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Begin New Search Topic Arms Control and Proliferation Political Geography Europe Content Type Working Paper Publication Year within 5 Years Publication Year within 10 Years

1. The EU and the Transformed Nuclear Context since the War in Ukraine

Author:
Clara Portela
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces in February 2022 has entirely transformed the European security landscape, bringing war to the European Union’s doorstep. Importantly, the war features a nuclear dimension that manifests itself in consequential ways, including Moscow’s nuclear sabre-rattling and its denunciation of the last surviving nuclear arms control treaty. This unleashed intriguing reactions, like a surprisingly tough resort to sanctions by the EU, or the shrinking of neutrality on the continent. However, while support for nuclear deterrence has increased in some NATO countries, support for arms control remains strong too. Meanwhile, nuclear disarmament advocates have not shifted their stance as a result of the crisis.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, European Union, Nonproliferation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. Everything Counts: Building a Control Regime for Nonstrategic Nuclear Warheads in Europe

Author:
Miles A. Pomper, William Alberque, Marshall L. Brown Jr., William M. Moon, and Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration insisted in arms control talks with Russia that a follow-on agreement to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) should cover all nuclear weapons and that such an agreement should focus on the nuclear warheads themselves. This would represent a significant change from previous agreements, which focused on delivery vehicles, such as missiles. The United States has been particularly interested in potential limits on nonstrategic nuclear warheads (NSNW). Such weapons have never been subject to an arms control agreement. Because Russia possesses an advantage in the number of such weapons, the US Senate has insisted that negotiators include them in a future agreement, making their inclusion necessary if such an accord is to win Senate approval and ultimately be ratified by Washington. In the wake of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine conflict, such demands can only be expected to grow if and when US and Russian negotiators return to the negotiating table.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

3. Will Russia Use Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine?

Author:
Helit Barel
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
One month into the war in Ukraine, the nuclear threat remains. Will Russia’s President decide to use nuclear weapons on the battlefield, and thereby shatter the 77 years of nuclear deterrence? From a rational perspective, there is little likelihood of this occurring, but thus far Putin has not succeeded in realizing his goals in the Ukrainian theater – and Russia has a large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. Arresting Nuclear Adventurism: China, Article VI, and the NPT

Author:
Henry Sokolski and Andrea Beck
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Given the current crisis in Ukraine, it’s tempting to consider focusing on Chinese compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to be an academic indulgence. Giving into this inclination, however, would be a mistake. As dangerous as Russia currently is, China will be more threatening in the long run. As we are learning with Russia’s violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, enforcing binding understandings is critical lest violators run roughshod over law and good order. This is true with Russia’s behavior in Ukraine. It is no less so with China’s nuclear weapons buildup and its repeated refusal to join in good faith negotiations to limit its nuclear weapons activities, which is required by Article VI of the NPT. This buildup and refusal clearly flies in the face of China’s legal NPT obligations. The question is what might bring Beijing back into compliance. To get the answers, NPEC held a battery of workshops last fall, followed by a week-long diplomatic simulation. The game participants included U.S., Japanese, and Australian former and current officials and staff as well as outside experts. The group concluded that Beijing is unlikely to comply willingly with the NPT anytime soon, but that U.S. and international security would still be best served by spotlighting Beijing’s nuclear adventurism and suggesting diplomatic off-ramps to arrest its nuclear buildup.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Peace, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

5. Blockchain Technology: An Innovative Policy Tool for Enhancing Conventional Arms Control and Verification

Author:
Nicolo Miotto
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Blockchain represents an unprecedented opportunity for enhancing conventional arms control (CAC) and verification. Based on the principles of transparency, verifiability, and predictability, this state-of-the-art technology could build confidence and facilitate the implementation of arms control mechanisms. Blockchain-based so-called “smart contracts” have advantageous practical implications for CAC. They could improve the verification of countries’ compliance with their CAC obligations by enhancing monitoring procedures and could strengthen arms export controls by improving treaty signatories’ ability to monitor weapons and ammunition supply chains. Reinforcing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) framework for conventional ammunition control with a permissioned blockchain would provide greater confidentiality and improve monitoring and data verifiability, thus strengthening the OSCE’s CAC regimes.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Blockchain
Political Geography:
Europe

6. Reviewing NATO’s Non-proliferation and Disarmament Policy

Author:
Katarzyna Kubiak
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The global treaty-based nuclear order is running out of steam. The problems facing it are progressively building up, while problem-solving is losing momentum. The search for a “golden key” to address disarmament and non-proliferation in a way fit for the 21st century prompts decision-makers to look for novel approaches. NATO needs to actively shape this newly emerging space. Acting today from within a tight policy and institutional “corset”, the Alliance should strengthen its non-proliferation and disarmament portfolio, and harness its consultative and coordination strengths for agenda-setting, norm-shaping and awareness-raising within the international community.
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and Global Focus

7. Transparency and Reporting on Arms Exports within and from the EU

Author:
Ian Stewart
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The EU’s annual report on arms export control presently lags behind the national reports of many countries. The introduction of a searchable online database will be a substantial step in increasing the user-friendliness of the report. This paper makes recommendations with regard to readability, comprehensiveness and comparability. Perhaps the principal recommendation is that steps be taken to harmonise the data provided under the categories ‘licensed value’ and ‘actual exports’, which are presently not consistently interpreted across the EU. The main argument of this paper is that the EU should move towards using data visualisation to complement the lengthy statistical tables in the annual report and thus make it more readable. The EU and its Member States should also explore opportunities to enhance the data contained in the report to include additional identified data fields, narrative sections to complement the statistical data, and disaggregated data on licence denials. In identifying additional data fields that could be included, the paper also examines the challenges associated with the provision of the data in each case.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Exports, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Europe

8. Nuclear Risk Reduction: Looking Back, Moving Forward, and the Role of NATO

Author:
Wilfred Wan
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In a difficult geopolitical environment marked by increased tensions among nuclear-armed and nuclear-allied states, there has emerged an urgent and widespread call for the implementation of practical measures to reduce the risk of nuclear-weapon use – whether intentional or inadvertent. A concerted effort to take risk reduction forward must address the spectrum of use scenarios by drawing on past activities, building on existing agreements and considering innovative approaches. NATO will have a key role to play, given the nuclear nature of the Alliance and the involvement of its members in strategic and regional competition. Alliance activities past and present can provide insight relevant to the development of multilateral risk-reduction measures. At the same time, in highlighting the dynamism and multi-faceted nature of risk, they underline the scale of the challenge ahead.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Risk, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

9. NATO’s Current and Future Support for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation

Author:
Rose Gottemoeller and Steven Hill
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Times may be tough in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation (ADN). But ADN is by no means dead. This is a moment of opportunity, a chance to look to the future and consider what we should be doing differently to improve the international architecture for ADN in the future. NATO is in the process of considering how it can adapt to continue to be relevant in the changing global security environment. The time is therefore ripe for the Alliance to take on an enhanced role in preserving and strengthening more effective ADN. There are a number of areas in which it can support these efforts. These include specific steps to preserve and implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty, modernise the Vienna Document, adapt nuclear arms control regimes and deal with emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs). NATO should position itself as a focal point for innovation in the ADN area, including promoting advances in verification, improving the multinational sharing and use of data, and advancing dialogue related to outer space.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nonproliferation, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

10. From Critical Engagement to Credible Commitments: A Renewed EU Strategy for the North Korean Proliferation Crisis

Author:
Antoine Bondaz
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile crisis is the most serious proliferation crisis the European Union (EU) and its member states currently face on the world stage. Despite the staging of diplomatic meetings, the threat caused by this crisis to European interests, in terms of proliferation, instability and to prosperity, persists. It is now essential that the EU and its member states move from a strategy of critical engagement to implementing a more proactive strategy of credible commitments in four areas: political engagement, non-proliferation, the implementation of restrictive measures and engagement with the North Korean people. Such a renewed strategy should be highly coordinated, build on the many initiatives already being taken and facilitated by the appointment of an EU Special Representative on North Korea.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, European Union, Disarmament, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and North Korea