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1. The Egyptian Financial Crisis: Implications for the region, and for Israel too

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Egypt continues to play an active role in regional affairs, including the Aqaba emergency meeting on the Palestinian situation (February 26) and the ongoing effort to prevent escalation in Gaza. At the same time, Cairo is in the middle of a significant financial crisis. The effects of the war in Ukraine – specifically, grain shortages – brought the Egyptian pound to more than 30 to the dollar, up from 20 in November and 15 in early 2022, facilitated by deliberate government action in response to demands by the IMF. Inflation still soars, and so does youth unemployment. All this could destabilize a nation of 105 million on our border, with dire consequences.
Topic:
Financial Crisis, Conflict, Fiscal Policy, and Financial Stability
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, Israel, Egypt, and MENA

2. Are Global Value Chains for Sale? On Business-State Relations in the MENA Region

Author:
Nora Aboushady and Chahir Zaki
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
We use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms’ participation in global value chains (GVCs) for six MENA countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). In addition to political connections, we construct several measures of “political influence” based on available data on lobbying and grand corruption. We also explore whether political connections help firms overcome barriers to trade and investment and increase their participation in GVCs at the extensive and intensive margins. Our findings suggest that political connections do matter for firms’ GVC participation. The impact is more pronounced for firms that combine political connections with informal payments to influence policymaking. Our findings on the significance of trade and investment barriers for GVC participation for different categories of firms’ political influence are – however – inconclusive.
Topic:
Corruption, Development, Politics, World Bank, Business, Investment, Trade, and Global Value Chains
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, North Africa, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and West Bank

3. The Security Ghost of the January 25th Revolution in al-Sisi Regime’s Policy toward Gaza

Author:
Shaimaa Magued
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
This study argues that al-Sisi regime has been haunted by the January 25 uprisings as a potential recurrent threat to the state survival during the formulation of national and foreign politics. In the aim of boosting its international legitimacy before Western allies, especially the US, the regime has capitalized on political instabilities in Gaza as a means to ensure its security grip on power without incurring foreign allies’ critics for human rights violations. How did al-Sisi regime mobilize Gaza as a means for bolstering its international credibility before Western bailers and shunning off the January 25 security ghost? In answering this question, this study refers to haunted politics in foreign policy-making as an informative perspective about the impact of traumatic events on ruling regimes’ interpretation of incidents, convocation of memories, recreation of meanings, and subjugation of citizens. Unlike Mubarak’s limited support for the Palestinian cause and Morsi’s exclusive ties with Hamas, al-Sisi adopted a balanced approach toward Gaza in the aim of counterbalancing the US reservations over the regime’s human rights violations since 2013.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Revolution, and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, and Egypt

4. Two are Better than One: The Role of Qatar and Egypt in Gaza

Author:
Yoel Guansky and Ofir Winter
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
The cooperation between Cairo and Doha has grown stronger – a development that until recently seemed nearly impossible. What lies behind the surprising rapprochement, how did it contribute to the swift conclusion of the recent campaign in Gaza, and what are the challenges and opportunities for Israel in light of the new situation?
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, Israel, Gaza, Egypt, and Qatar

5. Egypt and Israel: Renewable Energies for Peace

Author:
Ofir Winter
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Egypt’s intense preparations for the international climate conference that it will host in Sharm el-Sheikh were evident at the World Youth Forum that met there this past January. Many of the conference sessions were devoted to the climate issue, which is currently challenging the international system in general, and Egypt in particular. Cairo’s goal to serve as a regional hub for gas and renewable energies presents an opportunity for increased cooperation between Egypt and Israel – particularly at a time that Europe is confronted with the ramifications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Peace
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, Israel, and Egypt

6. The War on Public Consciousness: Social media as a tool of influence by supporters of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Author:
Michael Barak
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In March issue of BeeHive, Michael Barak analyzes how the Muslim Brotherhood uses social media for influencing public opinion against the Egyptian regime.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Social Media, and Muslim Brotherhood
Political Geography:
North Africa and Egypt

7. Russia invades Ukraine: The economic fall-out and consequences for energy markets

Author:
Paul Rivlin
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In our latest issue of Iqtisadi Paul Rivlin analyses the effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the Middle East and global energy markets.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Economy, COVID-19, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt

8. Retain, Restructure, or Divest? Policy Options for Egypt’s Military Economy

Author:
Yezid Sayigh
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The Egyptian military has been on a dramatic expansionary trajectory since seizing power in July 2013. Having previously been an economic backwater, the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) and other military agencies have spearheaded the enormous state-led investment strategy that President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has pursued since he came to office in 2014. The military controls a vast economic portfolio. It manages a significant share of the overall volume of publicly contracted infrastructure and housing. It builds industrial zones and produces capital goods, consumer durables, transport and heavy goods vehicles and parts, and information technology equipment. It undertakes associated retail, owns commercial media companies and hotels, and is rapidly increasing its stake in agriculture, fisheries, and mineral extraction. As of September 2021, the military even has a monopoly on the production of school meals. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) has formally controlled the use of state land by any civilian individual or entity, whether private or public, since 2001. The Ministry of Military Production (MOMP) is now one of two bodies that approves the import of foreign goods or services by government agencies. Military representatives sit on national boards, including for planning and sustainable development; feed into policy direction in several sectors, including the manufacturing industry, telecommunications, digital transformation, market development for electric vehicles, and rural development; and head major presidential initiatives, including the Long Live Egypt (Tahya Misr) development fund and the company responsible for constructing Egypt’s new administrative capital. Plans are underway to increase the capitalization of military companies by inviting private investment through the Egyptian sovereign wealth fund. What I have called an “officers’ republic”—comprising thousands of senior EAF retirees embedded in government ministries and agencies, regulatory and operational economic authorities, local government, and state-owned enterprises—complements the formal military economy. Military agencies and companies provide significant economic benefits. Military-managed public investment in transport infrastructure, for example, facilitates the movement of people and goods and expands access to external markets and investment opportunities. The construction of social housing for low-income groups addresses a serious shortage and assists government efforts to regenerate the informal settlements and slums where approximately one in seven Egyptians live. New industrial zones and extensive agricultural greenhouse projects attract investors, both domestic and foreign, contributing to economic growth and employment. And lower middle–class customers benefit from the expanding range of locally made consumer goods at affordable prices, alongside cheap meat and poultry imports, subsidized health services, and free food baskets for the poor. Why, then, should Egypt reconsider the military’s role in the economy?
Topic:
Armed Forces, Economy, Business, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, and Egypt

9. Throwing Down the Gauntlet: What the IMF Can Do About Egypt’s Military Companies

Author:
Yezid Sayigh
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Until recently, both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were wholly reticent to say anything about the involvement of the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) and other military agencies in Egypt’s civilian economy. This is a longstanding problem. By turning a blind eye to the diversion of resources to the military sector and to the increasingly significant impacts on the economy and public finances, these international financial institutions (IFIs) have undermined the effectiveness of their own programs and allowed their resources to be invested in support of suboptimal policies by the Egyptian government. There is a question of propriety when international assistance allows distorted policy incentives to continue or even intensify and disregards the fact that much of the hype about global growth in the Egyptian economy obscures the very real constraints imposed on private sector development. It is high time to throw down the gauntlet: IFIs and their governmental sponsors should tackle the reality of military involvement systematically in their programs and policy recommendations, and they should confront the issue head on in their dealings with Egypt’s authorities. Reticence persists but is starting to dissipate. A report released by the World Bank in December 2020 noted that military agencies account for an appreciable proportion of all state-owned enterprises producing capital goods; consumer durables and apparel; materials; food, beverages, and tobacco; automobiles and components; retailing; media and entertainment; semiconductors and intelligent transportation system equipment; and technology hardware and equipment.1 The IMF went further in a July 2021 review of its loan agreement with Egypt, in which it referred to the presence and role of Egyptian military companies for the first time ever.2 Significantly, it included them explicitly in its assessment of state-owned enterprises in general—many of which, the report noted, are “registering weak financial performance while some are benefiting from an uneven playing field”—and implied that military companies should come under the same broad reform policies that the IMF proposes for the public sector as a whole. Now that the IMF, in particular, has broken its former silence, it should refine its approach so as to tackle the Egyptian military’s economic role in a more targeted and consistent manner—hence making its approach more effective and sustainable. This requires a mix of measures. The first set involves bringing military agencies and companies within the scope of recommendations proposed by the IMF for Egypt’s civilian public sector and state-owned enterprises as a whole. These first measures therefore engage with IMF recommendations and Egyptian government policy initiatives relating to broad questions of ownership, regulation, and financing strategy. The second set of measures tackles the specific aspects of the legal, regulatory, and judicial frameworks that enable the military’s activities in the civilian domain. Unless they are revised, these enabling frameworks will impede wider reforms, but the Egyptian government and IMF have, for the most part, neither reviewed nor addressed them to date.
Topic:
Regulation, Economy, Business, IMF, Civil-Military Relations, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and Egypt

10. How Huawei’s Localization in North Africa Delivered Mixed Returns

Author:
Tin Hinane El Kadi
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Trade between China and North Africa has increased significantly since the early 2000s, but it has largely reproduced patterns of unequal exchange. Since they were unveiled, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Chinese government’s 2016 Arab Policy Paper have signaled the promise of a qualitative shift in China’s engagement with the region. China has committed to increase investments in high-value-added sectors and to boost cooperation in science and technology with countries across North Africa. The digital space is a notable aspect of recent China–North African partnerships. Chinese tech firms are becoming ever more important actors in North Africa through the Digital Silk Road, the digital component of the BRI. North African governments see the Digital Silk Road as an opportunity to help bridge the digital divide and bolster their own national efforts to build digital economies and create high-quality jobs for the millions of unemployed university graduates across the region. In recent years, the region has become home to notable Digital Silk Road projects such as smart cities, satellite navigation centers, data centers, and network infrastructure. Huawei’s localization strategies in Algeria and Egypt show that, far from imposing a one-size-fits-all blueprint on other countries, as Beijing is often depicted as doing in U.S. and European media and policy discussions, Chinese tech players adapt their engagement depending on local development agendas. Flexibility, customization, and services tailored to local demand have been cornerstones of Huawei’s localization strategies in North Africa. Accommodating local development priorities is central to Huawei’s success in globalizing its business ventures. The Chinese firm has responded favorably to Algeria’s and Egypt’s attempts to leverage foreign companies for conducting more value-added activities within their respective economies. Among other things, Huawei opened its first African factory in Algeria, employing Algerians to assemble products for and beyond the Algerian market. It also launched an OpenLab for conducting research and development (R&D) activities in Egypt and established partnerships with several universities in the region to train local students. However, closer scrutiny of Huawei’s localization in both Algeria and Egypt indicates that the company improved its brand image without engaging in meaningful capacity building. For all its success at winning the hearts of government officials across the region, Huawei has engaged in training, manufacturing, and R&D in a way designed to maintain the firm’s technological edge. The Chinese tech giant has managed to localize seemingly developmental activities in North Africa without contributing much to technological upgrading. North African governments should take lessons from China’s playbook of how it became a technological superpower. This means adopting policies that could maximize the benefits of Chinese and non-Chinese investments by ensuring positives spillovers and protecting potential local tech champions. Increasing economic integration across North African countries and moving beyond fragmented bilateral commercial negotiations with China are two steps that may help level the playing field with the Asian giant.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Telecommunications, Huawei, and Digital Space
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Algeria, North Africa, and Egypt