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132. On China's Commercial Reprocessing Policy
- Author:
- Hui Zhang
- Publication Date:
- 07-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- China is currently operating eleven nuclear power reactors with installed capacity of 9 GWe, and it plans to increase its total nuclear capacity to 40 GWe by 2020. China is seeking to reprocess the civilian spent fuel, and to recycle the plutonium in MOX fuel for its light water reactors (LWRs) and fast breeder reactors (FBRs). A pilot reprocessing plant with a capacity of 50-100 THM/a is ready to operate now. A larger commercial reprocessing plant and a MOX fabrication plant are expected to be in commission around the year 2020. Also, the China Experimental Fast Reactor (CEFR), capable of producing 25 MWe of power, will be operating soon. Furthermore, larger commercial FBRs are planned to be commissioned around 2030-2035. This paper will first discuss the status of China's nuclear power reactors, breeders, and civilian reprocessing programs. In addition, this paper will examine whether the breeders and civilian reprocessing programs make sense for China, taking into account costs, proliferation risks, energy security tradeoffs, health and environmental risks, and spent fuel management issues.
- Topic:
- Security, Energy Policy, and Environment
- Political Geography:
- China
133. China's Myanmar Dilemma
- Publication Date:
- 09-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- Each time global attention is focused on events in Myanmar, concerned stakeholders turn to China to influence the military government to undertake reforms. Yet simply calling on Beijing to apply more pressure is unlikely to result in change. While China has substantial political, economic and strategic stakes in Myanmar, its influence is overstated. The insular and nationalistic leaders in the military government do not take orders from anyone, including Beijing. China also diverges from the West in the goals for which it is prepared to use its influence. By continuing to simply expect China to take the lead in solving the problem, a workable international approach will remain elusive as Myanmar continues to play China and the West against each other. After two decades of failed international approaches to Myanmar, Western countries and Beijing must find better ways to work together to pursue a wide array of issues that reflect the concerns of both sides.
- Topic:
- Security and Economics
- Political Geography:
- China, Israel, Beijing, Asia, and Myanmar
134. Beyond Market Forces: Regulating the Global Security Industry
- Author:
- James Cockayne, Emily Speers Mears, Alison Gurin, Iveta Cherneva, Sheila Oviedo, and Dylan Yaeger
- Publication Date:
- 07-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Peace Institute
- Abstract:
- In late 2008, seventeen states, including the US, UK, China, Iraq, Afghanistan, and others, endorsed the Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict (2008). This provides important guidance to states in regulating private military and security companies (PMSCs). However, there is a need to do more, to provide increased guidance to the industry and ensure standards are enforced.
- Topic:
- Security, Globalization, Markets, International Security, and Financial Crisis
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, United States, China, Iraq, and United Kingdom
135. Risky business? The EU, China and dual-use technology
- Author:
- May-Britt U. Stumbaum
- Publication Date:
- 10-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Union Institute for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- This paper argues that it is high time for the European Union to adopt a proactive policy of managing the risks of sensitive technology transfer to the People's Republic of China (PRC). On the basis of a common understanding of the challenges of transferring dual-use technology, economically, politically and security-wise, the European Union can optimise benefits from opportunities available in the promising and technologically rapidly advancing Chinese market.
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Science and Technology
- Political Geography:
- China and Europe
136. Global security in a multipolar world
- Author:
- Radha Kumar, Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Andrei Zagorski, Paulo Wrobel, Feng Zhongping, Robert Hutchings, Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, and Luis Peral
- Publication Date:
- 10-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Union Institute for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- This is the second Chaillot Paper in a series exploring the various strands of a global topic: multilateralising multipolarity. Through the essays collected in the first study, we set out to assess the scope of change in the international system and how EU action could best be suited to bringing about a multilateral order. After the fall of the Berlin Wall brought about the end of bipolarity, the world has changed no less dramatically since the 1990s witnessed the Balkan wars and the first EU military crisis-management operations. Basically, the post-Cold War 'unipolar' world turned 'multipolar', and as a result the West can no longer tackle global issues – made more pressing indeed due to this very transformation – on its own any more than it can deal single- handedly with regional crises. The comparative analysis of the strategic vision of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, the so-called BRICs, showed that the best policy mindset for the European Union, contrary to some suggestions, was not to try to become a normal hard-power player. It further concluded that, in a multi- polar world, this was simply not a viable option. For the European Union to survive and to influence the outcome of the international order, it must succeed in giving a multilateral dimension to the current multipolarity; in other words, Europe must be able to define together with other world and regional powers the norms and rules that are needed to drive concerted efforts to stay clear of some future clash of competing unilateralisms.
- Topic:
- Security, Globalization, Intelligence, and Regional Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, India, and Brazil
137. Muddling along with Missiles
- Author:
- Dongho Jo
- Publication Date:
- 07-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- On April 5, 2009, North Korea carried out a rocket launch. North Korea argued that it was a satellite launch vehicle rather than a warhead-carrying ballistic missile, and portrayed the launch in innocuous and civilian terms, even naming the rocket “Unha,” which means “Galaxy” in Korean, to emphasize its space-oriented function. However, most nations, including Japan, South Korea, and the United States, suspect that these words were only a cover for a test of North Korea’s long-range missile technology. In addition, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on May 25, followed by several launches of short-range missiles from its east coast. Furthermore, North Korea test-fired four short-range missiles on July 2 and additional seven missiles on July 4, despite the United Nations Security Council’s unanimous adoption of Resolution 1874 on June 12, condemning North Korea’s hostile activities in the strongest possible terms. Why has North Korea gone ahead with its provocative actions in the face of serious opposition from most of the outside world? To date, analysts have focused on the political aspects of the missile launch. They speculate that its purpose was to push the United States toward bilateral dialogue or to pressure the South Korean government to return to its more positive stance known as the “sunshine policy.” Others argue that the launch was meant to strengthen leadership’s weakening hold inside the country and to ensure its dynastic line of succession. All of these explanations are plausible, and North Korea, of course, may have had multiple goals. But observers seeking to understand the North Korea’s actions are missing one critical component: the economic factor. The North Korean economy was in very poor shape in the 1990s and is still experiencing difficulties. This economic hardship, however, has not only been evident in recent decades but had already begun in the early 1970s, mainly due to lack of capital. Since then, the country’s top economic priority has been to determine how to encourage foreign capital to help the North Korea escape from economic shortages. One alternative pursued since the mid-1990s has been to develop the missile program as an effective means of earning foreign exchange. Understanding the part played by the economic situation in North Korea’s decisions about its missile program is the purpose of this brief article.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Space, and Missile Defense
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea
138. Prospects for Change in the Beijing-Pyongyang Nexus
- Author:
- Sukhee Han
- Publication Date:
- 12-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- Having detonated its first nuclear device in October 2006, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. Having consistently attempted to dissuade the North from such tests, China has been infuriated by the North’s defiance of Chinese advice and interests. Immediately after the 2009 test, China released a statement almost identical to the one it announced in the wake of the 2006 test. Beijing’s unprecedented wrath and “resolute opposition” to Pyongyang’s unmannerly behavior had been clearly expressed in the 2006 statement. In the 2009 statement, the Chinese government “strongly demands” that Pyongyang abide by its non-nuclearization commitments, “stop actions that may lead to a further deterioration of the situation,” and “return to the track of the Six-Party Talks.” Furthermore, China’s subsequent vote in favor of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, which was designed to impose tougher sanctions on the Pyongyang regime than its previous resolution passed in 2006, seemed to indicate that China may implement a strategic shift away from North Korea and may also increase its strategic cooperation with the international community in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. Witnessing China’s stern behavior toward the North, some China watchers in Washington and Seoul have argued that North Korea’s second nuclear test, along with a series of other provocations in the first half of 2009, which included a rocket launch and a complete withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks, have prompted China to reconsider its long-standing policy of amity toward North Korea. In contrast to its traditional policy, China since the 2009 nuclear test has not hesitated to make it clear in its official statements that North Korea has become a liability than a strategic asset, and that it was not satisfied with North Korea’s arbitrary behavior threatening the stability of the Korean Peninsula. Remarkably open discussions about North Korea have also been permitted in the Chinese academia and media. In the debates, some Chinese analysts have criticized their government for its failure to get tough with North Korea; others have also advocated for Beijing to take a firmer stance toward North Korea. These debates seem to be a departure from the traditional brotherly attitudes many Chinese have shared concerning North Korea, and also serve as convincing reasons for many experts to argue that China may change its policy toward North Korea. At the same time, however, China has made clear that it intends to continue its traditional policy of friendship toward North Korea. U.S. foreign policy circles have frequently commented that the Chinese leadership has become increasingly angry at the Kim Jong-il regime, especially in the wake of the second nuclear test, and that Beijing is willing and able to use its leverage to pressure Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons program. In contrast, however, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, during his visit to Pyongyang to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of PRC-DPRK(People’s Republic of China-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) diplomatic relations, reassured North Korea of its economic patronage by providing a number of economic measures for expanding China’s economic exchanges with the North. Furthermore, the recent visit of Liang Guanglie, China’s defense minister, to North Korea has also consolidated the Sino–North Korean military alliance. His avowal of “China’s willingness to have closer military contacts with the DPRK” must have provided more confidence for the North Korean leaders in dealing with post–nuclear test reactions. Given this situation, that China’s national interest concerning North Korea has been the maintenance of peace and stability is reconfirmed. On the one hand, in order to keep Pyongyang from further undermining peninsular security, Beijing has resolutely opposed North Korea’s provocations. China’s statements have emphasized its diplomatic pursuit of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and have also underscored that China, as a great power, acknowledges that it shares responsibility for preserving regional order and stability. On the other hand, China still places more importance on the maintenance of the status quo, in the sense of supporting the North Korean regime itself. China has exerted much more effort on behalf of the North’s survival than on behalf of its denuclearization. While China has in principle supported the UN economic sanctions on the North, it has never been sympathetic to the implementation of realistically effective sanctions. In facing Kim Jong-il’s presumed health concerns and subsequent contingencies in the North, however, China has realized that the status quo on the Peninsula cannot always guarantee regional peace and stability. Given that the demise of Kim Jong-il himself is relatively imminent and certainly inevitable, China has to adopt a new approach to North Korea. China’s chief concern is to strengthen its economic and military grip over the North with the intention of keeping the regime afloat and its leadership under China’s control even after Kim Jong-il has passed from the scene.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and North Korea
139. U.S.-China Cooperation on Nuclear Power
- Author:
- John R. Lyman
- Publication Date:
- 07-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- In 2007, the Atlantic Council of the United States (the Council) partnered with the U.S./China Energy and Environment Technology Center (EETC) at Tsinghua and Tulane Universities to hold a series of dialogues to foster cooperation between the United States and China on developing secure and sustainable energy supplies. Over the past several years, the Council and EETC have invited key organizations, experts from industry and government, and representatives from relevant United States (U.S.) and Chinese government agencies to become directly involved in several meetings designed to identify concrete recommendations for increasing official governmental and industry cooperation.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Nuclear Power
- Political Geography:
- United States, China, and Asia
140. Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament
- Author:
- Cristina Hansell (ed) and William C. Potter (ed)
- Publication Date:
- 03-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- Abstract:
- Today two key nuclear powers, China and Russia, stand at the crossroads of nuclear policy: both Beijing and Moscow are reassessing their nuclear policies and postures. The decisions they make will affect their negotiating positions for years to come; therefore, now is the time to engage both countries in discussions about deep nuclear reductions that could ultimately lead to the elimination of their arsenals. Such actions will contribute to reaching “nuclear zero”—the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons—an idea that was the focus of two recent opinion articles coauthored by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, who stressed the necessity of “turning the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a practical enterprise among nations.”
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Political Geography:
- Russia and China