implement if they are to increase the development potential of both their existing and new immigration pathways, particularly in the agriculture, nursing, and green technology sectors
Topic:: Development, Migration, Immigration, and Reform
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

211. Toward a New Youth Brain-drain Paradigm in the Western Balkans

Author:: Marjan Icoski
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Youth brain drain is one of the most worrisome problems for the Western Balkan Six countries (WB6)—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia. The pace and intensity of youth brain drain, rank the WB6 among the top brain drain leaders in the world, with estimations to lose a quarter to half of its skilled and educated young citizens in the forthcoming decades. A situation that cast serious doubts on the democratic and economic progress of WB6, and their prospective membership into the EU. Youth brain drain is a historically rooted topic in the culture and tradition of the WB6, provoking huge sentiments and heated public debates. Due to its sensitivity, it is prone to politicization and misuse by the political parties that did not manage to find a compromise for its full acknowledgment as a separate policy field. Therefore, to date, the policy approach to youth brain drain is declarative and inconsistent, tackled as part of bigger policy areas such as youth employment, education, and diaspora engagement. Although formally, all WB6 countries have policies and institutional mechanisms in place, youth emigration and the desire to leave are constantly on the rise, underlining their limited scope and impact to keep youth home. This paper analyzes the conceptual shortcomings of the current policy approach. In line with the latest trends and tendencies of youth brain drain, it offers fresh policy options for utilization of the potential of the regional youth diaspora as the new WB6 development doctrine. The paper sees the youth diaspora not only as a source of remittances but also as a source of investments, know-how, skills, and connections as per the examples of several EU member states. The paper further announces the necessary paradigm change grounded in the shift of the public narrative and redesign of return and circulation policies through deepening regional cooperation and establishing a new migration deal with the EU under the framework of the WB6 accession processes.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Migration, Brain Drain, and Youth
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and Central Europe

212. How Its War on Ukraine Killed Russia’s Hydrogen Ambitions

Author:: Aliaksei Patonia
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Hydrogen looks like the fuel that can facilitate global decarbonization because it can be used in diverse applications—such as heat and power generation, transport, and manufacturing—without any carbon emissions. But, while many countries (including in Europe) view renewables-based, zero-carbon hydrogen as the ultimate goal in transitioning to a hydrogen economy, today most hydrogen is produced from natural gas. Thus, it is unlikely that the hydrogen transition will happen without relying on this fossil fuel. Russia is the country with the world’s largest natural gas deposits, and it has been exploring ways to adjust its energy sector to the needs of the emerging global hydrogen one. In 2021, it announced the goal of capturing up to 20 percent of the world’s hydrogen market by 2030. This came after all the major importers of Russia’s energy products had developed their hydrogen strategies, and its key energy companies started to explore new opportunities. Having signed memoranda of understanding with some of the world’s major energy companies to jointly develop Russia’s hydrogen export potential, they focused on Europe as the key destination. Some of Asia’s hydrogen pioneers and most promising future importers, such as Japan and South Korea, were also included among Russia’s potential partners. These steps could have resulted in long-lasting and fruitful collaborations generating large profits for Russia, but its ambitions have been jeopardized by its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This has led to Russia losing key political and economic partners in Europe and also in Asia, which—in combination with being the target the toughest sanctions in its history—is likely to cripple its nascent hydrogen sector. Having planned to convert its natural-gas pipelines to transport hydrogen to future buyers in Europe, Russia is unlikely to be able to use this infrastructure for this purpose anymore. The EU will be an unlikely buyer of Russian hydrogen for the foreseeable future. Turning to Japan and South Korea would not be a success either, since they have joined the sanctions regime against Russia and, like the EU, have been officially labeled as unfriendly by Moscow. This will make the transfer of the technologies critical for the production of low- and zero-carbon hydrogen from the world leaders to a technologically backward Russia very problematic. Europe will also feel long-lasting repercussions of Russia’s war in Ukraine in the energy and hydrogen sectors. With no steady supplies of cheap Russian gas or hydrogen, Europe’s decarbonization efforts and building up its hydrogen industry will be inhibited and require a lot more effort and money. Russia will have to seek alternative markets for its energy commodities and it will seek deals with China, the only country whose energy consumption can rival that of Europe. But, as one of the world’s largest producers of electrolysers and of conventionally manufactured hydrogen, China probably will not need to import Russia’s hydrogen to build up its own hydrogen sector. Possessing critical technologies of its own, it will instead increase imports of Russian primary energy sources (such as natural gas) that it can use for producing hydrogen. The influx of huge volumes of cheap Russian feedstock will speed up China’s transformation from a country with a nascent hydrogen sector into a dominant player on the global hydrogen market. If the EU or the United States—the only two actors comparable to China in economic, technological, and geopolitical strength—do not develop similarly strong hydrogen sectors, Beijing could end up dominating the global energy landscape. To avoid the geopolitical consequences of this and for global balance to be maintained, further cooperation between the EU and the United States will be needed to speed up the creation of strong hydrogen sectors for both.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Business, Trade, Hydrogen, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

213. How the EU Can Defend Media Freedom and Pluralism in Hungary and Poland

Author:: Anna Wójcik
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: In recent years, the European Union has suffered from the erosion of media freedom and pluralism, particularly in Hungary and Poland, where this has been part of a broader decline in democratic standards that has reversed gains made from the transitioning from communism. The main problems include the lack of independence of media regulators; public media being turned into propaganda outlets for the government, characterized by reporting bias and vilifying the opposition; private media capture; the state disproportionately funding government-supporting private media, including through state-controlled companies’ advertising; and creating obstacles for private media independent of government, including through revoking licenses and threatening new taxes. In Poland, the number of strategic lawsuits against public participation against certain media that criticize the government have also greatly increased. The EU has been in the prepared to tackle the issue of breaches of media freedom and pluralism chiefly through a combination of political instruments and new legislation, which may eventually embolden the EU institutions to take legal action. However, it is important to ensure any new legislative initiative will have added value. The EU already has avenues for legal actions to protect media freedom and pluralism in member states.
Topic:: European Union, Media, Freedom of Press, and Pluralism
Political Geography:: Europe, Poland, and Hungary

214. Designing Sanctions: Lessons from EU Restrictive Measures against Belarus

Author:: Yuliya Miadzvetskaya
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The effectiveness and impact of sanctions are predetermined by how they are designed. This paper looks at the different elements in the design of European Union sanctions on Belarus in its different stages, their main pitfalls, and their potential effects on the country and its citizens. Several key elements are important for the design of sanctions: the triggering situation, the type of sanctions, the clarity of objectives and targets, the evidence for listings, and the conditions for review. They are crucial for explaining the mismatch between the objectives of EU sanctions and their limited impact. The gravity of the situation that triggers the introduction of sanctions is closely linked to the type of restrictive measures that will be chosen by the EU. Threats to EU and regional security as well as to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of its neighbors result in more complex measures, including sectoral economic sanctions, export restrictions, and flight bans. In the case of Belarus, broader economic measures were enacted in response to growing security threats to the EU and its partners. An analysis of EU sanctions on Belarus, including their cyclical nature, suggests that they have been most effective when their objective is limited and achievable. The release of political prisoners, cosmetic reforms to the Electoral Code, and the partial solution of the migration crisis are the most obvious examples of concessions that were made by the Belarusian authorities following the imposition of sanctions. Overly ambitious sanctions objectives limit the EU’s room for maneuver and bargaining. Bringing to justice those responsible for forced disappearances and human-rights violations or holding new free and fair elections are inacceptable demands for the Belarusian regime because they endanger its survival as it relies on the law-enforcement institutions. The effects of sanctions also depend on whom can be added on sanctions lists. Listing or designation criteria define conditions under which someone can be targeted. Those for Belarus were significantly updated in 2021 and now target those responsible for violations of human rights and election falsification, entities and persons benefitting from the regime, and those responsible for the forced landing of a Ryanair plane, the instrumentalization of the migration crisis, and Belarus’s involvement in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The broadening of the listing criteria increases the sanctioning power of the EU and paves the way for the extension of sanctions listings. The EU enacts sanctions by providing a statement of reasons that must come under the listing criteria and be substantiated with sufficient evidence for each listing. Based on EU sanctions-related case law, sanctions are designed in a way that takes into consideration the due-process rights of targeted individuals and entities. The EU Council has deployed a degree of legal gymnastics in crafting its sanctions on Belarus to increase their traction, notably by using the broad concepts of “support” for and “benefit” from the regime’s actions. Conditions for the review of sanctions are construed as requirements addressed to the targeted state. The fulfillment of these or some variation in the behavior of the target could trigger the partial suspension or the lifting of restrictive measures. Those conditions in EU sanctions against Belarus are sometimes included in EU legal acts and sometimes in other political statements. Clear-cut conditions for reviewing sanctions would help in improving their effects. The paper concludes with suggestions regarding the EU sanctions policy toward Belarus, notably with respect to national bias and to the need for a proper prior impact assessment, realistic objectives, clear communication, and more leverage for the EU.
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Domestic Politics, and Society
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, and Belarus

215. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: Matching Ambition with Reality

Author:: Jonny Hall and Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: This Strategic Update is based on a discussion hosted by LSE IDEAS in July 2022 on NATO’s 2030 Strategic Concept. Participants in the discussion included: General Sir James Everard, Gordon Barrass, General Sir Richard Barrons, Lt Gen Giles Hill, ProfessorChristopher Coker, Dr Luca Tardelli, Marissa Kemp, Tom McKane, and Peter Watkins. This Strategic Update reflects points made during the discussion, but no participant is in any way committed to its specific content, and the views expressed here are attributable solely to the authors. The Strategic Concept is the first since 2010 and was redrafted throughout a fundamentally different geopolitical and security context—following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This Update addresses the Concept’s recognition of necessary strategic realignment, with NATO’s widening in both its defence commitments and geographic focus on China, as well as its ambiguity in regards to practical military strategy, deterrence, and endpoint of the war in Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

216. NATO’s Resilience: The first and last line of defence

Author:: Johnny Hall and Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: Ahead of NATO’s Madrid Summit in June 2022, Hugh Sandeman and Jonny Hall confront the political challenges posed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the alliance’s 2021 Strengthened Resilience Commitment, especially in creating collective standards when resilience remains the responsibility of individual member states. The authors find that resilience is a psychological mindset as well as a material factor, and NATO’s ‘whole-of-society’ approach should be framed within the concept of ‘deterrence by denial’ to potential threats. This Strategic Update is based on a discussion hosted by LSE IDEAS in January 2022 on ‘How can NATO define and develop practical objectives for enhancing the resilience of member states?’ Participants in the discussion were: General Sir James Everard, Dr Tomas Ries, Susan Scholefield, Peter Watkins, Professor Gordon Barrass, General Sir Richard Barrons, Professor Christopher Coker, and Tom McKane. This Strategic Update reflects points made during the discussion, but no participant is in any way committed to its specific content, and the views expressed here are attributable solely to the authors.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

217. The Long Shadow of the Soviet Union: Demystifying Putin’s Rhetoric Towards Ukraine

Author:: Björn Alexander Düben
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: As tensions between Russia and Ukraine reach an almost-tipping point, Björn Alexander Düben analyses the historical and geopolitical rhetoric Putin and his government have deployed against the post-Maidan Ukraine since 2014. Asking, can this be seen as another Russian assertion of dominance in the post-Soviet region, could there be reasons closer to home, or why tensions across the border seem to once again be at a breaking point? From global oil prices to regime consolidation, an analysis into the words of Russia’s elites could unveil what future Europe is steering towards.
Topic:: Geopolitics, History, Conflict, Soviet Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

218. Can Chancellor Scholz Save the West? The New German Government and Global Geopolitics

Author:: Maximilian Terhalle
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: In the wake of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s departure from the German Chancellorship, her successor, Olaf Scholz, inherits a Germany which has been lacking in strategic vision and an acute foreign policy for a considerable amount of time. Maximilian Terhalle asks, can Chancellor Scholz provide this vision for his country, and imbue NATO and the EU with a coherent and unified foreign policy in the face of threats from China, Russia, and a divided ‘West’?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, Olaf Scholz, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Germany

219. On the Design of Effective Sanctions: The Case of Bans on Exports to Russia

Author:: Ricardo Hausmann, Ulrich Schetter, and Muhammad A. Yildirim
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:: We analyze the effects of bans on exports at the level of 5’000 products and show how our results can inform economic sanctions against Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. We begin with characterizing export restrictions imposed by the EU and the US until mid May 2022. We then propose a theoretically-grounded criterion for targeting export bans at the 6-digit HS level. Our results show that the cost to Russia are highly convex in the market share of the sanctioning parties, i.e., there are large benefits from coordinating export bans among a broad coalition of countries. Applying our results to Russia, we find that sanctions imposed by the EU and the US are not systematically related to our arguments once we condition on Russia’s total imports of a product from participating countries. Quantitative evaluations of the export bans show (i) that they are very effective with the welfare loss typically ∼100 times larger for Russia than for the sanctioners. (ii) Improved coordination of the sanctions and targeting sanctions based on our criterion allows to increase the costs to Russia by about 60% with little to no extra cost to the sanctioners. (iii) There is scope for increasing the cost to Russia further by expanding the set of sanctioned products.
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Exports, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

220. Global Supply Chain Pressures, International Trade, and Inflation

Author:: Julian di Giovanni, Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan, Alvaro Silva, and Muhammad A. Yildirim
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:: We study the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on Euro Area inflation and how it compares to the experiences of other countries, such as the United States, over the two-year period 2020-21. Our model-based calibration exercises deliver four key results: 1) Compositional effects – the switch from services to goods consumption – are amplified through global input-output linkages, affecting both trade and inflation. 2) Inflation can be higher under sector-specific labor shortages relative to a scenario with no such supply shocks. 3) Foreign shocks and global supply chain bottlenecks played an outsized role relative to domestic aggregate demand shocks in explaining Euro Area inflation over 2020-21. 4) International trade did not respond to changes in GDP as strongly as it did during the 2008-09 crisis despite strong demand for goods. These lower trade elasticities in part reflect supply chain bottlenecks. These four results imply that policies aimed at stimulating aggregate demand would not have produced as high an inflation as the one observed in the data without the negative sectoral supply shocks.
Topic:: Economy, Inflation, COVID-19, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

221. What the First Week of Fighting in Ukraine Tells Us About a Potential Insurgency

Author:: Alec Worsnop
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: While the Russian advance in Ukraine has been slower than expected, its overwhelming conventional superiority gives it the upper hand. Despite the valiant resistance of many Ukrainians, Russia will probably conquer all or a portion of the country. However, the first week of the conflict has provided some useful information about the prospects for an insurgent campaign in the wake of a Russian occupation.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

222. Are the effects of terrorism short-lived?

Author:: Vincenzo Bove, Georgios Efthyvoulou, and Harry Pickard
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: United Nations University
Abstract:: Numerous studies demonstrate that terrorism causes strong public reactions immediately after the attack, with important implications for democratic institutions and individual well-being. Yet, are these effects short-lived? We answer this question using a quasi-experimental design and data on three successful and three foiled terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom. We find that heightened risk perceptions and emotional reactions in the wake of successful attacks do not dissipate in the very short run but are sustained over time and up to 130 days after the attacks. We also find that, whereas large-scale attacks cause a long-lasting shift in risk assessments and emotions, the corresponding effect of smaller-scale terrorism incidents appears to subside within one month. Interestingly, foiled attacks can also affect public perceptions, which, however, quickly return to normal levels. We argue that the extent of media coverage is partly responsible for the duration of these effects.
Topic:: Terrorism, Emotions, and Risk
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

223. Prosperity and Resilience: Diverse Production and Comparative Advantage in Modern Economies

Author:: David Henig and Anna Guildea
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: A common version of trade theory suggests that countries will specialise in a limited number of products. Using the example of David Ricardo from 1817, England specialises in cloth and Portugal in producing wine – and then they trade with each other to mutual benefit. However, this is a crude version of comparative advantage that routinely leads to political concerns about trade. Today the prime concern is that Europe and other developed countries have become too dependent on China by allowing the logic of comparative advantage to work. In short, trade has made us vulnerable. The observed reality is different. Most advanced economies produce and export a broad range of goods and services. Their governments have similar aspirations to develop and support diverse manufacturing and services, including in the most traded global sectors such as pharmaceuticals, automotive, business services, and food and drink. Modern specialisation comes in countries producing various, but not all, products within global supply chains. Patterns of trade suggest such specialisation has allowed countries to both grow and become resilient to individual shocks. Knowledge and ownership of the whole supply chain is more important than producing everything.
Topic:: Globalization, Economy, Services, Resilience, WTO, and Production
Political Geography:: Europe and Global Focus

224. Strategic Autonomy and Long-term Innovation Competitiveness: On the Importance of Intellectual Property Rights for the Production of High-Value Medicines in the EU

Author:: Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Europe’s political leaders have in recent months called for “European industrial autonomy”. Notions of dependency, sovereignty and resilience are now also referred to in policy proposals targeted at pharmaceutical companies, with “strategic autonomy” being the ultimate political ambition. The precise meaning of strategic autonomy in biopharmaceutical industries remains yet to be defined, although the current Pharmaceutical Strategy only refers to “open strategic autonomy” in the context of dependencies and supply chains. This is regrettable, as it does not take into account the importance of strategic research and innovation autonomy, allowing the EU to ensure a high degree of autonomy in innovative medicines and therapies. Current policy conceptions fail to account for businesses’ long-term international innovation competitiveness and Europe’s capability to attract investments in pharmaceutical research and cutting-edge production technologies. Present conceptions of strategic autonomy of Europe’s pharmaceutical industry disregard the fact that the EU is substantially lagging the USA and, increasingly, other parts of the word in pharmaceutical innovation. Clinical trials’ pipeline data shows that, in the future, EU Member States will very likely become increasingly dependent on innovative medicines that are temporarily protected by patents and market exclusivity rights held by non-EU rights holders in many therapeutic areas. This gives some urgency to Commission President von der Leyen ensuring that the European industry remains an “innovator” and “world leader” (Mission Letter by Commission President von der Leyen to Commissioner Kyriakides). The European Commission’s current understanding of sovereignty in pharmaceutical industries centres around one core theme: the reduction of dependencies from pharmaceutical suppliers outside the EU. At the same time, in an effort to achieve equitable access to affordable medicines and to foster research into unmet medical needs, it considers changes in the incentive structure for research in medicines for children and rare diseases, and new obligations for companies to achieve a more equitable access to medicines across Member States. While these objectives are generally merited, the Commission has established a narrow perspective about a concept that is aiming for ambitious long-term achievements for Europe’s pharmaceutical industry. The industry’s future innovation competitiveness and the capacity to develop and produce high value-added medicines, which should be at the core of any concept of long-term autonomy, have largely been ignored.
Topic:: Intellectual Property/Copyright, European Union, Innovation, Medicine, Strategic Autonomy, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:: Europe

225. After the DMA, the DSA and the New AI regulation: Mapping the Economic Consequences of and Responses to New Digital Regulations in Europe

Author:: Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Erik van der Marel, and Elena Sisto
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The European Union (EU) has pursued an ambitious agenda for regulating the digital economy, and it is now planning to establish a new package of regulations, including the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Digital Services Act (DSA), and a new regulation of Artificial Intelligence (AI). These regulations build on an already established structure of digital and business regulations in Europe that is comparatively restrictive but that varies substantially between EU member states. In this study, we take stock of the new incoming regulations and review their effect on EU member states’ economies. More precisely, the paper considers how different countries in Europe will be affected by the regulations and how they should balance these effects with policies that help the economy to prosper. The European Commission’s economic analyses and impact assessments of the new regulations are thin. In fact, they are grossly inadequate for the purpose at hand: to better understand how the economy will change because of these regulations. The Commission identifies some benefits – for instance, positive competition outcomes from reduced network effects and more trust in AI-based goods and services. There are good reasons to think that these benefits are real. However, these regulations will also lead to new costs and have broader consequences for firms and resource allocation in the economy. Remarkably, the only costs identified in the impact assessments are direct compliance and administrative costs. Obviously, for far-reaching regulations such as the DMA, the DSA and the AI regulation, the main costs will not be the direct compliance burden, but the dynamic and downstream economic effects spurred by their implementation. This is because these regulations will prompt firms and markets to change their current and future behaviour: these changes are likely to define the most important costs. Furthermore, it is important to get a better idea of the distribution of these costs. It is highly unlikely that all sectors and countries will be affected equally. Some sectors will be more affected than others just as some countries will experience economic consequences that are bigger than in other countries. The question is: what factors will lead to the expected variation in the costs and consequences of the three new regulations? In this paper, we argue that two factors are important for grasping the distributive patterns of costs from digital regulations. First, the industry structure of a country is key. In the economy, countries have different endowment structures, and the modern European economy is defined by factor endowments such as data and digital competences. These factor endowments are exploited in the economy by firms and organisations that use them to create different comparative advantages. In turn, these advantages influence how a firm and a country market, sell and trade. Second, the existing structure of a country’s business and digital regulations will influence how an economy will respond to new and additional digital regulations. In fact, the restrictiveness of regulations that we know to impact on the digital economy vary substantially in the European Union – both between countries and between sectors. This variation will have consequences for the distribution of the costs of the three new regulations that are going to be implemented. This paper maps countries and country groups in the digital economy: their endowments, advantages, and flows. Especially, it evaluates the digital performance of countries in a number of key indicators and data points, and anchors the analysis in the academic literature. The paper points to some specific consequences of the DMA, the DSA and the AI regulation, and how different regulations will affect endowments structures and advantages. One key finding is that the distributive effects of the regulations will depend on size advantages and disadvantages. In short, small economies and small firms will likely carry a disproportionate part of the cost of new digital regulations. Furthermore, countries that have used their endowments to specialise in the digital economy will be more affected than others. On this score, there is a vast difference between EU countries. For instance, countries in Europe’s North – generally small, competitive, and open economies – will be most affected by these new regulatory burdens. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe will also be negatively affected, especially through risks of market exclusion effects for small firms. It is important for European policymakers to now consider how they can avoid that these new digital regulations continuously reinforce size advantages for big economies and big firms. There are some policy strategies that should be considered. First, regulations can be changed to better fit the overwhelming evidence that young, dynamic, and innovative firms drive a substantial part of productivity growth in the economy. Second, EU and national policymakers can pursue policies that make the transition into a more size-balanced economy easier, for instance by taxing and regulating small firms differently. Smaller economies can also be helped by having corporate taxes that are lower than in big economies. Third, EU and national policymakers can reform other digital and business regulations and make them less burdensome. Fourth, the EU can help to support the build-up of digital advantages in smaller economies.
Topic:: Markets, European Union, Regulation, and Digital Economy
Political Geography:: Europe

226. The New Wave of Defensive Trade Policy Measures in the European Union: Design, Structure, and Trade Effects

Author:: Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, Vanika Sharma, and Renata Zilli
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: This study undertakes a comprehensive review of proposed and adopted defensive trade policy instruments in the EU, with the purpose of better understanding their design, functioning, and implications. The study covers eight policy instruments at different stages of development. These are: Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), International Procurement Instrument (IPI), Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), Foreign Subsidy Instrument (FSI), Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence (DD), Level Playing Field Provisions in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (LPF), Enforcement Regulation (ER), and the Deforestation Initiative (DI). It is understandable that the EU seeks both redressive and retaliatory measures in its trade policy. However, these measures would have the total effect of Europe producing more for itself and being less dependent on imports. This is a significant policy shift, because in their totality the defensive trade policies make the EU more inward-looking. This can lead to major negative consequences. An extensive distortion of trade and markets would reduce the gains from trade and prompt a reallocation of European resources. Notably, the EU is a larger supplier of goods and services than it is a buyer, and an inward-looking policy that leads to retaliation from EU’s trading partners can harm its exports and trade surplus. There are also potential strategic consequences that could follow, and their importance has increased considerable as a result of the Russian war against Ukraine. Under these measures, the EU could introduce new trade frictions with friends and allies, and with countries that the EU seeks closer cooperation with to provide for a safer geopolitical environment. For each of these defensive measures, the study takes an extensive look at the objectives of the instruments, their legality, proportionality, and subsidiarity, the working of the instruments and the division of labour between institutions, as well as their enforceability in conjunction with existing multilateral and bilateral rules affecting the EU. It also attempts to capture the impact and potential for retaliation for the EU and its partners as a result of the implementation of the instruments. The study highlights the areas where the instruments lack clarity, particularly in the implementation of the instrument, the division of labour between the EU and EU member states, and the compliance of the instruments with WTO rules and bilateral FTA provisions. The instruments share some general characteristics. Many of the instruments have been created as retaliatory measures against coercion and unfair trade practices by partner countries. Very often, the partner countries most affected by the instruments are also the same. The United States, China, Russia, the UK, and Turkey are likely to be on the receiving end of the instruments due to the significant volumes of trade and economic interdependence with the EU, but also because they either do not follow the same trade rules as the EU, or the EU wants to maintain with them the current level of competitiveness. Most instruments also use restrictions to the EU market as the main policy lever. The objective is not just about creating an equal playing field but also ensuring that the rest of the world follows EU rules. Particularly, the EU aims at regulating non-EU companies directly and unilaterally through EU policies, which increases the risk of retaliation against the EU. At the same time, there are also important areas of departure in the specifics of each instrument, as illustrated by the varying objectives, measures, compatibility with international obligation, affected sectors, and whether the measures apply automatically or at the discretion of the EU.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Political Economy, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:: Europe

227. Policy Paper: Considerations of condemnation and balance of Palestine’s position on the war in Ukraine

Author:: Palthink
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:: In classic wars, we waited for the military result, and then we formed a political response. In new wars, there is not a final resolution; there is only the stronger party imposing its conditions. Additionally, there is also geographical control, regime projection, or behavior modification goals. Russia is seeking to maintain its national security and enhance its regional and international position. It has a deep fear that NATO will expand, bringing weapons to its border with Ukraine. Now that the first shock of the war has receded, the world realizes that the war will not exceed Ukraine’s borders. Russia has given indications that it will limit itself to the minimum that preserves its national security by preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. Global concern about the consequences of war is high. People are wondering if it will continue or stop. Additionally, sanctions have been announced. In this context, developing and poor countries are affected by conflict because they depend on foreign aid. Their positions on the war will determine where they are positioned, and how the political, economic and security consequences will affect them. Trying to show a neutral position would not endear them to the great powers. On the face of it, it may seem to be a war fought on Ukrainian lands only, but it is a world war of influence. The survival of developing nations depends on the strength of the international community and the extent to which it supports these nations in the light of political realism, not because of their strength and resources. Many places cannot survive without traditional international support.
Topic:: International Relations, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Palestine

228. The effect of COVID certificates on vaccine uptake, public health, and the economy

Author:: Philippe Aghion, Guntram Wolff, Philippe Martin, Lionel Guetta-Jeanrenaud, Bary Pradelski, Miquel Oliu-Barton, Nicolas Woloszko, Patrick Artus, and Arnaud Fontanet
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: In the COVID-19 pandemic, governments have, among other measures, mandated the use of COVID certificates to prove vaccination, recovery or a recent negative test, and have required individuals to show certificates to access shops, restaurants, and education or workplaces. While arguments for and against COVID certificates have focused on reducing transmission and ethical concerns, the incentive effects of COVID certificates on vaccine uptake, health outcomes and the economy has not yet been investigated. To estimate these effects, we construct counterfactuals based on innovation diffusion theory for France, Germany and Italy. We estimate that the announcement of COVID certificates during summer 2021 led to increased vaccine uptake in France of 13.0 (95% CI 9.7–14.9) percentage points (p.p.) of the total population up to the end of the year, in Germany 6.2 (2.6–6.9) p.p., and in Italy 9.7 (5.4–12.3) p.p. Further, this averted an additional 3,979 (3,453–4,298) deaths in France, 1,133 (-312–1,358) in Germany, and 1,331 (502–1,794) in Italy; and prevented gross domestic product (GDP) losses of €6.0 (5.9–6.1) billion in France, €1.4 (1.3–1.5) billion in Germany, and €2.1 (2.0–2.2) billion in Italy. Notably, the application of COVID certificates substantially reduced the pressure on intensive care units (ICUs) and, in France, prevented occupancy levels being exceeded where prior lockdowns were instated. Varying government communication efforts and restrictions associated with COVID certificates may explain country differences, such as the smaller effect in Germany. Overall, our findings are more sizeable than predicted. This analysis may help inform decisions about when and how to employ COVID certificates to increase vaccine uptake and thus avoid stringent interventions, such as closures, curfews, and lockdowns, with major social and economic consequences.
Topic:: Government, Economy, Public Health, Vaccine, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe

229. Cutting Putin’s Energy Rent: ‘Smart Sanctioning’ Russian Oil and Gas

Author:: Ricardo Hausmann, Agata Łoskot-Strachota, Axel Ockenfels, Ulrich Schetter, Simone Tagliapietra, Guntram Wolff, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:: Following the Russian aggression against Ukraine, major sanctions have been imposed by Western countries, most notably with the aim of limiting Russia’s access to hard international currency. However, Russia remains the world’s first exporter of oil and gas, and at current energy prices this provides large hard currency revenues. As the war continues, European governments are under increased pressure to scale-up their energy sanctions, following measures taken by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. This piece argues that given the inelasticity of Russia’s oil and gas supply, for Europe the most efficient way to sanction Russian energy would not be an embargo, but the introduction of an import tariff that can be used flexibly to control the degree of economic pressure on Russia.
Topic:: Economics, Oil, Sanctions, Exports, Currency, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and North America

230. Trade Liberalization, Collective Bargaining and Workers: Wages and Working Conditions

Author:: Bastien Alvarez, Gianluca Orefice, and Farid Toubal
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: Using large scale data on Eastern European workers, we show significant and sizable deteriorations of their wages and working conditions in regions that faced large tariff liberalization and strong erosion of collective bargaining over the process of accession to the European Union. Import tariffs liberalization reduces workers' wages. The deterioration of working conditions is mostly driven by increased labor demand due to the improvement of Eastern countries' international market access. The erosion of collective bargaining worsens wages and working conditions.
Topic:: Labor Issues, Tariffs, Collective Bargaining, and Wages
Political Geography:: Europe and Eastern Europe

231. EU in Search of a WTO-Compatible Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism

Author:: Cecilia Bellora and Lionel Fontagné
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: To meet the targets of the EU’s ”Fit for 55” package, the European Commission proposes to implement a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). The CBAM is firstly intended to avoid carbon leakages, but it also deals with the thorny issue of the compliance by European producers in carbon-intensive industries. In addition, its design, as voted by the European Council on March 15, 2022, questions the compatibility of the CBAM with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. The CBAM puts a price on carbon contained in imported products whose production-related emissions have not been taxed (or not at the same level as in the European Union) by the exporter country, in order to offset the difference in carbon prices at the border. This paper aims to quantify the economic and environmental impacts of different CBAM design choices with the aim of complying with WTO rules. Different from the previous literature, we evaluate the various options with a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring imperfect competition, global value chains, green-house gas emissions and endogenous price of emission quotas. We show that CBAM is effective in reducing carbon leakages. But its design leads to an increase in the price of carbon quotas in the European Emission Trading System (ETS) market. Losses in competitiveness on export markets are expected, also for downstream sectors not covered by the EU ETS nor the CBAM. Eventually, offsetting the difference in carbon prices at the border comes at a cost to the enforcing jurisdiction, suggesting that the CBAM was not designed as a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.
Topic:: Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Carbon Emissions, WTO, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: Europe

232. Second-generation immigrants and native attitudes toward immigrants in Europe

Author:: Oscar Barrera, Isabelle Bensidoun, and Anthony Edo
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: This paper investigates the role played by immigrants and their children in shaping native attitudes toward immigrants in the European Union. By exploiting the 2017 Special Eurobarometer on immigrant integration, we show that countries with a relatively high share of immigrants are more likely to believe that immigrants are a burden on the welfare system and worsen crime. In contrast, native opinions on the impact of immigration on culture and the labor market are unrelated to the presence of immigrants. We also find that the effects of second-generation immigrants on pro-immigrant attitudes toward security and fiscal concerns are positive (as opposed to first-generation immigrants). Finally, we find no impact of the immigrant share on the attitudes of natives supporting far-left or left political parties, while it is the most negative among respondents affiliated with far-right parties.
Topic:: Children, European Union, Immigrants, Ideology, Welfare, and Nativism
Political Geography:: Europe

233. Regional Diffusion of Foreign Demand Shocks Through Trade and Ownership Networks

Author:: Lionel Fontagné and Gianluca Santoni
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: International demand shocks are transmitted within the trade and ownership firms' networks and impact directly or indirectly domestic firm productivity and labor misallocation. Considering manufacturing firms for Italy, Spain and France over the period 2009-2017, we quantify these transmission channels from the global economy to the domestic firms, and within the domestic economy across locations, sectors and firms. We compute in a shift share fashion international demand shock at the district-sector-year level as plausibly exogenous to individual firms. Our results confirm that global shocks are transmitted through trade networks and that this transmission is largely mediated by firms' ownership networks both across and within the borders of the three countries.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Demand, and Productivity
Political Geography:: Europe, France, Spain, and Italy

234. The Heterogenous Effects of Employers’ Concentration on Wages: Better Sorting or Uneven Rent Extracting?

Author:: Axelle Arquie and Julia Bertin
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: We show empirically for France that labor market concentration decreases wages heterogeneously, with the lowest earners being the most vulnerable, and increases local wage inequality within occupations. If concentration allows employers to improve worker selection, both inequality and efficiency gains could materialize. However, based on a simple formalization, we interpret the findings that employer concentration increases within-firm inequality and decreases between-firm inequality as evidence against such a sorting mechanism. We also find evidence that employer concentration does not increase positive assortative matching. The results therefore suggest that concentration increases inequality through the relatively reduced bargaining position of the lowest earners.
Topic:: Labor Issues, Inequality, Labor Market, and Wages
Political Geography:: Europe and France

235. The Usual Suspects: Offender Origin, Media Reporting and Natives’ Attitudes Towards Immigration

Author:: Sekou Keita, Thomas Renault, and Jerome Valette
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: This paper analyses whether the systematic disclosure of criminals’ origins in the press affects natives’ attitudes towards immigration. It takes advantage of the unilateral change in reporting policy announced by the German newspaper Sächsische Zeitung in July, 2016. Combining individual-level panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel from 2014 to 2018 with 402,819 crime-related articles in German newspapers and those newspapers’ market shares, we find that systematically mentioning the origins of criminals increases the relative salience of natives’ criminality and reduces natives’ concerns about immigration, breaking the implicit link between immigration and crime.
Topic:: Media, Immigrants, Discrimination, and Nativism
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

236. Skilled Immigration, Task Allocation and the Innovation of Firms

Author:: Anna Maria Mayda, Gianluca Orefice, and Gianluca Santoni
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: This paper analyses the impact of skilled migrants on the innovation (patenting) activity of French firms between 1995 and 2010, and investigates the underlying mechanism. We present district-level and firm-level estimates and address endogeneity using a modified version of the shift-share instrument. Skilled migrants increase the number of patents at both the district and firm level. Large, high-productivity and capital-intensive firms benefit the most, in terms of innovation activity, from skilled immigrant workers. Importantly, we provide evidence that one channel through which the effect works is task specialization (as in Peri and Sparber, 2009). The arrival of skilled immigrants drives French skilled workers towards language-intensive, managerial tasks while foreign skilled workers specialize in technical, research-oriented tasks. This mechanism manifests itself in the estimated increase in the share of foreign inventors in patenting teams as a consequence of skilled migration. Through this channel, greater innovation is the result of productivity gains from specialization.
Topic:: Business, Immigrants, Innovation, and Skilled Labor
Political Geography:: Europe and France

237. Current Account Balances’ Divergence in the Euro Area: an Appraisal of the Underlying Forces

Author:: Emmanuelle Faure, Carl Grekou, and Valérie Mignon
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: This paper revisits the crucial issue of current account imbalances and focuses on the determinants of their gaps between eurozone Member States. We conduct robust estimations of the current account balances for a panel of ten founding euro area economies and construct a measure that allows us to diagnose why some countries have started to diverge from the eurozone mean in the last two decades. Our findings show evidence of remaining differences in countries’ economic development, meaning that real macroeconomic convergence has failed in the zone. Price and cost competitiveness, as well as fiscal balances, have also participated in this growing macroeconomic divergence. Overall, while the European authorities cannot influence the part of the current account gaps due to demographic factors, the role of fiscal redistribution and investment at the euro area level could help achieve macroeconomic convergence and thus reduce current accounts’ divergence in the zone.
Topic:: Economics, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Eurozone, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: Europe

238. Everything Counts: Building a Control Regime for Nonstrategic Nuclear Warheads in Europe

Author:: Miles A. Pomper, William Alberque, Marshall L. Brown Jr., William M. Moon, and Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:: Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration insisted in arms control talks with Russia that a follow-on agreement to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) should cover all nuclear weapons and that such an agreement should focus on the nuclear warheads themselves. This would represent a significant change from previous agreements, which focused on delivery vehicles, such as missiles. The United States has been particularly interested in potential limits on nonstrategic nuclear warheads (NSNW). Such weapons have never been subject to an arms control agreement. Because Russia possesses an advantage in the number of such weapons, the US Senate has insisted that negotiators include them in a future agreement, making their inclusion necessary if such an accord is to win Senate approval and ultimately be ratified by Washington. In the wake of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine conflict, such demands can only be expected to grow if and when US and Russian negotiators return to the negotiating table.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

239. Russian-Turkish Relations and Implications for U.S. Strategy and Operations

Author:: Hanna Notte and Chen Kane
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:: Russia and Turkey’s complex relationship has significant implications for U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategic interests. The two states cooperate, deconflict, and compete in multiple theatres within Turkey’s extended neighborhood, which straddles United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), and United States European Command (USEUCOM) areas of responsibility (AORs). 1 Their bilateral strategic trade has created mutual dependencies and vulnerabilities across multiple sectors, such as natural gas, nuclear energy, and tourism. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has many implications for the Russia-Turkey relationship. While engaging actively with Russia and stoking fears that its commercial ties with Moscow could serve Russia’s evasion of Western sanctions, Turkey has also provided TB2 Bayraktar drones to Ukraine, invoked the Montreux Convention, and offered itself as a mediator on various operational issues in the Russia-Ukraine war. As a result of these steps, Turkey’s leverage over both Russia and NATO allies has increased since February 2022. From a U.S. perspective, the implications have been mixed as Turkey has translated its increased leverage into foreign policy steps that threaten to undermine U.S. interests and NATO cohesion. Turkey remains of significant importance to the United States in enabling its interests in the three aforementioned AORs, preventing third actors like China and Iran from operating in the “seams,” and generating an enhanced, unified, and credible NATO capability and capacity in response to Russian aggression. It follows that Turkey’s interplay with Russia in its extended neighborhood has far-reaching implications for the United States and NATO. This study aims to shed light on this relationship, its likely trajectory over the coming decade, its implications for U.S. strategic interests, and how the United States and NATO might shape the Russia- Turkey interplay to their advantage.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, North America, and United States of America

240. The African-France Summit and an Overview of its Recommendations Since 1973

Author:: Fabien Sundjo
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:: France’s earliest profit-making involvement in Africa in the business of buying and transporting slaves started in the 17th century when the local Indian population proved unable to work in plantations in America compared to black Africans. France’s interest in Africa reached its zenith in the 19th and early 20th centuries when France acquired a gigantic African empire. Though several reasons could explain the scramble for Africa by France, we present herein the three most important. First, the defeat of France in the 1870 Prussian war in which she lost influence and a reduction in her international ego. Second, the anxiety to implement Colbert’s mercantilist philosophy emphasized that any rising industrial power required to have both the source of raw materials and market extension under her control. Third and finally, as Europeans scrambled for Africa, France feared their traditional enemies could annex a remarkable share of the territory. Hence, from the outset, it was not the financial gains that many thoughts motivated France’s involvement in Africa but politics and national ego. It will only be later that France saw Africa as a cheap source of military manpower that could help balance demographic stagnation in France. This perception will later be reinforced by her experience in the two World wars. In this light, Iliffe (2007) holds that French colonial policy was characterized by the exploitation of rich resources from Africa. In the midst of all these benefits from colonization in Africa, Charles de Gaulle‘s decision to retain influence in Africa after decolonization in 1960 was driven by the need to persist with these benefits under neo-colonization. According to Abdurrahim (2014), in Africa, France uses a realist foreign policy in which states shape their foreign policies based on their national interests. To facilitate the implementation of this realist foreign policy, France will design the Franco-African summit that will cement France’s influence in her former colonies to date. Were France’s policies put in place through the Franco-African summits shaped to benefit France solely? This paper aims to present the Franco-African Summit and carry out a stocktake of France’s commitments through recommendations from the Franco-African Summit.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, and France

241. Taking the road away from Europe – how far could Georgia go (and can it be reversed)?

Author:: Ghia Nodia
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: Earlier this year, as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moldova and Ukraine were granted official EU candidate status… but not Georgia. Instead, Georgia has been left behind on the waiting list, with its application due to be reevaluated by the EU sometime in 2023. Yet Georgia has an extremely pro-European society highly in favour of their country continuing its journey towards closer integration with the EU. So what happened? This CEPS Explainer argues that the ruling Georgian Dream party’s anti-Western rhetoric and democratic backsliding has actually diverted Georgia down a road away from its key Western allies. Until this is rectified, Georgia may be stuck on the waiting list for some time yet. But all hope is not lost – regardless of the government’s current actions and contradictory statements, Georgia’s highly active and pro-European civil society may hold the key in getting their country back on track towards its European future.
Topic:: European Union, Regional Politics, Democratic Backsliding, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Eurasia, and Georgia

242. Understanding Russia’s perception of international agency in the context of the war against Ukraine

Author:: Andrey Makarychev
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has dominated international politics in 2022 and this looks likely to continue for the foreseeable future. But how did we get to this point in the first place? The core argument presented here is that Russian foreign policy agency – the intention and the ability to act as transgressor and challenger to the liberal international order, defined as the space for norms-based multilateralism – played the key role in the full-fledged restart of the war in Ukraine in February 2022. Taking a critical look at the five pillars of Russian agency, this inaugural CEPS Explainer concludes that the current model of Russia’s international agency is a precarious and vulnerable construct that is unlikely to survive the regime currently sat in the Kremlin.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Multilateralism, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

243. Europe’s Area of Maritime Interest in Northeast Asia

Author:: Philip Shetler-Jones
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Participation in the monitoring of UN sanctions on North Korea is Europe’s most prominent operational contribution to Indo-Pacific security, but is also characterised by a fragmented, bilateral approach that contradicts the trajectory of recent European policies that strive for a more meaningful and coordinated investment in this area. A coordinated European presence in the region built around the sanctions monitoring task is within reach, and steps taken to achieve it would dramatically enhance the policy coherence and impact of European action on Northeast Asian security.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, European Union, and Maritime
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, and North Korea

244. Putin vs Monnet: European Resilience, Energy and the Ukraine War

Author:: Nathalie Tocci
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: As the Ukraine war escalates with no end in sight, Europe’s resilience is put to test. Nowhere is this clearer than in the energy sphere, where the crisis first created the perfect timing for Russia’s invasion and then became weaponised against Europe in the broader confrontation with the West. In this confrontation, two interpretations of resilience come to the fore: Vladimir Putin and Jean Monnet’s, with the former emphasising pain endurance and the latter transformation through crisis. The jury is out on whether Putin or Monnet will win the day, and whether and how the European Union will prove and strengthen its resilience. But at the height of this crisis, my bet today is squarely on Jean Monnet.
Topic:: Climate Change, Politics, European Union, Institutions, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

245. The Russian Economy Is Muddling Through the Sanctions War

Author:: Oleg Buklemishev
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The transatlantic campaign of sanctions against Russia after its aggression of Ukraine is unprecedented in scale and scope, involving not only dozens of democratic states but also many non-state actors. It imposes considerable barriers and additional cost to the functioning of the Russian economy, which is bound to undertake deep restructuring with far-reaching consequences for production and consumption processes. The current appreciation of the rouble and inflationary slowdown are not signs of improvement but rather the direct effects of the stabilisation measures undertaken and, in fact, bode ill for further economic development. Numerous problems have started to surface this summer and optimistic assessments on the basis of initial resilience of the Russian economy look premature. Russia currently lacks a strategic plan of economic restructuring under the new environment. The future course of events will depend on whether the private sector leads this restructuring with minimal losses or the government imposes its normative prospective, tilting the result farther from economic equilibrium.
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

246. The Geopolitics of Clean Hydrogen – Opportunities and Challenges for Italy

Author:: Marco Giuli
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The emergence of clean hydrogen as an energy carrier promises to shape the future geography of the energy trade. Under growing contestation of interdependence, such a geography should be read through political lenses alongside commercial and technological ones. Generally, hydrogen is likely to reduce the geopolitical sensitivity of energy trade with respect to a fossil-fuel-based energy order by increasing the share of energy produced domestically, shifting geostrategic competition from a focus on grabbing resources to a focus on mastering technology and setting standards, and offering petrostates opportunities for economic diversification. Italy can exploit the opportunities offered by a hydrogen economy for enhancing its energy security and positioning in the regional energy trade. However, it should be careful with monitoring how geopolitical barriers such as regional instability may affect its hydrogen ambitions.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Trade, Hydrogen, Pipeline, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe and Italy

247. A Scramble for Gas: Qatari LNG and EU Diversification Plans

Author:: Pier Paolo Raimondi
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Amidst a worsening geopolitical and energy crisis in Europe, the EU is scrambling to increase liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports as one component of its larger objective to reduce its overdependence on Russian gas. In 2021, the EU imported 155 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas from Russia (140 bcm via pipeline and 15 bcm of LNG). Under its REPowerEU initiative, the European Commission aims to increase LNG imports to replace 50 bcm of Russian gas by the end of 2022.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Gas, Diversification, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe and Qatar

248. The Implications of the Ukraine War for Israel

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: For Israel, this is evidence that its self-reliance doctrine must be nourished with no illusions about foreign support in times of crisis. Moreover, Turkey probably sees NATO more positively since it borders Russia, pushing Ankara toward the West.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel

249. The “New Uzbekistan”: Turkey’s New Partner in the Pan-Turkist Organization of Turkic States

Author:: Hay Eytan Cohan Yanaroack
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Tashkent’s increasingly critical approach toward Russia and its deepening role in the Organization of Turkic States has positioned the country as Ankara’s most important bridgehead in Central Asia.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and Turkey

250. The differences between Western and non-Western US allies in the Ukraine war

Author:: Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: For mid-level regional powers, avoiding non-essential friction with a major power like Russia is seen as an imperative, particularly in a situation where consistent support from their US patron is by no means a given.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

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